Y 4, IN 8/16: IR 1/4
104th Congress
2d Session
1
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE
THE UNITED STATES ROLE
IN mANMN ARMS TRANSFERS TO
CROATS AND BOSNIA
("THE IRANIAN GREEN UGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE")
REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APPROVED: OCTOBER 10, 1996
WITH MINORITY VIEWS
SUBMITTED: OCTOBER 26, 1996
DECLASSIFIED PURSUANT TO LETTER DATED DECEMBER 20, 1996
FROM WILLIAM DANVERS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (NSC)
'*fr sv
mm
m 1 g f997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives
^^^^^s^^ I INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
nNAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT SUBCOMMiniE TO INVESTIGATE
THE UNITED STATES ROLE
IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS
TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA
C^THE IRANIAN GREEN UGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE^')
WITH MINORITY VIEWS
HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN
LEE H. HAMILTON, RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER
REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 10, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
37-510 CC WASfflNGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054070-4
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS
HENRY J. HYDE, minou. Chairman
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Ranking Democratic Member
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska HOWARD L. HERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
JAN MEYERS ^ Kansas
Richard J. POCKER, Chief Coungel
John I. MILUS, Staff Director
Richard MELTZER, Minority Chief Counsel
Michelle Maynard, Minority Staff Director
^Representative Sam Brownback (RrKS) was initially chosen to serve on the Select Sob-
oonunittee. Congresmonal scheduling, however, truncated his service. Full Committee Chairman
Benjamin A. Oilman appointed Representative Jan Meyers (R-KS) to satisfy the Subcommittee's
complement of RepubUcan members.
(II)
X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20S04
December 20, 1996
(U) TKis letter responds to the Select Subconmiittee' s request,
contained in letters from Chairman Hyde of October 11, 1996, and
Mr. Hamilton of October 15, 1996, that the executive branch
review for classification the Subcommittee's majority and
minority reports. The final version of the majority report was
provided on October 23. The final version of the minority report
is dated October 25. Supplemental information to these reports
was provided subsequent to both final reports being received. On
November 6, the executive branch also received from Chairman Hyde
a request to review for classification a 26-page letter to the
Department of Justice signed by the Republican members of the
Select Subcommittee. As these letters correctly note the reports
are lenqthy (approximately 600 pages) and contain a great deal of
classified information.
(U) In response to these requests NSC staff distributed these
materials to designated representatives of the Departments of
State, Defense, including component elements, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. In order to maximize knowledge, save time,
and in the interest of the addressing the majority and minority
reports at the same time, the executive branch treated these
requests as a single request. Classification/Declassification
experts from each of these entities have now coii^>leted their
review by portion marking each paragraph and footnote.
Additionally, we have bracketed the specific portions of the text
that are classified within each marked paragraph or footnote.
(U) The executive branch reviewed the document for classified
infonnation only. The executive branch review did not address
the substantive content of these documents. Neither does this
letter. Further, this declassification review does not
constitute concurrence in the public release of any declassified
information enclosed.
__^_ Sue to the length
voluminous nature of the classified material contained in them.
Including sources and methods of intelligence that directly
(III)
IV
Inform and provide for the safety of U.S. forces in Bosnia, the
executive branch is not in a position to offer substitute
language. _This would require rewriting the majority of both
reports
(U) Executive branch review of the letter to the Department of
Justice referenced above, indicated that one sentence on page 18
could reveal an intelligence source or method. With the
inclusion of this sentence, the letter would be classified TOP
SECRET/GAMMA. With the deletion of this sentence, the letter
would be unclassified. The "classified attachment* to the letter
should be marked TOP SECRET/GAMMA.
(U) The text of this letter is also being sent to Mr. Van Dusen.
Sincerely,
William Danvers
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for
Legislative Affairs
Mr. Patrick Murray
Professional Staff Member
Committee on International Relations
Room 2170 RHOB
Washington, D.C. 29515-6128
Enclosure: a/s
CONTENTS
SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND
Page
Chapter 1: Origins and Phirpose of the Select Subcommittee 1
The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press 2
The Congressional Response 11
The Genesis of the Select Subcommittee 15
Chapter 2: The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Early Years of the Balkans
War 18
Chapter 3: The Public Policy of the Clinton Administration on the Bosnian
Arms Embargo: Denial and Deception 23
The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of Assertive Multi-
lateralism 23
International Political Reality: The Europeans Say "No" 25
Denial of the Iranian Green Light Policy 34
Chapter 4: The Public Policy of the Clinton Administration on Iran 40
Recognition of the Problem: Iran 40
The Policy Response to the Iranian Threat 41
SECTION TWO: THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDINGS
Chapter 5: Conduct of the Subconmnittee Investigation 44
Testimony 44
Acquisition of Classified and Non-Classified Federal Government Docu-
ments 46
Chapter 6: Administration Record of Cooperating with the Select Subcommit-
tee 48
Agency Compliance 49
The Prospect of Subpoenas 62
The Adnunistration's Classification Game 63
Chapter 7: The Investigation by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board . 65
Origins of the lOB Investigation 65
Conduct of the lOB Investigation 67
Findings of th» lOB 69
Limitations of the lOB Report 71
Chapter 8: Evolution and Implementation of the Iranian Green Light Policy ... 75
No Question: "We Have a Policy" (1991-April 1994) 76
The Question is Orchestrated (July 1993-April 1994) 80
Getting Acquainted
Without Our Fingerprints
The Question is Posed 92
Fishing in Troubled Waters
The Home Office Fails to Distinguish Itself
"Exactly Where We Want to Be*^
"Mine Shaft Canary"
"Hunker Down"
"Walk it Back"
Chapter 9: Allegations of U.S. Officials Facilitating Iranian Arms Shipments . 137
[XXXXJOOOCX] Missile Episode 139
Tuzla Mysteiy Flights 145
Chapter 10: The Iranian Green Li^t and Covert Action 147
Introduction 147
Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Covert Action 147
Application of Covert Law 154
An Invitation to More Restrictions? 156
Noncooperation in Congressional Investigative Functions 158
V
Pag«
Chapter 11: Conflicting Testimony and Questions to Be Resolved 159
SECTION THREE: POLICY RAMIFICATIONS
Chapter 12: The Green Light and the Iranian Foothold in Europe: Part
I— Croatia 161
The Bush Administration's Refusal to Open the Door to Iranians 162
The Iranian Green Light and the Growth of Iranian Influence and the
Terrorist Threat in Croatia 164
Chapter 13: The Green Light and the Iranian Foothold in Europe: Part
n— Bosnia 172
Before the Green Lu^t 172
After the Green Light 174
The Green Light and the Dayton Accords: An Expedient Becomes an
Impediment 179
Chapter 14: The Legacy of the Green light in Bosnia, Today and Tomorrow ... 188
Diminishing Hopes 188
Izetbegovic and the Radicalization of the Muslim Political Leadership 189
The Iranian and Foreign Radical Islamic Presence and Influence Toaay ... 194
The Iranian Green Light and the Future of Bosnia: Worrying Signs 199
SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 15: Conclusions 200
APPENDICES
A. Budget, Biographies, and Acknowledgments 211
B. Correspondence 219
C. Chart Detailing Detected Islamic Arms Donations and Purchases Flown
to Croatia for Transshipment to the Bosnian Muslims — May 1994 — Decem-
ber 1995 (SECRET)
— Ambassador Peter Galbraith's Memorandum to the File — May 6, 1994
(redacted)— (UNCLASSIFIED) 220
MINORITY VIEWS 223
vn
IBKHJUnUeHh
' MO*AM>LiaMAH
Congress of the United States ^h*™**
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
&bc> SaksmmittM ea t&< Vtutti Sutta Role in
trMMum Ami Trausfen to Croatia atdBotnU
Washington, D.C 20515
Novembar 7, 1996
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
21 70 Raybum House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with H.Res 41 6 (f). directing the Select Subcommittee to transmit
a report to the Committee on International Relations not later than six months after the
date of the Resolution, please find enclosed a copy of the Select Subcommittee's
Report, together with Minority Views. The Report was approved by the Select
Subcommittee during an executive session on October 10, 1996.
I urge the Committee to review the Report carefully for matters that the
Committee may wish to pursue further in the next Congress. I also believe the
Committee should continue the Subcommittee's efforts to get the Executive Branch
to declassify as much as much of the Report as possible without endangering
legitimately classified information. Assuming the Administration is reasortable in its
approach to declassification, it would be of particular value to the American people if
the Committee were able to work from the redacted classified version to prepare a
revised, unclassified version for public release.
Sincerely,
(UndasiKled when detached froni Classiflad Report)
SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1
ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE
On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page article by James Risen
and Doyle McManus that led with the sentence:
Presidfcnt Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms
shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that
the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own policy
of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of tenorism, according to senior
Administration officials and other sources/
This article was the first of several extraordinary articles that spelled out in detail, o.io with
what turned out to t>e excellent sourcing, a |x>licy decision that the Clinton Administration
had carefully guarded for two years - forbidding reference to it in writing, denying it to the
press, deflecting Cortgress, hoodwinking allies, and even trying to keep it secret from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secretary of Defense. The
decision came to be referred to by higher ranking Administratkin officials as the "wink and
nod,* the blind eye,* and other terms, but the one that seemed to have stuck was given
near the time of the decisnn's inceptnn by one of its intellectual authors: the 'green light.'^
The articles authoritatively spelled out the advantages Iran had reaped from the
green light policy, the confusion it had caused within the Executive Branch, and the other
policy options that had been overlooked or rejected by the Administratbn as being too
difficult
The congressksnal response was one of incredulity. Members were shocked to
learn that the Administration had chosen to give Iran an unprecedented foothokj in an
extremely unstable and vulnerable part of Europe. It was equally disturbing that for two
years the Administratkm had purposely hkJden from Congress, US allies, and the American
people its highly questionat)ie, major US poTicy shift
* James Risen and Doyle McManus. US. Qk'd Iranian Arms for Bosnia. QffirJals
Say. Los Angeles Times. Apr. 5. 1996. at 1 .
' First used in writing by US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith on May 12.
1994 in a Memorandum for the File (hereinafter 'Galbraith Memorandum*).
(1)
There had been occasional press reports before that might have exposed the policy,
earlier, however. Congress continued to believe the Administration's denials of the Iranian
green light policy. Congress found it unlikely that the Administration would adopt such a
policy that was inconsistent and incompatible with the Administration's well-known and
vigorously championed policies regarding the former Yugoslavia and Iran. Also, given the
long-settled US policy of isolating Iran both economically and politically, Congress refused
to believe that the Administration could have such bad judgment as to invite Iran, the
world's largest exporter of terrorism, into Europe, much less into an area so ripe for
fundamentalist exploitation as the Balkans.
The thought was that the Administration would surely inforni Congress if it intended
a major policy shift towards Iran and Bosnia. In retrospect. Congress cannot be blamed
for presuming to trust the Administration's trijthfulness, consistency, and strategic acumen.
In any case, when the story of the green light policy broke in April 1 996, there were
calls from both houses of Congress for an investigation; since then, several committees
have looked into the issue, emphasizing aspects relevant to their specific areas of
oversight. For example, both intelligence oversight committees - the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - have
examined the green light policy with an emphasis on its intelligence-related issues. Also,
on May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416, establishing a select subcommittee
of the House Intemational Relations Committee and gave it a broad charter to investigate
all aspects of the policy and implenientation. This sutxnmmittee, the Select Subcommittee
to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (also
known as the 'Iranian Green Light* Sut)committee) conducted an extensive investigatren
of the green light policy over the ensuing months and presents its findings and
recommendations in this report.
The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press
As early as May 1994, allegations began to surface that Iran, with some sort of US
complicity, was covertly transferring weapons to Bosnia, despite a United Nations (UN)
amts embargo on the former Yugoslavia. Each time the Administration issued denials of
US complicity and managed to keep the story in the botUe.*
* The Administration's polk:y of denial and deceptk>n on this issue is outlined in
detail in Chapter 3.
Unfortunately for those seeking to maintain the cover-up. James Risen and Doyle
McManus of the Los Angeles Times became aware of these hidden policy missteps. From
April through July 1996, they wrote a series of thirteen investigative articles exposing the
missteps with incredible detail to large numbers of well-placed Administration officials who
were willing to speak to them on a 'not for attribution' basis/
Because the Risen/McManus articles played such an important role in uncovering
the green light policy and its consequences, their findings are summarized below.
Background
The Clinton White House was not the first Administration to face the question of
Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia through Croatia, but its response was the opposit<=> of
* The following is a chronological listing of the Los Angeles Times (hereinafter
"LAT") articles:
Risen and McManus. US Qk'd Iranian Arms for Bosnia, LAT, Apr. 5, 1996, at 1.
Risen, Administration Defends Its QK of Bosnian Arms, LAT, Apr. 6, 1996, at 1.
Risen, Gingrich Criticizes Clinton Over Bosnia, LAT, Apr. 11, 1996, at 12.
Risen and McManus, US Envoy May Have Aided Arms Convoy to Bosnia, LAT.
Apr. 17. 1996, at 1.
Risen and McManus, US Didn't Anticipate Wider Iran Bosnia Role. LAT. Apr. 23.
1996. at 1.
Risen, Administration Defends Bosnian Arms Policy. LAT, Apr. 24. 1996, at 17.
Risen and McManus. Study of Other Bosnian Amns Sources Told, LAT, Apr. 26.
1996. at 22.
Risen and McManus. Democrats Join Critics of Bosnia Amns Secrecy. LAT, May
2. 1996, at 1.
Risen and McManus. Terrorist Risk to Americans In Croatia is L inked to Iran.
May 21. 1996. at 1.
Risen. Ex-Envoy Says Iran-Bosnia 1 ink Was Worth Risk. LAT. May 22. 1996. at
1.
Risen. Clinton Defends Arms-to-Bosnia Policy, LAT. May 24. 1996, at 26.
Risen. US CquM Have Stifled Arms to Bosnia, Envoy Says. LAT. May 31. 1996.
atl.
Risen and McManus. US Had Opttons to Let Bosnia Get Amns. Avokl Iran. LAT.
July 14. 1996. atl.
the prior administration's. In September 1992, the Bush Administration discovered that
Iran was attempting to smuggle arms on board a 747 airplane to Bosnia through Croatia
in violation of the arms embargo and, according to former Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger. "raised hell." The Administration acted decisively and had the 747 and the
weapons seized. According to Secretary Eagleburger, "We made it very clear that we were
adamantly opposed to this going on. There was no question in the Bush Administration
of where we were on this subject."*
Throughout the presidential campaign of 1992. Governor Clinton forcefully and
repeatedly criticized President Bush for his consistent enforcement of the arms embargo
and called for the United States to arm the Bosnians. The new Administration, upon taking
office in 1993, found itself hamstrung. Unfortunately for President Clinton, the same policy
constraints that faced President Bush ~ unwillingness on the part of the American public
to commit troops and allied opposition to lifting the embargo -- equally applied to him. By
the spring of 1994, Clinton's fmstrations were at a peak.*
While Clinton felt compelled by circumstances to follow President Bush's much-
criticized path, Iran was also chafing under the policies of containment consistently
followed by the Bush Administration and, until the green light policy, under President
Clinton. Iran's radical Islamic government was eager to increase its influence in the
Balkans and saw the West's refusal to provide weapons to the Bosnian government as an
opportunity. Though Iran had smuggled a small, insignificant amount of weapons to the
Bosnian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Bosnian Croats and
Muslims, 'A was their subsequent truce and creation of the Bosnian Federation that set the
stage for Clinton's green light policy decisions.
The Proposal
On April 27, 1994, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic entered the US embassy
in Zagreb with a potentially exptosive request: Would Washington accede to Croatia's
plans to accept Iran's offer to open up a weapons pipeline from Iran into Bosnia? The
Croatians were split over the question, having yielded to the Bush Administration's
demands in 1992 that weapons shipments be stopped, and were seeking instnjctions.
Granic was giving the US advance notice that Croatian Presklent Franjo Tudjman planned
formally to ask US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith how the United States would
• LAT. A|)f. 5. 1996.
• LAT. July 14. 1996.
respond to new arms shipnnents from Iran. Granic himself was against the idea, a minority
view in the Croatian government, but was following his orders to seek Washington's
reaction.
Ambassador Galbraith had been impatient with the Clinton Administration for not
doing nrK>re to aid the Bosnian cause, and was strongly in favor of the US allowing the new
arms shipments. Risen noted that Galbraith had earned his reputation as an activist as a
staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had sometimes rankled the
career officials within the US government in his efforts to expand his role as the first US
Ambassador to Croatia. It is clear that Galbraith supported the pro-weapons pipeline
faction within the Croatian government, the most prominent member being Gojko Susak,
Croatia's Defense Minister and Tudjman's right-hand man.'
Though the Administration thought the green light decision "obvious" and
insignificant at the time, a senior US diplomat would later acknowledge that the pipeline
probably would not have been established if the United States had opposed it forcefully."
Peter Galbraith would later testify. * I can say that had we in a very, very forceful way made
it clear that we would not tolerate the flow of arms to the Bosnians, they probably would
not have done it When we did not object, they proceeded to go ahead and do it."*
The Decision
While most diplomatic exchanges require days, if not weeks or months, to
coordinate and yet, this request for instructions reached President Clinton in a matter of
hours. The first recipient of the cable was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander
Vershbow, who refen^ the question to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who were travelling with Clinton to Nixon's funeral
in Yorba Linda, California.
Talbott and Lake agreed on the solution: Do nothing. Galbraith was to give the
coded response of 'no instructions,' whk:h wouM tell the Croatians that the US would not
act to stop the shipments. Lake asked for 20 minutes of Preskient Clinton's time and was
ushered into Clinton's office atx>ard Air Force One. James Risen described the meeting
'Id.
•LAT. May 31. 1996.
•Id.
as follows: 'Lake ran [the President) through the pros and cons and said, This is our
recommendation . . . ." And he said 'yes' a senior ofTicial recounted. There was little
discussion and no serious debate. It seemed like 'an obvious choice.' the official said."^"
No other officials even at the highest levels of the US government were consulted
before the green light was given to the Iranian arms transfers. In addition, the Central
Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to protect national security by evaluating information
on political and military developments abroad, was never offlcially notified of the policy."
As a result of this closed and truncated decision-making process, US offidals would
later admit they gave little thought back in 1994 to the chance that Iran's political and
military presence would grow in Bosnia as it did. A senior Administration official would
concede they did not focus on the problem until the prospect of US troops going in was
raised in 1995."
The Alternatives
For the first two weeks following the breaking of the story, the Administration spin
was that "there were no altematives" to allowing the Iranian arms transfers, and that the
decisk>n was "obvious." Further research showed, however, that far from being forced"
into approving the arms transfers, the White House had actively rejected multiple calls for
having nations friendly to the United States supply weapons to the Bosnians. The
Administration rejected these equally effective alternative means of arming the Bosnians
even though they would have negated the chance of increasing Iranian influence in
Bosnia."
The first such suggestion was made by Richard Holbrooke several nrtonths after the
green light decision. In the fall of 1994. Holbrooke sought a legal opinion from State
Department attorneys asking what diplomatic approaches to friendly nations coukj t>e
made without triggering US covert action laws requiring Congress to be notified.
Holbrooke thought that the unequal battlefield conditions feced by the Muslims in Bosnia
'• IJ^T. July 14. 1996.
''id.
" LAT. Apr. 23. 1996.
" LAT. July 14. 1996.
could be eased if friendly nations would covertly supply the weapons with American
encouragement.
When news of this proposal reached the upper levels of govemment, Holbrooke was
rebuffed. According to Risen, Anthony Lake thought the idea was "too risky,' and
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was also opposed." Indeed, Risen would write
that, 'senior administration officials opposed Holbrooke's plan because they feared that
covert smuggling by friendly nations woukl make it too obvious the United States was
encouraging the violation of a UN arms embargo against Bosnia.'**
In a July 1996 article. Risen and McManus would document other altematives to the
failed green light policy that were rejected by the Clinton Administration. They would note
that at least three times between 1993 and 1995, discussions were held about asking
friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to move weapons and
support to the Bosnians. The nxxjel for such aid existed before in the 1980s when Saudi
Arabia served as the conduit between the US and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.
Galbraith hinjgelf had suggeste^^ using friendly intermediaries in late 1993. He
reportedly asked theMHHHBBiplin his embassy how much it would cost to begin
Lcovert operqtipn to'aid the Bosnians, wondering if $250 million would be enough.*' The
jVwas surprised by the request, advise^jGalbraith that §ych an actkjn would
be illegal without formal authorization, and wamedf^WM^WWpn Washington that
Galbraith was thinking along these lines, /^i^ ^' -
The Consequences
Among the negative consequences of the green light policy and how it was
implemented, as kientified by Risen arKl McManus. are the confusion it caused within the
US government, the resultant iiKrease in Irania.n influence in the former Yugoslavia, and
concerns that, beneath the Administratkxi's obfuscatk>n of the polk:y. there may have been
an Illegal covert actkm.
A. Policy ConfiiskMi
"Id.
" LAT. Apr. 26. 1996.
" LAT. July 14. 1996.
8
There was considerable confusion among Administration officials throughout the
whole process. Very little time elapsed and even less thought took place from the time the
original query was made to Galbraith until Lake met with the President on Air Force One.
Even after receiving the "no instructions' instruction, Galbraith himself was still unclear
what action to take. According to Risen, Galbraith called Jenonne Walker, the National
Security Council's chief European expert, who told him Lake had indicated he was to stick
to "no instructions," but she added, Tony was smiling when he said it.""
Not only were other appropriate agencies of the US government not consulted, they
were not advised of the decisk^n once it was made. NQJlber the CIA nor the Pentagon
were informed of the policy change. Accordingly, the j^PIHIBHIIB^in Zagreb
continued to be under the impressbn that the official policy of the United States was to
support the arms embargo, the same positk)n which Assistant Secretary of State Talt>ott
would also lead CIA Director James Woolsey to believe was still valkj. The CIA continued
to collect informatkjn on embargo busting and became increasingly mystified at the US
government's unwillingness to act on that intelligence. The CIA woukj never be informed,
and, as the evidence grew tfiat Oirecto^VV^plsey had been deliberately kept in the 6atk,
he resigned in December 1994.
B. Increased Iranian Influence
The most troubling consequence of the green light policy was the resultant
exponential expansion of Iranian influence in Bosnia. Risen's sources helped him paint
the folk>wing assessment of Iranian influence before and after the green light
Western intelligence agencies detected several hundred militant Muslim
guerillas from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in Bosnia as eariy as
1992. offictals sakl, including several "Afghanis," veterans of the CIA-funded
war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But these were largely
ragtag volunteers, with no readRy apparent command and control from Iran
or anyone else.'*
In 1994. however, a different kind of Iranian was showing up in Bosnia, officials said:
. . . military and dvflian advisors who appeared to have been sent i>y the
"Id.
'• l-AT. Apr. 23. 1996.
Tehran government on well-defined missions. Some were military trainers
who taught the Bosnians how to use the wire-guided antitank missiles Iran
was shipping, one source said. Others helped with logistics and with
weapons factories, according to the Bosnian government.^*
Ambassador Galbraith himself noted that the difference was like night and day.
'Certainly what was being talked about in April 1 994 was something very substantially
greater"^ than what had been shipped by Iran previously. Risen would elat>orate:
From May 1994 to January 1996, the Iranians shipped more than 5,000 tons
of arms to Bosnia through the Croatian pipeline. They provided the largest
portion by far of Bosnia's military hardware - two thirds by official US
estimates. The Iranians delivered mostly small arms and equipment,
including rifles, ammunition, and uniforms but also antitank weapons and
shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles - weapons that could threaten
aircraft, including US aircraft
Other countries 6id supply weapons to Bosnia without US encouragement
But Iran was the largest supplier by far. By early 1995 the Iranian flights
were landing as often as three times a week. The arms pipeline was
managed largely by the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's militant Islamic shock
corps, operating out of the Iranian embassy in Zagreb. Other Revolutk>nary
Guard officers moved to Bosnia to serve as military advisors and trainers.
The Bosnian Government's intelligence servk:e and intemal security forces
soon had Iranian advisors too. To both secular Bosnians and US intelligence
analysts, this was a worrisome trend: creeping Iranian influence in what once
had been a multiethnic, secular state.^
The former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had himself worked in
the Balkans for several years as a US diplomat, declared the increase in radical Islamk:
support in Bosnia as a major bksw to the national security of the United States. He referred
to it as the height of insanity. We are inviting Bosnian-Islamic connections with a terrorist
'•Id.
"l-AT.May31.1996.
'^ LAT, July 14. 1996.
10
state that wishes us as much damage as they [sic] can possibly inflict upon us."'^
Of even nnore concern to the United States and the families of American servicemen
deployed in Bosnia is the terrorist threat that materialized in Bosnia under the green light
policy. Risen gave two examples in his articles of the increase in the terorist threat, but
alluded to having more information than he reported.
In February 1995, NATO troops raided a "ten-orist training school" at which they
arrested eight Bosnian and three Iranian "diplomats,' who quickly invoked diplomatic
immunity and flew back to Iran. Items seized in the raid included bomb devices within
shampoo bottles and children's toys and a training video showing how to ambush a car on
an open highway and to kill its occupants.^
In an even more ominous sign, American embassy officials in Zagreb and Croatia
became aware in 1995 of suspected Hizballah (Party of God) members stalking embassy
personnel and their families. Suspected Iranian terrorists were seen with video cameras
recording Americans as they came and went. Officials feared that an attack was imminent
and one official confirmed the terrorist threafwent right up the scale to levels you would
see in preparation for an attack."'*
C. Possible Illegal Covert Action
The final consequence of the Administration's giving the green light to the Iranian
arms pipeline was the chance that actions taken by US government officials crossed the
legal line from what the Administration terms as passive, i.e., 'no instructions,* to a
concrete act which might reasonably be constnjed by foreign officials as an invitation to
conduct covert action. Under US law, covert action is illegal unless it has been authorized
by the President and reported to Congress.
According to Risen's sources, there were two instances when Administratk>n officials
came objectively dose to the legal line. The first case occurred in May 1994 vAren Special
Envoy to the former Yugoslavia Charles Redman intervened with senior Croatian
government officials to expedite the movement into Bosnia of a blocked convoy that is
" LAT. Apr. 5. 1996.
** LAT. Apr. 23. 1996.
Ml
LAT. May 21. 1996.
11
believed to have carried arms to the Muslim government troops. Redman claims to have
never asked whether arms were being carried, but US officials now acknowledge that
questions could be raised whether the Administration had gone beyond passive support
for the Bosnian cause and taken on a more active role.^^
The second case occurred in September of 1 995 when a shipment of Iranianl
missiles bound for Bosnia was detained in Croatia because the Croatian govejgment
nervous that the missiles were tipped with chemical warheads.'* Experts fror
the US Army rapidly moved to inspect the missiles, determined that they were not (
chemical or biological warheads, and then permitted them to be delivered into Bosnia.''
Some US officials wer^^ncemed that in this action the US had directly violated the UN
arms embargo.'^! '
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) was secretly commissioned on
November 29, 1994 to investigate the green light policy and to determine if any covert
action laws were violated. The lOB's classified report sharply criticized the Administration
for excessive secrecy but determined that notification of Congress was not necessary. The
Administration's actions, according to the lOB. fell within the category of traditional
diplomatic activity." exempt from US covert action laws."
The lOB investigation had the potential to put the matter to rest, but raised
questions of its own. Moreover, the White House, even after receiving the report, failed
to advise Congress of the green light policy. What made the situation worse in the minds
of many in Congress was the decision by the Administration in April 1996, after the story
was out. to bar lOB Chairman Anthony Harrington from sharing the report with Congress
or testifying about it under oath." Suspicions were heightened.
The Congressional Response
*LAT,Apr. 17. 1996.
" LAT. July 14. 1996.
"LAT, May 21, 1996.
»ld.
»ld.
* LAT. Apr. 17. 1996.
12
The congressional response to the revelations alx3ut the green light affair was
strong. Senior Democrats joined Republicans in denouncing the Clinton Administration's
failure to consult with or notify Congress of the important change in policy towards Iran and
the arms embargo. It was only this wellspring of bipartisan condemnation that prompted
the Administration to admit that it should have consulted Congress. Undersecretary of
State Peter Tamoff acknowledged that he was unaware of any congressional notification,
and an Administration ofTicial admitted that "there is a growing understanding in the
Administration that in terms of Congress, this could have been handled better.""
In the two years between when the green light policy went into effect and when it
was uncovered, there had been innumerable meetings between Members of Congress and
senior Administration officials discussing policy options on lifting the arms embargo on
Bosnia. The failure of the Administration to mention the green light policy in any of these
discussions can only be intentional.
A week after the green light decision was made, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott
responded to a lengthy list of specific questions on Bosnia that had been submitted by
Republican Senator John Warner. In his letter to Senator Warner, Talbott warned that
lifting the embargo, as many favored in Congress, could lead to an increased Iranian
presence in Bosnia. Taltx>tt did not mention that he had just taken part in a policy decision
that would bring Iranians streaming into the region."
In midsummer 1994. Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Sam Nunn met with Charles Redman, then chief US negotiator in the Balkans,
to discuss ways of aiding the Bosnian cause. Redman failed to mention the fact that the
Administration had already made the green light decision. "I don't ever recall anybody in
the Administration telling me anything attcut that," noted Nunn after the cover-up came to
light in 1996." Senator Nunn later reflected on the Administration's keeping Congress in
the dark, "It seems to me the question is whether Congress should have been informed.
not so much as a matter of taw but as a matter of comity." ^ In response. Ambassador
»'LAT. May2. 1996.
«ld.
»ld.
13
Redman could only say, "It never came up."'*
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, speaking on the floor of the Senate, observed:
While we read and heard reports that Iran was smuggling arms to the
Bosnians, we did not know the President and his advisers made a conscious
decision to give a green light for Iran to provide arms. Indeed, those of us
who advocated lifting the arms embargo ~ Republicans ana Democrats -
argued that if America did not provide Bosnia with assistance, Iran would be
Bosnia's only option. "
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott offered another response in defense of the
Administration: Since the press was reporting on Iranian arms shipments. Congress was
properiy informed. Democratic Senator Robert Kerrey sharply rebutted the argument. "Do
you think. Mr. Secretary . . . that Congress getting its information through what really was
half a dozen newspaper accounts in 1994 constitutes knowing more or less what you
knew?"*^ Senator Ken^y also observed that for Congress to do its job properly, it must be
kept informed by the Executive Branch, particularly in the area of foreign policy. "Certainly.
you don't want us reaching a conclusion every time we pick up the newspaper or hear a
news account of something temble going on and knee jerk, particularly when its a foreign
policy question."''
Dde).
Id.
142 Cong. Rec. S 3445 (No. 49. Apr. 17. 1996) (Statement of Sen. Robert
'^ Hearing on US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia Before
the Senate Selert Cnmmittee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. (May 28. 1996). Sen.
Kerrey also addressed this issue In the first SSCI Hearing on the Iranian Arms
Transfers: *. . . The Washington Times talks about a wink, that there were discussions
in the press, that we're aware as well as the consequences of our having changed the
law to say that we're not going to enforce that embargo, that doesn't mean that we were
informed, that the committee was informed of a change in policy * Hearing On
Iranian Arms Shipments tr> Rnsnia Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
104th Cong. (May 21. 1996).
** Hearing nn Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia Before the Senate Select
Committee on IntalligenrA, 104th Cong. (May 21. 1996).
14
House Speaker Newt Gingrich described the chilling effect the cover-up of the green
light has had on trust between the executive and legislative branches of government:
Never did Clinton indicate the Administration had given a green light to
Iranian arms smuggling .... If you have been told face to face by the
President of the United States for three years that you can't help the
Bosnians and now you learn after all these face-to-face meetings that they
were encouraging the Iranians, giving the Iranian arms shipments a wink and
a fKxJ, then how do you walk into the next meeting and believe what you are
being told?^»
Throughout, the congressk^nal reactions to the uncovering of the green light policy
was outrage that the Administration had given Iran, the rogue state most actively hostile
to US interests around the world, a sanctioned foothold in Europe from which h could
launch terrorist campaigns against US personnel across Europe. Congressman Henry
Hyde, for example, warned that the policy had to be examined and could not remain
'buried behind classified documents.' He was of the view that "the introductbn of the most
radical nation in the worid . . . into the Balkans in force with weapons to give them a
foothold in that most volatile part of the worid is incredible folly.' He wondered, as many
have since, why the Administration had not chosen readily available and far nmre palatable
means of assisting the Bosnians, means that would not endanger the safety of the
American people. There were some dozen countries,' Hyde explained, that could
reasonably be asked to provide weapons for the Bosnians - not Iran."*"
A strong majority in Congress was also incredulous that the Administration would
violate its own declared policy of containing Iran in favor of inviting the radical terrorist
regime into the Balkans. Congressman Christopher Cox would speak for many when he
denounced the Administration's decision to give the green light. "This policy was
absolutely insane,* he noted. 'Giving Iran a foothold into Europe .... That's what this
policy is about. "^^ In particular, a great many Members of Congress would express their
concern over the increased terrorist threat to US and NATO troops resulting from the
"•LAT. Apr. 11. 1996. at 12.
*° Hearing on US Policy in Bosnia Before the House International Relations
Committee. 104th Cong. (Apr. 23, 1996).
*' Risen. House Qk's Panel to Prohe Anms to Bosnia. Los Angeles Times. May 9.
1996. at 5.
15
expanded Iranian influence in Bosnia, a threat the Administration chose to overlook.
Yet, not all Members of Congress, particularly in the House, were upset by the
revelation of the green light policy. Congressman Alcee Hastings spoke for many of them
when he publicly thanked Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman for their efforts in putting
together the green light policy:
A central criticism of the "no instructions" policy that you two gentlertien have
testified here about allows that, according to some, it permitted the
dangerous military and intelligence penetration of Bosnia by Iran.
Yet we know just from using open, public sources, the United States
decisions in April of 1994 dk) not give Iran a beachhead in Bosnia; Iran and
other Muslim countries were already there. And I might add for historians
and the buffs of history, Islam has been involved in the Balkans since fights
with the Ottoman empire, if we just want to go back into K . . . . And any
Congressperson that did not know all of that, that serves on the Committee
on International Relations, was not doing his or her job."**
The Genesis and Charter of the Select Subcommittee
The controversy over the secret green light policy culminated in calls for legislative
investigations. The House of Representatives' Committees on International Relations.
National Security. Intelligence, and Judiciary began investigations probing the
Administration's green light policy in April and May of 1996. At the urging of his Senate
colleagues. Senate Majority Leader Dole called upon the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign
Relations. Intelligence. Armed Services, and Judiciary Committees for parallel
investigations.
During initial hearings hekj by the House Intemational Relatk>ns Committee, many
questions were raised that demarKJed further examination:
• Was the US government directly or indirectly involved in the executk)n of the
transfer of Iranian anms, and dkj any of the Administration's actions violate
US law?
" Hearing on US Policy in Bosnia Before the House International Relations
Committee, 104th Cong. (Apr. 23, 1996).
16
• Where did the idea of an Iranian pipeline originate and with whom?
• Why were Congress, the CIA and other government agencies. US allies, and
the American public not notified of this decision when it was made or in the
nearly two years until the policy was exposed by the press?
• And. why did the President allow the world's most dangerous terrorist state.
Iran, to provide arms and establish a foothold in Europe when other friendly
nations were willing to help?
In an effort to consolidate the investigations of the four House committees and to
further examine these questions, the House leadership and the International Relations
Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman announced a proposal to establish a Select
Subcommittee to investigate the United States' role in the transfer of arms from Iran to
Bosnia and Croatia during the period when the international arms embargo was in effect.
On May 8. 1996. the House approved Resolution 416 which created the Select
Subcommittee within the International Relations Committee. The Subcommittee is
composed of five Republican Members and three Democrat Members, and is chaired by
Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, with Lee H. Hamilton as the Ranking Minority Member.
The Select Subcommittee was given the authority to investigate the following areas:
• The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of
arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or
entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
during any period that an intemational arms embargo was in effect;
• The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran
or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period that an intemational arms
embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect;
• Any actions taken by the United States Government to fadlitate or to impede
such transfers;
• Any communication or representations made to the Congress of the United
States or the American people with respect to the intemational arms
emttargo or with efforts to modify or terminate United States participation in
that emt>argo;
17
• Any implications from the Iranian amis transfers for the safety of United
States armed forces deployed in or around Bosnia, for relations t>etween the
US and its allies and for United States efforts to isolate Iran;
• And all deliberations and communications between the United States
Government and other govemments, organizations or individuals relating to
such matters.
The Sut)Commrttee's charter ends on November 8. 1 996. by which time tt is to have
transmitted its report to the House Intemational Relations Committee. Given its short life-
span and limited resources, the Subcommittee has attempted to address as many of the
key questions as possible. What follows are the results of the Subcommittee's
investigations.
18
CHAPTER 2
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND THE EARLY YEARS OF THE BALKANS WAR
The events discussed in this report mainly occurred during and after April 1994. To
understand these events, hov/ever, it is necessary to have a basic familiarity with the
political developments in the former Yugoslavia prior to that date.
The autocratic aile of Yugoslav dictator Tito after World War II suppressed but did
not eliminate the strongly divergent and divisive ethnic and religious tensions that have
existed for hundreds of years between the various peoples living within the borders of what
was Yugoslavia. These rivalries reemerged after Tito's death in 1980, and the centrifugal
pull of ethnic identities led to inceasingly bitter arguments over the scope and powei$ o:
the central govemment. Unable to convince Sertiia and Montenegro that a loose
confederation was a viable alternative to the existing SertxJominated govemment,
Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991. Further
complicating the situation, several Sertxiominated regions of Croatia declared
independence from the new republic.
The central Yugoslavian govemment based in Belgrade, Serbia promptly declared
the Slovenia and Croatia secessions 'illegal and illegitimate" and sent the Yugoslav
Peoples' Army (YPA) to restore control over the breakaway regions. Hostilities broke out
when the Croatian and Slovenian forces refused to lay down their arms. The fighting
continued until the Brioni agreennent was finalized in eariy July 1 991 .
The Brioni agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in exchange
for a three-month suspension of the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia.
The YPA soldiers began immediately to withdraw from Slovenia, where the Slovenian
irregulars had t)een able to hokj their own. Despite the agreement, however, the fighting
continued within Croatia t>etween the newly independent republic and the Krajina Serbs
backed by the YPA forces.
In September 1991. the UN Security Council, through Resolution 713. enacted a
general and complete arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia to try to temper the
conflict. In Octot>er 1991. the three-nfK>nth moratorium on secession elapsed, and the
govemments of Stovenia and Croatia formally separated from the former Yugoslavia.
Germany recognized both countries as sovereign nations in December 1991. The
European Community (EC) followed suit in January 1992.
19
As Slovenia and Croatia were leaving the former Yugoslavia, a more bitter and
protracted conflict was developing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 14, 1991, the
National Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed, by majority vote, a memorandum on
sovereignty and independence which stopped just short of declaring outright
independence. The following December 21st. the Bosnian Serbs held an unofficial
referendum declaring their opposition to withdrawing from the withering Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). and local Serbian leaders proclaimed their independence
from Bosnia.
Following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat citizens
voted for independence in a March 1992 referendum. The Serbs boycotted. On April 6, the
EC recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following day, the US
recognized the nations of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lifted the
economic sanctions against the >hree republics.
The Bosnian Serb minority vigorously opposed the withdrawal of Bosnia-
Herzegovina from the mmp SFRY that was rapidly becoming a de facto Serbian state. The
Bosnian Serbs withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina into their self-proclaimed "Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
Fighting between the Serbs and the Muslinrvdominated Bosnian govemment
ensued. The Bosnian Serbs soon seized more than two-thirds of the Bosnian republic's
territory and began the siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs managed their successes despite
the fact that, according to a 1991 census, they comprised only 31 percent of the
population, with the Muslims and Croatians having 44 and 17 percent, respectively.^ Two
key reasons the Bosnian Serbs gained such an advantage over the Bosnian Muslims so
quickly were that the withdrawing YPA relinquished its large arsenal of weapons to the
Bosnian Serb forces as it withdrew and that the YPA soldiers with a Bosnian Serb
background stayed behind to become a formidable part of the new Bosnian Serb officer
corps.
While the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims were fighting, the Bosnian Croatians were
^ According to the Congressional Research Service, the eight percent of the
population unaccounted for in these percentages comprises various other ethnk:
groups, none of which number more than 1 percent of the total population. Additionally,
the 1991 census aflowed a "Yugoslavian' response for individuals of mixed parentage
(5.5%) and others who declined to identify themseh/es as belonging to only one ethnic
group.
20
working to consolidate their positions in western Bosnia in their desired mini-state, Herceg-
Bosnia, which they would proclaim in July 1992. The Bosnian Croatians, much like Croatia,
would change sides in the Bosnian conflict as the circumstances affected their interests,
supporting the Muslim government at this time, then later moving towards the Bosnian
Serbs, until shifting again towards the Muslim government when the 1994 Washington
Accords established the Bosnian Federation.
On May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 757. The resolution
condemned the SFRY's defiance of UN demands that it cease its interference in the affairs
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and placed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia until it fulfilled rts obligations under Resolution 752. Resolution 752, which was
passed two weeks earlier on May 1 5. called for an end to the fighting in Bosnia, elimination
of influence and forces from both the YPA and Croatia, and respect for the territorial
integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Notwithstanding the UN's efforts, the war continued into the summer. In August
1992. representatives from over 30 countries and nongovemmental organizations met in
London at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to bring about a
negotiated end to the fighting. The London Conference, co-sponsored by the EC and the
UN, named Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance co-chairmen of the EC-UN steering
committee. The Conference affirmed the principle that intemational boarders should be
changed only by mutual consent, and called for a cease fire, access to detention camps
(by intemational organizations such as UN High Commission on Refugees or the Red
Cross), and the protection of human and minority rights. Unfortunately, the London
Conference, like the resolution before it. had little effect on the violence on the ground.
Finally, on August 31. Cyrus Vance announced that all parties had already violated the
terms of the Conference, including the cease-fire, which they had approved just days
eariier.
The Geneva Peace Conference was held the following month, for the purpose of
developing means of implementing the ksfty principles declared by the LorxJon Conference.
The Geneva Conference, urxler the co-chairmanship of Vance and Owen, established six
working groups focusing on the nrx^st pressing issues confronting the former Yugoslavia:
Bosnia-Herzegovina, confidence-building measures, humanitarian issues, economic
problems, mirwrity rights and various othpr legal issues.
21
Croats, who shut it down. The Iranians wece forced to return to their small-scale arms
Croats, who shut it down. The iranign^wete
smuggling and training efforts. '^^OTT^^
In October 1992. negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen advanced their plan (the
"Vance-Owen" plan) to settle the conflict. Their plan was to establish a decentralized state
with seven to ten autonomous provinces defined by economic and geographic, rather than
ethnic, criteria. The Bosnian Serb leadership promptly rejected the plan the following day.
In response to the Bosnian Serbs, Vance and Owen reworked their plan several
times, and in January 1993 the Bosnian Croats approved the measure. The Bosnian
Muslims followed suit in March. On May 2, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic
signed the plan under intense pressure by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Two
days later, the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the plan, and the Vance-Owen process
was finished.
There was no hiding the viciousness of the fighting. Genocide was frequently
alleged by the combatants and. as the worid discovered more and more about the
atrocities toeing inflicted by all sides, the Security Council passed Resolution 808 in
February 1 993. establishing the War Crimes Tribunal. In support of the Resolution, the EC.
the UN staff and the US State Department submitted reports documenting the crimes of
systematic rape, murder, mutilation, deportation, illegal imprisonment, and "ethnic
cleansing' by all parties.
All three sides committed a great many atrocities during this conflict upon
Innocents, but it appears the Bosnian Sert>s were the most egregious in their violations of
human rights. It was the Bosnian Serb leadership that set the war aim of creating an
ethnically "pure" and geographically contiguous greater Serbia by (seemingly) any means
necessary. Unfortunately, it will be future historians who will have to render a more
complete accounting of the genocide which occurred.
In May 1993, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned of a "new aggression' by
Bosnian Croatians, and relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians steadily
worsened. As the fighting intensified around the city of Mostar and throughout central
Bosnia, both sides engaged in atrocities and 'ethnic cleansing' to solidify gains made on
the battjefield.
Also that May. the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824, which
declared that Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzia, Gorazde. and Zepa should be treated
as 'safe areas* and that all Bosnian Serb military units should withdraw from those areas
at once. The Security Council foHowed up this declaration on June 4, 1993 with Resolution
22
836 extending the mandate of UN Protection Forces and authorized measures, including
use offeree, to protect these "safe areas.' By February of 1994, the situation on the ground
had become intolerable for the NATO leadership as the Bosnian Serbs oven-an Srebrenica
and Zepa and besieged and shelled the others, creating appalling humanitarian conditions.
Serbian actions had made a mockery of the term 'safe area.'
The catalyst for increased international action came when a mortar shell landed in
a crowded Sarajevo market on February 5. 1994, killing 68 and wounding over 200
civilians. The following day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lifted his
opposition to air strikes and asked NATO Secretary General Manfred W5emer to seek
permission from the North Atlantic Council to secure a heavy weapons exclusion zone
around Sarajevo. President Clinton supported the Secretary General's call for air strikes
should more vralence against civilians occur. On April 10, the NATO Alliance, in its first
offensive action since its founding, launched air strikes against Serb positions which had
been shelling Gorazde relentlessly. A second strike the following day helped bring the
Bosnian Serb advance to a halt, although the Sert)s maintained control over a large
percentage of the territory acquired in their advance.
The Serbs had also been put on less advantageous terms by the Washington
Accords reached the month before, in March, between the Bosnian Muslims and the
Croats. The Accords set up a Federation which, in addition to relieving military pressure
on the hard-pressed Muslims, put the Serbs in a difficult strategic situation. The Croats
were now freed up to begin preparatk>ns for a major offensive to retake the Krajina, and
the Muslims were able to shore up their defenses and keep other Bosnian Serb units
engaged elsewhere in Bosnia.
This was, in brief, the situatk>n in the regbn in April 1994, when Iran again sought
to interject itself into the war on a large scale.
23
CHAPTER 3
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
ON THE BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO - DENIAL AND DECEPTION
This chapter will examine the Clinton Administration's public policy on the UN arms
embargo on Bosnia. Starting with the formulation of the Iranian green light policy in April
1994, the actual policy became very different from what the Administration represented it
to be in its statements to Congress, the press, and the American people. As is discussed
in Section II of this report, where the development and implementation of the Iranian green
light policy are discussed at length, the Administration went to extraordinary lengths to
keep Its diplomatic duplicity under wraps. Senior Administration officials were intent that
there should be no US fingerprints.' In the public realm, this went beyond the usual
practice of offering "no comment' on allegations of US covert activity; instead.
Administration officials from the President on down lied.
Some have criticized the Clinton Administration for a lack of consistency in foreign
policy. While this charge coukl be leveled at several aspects of its Balkans policy, it would
largely be unfair in describing the Administration's public record on the Bosnian arms
embargo.
Regarding the embargo, the Administration consistently expressed its opposition to
the embargo while also consistently stating its unwillingness to take unilateral action to lift
it. The concept of unQateral actk>n by the US was fundamentally inconsistent with the
'assertive multilateralism' that became the centerpiece of the Administration's foreign
policy. Assertive multilateralism rests on a high regard for the UN as an instrument of
foreign policy, a professton of the moral obligation to follow the spirit and letter of
international law. arHJ the imperative of multilateral cooperation. In its public statements
about the arms embargo, the Administration never deviated from the positk>ns necessitated
by these principles, despite the fact that the Administratk>n leamed within days of taking
office that assertive multilateralism effectively tied its hands in working to lift the embargo
it t>elieved to be against US interests. It was this quandary that would, in April 1994, lead
the Administration to subvert the embargo clandestinely through third parties, specifically
Iran and Croatia.
The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of "Assertive Multilateralism"
Although foreign poikry was not a centerpiece of Bill Clinton's preskJential campaign.
Bosnia was an exception. Candklate Clinton condemned the Bush Administration's polk^
of nonintervention, "The continuing bkxxlshed in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia
24
demands urgent international action It is time for real leadership to stop the continuing
tragedy in the former Yugoslav republics.** He expressed confidence that, as president,
he could define a policy, working jointly with other countries and the UN, that would stop
the fighting and lead to a peace settlement. "We will make the United States the catalyst
for a collective stand against aggression, the action I have urged in response to Serbian
aggression in Bosnia.'^ He provided some specificity in the first presidential debate in
October 1992:
I agree that we cannot commit ground forces to become involved in the
quagmire of Bosnia or in the tribal wars of Somalia. But I think that it's
important to recognize that there are things that can be done short of that,
and that we do have an interest there .... I think we should stiffen the
embargo on the Belgrade govemment, and I think we have to consider
whether or not we should lift the arms embargo now on the Bosnians, since
they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on
"ethnic cleansing.* We can't get involved in the quagmire, but we must do
what we can.^
And, as Governor Clinton would repeatedly stress, "what we can do" meant what we can
do in tandem with others, that is to say, within the framework of assertive multilateralism.
As might be expected, consklering her key role in implementing multilateral foreign
policy, US Ambassador to the UN and cabinet member Madeleine Albright became one
of the preeminent public advocates of assertive multilateralism. As she has explained it,
the US has three roles it can play internationally: "world cop," "ostrich," or "partner," and
the Clinton Administratk>n prefers the role of partner. As Ambassador Albright explained:
The fancy word is 'multilateral.' but the ordinary word is 'partner.' I fully
believe it is my job at the U.N. and the job of all of us within the foreign poficy
structure to put an adjective with the partrier - senk>r. managing, leading,
whatever way you want to phrase it So the tenn assertive multilateralism
comes from having a leadership role within a multilateral setting to deal with
* Clinton Campaign Statement on Crisis tn Bosnia. US Newswine. July 27. 1992.
' Governor Bill Clinton. Address at the Los Angeles Worid Affairs Council (Aug.
13. 1992).
' Governor Bill Clinton. Address in the Presklential Debate (Oct. 11. 1992).
25
the problems that we have to deal with/
Bosnia, for the Clinton Administration, is exactly such a problem; one of those many
occasions when, in the words of George Stephanopoulos, "we need to bring pressure to
bear on the belligerents of the post-Cold War period and use our influence to prevent
ethnic and other regional conflicts from erupting. But usually we will not want to act alone
— our stake will be limited and direct U.S. intervention unwise."'
The weeks leading up to the inauguration in January 1993 saw the start of new UN-
sponsored diplomatic talks on Bosnia in New York. These talks fed the hopes of the new
Clinton foreign policy team, anxious to exercise its policy of multilateralism, as well as the
hope of an American populace sickened by the viciousness of the fighting.
The heady days of transition brought forth within the new Administration
declarations of major reviews of Bosnian policy altematives and the strong desire for
"improved" options.' Nonetheless, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, these
deliberations inevitably led back to Clinton's policy as declared in the election campaign.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking in January 1993 said, "I would stress, as
President Clinton has, starting last August, that it [Bosnia] does seem to be a place where
the United States needs to be activist and internationalist in our outlook."'
International Political Reality: The Europeans Say "No"
Yet, once in office. President Clinton found the Bosnian problem much more
complex and intractable than he anticipated as a candidate. Despite the rhetorical
flourishes and talk of change, practical changes in the policy from that of the Bush
* Hearing on US Participation In United Nations Peacekeeping Activities Before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 103d Cong. (June 24,1993).
* Thomas W. LIppman, African Crises Test Limited US Government; Pressure
Builds for More Direct American Intervention as Five Nations Suffer Strife, Washington
Post. June 13, 1993. at A33.
* Carol Giacomo. Clinton to Review Bosnia Policy. Including Lifting the Arms
Ban. The Reuter Library Report. Jan. 22, 1993.
^ Alan Eisner. US Looking at Option of Bombing Bosnian Serb Airfields, The
Reuter Library Report. Jan. 27. 1993.
26
Administration were difficult to discern. Leaving the new Administration's first Bosnia policy
review. Secretary Christopher counseled the press to "lower expectations," particulariy "in
terms of timing."' Where candidate Clinton had been calling for "urgent" international
action, President Clinton was now urging caution:
The thing I have not been willing to do is to immediately take action, the end
of which I could not see. I want to do - whatever I want to do, I want to do
it with vigor and wholeheartedly. I want it to have a reasonable prospect of
success, and I have done the best I could with the cards that I found on the
table when I became President.'
Given the President's desire to act "w\\h vigor and wholeheartedly," it was still not
clear what he wanted to do. Yet. it was also clear that he did not know what it was he
wanted to do. Some criticized the Clinton Administration for lacking the political will to
enact a policy change. Democratic Congressman Frank McCioskey accused the
Administration of being an accomplice in genocide in Bosnia, stating that "when it comes
to real action to get the arms embargo lifted from the Bosnian Government, the
administration opts out."'" It is probably rrwre accurate to say, however, that the lowering
of Presidential sights came at)Out as the Administration realized that rt had painted itself
into a comer by advocating an end to the arms embargo but surrendering the only vehicle
by which the embargo could be lifted - namely, unilateral action by the US. Simply put.
neither the UN (the Clinton Administration's preferred multilateral mechanism) nor other
intemational bodies were willing to go along with lifting the embargo. That left the
Administration without a vehicle it thought acceptable to implement the changes in Bosnian
foreign policy it believed to be in the national interest.
In the first few months of the Administration, the UN, in particular, turned out to be
an unlikely forum for a fresh approach. In addition to the UN Security Council being the
body that put the embargo in place, the new Clinton Administration found itself in the
uncomfortable position of being unwilling to subscribe fully to the ongoing UN-sponsored
' Carol Giacomo. Naw Secretary Fypftrts No Quick Dftdsion on Bosnia. The
Reuter Library Report. Jan. 28. 1993.
• President Bill Clinton, Questk>n and Answer Session With the Natkjnal
Associatk>n of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 1, 1993).
'* 139 Cong. Rec. H4262 (No. 93. June 29, 1993) (Statement of Rep. Frank
McCioskey).
27
Vance-Owen plan it felt would have effectively partitioned Bosnia. For an administration
that placed heavy emphasis on the UN and multilateralism in foreign policy, this was not
a comfortable situation. Secretary Christopher tried to step around the problem during a
trip to the UN in February 1993. saying that the US supported the "process" without
necessarily supporting the results." Two days later, using locution that would later
become the hallmark of the Iran green light policy. White House spokesman George
Stephanopoulos said President Clinton "does not have any specific support or rejection"
oftheUNplan.'^
Some commentators have strongly attacked the tenets of the Clinton
Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism. Steven Ertanger. in the New York
Times, called it "a formula for action that seemed to make the UN the only source of
legitimacy for the use of force to keep the world secure," and Peter W. Rodman of the
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, declared that for multilateralists "Ameri'^an
unilateralism was the principal sin to be avoided, as if to atone for a shameful past."'' It
was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, however, who most astutely identified the
inherent weakness of assertive multilateralism. The policy, he said, resigns the US to a
belief that "the national interest is on the whole defined by the attainable global
consensus."" This tumed out to be the reef on which the Bosnia policy foundered.
Although the Administration wanted to lift the arms embargo as it applied to the Bosnian
Muslims, it was unable to lead its global "partners" into a consensus to do so - and to act
unilaterally would require the Administratk>n to violate the philosophical cornerstone of its
foreign policy.
The Administration quickly leamed that the Europeans, in particular, were unwilling
to yield on the fundamental question of lifting the arms embargo. Fighting in eastem
Bosnia intensified, and in April 1993, the Serbs, in a much-reported offensive, moved to
^* Donald M. Rothberg, Clinton's Biggest Headache is in Europe. The Associated
Press, Feb. 3, 1993.
12
Id.
" Stephen Erianger, The US and the UN; Now, Who Needs Whom More?, The
New York Times, July 7, 1 996.
" Hearing on US National Goals and Objectives in International Relations in the
Year ?00Q and Beyond Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 104th
Congress (July 13,1995) (emphasis added).
28
capture the town of Srebrenica. President Clinton spoke of his outrage at the fighting. "I
condemn it and I have condemned it repeatedly and thoroughly. And I have done
everything I could to increase the pressure of the international community on the outrages
perpetuated in Bosnia by the aggressors and to get people to stand up against ethnic
cleansing."'* The Europeans, however, had refused to go along, and, without their
support, the US simply did not have the votes in the Security Council to overturn the
embargo. More importantly, though, as President Clinton would repeatedly point out in the
years to come, even "if we did. it would endanger the humanitarian mission there carried
on by the French and British who oppose lifting the embargo."" Despite the Presidents
outrage, he steadfastly refused to permit unilateral US actions. Behind this all there
continued the dnjm-beat of keeping US policy within the boundaries acceptable to the UN.
As Secretary Christopher declared, "whatever we would do, we would do multilaterally and
we would want to do it with the full concun-ence of the UN. We would not try to take any
shortcuts in the matter."^^
President Clinton's press conference on April 23, 1993, illustrated the in-econcilable
tension between US national interests and the Administration's allegiance to assertive
multilateralism. On the one hand, the President stated vigorously about Bosnia. "I think
we should act. We should lead - the United States should lead." Yet. a few minutes later,
in response to a pointed question about multilateralism "hamstringing" US foreign policy,
he conceded his Administration's abdication of policy-making to the UN. The United
States, even as the last remaining superpower, has to act consistent with international law
and under some mandate of the United Nations.""
On May 6. 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan,
which the Administration had finally come to support. The Administration renewed its call
for multilateral lifting of the embargo against Bosnia. Then Secretary Christopher traveled
to Europe on an ill-fated mission to win the support of Britain and France. His charter.
evidenUy. was not broad enough to allow him to negotiate the issue forcefully. Later,
" President Bill Clinton. Question and Answer Session With the National
Association of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 1, 1993).
IT
' Alan Eisner. Clinton Has Fbw Options on Yugoslavia. The Reuter Library
Report. Apr. 22, 1993 (emphasis added).
'• President BHI Clinton. Press Conference (Apr. 23. 1993).
29
Secretary Chrisopher would admit that ttie effort had been a mistake. "The way that I
made the trip to Europe in May 1993 was not consistent with global leadership."" After
that, the Administration more openly acknowledged its political impotence. President
Clinton explained:
Let me tell you something about Bosnia. On Bosnia, I made a decision. The
United Nations controls what happens in Bosnia. I cannot unilaterally lift the
arms embargo. I didn't change my mind. Our allies decided that they weren't
prepared to go that far at this time. They asked me to wait, and they said
they would not support it. I didn't change my mind.'"
It was also at about this time that Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff indicated
the US had to rethink its intemational role and realistically reappraise the degree to which
it could hope to act and influence intemational events unilaterally. This doctrine, the so-
called Tamoff Doctrine," was eventually disavowed by President Clinton. A Congressional
Research Service report noted, however, 'US policy on Bosnia appeared to confirm Mr.
Tamoff s views rather than contradict them. Liifting the arms embargo, while in principle
favored by the Administration, was not viewed as a viable option without the participation
of other allies."*'
On June 30, the Administration suffered yet another defeat in changing US policy,
ft was the only other Security Council member to back a resolution put forth by five non-
aligned member countries to lift the embargo. Even though President Clinton had
previously asserted that the US should take the lead in formulating intemational policy
towards Bosnia, the US "dkl not push strongly for its adoption,"^ and Russia, France, and
Britain joined other Council members in handily defeating the measure. The result was
that a policy change the Administration deemed to be in the national interest was
'* Elaine Sciolino, The Clinton Record: Foreign Policy; Bosnia Policy Shaped By
US Military Role. The New York Times. July 29, 1996. at A15.
^ President Bill Clinton, Press Conference (June 15. 1993).
'^ Julie Kim and Dianne E. Rennack, Bosnia-Hercegovina Conflict and the 1Q3d
Congress: Policy Debates and Summary of Major Legislation, Congressional Research
Service (CRS), Report for Congress 94-1008 F, at 7.
^ Steven Woehrel. Bosnia-Hercagovina: Summary of the Dehata On a Unilateral
Lifting of the Arms Embargo, CRS, Report for Congress 95-477 F, at 5.
30
squelched yet again by the UN.
In July, the President was again put on the defensive in a press conference when
a questioner referred to the Administration as being "indecisive' in formulating a Bosnia
policy. He replied.
Let me. first of all, point out what the United States has done just since I've
been President. We spent a great deal of money on humanitarian aid; we
have pushed hard for strengthening the embargo against Serbia; we have
pushed for a number of other things to try to help resolve the situation that
we have all agreed on.
I did not back away from my position, sir. Britain and France and
Russia said they would not support that position within the United Nations.
The United States cannot act alone under international law in this instance."
In July, as Serb forces stepped up their assault on Sarajevo and threatened to
overrun the Bosnian capital, the Administration finally was moved to act. It announced
that, while it hoped to work with the allied states. A was prepared to act unilaterally with
air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo. It is hard to know how serious the Administration
was in making this statement. No military action was ever taken, although the threat did
motivate NATO to meet in August to consider joint action. Even then. NATO ceded its
authority to the UN Secretary-General to determine if military action was wan-anted and to
call for air strikes.
The President's subsequent statements squarely contradicted his professed
willingness to take unilateral action and reaffirmed his commitment to multilateralism, no
nnatter what the consequences for US national interests. Seven months later, on February
6, 1994, the day after a rocket attack on a crowded marttet in Sarajevo killed 68 people,
PreskJent Clinton made his mosi categorical statement yet on his interpretatkMi of the limits
on US sovereignty in using its military. The United States, I will say again, under
intematnnal law, in the absence of an attack on our people, does not have the authority
to unilaterally undertake air strikes."^
" Presklent Bill Clinton, Press Interview (July 2. 1993).
** The Late Edition: US Responds to Attack in Sarajevo. CNN Television
Broadcast (Feb. 6, 1994) (emphasis added).
31
In the same month. Febmary 1994, arguing against Senator Dole's legislative
proposal to lift the embargo, Madeleine Albright advanced another argument that the
Administration would frequently use ~ lifting the embargo would set a precedent allowing
states to pick and choose which of the internationally sanctioned embargoes and sanctions
they will enforce:
Frankly, what will happen is, if we decide to lift the embargo unilaterally
against - on this particular issue, then there will be those who will decide
that we can just not abide by the intemational embargo against Iraq or
against Libya. This is an intemational system, whereby we deal with rogue
states, Iraq and Libya, through an intemational embargo. We depend on the
intemational community to abide by it. And, even though we do not think it
is appropriate for the Bosnian Muslims to be embargoed at the nviment, it is
an intemational decision that we cannot change unilaterally.^
A few months later, in April, with renewed and increasingly bipartisan criticism of the
Administration's refusal to lift the embargo, PreskJent Clinton made a similar argument, 'If
we ignore a United Natk>ns embargo t>ecause we think it has no moral basis or even any
legal validity, but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations
allies from ignoring the embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against Saddam
Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in the UnKed Natk>ns, you
must follow other embargoes?'*
By mkl-1994 there was bipartisan consensus in Congress that the US should lift the
Bosnian arms embargo unilaterally. This opinion was shared by many of those who
supported a more active US role in stopping the fighting, as well as by many who still
believed the US shoukJ be cautk)us in any action that could commit it to a role on the
ground in the regfon. On May 25, Representatives Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, and Henry
Hyde urged the PreskJent to 'act in our natk>nal interest and not rely on the UN to
determine our polk:y.*"
In late summer, with peace talks stalled, Congress began working on several
'*'ld.
* PreskJent Bill Clinton, Press Conference (Apr. 20, 1994).
" Letter from Reps. Newt Gingrich. Richard Armey and Henry Hyde to PreskJent
Bill Clinton (May 25, 1994) (emphasis in original). See Appendix B.
32
options to remove the embargo. This eventually led to Section 1404 of the fiscal year 1995
National Defense Authorization Act ." According to that legislation, if the Bosnian Serbs
did not accept the Contact Group peace plan by October 15. the President v»/as to
introduce a resolution at the Security Council to lift the arms embargo muttilaterally no later
than December 1 . Moreover, should such a resolution fail to pass, no US funds were to
be expended after November 15 to enforce the continued embargo. This provision is
commonly referred to as "Nunn-Mitchell," after its Senate sponsors. Since it was clear the
Security Council would defeat a resolution to lift the embargo, the Administration halted the
use of US funds effective November 12, 1994. It also ended the deployment of American
ships in the Adriatic Sea for embargo enforcement and ended the sharing of intelligence
on embargo violations with other countries.
In all other respects, the Administration's policy remained unchanged, particulariy
its opposition to unilaterally lifting the embargo. Although the Administration consulted with
Congress on possible plans to aid the Bosnians unilaterally (as was also required in the
legislation), the Administration made it clear it would not accept any form of unilateral
action by the US. Indeed, on January 8, 1995. Vice President Al Gore wamed that the
President would veto any bill requiring a unilateral lifting." This actually came to pass on
August 11. 1995. when the President vetoed S.21. a bill calling for the unilateral lifting of
the embargo after the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia or 12 weeks after the
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina requested that UN peacekeepers leave, whichever
came first.
Another concem expressed repeatedly by the Administration during its debates with
Congress in 1995 about the unilateral lifting of the embargo was that it could lead to one
of two possible situations, both of wrfiich were worse than the status quo. The first was the
•Americanization" of the war. The second (and this is brazen in light of the Administration's
ongoing secret Iranian green light policy) was the introduction of Iranians into the war.
The logic t»ehind the fear of "Americanization" was that the natran that lifts the
embargo unilaterally will be held responsible for what follows. White House Press
Secretary Mike McCurry explained that the Administration "strenuously" opposed a
unHatera! lifting of the embargo because it would "give the US unilateral responsiblity for
" US Publk: Law 103-337.
* Ron Foumier. c^rtk- liS Still Rarks Yaltsln Dftsptte Apparent Lack of Control.
The Associated Press. Jan. 8, 1995.
33
the devastating consequences.'^ Consequently, if the Bosnian military were to begin to
falter after the lift, the US would have to step in to train, arm. and possibly defend its new
dependents. American intervention, the argument went, became all the more likely
because a unilateral lifting by the US would likely have led UN peacekeepers to withdraw
from the region.Thus. not only would US intervention be required to prop up Bosnian
forces, it would also be required to aid the withdrawal of UN forces.^'
The most disingenuous of the Administration's arguments was that lifting the arms
embargo could allow the Iranians a foothold in Europe. The argument was that if the US
were to lift the embargo, without itself arming the Muslims, Iran would fill the vacuum and
thereby 'establish a presence' in Bosnia and the Balkans.'' (As shown in Section III of this
report, the Administration had already secretly acquiesced in Iran's filling the existing
vacuum.) It was against such an argument that Senator Dote spoke on June 5, 1995,
[W]hen those of us who advocate lifting the arms embargo . . . point out that
other countries would also participate in arming the Bosnians, we are told
that this would allow Iran to arm the Bosnians. The fact is the arms embargo
has guaranteed that Iran is a key supplier of arms to Bosnia and
administration officials have actually used that fact to argue that there is no
need to lift the arms embargo .... From statements made by State
Department officials to the press, one gets the impression that Iran is the
Clinton Administration's preferred provider of weapons to the Bosnians. If
the Administration has a problem with Iran arming Bosnia, it should t>e
prepared to do something about it"
* Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (July 18, 1995).
'* There is no question that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, if the United
States took that action, would lead U.N. troop-contributing nations to quickly withdraw
their troops. That would then trigger, as you all know, a commitment we have to our
allies to help extract them. So it is almost a dead-certain t>et that lifting the arms
emt>argo would mean U.S. ground troops would have to be present in Bosnia very
shortly.' Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (July 12, 1995).
" Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (June 9, 1995).
"^ 141 Cong. Rec. S7880 (No. 92. June 5. 1995) (Statement of Sen. Robert
Dole) (emphasis added).
34
Senator Dole had no idea at the time how taie his words were about Iran being the
Administration's "preferred provider' of weapons. His mistake, like that of his colleagues
in Congress, was in believing the Administration's denials of complicity and thinking no
administration would be so foolish as to pemiit Iran - the world's leading sponsor of state-
sanctioned terrorism - to establish a foothold in Europe.
It would seem that the Administration would not want to revisit this particular
argument, knowing how it would look when the truth finally emerged. Yet a month later,
in July 1995. White House spokesman McCuny could not resist speculating sarcastically
that Senator Dole, in his calls for lifting the embargo, was presumably ready to surrender
Bosnia to Iran.** It would not be until spring 1996 that Congress and the American people
would leam the truth and appreciate the irony behind McCurry's statement: A year before
he accused Senator Dole of being willing to give the Iranians a free ride into Bosnia, the
Clinton Administration had already laid out the welcome mat for Iran.
Denial of the Iranian Green Light Policy
As is discussed elsewhere in this report, the Administration's public
pronouncements about its policy on the embargo significantly diverged from actual practice
starting in April 1994. It was then that President Clinton authorized the giving of a secret
"wink and a nod" or "green light" for the covert transshipment of Iranian amis to the
Balkans. The development of that covert policy is treated at length in Section II of this
report. In this chapter, treating the puWkdy acknowledged policy, we will only discuss the
official denials that were made as elements of the policy began to leak to the press.
The flow of Iranian arms through Croatia was difficult to disguise, and the openirvg
of the so-called amis pipeline to Bosnia was reported in the US and European press within
weeks.^ An obvious question for the press and our allies with troops on the ground in the
** "Our view has been it is highly questtonaWe morally for the United States
Congress to say that we are unilaterally lifting the amis embargo so that Muslims can
have a fair fight and then not do anything to provWe them exactly those armaments
that we've been talking about. There's some vague notion on Capitol Hill that perhaps
they coukj get them from inventories of the fbnuer Soviet Unfon stocks. Perhaps they
could get them from Iran. I guess Ser}atorDole is saying.' Mike McCuny. Press
Conference (July 18. 1995) (emphasis added).
* E4J. Bill Gertz. Iranian Weapons Sftnt Via Croatia. Washington Times. June
24. 1994; Robert Block, i is Tiim.«t a Riinri Fya to Iran Arms for Bosnia. The
35
region concerned whether the US was involved in either setting up or sanctioning the
operation.
On May 13, 1994, two weeks after the Administration gave the green light. State
Department spokesman David Johnson commented on reports of Iranian shipments
through Zagreb, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on
the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia." He quickly added that the US believes
*if s important that UN Security Council resolutions be fully observed," a broader statement
that suggested that the US expected other nations to respect the embargo as well.^
On June 3, the British newspaper. The Independent, reported that Iranian sources
"close to the government and opposition in Tehran, claim that elements in President Bill
Clinton's administration have made it clear that America would not interfere with Iran's
attempts to circumvent the international arms embargo on Bosnia."" The same article
contained official US denials. Nonetheless, the issue would not die. and the press
continued to pursue the story.
Later in June, the Administration once again was faced with a press story that
threatened to uncover the green light policy. An article by Bill Gertz of the Washington
Times led with the sentence. 'Croatia has become a major transit point for covert Iranian
arms shipments to Bosnia with the tacit approval of the Clinton administration, which
publidy rennains opposed to a unilateral lifting of the intemational arms embargo against
the fractured Balka.n states." But in the same article a 'senior U.S. official" sakj that the US
government opposed the Iranian arms shipments because they undercut UN sanctions.
"There is no U.S. support for what Iran is doing," the official said."'* That same day press
guidance issued by the State Department explicitly denied active complicity and any sort
of acquiescence, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on
the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia. We strongly believe that UN Security
Independent, June 3, 1994.
" US Mum on Report of Iran Arms to Bosnia. Reuters World Service, May 13,
1994.
»^ Robert Block, US Tums a Blind gye to Iran Anms for Bosnia. The Independent,
June 3, 1994, at 14.
^ Bill Gertz. Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia, Washington Times. June 24,
1994, at A1.
36
Council resolutions must be fully respected."" This guidance would be sent out repeatedly
in the following months.*"
Subsequent press guidances and public statements from the State Department.
National Security Council and the White House consistently denied any US role in the
Iranian arms pipeline. At the State Department's daily press briefing on November 7, for
example, spokesman Christine Shelley was asked directly if the US was contributing to,
or turning a blind eye to, the violations of the arms embargo. The response was clear and
categorical. "We're certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly are not turning a blind
eye. We have been a major participant, as you know, in the enforcement of ail the different
UN Security Council resolutions which have been passed in the past."^'
Congress took the Administration at its word, yet the press and intelligence reporting
indicated the Iranian arms kept flowing and, in the wake of such reports, the growth of
Iranian influence in the region became increasingly a matter of concern. While the
Administration still denies the linkage, at least for Congress it was obvious from the
beginning that there was a direct connection between the provision of Iranian weapons and
assistance and the growth of Iranian influence. Senator Dole in January 1995 argued that
S.21 , his legislation lifting the embargo, \vould reduce the potential influence and role of
radical extremist states like Iran" in the Balkans.*' The Administration nevertheless vetoed
the legislation. As on many other occasions, it chose not to advise Congress that the
actual Administration policy was that "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose
ourselves' between the Iranians and the Balkans - that is, to permit Iran to use arms
transfers to solidify its influence in the reg'ion.*'
In April 1 995, a year after the green light policy went into effect, a Washington Post
story reopened the question of the US's tacit approval of Iranian arms transfers.
Department of State press guidance on Apnl 14 posed the following hypothetical question
and guidance on its answer
^ Department of State, Daily Press Guidance, June 24, 1994.
** E-8-. Department of State, Daily Press Guidance, June 27 and Aug. 3. 1994.
*' DOS cable. State 300842. Nov. 7, 1994 (emphasis added).
** 141 Cong. Rec. S21 1 (No.1 . Jan. 4. 1995) (Statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
*' Peter Galbraith, MenrK>randum for the File. May 6. 1994.
/
37
Q: Is Iran delivering arms to the Bosnians? Does the US tacitly approve of
this activity? What are we doing about it? How do we reconcile this policy
with our more general concern atx>ut Iranian arms sales?
A: Contrary to the impression left by this morning's Washington Post story,
- /77he US neither 'allows' nor taatly accepts" the provision of Iranian
arms to Bosnia or to any other country.
- It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo
on the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia
- The United States has on many occasions made known its strong
objection to the behavior of the Government of Iran. We are actively
involved in international efforts to isolate Iran and prevent it from engaging
in illegal and dangerous weapons transfers.**
In July of 1995, the President and Secretary of State confirmed the press guidance
set forth above as the Administration's 'declared' policy. In a CNN interview on July 28,
1995, President Clinton was asked if the US was 'orchestrating the transfer of arn« to the
Bosnian Muslims through Arab or Middle-Eastern countries or anywhere else.* The
answer was a curt *rK>.* On the same program. Secretary Christopher stated, "We are not,
as I repeat myself, covertly supplying arms [to Bosnia] or taking steps to support arms.***
The next day. Secretary Christopher was quoted in the press as saying. The United States
is not, underiine not, covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to the
Bosnian govemment."**
Perhaps the nx>st categorical false denial of the green light came in the National
Security Council's press guidance of February 2. 1996, only two months t)efore the
Administratk>n finally admitted its true policy towards Iranian arms transfers. This time, the
Administration was concerned with allaying suspicior^ raised by another Washirtgton Post
** DOS cable, State 092370. Apr. 14. 1995 (emphasis added).
** The Late Edition: US Denies Funneling Arms to Bosnian Muslims, CNN
Television Broadcast (July 28. 1995).
^ Bill Gertz. Peny Threatens 'Massive Air'; Christopher Denies Report of Covert
Anms Shipments. The Washington Times, July 29. 1995. at A9.
38
story, this one alleging US involvement with a Saudi program to arm the Bosnians. Again,
the guidance is given in hypothetical questions and answers. They are quoted at length
below. This is necessary to document the degree to which the Clinton Administration was
willing to misrepresent the truth In order to cover up their policy to allow Iran to develop a
foothold in Europe through Bosnia.
[Q:] Response to allegations in the Washington Post that the United States
cooperated with Saudi Arabia in a program to arm the Bosnians over the
past three years.
[A:] We categorically deny the allegations in the Post story that the US was
in any way involved with the purported Saudi program to arm the Bosnian
Government, in violation of the UN amis embargo. While this Administration
consistently argued that the arms embargo unfairly punished the victim of
aggression during the Bosnian conflict, it was always our policy to abide by
the terms of the arms embargo. We opposed a unilateral lifting of the
embargo because it would undermine respect for other binding UNSC
resolutions, including economic sanctions against Serbia, Iraq and Libya.
The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other government
regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians.
[Q:] But weren't you aware of covert arms assistance to the Bosnians by the
Saudis and other countries, such as Iran?
[A:] No such shipments were fa/cen in consultation or coordination with the
US government.
[Q:] If you were aware of these shipments, why didn't you stop them?
[A:) We have always made dear that we were abiding by the arms embargo
and that we expected other countries to do so as well.*^
" National Security Council. Daily Guidance Update. Feb. 2. 1996 (emphasis
added).
39
The Clinton Administration's consistent assertion of the need for assertive
multilateralism was matched in effort and practice only by its consistence in falsely denying
its 'Iranian green light' policy. The truth finally came to light with the publication of the
series of highly detailed and well-infomned Los Angeles Times articles starting on April 6,
1996/* It was only then that the Administration ceased its denials and deceptions and
admitted what its true policy was - to allow Iran to purchase influence in the Balkans by
supplying arms.
' The articles have been discussed at length in Chapter One.
40
CHAPTER 4
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN
In the preceding chapter, we have discussed at length the Clinton Administration's
public policy of duplicity and denial regarding its green light to the Iranians' breaking the
UN arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. What makes the green light policy scandalous
is that the Administration chose to use Iran, of all countries, to carry out a policy that the
Administration was legally able, but unwilling to carry out Itself. The green light decision
allowed Iran to expand economic and diplomatic relations in a volatile and unstable part
of the world and, worse, to establish programs of military, security, and intelligence
assistance and cooperation of unprecedented scope in Europe. This decision was made
despite the US's firmly entrenched policy of isolating and containing Iran. The threat from
Iran has been as clear as has been the US policy response to the threat, at least prior to
the Administration's green light policy. For this reason the green light is not only an
inexplicable reversal of long-standing US policy, H is a case of appallingly bad judgment
in which US national interests were sacrificed out of the Administration's policy-based
objections to unilateral actions by the US to protect American interests.
In later chapters, we will demonstrate how such an indefensible decision was made
and the effect it has had in radicalizing certain elements in Bosnia, as well as buying Iran
influence in the region. In this chapter, we will simply establish the fact that, in its public
pronouncements, the Administration has advocated an Iranian policy that is totally
incompatible with its actions in Croatia and Bosnia.
Recognizing the Problem: Iran
The Clinton Administration deserves credit for its public statements recognizing
Iran's preeminent role as a state sponsor of terrorism. According to the annual State
Department report on intemational terrorism issued on April 1996,^ Iran is the premier
state sponsor of intemational terrorism and is deeply involved in the planning and
execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate groups.* The report
goes on to rK>te that Iran continues to view the United States as its principal foreign
adversary, supporting groups such as Hizballah that pose a threat to US citizens. Because
of Tehran's and Hizballah's deep antipathy towards the United States, US missions and
' Department of State. Pattems of Global Tefmrism: 1995, Apr. 1996, at 24.
41
personnel abroad continue to be at risk.'' Two years earlier, the annual report reached
much the same conclusion:
Iran again was the most active state sponsor of terrorism and was
implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy, Turkey and Pakistan. Its intelligence
services support terrorist acts - either directly or thre>ugh extremists groups
.... Iran still surveys US missions and personnel. Tehran's policymakers
view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives, and acts
of terrorism are approved at the highest levels of the Iranian govemment.'
In this document, which, ironically, was published the very month of the Administration's
green light decision, the Administration provided information that would lead one to believe
the Administration would be making efforts to crack down on Iran's involvement in Bosnia
and Croatia rather than "wink and nod" at it:
Bosnian Vice PreskJent Ejup Ganic warned in June [1993] that Bosnians
living in EuroF>e were likely to resort to terrorism if the West did not come to
Bosnia's aid. and outskje terrorist groups are reported providing support to
the Bosnian Muslims. In August. Croatian authorities confiscated weapons,
explosives and false documents from a lerrorisf networi^ that had been
aiding Bosnia. Hizballah and Iran have provided training to the Bosnian
Muslim army.*
Sectk>n III of this report further documents the extensive infonnation available to the
Administration on Iran and its surrogates' activities in the former Yugoslavia prior to the
green light as well as after.
The Policy Response to the Iranian Threat
Not only has the Clinton Administration been dear in acknowledging Iran's threat
to US national interests and world stability, the Administratk>n has also been consistent
(other than in the fonner Yugoslavia ) in articulating and adhering to a policy that was
noeant to isolate Iran politically, eooriomrcally, and militanly. Such isolation, K was hoped,
' Id. at 25.
' Department of State, Pattems of Global Tentirism: 1993, Apr. 1994, at 22.
•Id. at 11.
42
would lead to the regime's moderation.'
Secretary Christopher encapsulated the Iran policy and its rationale in May 1994 in
a speech before the American Jewish Committee Conference:
Well, Iran is an outlaw country in my judgment and deserves to t>e
treated with containment and isolation. It is not only their weapons of mass
destruction program that concerns us, but their resort to terrorism around the
world. Their ugly hand can t>e seen not only in the Middle East but in Africa
and some places in Europe. Their determined opposition to the peace
process in the Middle East is only one of the reasons why I think that they do
not deserve the approbation of the intemational community.
We cannot expect to end all trade with them, but I think what we can
urge our allies is to not give them concessions and not welcome them into
the family of nations and accord the advantages of that kind of status. The
United States will be working hard in this vein, feeling it's necessary to try to
isolate them, to try to contain them until there is a change in their attitudes
toward their neighbors and toward the rest of the worid.
.... Iran is a country that I think deserves our very close watching,
and until they make a major change in their policy, I think the United States'
present policy of isolation and containment is the correct one.*
' The Clinton Administratkin has attempted to link its Iran policy with its policy
vis-a-vis Iraq in a regional strategic polkry it has termed 'dual containment.* This policy
was outlined by Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the President for Near East and
South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), in May 1993, and makes up
a significant portion of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's Foreign Affairs article
Confronting Backlash States (Vd. 73. No. 2. MariApr. 1994, at 45-55). The dual
containment polk^ has receivxi significant criticism by MkJdIe Eastern foreign policy
experts as being ilk)gical and a. .terproductive in implementation. However, for our
purposes it is not necessary to review the Iran^policy in this larger regional strategic
context It is sufficient to note that there is a dear and unambiguous policy of isolatir^
and containing Iran so as to nxxjerate its policies.
* Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Remarks at tiie Anr)erican Jewish
Committee Conferer>ce (May 5. 1994).
43
More than just keeping up the rhetorical drum-beat of calls to isolate Iran, the
President has also taken action to further that objective and increase the pressure on its
leadership to moderate its many objectionable policies. In May 1995 the President signed
an executive order banning, in effect, all US trade and investment in Iran/ In August
1996, the President signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,' a bill that had passed the
House without a single dissenting vote, imposing sanctions on foreign companies exporting
petroleunvrelated technology to Iran. In regard to this bill, the President said, "You cannot
do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or
protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong.
I hope and expect that before long, our allies will come around to accepting this
fundamental tmth."* As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has noted, those countries
that believe positive inducements will woric with Iran are wrong and improvement in
relations must come about only as a reward for Iran's moderating its objectionable
behavKjr. The most effective message is a consistent one: no normal relations until these
[objectionable] actions end.'^"
The Administratk)n tumed its back on this established principle of American foreign
policy in making the green light decisbn. Instead of 'isolating' and 'containing* Iran, as
Secretary Christopher had promised, the Administration's policy in the Balkans was 'at the
highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and the
Croatians."^^ In allowing Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia, the Administration essentially
forced the Bosnians into a position of dependence on, and subservience to, Iran. This
would soon come back to hurt the Administratk>n.
^ Executive Order No. 12959. 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995).
•Public Law 104-172.
* President Bill Clinton, Address at George Washington University (Aug. 5,
1996).
^^ Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States, supca at 5.
" Ambassador Peter Galbraith quoting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Alexander Vershbow in a May 5, 1994 telephone conversatk>n. Recounted in a
Memorandum for the File by Galbraith. dated May 6, 1994.
44
SECTION TWO:
THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDINGS
CHAPTER 5
CONDUCT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
Testimony
The Select Subcommittee sought to take depositions from all significant participants
in the events under investigation. In some instances, interviews, rather than depositions,
were conducted by special investigators, who were detailed as a joint resource to the
Subcommittee staff.' Both the majority and minority staff were represented at every
deposition and interview. The deposition testimony was transcribed by a certified court
reporter who is provided by the Office of Official Reporters to Committees of the House of
Representatives. Depositions were conducted under oath in a question and '^nswer
format. Interviews were conducted by the Select Subcommittee staff and by the special
investigators. Interview witnesses were not put under oath.
The Select Subcommittee took the depositions of 27 witnesses and interviewed
approximately 55 others.
The following individuals (listed in alphabetical order) appeared for depositions:
Janet S. Andres - former Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence; Reginald
Bartholomew - former Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia; General Wesley Clark -
former Director of Strategic Plans & Policy (J-5) on the Joint Staff; Thomas Doniion -
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State;
Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith - Ambassador to Croatia; Colonel Richard C. Henick -
Defense & Army Attache, Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Richard Holbrooke - former
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; Richard A. Holtzapple -
former Political Officer/Second Secretary, Embassy Zagreb; Susan C. Hovanec - fomier
Public Affairs Officer. Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Robert Hunter - Pemnanent US
Representative to the Nj^rth Atiantic Council: Ambassador Victor L. Jackovich - for
Ambassador to Bosnia£_
Douglas MacEachin - former Deputy Director for intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA); Thomas D. Mittnacht - former Economic/Commercial Officer. Embassy Zagreb;
Rorukl J. Neitzke • former Deputy Chief of Missnn, Embassy Zagreb; Rudolf V. Perina -
Chief of Mission. Embassy Belgrade; Charles E. Redman • former Special Envoy to the
fermer Yugoslavia; Lt. Colonel Robert J. gadler - Defense Attache. Embassy Zagreb;
[Lt Colonel John E. Sray - former G-2
* See Appendix A.
45
Intelligence Chief for Bosnia/Herzegovina Command, UNPROFOR; Chariotte Stottman ■
former secretary to Ambassador Galbraith; Strobe Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State;
Peter Tarnoff - Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs;!^
/Alexander R. Vershbow - former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European an?Canadian Affairs; James Woolsey - former Director of the CIA;
Kathryn Zabetakis - former Secretary to Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzk^^^|^0B^
The Select Subcommitte staff, including staff investigators, also conducted
interviews, not taken under oath, of the following individuals: Mark E. Anderson; Terri Lee
Baker; Richard C. Barkley; Frederick Baron; Maria Barton; Samuel "Sandy" Bergen Robert
L. Burkhart; Ambassador Lawrence Butler (telephonically); Robert Caudle; Peter Comfort;
Robert Davis; former Senator Dennis DeConcini; Dushka Djuric; Robert P. Finn; former
Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley; Philip S. Goldberg; Jane Green; Anthon> G.
Harrington; Christopher R. Hill; Christopher J. Hoh; Swanee Hunt; Stephen H. Klemp;
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake; former Republican Leader of the House of
Representatives Robert Michel: John Monjo; Imam Sevko Omerbasic; Ronna Pazdrai;
Shane Pitzer. Susan Ray; John Rizzo; William G. Root; James W. Swigert; Mildred
Tangney; Alexander "Sandy' Vershbow; Paul Vogel; Ambassador Jenonne Walker;
Thomas G. Weston; Philip C. Wilcox. Jr.; and John S. Wolf.
Briefirtgs of Subcommittee staff and special investigators at C|^
given by the following CIA analysts of the Directorate of Intelligent
Headquarters were
Under advisement of their agency of for other reasons, several of the above
individuals declined to testify under oath. The National Security Council (NSC) declined
to have its employees testify under oath, including National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake
and his deputy Samuel 'Sandy* Berger. Chairman of the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board, Anthony Harrington, at the instniction of the White House Counsel, also
declined to testify urwier oath. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Secretary of
Defense William Perry, and Leon Feurth. Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs, all declined to sit for a staff deposition.
In addition, the Select Subcommittee acquired copies of relevant testinxjny given
by several indivkluals in dosed hearings conducted by the House Permanent Select
Committee on IntelligerKe (HPSCI). HPSCI was most generous in sharing these and other
resources for review by the Select SutKommittee. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) also provided the Select Subcommittee access to transcripts of its
46
relevant closed hearings. In addition, SSCI offered the services of their special
investigators who shared their research and information they obtained during their
investigation of this issue.
Acquisition of Classified and Non-Classified Federal Government Documents
Throughout the Subcommittee's investigation, documents were obtained from
several Federal agencies. Documents were processed, each identified with a bate stamp
number and stored in a Sensitive Compartmented Infonmation Facility (SCIF).
The Select Subcommittee sought relevant documents from numerous federal
agencies. These agencies included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department
of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Security Council
(NSC),the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB). the US
Information Agency (USIA), and the Department of State (DOS). The Select
Subcommittee initially submitted written requests to Federal agencies based on infonnation
available in the public record. The agencies identified responsive documents and, with
some exceptions, made them available for review. Security an-angements were made for
the review of classified documents, in accordance with proper security procedures. The
Conference Room, within the Select Subcommittee offices, was examined for surveillance
devices whenever deposition testimony was given or classified documents reviewed.
Some agencies permitted the Select Subcommittee to retain copies of pertinent
documents, and others provided documents which were to be returned following this
investigation. Review of highly classified documents was conducted in a secure facility at
the various agencies, and only notes were permitted to be removed by the staff.
Central intelligence Agency (CIA)
Two staff members from both the Majority and Minority staff were given unrestricted
access at CIA headquarters, to a wide variety of requested materials, including over a
1.000 documents and cables related to our inquiry. The Select Subcommittee, also
received over 1,000 pages of CIA finished intelligence products for review at the
Subcommittee.
department of Defense (DOD)
Both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
offered their cooperation in providing the Select Subcommittee with documents relating to
the Balkans crisis. Several hundred NSA documents were reviewed by staff at NSA
47
headquarters, and approximately 1 50 pages of materials were made available for review
at the Select Subcommittee offices. DIA also compiled several hundred documents for
review at DIA headquarters and provided approximately 250 for use at the Select
Subcommittee.
National Security Council (NSC)
The National Security Council (NSC) provided fewerthan 30 documents for use at
the Select Subcommittee. The staff was briefed on an additional 52 documents at the
NSC. In addition, the Subcommittee was provided with a Bosnian Document List,
however, no actual documents were attached.
White House • Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB)
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (iOB) provided the Select
Subcommittee with a list of individuals it reviewed in the course of its own investigation.^
United States Information Agency (USIA)
The United States Information Agency (USIA) provided the Select Subcommittee
with copies of official calendars kept by Susan Hovanec, the Public Affairs Officer at the
US Embassy in Zagreb, for 1994 and 1995. These calendars documented dates of
important meetings between Hovanec and officials in the region, relevant to our
investigation.
* See Chapter 7.
48
CHAPTER 6
ADMINISTRATION RECORD OF COOPERATION
WITH THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE
During the first days of it's existence and throughout the investigation, the Select
Subcommittee continuously sought the cooperation of various federal government
agencies. In an effort to obtain all classified and unclassified information related to the
United States role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, the Subcommittee
requested the assistance of the White House, National Security Council, Intelligence
Oversight Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State. Department of
Defense, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The rate and scope
of administration cooperation, however, varied from full compliance from some agencies
to almost complete non-compliance from others.
In April 1996, before the establishment of the Select Subcommittee, document
requests relating to the Iranian "green light" policy had already been submitted to the
Administration. Chairman Arlen Specter and Vice Chairman RotJert Kerrey of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence contacted the President's Intelligence Oversight Board,
the National Security Council, and the Department of State requesting "any unpublished
material bearing on this subject, such as cables, electronic correspondence, intemal
memoranda, minutes of meetings, letters, and memoranda to other agencies or talking
points for briefings.'^ Additionally, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee requested the President turn over ". . . all documents related to the role that
your Administration may have played in proposing, organizing, assisting, consulting,
arranging, or agreeing to the transfer of arms by any govemment or private organization
into the former Yugoslavia during the period in which the United Nations arms embargo
was in effect."* Chairman Benjamin Oilman of the House International Relations
^ Letter from Arlen Specter. Chairman, and Robert Kerrey, Vice Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Warren Christopher (hereinafter
'Christopher*), Secretary of State (Apr. 9, 1996). See Appendix B.
' Letter from Jesse Helms (hereinafter "Helms') Chairman. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, to President Bill Clinton (hereinafter 'Clinton') (Apr. 16. 1996).
Sfifi Appendix B.
49
Committee, and Chaimian Floyd Spence of the House Committee on National Security
also submitted requests at this time, for similar information.'
President Clinton on May 15, 1996, insisted that the Administration would cooperate
with Congress:
I have asked the relevant agencies ... to work with you to ensure that the
Committee obtains the information it needs on this matter.
I welcome this opportunity to present the policy my Administration has
pursued to help bring peace to Bosnia. Let me assure you that my
Administration will cooperate fully with the Committee and with other
Congressional bodies in their examination of this matter*
Because Congressional requests were made, and because the President directed
his agencies to meet these requests, it is presumed that the Administration would have
compiled all infomiation relevant to the Iranian arms issue. When the Select
Subcommittee later requested this infomiation. however, the Administration needed until
the end of September, five months after the original Congressional request, to gather all
related materials. The Subcommittee notes, in particular, that the materials made available
on September 27 by the Department of State were important documents, critical to the
investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers. The Department was aware that it
was providing access to documents only a week before the Subcommittee planned to
finalize its report.
Agency Compiiance
Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the most cooperative and willing of the
Administration agencies in their efforts to provide the Select Subcommittee with requested
' Letter from Benjamin Gilnrian (hereinafter "Giiman*), Chairman, House
Intemational Relations Committee, to Christopher (May 2. 1996); Giiman to Anthony
Lake (hereinafter "Lake"), National Security Advisor, (May 21, 1996); Ftoyd Spence.
Chairman, National Security Committee, to William Perry. Secretary of Defense, (Apr.
15,1996). See Appendix B.
* Letter from Clinton to Helms (May 15. 1996). See Appendix B.
50
documents and other related material. Within days of the Subcommittee's inception,
thousands of pages of cable traffic were made available at the CIA headquarters for review
by a limited number of Select Subcommittee staff. The CIA also accommodated the
Sut>committee in making their staff, including former Director of Central Intelligence James
Woolsey, available for depositions and interviews, as requested.
In addition, the Agency also played a pivotal role in expediting the security clearance
process for Select Subcommittee staff, which enabled the Subcommittee to complete its
investigation during its six-month charter.
Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) was generally helpful in the production of
requested documents. It was consistently effective in making Defense personnel available
for depositions, as requested. The only exception to this remains an outstanding request
for Secretary William Perry's appearance to provide information to the Select
Subcommittee.
In addition, the Defense Department's Investigative Service and Security Directorate
understood the Subcommittee's critical and immediate need to obtain security clearances,
and were instrumental in expediting the processing of background investigations of the
Subcommittee staff.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
On May 13, 1996, Chairman Hyde requested special agents be detailed from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the Select Subcommittee to assist with its
investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers.* The "October Surprise Task Force",
in 1992, employed the services of seven agents detailed from three federal govemment
investigative agencies, while the Select Subcommittee requested only three agents from
the FBI. Additionally, unlike 'October Surprise*, the Select Subcommittee pakl the salary
and benefits of these agents, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
' Letter from Henry J. Hyde (hereinafter 'Hyde'), Chairman, Select
Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to
Croatia and Bosnia (hereinafter 'Select Subcommittee*), to Louis Freeh. Director.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (May 13. 1996). See Appendix B.
51
The Subcommittee worked jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI
to make the appropriate arrangements to secure their assistance.* Both agencies were
reluctant at first to provkje investigators to the Sub committee. Part of the FBI's hesitancy
could rightfully be attributed to the political fervor, at the time of the Subcommittee's
request, surrounding the White House/FBI "Filegate" affair.' Nonetheless, on July 23,
1996. the Deputy Attorney General, Jamie Gorelick, approved the detailing of three FBI
agents to work as shared resources between the Majority and Minority staffs of the Select
Subcommittee.
In an effort to ensure that the inquiry would be conducted in a bipartisan manner,
Chief Counsel and Chief Minority Counsel agreed to a memorandum of understanding with
respect to the utilization of the agents detailed to the Select Subcommittee.' The
memorandum provided that the investigators assigned would be a joint resource between
the Majority and the Minority staffs, it was also agreed that, upon conducting an interview,
the investigators would provide an interview report to both the Majority and Minority staffs.
Department of Justice
In addition to the Department of Justice's assistance in obtaining FBI agents for the
Select Sutxx>mmittee, DOJ p>ersonnel were also helpful in securing space for depositions.
The Office of Legislative Affairs, in particular, Alan Hoffman, was able to arrange secured
areas to conduct depositions of Ambassadors Charles Redman and Richard Holbrooke in
Chicago and New York, respectively. Likewise, the US Attorney's office was most
accommodating in these requests.'
' Memorandum of Understanding from Richard J. Pocker (hereinafter "Pocker"),
Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee and Richard Meltzer (hereinafter "Meltzer").
Minority Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee, to Howard Shapiro, General Counsel,
Federal Bureau of lnvestigatk>n (Aug. 9, 1996). See Appendix B.
' It was disclosed that the FBI was inappropriately used by political operatives in
the White House. Over 700 files - including background investigation materials - were
turned over to the Administratkin for no objective reason.
* MenK>randum of Understanding from Pocker to Meltzer (July 24. 1996). See
Appendix B.
* Deputy Chief of Chicago's Criminal Division, Sergb E. Acosta, and Chief of the
Civil Divisk>n in New York. Jane Booth, were very cooperative and willing to assist the
52
Department of State
The Department of State (DOS) was generally slow to respond to the Select
Subcommittee's document requests and reluctant to facilitate requested depositions and
interviews. At the outset of the Subcommittee's investigation, the Department stated that
it 'remains committed to cooperating fully with the Select Subcommittee, with a view
toward concluding this inquiry promptly."^*' The State Department's actual performance fell
well short of Ks assurances. Only days prior to the Sut>committee's drafting deadline and
after the Subcommittee had met with all witnesses, did the Department of State provide
important documents which were requested within the first month of the Subcommittee's
existence.
The Select Subcommittee, on July 26, 1996, made an initial request to the
Department of State for Ambassador Galbraith's compilation of memos which he
maintained in his office in Zagreb as his "record' of the issues and events that he
encountered as US Ambassador to Croatia. Also requested were the Ambassador's
calendars, phone records, and travel vouchers. The Department at first characterized the
record as being Ambassador Galbraith's personal document despite it having been typed
by a government secretary, on a government computer, on govemment time."
On August 22, 1996, the State Department made available only selected (by State
Department officials) portions of the record. Even then, the Subcommittee was not given
copies of these materials, as requested, but rather was only allowed to review selected
portions at the State Department, where no photocopying or verbatim note taking was
permitted.^' Not until September 18, 1996, were Chaimnan Hyde and Mr. Hamilton advised
that Ambassador Galbraith's 'record* would be made available, in its entirety, at the State
Department. It was made available for review, however, solely to the chief counsels who
could not rennove any notes from the Department, nor discuss the contents of the over 1 50
Select Subcommittee staff.
" Letter from Barbara Larkin (hereinafter tarkin*). Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to HydS (July 30, 1996). See Appendix B.
" Letter from Hyde and Lee Hamilton (hereinafter 'Hamilton*), Ranking Minority
Member, Select Subcommittee, to Christopher (July 26, 1996). See Appendix B.
" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Aug. 22. 1996). See Appendix B.
53
page document with anyone other than Chairman Hyde and Mr. Hamilton."
Based on testinxjny received by various witnesses, the Select Subcommittee, on
August 14, 1996. requested access to additional documents during staff travel to Embassy
Zagreb. The requested documents included the chronological cable file of all cables sent
to the State Department by Embassy Zagreb, as well as notes taken by Political Officer
Richard Hoitzapple during Gaibraith's meetings. To alleviate costs and the burdens of
production upon the State Department, Select Subcommittee staff offered to review the
previously requested phone records and travel voucher information while at Embassy
Zagreb, and to simply make copies of only those portions the Subcommittee staff
determined to be relevant to their inquiry. This offer would have saved the Department
from making photocopies of the entire set of documents, and shipping those same items
to the Select Subcommittee offices." Upon arrival in Zagreb, however, the Subcommittee
staff was not permitted to view any documents and were told that it would be provided
access to them only in Washington. Some of the documents were finally provided on
September 18, 1996.'*
As part of the staff delegation's inquiries, the Select Subcommittee asked the State
Department to request, on its behalf, meetings with specified Croatian and Bosnian
govemment officials and community leaders to discuss their knowledge of the United
States' role in Iranian arms transfers.'* Due to the late notice from the State Department,
Embassy Zagreb was only able to arrange one meeting. One hour prior to the staffs
departure, the Subcommittee staff met with Croatian Muslim cleric Imam Sevko Omerfoasic.
Despite a renewed request," the State Department has never shared a copy of a
diplomatic note or other Departmental correspondence showing Department efforts to
arrange the requested meetings with foreign officials.
B.
^' Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Sept 17, 1996). See Appendix B.
** Letter from Hyde and Hamitton to Christopher (Aug. 14, 1996). See Appendix
" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Sept 17, 1996). See Appendix B.
'* Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 12, 1996); letter from Hyde and
Hamitton to Christopher (Sept. 5. 1996). See Appendix B.
" Letter from Hyde and Hamilton to Christopher (September 5, 1996). See
Appendix B.
54
Subsequent document requests, made in early and mid-August, were also not
responded to until September, including requests to turn over the approximately 30 spiral
notebooks that former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Alexander
Vershbow kept during his tenure with the State Department. The morning of Vershbow's
deposition, the Select Subcommittee staff was informed that Vershbow made available
some of his handwritten notes, which were taken contemporaneously with events being
investigated by the Subcommittee. That same day. Chairman Hyde submitted a document
request to the State Department requesting production of all of Vershbow's notes, not just
those the State Department decided the Subcommittee should review." More than one
month later, the State Department provided only portions of the materials to Hyde and
Hamilton, and even fewer sections for review by Subcommittee staff.
The integrity of the Subcommittee's investigation and report rests upon the
assurance that all materials it has determined relevant, have been turned over. The
Subcommittee could not entrust the truth-seeking process to the Department and
indivkJuals who have a stake in the outcome. As with any oversight investigation, it should
be the oversight body that makes the determination of relevant material, not the agency
at the heart of the investigation.
With respect to requests for depositions, on August 1, 1996. the Select
Subcommittee sent letters requesting the State Department make Deputy Secretary of
State Strot)e Talbott and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff available for staff
depositions." Subcommittee Staff was advised that the Department's legal section was
reviewing the resolution creating the Subcommittee to detemnine if the Select
Subcommittee had the authority to take staff depositions of "principals.* It was asserted
that the "principals' were Seaetary of State Warren Christopher. Deputy Secretary of State
Talbott, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Tamoff. Moreover, it was also asserted
that the issue of whether the State Department would even allow 'principals' to sit for staff
depositions was at the same time separate from whether the Select Subcommittee enjoyed
the authority to conduct such proceedings.^
B.
^* Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 12, 1996). See Appendix B.
'• Letters from Pocker and Meltzer to Christopher (Aug. 1. 1996). See Appendix
" Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 26, 1996); letter from Patrick B. Mun^y
(hereinafter 'Murray'). Deputy Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee, to Michael
Klosson. Deputy Assistant Secretary. Legislative Affairs, US Department of State (Aug.
55
The State Department's refusal of the Select Subcommittee's request to have
Talbott and Tarnoff sit for the requested depositions could not be based upon any legal
principle. House Resolution 416 unambiguously authorized such depositions and
authorized the Chairman to issue a subpoena compelling the appearance of any individual
for such depositions. In the interest of time, the Subcommittee agreed to the State
Department's August 28 proposal that Taltxjtt and Tarnoff meet with Chairman Hyde. Mr.
Hamilton, and Select Sutx»mmittee staff for a one hour informal unsworn interview.'' At
the interview both Talbott artd Tarnoff agreed to provide their testimony under oath and did
so.
Additionally, the State Department did not honor the Subcommittee's request" to
meet with Secretary Christopher. On Septemt>er 26, the Department informed the Select
Subcommittee that the Secretary's schedule did not permit him to accommodate the
request.**
The White House - National Security Council
The National Security Council (NSC) made only 22 documents available to the
Select Subcommittee staff out of approximately 63,000 pages of documents that turned
up in response to its initial search request and review. Many of these documents are
classified as Top Secret." There were another 75 documents that the NSC agreed to brief
only Memtjers. with staff present. Those documents could neither be copied, nor read by
Sut>committee staff.
The Select Subcommittee also requested the NSC make available its personnel for
depositions. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and US Ambassador to the Czech
Republic Jenonne Walker (who had been on the NSC during the green light decision),
were asked to testify due to their direct role in provkiing instructk)ns to US Ambassador to
Croatia Peter Gaibraith regarding the US response to Croatian PreskJent Franjo Tudjman's
request for a US position on Iranian arms transfers. Deputy Natk)nal Security Advisor
6. 1996). See Appendix B.
*' Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Aug. 29, 1996). See Appendix B.
" Letter from Hyde and Hamilton to Christopher (SepL 24. 1996). See Appendix
B.
" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (SepL 26. 1996). See Appendix B.
56
Samuel Berger's deposition was requested because of statements attributed to him by
Alexander Vershbow. former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. With
respect to Vershbow. he was integral to the fonnuiatlon of the policy change while he was
at the State Department in late April and early May of 1994. In June 1994. he moved to
the NSC. where he continued to follow this issue. Based on NSC documents there was
also reason to interview him regarding his actions and knowledge after the "no instructions"
policy had been articulated to the Croatian government.'*
The NSC witnesses from whom depositions were requested were determined based
on a number of factors, including how centra! his or her role was in the conveyance of the
Iranian green light decision. Disturbing questions of credibility needed to be resolved, as
well as issues of whether the President was fully infomned of the intelligence on this matter
or on the risks Inherent in making the decision to let Iran send weapons into Croatia and
Bosnia. These issues were particularly difficult to ascertain, due to the 'deliberative
process" veil of executive privilege the Administration cast over this information.
On August 14, 1996. the Counsel to the President. Jack Quinn. responded to the
Select Subcommittee's request to take the depositions of Lake. Berger. Walker, and
Vershbow. The White House asserted the position that neither cun-ent nor fomier NSC
staff vrould be allowed to sit for staff depositrons. because to do so would intmde upon the
President's 'deliberative process."*
The White House described the Presklent's "deliberative process" on July 23. 1996.
as matters pertaining to confidential communications to and from the President.
Presidential meetings with foreign heads of state, and the content and deliberations of
Principals* and Deputies' Committee meetings. The Select Subcommittee made it clear
that their questioning would not intrude upon these areas. The Subcommittees interest
was to establish facts regarding these individuals' actions implementing and transmitting
the policy, not to delve into their deliberative discussions with the President The
Subcommittee understands the necessity of preserving the Presklent's ability to seek frank
arKJ honest discusskin of views from his staff, in order for him to undertake his obligations
** Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 15. 1996); letters from Pocker to Lake
(July 31. 1996). See Appendix B.
** Letter from Jack Quinn (hereinafter "Quinn"), Counsel to the President, to
Hyde (Aug. 14. 1996). See Appendix 8.
57
appropriately.^
Due tc the NSC's lack of cooperation, the Select Subcommittee began preparation
of subpoenas to compel the production of sworn depositions of Lake, Berger, and
Vershtiow. To avoid issuance of the subpoenas, the White House Counsel met with
Chairman Hyde and Subcommittee staff on September 17, 1996. The Counsel explained
that "executive privilege is as much a process as it is a privilege.' Thus, there was no
difficulty for the NSC and the White House to produce these senior government officials
for an interview to discuss their role in the execution of the Iranian arms pipeline policy
decision so long as it was merely an "interview" format. The Counsel argued that, in the
view of the White House, an oath and a transcript alter the nature of a meeting, because
those items are 'indicia of a hearing.' He admitted, however, that there is a well-
recognized exception to executive privilege whenever there are "credible allegations of
criminal wrongdoing." Additionally, the White House required the presence of a Member
of Congress during the interviews with "principals" Lake and Berger.^'
The White House continued to refuse, however, to permit Leon Fuerth. Assistant to
the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to appear for a deposition, as requested
by the Select Sut)committee". Rather. Fuerth was made available to brief only Chairman
Hyde and Mr. Hamilton on issues not touching upon the deliberative process.*
To resolve the impasse, and to facilitate the fact-gathering process within the Select
Subcommittee's very limited time frame, Chairman Hyde accommodated the White
House's prerogative on this issue and agreed to non-sworn inten/iews. For the record, it
was nnade dear that if the Select Subcommittee was dissatisfied with the conduct of these
interviews, it had not waived its prerogative to issue and serve subpoenas compelling the
public servants' appearance for sworn depositions.
The Subcommittee is adamant, however, that there is no basis in taw for staff of the
NSC to refuse to appear before authorized Congressional subcommittees and give sworn
testimony demanded by a valid subpoena on matters pertinent to the legislative inquiry.
" Mun^y notes from NSC meeting (July 23,1996).
" Mun^y notes from Hyde-Quinn meeting (Sept. 17. 1996).
" Letter from Pocker and Meltzer to Quinn (Aug. 2, 1996). See Appendix B.
" Letter from Quinn to Hyde (Aug. 14. 1996). See Appendix B.
58
Congress "is entitled to have" a witness under subpoena give nonprivileged "testimony
pertinent to the inquiry. . . before the (authorized] committee."" The interest of the
Executive Branch in preserving the confidentiality of privileged material is fully protected
by appearing in response to the subpoena but asserting privilege in the event the witness
is asked questions which call for privileged material." To the extent NSC staff believe that
questions or document requests propounded by the Subcommittee through its staff call for
privileged material, the NSC may invoke such privileges through the proper procedural
mechanism. Short of making a specific claim of privilege, however, NSC staff cannot lay
claim to any immunity from the obligation to give sworn testimony in response to a valid
subpoena for pertinent information. Such refusal to appear and be placed under oath in
response to such a subpoena would be grounds for a citation for contempt of Congress."
The NSC staff cannot claim or be granted immunity from answering subpoenas.
First, the White House's assertion that this policy of not appearing for depositions has been
a long-standing tradition of the NSC is incon-ect. Former NSC aide Oliver North
involuntarily testified before Congress." NSC aide David Wigg testified before a federal
grand jury.^ National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and two former NSC staff
members were called as witnesses before a Senate investigative subcommittee,** and the
House Ethics Committee subpoenaed Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Robert
Hyland. all of whom were NSC staff."
* McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135. 180 (1927) (hereinafter "McQrain!).
'' 2 Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel 197 (Sept. 6. 1978). 1978 OLC Lexis
50. at 205.
.»McGmioat180.
» United States v. Notlh. 901 F.2d 843. 851 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), qd
tBheaonq. 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. CIr. 1990) (per curiam), cftft. denied. 500 U.S. 541
(1991).
" G. Lardner. Wallarh Soupht $1 Million; Meese Ally Asked Client to SuDDOrt
•Washington Presence' on Pipeline. Washington Post. Mar. 6. 1988.
* G. Lardner. Billy Probers to Question A Carter Aide. Washington Post, Sept.
16. 1980.atA12.
* C. Babcock & S. Armstrong. Fthirs Cnmmittee to Call 4 Officials: Committee to
Call 4 in S- Korean Probe; Subpoenas Voted In Investigation of S. Korean Gifts.
59
The Administration's argument that these precedents are distinguishable in that they
involved investigations into violations of federal criminal laws whereas the Select
Subcommittee's investigation is essentially a matter of oversight, is spurious. The
Supreme Court has not limited the power of investigation to cases involving allegations
of criminal misconduct, nor has the Court accorded less weight to the congressional
interest in oversight as compared to investigating crimes. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has held that the congressional investigatory power 'encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.' in addition to 'probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste."^'
Second, no official within the Executive Branch of government - not even the
President himself - enjoys blanket immunity from the obligation to comply with valid
subpoenas. If the President lacks blanket immunity from the subpoena power, it follows,
a fortiod, that NSC staff lack such immunity.** There is an obligation to testify in
appropriate instances that applies equally to all federal officials and that derives specifically
from the right of Congress to oversee the faithful execution of the laws by the President
and his administration."" Although a number of recognized privileges, such as executive
privilege "may shield an official from answering some or all congressional questions if they
fail to meet the standard of 'right to know,' there is no basis for a constitutional doctrine that
some officials need not even appear to hear the legislators' questions because they are
wrapped in privilege as to every aspect of their knowledge or activity."*^
Moreover, according to the Supreme Court:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information . . . and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite informatton - whk:h not infrequently is true - recourse must be had
Washington Post, June 9. 1977. at A1.
^ Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178. 187 (1957).
» Cf. tJixon V. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731. 750 (1982) ("The President's unique
statuS'under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials.*)
** Franck. Comment: The Constitutional and Legal Position of the Nationa!
Security Advisor and Deputy Advisor, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 634, 637 (1980).
^ Id. at 638 (citing t Inited States y. Nuqd, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
59
60
to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for
such information which is volunteered is not always accurate and complete;
so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.*'
In short, the Supreme Court, has ruled that "[t]he power of inquiry - with process
to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."*^ and "is
inherent in the power to make laws."*'
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board
In order to do as thorough a job as possible investigating the Iranian green light, the
Subcommittee attempted to review previous efforts. Principal among them was the
investigation undertaken by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) in 1995.
The lOB investigation had been undertaken at the direction of White House Counsel Abner
Mikva, and rt was upon its findings that the White House Counsel reached his legal
conclusions. Accordingly, on July 26, 1996, Chairman Hyde requested a copy of the lOB's
report to the President on the Iranian arms matter. The Subcommittee also requested a
list of names of the individuals interviewed by the lOB during the course of its investigation
and any memoranda of those interviews.**
On August 5, 1996. Anthony Hamngton, Chaimnan of the lOB rejected the request
for these documents.** In their discussrans with the Subcommittee, the White House and
lOB never asserted privilege, either executive or attorney-client. Their argument was
simply that disclosure of the report and the underlying documents would "do violence" to
the lOB's ability to obtain a truthful and complete accounting of events from government
officials. The lOB was unable to answer the Subcommittee's question of why the lOB's
public release, a few months eariier, of its findings on its investigation of intelligence
activities in Guatemala under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, had not done more
*' McGrata at 175.
** Id. at 174.
*» Eastland v. l InHftd Statas Servicemen's Fund. 421 U.S. 491 , 504 (1975).
** Letters from Hyde to Anthony S. Harrington (hereinafter "Harrington"),
Chairman. Intelligence Oversight Board (July 26, 1996 and Aug. 13, 1996); letter from
Hyde and Hamilton to Lake (July 26, 1996). See Appendix B.
** Letter from Harrington to Hyde (Aug. 5. 1996). Sfifi Appendix B.
61
'damage* than sharing the Iranian green light findings with Congress behind closed doors.
The lOB did argue that the public release of the Guatemala findings was necessary due
to the confused state of the record on the matter.** That may very well have been the
case, but the Subcommittee notes that the same confusion reigns in the Iranian green light
issue.
After much negotiation the White House did eventually relent to providing the
Subcommittee with a written list of the individuals the lOB interviewed in the preparation
of its Iranian green light report.*'
On the issue of testifying before the Subcommittee under oath and on the record,
Harrington, similar to the NSC staff, also refused, on advisement from the White House.
The information he provided to the Sut>committee was through an unswom interview,
without a court reporter present to make a verbatim transcript.
The Subcommittee strongly believes that, in this case, the Administration's refusal
to give Congress access to the lOB report has actually done real damage to the integrity
of the lOB's investigatory process. Based upon the infomnation the White House has
provided from the report, the Subcommittee concludes that at least two individuals
interviewed by the lOB withheld relevant documentary information and some may have
provided contradictory statements to the lOB and Congress. These individuals are,
however, now safe in the knovi^edge that it is impossible to document these actions
because of the lOB's claim of 'privilege.'
Finally, the Select Subcommittee is concerned that the Administration has publicly
cited this lOB report to exonerate the Administration of wrong doing in the Iranian green
light policy, but refuses to allow Congress to examine the report or to allow its author to
testify under oath about it so as to allow the Subcommittee to verify its accuracy or
authority. Democratic Senator Rot)ert Kerrey has expressed similar concerns:
I think this entity ... is veiy badly named as an oversight board, and cannot,
under any circumstances. vindKate the Presklent If there is a daim of oversight -
if there is a daim of Executive Privilege and a daim of vindk^ation simultaneously,
one of those two has to fall.
** Select Subcommittee Interview with Anthony Harrington (hereinafter
■Harrington InL"), July 25,1996, at 7.
*^ Letter from Harrington to IHyde (Sept 20. 1996). See Appendix B.
62
Let me isolate two mistakes. One is in implying because it has a
name - Oversight Board ~ that it is an oversight board. It's not.
Plhere's been some references that the President w^as vindicated by
an oversight board, and that leaves an impression with the citizen that this
is different than what I think this organization is.
The second mistake was sending Mr. Hamngton to the Hill at all. I
mean. I really think he should not have been sent up to Capitol Hill to srt
before this Committee with a report that he would read but not be able to
leave with the Committee.**
Subpoena
Unlike some of the other Congressional examinations of the Iranian green light, the
Select Subcommittee enjoys a broad mandate as charted out in House Resolution 416. In
order to conduct an authentic oversight investigation. H.Res. 416 bestowed upon the
Chairman of the Select Subcommittee, "upon consultation with the ranking minority party
member of the Select Subcommittee." the authority to take "affidavits and depositions
pursuant to notice or subpoena.* Authorized subpoenas may be signed by the Chairman
of the Select Subcommittee. Furthermore, the resolution provided that such depositions
and affidavits could be conducted by staff as "designated by the chairman of the Select
Subcommittee."**
The Subcommittee conskjered the issuance of subpoenas on several occasions,
sometimes to the extent of having them prepared for service: once to get the White House
to comply with requests for NSC documents and depositions; twice to get the White House
to produce lOB materials; and twice to compel the Secretary of State to produce requested
documents. On eanh occasion the issuance was avoided by either the capitulation of the
Executive Branch or by Chairman Hyde's negotiating a compromise whereby the Select
Sutxxxnmittee couk) get access to cntk:ally required information without urKJermining either
the Select Subcommittee's rights to do legitimate oversight or the Executive Branch's
asserted privileges. Throughout this process, considering the very limited time made
** Hearing on US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments into Bosnia before
the Senate Setact Committee on Intelligence. 104th Cong. (May 28. 1996) (statement
of Vice Chairman Robert Kerrey).
** House Resolution 416. 104th Cong. (1995). Sea Appendix B.
63
available for it to do its work, the Subcommittee has preferred to compromise in order to
do as complete a job as possible rather than join in divisive and counterproductive public
battles with the Administration.
Classification
The Select Subcommittee on July 26, 1996.^ asked the State Department to
declassify Ambassador Galbraith's two reporting cables (Zagreb 1683 and Zagreb 1721 ),
dated April 27 and 29, 1994, as well as a memorandum to the file he prepared, dated May
6. 1994.'* These documents are absolutely key to any coherent discussion of the genesis
and implementation of the green light policy. They were prepared contemporaneously with
key developments and can be used in verifying the accuracy of testimony. The matters
discussed in these documents, excepting a few brief phrases, are not diplomatically
sensitive and their public disclosure would not compromise national security or intelligence
information or technk]ues. Additk>nally the substance of large portions of these documents
has t>een testified to in public testimony t>efore various Congressional committees by
Ambassadors Galbraith and Rednrtan, Undersecretary Tamoff, and Deputy Secretary
Talt>ott, with noticeable elisions of inconvenient facts and with a 'spin' not substantiated
in the documents. Nonetheless, after over one month of delit)erations and several missed
deadlines, the Department of State finally decided not to declassify any part of the two
cables and only declassified approximately one-half of the memorandum to the file.''
Clearly demonstrating the Administration's efforts to hkie its actions t)ehind the
shroud of dassificatnn is the feet that several sentences and phrases were redacted from
the nnenfK>randum that were dearty undassified, tHJt which would have been embarrassing
to the Administratk^n if they were known. For example, charaderizations by a senior
Department of State offk;ial of Washington's inept and confused handling of the initial
request from the Croatians about Iranian arms transshipments.
Based upon this highly unsatisfactory response. Chairman Hyde wrote letters to the
'° Letter from Hyde, Hamilton and Gilman to Christopher (July 26, 1996). See
Appendbc B.
'^ These are some of the documents that the State Department refused to altow
the Subcommittee to have in its possesson. Accordingly, they are currently availat>le
only at the Department arid cannot be induded in this report's appendices.
82
A copy of the redaded document is induded in Appendix B.
64
Information Security Oversight Office and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel on September 26. 1996" reporting the Department of State's apparent violation of
the Clinton Administration's own Executive Order 12958. in which are laid out the proper
uses of classification. Specifically, the Department appears to be in violation of the Order's
forbidding the classification of information to "prevent embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency.*** Chairman Hyde advised the House of his action in a floor
statement on September 26, 1996.** The Subcommittee heard telephonically from the
Information Security Oversight on October 2, that an investigation is undenway.**
More recently, the Department of State refused the Subcommittee's request that it
declassify portions of the contemporaneous notes kept by fomier State Department official
Alexander Vershbow. The Subcommittee agrees that those portions that reference
confidential discussions with foreign heads of state are legitimately classified. It is.
however, unconscionable to refuse, as the Administration has. to declassify those portions
of the notes that detail conversations between US govemment officials on the execution
of what is now a publicly revealed policy.
" Letter from Hyde to Steven GarfinKel (hereinafter 'Garfinke!'). Director.
Infbnfnation Security Oversight. Natfonal Archives (Sept 26. 1996); letter from Hyde to
Rostyn Mazer, Chair. Interagency Security Classificatnn Appeals Panel. US
Department of Justice (Sept. 26, 1996). See Appendix B.
^ Executive Order 12958. Sectnn 1.8 (2).
»• 142 Cong. Record H1 1360 (No. 135 Sept 26. 1996) (Statements of Hyde).
*• Letter from Garfinke! to Hyde (Oct 1. 1996). Sea Appendix B.
65
CHAPTER 7
INVESTIGATION BY THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (lOB)
Origins of the lOB Investigation
In the fall of 1994, based upon a variety of intejijgence reports from several sources, ^^^
and operational messages fromWBMIMWBBJyand elsewhere. Director of Central ^^y
Intelligence (DC!) James Woolsey, became alarmed that members of the Clinton ^^'
Administration may have been involved in an illegal covert action. He was concemed that
an improper and unauthorized diplomatic activity was qccuning, which was helping Iran
circumvent the UN arms embargo in the Balkans.'^J^^
As Woolsey examined the information that had been compiled for him.' he realized
the situation under review was related to a matter he had first become aware of in early
May 1994. In the ainent case, as before, there were strong indications that something
was askew in the implementation of the US policy enforcing the Bosnian amns embargo
as interpreted in the US Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. Woolsey quickly decided to seek
guidance and advice from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. That meeting
occurred on October 5, 1994.*
During that meeting, Woolsey shared with Lake the information he had indicating
a possible US role in facilitating or acquiescing in the Iranian shipment of weapons to
Bosnia by way of Croatia.' As a result of that meeting, on October 14, National Security
Council (NSC) officials, including Senior Director of Intelligence Programs George Tenet
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of James Woolsey. SepL 13. 1996. at 29.
(hereinafter "Woolsey Dep.*).
' CIA Memorandum by^HHHiv4'T3"^"9 Points for the DCI's Weekly
Meetings" (Sept 30. 1994).^^
' NSC document. 30, Nov. 16. 1994; CIA Memorandum by0BBVHBs
Talking Poinjg for the DCI's jl^eekly Meetings* (Segt. 30, 1994); CIA Memorandum for
the RecordMBHBBBHOcL 14. 1994)..
* CIA Memorandum for the RecordJVHIBBaif(OcL 14. 1994): Woolsey
Dep. at 53-54^
66
and Deputy Legal Advisor James Baker.' met with officials from the CIA to undertake a
preliminary investigation and to obtain copies of relevant documents.*
On November 1, 1994, NSC Legal Advisor Alan Kreczko met with White House
Counsel Abner Mikva to discuss the issues raised at the Woolsey-Lake meeting.' At about
the same time. Mikva met with Lake and White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta for the
same reason."
In response to some of the legal issues raised in its preliminary investigation, Baker
wrote a legal memorandum analyzing the issues presented. That memorandum for the
record was dated November 7, 1994. According to oral, unswom statements by NSC staff,
that memo attempts to clarify the distinction between covert activities and diplomatic
activities.'
On November 29. Mikva met with Anthony Hanington, Chairman of the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board.'" The two men discussed the question of US complicity in
Not to be confused with former Secretary of State James A. Baker. III.
• Handwritten list of attendees at October 14. 1994, meeting with George Tenet
at CIA headquarters, CIA document label 94-339. Oct. 14. 1994; CIA Menvsrandum by
jrandum ogj* assage of Operational File to NSC Q^rge
^Tenet/jCIA CaETe.lPMiflHHOct. 15. 1994; CIA Memorandum byflpM
MBB^Telephone Call to Georgeienet' (Oct. 17. 1994); CIA Memorandum for the
Record "Meeting with George Tenet from NSC re Croatian Issues" (Oct. 14. 1994).
^ NSC document. 29. Nov. 16. 1994.
* Select Subcommittee Interview of Anthony S. Hanington. July 25, 1996, at 1
(hereinafter 'Harrington Int').
0 NSC document. 34. Nov. 16. 1994.
*" The lOB was first established by President Ford in 1976. Since then, the lOB
has had specific White House oversight responsibilities for intelligence activities.
President Clinton established the current lOB in 1993, pursuant to Executive
Order 12863. Under that Executive Order, the lOB is charged with preparing reports of
intelligence activities the lOB t>elieves may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or
presidential directive. See Executive Order 12863. The lOB is directed to refer reports
to the Attorney General if wrongdoing is believed to have occurred.
67
the Iranian circumvention of the UN arms embargo. During this meeting, the lOB was
assigned the task of investigating the arms embargo violations issues presented by the US
actions in the Ball^ans.
The lOB's investigative mandate was framed very narrowly by White House Counsel
Mikva. The lOB's directive was nanower in scope than the Select Subcommittee's charter.
as found in H.Res. 416. The issues before the lOB were:
1 . Whether Ambassador Galbrarth or Ambassador Redman was directly
involved in assisting an arms shipment pass through Croatia to
Bosnia in May 1994, in violation of the UN Arms Embargo;
2. Whether the "no instmctions" message to Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman by Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman constituted illegal
covert activity; and
3. Whether Ambassador Galbraith and Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs. Richard Holbrooke, made any offers
to provide amns or funds to the Bosnian or Croatian Govemments?"
Conduct of the lOB Investigation
The lOB conducted its investigatton by reviewing the intelligence and operational
infomnation underlying the initial concerns of the DCl. The IDS also reviewed additional
intelligence that was made available from other non-CIA sources. Several current and
former US government officials were inten/iewed by the lOB. Captain David Wesley
(USAF) of the lOB staff was assigned to work with the lOB members in the investigation
and the preparation of the report
Anthony S. Harrington is the current Chairman of the lOB. He is a senfor partner
at the Washington. D.C. law finn of Hogan and Hartson. Prior to his service with the
lOB. Mr. Harrington sensed as General Counsel to the Clinton-Gore 1992 presklential
campaign.
Mr. Harrington's felkw Board members included former Deputy Director of the
Natk)nal Security Agency Ann Caracristi and Philadelphia businessman Harold W.
Pote.
" Harrington Int at 1-3.
68
The individuals interviewed by the lOB were:
Department of State
Warren Christopher, Secretary
Peter Tamoff. Under Secretary/Policy
Richard Holbrooke. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Charles Redman, Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia
Peter Galbraith, Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia
Ronald Neitzke. Deputy Chief of Mission. Zagreb, Croatia
Jenonne Walker, Ambassador to the Czech Republic (former Senior Director
for European Affairs at the NSC)
National Security Council
Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor
Alexander Vershbow. Senior Director for European Affairs (former
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs)
Department of Defense
Walter Slocombe. Undersecretary for Policy
General Wesley Clark, Commander in Chief, US Southem Command (former
Director of the Office for Strategic Policy and Planning. Joint Chiefs)
Major General Ed Hanion, US Marine Corps HQ
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hemck. former Defense Attache. Zagreb, Croatia
Colonel John Sadler, current Defense Attache. Zagreb, Croatia
Colonel Clifton Schroeder. US Marine Corps Reserve, European Command
LNO, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Colonel Davkl Hunt. US Army. Sarajevo. Bosnia-Herzegovina
Central Intelligence Agency
R. James Woolsey. former Director of Central tntefligence
Jmiral WPIiam Studeman, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Tchief of Interagency Balkan Task Force
Theodore Price, former Dsputy Director of Operatkms
Douglas MacEachin. former Deputy Director for Intelligence
69
Harrington stated that the interview process was very infomnal. The lOB interviews
were not conducted under oath. None of the individuals interviewed were informed of the
applicability of Title 18, United States Code. § 1001, which makes it a crime to provide a
material false statement during the course of an investigation conducted by an agency of
the Executive branch. Harrington also stated that no verbatim text of any of the interviews
exist. The only memorialization of the interviews would be the notes taken by the
interviewer."
The lOB concluded its investigation by mid-May 1995. White House Counsel Mikva,
presented the lOB's report to the President on May 17, 1995."
Findings of the iOB Investigation
The IOB reached the foltowing factual conclusions, which are addressed, seriatim.
The IOB review found that Ambassador Galbraith did not take any action to facilitate
or direct the release of a Bosnia-txsund convoy that had been stopped in Croatia in eariy
May 1994. The IOB did find, however, that it had been provided conflicting information
regarding the role of Amt>assador Redman with respect to this particular convoy. CIA
officials stated that the Bosnians asked Redman to help obtain the release of the convoy
during negotiations in Vienna on the future of the Bosnian Federation. The IOB, however,
deenned Ambassador Redman's conduct as 'diplomatic discusstons,' insofar as he simply
removed anjpiogdiment to negotiations that had arisen due to the stoppage of the
convoy." AMMsfficial woridng with Ambassador Redman in Vienna stated that Redman
had been advised of the problem by the Bosnians and may have taken steps to get it
released because the issue was not raised again in the negotiations. Ambassador
Redman stated, however, that he had taken no action obtaining the release of this
particular convoy. The IOB further found that even if Redman had taken action, the IOB
J^ List of IOB Interviewees. Select Subcommittee Doc. 000003, Sept. 20, 1996.
" Harrir^on Int. at 6.
'* NSC document. 39, July 28. 1995.
IS I
Hanir>gton Int at 2.
70
did not believe he was aware that the convoy contained weapons/*
For this issue, based on the factual conclusions made by the lOB, White House
Counsel decided that Ambassador Galbraith's and Ambassador Redman's actions did not
fall within the definition of covert activity.
With respect to the secorMJ issue, the lOB concluded that Ambassador Galbraith's
and Redman's statements to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman were consistent with the
"no instructions' policy approved by Washington. Additionally, the lOB found that Galbraith
had t}een instmcted not to report back, in writing, the result of his communications with the
Croatian President." The decision not to document the communication between the
Ambassadors and the Croatian Government was beyond the scope of the lOB's
investigative mandate."
The White House Counsel reached the legal conclusion on this issue that in
delivering the "no instructions* message, Galbraith and Redman were following their
instnjctions property and had not engaged in covert action.^'
With respect to the third issue, the lOB was unable to reach a conclusion as to
exactly what had been discussed by Ambassadors Galbraith and Holbrooke with Bosnian
jnd Croatian govemment officiajgjn thejgll of 1994. The lOB was unable to disprove
^JM^BP^M^eporting thatypB|Ahe two Ambassadors had discussed SF>ecific
covert action proposals with foreign offlcials. However, the panel believed these
discussions probably involved little more than 'contingency plans in the event the embargo
was lifted.'^ The lOB found no evkj^n^ that actual promises of funds or weapons were
made by the US officialSj^
Mikva concluded that legally these conversations were nothing more than
'•Id.
"Id.
at 3.
"Id.
at 3.
" Id. at 2.
»ld.
at 4-5.
'^Id.
at 5.
71
hypothetical discussions or items under consideration among the parties to the
negotiations. Because nothing concrete was promised, White House Counsel found that
no covert action occurred as a result of these discussions.^'
Limitations of ttie iOB Report
Despite the generally favorable findings set forth above, the White House, as
discussed in Chapter 6, refused to noake the IOB report available to the Subcommittee for
its review. The White House insisted that it only provide an oral briefing on the report
without a verbatim transcript The White House also refused the Subcommittee's request
to review the documentation compiled in the preparation of the IOB report, such as the
notes of interviews. Accordingly, the Sut>committee can judge the IOB report based only
on the information it has been provided.
That said, it is evident that the IOB investigation cannot be looked to for authoritative
answers to many of the questions relating to the Iranian green light policy that have been
put before the Subcommittee. In addition to the tOB's scope of inquiry being extremely
narrow, the report was prepared without benefit of interviews of key participants in the
events in question. Similarly, some of the indivkJuals interviewed did not provide the IOB
with access to relevant materials and, it appears, some of those interviewed did not
respond truthfully or completely. The IOB investigation appears to have been less than
thorough and insufficient to support the conclusk>ns reached.
First, the Subcommittee notes that the IOB never interviewed Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott rK>r IDeputy National Security Advisor Samuel ("Sandy*) Berger^ about
their participation in the implementation of the President's Iranian green light decision.
in Chapter 8, we explain how these two individuals were in key positions during the
period in question. It is sufficient here to note that Talbott, the second highest State
Departnrtent official in the Administration, and the highest ranking State Department official
in the United States at ttie tune tfie decision was made.^ was traveling with the President
23
' See IOB List of Witnesses, supca note 12. Cf. Select Subcommittee List of
Depositions and Interviews, See Chapter 5.
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Thomas Donilon. Sept. 12, 1996, at 8-15.
Secretary Christopher was traveling in Egypt
72
when the green light issue was forwarded to the President." Meanwhile, Berger had been
in charge of the NSC; National Security Advisor Lake was traveling with the President.
Harrington has explained that the lOB was not concerned with how the policy was
formulated, but rather with the narrow questions of whether the policy was properly
implemented and whether the actions of any US government officials violated US law.*
Key to the first question, however, is understanding what exactly the policy was that
Ambassador Galbraith and other US diplomats were to have earned out. To do that, it is
necessary to determine Talbott's and Berger's understanding of that policy as given to
them by the President and how they expected it to be implemented. The lOB's failure to
interview these two key participants in the policy process seriously limits the value of the
JOB investigation.
Second, the Select Subcommittee questions the degree to which individuals
interviewed by the lOB were honest and forthcoming. Although the White House refuses
to disclose any statements of the JOB witnesses to the Select Subcommittee for review,
the lOB Chairman has stated that the lOB found no reason to make any criminal referrals
to the Justice Department based upon probable false statements made during the course
of the lOB's investigation. This leads the Subcommittee to surmise that the witnesses to
the lOB investigation gave statements, which contradict their testimony before the Select
Subcommittee, or the lOB is somehow unaware of significant factual inconsistencies in
various wKnesses' statements that have emerged in the Select Sut)committee's
investigation. One example, of many, which are developed in the following chapters,
p>ertains to the clear and material contradictions of several witnesses in the purported
transmittal of the 'no instructions* policy from Anthony Lake *with a raised eyebrow and
a smile.* The differences in the testimonies allows one to interpret the Administration's
policy as being strictly "No instructions. Period,"" as Anthony Lake put it, or "a wink and
a nod' as stated by Ambassador Galbraith.
" Select Subcommittee DeposKion of Strobe Talbott, SepL 5, 1996. at 30; Select
Subcommittee Interview of Samuel Berger, Sept. 26. 1996. at 1.
" Harrington Int. at 1 (scope of lOB inquiry narrower than Select
Subcommittee's). 2 (". . . [t]he lOB review was primarily concemed with determining if
the actions involving US officials would have fallen within the definition of 'covert
activity."). 6 (*. . . [t]he lOB does not investigate policy.*).
" Select Subcommittee Interview of Anthony Lake, SepL 26. 1996. at 2.
73
Finally, it has emerged Oiat some of the individuals whom the lOB interviewed, did
not provide the lOB with highly relevant and contemporaneous records of events under
investigation which they had in their possession. Specifically, Ambassador Galbraith and
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander ("Sandy") Vershtxjw t>oth
made contemporaneous records of events involved in the lOB's inquiry. That they did not
share these documents with the lOB, despite the lOB's request for such materials, is
disturbing.
In the case of Ambassador Galbraitn, he kept a daily "Record' of his activities - as
Ambassador to Croatia - in which he documented several highly relevant meetings that
are key to understanding whether or not he had acted consistently with the instmctions
provided him by the Department of State. The head of the lOB, Hanington. only leamed
of the 'Record' in the course of his interview with the Select Subcommittee. The
Subcommittee, itself, learned of the "Record's" existence from Galbraith's former secretory,
Chariotte Stottman, to whom the "Record" was dictated.*
Similarly, H also appears the lOB was never told that Vershbow," who participated
in many of the telegraphic and telephone communk:ations between the embassy in Croatia
and the State Department, kept contemporaneous handwritten notes of those
communications.^ The Subcommittee has found those documents invaluable to its efforts
to reconstruct the events, especially since the Administration saw to it that the events being
scrutinized by the Subcommittee are largely otherwise undocumented. The descriptions
" See Select Subcommittee Deposition of Chariotte Stottman, Aug. 10, 1996, at
15-20. ("Q: Can you tell us what the Record is? A: Well , the Record started in - the
Record ended in November of 1995. It started - I think it started and lasted for atx)ut
10 days in 1993 and then it picked back up - it picked back up. I think, late '93. The
first one picked up and erKJed in atxHit 10 days around September, I think of. 1993. and
then in November of 1993 he started a second one. and it went until I went on honrie
leave on February Ist. and ttien he didn't dk:tate it while I was gone. He picked tt back
up when I retumed to post in May. Q: When you came back May 1 , 1994, you had
been gone a good two-and-a-half, three months? A: Three months. Q: At that tinoe dkl
Ambassador Galbraith need to catch up on the Record? A: He dM some catching up.*)
^ Mr. Vershbow currently serves as the Senk>r Deputy in the Directorate for
European Affairs at the NSC.
* Notes of Alexander Vefshbow, fonner Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State: Select Subcommittee Depositton of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8. 1996. at 5-12.
74
of events found in Vershbow's notes, tend to be at odds with the public gloss the Clinton
Administration has put on the Iranian green light. Mis notes display the lack of serious
discussion leading up to the President's decision, which led ultimately to the Iranians
establishing their strategic beachhead in the heart of Europe. Had the lOB been aware of
the notes, it might not have played such a prominent role in the application of that gloss.
75
CHAPTER 8
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT POLICY
The decision by the Clinton Administration to give the Iranians and Croatians a
'green light' to throw the door open to Iranian weaponry, personnel and influence in the
Balkans was reached and implemented hastily in an uninformed haze of confusion. In
exploring the origins of the decision, which reflected a major departure from this country's
prior policy toward both Iran and the UN arms embargo, the Select Subcommittee
encountered staricly conflicting testinrx>ny from individuals involved in the process, as well
as significant discrepancies between contemporaneous documentation and the
Administration's after-the-fact rationalizations of its conduct. Those inconsistencies and
discrepancies represented a significant challenge to our ability to set forth with certair.ly
the factual record necessary to explain the origin of the decision to acquiesce in the
establishment of the Iranian arms pipeline. Nevertheless, this chapter will review the
relevant facts and contentions as revealed in the course of the investigation with a view
toward answering as best we can how such a decision came to be made and implemented.
This chapter is, for purposes of organizational clarity, divided into three sections.
In the first section, we have set forth the denranstrated US policy and reaction to Iranian
efforts to establish an arms pipeline through Croatia from August 1992, through the
summer of 1993. This section provides the background essential for understanding the
radical departure reflected by the April 1994 Iranian green light decision.
The second section describes the relevant events between Ambassador Peter
Galbraith's July 1993 arrival at his post in Croatia and April 1994, with a view toward
describing how Galbraith, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, US Special Envoy
Charles Redman, various Iranian surrogates and others orchestrated a situation in which
a radicat departure from established US policy toward Iran was not only contemplated but
approved at the highest levels of the US government
The third section provides a detailed expositk>n of what the Select Subcommittee
has t>een able to determine regarding the operatwnal details attendant to the new polic/s
genesis, implementatksn and immediate aftermath in 1994. It is, of necessity, intensely
detailed and inherently complicated, but has been presented in this fulsome manner to
allow the reader to reach his own judgment about the Clinton Administratton's corxJuct and
Its consequences.
76
No Question — "We Have A Policy"
In order to minimize the gravity of its decision not to inform Congress of the Iranian
green light decision, the Administration has attempted to argue throughout the Select
Subcommittee's investigation that the decision did not constitute a change in policy/
Although some of the witnesses from the Department of State have testified that, in their
opinion, US policy toward the amis embargo did not change in April 1994, no one has ever
been so disingenuous as to suggest that the decision was consistent with the US policy
of isolating Iran diplomatically, economically and politically. Moreover, numerous witnesses
testified that, as they understood it, US policy toward the UN arms embargo in the spring
of 1994 was exactly as Ambassador Galbraith described it in late April of 1994: the US
respects the arms embargo and expects other nations to do so, as well.^
The significant departure from prior policy represented by the Clinton
Administration's Iranian green light decision can only be appreciated when contrasted with
the response of the Bush Administration to the efforts of the Iranians and Croatians to
transship arms through Croatia to Bosnia in September 1992.* By swiftly and conclusively
informing the Croatian govemment that the United States did not approve of the Iranians
violating the UN arms embargo, bringing weapons and soldiers to Croatia, and using
Croatia as a transshipment point for arming Bosnian Muslims, the Bush Administration left
no doubt in the minds of the Croatians or the Iranians about American opposition to Iranian
involvement in the Balkan crisis. Although the Bush Administration knew that some
leakage of the arms embargo was occurring, it would not countenance an Iranian arms
pipeline and demanded, through a demarche, that the Croatians shut it down.
The Bush Administratton let the Croatis
Iranian arms pipeline was not to t>e condoned.i
Lknow by words as well as deeds that the
^Eg.. See Hearing On US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Transfers Into Bosnia
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 104 Cong. 65 (May 23, 1996)
(Testimony of Strobe Talbott).
' E4).. See Select Subcommittee Deposition of Robert l-iunter. Sept 20, 1996. at
8. 1 1-14. 41-42 (hereinafter "Hunter Dep.'): Select Subcommittee Deposition of General
Wesley Clark. Sept 4. 1996. at 7-13 (hereinafter 'Clark Dep.*).
* See Chapter 13.
77
Despite this "worry," tfie Croatian Government tested the US with the Iranian arms
shipment in September of 1992 and provided the senior official with a chance to convey
the US objections strongly. On Labor Day weekend 1992, he was sent to Croatia to
engage his Croatian contacts on the issue of the impounded Iranian arms shipment. He
met with Zuzul and advised him, in no uncertain terms, to send the arms back to Iran.'
Coupled with a United States demarche, a demand by the United States that the amns
delivery be reported to the UN and a request by Charge Ronald Neitzke of US Embassy
Zagreb to UNPROFOR to seize the arms, the CIA official's message as to the United
States' view on Iranian arms could not have been clearer.'
ifthe Central Intelligence Agency has been able to
deterfirrrie, the attempted Iranian arms pipeline was shut down in September 1992 and
remained djised until the Clinton Administration's Iranian Green Light decision in the spring
of 1994 Jp
On January 20, 1993 Bill Clinton was inaugurated PreskJent As noted earlier in this
* Select
11 (hereinafter
imittee Deposition ol
ug. 15. 1996. at 6-
• Select Subcommittee Depositfon of Ronald Neitzke. Aug. 7. 1996, at 13-23
(hereinafter 'Neitzke Dep.*).
Dep. at8-11.
|Dep. at 11-13.^^^
78
report, the Clinton Adnninistration expressed its intention to honor the UN arms embargo
as long as it was in effect.* The Clinton Administration also expressed strongly its policy
of isolating Iran diplomatically, economically and militarily.^° There was certainly nothing
in its public discussion of arms embargo policy or the policy toward Iran that would lead
foreign governments in the spring of 1993 to conclude that the United States would react
differently to the establishment of an Iranian arms pipeline through Croatia than it had in
September of 1992. The US had made a clear decision that UN Security Council
Resolution 713 applied to all of the former Yugoslavia and that "all arms embargo violations
should be investigated and where appropriate prosecuted.""
Events confirm that the Iranians ai
policy on Iranian arms transshipments
he Croatians understood the US no-nonsense
In February of 1993, the Turks and Iranians separately approaj
Govemment about the transshipment of arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
the Croatian
* See Chapter 3.
'"See Chapter 4.
11
Departmeot of State Cable, 82580, Mar. 22, 1993
79
The Croatian Government was clearly not willing to risk the ire of the United States.
-J^
In April 1993, Susak asked the US Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia,
Reginald Bartholomew, for the US view on Croatia's facilitation of Iranian arms shipments
to Bosnia. Bartholomew urged Susak to t>e careful in dealing with iran.^'' Bartholomew told
him that the United States could not be placed in the position of supporting Croatia in
transshipping Iranian arms and that it was Croatia's decision to make. Bartholomew went
on to say that the US could not be put in the positk>n of advising the Government of Croatia
to supply Iranian arms to the Bosnian Government.^ Ron Neitzke, serving as the
American Charge in Croatia in these pre-ambassadorial times, was informed by
Bartholomew of the Susak question and his response.^' Subsequent events in the next
few months revealed that Susak dk) not perceive Bartholomew's response as American
approval for such transshipments.
Around May 7, 1993. Presklent Tudjnnan discussed with Charge Neitzke the
^* Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1479. Apr. 27. 1993.
" Although depositton testimony was ot5lained from Mr. Bartholomew, his failure
to remember the words he spoke or the detafls of the conversation, plus his strained
efforts to fit his recollectk>ns into the current State Department Iheory" makes the
testimony of Ron Neitzke a t)etter source of evidence conceming this exchange.
^ Neitzke Dep. at 23-30.
80
increasing pressure the Croatian Government was receiving from Iran on the arms pipeline
issue. Tudjman characterized Iran as knocking at the door, and asked Neitzke what the
United States wanted Croatia to do. Neitzke. upon instructions from Washington, told
Tudjman that the United States did not want Croatia to enj^opto a relatkjnship with ]ran."
The Croatians followed Neitzke's advice a few days I
Although the Croatians would continue to flirt with greater ties to Iran in 1993. they
saw no need to ask the United States about its attitude toward the Iranian arms pipeline.
Charge Neitzke. the^jjMIBBofficial. and other US offlciais had nDade it abundantly clear.
Iranian arms in the Balkans was an unacceptable poison. As Ambassador Galbraith noted
in April 1994, "We do have a policy. We^obi^ the embargo and expect other countries to
obey Security Council resolutions.'^
The Question Is Orchestrated
The evidence that Peter Galbraith was involved in the planning of the Iranian arms
pipeline, or at the very least was knowledgeable of the details of its origin and operation
well before the last week in April 1994, is substantial. In his public testimony before the
House International Relations Committee in May of 1996, Galbraith assured Congressman
Henry Hyde that the kJea of establishing an Iranian arms pipeline to Bosnia originated with
the Croatians. and not w«thin the US government.* Moreover. Congressman Ballenger
questk)ned Galbraith regarding wrfiether Galbraith or "anyone else in our govemment ever
went to the Croatians. the Bosnians or the Iranians to suggest that they consider
" Neitzke Dep. at 32-34
23;
J^
^ Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1721, Apr. 29. 1994.
" Hearing On US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia Before
the House Committft** On International Relations 104th Cong. 54 (May 30, 1996}
(Testimony of Ambassador Galbraith) (hereinafter 'Galbraith HIRC testinrwny').
81
establishing an arms pipeline from Iran, or to tell them that we would not object if such a
thing were to happen" Galbraith replied that he was not involved in any such conduct, and
'to the best of his knowledge' he did not 'inspire' this suggestion.^ In response to
Congressman Oilman's question about whether Galbraith was ever asked by anyone to
help implement the Iranian arms pipeline or help facilitate any dealing of Iranian arms to
Cnsatia or Bosnia, Galbraith answered "no.'^ The facts and testimony elicited during the
course of the investigation call the truthfulness of these responses into question.
An understanding of the background, activities and motivations of the principal
participants in the Croatian events leading to the opening of the Iranian arms pipeline is
essential to demonstrating Galbraith's knowledge and involvement.
Getting Acquainted
Peter W. Galbraith assumed his duties as the United States Ambassador to Croatia
in July of 1993. Upon Galbraith's arrival, Charge Ron Neitzke became the Deputy Chief
of Mission. A man with a penchant for action. Ambassador Galbraith brought to his new
position his lengthy experience as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Staff. As the President's emissary to a natk>n in what was perhaps one of the most volatile
parts of the worid, he faced a myriad of challenges and opportunities. Without delay, he
immersed himself in the politics and issues of the Balkan region with a self-confidence
amply displayed throughout his public life.^
Early in his tenure Galbraith made it dear that he was sympathetic to the plight of
the Bosnian Muslims, as they battled Serbs arKl Bosnian Croats in the complicated and
seemingly intractable conflict in Bosnia. Within two months of his arrival in Zagreb,
Galbraith met with Imam Sevko Omert>asic, a prominent Muslim spiritual leader in Croatia
arKJ a key contact of anyone hoping to follow the Bosnian Muslim issue from Croatia. He
was also a linch-pin figure in the establishment and operation of the Iranian arms pipeline.
In the late summer of 1993. Omeft>ask: was a sufHctently prominent leader in the Croatian
" Id. at 84-86.
" Id. at 149.
^ See Peter W. Galbraith. Last Stand: A Report from Kurdistan, The New
Republic. Apr. 29, 1991; Peter W. Galbraith. Diplonriacy Helps Contain the Bosnian
Conflict. SAIS Review, Volume 15. SumnidSaBKf995.
82
Muslim convnunKy to merit a visit from the United States Ambassador.
The meeting occurred in Omerbasic's office. Gatbraith was accompanied by the
Embassy Zagreb Public Affairs Officer Susan Hovanec and another individual was present
as a translator, l-lovanec believes Ouska pjuric, a Foreign Service National worWrtg at the
Embassy, ananged the meeting.^ The evidence is conflicting, but it is possible that
Embassy Economic/Commercial Officer Tom Mittnatht accompaniisd Ambassador
Gaibralth to the meeting, as weli.'^ The meeting was a courtesy cafl which evotved Irito an
hour long dlsojssion of Muslim suffering and dying.** Galbraitf) expressed his sympathy
for the Bosnian MusBms arul informed Omerbasic that the US did not fear Islam or believe
everythir>g it heard about tfie dangers of increasing Islamic fundamentalism.** AltHough
Omerbasic daims never to have had any further meetings with Galbraith. the credMe
evidence available as a resuR of this investigation suggesb that Galbraith and Omerbasic
met a number of times between August 1 993 and April 29, 1 994."
i
The significance of this contact and relationship between GaB>raith and Omefba»c
arises from the rote Omerbasic played as thfikey tadlltator and operator of the Iranian
arms pipeline^throggh Croatia to Bosnia.* j
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Susan Hovanec Aug. 14. 1996. at 31-33
(hereinafter *Hovanec Oep."). ,
"U. at 31^2, 76-78.
"Id.at34.
*" Select Subcommittee Interview of Sevto Omerbasic Aug. 21. 1996. at 2.
** Select Subcommittae Deposition of Charlotte Stottman. Aug. 10. 1996, aiSS
(hereinafter 'Stottman Dep."); Memorandum of Inten/lew of Terrl Lee Baker by Julia
Gaines and Janine Ooherty.
83
By the end of 1993, Peter Galbraith was firmly convinced that the Bosnian Muslims
were desperately in need of weaponry or they would not survive." He had mobilized his
staff to study and alleviate the Muslim refugee situation in Croatia. Embassy personnel
were communicating regularly with UN officials and Muslim community leaders, seeking
information and doing what they could on the problems." Anyone truly interested in the
Bosnian Muslim situation would have t>een acquainted with the Muslim leaders, including
Omerbasic.
Galbraith had no aversion to Islamic fundamentalism. As noted earlier, he told
Omerbasic as much in their first meeting. Moreover, Galbraith was not as concerned about
Iran or its influence, as were other Embassy Zagreb officials. As Neitzke has characterized
the situation, he and Galbraith had different views on Iran.^ Neitzke described his own
view toward dealings with Iran as 'don't do it, don't do anything with Iran."*" He became
very much aware of Galbraith's different view when, after the Iranian arms pipeline opened
up, Galbraith proved reluctant to do anything to end the Croatian-Iran cooperation for fear
that the arms flow would t>e interrupted. Galbraith dismissed Neitzke's fear of Iranian
terrorism by proclaiming that it was not in Iran's interest to attack the US.*^ With his mind
open with respect to Iranian intentions and set upon finding a solution for arming the
Bosnian Muslims. Galbraith was poised to act at the beginning of 1994 and receptive to
kleas.
Shortly after his arrival in Croatia, Ambassador Galbraith developed another
important relationship for purposes of this investigation, a long and close woridng
relationship with Croatian Defense Minister Susak.*^ The two men met and dined
frequently, establishing an alliance of professk>nal convenience and mutual benefit which
'^ Galbraith HIRC testimony at 21-22.
" Select Subcommittee Depositkm of Peter W. Galbraith, Aug. 19. 1996. at 77-
85 (hereinafter "Galbraith Dap.'); Neitzke Dep. at 41-42; Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Tom Mittnacht. Aug. 14. 1996, at 14-15. 44-52, 69-72; Select
Subcommittee Deposition of Richard HoKzapple, Aug. 20, 1996. 8-12.
" Neitzke dep. at 53-59.
*• Id. at 156-158.
*' Id. at 113-115.
'^ Galbraith Dep. at 147-46. 158-9.
84
bore, as part of its fruit, the Iranian green light decision. Gojko Susak, although a Croat
by birth, spent much of his adult life in Canada, amassing a fortune through his pizza
business. Born in a small town in Bosnia in the hills between Mostar and Split, after his
return to the Balkans as Croatian Defense Minister he became intensely focused on
regaining the region of his birth, known as the Krajina." As Defense Minister. Susak set
about building a military capable of retaking the United Nations protected areas in the
Krajina, Sectors North. South. East and West.
Susak ran the Croatian military with a hands-on approach, functioning more like a
commanding general than an American Secretary of Defense." As his primary focus was
Croatian natkjnalism. he was hostile toward the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and. even
when playing a critical role in the Iranian arms pipeline, he was not eager to see the
Bosnian Muslims armed with artillery or missiles.'* Susak was a powerful man in Croatia,
fluent in English from his Canadian years and a man of action for whom Galbraith
developed a strong affinity.
In the fall of 1993, the UN arms embargo posed an obstacle to Susak's efforts to
augment his army. Embroiled in fighting_with Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Susak
ennbarked on a shopping trip for weapons j
with Galbraith in one of the first of many one-on-one meetir
next three years.*'!
Upon Susak's retum, he met
s the two would have over the
** Select Subcommittee Deposition of Richard Holbrooke. Sept 27. 1996. at 25-
31 (hereinafter 'Holbrooke Dep.*).
**ld.
«ld.
^'Neitzke Dep. at 46-52.
85
^ _^ As Susak
declined to make himself available for an inten/iew with the Select Subcommittee, it is
impossible to conclude with certainty whether or not parts otan Iranian-Croatian amns deal
were already well along as early as November 1993.j^^yr"
Besides the arms shopping trip to Iran. Susak attempted to cury favor with US
officials and learn what he could of US attitudes and policy toward the Balkans. In a
November 1 993 meeting with Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff and US Special Envoy
Charies Redman, he learned that it was very important to these US officials that Croatia
cooperate in the process of getting humanitarian aid to the Bosnians* At that time and
on throughout 1994, the humanitarian aid flow to Bosnia consisted primarily of convoys,
organized by Muslim humanitarian organizations that later played a significant role in the
Iranian arms pipeline to Bosnia.
Ambassador Galbraith was irritated by the fact that his frjend Susak had not been
viewed as important eiKHigh to warrant a meeting with Woolseyi
* CIA Cable. State 343310. Nov."l 1 . 1993.
86
__^ This did fwt deter Galbralth from his efforts to
cultivate an exclusive relationship with Susak. As previously mentioned, the two began
working dosely together, and Galbraith would frequently meet with Susak through 1995,
often without reporting such meetings to Washington.** Both men began to reaHze that
they could achieve important goals working in tanderrror by using each oth^
As 1993 canrte to an er>d, Susak was still mulling over the possible arms deal with
Iran, although not excited about the prospects of sharing firepower with the Muslims with
whom the Croatians were stOI at war. The US was discouraging his military aspiratnns and
apparently had little interest in taking Croatia's side In the ongoing Balkan dispute.
Moreover, If he decided to go forward with an amis deal with Iran, he could anticipate
opposition from many within the Croatian government, who greatly feared the spread of
Iranian Influence In the area, as wed as fierce objections from the US about Iranian
flirtations." Susak's friendship and working relationship witii Galbraith offered a solution
to his problems.
The Bosnian Muslims were more than ready to be rescued, armed or ottwnwise
assisted in a war they were dearty not winning. The US Ambassador to Bosnia in 1993
and 1994. Victor Jackovich. was constantiy importuned by both Bosnian oftteials and
dtizens as to the need for weapons or a RflHig of the arms embargo." The anns embargo
was the most important issue for the Bosnian government and Bosnian ofRdals discussed
its Wling with .Ambassador Jackovich. Redman, congress tonal delegations and any US
offictai who woukj Hsten."
In late 1993 or the early months of 1994 Ambassador Jackovfch received a request
that was different from the generalized Importuning mentioned earlier. Bosnian Prime
Minister Siajdzic approached Jackovk:h and toM him that Bosnian Vtoe PreskJent Ejup
Gante. during a trip to MusSm countries, was Wbnned by the Libyan Foreign Minister ttiat
**Ne(tzkeDep. at 50-52.
" See pages 75-60.
" Select Sut>oommitt»e Deposilton of Vtetor Jackovteh. Aug. 20. 1996. at 6-12,
48-53 (hereinaAer 'JadaMOi Dep.").
<^
87
Libya would be willing to send arms to Bosnia if the US was agreeable. Jackovic made no
comment on the proposal, Injt agreed to pass it on to Washington. Jackovich reported by
cable to the European Bureau of the Department of State. He never received a response
from the Department of State on the Libyan arms proposal, and does not recall any follow-
up with Bosnian officials. ^
Thus, it was no surprise that after Jackovich failed to respond favorably to the
Libyan arms deal, the Iranian arms pipeline proposal was never suggested or broached
with him.** In fact, altfK)ugh he knew that the Iranian and Bosnian government were having
continuous contact throughout March and April of 1994. Jackovich was not surprised that
the Bosnians did not discuss these contacts with him, in light of the US attitude toward
Iran.*" Cleariy, although sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslim concerns, the US Ambassador
to Bosnia was not a good prospect for assisting the Iranians in securing their arms dealing
franchise in the Balkans. The prospects were better in Zagreb.
Without Our Fingerprints
On the eve of the Clinton Administration's Iranian green light decision in late April
1994, Ambassador Galbraith assured the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs Sandy Vershbow that he could handle giving the US
gukjance to the Croatians on the Iranian arms issue "without our fingerprints."^ Although
this remarit is discussed in detail later in this report in the context of explaining the manner
in which the US conveyed the Iranian green light, it was a telling remark regarding
Galbraith's state of mind in the Spring of 1994 and the extent to whk:h he was familiar with
the planned Iranian arms pipeline.
Try as he might as the Iranian arms pipeline was established in the spring of 1994,
Ambassador Galbraith was unable to keep his own proverbial fingerprint from appearing
on the evidence. A mere comparison of how the Iranian pipeline was operated with
. " Id. at 54-57.
* Id. at 29-36.
* Id. at 16-20.
*' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8, 1996, at 48-
56 (hereinafter "Vershbow Dep.*): Notes of Alexander Vershbow (hereinafter "Vershbow
Notes').
88
Ambassador Galbraith's words and deeds in the winter and spring of 1994 reveals starkly
his knowledge and role.
In late Febmary or eariy March of 1994. Ambassador Galbraith approache«i^H
^^■■■■^to discuss a proposal he. was exploring to arm the Bosnian Muslims.
Galbraith requested that the^WWM^jUbegin a covert action proposal. The proposal,
as described by Galbraith /would involve the US communicating to the Croatians that it
would look the other way if the Croatians would allow amns for the Bosnian Muslims to
transit Croatian tenitory on whatever terms could be worked out between the Cnjatians
and the other parties. Galbraith further suggested that the Iranians could be the supplier
of the arms. He further proposed that the Turks be used as "cut-outs" in the plan. The
^appalled at the klea. replied that the plan was not a good idea as it would
give Iran a firmer foothold in the Balkans, would violate US law under the UN arms
embargo regime, would be unsustainable in an operational sense (UNPROFOR or NATO
would notice or the Iranians would leak knowledge of its existence) and it would result in
the Serbs viewing the US as a co-belligerent in the war." "
As additional downsides to Galbraith's plan, the^f^flffBlQidentified the risk
of encouraging Croatian military aspirattons. the lack of deniability given the need to let
ships or planes sneak by and the substantial risk to intelligence "&3^ties|posed^such
an "Iran-Contra" type plan without clear pdrcy-level gukJance. Th^^^B^B^Hended
his remartcs by informing the Ambassador that such a proposal would have to comedown^
from theiiSP or the White House, and he would not initiate such an action proposal r^^
Despite thefipHHIfli^Bbleak assessment of the wisdom or prospects for his
Iranian 'IggK the other waV" plan. Galbraith appeared undeter^ed in his enthusiasm. He
told theSMBilMM^at he might raise the plan with National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake. Th^^^M^1^>elieved that he had suffipiec«y discouraged Galbraith
such that his Iranian plan wouW "die a deserved death."tifafip^^
Galbraitti thought differently. He was no stranger to creative thinking about actions
to arm the Bosnian Musfims. In November of 1992. while stifl a Senate Foreign Relations
89
Committee staffer, he accompanied Senator Daniel Moynihan to Bosnia. In a meeting with
the UN Commander, Genera! Morilion. he aslced the General what he thought atx)ut the
US arming the Bosnian Muslims. Morilion replied, "Just give me five days to get the heli
out of here ^d you can do what you wani'^ In December 1993, shortly_aftef!!MBMMi
MniH^H^Ibraith had approached|JMMBBHMHBW^6Bnd asked him
whetheif^g^ipas conducting a covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. He openly
advocatedlha* such an action would t>e a good thing, but cautioned that a friendly Muslim
country such as Saudi Arabia should be the p^jvider of the weapons to alleviat6-,'the
political blowback.'tSflHHHSHBHBchecked with the^HHBPj^nd
learned that no such plan was in effect, and there was no Presidential finding authonzir;
such a program." Galbraith expressed further interest in proposing such a plan.j^
As noted, by the spring of 1994, the Iranians figured prominently in hit new
proposal. This was no accident. Galbraith's proposal was a virtual blueprint for the Iranian
arms pipeline that was put into effect by Susak, Omerbasic and Hasan Cengic in May
1994. This telltale similarity between the Galbraith plan and the Iranian pipeline is not the
only evidence that he had advance knowledge of the Iranian-Croatian plan. In another of
his frequent telephone conversations with Alexander Vershbow during the last week of
April 1994, Galbraith told Vershtxsw details about the Iranian arms flights, such as the fact
that they would arrive in unmarked 747 aircraft and the fact that the Croatians and the
Muslims would split the arms, fifty-fifty, which he could not have known had he not had
knowledge of the plan before Presklent Tudjman's question."
Vy/hether Galbraith authored the arms pipeline plan and brought the Croatians and
Iranians to agreement, or whether the plan was designed by the Croatians and Iranians,
who then told Galbraith of the details and secured his help, no one may ever be able to
determine. Susak refused to make himself available for an interview with the Select
Subcommittee staff during its investigative visit to Zagreb. And although Omert)asic
consented to a brief meeting during that Zagreb trip, his answers to the staffs questk>ns
*^ John Pomfret and David B. Ottaway, US Envoy's Batkan Role Criticized on
Capitol Hill. Washington Post, May 21 , 1996 at A1 2.
' Vershbow Dep. at 11-17; Vershbow Notes.
90
were denronstrably false on most of the issues critical to the investigation, and thus of little
help. Nevertheless. Galbraith's own words reveal his central importance to the evolution
of the pipeline.
shared this information writh Ambassador Galbraith, who admitted that he
was one of the US officials who met with Omerbasic, but that the meeting was in a mosque
at a public religious event and that there was no discussion with Omerbasic on the subject
of arming the Bosnian Muslyns. Galbraith iden^ed the other 'official" mentioned in the
report as Tom Mittnacht.'° ^J^BBBM^^Byhared with Galbraith in th9 r;^xt few
weeks the intelligence infonnation regarding Omerbasic's activities.^
^LThe import
of this distancing was not lost on Omert>asic, who was still angry at US officials two years
later when then Deputy Chief of Mission Patrick Finn of the Embassy Zagreb paid him a
courtesy call. Omerbasic pointedly observed to Finn that no US Embassy official had paki
him a visit since spring of 1994.^^ This distancing activity is strongly indicative of a
consciousness on Galbraith's part that being linked to Omerbasic, in light of the other
evkJence of his advance krK>vtlledge of or possible participatktn in the planning of the
Galbraith Dep. at 268
ug. 9. 1996, at 23-24
'^ Sejggt Sq^mmittee Degosition ol
" Select Subcommittee Interview of Patrick Finn, August 18, 1996;
Memorandum of Finn Interview by Julia Gaines and Janine Ooherty.
91
Iranian arms pipeline, would contradict his denials of any role in encouraging the Croatians
and Iranians to establish the pipeline or in orchestrating the posing of the question to the
US government In sworn testimony twfore a congressional committee, he has attempted
to minimize his contacts with Omert>asic to a single very fleeting, public meeting."
Testimony elicited and evidence obtained in the Select Subcommittee's investigation has
revealed that Galbraith had other meetings with Omerbasic, some of them in the US
Embassy, and that the buslra^ card of Omertjasic was in the Ambassador's Roiodex as
late as August 199€'l^^p
The evidence is also dear that during the spring of 1994. as Galbraith shopped his
Iraniarvlicok the other way* solution to the crisis of the Bosnian Muslims with the^^BP
ifliH^Omert>asic and Susak were working with the Iranians to make that sokrtion a
reality. The Washington Accords, resulting in the MusTimOoat Federation, by hatting the
fighting betweeri^rcats jnd Bosnian Muslims, softened Susak's resistance to the Iranian
arms proposal. ^^^''tNSHMHHHHMMMHHi
with the wishes of the US, the Croatians co«j)d 4^ give the Iranians any guarantees without
assuring that the US wouM not objecL'^Hf^'
»
The key to getting the favorable US response necessary for the Iranians, Croatians
and Bosnians to feel secure in cementing this "win-win-win° arrar^gement was Ambassador
» Maaring On Rnsnifl R«fcw» tha Mmifto Pafmanont Ridtttt nnmmitt#m nn
intAHigAnra, 104th Cong. 30 (May 30. 1996} (Testimony of Peter Galbraith} (hereinafter
-GalbraRh HPSO testimon/).
^* Select Subcommmee Doc., Bate Stamp #000001 (Aug. 21. 1996).
-mji^
75-80.
92
Galbraith. In light of his sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims, his open-minded view towards
Iran, his friendship and close working relationship with Susak. his desire to make the
Federation work and his natural tendency toward action. Galbraith was willing to
orchestrate a dipkjmatic exchange which wouW meet the needs of all parties. Confident
in his ability to sway the opinions of his superiors, he set to work to assure that ttie
Croatian government asked the right questton. and received the answer it needed."/<^
^BSi^^^^^a^n April 29 that Peter G^raith recited ttie worts which gave the"
Iranians arxj Croatians the green ''flWj^j^JW''''^
The Question is Posed
By mkl-April 1994. Croatian Defiense Minister Susak. had apparently prevailed upon
President Tudjman to accept weapons from Iran and allow the Iranian amis pipeline to
Bosnia to pass through Croatia. In Bght of virtiat he knew of the mutual antipathy between
Iran and the US. as well as past reactkjns by Oie US to arms embargo vWatkjns, Tudjman
proceeded cautknjsly to seek the US position with regard to such a move. Whether Susak
discussed with Tudjman the efforts and willingness of Ambassador Galbraith to arrange
for a positive US response on the Iranian amis pipeline is a matter of mere speculation,
given the rBfusal of PresWent Tudjman and Susak to nrake themselves available to the
Select Sutx»mmlttee for inten/lews. Nevertheless, despite a division within his own
government regarding the wisdom of woriong with Iran, Presklent Tudjman decided to pose
the questkxi. How that questksn was asked, how the US dev^oped a response, and how
Ambassador Galbraith conveyed that response, as well as the consequences and the
confusion that flowed from the dedston are discussed in the pages that follow.
The Croatians Test the Waters
In n»d-ApriI of 1 994. the Croatian ofltetote began again to exphJTB whe«har or not the
US Government wouW toleratB or approve the shipment of Iranian arms to Croatia and
snia. On Aprt 18. 1994. during a meeting with Special Envoy Charles Redman.
^imBH|||dJHBI0il9|nfonned Redman that the gpsnjaqs had come to the
5oatian Government earlier that day. asking for weapons.^Jjgjpated that Croatia
** Sea^ages 92-111
93
remained 'oriented toward peace,' and that Croatia hoped for US support for that position.
To the USJ^utv Chief of Mission (DCM) Ronald Neitzke, who was in attendance at the
meeting. Spl^^remarks evidenced that the Croatians had little appetite for
reestablishing ^pipeline for anns to Bosnia. He also formed the impression that the
Croatians might soon seek more specific guidance from the US on this issue. On Aprij,
1994, Neitzke reported on this conversation to the Department of State by cable.*' ^
April l£^^
On April 20, 1994, thef^BBJ^B^^BB^reported to his headquarters that, in
the wake of Redman's April 18. 1994 visit, the qtle^ion of Croatian circumvention of the
arms embargo had resurfaced. He recounted Ambassador Galbraith's conversations with
him in March 1994 about developing a covert action to let the Croats know the US would
look the other way if arms were to transit their territory, stressing that, although he believed
Galbraith's plan had "died a deserved death," that belief was apparently premature. He
reported that he had been informed by Neitzke that Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith
were among those discussing "doing an Afghanistan' igjosnia.to arm, the Muslims.
Although uncertain about the seriousness of such talk, th^MpBfjpii^'eported it out
of an abundance of caution to keep headquarters informedT
f^ The following jjgy, April 21, 1994, thejjflUCBHHS^as approached by a
^BUjMJMWWIynd was asked what the US position was with respect to the arms
embargo and the franshipment of arms through Croatia. The contact expressed his
opinton that allowing such transshipments would be a bgd^idea, posat>ly leading to
renewed fighting between Bosnian Muslims a^ Croats. Thj^plMMMJiyurther offered
to help interdict such arms shipments if the^BMBMMBIfcould provideinformation on
them.i
Thq2I^BiBMfl|y^ware of the US position to date and having watched President
Clinton declare publicly ($n television the previous evening that the US honored the arms
emtiargo, responde<jJp the^uestigp by stating that compliance with the arms embargo
was US policy. The^^flHflH^BnforrriedNei^ke^whowas Charge in the absence of
Ambassador Galbraith, ofttie^u^yfrom thefifc— BBjB? Neitzke sent the Department
of State a message onttiis development in which he referfiS to a refatestPOQ^ersation that
fH^BBim^H^had with Redman on April 18. He opined thaj^ippiad perhaps
^een too subtle^in fiisapproach with Redman, and may have wanted to ask the US more
formally to stand with Croatia in rejecting -^e Bosnian approaches. The Croatians. in his
*' Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1567, Apr. 19, 1994.
94
view, clearly intended to stonewall the Bosnians until they received formal clarification of
United States support for their inclination to refuse. The cable also informed the
Department of State that Iran still loomed raQst^omlnently as the likely source of arms."
Neitzke sought guidance on the issuey^'^>7^
Croatian govemment officials continued to test the waters on the Iranian pipeline
issue. On April 22. 1994. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Herrick, the Defense Attache to the
US Embassy Zagreb, met with Croatian Defense Minister Susak regarding a number of
military issues. The meeting was one in a reflular series of meetings that the two held to
discuss matters of mutual military interest.
es
Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1597. Apr, 21, 1994.
95
On his return to the Embassy, Herrick reported this conversation to Neitzke. Neitzke
told him to report the discussion back to Washington, which Herrick promptly did by cable
on Monday. April 25. 1994.** Herrick showed the cable to Ambassador Galbraith upon the
tatter's return to Zagreb on April 25 or 26.
Shortly thereafter. Galbraith, Neitzke, Herrick and thepJBMMpjynet to discuss
the various Croatian approaches. Galbraith questioned Herrick as to Wiy he responded
to Susak as he had. Herrick replied that his response was the US ofTicially stated policy.
The Ambassador asked Herrick to set up a meeting between the Ambassador and Susak
at which time the same question couldj^e posed. Irujther words, he told Herrick to get
Susak to ask tiim the question. The^BBH^HHWexpressed his opinion during the
meeting that anything having to do with Iran wasTTraught with danger and^hould be
avoided. He urged the Ambassador not to support the Croatian proposal.|"
On April 27, 1994, Neitzke, Special Envoy Redman and Croatian Foreign Minister
Cranio met in Zagreb to discuss the WashingtonAccprds and Federation issues. When
the discussion on these subjects ended,^H^0^appealed to Neitzke for help in
withstanding Iranian pressure to allow the transshipment of Iranian arms to the Bosnian
Muslims. Neitzke was also informed that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman would ask
Galbraith about the US position on this issue at a meeting the following moming^pQl 28.
1994. Neitzke remembers Redman being present during this conversation Witt^jgfg^nd
believes that he shoukl have heard what was sakJ.*^ Nonetheless, Redman has stated in
swom testimony that he was unaware of the Croatian request regarding the transshipment
of Iranian anms until his return to Zagreb on April 29. 1994." On hi&re^ to the Embassy.
Neitzke informed Ambassador Galbraith of his conversation wiUjfl^B Galbraith seemed
*" Department of Defense Cable
* Herrick Dep. at 12-24
" Neitzke Dep. at 60-66.
Apr. 25. 1994
Apr. 28. 19947
** Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Charies Redman. August 27, 1996. at 29-
37 (hereinafter 'Redman Dep.').
96
unaware that the question was to be posed to him the next morning, and he acted quickly
to contact Washington for instructions. Although Galb^aitbwanted a "nonobjection"
instnjction. Neitzke made it clear that he did not agree^J^gw^
_Atjhe dose of business on April 27. 1994, Ambassador Galbraith asked his
~ to meet with him in the conference room. During that meeting, Galbraith
described a recent meeting with Susak, in which Susak had made the case in favor of the
Unitgd States' supporting th^jgansshipmentj^f Iranian arms through Croatia. Galbraith told
the^lHHHHP^that if^Bm^BJ^pHshould raise the arms transshipment issue
again, the US position on the arms embargo^ not firm." ^ce that statement was not
consistent with publicly stated US policy, th^^lBBI^^asked Galbraith if he had
received instnjctions to that effect. The Ambassador responded that the matter was under
review and that 'Washington doesn't know what policy iyxxants anyway." Without some
sort of confirmation of a policy£hi^r reconsideratk}n, th^^HBB^Mcleclined, so the
Ambassador told him to d^^^^^o ask the question of the Ambassador instead.*"
The Home Office Fails to Distinguish Itself
As this preliminary sounding out of the US policy was underway in Croatia,
Ambassador Galbraith was actively lobbying the Department of State for a response that
would signal to the Croatians that the United States had no objection to the proposed
Iranian arms pipeline. According to contemporaneous notes taken by Alexander "Sandy"
Vershbow, then serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs, Ambassador Galbraith spoke with him by telephone at the
Department of State on either April 25 or April 26 to argue his position. Galbraith told
Vershtx}w that President Tudjman of Croatia would t>e requesting the United States view
on such shipments at an upcoming meeting, that it was an important matter and thathe
needed instoictions from senior levels in Washington. Galbraith explained that theHpV
IBBpl^and Defense Attache Herrick had told Croatian officials that US policy was to
uphold the UN Security Coundl resolutions and to oppose their violation. Ambassador
Galbraith stated that he needed dear gukjance on the Presklent's policy and wanted
instructions vetted at a high level, such as by the Acting Secretary of State m^ National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake. He wanted those instructions by cable ji^'
•• Neitzke Dep. at 60-66.
''^■■■■IViHHMApril 28. 1994,
*^ Vershbow Dep. at 11-17; Vershbow Notes.
97
In that same telephone conversation, Ambassador Galbraith discussed what he
believed to be the pros and cons of the different responses available to the question
anticipated from President Tudjman. He warned that UNPROFOR would most likely detect
the arms shipment traffic. He also betrayed a strikingly detailed and prophetic knowledge
of the details of the Iranian/Croatian plan, remarking that the arms would arrive in
unmarked 747 airplanes, the Croatians would take half of the arms for themselves and the
other half would go on to the Bosnians." Galbraith characterized the United States'
response he advocated as a "wink and nod."" He was insistent that he must have
Departmental guidance prior to his scheduled meeting with President Tudjman on the
nfK>ming of April 28.
Vershl)ow, accepting this deadline, began to regard the issue as "urgent.""
Acconjingly, immediately after this conversation with Galbraith, Vershbow bro":;^ the
issue to the decision makers on the Seventh Floor" of the Department, in particular
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff. Mr. Tamoff was the Senior Department
official responsible for policy with respect to Bosnia. Tamoff was also the Acting Secretary
of State, as Secretary Christopher was traveling in the Middle East and Deputy Secretary
Strobe Tallxjtt was travelir>g with President Clinton's entourage to the funeral of former
President Richard Nixon in California. On April 27, 1994 Vershbov/s notes indicate that
he attended a meeting on Bosnian-related issues with Tamoff. During the course of that
meeting, Vershbow received a message from Tom Donilon, the Chief of Staff to the
Secretary of State advising him not to let too much time elapse before responding to
PreskJent Tudjnr«in and that there should be "no funny business."" Vershbow recollects
no further discusskan of the Tudjman question during the April 27 meeting.
At the time of the meeting, Donilon was traveling with Secretary Christopher in the
Middle East On the evening of President Richard Nixon's funeral, April 27, 1994, Mr.
Donilon was at the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo, Egypt. He had several telephone
conversatk>ns with tamoff that night, serving as Secretary Christopher's "link" back to the
State Department Although Donik>n has no present recollection of the "no funny business'
"^ As it turns out. once the pipeline was operational the Croatians' portion usually
turned out to be about one-third.
•* Vershbow Dep. at 1 1-17; Vershbow Notes.
•* Vershbow Dep. at 19.
*^ Versht>ow Dep. at 26-30; Vershbow Notes.
98
remark, he does not question the accuracy of Vershbow's notes indicating that he made
It.** Tamoff advised Donilon that the issue raised by Ambassador Galbraith was under
consideration, and that there were differing opinions in Washington as to what the
response should be. Tamoff also indicated that he was in contact with Taltx)tt, who was
with the President on Air Force One. Donilon informed Secretary Christopher that the
issue was being discussed back in the United States, and Secretary Christopher exhibited
no memorable response beyond acknowledgment of the information.*' -
Later in the day on April 27, as the discussions continued in Washington, Galbraith
called Vershbow, informing him that the meeting with President Tudjman the next morning
would t^egin at 1 1 :30 a.m. Galbraith said something atxsut having or having had lunch wKh
Defense Minister Susak, and Vershfc>ow surmised that Galbraith may have learned of
President Tudjman's planned question during such a lunch. Galbraith also reported in the
conversatksn that he had heard from the Croatians that Croatian Prime Minister Valentic
was scheduled to depart for Iran on April 29.^6iP— — — ^pB^— PMJ
WB He expressed
concern to Vershbow that using the "no instructions" policy may not hpv^he right effect,
and that the Croatians might back off from the arms pipeline idea.^S^^^^™^
Besides speaking with Vershbow, Galbraith made other efforts to advocate his
position. He placed a telephone call directly to Undersecretary Tamoff, which was not
returned.** He also composed and transmitted a cable to the attention of Secretary
Christopher on April 27.'°*
In this April 27 cable. Ambassador Galbraith recommended that President Tudjman
be given a "non-responsive" answer that indirectly signaled that the United States wouldn't
object to the arms shipments. While acknowledging that the major supplier of arms would
be Iran, he argued that a non-response would be better than *no instructions.* He argued
•e
Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Thomas Donilon, Sep. 12, 1996, at 12-16.
•^ Id. at 12-14.
** Vershbow Dep. at 30-33; Vershbow Notes.
•* Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Peter Tamoff. Sep. 13, 1996, at 29
(hereinafter "Tamoff Dep.").
'°° Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683, Apr. 27, 1994.
99
forcefully that 'if we do not object to Croatia's role as a conduit, it is better to signal that
now." He repeated his concerns that the Valentic visit to Iran would be hindered, as he
believed that the only thing the Iranians wished to discuss with Valentic were the
arrangements for the transhipnnents of arms. Ironically, he suggested that he should also
'caution' the Croatians on developing too close of a relationship with lran.'°^
Ambassador Galbraith also discussed in this cable his understanding of Croatian
govemment views on the Iranian arms issue. He judged that Croatia wanted to act with
US approval, and it also wanted to be sure that the US would not act or speak against
Croatia if it undertook the role of arms conduit. He acknowledged the differences of
opinion within the Croatian government.]
He also argued that stopping the arms pipeline ns''ci
repeating a mistake of the' past. He specifically argued that the US demarche to Croatia
in September 1992 over Iranian arms transhipment had led to the outbreak of war between ^_S _
Bosnians and Croats that fall. His cable once again stressed the urgency of his request. 'j2fe!X/ ""
On the morning of April 28. 1994, Vershbow called Ambassador Galbraith on an
open (that is, non-secure) phone line to tell him to convey to President Tudjman in their
meeting that he (Galbraith) "really had no instructions.""^ Galbraith was left with the
understanding that the issue was still being reviewed and that a decision had not yet been
made. He continued to press his arguments with Vershbow. again advocating a
'nonresponsive response" that would give President Tudjman a go ahead to cooperate
with Iran. Galbraith ventured a political argument for his position, opining that those in
Congress who favored lifting the arms embargo would be pleased with his proposed
course of action, since it would help the Bosnians. Vershbow's notes also reflect that
Ambassador Galbraith said such members of Congress would 'be less hot on the issue.""^
Vershbow, during this telephone conversation or another one later that day. indicated his
belief that 'no instructions' would have the same effect as a non-responsive response.
Galbraith argued once again Susak's view that if the Croatians did not cooperate with the
pipeline, the Bosnian Muslims wouM lose their commitment to the Federatfon. He repeated
'•'Id.
"»ld.
'" Vershbow Dep. at 33-36.
"* Vershbow Dep. at 41-47; Vershbow Notes.
100
that cutting off arms flows in 1993 had led to war.^"'
In his telephone conversation with Vershbow. Galbraith expressed his impatience
that Washington had not yet made a decision. He was adamant that he did not want to
attend a meeting with Tudjman without guidance. Galbraith stated to Vershbow that the
United States could handle the matter and provide guidance to the Croatians "without our
fingerprints" and that he could say what he wanted to say "less directly."'"
Later on April 28, 1994 Galbraith attended the much-anticipated meeting with
President Tudjman in Zagreb. At the meeting. Galbraith stuck to the guidance he had.
such as it was. He informed Tudjman that the United States honors the arms embargo.
He further stated that, although his eml)assy had been aware that the amns issue might be
raised and he had sought his instructions from Washington, he had not yet received any.
in sum. he told President Tudjman he could not give a direct reply to the question.""
President Tudjman advised that he sought US guidance because the Croatian
government wanted to act in accordance with US policy, especially in light of the
Washington Accords. He was well aware of the West's attitude toward Iran, but described
the request as a test of Croatia's good will toward Bosnia. '°*
Following this meeting with President Tudjman, Ambassador Galbraith urgently
cabled the Department of State, reporting his conversations and once again advocating
a nxxJification of US policy. He reminded Washington of his understanding of US policy
(*We have a policy. We obey the embargo and expect other countries to obey Security
Council resolutions.') and urged that it be modified to signal to the Croatians that we would
not object if they were to serve as the arms conduit to the Muslims. In his desperation, the
Ambassador stressed that the Croatians had repeatedly signaled Tudjman's intent to ask
the question and the State Department had known so for over a week."*
While Galbraith agonized over his feilure to receive instnjctions, Vershbow. Tamoff
'" Vershbow Dep. at 41-47.
^<* Vershbow Dep. at 48-56; Vershbow Notes.
"" Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1721. Apr. 29. 1994.
'"•id.
'"Id.
101
and other officials in Washington had not yet reached a decision. Vershbow testified that
he and Tamoff considered only two options available for Galbraith's response: 1 ) a clear
statement that the United States abides by the arms embargo and expects others to do so,
or 2) an indication that the US neither endorses nor approves by continuing to say "no
instructions.' Although they were concerned that Iran would be the principal arms supplier,
they felt that having a 'neutral stance' was justifted in that it opened the arms flow.""
There was no consideration of an option that might have closed the door on Iranian arms,
but left it open regarding nmre palatable and less dangerous sources.
During these discussions. Vershbow did not share with Tamoff all of the information
he learned from Galbraith. He neglected to mention that Galbraith had advance
knowledge of the Iranian intent to ship the arms in unmarked 747 aircraft. He also did not
convey that the Croatians would be keeping half of the weapons for themselves."^
In the midst of this process. Special Envoy Charies Redman telephoned Vershbow
fronri Bosnia. Vershbow's contemporaneous notes indicate that Redman told him that he
(Redman), at the request of President Tudjman, was on his way to Croatia to discuss arms,
Iran arxl other subjects. Redman added that, if he had instructbns, he would use them."'
In dosed and public testimony. Redman denied that he knew anything about the Tudjman
question regarding the Iranian arms issue prior to his anival in Zagreb on April 29, 1994."'
Vershbow's contemporaneous notes cast doubt on the truthfulness of those jjfinials.
Vershbow was also tottLJQ that April 28 telephone conversation vrith Redman thatfiJB—
stated that pending contracts with Iran were being held up by
'Bosnia-Iran connjy^ce.' Vershbow recalled no greater detail at>out that portion of the
conversation."*/
The Washington Decision
As Redman traveled to Zagreb, offlctats in Washington and en route from the Nixon
funeral apparently arrived at a decisk>n on how to respond to the Tudjman question.
^^ Vershbow Dep. at 36-40.
"' Tarrwff Oep. at 39. <.
"' Vershbow Dep. at 70-72; Vershbow Notes.
"* Redman Dep. at 39-42.
^^* Vershbow Dep. at 70-72; Vershbow Notes.
102
Despite the fact that the Administration has characterized the "no instructions" decision as
a 'brilliant* stroke of diplomacy."* the least "lousy" of all available options and a judgment
call which ted to the Dayton Peace Accords,"* the Select Subcommittee's investigation
has revealed that those consulted in the decision making process have displayed a curious
tendency to minimize their own involvement in the decision, while readily extolling its
virtues. To the extent facts and circumstances concerning the decision's genesis have
been made available, they can be summarized as follows.
As the Acting Secretary of State, ^eter Tamoff made efforts to keep in touch with
Chief of Staff Donilon in Secretary Christopher's party in the Middle East. In addition to
talking to Donilon, he also had at least one discussion with Secretary Christopher himself
on the issue. During that discussnn, Tamoff and Christopher spoke about three options
which Mr. Tamoff believed were tjeing contemplated on Air Force One by the Presidential
advisors: responding with no objection, objecting, on responding with "no instructions.'
Tamoff informed Secretary Christopher of a consensus developing among those involved
in the process toward "no instructions," and the Secretary seemed comfortable with that
development.'" In addition to Secretary Christopher, Tamoff discussed the issue with
Alexander Vershbow, Tom Donilon and Sandy Berger, the President's Deputy National
Security Advisor.'"
Berger told Tamoff that the President had made the decision that Ambassador
Galbraith was to have no instructions."* Tamoff called Tom Donilon to inform him of the
President's decision, and Donilon, in turn, informed Secretary Christopher, who
acknowledged Donilon's message and expressed no objection to K.'^ Tamoff has no
"' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, September 5, 1996, at 45
(hereinafter Talbott Dep.').
"* Hearing On US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 48 (May 23, 1996)
(Testimony of Richard Holbrooke).
"_^ Tamoff Dep. at 8.
"• Tamoff Dep. at 8-10.
"• Tamoff Dep. at 5.
'* Tamoff Dep. at 6-9.
103
recollection of telling Vershlx)w of the President's decision.'" Moreover. Tamoff does not
recall how the "no instructions" guidance was conveyed to Galbraith.'" Vershbow recalls,
however, that between April 28 and April 30 he gave Galbraith the "no instmctions' position
three times, and believes that Tamoff probably directed him to make these calls/''
The decision was purportedly taken to President Clinton while he was aboard Air
Force One retuming from the Nixon funeral in California. Deputy Secretary Talbott and
National Security Advisor Lake, who were accompanying the President, first discussed the
options privately. Talbott also recalls t>eing in touch with Tamoff by telephone from the
plane. It is his recollection that he and Lake concluded that the 'no instmctions' response
was the best option and should be the recommendation to the President. Talbott did not
speak with the President about this matter. Lake then went to the President's
compartment to discuss the ntatter. He retumed shortly and advised Talbott that the
Presklent approved the 'no instructions" option.'^*
President Clinton has not pubiidy acknowledged or claimed that he personally made
the decision to issue the 'no instructions' guidance to Ambassador Galbraith. In a letter
dated May 15, 1996 to Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the President characterized
the decision by saying 'we chose not to take a position with respect to Croatia's pemriitting
arms shipments to Bosnia across its territory. I believe that my Administration made the
correct decisfon at the time . . ."'* The Select Subcommittee's ability to determine
precisely what was presented to the President during his discussion with Lake (and his
responses to such information) has been hindered by the refusal of the White House
Counsel to permit Lake to respond to questions regarding his conversations with the
PreskJent. as well as. the refusal of White House counsel to perniit Lake's testimony to be
taken under oath.
The evkJence available with respect to the decision making process reveals that the
Presklent was almost certainly not provkjed with relevant, highly sensitive, and
'** Tamoff Dep. at 5. .
'^ Tamoff Dep. at 32.
"* Vershbow Dep. at 28-30.
'^Talbott Dep. at 31.
'" Letter from President ainton to Senator Jesse Helms (May 15. 1996)
(emphasis added).
104
controversial information important to the decision he was being asked to make. The
details of the arms delivery plans known to Ambassador Galbraith and conveyed to
Vershbow were not passed on to Tamoff, and consequently not to Lake, Berger or the
President. Tamoff. Talbott, Berger and Lake were unaware, at that time, of the
discussions Galbraith had prior to April 1994 regarding his proposed plan to signal the
Croatians that the United States would look the other way if it acted as an arms conduit,
or that Galbraith had suggested that the Iranians might be used as a source of the
smuggled arms.'*
Determining precisely what information and arguments were considered in the
decision-making process has, of necessity, been dependent upon the recollections of the
US officials involved, many of whom were reluctant or outright refused to share the details
of the statements by and between officials. Moreover, no written position papers, decision
memoranda or other written analysis were prepared for the President or, his advisors.
Nonetheless, a few conclusk}ns about the discussk>ns are dear. Tamoff has testified that
the 'consensus' reached in the process was that the Iranians already had a presence in
the Balkans and that the 'no instructbns' message would not lead to a significant increase
in Iranian presence or influence.'" This consensus prediction proved to be woefully
inaccurate.'* Galbraith and Vershbow shared the hope that Croatia would accede to the
pressure to allow the pipeline even though the NATO allies would discover the arms flow,
and despite the fact that some members of the Croatian govemment opposed it'^
Whether other relevant United States officials felt the same way or were advised at all of
the split in the Croatian Govemment is unknown, given the information made available.
Lake and Berger were unaware of that split'*
Vershbow and Tamoff never discussed with Galbraith the type of arms whteh the
Iranians anticipated shipping through the pipeline, nor dkJ they discuss with him how such
an arms flow couM be controlled, so as to prevent chemical weapons or other undesirable
'* Talbott Dep. at 7; Tamoff Dep. at 22; Select Subcommittee Interview of
Anthony Lake, Sep. 26. 1996, at 1 (hereinafter take Int'): Select Subcommittee
Interview of Samuel Berger (hereinafter 'Berger Int'), Sep. 25. 1996, at 2.
'*^ Tamoff Dep. at 31.
'* See Chapters 12. 13 and 14.
'^ Vershbow Dep. at 48-56.
'*> Lake Int at 1; Berger Int at 2.
105
arms from entering the Bosnian theatre."' There is no evidence that this aspect of the
decision was discussed with or between higher level officials.
Undersecretary TamofTs recollection indicates that, during the decision-making
process, there was no discussion by officials of the impact of the "no instructions" solution
upon the United States policy toward Iran,'^ and there was no consideration that the 'no
instructions' guidance coukJ send Iran the wrong message about US attKudes or policy.'"
Vershbow was aware at the time he participated in the discussions that the Iranian agenda
was to gain greater influence, promote Islamic fundamentalism and support anti-Westem
aims. The US policy widely utKJerstood in the Administration at that time, was to isolate
Iran, economically, militarily, and politically.'^
Exactly Where We Want to Be
On April 29, 1994, Special Envoy Charies Redman anived in Zagreb, Croatia to find
Ambassador Galbraith still imp>atiently awaiting a response from the Department of State
which he would feel comfortable conveying to President Tudjman. Redman has testified
that he traveled to Zagreb on that date to brief President Tudjman on Contact Group
issues, and had been advised by Galbraith by telephone that he (Redman) needed to be
briefed on something prior to the meetir>g with President Tudjman. Ambassador Galbraith
provided no details as to the subject matter, out of concem that the telephone call may
have been monitored by the Croatians.''^
Redman and Galbraith nr>et at the Ambassador's residence. Redman recalls being
briefed on the Tudjman question and has testified that he could not see how the
appropriate answer could be anything other than 'no instructions.' It was dear to him.
however, that Ambassador Galbraith wanted further instructions from Washington.'^
Ambassador Galbraith asked Defense Attache Richard Herrick. who was present at the
"' Vershbow Dep. at 48-56.
""TamoffDep. at43.
"»Id.
"* Vershbow Dep. at 123-131; Tamoff Dep. at 41; Talbott Dep. 27-28.
'** Redman Dep. at 37-46.
'"Id.
106
Ambassador's residence that evening, to place a telephone call to Jenonne Walker of the
National Security Council (NSC) ostensibly to discuss the Councils assistance in getting
a demolition team to Croatia to assist with an ordinance issue. After placing the call.
Hemck tumed the telephone over to Ambassador Galbraith Hemck's recollection of the
remainder of the telephone call is that Ambassador Galbraith spoke with Jenonne Walker
regarding the military demolition team issue and the Iranian arms question. Herrick recalls
that Redman then spoke with Walker, although he did not overhear that conversation.'"
Redman, in his deposition testimony before the Select Subcommittee stated that
Galbraith spoke with Walker during that telephone conversation regarding the Tudjman
question and received the "no instructions" instruction. Redman acknowledges that he
then got on the line to speak with Walker, but only about Contact Group issues.'^
At the time of the above referenced telephone discussion. Jenonne Walker served
on the staff of the National Security Council as the Senior Director for Europe. In the
Spring of 1994. the countries which had constituted the fonner Yugoslavia (including
Croatia and Bosnia) were the responsibility of the European Directorate.'" In that
capacity, her duties included a coordinating role, such as chairing interagency committees.
as well as the preparation of papers on various subjects for the President, reflecting the
positions of the involved agencies.'** Prior to her service in that position. Walker had
sen/ed as a CIA analyst, an assistant to CIA Director William Colby, an assistant to
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a member of the Policy Planning Staff during the
Carter Administration and as Director of the Office of UN and Eunspean Arms Control
during the second terni of the Reagan Administration.'*' She left the NSC at the Ijeginning
of July, 1 994, to prepare for her current positron as US Ambassador to the Czech Republto.
Galbraith, Redman and Walker have given conflicting statements or testimony as
to the content of the April 29, 1994 telephone conversatkjn. As noted eartier, Redman has
testified he did not dipcuss the Tudjman questton with Walker. When Galbraith was talking
'" Herrick Dep. at 24-31.
'" Redman Dep. at 37^*6.
"* Select Subcommittee Interview of Jenonne Walker, Aug. 21 . 1996, at 4
(hereinafter "Walker Int*).
107
to Walker, Redman could not hear Walker's side of the telephone discussion. Galbraith told
Redman, after the call's completnn, that Walker said that Anthony Lake had given the "no
instructions" instructk)n with a smile and raised eyebrows/'^
Galbraith, in describing the content of the telephone conversation, has also stated
that Walker advised him that Lake's instructk>ns to him were to say that he had no
instructions, but that Lake had sakJ this "Vrith raised eyebrows and a smile."^
Walker's recollection of the telephone conversation with Galbraith and Redman is
that it occurred after she became aware that Galbraith had received the "no instructions"
guidance, and after President Tudjman had first posed the question. She also recalls her
discussion of the Tudjman question to be an 'add-on' to a conversation she had in a
regular series of conversations with Redman regarding Bosnian issues. Typically in ♦'^C3 -
calls, Redman woukl discuss his thoughts and observations regarding the Bosnian Civil
War negotiations and check the "mood music' in Washington, that is, what the policy
makers in Washington were thinking.^**
Walker recollects that Redman informed her during the call from Zagreb that
Galbraith had received instructions from the Department of State which both 'surprised and
trout>led' Redman and Galbraith. Redman then put Galbraith on the telephone. Galbraith
told her that State had instructed him to respornj to Presklent Tudjman's question about
the US position on the transshipment of Iranian arms to Bosnia through Croatia by saying
that the US was going to comply with the arms embargo on Bosnia and that the United
State assunr>ed Croatia wouM also comply. Galbraith expressed his belief that such a
response woukl reflect a change in US policy, and that the response would cause
problems related to the newly created Federation.^**
Walker toM Galbraith that it was her understanding at Uie time that Galbraith was
to respond to the Tudjman question by advising that the US would comply with the
'*' Redman Oep. at 46-50.
'** MenrKirandum to the FBe. from Ambassador Peter Galbraith, May 6. 1994
(hereinafter 'Galbraith Memorandum*).
'** Walker Int at 1.
108
embargo, but that Galbraith had no instructions as to Croatia.'** Given the discrepancy,
she took up the matter with Anthony Lake. Lake told Walker to tell Ambassador Galbraith
that he would be receiving the 'no instructions' instruction. Although she has no specific
recollection of passing this information on to Galbraith. Walker doubts that she said that
Lake had smiled and raised his eyebrows when conveying the "no instructions'message
to her. as that is not something Lake would do or something that she would say. She also
believes she did not indicate in that convensatwn that the no instructions matter had been
decided in a meeting with the President, as she was never a party to any presidential
discussions on the issue.'*' She also does not recall discussing ordinance demolition
issues with either Redman or Galbraith.
Following the telephone conversation with Walker, Galbraith's mood and approach
changed as he and Redman prepared for the dinner meeting scheduled for that evening
with President Tudjman. Ambassador Galbraith rehearsed a number of embellishments
of the simple "no instructions," and he decided that he would try to explain the response
to Tudjman by saying, "Pay attention to what I don't say as well as what I do say. I arn not
saying yes or no." Redman and Galbraith believed that they could not say "no" because
that response would hurt the Federatwn, and that they could not say "yes" because of the
embargo. Galbraith was satisfied with his guidance from Walker and his planned
embellishment as the two of them departed for the Tudjman dinner.'**
The dinner meeting on the evening of April 29, 1994 was held at the PreskJential
Palace in Zagreb. As expected. President Tudjman asked the US positi^on the
transhipment of Iranian and other amis to Bosnia. According to Galbraith,^
■■■i^ly Galbraith has stated that
in reply to Tudjman's question and remarks, he stated that his statement from the day
before still stood. Galbraith sakj he had no instructions from Washington on the issue, and
urged Presklent Tudjman to focus not only on what he had said, but also on what he had
'*«ld.
"' Walker Int. at 2.
'*• Redman Dep. at 46-50.
109
not said
President Tudjman was apparently still, confused. He pulled Redman aside and
asked again. Redman responded by telling President Tudjman, 'It's your decision. We
don't want to be in a position of saying no.""" Following this exchange. President Tudjman
seemed satisfied with the answer and as later events confirm, the Croatian Govemment
concluded that the United States had given its approval to the Iranian arms conduit.
Redman fully expected that, after hearing what he and Gaibraith had said, the Croatians
would go ahead with the arms pipeline.^''
After the meefr>g and dinner at the Presidential Palace, Gaibraith and Redman
discussed whether to report on the conversation by cable. Redman suggested that,
because he was traveling back to Washington the following day, he could convey the
events orally, in person, to Natk>nal Security Advisor Lake.'" One of Redman's objectives
in reporting back to the Natkjnal Security Council on the events was to make sure that
officials back in Washir>gton understood that the arms pipeline would most probat>ly open.
On his arrival in Washington, Redman met with Lake and brought him up to date on
the Contact Group and the April 29 Tudjman meeting. According to testimony provkled to
the Select Subcommittee by Redman, Lake was not surprised about the meeting and
indicated that he understood the results of the exchange. He expressed no reservations
about what had been said, and posed no questions to Redman about K. Lake nfiade it
clear to Redman that the PreskJent had been involved in the deciston and had himself
personally deckled on the response to Tudjman. Lake also informed Redman that there
was no need to report in writing on the April 29 conversatkan with Tudjman.'" Anthony
Lake, when interviewed by the Select Sulxommittee, stated that he vaguely recollected
meeting with Redman on this matter. Although Redman has testified that Lake showed
no surprise when told what Gaibraith and Redman saki to Tudjman, Lake opined that he
has a nrtemory of vigorously stating to all within earshot within a week of the Nixon funeral
that 'no instructk^ns meaos rx) instructkjns.' He offered during his interview that the
*** Gaibraith Memorandum.
^" Redman Dep. at 50-56.
'*»ld.
no
response may have been made after Redman told him about the comments to Tudjman.'**
On or about May 2. 1994. Redman told Ambassador Galbraith by telephone of Lake's
direction not to report in writing on the issue.'**
On April 30, 1994. the day after the dinner meeting with President Tudjman, press
reports indicated that Croatian Prime Minister Valentic and the BQSPian Deputy Prime
Minister Bukvic had arrived in Iran separately on April 29. 1994.|^|i9BHII^M
Galbraith had known in advance of the Valentic trip and was
concerned tharlTthe US did not cleariy get its "non-objection" across to the Croatians
regarding the Iranian arms pipeline, the trip could be canceled/'T^
On May 1 . the Secretary's Morning Summary mentioned the press reports of more
economic cooperation between Croatia. Iran and Bosnia, commenting that this cooperation
would strengthen the Federation, but also give Iran a greater foothold in the fonner
Yugoslavia.'** /J^T^"^"^
By this time, it was becoming obvious that the response to the Tudjman question
had avoided Galbraith's fears of derailing the Croatia-Iran arms pipeline and the economic
'** Lake Int. at 2.
'*" Galbraith Menrtorandum.
^*^ Vershbow Dep. at 30-33; Vershbow Notes.
'*• Department of State "Morning Summary." Apr. 30. 1994.
"• Department of State "Moming Summary." May 1 . 1994.
'** Departnrtent of State "Moming Summary." May 2. 1994.
Ill
deal between those countries. The pipeline was open. In the words of Alexander
Vershbow to Ambassador Galbraith on May 5, 1994, "You and Chuck have taken it exactly
where we want to t)e."'*'
Mine Shaft Canary
A period of confusion, second thoughts and miscommunication regarding the
wisdom and execution of the "no instructions" instructksns began on Monday, May 2, 1994.
As noted earlier, it was on May 2 that Redman informed Ambassador Galbraith that he had
spoken with National Security Advisor Lake and that Lake had said that there was no need
to report in writing on the AJarii 29 meeting with President Tudjman. Both Redman and
Galbraith have stated they believe that Lake was satisfied with the manner in which the "no
instructions' message was conveyed. Ambassador Galbraith expressed through his
actions and words in the next few days no reluctance to assure that the Iranian arms
pipeline would k>ecome operatkmai.
Also on May 2. ^rpbassador Galbraith met with the his^^Hi^HH||and
instructed him to use h\^0^KKK^Ro advise the Croatians that it was US policy to
h^ve no position as to the enforcemSnfof the UN arms embargo. He explained to the
lat he and Redman had already conveyed the 'no ijistnjctions" nagssage
to PresidenrTudjman on instructions from Washington. ThefiBMWBWy asked
Ambassador Galbraith if the response given woukj not send the message to the Croatians
that they could go forward with bringing Iranian weaponry into the area. Galbraith said that
Washington was aware of this and that he had done all that he could to let the Croatians^
know that the United States would look the other way, without actually saying so.^'^'^^
Disturt>ed by this unusual and potentially dangerous shift in policy, the^
|asked to see the Amt>assador's instructions. When Ambassador Galbraith sakJ his^
instructions canr^ telephonically from the Natk>nal Security Council, the
replied that he wquM r>eed guidance from his headquarters before he a>ukj use the
jto convey such a message to the Croatians, since such enaction
I a covert action. Galbra'ittiJ?ecame angry and 'ordered* thefljI^B
[ to convey the message. Again, thejHHHHBM'efused to act as directed,
**^ Galbraith Memorandum.
112
stressing the need for guidance given the legal and oversight issues
The agitated AmbassadQC-questioned ^at right thejWiWWyhad to block
the policy of the President. ThqaHHH99|presponded that he vt/as hSTattempting to
block policy, but that he needed to see some sort of written instmctions from the President
or at least consult his headquarters first. Galbraith continued his argugQen^iththaSpH
■■■flby declaring that Tony Lakglhad wanted ta.know why th^JpHHHB^nd
DefenSeAttache Herrick had told the^^D9HIIII|^nd^ys^uespectj^ly thiat the US
policy was still to enforce the UN arms embargo. Th^^^HHMHreplied with a
number of reasons, among them the fact that President Clinton had reaffipped that polic
in a statement on April 20, 1994. Frustrated by his inability to change the
mind, Galbraith ended the conversationJ^lMjJ^ **
Shortly after this discussion, Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke informed theJ
J that Galbraith had never actually spoken to Anthony Lake, and that he (Fjeitzke)
had advised Galbraith not to push the "policy line." Neitzke also characterized the
Ambassador as being in a "Capitol Hiil mode," making policy, cutting deals and maybe
getting out ahead of Waghington on Jb'S policy issue.'** Subsequent discussions with
Neitzke revealed to theflPBBHH^het, as of May 4, 1994, the Embassy had still not
received any written guidance on !he Iranian arms issue. Neitzke also expressed his
understanding that the failure tqissue written instructbns had been deliberate for reasons
of establishing deniabilitv^^^^^
ht decision, and
sought guidance
with the
On May 4, 1994. disturtjed by the dangers of the J
concerned as to whether it truly was the US policy, th^
from his headquarters in a cable which summarized his cxtnversati
Ambassador. With the memory of the Iran-Contra scandal still fresh
fwisely and fortunately begagto funcE
fas a "mine shaft canary,"
assuring that activities and events were carefully documented in this sensitive area of
^'^ Ambassador Galbraith had served for over a decade on the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
113
quasi-covert activity/** On May 5. 19&4. the JjpBjj^^^Mtvas advised that he should
continue to refrain from using his^PMBMByo influence Croatian policy towards
embargo busting unless he was specifically instructed otherwise. He was further
commended with a "well^oqg" and advised that perhaps a telephone call from Woolsey
to Lake was in order. ^,22^^^^
raised with Ambassador
and invited him to send a
mbassador indicated that the
no longer be necessary, as the "ball is
i2!ling." He also stated 'that he saw m) needjpr him to send a message on the matter to
K^ The^HIHHIri^also met with Neitzke on that
On that same date, May 5, 1994, tj]
Galbraith, ths, issue of his request
message toi
communication through
P
day, and Neitzke filled him in on his understanding of the events of April 2P at the
Presidential Palace. He related that Galbraith had been told to tell Tudjman that he had
no instmctions regarding the enforcement of Croatian compliance with the arms embargo
and to "smile when he said it."'*' Neitzke added that after the Ambassador conveyed this
remark. President Tudjman still missed the point and went for a walk with Redman.
Redman then told Tudjman that the Untied States did not want to be put in the position of
having to say 'No" on the issue. According to Neitzke's version, all concerned understood
that the arms shipments were to come from Middle Eastem countries, principally Iran "^
During that same discussion, Neitzke informed theJfplH^HMtfthat it was his
further understanding that Galbraith had been told by the National Secunty Council that
reports of the Tudjman discussion were not to be put on paper and that the Ambassador's
job would be imperilled or forfeit if it was. Sensing the irregularity of the situatbn, Neitzke
had urged the Ajnbassador to write a memorandum on the incident for the Ambassador's
protesltion. To Ngj^ke's knowledge, the Ambassador had not yet done so as of May 5.
The|fl|^HII|0asked Neitzke why, if the policy was defensible as a means of helping
the Bosnian Musl'ms, it shoukl not be put in writing. Neitzke's understanding, based on
114
his conversations with the Ambassador, was that either those involved in the decision had
failed to fully coordinate with their superiors or did not wish for the incident to be the subject
of coordination with the Department of Defense or CIA. Throughout this May 5 discussion,
Neitzke was very concerned and anxious thai if any of this information got out to the
national security community, the "White Mouse' would "have their heads." [WB^^^BI
^Bi^jf^xpressed support for Neitzke's plan to push Galbraith to write a memorandum.
Despite Neitzke's misgi^ngs about sharir\g. these events and concerns with other
government agencies,JBBBBBBIiHHyrepoi^d on his May 5 discussions with
Galbraith and Neitzke to his headquarterC
J^mbassador Galbraith began to share the concerns of Neitzke and ]_
^■H^He spoke by telephone with Sandy Vershbow at least once, maybe twice on May
5. 1S94. Although Vershbow and Galbraith denied during the course of the Select
Subcommittee's investigation that Vershbow rebuked, reprimanded or criticized Galbraith
for his conduct in the "no instruction" exchange, evidence of Galbraith's contemporary
reaction to his discussions with Vershbow and other State officials establishes that he was
verbally chastised for his conduct.'" As late as July of 1994. Galbraith was still angry over
having had his "knuckles rapped" by State and having been called on the carpet for his
conduct in giving the "no instructions" message.'" Galbraith claims that on May 5. he
informed Vershbow of the content of his and Redman's statements to Tudjman, and that
Vershbow told him that "you and Chuck have taken it exactly where we want to be." adding
that "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and
the Croatians.""* Galbraith's later actions reveal that the conversation with Vershbow was
not as reassuring as he now portrays it?
Later that evening on May 5. 1994, after a meeting at his residence with Defense
Attache Herrick, Neitzke and General George Joulwan (Commander-in-Chief of the US
European Command), Ambassador Galbraith asked Henick to take him back to the
Embassy for purposes of making a secure phone call. Galbraith got through to
Washington shortly after midnight. Zagreb time. The available evidence suggests that he
^^* Galbraith Memorandum.
115
spoke with Jenonne Walker at the NSC. Herrick overheard him asking whether his
response to Tudjman was proper policy. He mentioned the rebuke he received from
Vershbow and commented that, as an Ambassador, he worked for the President, not the
Department of State. Galbraith repeated that he had given the Croatians a wink and a nod
at the direction of the NSC and that Redman had done a good deal more than that. He
asked whether the US was ready to back him and Croa||a on this issue. Hem'ck also heard
Galbraith state during the call that thefi^^HBHwand Hemckhad reported on the
issue, and there was rK> guarantee thatit would nofgit out^^^p^^
aving been advised of the prevbus month's unusual events in Zagreb. officialsMf
were not at all certain that Ambassador Galbraith's activities had been properly
coordinated or^gfe talking the United Statesj
May 5, 1994^P^Headquarters ^
^ised the
jywhere pear it wanted or ought to be. On
*^ Jto continue to resist
Galbraith's request to the use th^MWMII^^tf^* yfc||pofficialsMBBpjarrariged
to have R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Inl^ligence. raise the event^in^agreb with
Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a meeting on May 5, 199^ ^
The conversation at the May 5 meeting has been the subject of slightly conflicting
testimony, as have been the recollections of the participants as to the reasons for the
meeting, and the impressions it left. It is undisputed, however, that Woolsey and Deputy
Director for Intelligence Doug MacEachin were present at the meeting for the CIA, and that
Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and Ambassador Phil Wilcox of
the Department of State also attended. The recollection of the CIA participants, assisted
by a menrorandum for the record the CIA notetaker prepared immediately aftgr the
meeting,'" is that Woolsey raised the issue by describing the repoi^Jrom the
tat Ambassador Galbraith was urging him to usq
fto the Croatian government that the US would look the
other way from Croatian transshipments of arms from Iran to Bosnia. Woolsey informed
the attendees that he had also given this information to National Security Adviser Lak^
Secretary Christopher said nothing in response. Talbott replied that he had been
called by Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel Berger after Woolsey's call to Lake.
He then infbnned Woolsey of the situation in Zagreb from the perspective of the
'^ Herrick Dep. 32-39:j^BVBHVHHHI(May 9, 1994.
'^^I^HiHM^mi^iHyMayS, 1994.
^" CIA Document. Memo for the Record by Douglas MacEachin. May 5. 1994.
116
Department of State. Taltx)tt said that Galbraith had been told twice (once before his
meeting with Tudjman and once after) that he had "no instructions" as to Tudjman's
question. After his first meeting with Tudjman, Galbraith contacted the Department of State
and requested more in the way of instructions, seeking something on the order of an
"amber light." Talbott indicated to the attendees that Galbraith had been told "rather tartly"
that he should stick to his 'no instructions" statement with nothing more. He had been told
that he was not to hint at having any "wiggle room." Talbott further commented that
Galbraith was apparently not absorbing the message and would be informed again so he
could not misunderstand. Woolsey was not informed of any change in United States policy
during the meeting, and left with the impression that no such policy change had
occurred.'"
Talbott recalls the conversation essentially as does Woolsey, and has testified
publicly that, in his view, the "no instructions" message to Ambassador Galbraith had not
been a 'change in policy," hence there was no discussion of such a change at the meeting.
He did not at the time appreciate the "disconnect" in his communications with Woolsey."'
Doug MacEachin, who served as the CIA notetaker at the meeting described the
discussion in these terms:
[0]ur Ambassador is asking our Ji^Bimpyo take an active step to
permit an arms shipment that we - that I go to meetings on, that we are
supposed to be against. What's going on here? ... and that's the way I
heard Woolsey present it, saying you know, is your ambassador being too
ambitious, or has there been a change? And Talbott said . . . I've checked
everything that he has been told and it's unambiguous. He has been tokj "no
instmctions," he is not to indicate any wiggle room He apparently hasrTt
gotten the message and we are going to give him the message again/"
ld.:MBIHHS|BHBI|BlB/^ay 6. 1996; House Permanent "Vf^S,
Select ComrMee on Intelligence Depos'rtion of R. James Woolsey. June 6. 1996. at lO.s^J
'" Hearing On t IS Artinns Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia
Rftfnre the Senate Select rommJHPft On Intelligence. 104th Cong. 86-89 (May 23.
1996) (Testimony of Strobe Talbott).
'*• Select Subcommittee Deposition of Douglas MacEachin, Sept 6. 1996. at 66.
117
When leaving the meeting, Ambassador Wilcox stated that Ambassador Galbraith was (or
was going to be) in trouble with his "boss."'"
The events atj^he May 5. 1994 Woolsey-Taibott meeting were conveyed to the
Dy cable on May 6. 1994. Hej^as further advisedlhat there had.
been no change in l7§ policy, and thaMtl^HBm^would advise the£_^
if and when, any such jbange occurr^!^ The cable by which he received this information
also commended thqflB^I^HBV^^'^ ^'^ excellent judgment^^nder intense pressure
and for having kept headquarters well-advised of events.'.
dgment^jnder
In Zagreb, the Woolsey-Taibott meeting had an unsettling impact on Ambassador
Galbraith and Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke. On May 6, 1994. Deputy Secretary Talbott
spoke with Galbraith by telephone. Three versions of this telephone conversation have
been given during the course of this investigation. Galbraith set forth one version of the
conversation in an alnxsst contemporaneous written memorandum he prepared on May 6,
1994."* Talt)Ott testified regarding the conversation, both publicly and in closed session.
Moreover, contemporaneous notes taken by Sandy Vershtiow of a conversation between
Taltxstt and Vershbow contain another version of the Talbott-Galbraith discussion.'*' From
the aforementioned sources, it appears that the substance of the conversation between
Talbott and Galbraith was as follows.
Mr. Talbott, after his meeting with Woolsey, had a concern that "something more
than and other than no instructions was being transmitted."'" As a result of the uncertainty
over the policy, he had a concem that the right signal had not been sent to the Croatians.
He telephoned Ambassador Galbraith on May 6 to try to address that concem. During the
discussion, Galbraith informed Taltx>tt of the instructions he had received from Jenonne
Walker, and the remark about Tony Lake smiling and raising his eyebrow. Talbott informed
him that his instnjctions on the Tudjman question had been "no instnjctions" and that the
'•' Id. at 19.
Dep.41-42
^** Galbraith Memorandum.
'" Vershbow Dep. at 73-81; Vershbow Notes.
'••Talbott Dep. at 14.
118
Administration did not want word to get out that the US had given "a green or amber light"
to the Croatians. Galbraith recounted exactly what he and Redman had said to President
Tudjman on the issue, and explained that anything short of a statement that the Croatians
should not facilitate the Iranian arms flow would be understood as a "green light" from the
United States.'" He informed Talbott that the Croatians. if cornered, would put out the
word that we had given a green light, especially since the arms traffic would be picked up
by NATO and UNPROFOR. Galbraith also noted that the Croatians would view this new
statement of position in the context of the interception of the 1992 Iran Air shipment and
the seizure of a Croatian vessel smuggling arms just a few weeks earlier.'"
Ambassador Galbraith recalls Talbott stating in the telephone conversation that the
United States wanted to do nothing that would undermine the "fragile" Muslim-Croat
Federation, but it also did not want to be seen as undermining the arms embargo. Talt>ott
told Galbraith that he was doing an excellent job, and that he had earned the messages
on the issue with great skill given the confusion in Washington. Talbott opined that the
"home office had not distinguished itself." Talljott was also curious as to whether the
United States could "walk this situation back." By this statement. Talbott now claims that
he meant "walking it back would mean make sure that the Croatians aren't reading more
into this than we are saying."'*' Galbraith replied that to do so would be almost impossible
unless the US wanted to cut off the flow of arms. When Galbraith said that he had been
tokJ not to report on the Tudjman exchange and asked if Talbott wanted a written report.
Tallxjtt sakj. "Yes." but he should not send one unless contacted by Vershbow or Assistant
Secretary Oxman."°
Ambassador Galbraith, troubled by his telephone conversatiop_yvith TalbotI
approached thejJBBBMHBjPIJfcn that same date. He asked the
what "exactly" he had shared withH^HIHHHlfion the Iranian arms i
"ireplied that he had reported Galbraith's request that he use the
"^ The notes and testinnony of Sandy Vershbow indicate that when Mr. Talbott
recounted his conversation with Galbraith to Mr. Vershbow, he described Galbraith's
renr^rk to Presklent Tudjman as 'no instructtons. yet we don't want to interpose
ourselves, so call attention to what I dkJn't say." Vershbow Dep. at 73-81 .
'•• Galbraith Memorandum.
*" Talbott Dep. at 25-30; Galbraith Memorandum.
^*" Galbraith Memorandum.
119
to convey the "no instnjctions" message. Ambassador Galbraith j^as very curious about
the language used and any knowledge that the MBMHHH^had about the May 5
meeting between Talbott and Woolsey. Galbraithstated tha^^TaJbott had Qgntacted him
to tell him that Woolsey stated that he thought, based on the^JH|HHH[»nfomiation,
jt the 'high ^n" for the Iranian arms pipeline was given by Galbraith and Redman. The
(replied that he told his headquarters about the "no instructions' message
and how, in^mbination with intelligence availablQ^it anx)unted to a "go-ahead." Galbraith
acknowledged the truth of this statement J'^^
The j^B^^^Mf reminded Ambassador Galbraith that this confusion was part
of the danger^jjushmg an uncoordinated policy line and the consequence of not
informing the^JBof what was going on. He brought to the attention of the Ambassador
a recent tasking request from the Department of Defense on May 5 seeking information
on Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia and what could be done to stop them.'" The
Ambassador characterized this/equest as the department of Defense just trying to find out
what was going on. and tha^^HB||pi^rea^ agreed, noting that the Defense
officials ought to be informeoasto this issue.
Wreaj^iiyagr
The two discussed the fact that foreign apd allied intelligence sources were taking
an interest in the Iranian-Croat deal, and the^^BHHH|y predicted that any decent
foreign intelligence service would t>e able to "walk this issue back," given the unreliability
of the players. Ambassador Galbraith venturgd his opiniortJ^at this issue was not as
serious a matter politically as Iran-Contra. Th^|2pH|^|P|^nswered that, if this were
so. why had no written instructions been provided? He fOrther urged Galbraith to creat
a memorandum of his conversations about his instructbns, for his own protection J|
Ambassador Galbraith took to heart the advice of Neitzke and the
On May 6, 1994 he created a written memorandum for record, setting firth his version of
the discussions with Presklent Tudjman, NSC officials, State Department officials and
Redman. His secretary, Charlotte Stottman, typed the memorandum, and it was signed
120
and dated by Galbraith. and by Neitzke. as a witness/*' After the document was signed
in front of Stottman. she sealed it in an envelope and locked it in the Ambassador's safe.
The Ambassador told Stottman that the memorandum was for his own protection because
of events which had taken place where he had received instructions over the telephone
from Washington. The memorandum would serve as his proof of the events which
occurred. The menx)randum remained in the safe until Captain David Wesley, working for
the President's IrU^lligence Oversight Board, asked to have it read to him in the winter of
1 994-1 995.!!^
"Hunker Down"
May 6, 1994 was also a day of worry and second thoughts about the Iranian green
light in Washington. D.C. Deputy Secretary Talbott and Vershbow discussed Talbott's
conversation with Ambassador Galbraith. Talbott recounted his directive to Galbraith to
'walk it back " if he could to 'no instructions" only. He pointed out that Galbraith had
received mixed signals, hearing both that Washington had not made a decision and that
he had no instructions. Talbott worried that the US needed to "get the right signal on the
record," but that it might be too difficult to do so. In evaluating the available courses of
action. Talbott stated that perhaps they would have to "hunker down" and let things stay
as they were. Talbott told Vershbow that he had decided that, if anything were put in
writing, there should be only one copy. Talbott feared that public disclosure of what had
happened would create serious difficulty with the United States' allies."'
On May 6 or May 7. Taltxjtt and Vershbow discussed the rapidly growing concerns
at the National Security Council atxjut the "no instructions" events. Talbott reported that
he had met with Deputy National Security Advisor Berger. Berger, on the subject of the
'no instructions" events, stated that he thought it would be "dynamite to do a record."
meaning that there should be no paper trail."* In his remarks to Vershbow. Talbott also
'"^ Galbraith Memorandum.
'•" Stottman Dep. at 26.
"^ Vershbow Dep. at 73-81; Vershbow Notes.
"• Vershbow Dep. at 92-94; Vershbow Notes. When interviewed by the Select
Subcommittee Staff. Mr. Berger did not specifically recall making this remari<. but
speculated that if he said it, it may have been in reference to potential damage to
relations with our allies. Berger InL at 2.
121
made reference to Jenonne Walker's being disciplined."* Although Walker, when
inten/iewed by the Select Subcommittee Staff, denied having been disciplined or criticized
by any of her superiors at the NSC, she did reveal that when she approached Berger with
a request from Ambassador Galbraith that he receive his instnjctions in writing, Berger
replied with words to the effect of "Dammit. Jenonnel Shut up! He is not going to get his
Instruction In writing, he has his instnjctions."'"' Contrary to later public and private
contentions that the, Iranian green light policy was a sound and well executed, the doubts
and near panic regarding its wisdom and impact v/ere very much in evidence in May 1994.
Thei
janic was also growing in Zagreb. On May 6 or May 7, Neitzktspoke with th?
zkggpoke wrth the,
Jabout his concerns over recent events. Neitzke told thqSHHBHjw
'that Galbraith had talked to Talbott on May 6 and that the Washington officials were rtoj^
denying that they ever intended to indicate acquiescence to the Iranian-Croatian dealings.
They also reportedly could not t>elieve that the Croatians so indiscreetly allowed so many
Iranian deliveries so qurckly. Neitzke felt that the Ambassador was worried about being
made a scapegoat for the green light decision. Galbrai^ s^ent a good portion of May 6
on the secure phone with Redman and Washington^^^l^^^^
Witbin the next weeJs^rtMay 12. 1994, Ambassador Galbraith sought th^
view on the ^Hfir understanding of the US pojigy on Iraniac
transhipfnents. He was espeaally interested in anything that th^
krK)w atXMjt the discussnns between Wodsey and Lake on the issue. The
advised Galbraith that he had heard nothing new. Galbraith also stated that he had
received a phone call from a reporter regarding Iranian arms on May 11,^ that he had_
responded with a "no comment*** On that same day, Neitzke told the _
that Galt)raith had received an apology from the NSC for being left out on a limb, and that
policy was. indeed, the wink and nod approach.*" Defense Attache Herrick also advised
'•• Vershbow Dep. at 92-94; Vershbow Notes. In his deposition testimony.
Vershbow irnJicated that perhaps Jenonne Walker had been disciplined for conveying
the position to Galt>raith and her remarks about the smile and raised eyet>rows. Walker
denied ever being disdpfined.
aoo
Walker Int at 3.
122
f hat he was receiving numerous calls from the Department of Defense
on the Iranian arffis issue, and that the Department of Defense was in the dark, wondering
what was going on.*** From the vantage point of Zagreb, there appeared to be confusion
among the departments in Washington on this new policy, and a lingeHQg fear in the
Embassy that Washington might disavow the Ambassador's activitv^ii^LO
The Iranians and Croatians had wasted little time in turning on the arms pipeline.
As the Embassy Zagreb Public Affairs officer would later testify, the sudden and open
presence of Iranian arms flights was quite "provocative.""'
Western journalists noted the sudden appearance of Iranian aircraft in Croatia.^'^
On May 25, after seeing one newspaper story in the Washington Post conceming Iranian
arms shipment to Croatia, Fred Baron, a US Representative to the UN Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) Conceming Yugoslavia,
suggested at a meeting of the Committee that the Committee should look into the alleged
Hovanec Dep. at 22.
123
violations of the arms embargo by Iran.*'* Clearly the US representatives serving on
various UN bodies concerned with arms embargo issues were not advised of the Iranian
green light policy. Fortunately in light of the potential for embarrassment. Secretary Ngobi
of the Committee advised that he had already sent letters to the Governments of Croatia
and Bosnia asking them to investigate the story, as well as a letter requesting a response
from Iran. The US was spared the ordeal of being exposed as a hypocrite.*"
A UN Sanctions Committee team traveled to Zagreb in May 1994 to investigate the
delivery of Iranian arms through Croatia. The British had expressed concern about Ujese
arms embgrgo violations. In late May of 1994. Ambassador Galbraith informed th^^iB
that the investigation had been inconclusive.*'* It is readily appar^t that
GalbrdRh had not gone out of his way to assist the visiting UN investigatore^^^^T*
In addition to the CIA and the United Nations, the Department of Defense, then
involved in the interdiction of arms embargo violators, was not infonned of the US tolerance
or complicity in the Iranian arms pipeline, let alone the Iranian green light policy decision.
As of May 5, 1994. the Secretary of Defense had requested that the CIA provide
information relative to the clandestine arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims.*" As noted
earlier, as of May 12. 1994. Defense Attache Henick was also receiving inquiries from the
Department of Defense Iranian arms shipments.*'*
Department of Defense interest in the issue reached a crescendo on approximately
May 13, 1994. On the eve of a "Principals Meeting"*'^ in Washington, the Defense
*'* ProvisionaLSummary Record of the 1Q4th Closed Meeting of .the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 Concerning Yugoslavia
(1991). at 11-12.
"^ A meeting of cabinet level national security officials, usually consisting of at
least the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor and,
frequently, the DCI.
124
Attache's Office in Zagreb was contacted with frantic calls from the Pentagon seeking
information on the Iranian arms flow for use in briefing Secretary William Perry. As Herrick
was absgptfrom the Embassy atjbe time, his assistant sought advice on how to respond
from theplpBBBI^Q The^P^HMMj^Hj^vised hinaJo wait for Heqick's return.
Ambassador Galbraith asked th^Bp^^B^pwhat thj^BWil^instructions
were on responding to the requestslor information. Thq^B|^BBBB|^es£pnded that
he was not to get involved in the matter or raise it irihi^|k|riBSHBF Galbraith
commented that the Department of Defense should get "on board, and add6?nhat he was
covered on the issue, as he was following instaictions from the White House.*" Neitzke,
upon teaming of the Pentagon inquiries, expressed his desire to talk to Herrick before he
communicated anything back to the Pentagon.*" Evidence further suggests that upon
Herrick's return to the Embassy. Galbraith told him not to respond to inquiries from
Washington on the Irarugn arms issue beyond references to press or intelligence reports
already availabl^^J^H^
The suspicions of the Ambassador, the/i^— M^and Neitzke that the
Department of Defense had not been advised of the Iranian green light policy, provoked
anxious discussion on July 21 . 1994 regar^ng an immiggnt visit to Croatia by Secretary
Perry. Ambassador Galbraith asked the^BBHHMpwhether or not Croatian Prime
Minister Valentic (a significant figure irytb'eTran-Croat^Telationship) should be invited to
have lunch with Secretary Perry. TheMB— ^^entured his opinion that to do so
couW create an awkward situation if. asTFey all suspeaed. Secretary Perry had not been
informed of the Iranian green light/no instructions decision. The Ambassador wanted to
discuss the matter further in the Secure Conference room at the Embassy. In that
discussion, Galbraith stated that he was tired of the CIA and Department of Defense
running a separate foreign policy from that of the DepartmeriLof State, the NSC and
'probably* that of the President on the Iranian amns issue. The^|iHHiH|^isagreed
with Galbraith and pointed out that the Director of Central Intelligence had beenpejsonally
told by the Department of State that the "wink and nod" was not US policy^*'
Galbraith asked
wrhether he thought Secretary Perry might raise
125
the Iranian arms issue. The^Spi^HB^^said that he could not speak for the Secretary
of Defense and opined that Galbraith was probably better placed to guess what might have
been happening back in Washington. Galbraith responded that he thought he knew what
went on, and that he, in any event, had acted on instructions. The discussion then turned
to the subject of the Ambassador's concem that Croatian Defense Minister Susak might
raise the issue with Secretary Perry, and how Sysakmightreact if the Secretary told him
that the arms embargo remained in force. Th^/MIMBHBBfreplied that although Susak
would t>e confused, he would probably continuethe Iranian shipments. Defense Attache
Herrick had the final vwjrd on the issue, when asked if there was "angst" at the Department
of Defense over the issue and whether Galbraith should raise it with Secretary Perry.
Herrick replied that the level of concem at the Department vaned. Herrick also advised
against Galbraith rajsingthe issue with Secretary Perry, warning that it might open up
"Pandora's I In ^"ijjQ'^
Unt>eknownst to the participants in this meeting. Secretary Perry had already flipped
open the proverbial lid on Pandora's Box. only to have it slammed shut by Anthony Lake.
In June of 1994. Secretary Perry met with Lake, asking for clarification regarding why the
US had not taken action to block the Iranian arms shipments to Croatia. According to a
Department of Defense official. Lake replied that he was tired of hearing about the issue
and that the shipments would be permitted to continue. Secretary Perry was upset about
the situation and Lake's response.*^
Others in high positions at the Department of Defense were also in the dark abtout
the green light. From April 1994 to June 1996, General Wesley Clark served as the J-5,
that is, as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. As the
J-5, General Claris was the staff officer who advised the Chaimian of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on US military policies woridwide. In April and May of 1994, General Claris was
neither consulted nor informed of the Iranian green light decision. Although aware in May
of 1994 that there was an influx of arms into Bosnia, he did not know the reason for it or
that the US was involved with it His understanding was that US policy was to enforce the
UN arnts embargo, and he regularly saw reports indicating that the embargo was, in fact,
being enforced.***
*** Select Subcommittee Deposition of General Wesley Clark. Sept. 4. 1996, at
3-8.
126
As the summer of 1 994 ^pte on. it becaipe more and more apparent to Ambassador
Galbraith, Mr. Neitzke and theifl[|0iilBBthat the list of those unaware of the Iranian
green light was lengthy and troubling. Through all of Galbraith's display of bravado, he and
Neitzke became increasingly dismayed at the prospect of being hung out to dry if and
when the misguided decision was exposed. Throughout the summer. Galbraith probed
visitors and officials for information on the issue.
On a June
a regent meeting
mbassador
ad with the.
QaU)
m
raith quizzed th
egarding
_ Galbraith tried, without success, to get an acknowledgment of CjAinvolvemerit in the
Iranian arms situation.^ On that same date. Neitzke spoke with the^^BB^^about
his perception that Galbraith was sitting on "the horns of a dilemma." Neitzke was
concerned that, because Galbraith was without written instmctions. Washington would
hang him out to dry. He speculated tnat Charles_Bedman and ^eponne Walker would be
in the same unpleasant predicament.^ The^i^BlHBI^^speculated it appeared
possible that the instmctions had been an NSC directive without the Departme]^LUi([^tate's
knowledge and that no one at State was willing to stand up for Galbraith^^*
Ambassador Galbraith's search for clues about the Washington scene continued on
_ I Galbraith questioned a visiting team of intelligence analysts from the Balkan
""Task Force regarding their knowledge of the Iranian arms issue. He specifically asked if
they had seen anything to indicate that there was a US govemment connection to the
Iranian arms flow. The analysts responded that they had not seen anything definrtive on
aUSrole.^"
Later in July of 1 994. Deputy Chief of Missksn Neitzke visitejljyVashington. After his
return to Zagreb, he met with Ambassador Galbraith and the^BHHH|^for the
purpose of receiving an intelligence report on the latest Iranian arms deliveries loXroatia.
Neitzke shared his observations on what various Washington officials knew about the
decision to look the other way with regard to the Iranian arms shipments. Neitzke
expressed his clear impressk>n that the Department of Defense and the CIA had no
127
knowledge of the policy on the Iranian arms. He was even doubtful whether the State
Department was on board, declaring, "You could not find two people at State who have the
same idea as to our policy in the region much less on Iranian arms."^
Neitzke continued in this vein, stating that it was his understanding that the issue
of whether Iranian weapons deliveries to Croatia should be tacitly allowed had been raised
by Secretary Christopher with Anthony Lake. Neitzke had heard that Christopher was
equivocal on the issue and told Lake that he might go along if nothing was put in writing.
Upon hearing this, Galbraith remarked that the scenario didn't explain why he had his
'knuckles rapped' by the State Department on this issue. Neitzke responded that there
was inconsistent knowledge of the policy at the State Department and that Deputy
Secretary Talbott is clearly not completely "in the loop.' Galbraith continued to obsess
about the reprimand he received in May. He maintained that despite Neitzke's analysis he
couldn't understand being called on the carpet. Neitzke agreed that the reprimand was
difTicult to explain since Jenonne Walker had told Galbraith and Neitzke that Lake had
cleared the policy with the PreskJenL Neitzke further commented that Charies Redman's
"key" role in the Iranian arms issue was not widely recognized in Washington.^
By August 2, 1994. Neitzke's thinking on the Iranian Green Light events ai;
implicatkjns thereof had evolved to a sense of dread. He sought information from th^'
fl^lM^as to the terrorist threat to Americans citizens posed by the aftermath
decisk5n. His disillusk>n with the frightening growth of Iranian presence in Croatia and the
strange lack of appreciation for the consequences of the decision in Washington led him
to seriously conskler sending a "dissent cable' on the issue."' He was, in many respects,
a worried man. As events woukJ ha^e iy he was not alone. He soon had plenty of
company in Washington and abroa^
■n/Valk it Back"
There is substantial evklence indk:ating that beginning within weeks. If not days, of
Galbraith's response to PreskJent Tudjman US government officials began to have second
thoughts about the decision to signal a green light to the Iranian arms shipments. Other
officials, unaware of Galbraith's response or that the US had been consulted on the issue,
128
noticed the flow of Iranian aims and personnel, and were ready to shut it down. Between
early May 1994 and the effective date of the Nunn-Mitchell legislation in November 1994.
the Administration had several opportunities to halt or mitigate the Iranian arms flow and
failed to take advantage of them. By September 1994, some leaders of the Bosnian
Muslims, the very people that the Clinton Administration hoped to assist through the Iranian
arms pipeline, asked US officials to find a way to arm them that dW not involve the Iranians.
The Administration dkj nothing, though, to staunch the growth of Iranian influence.
Information regarding the Iranian arms shipments and the consequences of those
shipments was frequently included in the Secretary's Moming Summary prepared by the
Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis (INR) at the Department of State. When the pipeline
opened, the Moming Summary for May 14, 1994 commented that. "Though there seems
little doubt that regular arms-supply flights to Croatia are under way. it is not clear how long
they can be kept from becoming public knowledge or prompting reaction from the
international community.""^
^____^__^__^_^^_ JOn the eve of an important Principals Meeting on May
), the Secretary's Moming Summary reported that:
The Croatians are serving as hustling middlemen in a long-tenn arms-supply
operation that gives Croatia a stake in the ongoing Bosnian conflict,
encourages ctoser Croatian-Iranian ties, and provides an incentive to sneer
at sanctions.^
Against this backdrop, a Principals' Meeting was conducted on or about May 20,
^ Secretary's Moming Summary, May 14, 1994.
*" Secretary's Moming Summary, May 19. 1994.
»« Secretary's Moming Summary, May 20. 1994.
129
1994. A "pre-brier meeting was held beforehand, attended by Secretary Christopher.
Charles Redman, and Tom Donllon. Christopher expressed concern about the "winking
and nodding" that had gone on (or was going on) regarding the flow of arms from Iran to
Bosnia, and the participants discussed the pros and cons of the matter.^ The issue of the
Iranian arms shipments to Croatia and Bosnia did come up at the Principals' Meeting.
Some participants argued that the US should go to the Croatian government and tell them
to stop the 'ranian shipments."' To the recollection of Anthony Lake, present at the
meeting, no one discussed the "no instaictions' dedsion."* The contemporaneous notes
of Jenonne Walker reflect that someone (the NSC has refused to disclose to the
Sut)committee the person's identity) sakJ that the President knew that the arms flow was
happening and that the US was not taking any position with respect to it.'™ Lake recalls
informing the other participants that to take action on the Iranian arms shipments would
require taking the issue to the President No one suggested that the matter be >•«>• Jewed
with President Clinton.'^
As of May 24. 1994, the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in shutting down the
Iranian arms flights was strong. Colonel Donakj K. Herrick, assigned to the NSC. reported
to Jenonne Walker on that date that during a "Bosnia teleconference" the Joint Staff
suggested that something be done about the Iranian arms flights taking place. He
informed Walker that he told the Joint Chiefs that the US would probably not push the
issue at the time.'*^
^ Notes of Pre-Brief Session for the Secretary of State Regarding the May 20,
1994 PC Meeting on Bosnia, prepared by John Hannah and maintained by the NSC.
The NSC refuses to permit the Select Subcommittee staff to view the aforementkaned
document and others cited in this paragraph, and this cursory information was obtained
from an oral *brief"g" by a low level NSC staffer to Chairman Hyde and Congressman
Hastings.
**' Notes of Nancy Soderberg. May 20. 1994. maintained by NSC.
'*'Lakelntat4.
*" Notes of Jenonne Walker. May 20. 1994. maintained at NSC (hereinafter
Walker Notes).
'*° Lake Int at 4; Walker Notes.
**' Memo for Jenonne Walker from Don Kerrick. May 24. 1994.
130
Great Britain was alarmed about the Iranian arms shipments in May 1994 and was
willing to join the US in taking action to intercept or halt such shipments. The British
concern with the Iranian arms deliveries was entirely reasonable, given the significant
number of British soldiers on the ground in war-torn Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR.'*' The
British were very interested in keeping even small arms from reaching the waning factions
in Bosnia, as those weapons were the source of numerous British and French casualties.'^'
An American sokJier serving with UNPROFOR. Lieutenant Colonel John Sray, shared the
British alarm. As the S-2 (intelligence) officer assigned to UNPROFOR Commander
General Michael Rose's staff. Colonel Sray was well placed to observe the effects of the
Iranian anms pipeline in increasing the fighting.^
On May 27. 1994 the British embassy in Washington sent a letter to Secretaf
Christopher, care of the F^ecutive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In that lettec
_ _ _ _ _r/ She
recounted the fact that before the Croatians agreed to allow the Iranian shipment several
*** Select Subconmnfttee Deposition of LTC. John Sray. August 29, 1996. at 7.
***ld.at4-5.
*** Letter from the British Embassy, to the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
State, May 27. 1994.
** Information Memorandum, from INR Toby J. Gati. to Secretary Waoen
Christopher. May 31. 1994.
131
of their officials asked for the US reaction to the proposal, and observed that "the Croats
surely now think we approved of the arms deal as long as it remained plausibly
deniable."**!^'
On June 3, 1994. James Bevan, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in
Washington, also informed Colonel Kerrick of the NSC of Foreign Minister Hurd's intention
to raise the issue of the Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia with Secretary Christopher.
Bevan expressed concem because the British did not want to see Iran gain the influence
arxj access in Bosnia which would create a hostile Muslim nation, and because the Iranian
arms placed British soldiers in danger. Moreover, the British worried that the West and the
US would lose credibility as far as enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions was
concerned if the arms were allowed to flow. He alerted Kerrick to the fact that the British
intended to ask the US to join with them in pressing Croatia to stop the shipment".
Significantly, Bevan indicated that the British were willing to consider the lifting of the anms
embargo (a lifting which the British has previously opposed) if the peace process was
unsuccessful.^^ General Kerrick's memorandum reflects that it was intended to be passed
on to Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger.'**
The Select Subcommittee has been provkJed with no information regarding whether
or not Secretary Christopher discussed tfSe Iranian arms flow with Foreign Secretary Hurd.
K can be inferred from subsequent events that the Clinton Administration was not candid
with the British on this issue, as the British continued to press the United States to take
actkin regarding the Iranian arms pipeline. In eariy July of 1994, Kerrick received a cable
which emphasized the British fear' of "creeping fundamentalism' in Bosnia stemming from
the Iranian influence. Kerrick passed this cable on to Vershbow, who had left the
Department of State at the end of June 1994 and assumed Jenonne Walker's position at
the NSC. Vershbow recalls taking no actk>n as to the British concerns and doesn't believe
the British complained at a high enough level for the US to consider reacting to their
concerns.^
M7
Id.
*** Menwrandum from Don Kerrick regarding "British to raise Iranian arms
shipments to Bosnia," June 3, 1994.
"" Memorar>dum from Colonel Don Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. July 6. 1994
regarding 'Iran's arms in Bosnia*; Select Sut>committee Interview of Alexander
132
In addition to the risks to intelligence activity, the Clinton Administrations efforts to
keep the green light policy secret resulted in US government officials in the region, who
had and overriding "need to know,' being kept ignorant The US Ambassador to Serbia
was not infonried of the decision, nor vras the US Ambassador to Bosnia, the very country
to which the arms were being funneled.^ Moreover, the US Ambassador to NATO was
Vershbow. September 24. 1996.
^ Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Rudolf V. Perina, Aug. 26. 1996. at 6-
Jackovich Dep. at 20-24.
133
unaware of the Iranian Green Light, and was under the impression throughout 1994 that
the US policy was to respect the UN arms embargo and expect other countries to do so
as well.^ Given the potential for Serb retaliation against American interests or personnel
If the Serbs regarded the US as co-belligerents with the Croatians or Bosnians, this
secrecy, bom of fear of embarrassment or detection was reckless.
Opportunities to "walk it back," that is. to dilute or eliminate Iranian influence
continued to present themselves to US officials. The Croatians and the Bosnians both
expressed concerns and reservatjat^ about the dominant role played by the Iranians as
the main supplier Qf weaponry^AgpBH '~
In August of 1994, General Wesley Clark visited Bosnia on behalf of the US Joint
Chiefe of Staff to determine Bosnian military needs if the UN arms embargo were lifted.
During the course of a series of discusskins with Bosnian offscials, General Claris met with
Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic. Izetbegovic asked
Clark whether the US would "covertly assist' the Bosnians by authorizing Slovenia to
release two thousand tons of weaponry the Slovenians were detaining. General Clark
stated that he would pass on the Bosnian request to his superiors. He did so, informing
General Shalikashvilli. Shalikashvilli directed General Clartt to take the matter to Deputy
National Security Advisor Berger at the White House. General Clark met wrtth Berger
persor^jly and put nothing in writing about the request. Although General Claric was never
specifically advised of the US response, he later saw a letter from Sven Alkalai, the
Bosnian Ambassador to the Unit^ States whkii led him to believe that the US had denied
Hunter Dep. at 5-8.
3S7i
134
the Bosnian request.** Berger, when questioned by the Select Subcommittee staff
regarding the Bosnian request for Slovenian arms, had no recollection of the request or Ks
ultimate disposition.*"
Bosnian and Croatian interest in obtaining weapons from sources other than Iran
and stemming the growth of Iranian influence in the region continued into the fall of 1994.
According to Ambassador Galbratth, Defense Minister Susak infomed him at lunch on
September 5. 1994 that he preferred a covert program for providing arms to Croatia and
Bosnia to a lifting of the UN arms embargo. Moreover, Susak contended that he knew of
other countries that were willing to help if the US would provide "a signal." Galbraith claims
to have pointed out that the US could neither violate the arms embargo nor actively
cooperate in its violation. At the same time he believed Susak understood the US would
not actively stop others from violating it.*'
Richard Holbrooke became the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in
September of 1994. A firm believer in taking action, he plunged into the nx>rass of Balkan
politics with a vengeance. During an earty fact-finding trip to Croatia, he teamed of the
Iranian green light inckJent from Ambassador Galbraith.** Holbrooke, in his previous
position as Ambassador to Germany, had been aware that Iranian and other arms were
fk)wing into Croatia and Bosnia, so he asked Galbraith what the US knew and was doing
about it. Galbraith toW Holbrooke that in April of 1994 that either Tudjman or Susak
(Holbrooke's present memory is uncertain) called him in and told him Iran wanted to ship
arms through Croatia to the Bosnians and asked wrtiat US policy was on this issue.
Galbraith said he had called the White House (Holbnx)ke understood him to say that he
had talked with Tony Lake), and was told to say he had no instmctions. no position.
Galbraith sakJ he dkl exactly that and that someone at the NSC told him not to report back
by normal channels.*'
After hearing Galbraith's account, Holbrooke was highly concemed about the role
*• Claris Dep. at 28-34.
**• Berger Int at 3.
^ Galbraith Memcon for September 5, 1994, from the "Record' maintained by
Peter Galbraith.
** Holbrooke Dep. at 6-13.
*'ld.
135
of Iran in Bosnia and the Balkans. TTiis reniained the case through the time of negotiating
the Dayton Accords when he was adamant in seeking assurances that the Iranians would
be required to leave Bosnia.^
To Holbrooke's credit he began working on kieas to eliminate or dilute the Iranian
dominance of the arms fk)w to Bosnia in September 1994. Bosnian Prime Minister
Silajdzic, for all his earlier willingness to accept arms from any country that would provide
them, had changed his tune by the fell of 1994. According to Holbrooke, Silajdzic made
a point of telling American policy-nekers at every opportunity that the Iranian anms pipeline
was a "very risky thing because it woukJ increase Iranian influence."** In September of
1994, Holbrooke met with Silajdzk; in New York City where Silajdzjp floated a plan that
would diminish the Bosnian Government's deperxjence on \r^n.^i
slbrooke liked the kJea and supported it. in no small
measure because it reduced the Bosnians dependency on Iran. Holbrooke discussed it
with Secretary Chris^pt]^r, who Holbrooke believes, Christopher obtained a legal opinion
on the proposal.*^-'
A few days following the meeting in New York, Silajdzic met in Washington with
Holbrooke, and Lake. Holbrooke believes that Lake heard part, but not all, of Silajdzic's
proposal before Lake was called out to a meeting with President Clinton. The proposal
went nowhere in Washington and despite Holbrooke's advocacy, it was rejected for policy
rather than legal reasons.^
The Bosnians remained interested in alternatives to the Iranian arms pipeline even
after Novemt)er 1994 aruJ the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment. Ambassador Galbraith's
assistance was sought on Novemt>er 23, 1994 in yet another effort to secure the release
of Bosnian-bound weapons that had been seized by the Slovenes. Although asked to
"* Id. at 50.
»* Id. at 51.
*• Id. 41-45.
*'ld.
"•id.
136
intervene with the Slovenes, Galbraith said nothing to the Bosnians, noting in his memoirs
that "any comment would be seen as us working to undermine the embargo' and could
jeopardize the way in which the Bosnians received "real quantities" of weaponry,
presumably from the Iranians.**
As 1994 was coming to a dose, the Iranian arms pipeline continued to flow, and
Iranian influence continued to increase. A disillusioned Prime Ministe*- Silajdzic dined with
Galbraith on December 16, 1994.
^As Holbrooke never tokJ Silajdzic that his proposal for reducing Iranian influence
had been rejected by the Administration, Silajdzic was unaware that his lunch partner on
that December day.was truly far more to blame for Iran's mnning arrwk in Bosnia than was
Holbrooke."' '
** Memcon of Peter Galbraith, November 23, 1994, from the 'Record*
maintained by Peter Galbraith.
"• Memcon of Peter Galbraith. December 16, 1994, from the "Record"
maintained by Peter Galbraith.
''' Holbrooke Dep. at 44.
137
CHAPTER 9
ALLEGATIONS OF US OFFICIALS FACILITATING
IRANIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS
Assistance to Arms Convoy
Among the issues which the Select Subcommittee examined in the course of its
investigation was the question of whether or not US officials knowingly assisted the
passage of convoys containing weapons from Croatia to Bosnia in violation of the UN amns
embargo. Press reports had identified one specific allegation of such assistance,
purportedly involving intervention by US Special Envoy Charles Redman to secure the
release of a convoy containing Iranian weapons detained by the Croatians on or about May
13. 1994/ Information developed in several depositions, the interview of Anthony
Harrington of the President's intelligence Oversight Board, and from relevant written
records, allowed the Subcommittee to determine the facts as follows.
US officials at the embassy in Zagreb were actively involved in efforts to expedite
and facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims from Croatia
throughout 1993 and 1994.* In 1994, although many of the gspvoys traveling from Croatia
to Bosnia legitimately carried nothing but humanitarian aid j
* Risen and McManus. US Envoy May Have Aided Arms Cnnvny to Bosnia, Los
Angeles Times. Apr. 17, 1996. at A1.
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ron Neitzke. Aug. 7. 1996. at 126-128
(hereinafter "Neitzke Dep.*): Select Subcommittee DepositkMi of Peter Galbraith. Aug.
19. 1996, at 69-70. 74-78 (heieinafter -Galbraith Dep.").
138
f Ambassador
Turkovic attempted to convince the US Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor JacKo^ich. to join her
in the convoy. Ambassador Jackovich declined the invitation, determining that it was^n
oddrequestand also a matter occurring outside his jurisdiction as Ambassador/^
On May 13. 1994, Turkovic placed a telephone call to Ambassador Galbraith,
seeking his assistance in getting the Croatians to release the convoy.' Galbraith ga^e her
a noncommittal response t}ecause he believed that the convoy contained weaponry and
he did not want to be involved in fecilitating its passage.'" Galbraith's belief that the
convoy contained arms was based either upon conversations he had with news reporters
or upon intelligence information."
Unsuccessful in obtaining Galbraith's assistance. Turkovic called Special Envoy
Redman for his help. He was, at the time, in Vienna negotiating with Bosnian and Croatian
officials regarding vartous issues. Redman often intervened in order to help relief convoys
cross the border, but when questioned during the investigation regarding the Turkovic
' Select Subcommittee Depositton of Victor Jackovich, Aug. 20. 1996, at 57-61.
* Sel^Suboommittee D^DOsition ofJaHHII^Aug. 9. 1996. at 65-66
(hereinaflerH|S^P')-^^9^
"> Galbraith Oep. at 69-72.
" Id. at 74-78.
139
convoy he had no r^yllection of assisting in securing its release.'* According tc
^(^■■■■Mi^Htraveling with Redman at the time, the detained convoy was a
sticking point in the negotiations between the Muslia^aod the Croatians. Redman acted
as if he were interested in resolving the^isputg, buJ^Bv^as no firsthand knowledge that
Redman acted to free the convoy.'^ ftflj^owever. had no knowledge tji^t^eapons
were in the convoy, nor any indicatron thaTRedman had such knowledg^^sS^^
The Turkovic convoy was released by the Croatians and the circumstantial, but
logical corKJuskwi^that the release wa^e result of intercessnn by Redman.'* Although
Galbraith and thqflBIMII^^IHHMcieariy had suspicions that armgJ^ere probably
in the Turkovk: convoy, there is no eViclehce to suggest tt)qt Redman oi/Swi^ad such
suspicions. In fact, while the convoy was detained, the^^MW^BEBi<rnof contact
Ctfifito inform her of the convoy's suspicious content.'^ The Select Subcommittee also
eh^untered no proof that Galbraith infonQed Redman of his knowledge or suspicion thjt
arms were contained in the convo^^S^^^
Apparently. Redman unkrK}wingly intervened in a transaction which violated the UN
arms embargo. His intervention was not atypk:al, however, because Clinton Administratk)n
ofTicials regularly intervened to facilitate the passage of convoys to Bosnia which they
believed contained humanitarian akj without consistently making efforts to ascertain
whether those convoys also contained weaponry. Hence, after May 1 , 1994, US offidals
may have routinely (albeit unwittingly) facilitated the Iranian arms flow to Bosnia."
issile Episode
During the course of the investigation of the evolution and implementation of the
Qinton Administratk>n's Iranian green light policy, the Select Subcommittee examined in
detail a trout)ling inckjent in 1995 which casts doubt on the Administration's contentions
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles E. Redman, Aug. 27. 1996, at 64-
70 (hereinafter *Redman Dep.*).
" Select Subcommittee Interview oJjI^HMf Aug. 21 . 1996, at f!
^ The same condusk>n was reached by the lOB. See Chapter 7.
'g^l^^Dep. at 68-71.
^* Neitzke Dep. at 126-128; Redman Dep. at 64-70; Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Tom Mittnacht. Aug. 14. 1996, at 8-11. 42-44. 55-60.
140
that the "no instructions" instruction involved nothing more than a failure to object to
violations of the UN arms embargo. The incident suggests that in this instance, and
perhaps in others as w/ell, Ambassador Galbraith may have gone beyond standing mute
in the face of embargo violations, and may have actually secretly played a direct role in
violating the embargo.
In September 1995, Croatian officials intercepted six crates oigl^g/nvssWes from
Iran that, after being dropped off by an unmarked airplane that was said to carry only
humanitarian aid, were en route to Bosnia across Croatian territory." The land-to-land
missiles earned one warhead each (but not, it was later learned, chemical weapons), and
were designed to be fired from a stand-alone missile launcher.'* The weaponry, like the
aircraft that delivered it, did not bear any markings that wouldsjdentify their source, but that
type of missile is known to be of Iranian manufacture.'^fj^^
Croatian officials informed US officials of the suspicious missiles' capture and
requested guidance from the United States."* In particular, the Croatians were concerned
that the missiles might carry chemical weapons. US officials inspected the arms, which
were being detained at Pula/
Dep. at 100-104.
'* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Lt. Colonel John Robert Sadler, August
21. 1996. at 15 (hereinafter "Sadler Dep.").
19
Dep. at 102.
» Sadler Dep. at 26-27.
^iPMiDep. at 102, 1057
22
141
This much is certain. What is less clear is. among other things, why the Croatians.
knowing that the United States did not "want to t}e in a position of saying no' as to arms
shipments to the Bosnian Muslims from other nations,^' sought US guidance in the first
place, and why the Croatian government ultimately decided to release the shipment of
missiles. On these important matters, the testimony of the US officials involved is in
conflict.
According to General Wesley Clark, who was serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the interception of the missiles was brought to
the attention of the US in a meeting in Zagreb between Croatian President Tudjman and
Special Envoy Holbrooke.* At that meeting. Foreign Minister Susak informed Holbrooke
that the Iranian weapons had t)een captured and were being detained by the Croatian
government. Susak asked Holbrooke to send a team of US experts to inspect the missiles.
Holbrooke tasked Clark, w/ho wab in attendance at the meeting, with handling the matter.
Clark, in turn, asked Lieutenant Colonel John Sadler, the Defense Attache for the US
Embassy in Zagreb, to examine the missiles, at which point Clark's involvement ended.
Clark stated that the only purpose for the Croatian request was to determine whether or
not the missiles were carryir>g chemical weapons, and specifically denied that Susak was
asking the United States whether or not the government should allow the missiles to
pass.*
Clark's testimony as to the purpose of the Croatian request was contradij;
Sadler. Sadler indicated that Susak contacted Ambassador Galbrarth about the
missiles and asked Galbraith to have the missiles investigated.^' Galbraith told Sadler to
examine the missiles. Sadler complied and reported his findings to the Department of
Defense for analysis.* V^en the expgrts were unable to klentify the missiles based on
Sadler's description. th^P^fimH^Hasked Sadler to make a second trip to Pula, this
'* Galbraith Dep. at 39 (attributing this statement to Special Envoy Charles
Redman).
^ Select Subcommittee Deposition of General Wesley Clark. Sept. 4. 1 996,
at 50-51.
" Id. at 53.
" Sadler Dep. at 26-27.
"id. at 12-16.
142
time with aflHP&eapons expert Galbraith approved the secorxl inspection, and it was
conducted sb^ays after the initial examination. The results of the secopd. examination
were forwarded to the Department of Defense a couple of days iater^
I six day
Later in the nwnth of Septemt>er, during a meeting with Sadler, Susaic asked
questions about the missile shipment that suggests that the Croatians were holding the
missiles pending instructions from the US as to what to do with them. Sadler testified that
Susak said. 'I'm getting a lot of pressure from the Bosnians to let these missiles into the
country, into Bosnia.** Susak then pointedly asked. "What should I <I6?" Sadler
responded that he could not comment on that issue.
Ambassador Galbraith gave a similar account He stated that although Susak was
concerned that the missiles might contain chemical weapons, he was asking more of the
United States than simply to determine Vno nature of the missiles. Galbraith understood
that Susak was asking the US government for permisston to let the convoy of missiles
proceed into Bosnia." Consistent with the green light policy he had championed to his
superiors, Galbraith testified that the amis shipment "was a Croatian and Bosnian
operatton' and "wasn't one for us to monitor or control."*
* Id. at 17-23.
" Sadler Dep. at 27.
« Id.
Galbraith Dep. at 75.
" Id. at 76.
••^"^■■^Oep. at 108.
143
These facts, taken as a whole, suggest that Ambassador Galbraith was doing more
than simply saying he had 'no Instnjctions' concerning Iranian arms shipments through
Croatia in violation of the Bosnian arms embargo. The picture that emerges, instead, is
that Galbraith may have played an active role in managing and controlling the
transshipment of amis. The CroaUan government was formally instnjcted two years earlier,
in April 1994, that the US did not "want to t>e in a position of saying no" to such arms
shipments.^' During the two years that had since elapsed, Iranian arms had steadily
poured across Croatia and into Bosnia, without any protest by the Administration.
In light of these facts, it is somewhat surprising that Croatian cfficials asked the US
government in the fail of 1995 whether they should permit the missiles to continue into
Bosnia. If Galbraith is to be believed, they shoukJ have known that the answer they would
have gotten would have been "I have no instructkins. pay attention to wtiat I'm not saying'
- that is, a "wink and a nod.' - and the Croatians would be left to decide for them^elvei^
what to do. Of course, all agree that the Croatians were concerned that theqWWW
missiles might carry chemkal weapons and that they wanted US weapons experts to see
whether they had chemical capabilities. Even so. the dear preponderance of the evidence,
including testimony from Galbraith himself, shows that tiie Croatians wanted more than
simple advice on whether the missiles carried chemical weapons. What they ultimately
wanted to kpow, as Susak asked Sadler, was what they should do with the Iranian
missiles^Jj^^fl^^
TheMHM^BWtestimony provides a ready and plausible explanation for why.
" Galbraith Dep. at 39 (attributing this statement to Special Envoy Charles
Redman).
38
Id.
144
after two years of the green light, the Croatians would ask the question: They were looking
for US permission to turn back the missiles. Even though the Croatians were receiving a
share of the arms transferred to Bosnia, it clearly was not in their self-interest to allow
Bosnia to develop military capabilities that rivaled Croatia's. The Federation might not last
forever, and the Croatians had good reason to think that they might someday be at war
with Bosnia. The Croatians thus were reluctant to allow the sophisticated Iranian missiles
to pass into Bosnian hands. They ultimately did so, however, because "Galbraith told us
to release" them.J|^5|*J^
Tudjman's statement that Galbraith had directed the release of the missiles was
jnfirmed by a statement of Susak from the previous year, which was memorialized in a
The
clear suggestion was that US involvement consisted of more,th^ mere passive
acquiescence in the release of thej^HMyriissiles into Bosniaf^
There is additksnal evidence supporting the inference that Galbraith did more than
simply manage the fk>w of arms through the Iranian-Bosnia pipeline;jy^ould appear that
he took affirmative steps to ensure that the pipeline remained open.
Jii
I Galbrarth's response was not that it was for Croatia to decide for itself whether
to accept ftjrther transshipments of Iranian arms. To the contrary, his response was that
Croatia could not shut dowrithe pipeline to which the Administration had given the green
light.)
145
The Croatians. Galbrarth explained, "are
on the hook for it," megQjng that they are committed to act as a conduit for Iranian arms
shipments to Bosnia.*' i
These facts, t^ken as a whole, suggest that, on these occasions, Galbraith may well
have overstepped the tK>unds of the no instructions policy. Instead of remaining neutral
in third-party violations of the arms embargo, albeit with the expectation that Croatia would
transship arms, Galbraith apparently exerted pressure on Croatian officials to violate the
embargo. To be sure, it is perhaps possible to reach a different factual conclusion, and
there may be facts that are presently unknown which might support a conclusion other than
the one the Subcommittee has reached. Nevertheless, based on the facts known to it. it
is the conclusion of this Subcommittee that the totality of the evj^en^ suggests that
G^lbt^^ may have played an active role in the release of th^^|K^missiles. The
jj^pWgmissile episode also provkjes at least some reason to beltSve that, on other
occasK>ns as well, Galbraith may have more or less actively managed the flow of Iranian
arms and quashed any possibility that Croatia would shut down the JraaiarLanns pipeline
before Bosnia became totally co-opted - and corrupted - by Ir^
Tuzla Mystery Flights
The Select Subcommittee encountered in the course of its investigatnn, allegattons
in press accounts that United States military personnel and equipment participated in the
delivery of weapons and supplies to Bosnian Muslim forces in the vicinity of Tuzla, Bosnia
during February of 1995. According to newspaper stories. UN observers claimed to have
observed C-130 military transport aircraft operating wrtiat they believed to be low-level
parachute drops in the Tuzla area on Febmary 10, 12, 17, and 23 of 1995. News reports
also indk:ated Danish and Norwegian troops serving with UNPROFOR in the area dainted
to have "heard* C-130 aircraft, seen American mflitary weaponry and packaging, and been
fired upon when they attempted to investigate the mysterious flights. In light of NATO
denials that any such US or NATO flights were occurring, tensions devek)ped between the
146
UN observers and NATO commanders on the issue."
The Select Subcommittee has attempted to determine the accuracy of these stories
and based upon the information made available, has concluded that there is no reliable
evidence to support the contention that the US military and US intelligence agencies were
involved in what have become colloquially known as the Tuzia Mystery Flights." The
Department of Defense. National Security Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency have
all independently and exhaustively investigated the allegations. Having reviewed materials
obtained from these agencies, the Select Subcommittee agrees with their conclusions that
there is no evidence of US government involvement in the incidents. Deposition testinnony
from other individuals who conducted investigations or inquiries regarding the matter have
also supported the results of the aforementioned agency investigations.^
** Eagan, Invisible Anriy Gets Arms. Europeans Say, The Observer, Nov. 5.
1995; Drozdial and Ottoway, US Helps Bosnian Army Get Arms. Europeans Say,
Washington Post. July 28. 1995; Dowden. NATO Angers UN in Bosnia Army Mystery,
The Independent. Feb. 27. 1995; Wovldstream. Report: US Turns Blind Eye to Arms
Drop in Bosnia. Associated Press, Oct. 30, 1995.
^^_^_^Dep. at 54-60; Jackovich Dep. at 67-70jAMpfDep. at 64-69; Select
Subcommittee Depositton of Richard Herrick. August 20rt9S6, at 64-65.
147
CHAPTER 10
THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT AND COVERT ACTION
Introduction
Any discussion of the legal constraints on the President's use of covert action must
start with the realization that covert action is a legitimate instalment of foreign policy.
Covert action, wisely conceived and judiciously executed, can aid the United States in the
achievement of its legitimate foreign policy goals and objectives. It is occasionally an
indispensable tod. the use of which can effectively advance US interests. Thus, we should
not. and do not, start with the proposition that covert action is to be avoided at all costs or
should be restricted in ways that make its employment impossible.
At the same time, covert activities, by their very nature, must not be publicly
disclosed, at least for some period of time. The planning and execution of these activities
are not open for the public to see, to debate, to criticize, or to protest, as are most other
governmental activities in this free society. For these and other reasons, the political
processes that normally constrain and control exercises of governmental authority do not
easily or effectively operate in this sphere. This lack of traditional political and legal
oversight is compounded by the wide discretion the Executive Branch enjoys under US
law in the foreign policy arena. This decision, coupled with diminished polKical
accountability, leaves an overzealous administration with the ability to pursue (xslicies that
are unwise or outright illegal.
Against this backdrop, it is the purpose of this section to address one principal
question: DkJ US ofHcials formulating or executing the green light decision violate any of
the laws or circumvent any of the procedures established by Congress and the Executive
Branch? In the event US laws were violated, the next question is what action, if any, ought
to be taken. If there were no violatktns of law, we must still consider whether, in light of the
facts as they have t>een uncovered through this investigation, cunent laws and procedures
are adequate to provide sufficient oversight and control of covert activities.
Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Covert Action
A detailed history of ttie various laws and executive orders goveming covert actk)n
is not essential to the purpose of this report and, in any event, is readily available
148
elsewhere/ At the same time, to detemfiine whether the various actors in the green light
affair have complied with both the letter and spirit of applicable laws, it is important to
highlight the Congressional concerns that have generated the various legal and procedural
restrictions over the years.
A review of the legislative activities in this area reveals that Congress has been
most concerned about three particular aspects of covert action. First^Congress has
sought to ensure that covert action is not carried out by subordinate officials within the
Executive Branch operating without adequate coordination among relevant agencies and
officials and without supervision by the President and his most senior foreign policy and
national security advisers. To eliminate such possibly renegade and generally highly ill-
conceived operations. Congress, in cooperation with the Executive Branch, has taken
steps to ensure that any possible covert action will be carefully considered at the highest
levels of the Executive Branch. Congress has worked closely with the Executive Bran^^h
to rationalize the functions and responsibilities of the different intelligence agencies, again
for the purpose of ensuring a process of high-level review, analysis and advice to the
President regarding any proposed covert activity, and to guarantee advance Presidential
approval of any such activities.
Second. Congress has t>een concerned about the appropriate bounds of such
activities. In that regard, it has successfully solicited representations from successive
Presidents that certain types of covert activities will not be undertaken as a general rule.
The Executive Order generally restricting attempts to assassinate foreign leaders is an
example of this kind of undertaking. Congress has also occasionally expressed its
concems in this regard more forTr.ally through the legislative process, as. for example,
when it prohibited the Executive Branch from using any federal monies to supply arms to
the Contras.
Third. Congress has also frequently wondered about the wisdom of proposed covert
activities, especially how such activities relate to other stated foreign policy goals and
objectives and how such activities advance the national interests of the United States.
^ See, eug., Report of the Congresskinal Committees Investigating the iran-
Contra Affair. H. Rept. 100-433; S. Rept No. 100-216, Nov. 13, 1987. at 457-479.
Appendix A (Minority Report, Chapters 2-4); Treverton. Controlling Covert Action, in
Controtling Intelliganrft, at 113-133 (Hastedt, ed.. 1991); Koh. The National Security
Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair, at 57-64 (1990); Reisman &
Baker. Regulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion
Abroad in Intematinnal and American Law, at 116-135 (1992).
149
Accordingly. Congress has provided by statute that "[t]he President shall ensure that any
finding approved pursuant to [the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991] shall be
reported to the intelligence conDmittees as soon as possible after such approval and before
the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding. . .,' except in certain cases.^
The statutory exception is rather broad and open ended, to allow the President adequate
discretion to conduct foreign affairs within the scope of his constitutional powers. But, at
the same time, the statute continues that in those cases in which the President does not
give prior notice, he then 'shall fully inform the intelligence committees in timely fashion
and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice."' Whatever may
constitute "timely" notification, the congressional concem is clear Congress wants its
leadership infomied about clandestine US adventures abnaad - before the fact, whenever
possible, and shortly thereafter in the few remaining cases. Such notification permits a
much more informed, candid dialogue between these two branches of government and
significantly increases the ability of Congress to carry out effectively its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to these activities.
It is against this backdrop that we must examine the legal requirements in this area.
Of particular relevance to the instant inquiry is a single broad inquiry: Did any of the
individuals invoked in the green light affair engage in unauthorized "covert action?" Under
current law. the President cannot authorize a covert action unless: (1 ) the President has
made, in advance, a written finding that the action "is necessary to support identifiable
foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the
United States.* and (2) the President has notified Congress, if at all possible, in advance
of the covert activity or. in exceptional cases, soon thereafter.* Of course, to determine
whether there is covert action, we must examine the legal definition of "covert action."
The current definition of covert action has not been arrived at easily. Interestingly.
what is often thought to be the initial legislative authorization for broad-scale covert
activities - the National Security Act of 1947 - does not even use the term "covert" in its
relevant sections. Instead, the statute merely indicates that it shall be the duty of the
'Agency, under the direction of the National Security Coundl ... (5) to perfbmi such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
* Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991. § 503(cX1). Public Law 102-
88. Aug. 14. 1991. 105 Stat 443 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413b) (emphasis added).
* 50 U.S.C. § 413b(cK3) (emphasis added).
*50U.S.C.§413b(cX1).
150
Security Council may from time to time direct."* The National Security Council directive
issued in relation to the 1947 Act does refer to covert action in the course of assigning
responsibility for coordinating and executing such activity, but provides no dear definition
of the phrase.'
Definitions did gradually begin to creep into official documents, however. For
example, by 1976, Executive Order 11905 contained the following definition of 'special
activities,* a then-convenient euphemism for covert action:
Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means activities,
other than the collection and production of intelligence and related support
functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies atsroad
which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government
is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.^
Executive Order 12333, issued five years later by President Ronald Reagan, embellishes
that definition by enumerating activities that are not to be considered special activities or
covert action. These include "diplomatic activities," as well as the "collection and production
of intelligence or related support functions."*
The exclusion for traditional diplomatic activities is particularly relevant here because
some of the participants in the green light affair claim to have done nothing nrwre than
engage in the routine conduct of foreign diplonnacy. Routine diplomatic activities often
occur under some cloak of confidentiality, if not secrecy. Indeed, one of the t)edrocks of
foreign diplomacy is the belief, often vindicated in practice, that foreign government officials
are often more candid than they might otherwise be when they can expect that their
conversations with US govemment officials will be held in confidence.
It was on precisely this point that in 1990 President Bush pocket vetoed the
proposed Intelligence Authorization Act. Fiscal Year 1991 (S. 2834). In Section 602 of that
proposed act. Congress attempted its first legislative definition of covert action.
* National Security Act of 1947. as amended. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
' National Security Council Directive 10/2, June 18. 1948.
' Executive Order 11905. § 2(c). Feb.18. 1976.
• Executive Order 12333. § 3.4(h). Dec. 4. 1981.
151
Covert action was defined under the bill to include, among other things, any
"request" by the US that a foreign government or a private citizen take action that would
constitute "covert action" if performed by the United States.' The Joint Explanatory
Statement which accompanied S. 2834 explained that the provision was designed, "to
prevent the conduct of a covert action at the specific request of the United States that
bypasses the requirement for Administration review. Presidential approval, and
consultation with the intelligence committees.""
In his MenrK>randum of Disapproval, the President indicated his belief that the
provision "purports to regulate diplomacy by the President and other members of the
Executive Branch by forbidding the expression of certain views to foreign governments and
private citizens absent compliance with specified procedures."" He opined that this
provision "could require, in most instances, prior reporting to the Congress of the intent to
express those views." This was unacceptable, in his view, because:
. . . the vagueness of this provision could seriously impair the effective
conduct of our Nation's foreign relations. It is unclear exactly what sort of
discussions with foreign governments would constitute a reportable "request"
under this provision, and the very possibility of a broad construction of this
term could have a chilling effect on the ability of our diplomats to conduct
highly sensitive discussions concerning projects that are vital to our natbnal
security. Furthermore, the mere existence of this provision could deter
foreign govemments from discussing certain topics with the United States at
all. Such a provision could result in frequent and divisive disputes on
whether an activity is covered by the definition and whether individuals in the
executive branch have complied with a statutory requirement/^
" The proposed legislation read, in pertinent parts, that any "request by any
department. agerKry. or entity of the US to a foreign government or private citizen to
corKJuct a covert action on behalf of the United States shall be deemed to be a covert
action.' § 602(eKa). S. 2834. H. RepL 101-928. 101st Cong. (1990).
"Id.
*' MemorarxJum of Disapproval for the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1991. Nov. 30. 1990. Public Papers of the Presidents of the US: George Bush 1990,
Book II - July 1 to Dec. 31. 1990. at 1729.
"Id. at 1729-30.
152
As the President made dear in that sanie Menvjrandum, however, his disagreement
with Congress was largely over the vagueness of the definition, not the substance of the
provision. He went on to note:
. . . [0]bjections to this provision should not be misinterpreted to mean that
executive branch officials can somehow conduct activities otherwise
prohibited by law or Executive order. Quite the contrary. It remains
Administration policy that our intelligence services will not ask third parties
to carry out activities that they are themselves forbidden to undertake under
Executive Order No. 12333 on U.S. intelligence activities."
To allay Congressional concerns, moreover, he explicitly indicated that he had "directed
that the notice to the Congress of covert actions indicate whether a foreign govemment will
participate significantly.'
That the President and Congress were in basic agreement regarding prior policy
and practice was also made dear by a letter to the President from the chairmen of both the
Senate and the House intelligence committees, dated November 29. 1990. In the letter,
they explained to the President that the provision was not intended as a departure from
prior practice, but rather as an attempt to codify what they believed was a pre-existing
mutual understanding regarding the requirements that might entail use of foreign
governments and norv-govemmental entities to take covert adion on behalf of the US In
that letter, the chairmen stated:
Findings have never been required to authorize contads made by the
Govemment to determine the feasibility of. and to plan for. a covert action
prior to seeking the approval of the President. Indeed, it is not the intent of
this provision to preclude the informal contacts and consultations which
would be required prior to the United States officialiy requesting a third
country or private citizen to undertake such activities on its t>ehalf. Only
once R had been determined that such assistance was feasible and is made
the subjed of an official request by the United States Govemment woukj the
requirement for a finding and reporting to the intelligence committees come
into play. That is, irxleed, consistent with the understandings that have long
existed between the Administration and two committees.*^
"Id. at 1730.
"* See Cong. Rec.. H.6161. July 31, 1991.
153
Thus, both chairmen confirmed the intent of Congress merely to codify existing practice,
not to create new standards or obligations.
Subsequent negotiations did not bring the two sides any closer to agreement on
appropriate language. As the House Report on the subsequent version of the Intelligence
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 , noted: "Efforts to resolve the President's concem with
the definKlon of covert action in S.2834, and related issues conceming the notification to
Congress of covert actions, in a manner satisfactory to the Committee, were
unsuccessful."" Accordingly, that part of the definition of covert action was dropped from
the next version of the bill.
Congress" expectation that it would continue to receive timely notification of any
covert activity that the US government requested a third party to execute was in no way
diminished by failure to include explicitly this requirement in the definition of covert action.
After all. Congress had the President's explicit assurance in this regard." Congress was
not content ro rely entirely on the good will of the President, however. Congress included
in the new law a requirement that any time the US uses a third party to take covert action,
the President must make a specific finding to that effect. The law also makes clear that
no finding of the Preskjent could 'authorize any action that would violate the Constitution
or any statute of the United States.""
Under pre-existing understandings and dear Presidential representations nrade
during the course of the legislative process, it is clear that some requests to foreign
governments or third parties to undertake certain actions fall within the purview of the
regulations on covert actions, while other discussions with foreign governments
presunr^bly do not The trick, of course, is to decide which is which. At the extremes, it
is easy to draw the line between traditk>nal diplomatic activities and covert action. If US
government offk^ials are simply told that some government intends to take a certain action
and the US has played, or plays in the future, absolutely no further role in the matter, it has
not engaged in covert actbn. If, on the other hand, US govemment officials instigate,
facilitate arKJ otherwise play a significant executory role in the action, even though it is
carried out by entities other than the US government, their conduct approaches, if not
crosses, the line into covert action.
" H.RepL 102-37. 102d Cong.. 1st Sess.. Apr. 22. 1991, at 2-3.
'• Cong. Rec., H 6161. July 31. 1991.
"50U.S.C.§413b(aK5).
154
Application of the Covert Action Law
Successful delineation of this dividing line is no abstract matter in the case at hand
because it is precisely the role of US Government officials in their discussions with foreign
governments that is at issue. This is made all the more difficult because, on some cnjcial
issues, the evidence in this case conflicts. Depending on the inferences one draws from
the evidence, the role of US Government officials may draw closer to. or farther away from,
the line.
Some of the conduct in the Iranian green light matter clearly does not constitute
covert action. Although Ambassador Galbraith may properly be criticized for being
somewhat overzealous in his advocacy of the green light policy, and although he may be
criticized for pushing the foreign policymal<ing apparatus to an unduly hurried and ill-
considered conclusion, the formulation of the policy does not constitute covert action.
Ambassadors are not expected to be mere passive conduits for flows of communications
and information between foreign governments and domestic policymakers. It is perfectly
legitimate for, and part of the traditional functions of, a diplomat to make recommendations
anrong altemative courses of actkjn. His zeal in advocating giving Iran the green light does
not detract from the legitimacy of his championing a particular cause within the corridors
of the Executive Branch. Such conduct simply does not fall within the definition of covert
action.
Similariy, diplomatic efforts to implement the green light policy do not constitute
covert action. Again, the traditional function of a diplomat comes into play. Diplomats
traditionally have been responsible for communicating the policies of their governments to
representatives of foreign nations, either on their own initiative or upon request from a
foreign representative. Even tfiough the policy in this case was. as Ambassador Galbraith
described it. to give "a wink and a nod" to Iranian arms transfers in violation of the UN arms
erribargo.'* the fact that a communication of policy (as opposed to a request to take actk>n)
might be intended or expected to produce action on the part of a third party does not
subject the diplomat's activity to scrutiny under US covert action laws. Consequently,
tellirtg Croatian officials that US officials had been given no instructions on whether to
object to Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims does not constitute covert action.
The Subcommittee's investigation dkJ. however, indude allegations that US officials
had taken action in support of the Iranian arms pipeline that, in theory at least, could
constitute covert action. The allegation is that in May 1994 Special Envoy Redman, at the
'• Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Galbraith. Aug. 19. 1996. at 13.
155
request of the Bosnian Ambassador to Croatia, pressured the Croatians into releasing a
convoy that purportedly carried only humanitarian supplies but that, in actuality, carried
some anx>unts of arms." We find that this activity could constitute covert action if Redman
knew that the convoy contained arms, but we find no basis for believing that he had such
knowledge. The second allegation of potential covert action was that US officials had air-
lifted weapons and supplies to Bosnian Muslim forces in Tuzia, Bosnia in Febmary 1995."
Like the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Subcommittee
found no evidence that US officials had any involvement In the so-called TuzIa Mystery
Flights.' On each of these allegations, we find no grounds for concluding that US officials
engaged in any covert action.
Unfortunately, we are constrained to reach a different conclusion on certain other
allegations pertaining to Ambassador Galbraith, based on evidence revealed during this
investigation. These allegations relate to the Nazeat missile shipment capt'jred by
Croatian officials in September 1995.*' At the request of Croatian officials, US weapons
experts analyzed the Iranian missiles to determine whether they earned chemical weapons.
Those missiles were released by Croatia, and the Subcommittee's inquiry on this issue
focused primarily on who authorized the missiles to be released. The totality of the
available evidence suggests that it may have been Galbraith who instmcted the Croatians
to release the missiles.
^" See Chapter 9.
"Id.
''Id.
**Seli
(hereinafter!
Aug. 9. 1996, at 108
156
/Galbraith argued that Susak and the rest of the
Croatians were "on the hook" and, therefore, simply could not discontinue serving as a
conduitforarms shiprnents fronn Iran to Bosnia.^' In Galbraith's view^j^|iflBiPIB
^B^B— |»rit_ [\\as] the intent of [US] policy to facilitate the delivery of [Iranian arms
to Bosnia]."''
Taken as a whole, these facts provide reason to believe that Galbraith may have
engaged in an unauthorized covert action with respect to this shipment of missiles. To the
extent he affirmatively and knowingly intervened in the shipment of arms to Bosnia,
Galbraith may well have crossed the line from merely canying out the no instmctions policy
and taken active part in a clear violation of the UN arms embargo. This conduct —
managing the flow of arms - appears to exceed the bounds of traditional diplomatic
activity, a phrase that, as a matter of plain meaning, does not exempt any and all cond'ict
undertaken by a diplomat. If, as it seems, Galbraith funneled theffw^jynissiles into
Bosnia, his conduct would appear to fulfill the definition of covert action. That is so
because the shipment was done secretly, in a manner that saved the US role from being
'apparent" or 'publicly acknowledged," and was intended to prop up the Bosnian
government and military (thereby influencing "political, economic or military conditions
abroad').* Such conduct would be lawful only upon a prior presidential finding and prompt
notification of Congress, neither of which occurred hereJ^^Jv^^
In light of these conclusions, the Subcommittee is compelled to recommend to the
House Intemational Relations Committee (HIRC) that this Report and the evidentiary
materials amassed in the course of this investigation t>e referred to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action within that
Committee's jurisdiction.
Additional Concerns
An Invitation to More Restrictions?
«ipgDep.a.103.T§L
m
-^k
* 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
"50U.S.C.§413b.
157
Even if they were lawful under covert action laws, the Administration's actions in the
green light affair are inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in the formation and
execution of US policy that should exist, and has previously existed, between the Congress
and the Executive Branch. Before the Administration gave Iran the green light. Congress
had expressed strong concems both about the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and about
the need to contain Iranian influence around the world. In taking steps that directly
exacerbated both these legislative concems, it is inexcusable that the Administration not
only failed to consult with Congress about its major shift in US policy, but affirmatively
concealed its misguided green light policy through outright deception of the American
people and their representatives in Congress. This was a matter that, either as a matter
of law or as a matter of comity, clearly should have been promptly brought to the attention
of Congress.
It also appears that the green light policy occurred as a result of a complete
breakdown of normal Executive Branch delik>erative processes. The policy was hastily
adopted without adequate consideration of alternatives due to undocumented, behind-the-
scenes machinations of senior diplomatic personnel, activities that circumvented the
normal foreign policy decision making process. It, therefore, is open to serious question
whether the President enjoyed the benefit of adequate reflection and consideration of this
policy and its potential consequences by his senior foreign policy and national security
personnel. It is precisely to avoid these kinds of problems in areas such as this, with such
potentially explosive consequences, that well-defined processes and procedures have
been worked out. Whether or not a legal line was crossed in the haphazard, if not
reckless, manner in which the policy was implemented, the American people, to say the
least, were not well served in this instance of gross foreign policy mismanagement.
Finally, the wisdom of the Administration's procedures and processes is open to
serious question. While it is dear that many in the Congress wanted more arms to flow to
the Bosnian Muslims, the Administration repeatedly tokl Congress and the American publk:
that the Administration coukJ not unilaterally arm the Muslims in the fece of the UN Security
Courtdi arms embargo and oppositnn from US allies. To play at least some role in
encouraging and facilitating, however oblk)ueiy. violations of precisely the standards of
international law that the Administration declared itself bound to obey is an exercise in
duplicity that, to say the least, cannot be expected to inspire confidence that the
Administration is complying with the legal strictures that supposedly govern Administratnn
behavior.
Even more problematically in this case, the supplying country was known to be Iran.
US policy to deny Iran the opportunity to expand its economic, military, and political
158
influence in any way could not have been clearer. To find that the Administration was not
only tolerating such expansions of Iran's pernicious influence, t)ut, at a minimum, "winking"
and "nodding" assent, if not doing more, certainly must give Congress second thoughts
atjout the extent to which the representations of this Administration can be relied upon by
lawmakers.
In addition to being ill-advised as a policy matter, the sum of the Administration's
actions in this matter seem certain to invite Congress to consider whether more formal
restrictions and procedures on the scope of Presidential discretion are warranted. History
is a good guide in this respect. When Presidents, in the development and execution for
F>olk::y, even policy related to America's foreign interests, treat Congress as the adversary,
the usual result is ever-increasing restrictions on the procedures and processes by which
that policy is formed and executed. An Administration that deals with congressional
concerns in such a cavalier and dismissive way leaves Congress little choice but to
consider enacting further limitations and restrictions on the discretion of the Executive
Branch. Such limitations can be avoided only if Presidents effectively nrxsnitor their
advisers and themselves engage congressk^nal leadership in an open and frank dialogue
on issues that implicate our fundamental national security concems, such as the US policy
to isolate Iran.
Noncooperation in Congressional Investigative Functions
It is worth noting that the problems mentioned above have been exacert>ated by the
manner in which the Administration has obstructed congressional investigations of its
green light policy. We have highlighted at various points in this report actions by the
Administration that seem designed not to protect the integrity of the decision-making
process or protect confidential communications between US and foreign government
officials, but rather merely to discourage the revelation of emban-assing details about a
foreign policy process gone amuck. Administration officials, at all levels, seemed less
interested in serving the put>lic good than in thwarting it, especially with respect to
Congress' attempt to fulfill its constitutksnally mandated oversight and investigating
responsitMiities. Needless to say. such otjstructk^nist tactics by the Administration cannot
be condoned.
159
CHAPTER 11
CONFLICTING TESTIMONY AND QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED
In the course of Ks investigation, the Select Sutxx)mmittee obtained testimony and
information from numerous individuals regarding the matters under investigation. While
recognizing that the recollections of witnesses to the same incidents or events may vary
on occasion as a result of failure of memory, or differing perceptions, the Select
Subcommittee encountered a number of troubling instances where testinrvsny or statements
of witnesses was directly contradictory on important matters under investigation. Those
contradictions, in some instances, raise the possibility that perjured testimony was provided
by witnesses.
The integrity of Congressional investigative authority is adversely affected by
perjury, and Congress will encounter tremendous difficulty in carrying out its legislative
mandate if false testirrx^ny or statements are permitted to obstruct the inquiry. As a result,
the Select Subcommittee will set forth the principal instances of conflicting testimony in this
chapter, with a view toward identifying with specificity, matters which require investigation
by the United States Department of Justice or Independent Counsel.
Conflicting Testimony as to the Content
of the Instructions Given to Ambassador Galbraith
A significant factual issue addressed by the Select Subcommittee in its investigation
involved the determination as to what instnictions were conveyed to Ambassador Galbraith
for use in his diplomatic response to Presid&nt Tudjman's question regarding the
transshipment of Iranian arms. The sworn testimony of Ambassadors Galbraith and
Charles Redman varies from the swom testimony of Deputy Secretary Strot)e Talbott.
former Deputy Assistant Secretary Alexarxler Vershbow. arid Undersecretary Peter Tamoff
and the unsworn statements of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Deputy National
Security Advisor Samuel Berger, ar>d former National Security Council official Jenonne
Walker on the subject of the content of Galbraith's instructtons.
The conflict pertains to a material matter under investigation, and is not easily
resolved in light of the fact that the NSC staff declined to provkle testimony under oath.
The matter would t>e nrK>st appropriately addressed by refenxil to the US Department of
Justice for further investigation.
160
Conflicting Testimony and Evidence as to Whether Congress
was Informed of the Administration's Iranian Green Light Decision
In the course of its investigation the Select Subcommittee interviewed chaimien and
ranking members of various congressional committees with an interest in the subject
matter of the Iranian green light decision to determine whether such members were
advised by the Administration of Ambassador Galbraith's exchange with President
Tudjman and the Administration's decision to give the green light to Iranian arms
shipments. With the exception of former Senator Dennis DeConcini, all Members of
Congress who responded indicated that they were unaware of the Galbraith exchange or
the green light. Moreover, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke testified under oath that the Administration made a conscious decision
not to inform Congress of these matters, and, hence, did not do so. As Senator
DeConcini's statement to the Select Subcommittee staff are in conflict with both sworn
testimony and the vast majority of information available to the Select Subcommittee, further
investigation by the Department of Justice of the matter is necessary to determine if any
laws have been violated.
Conflicting Testimony and Evidence as to the Availability
of the "Record" Maintained by Peter Galbraith
Ambassador Galbraith made available to the Select Subcommittee, for its review,
portions of the written "record* he maintains of his recollections and thoughts on the events
of his ambassadorial tour. Charlotte Stottman. his former secretary (who typed the record
from his dtetatron), and Ronald Neitzke. his former Deputy Chief of Misskjn (who frequently
saw him dictating the record), have informed the Subcommittee staff that Galbraith began
creating the record in 1993, shortly after his arrival in Croatia. Galbraith has testified that
he dkl not begin to keep the record until November 1994. This conflict must be resolved
through an investigatnn, so as to assure that the Select Subcommittee has been provided
with access to all of the document maintained by Galbraith. The withholding of portions
coukJ constitute offenses against both the Congress and the Department of State.
161
SECTION THREE: POLICY RAMIFICATIONS
CHAPTER 12
THE GREEN LIGHT AND THE IRANIAN FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE
PART I - CROATIA
The decision 'at the highest levels' of the Clinton Administration in April 1994 not
to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and Croatians'^ removed the only effective
external impediment to Iran's hopes to interject itself into the Bosnian conflict and gain its
long-sought foothold in Europe. Before then, Iran had achieved limited success in
ingratiating itself with the Bosnian government and almost no success in Croatia. With the
US giving the green light, however, Iran has had an unprecedented opportunity to
advance its influence in the region and develop a European-based infrastmcture - overt
and covert - to spread further its radical political and religious message. As bad as the
strategic implications are of nefaiious and hostile Iranian activities in Europe, Iran's
success at co-opting the Bosnian political leadership and developing agents and
mechanisms of political influence has also been a disaster for Bosnia itself. It has
comjpted the Bosnian Muslim body politic to a degree that, as yet. is not well understood
in the West. Moreover, it has immensely complicated, if not doomed, the process that was
to have led to the developnnent of a multi-ethnic, secular Bosnia.
The public statements of Administration officials paint exactly the opposite picture,
however.
• Ambassador Galbraith testified before the House International Relations
Committee that the Iranian presence in Croatia after April 1994 increased
•slightly, but not significantly."* In the same session, he stated that the
Clinton Administration's green light policy 'contributed to peace and to the
very significant reduction of the Iranian influence.'^
• Natural Security Advisor Anthony Lake advised the Subcommittee that the
' MenK)randum to the File from Peter Galbraith. May 6. 1994 (hereinafter
'Galbraith Memorandum*).
' Hearing on US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Crnatia Before the
House Committee on Intpmatinnal Relations. 104th Cong. 151 (1996) (Testimony of
Peter Galbraith).
* Id. at 145.
162
Iranian push in the Balkans preceded the green light. "We have no evidence
after the 'no instructions' decision that there was a further significant build up
of Iran in the area."*
• Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff characterized the April 1 994 decision
as one that would allow "the possibility that Iranian influence or Iranian
personnel might marginally increase.*^
• Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott assured the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that the issue in April 1994 was not "to open a
door that had been closed to the Iranians. That door was already open."*
Volumes of raw and finished intelligence product, reams of diplomatic cable traffic,
and Department of State documentation show these statements to be, at best, uninformed.
At worst, they are disingenuous. Moreover, with the passage of each day, the newspapers
carry more and more information making it appear that the Administration's expectations
for the success of the Dayton Peace Process were unrealistic and that the peace process
is unraveling. As the peace process falters, the threat of resurgent Iranian influence in
Bosnia — direct and through ideological surrogates — grows.
The Bush Administration's Refusal
to Open the Door to the Iranians
What the Iranians accomplished on the watch of the Clinton State Department had
been tried before, but was rebuffed by the US in 1992.
* Select Suljcommittee Interview of Anthony Lake, SepL.26, 1996, at 4
(hereinafter 'Lake InL").
' Hearing on US Policy on Bosnia Before the House Committee on International
Relations. 104th Cong. 24 (1996) (Testimony of Peter Tamoff); Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Peter Tamoff, SepL 13, 1996, at 21 (hereinafter Tamoff Dep."). In his
deposition t>efore the Subcommittee, Tamoff expanded on this judgment, stating that
*we had no evidence following the dedsnn in late April of 1994 that tfle Iranian military
or the Iranian forces' preserKe had, as a result of that decision, increased significantiy.*
' Hearing on US Actions Regarriing Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia Before
Senate Select Committee on Intelliqenre. 104th Cong. 57 (1996) (Testimony of Strobe
Talbott).
163
In September 1992. almost two years before the Clinton Administration signaled
its green light, the Iranians tried for the first time to set themselves up as the Bosnians'
most important ally, using Croatia as the middleman. The UN-imposed arms embargo
(UN Security Council Resolution 713). which passed in September 1991 , had achieved the
unintended effect of giving the Bosnian Serbs a military advantage over the Muslims and
Croatians. Despite a significant numerical advantage, the Muslim forces were left without
a significant source of weaponry and supplies, whereas the Bosnian Serbs were able to
get supplies from the neighboring Serts-dominated Yugoslav Arniy. The Iranians saw this
as their opportunity. They could exploit the desperation of the Bosnian Muslims so as to
become their main t>enefactor and buy influence and a friendly beachhead in Europe. The
plan would, however, require the cooperation of the Croatian government because Croatia
controlled the only safe land routes into Bosnia.
The Bush Administration became aware of the Iranian scheme in August 1992 and
put the Croatian govemment on notice that the US would find such an anangement highly
objectionable. Thus, in Septemt>er when an Iranian 747 arrived at Zagreb airport, loaded
v^h military equipment and mujahedin from Iran and other Muslim countries, the Croatian
govemment notified the US and worked closely and cooperatively to bring the UN in, seize
the weapons, and send the plane and its passengers back to Iran. This decisive action -
this clear "red light" policy - stymied Iranian plans until the Clinton Administration flashed
the green light in April 1994. In the meantime, the Iranians put their designs for a
beachhead back on the shelf arKi contented themselves with small-scafe arms smuggling
and the incremental expansion of its presence and influence in the region.
Interestingly. Ambassador Galbraith has argued that the Bush Administration's
demarche to the Croatian govemment to stop the establishment of the arms pipeline was
a principal cause of the outbreak of the Croat-Muslim war in earty 1 993.' Based on that
interpretation, he argued that the Clinton .Administration dkj not want in April 1994 to repeat
this error of the past. The premise of the argument - that the seizure led to Croat-Muslim
fighting - is highly questnnable. Ronald Neitzke, Ambassador Galbraith's deputy in 1994
and the US Charge to Zagreb in 1992, when the first inckjent took place, disagrees with
Galbraith's analysis and dk) so even when Galbraith was citing 'it in 1994 in an effort to
convince Washington of the wisdom of giving the green fight' JDiere is also no jitfeHigence
Unking the demarche and the outbreak of hostilities in 1993. ^■HHBHHthe head
' See, &.g.. Galbraith in Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683. Apr. 27. 1994.
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ronak) Neitzke, Aug. 7. 1996, at 36
(hereinafter "Neitzke Dep.*).
164
of the Interagency Balkans Task Force and the US Intelligence Community's senior
analyst of the former Yugoslavia, forcefully dissents from Ambassador Galbraith's view.
'I have not seen anything that would support that as a rationale for the start of that war. j
The Iranian Green Light and the Growth of Iranian Influence
and the Terrorist Threat in Croatia
President Clinton's green light decision threw open the door of Croatia to the
Iranians. After the Bush Administration's demarche of September 1992 and into early
1994 the Iranian presence in Croatia was limited and its influence insignificant. It had a
■rnodest"'" embassy and maintained a small but active intelligence presence. Relations
with the Croatians were proper but by no means warm. The Croatians were suspicious of
Iran's objectives in the region and were troubled by its efforts to radicalize the local Muslim
population and the Bosnian Muslims wrth whom, for most of this period, the Croatiems were
fighting.
The green light decision changed the situation in late April 1994 when the US
authorized Iran to use Croatia as its fonward staging area and depot in the arms supply
line into Bosnia.
Within days of the green light. Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic made a
highly publicized and friendly visit to Tehran. The US had known of this trip in advance,
and it was cited as the basis for the urgency of Ambassador,. GalbraitK's cables to
Washington seeking issuance of a green light instruction. In his message to Secretary
Christopher on April 27, 1994. Ambassador Galbraith expressed concern that "if we frown
on their [the Croatians] role in supplying the Muslims, this trip may be canceled."' The
green light was given despite the US's often-stated and steadfastly defended policy of
isolating Iran diplomatically, economically, and politically.'^ As a result. Valentic traveled
to Tehran where the press reported his joint pronouncements of cooperation with Iranian
President Rafsanjani and the successful negotiation of several wide-ranging bilateral
" Select Subcommittee Intennew of CIA analysts. Aug. 21 . 1996. at 5 (hereinafter
*CiA analysts InL').
" Neitzke Dep. at 57.
" Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683, Apr. 27, 1994.
'^ See Chapter 4.
economic agreements, j
Additionally, the two countries set u.
agenda for concluding three-way economic agreements including Bosnia
an
'Apparently, the green
light from the US was all they were waiting for. A few days lateCTranian Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati reciprocated Valentic's visit by going to Zagreb. There, they agreed to
expand areas of cooperation and. as reported in Jlhepress. consulted on establishing
tripartite cooperation anangements with Bosnia!T^y^^|S!^JB^^
In subsequent years, the trade between Croatia and Iran would work significantly
to Iran's advantage, particularly because of its hard currency problems
mmmmmm
The significance of the Zagret>-Tehran agreements in opening up the Balkans to
Iran was not missed by political arx) intelligence analysts within the Department of State.
The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence arxj Research (INR), on May 1 , 1 994, just
four days after the PreskJenf s green light decision, wrote that the agreements "will g'lve
Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1683. Apr. 27. 1994.
166
Iran a greater foothold in the former Yugoslavia."" Thirty days later, another State
Department analysis concluded. 'Iran sees this as an opportunity to win converts for
Islamic fundamentalism and establish a foothold for a base of operations in Europe.*^* And
just two nxjnths after the green light decision, the Secretary of State's "Moming Summary"
included the assessment that Croatian and Iranian bilateral relations had "retwunded" and
noted, as an aside, that the Croatian foreign ministry believed the US "tacitly approves'
of Croatia's role as a centerpiece of the Iranian pipeline. The Summary concluded that
under the circumstances the "lure of close relations with Iran will be hard to resist."^' On
the ground in Croatia, the effect was also clear. US Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke noted:
In the summer of 1993 .... the Iranian presence in Zagreb had been
extremely limited .... It grew rather dynamically in the aftermath of Croatia's
agreeing to transship lots of arms to Bosnia in April [1994] such that by the
late fall of '94 relations vere clearly t>ooming between Croatia and Iran. We
had to drive by their Embassy all the time. We could see the antennas
sprouting, nnore Mercedes plates, and from "inter sources we were aware
that they were a great deal more active. They had more diplomats around
town."
This did not include Iranian flight crews.
•passengers." and others who traveled in and out of Croatia as they were need^ "
Considering the influx of IRGC into the Balkans, it is important to remember that the
^' Department of State, Intelligence Research Bureau (INR), Secretary's Morning
Summary. May 1 . 1994.
^* information MenrK>randum from Toby T. Gati. Assistant Secretary of State, to
Warren Christopher. Secretary of State. May 31 , 1994 .
^* INR. Secretary's Moming Summary. June 22, 1994.
^ Neitzke Dep. at 104.
^J^
Z>
167
IRGC is much more than simply an elite fighting force. It is also Iran's "primary instrument
in exporting its Islamic Revolution,' with contingents in Lebanon and Sudan. It also
supports radical Islamic forces in Afghanistan, Algeria. Egypt, and in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. Moreover, it has dose ties with several temsrist organizations, particularly
and most noteworthy Hizballah, which it helped establish in the early 1980's." Similarly,
in Croatia the IRGC was involved in all these activities, in addition to those of a traditional
military nature.
Iranian intelligence activities were also growing exponentially. In 1994, the Iranians
began developing an intelligence network that soon spanned Croatia. In 1995, the Iranians
built on this success and began developing another independent network of agents and
contacts.
The Croatians knew the dangers of dealing with a rogue state such as Iran. They
had rK>t lost their fear that the Iranians wouM radicalize the neighboring Bosnian Muslims.
There were, however, some 'reafpolitik* advantages to the Croatians' new bilateral ties.
In additk}n to the commercial t>enefits descrit)ed above. Croatia received a commission of
at least thirty (and in some cases fifty) percent of all Iranian arms being transshipped
across its territory. Additk>na!ly. regnnal commarKiers and officials in parts of Croatia and
in the Croat-held areas of Bosnia were in a positkin to demand further payments in arms
and cash to fadlitate the fkiw. Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, who controlled the
military apparatus in Croatia, as well as in Herceg-Bosna. saw the most gain from this
arrangement.
Inevitably, these beneficial aspects of this leiattonship influenced the Croatians and
made it easy for them to overtook the dear dangers of dealing with Iran. The adual
destabilizing consequences of the IraniarvCroatian relationship in the regk}n and its
fadlitatnn of Iran's terrorist designs and capabilities - particutariy those directed against
the US - are appalling. Unfortunately, it is entirely too easy to document these hannful
consequences caused by the green light poficy. Two inddents - one from the summer of
1993 and the other from the summer of 1995 - dramatically illustrate Iranian influence In
Croatia which came at the cost of endangering the safety of US citizens in the regton and
the US's ability to wortc with Croatia to counter Iran's terrorist designs.
In the summer of 1993 - one year before the green light decision - based on
" Alfred Prados. Julie Kim, and Kenneth Katzman. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Foreign
Islamic Fighters fMujahideen'), Congressfonal Research Sennce Report. Jan. 29.
1996, at 3.
168
extremely fragmentary ir^telligence information about a terrorist threat,!
The Croatian response was inimediate and totally responsive to
US concerns over fResafety of its citizens. At the time the Iranian presence in Croatia
was extremely limited, and the Croatians showed no concern about possibly harming
bilateral relations with Iran by acting vigorously against the trrrrri't^ C^S^
A mere two years and a green light later, in the summer of 1995, the situation was
very different. By that time, supporting the massive military assistance program that had
been given the green light and enjoying the resultant privileged relationship it had with
Croatia, the Iranian embassy in Zagreb had become its largest in Europe. For months
(starting in the fall of 1994), the US had been gathering evidence of Iranian ten'orist
planning agains^US officials presence in Zagreb. The indications were many and
unambiguous^
threat was so serious that the US embassy instituted more rigorous security measljrS
evacuated individuals who were believed to be most at risk^^j^^^^^
At the strong urging of his Deputy Chief of Mission Ronald Neitzke, Ambassador
Galbralth approved using the Embassy's various contacts within the Cnsatian govemment
to urge that they act against the terrorists. These diplomatic efforts were fruitless,
however, and the security situation continued to deteriorate. The Iranian terrorist activities
soon accelerated to the point that the US embassy was certain a terrorist act was
imminent. Accordingly, in April, while the Ambassador was traveling outside Croatia,
Neitzke drafted a strongly worded message to Washington. In it he stated that the time of
gentle pressure had passed, and he asked that Washington approve a demarche to the
Croatian govemment to take immediate and decisive action to neutralize the terrorist
threat
In his message, Neitzke linked the threat of Iranian terrorism to the President's
" The 1995 terrorist threat is docunoented in a large number of CIA and
Department of State cables and reports made available to the Select Subcommittee.
See also, Neitzke Dep. at 104-1 15. The most comprehensive putMic account can be
found in Janrws Risen and Doyle McManus, Terrorist Risk to Americans In Croatia is
Linked tn Iran, Los Angeles Times, May 21. 1996.
169
green light policy and pointed out the diplomatic comer the US had painted itself into by
giving the Croatians an "all clear" signal to cozy up to the Iranians. The message wan-ants
quoting at length:
Neitzke concluded his message by stating that the only other option available was to
authorize an evacuation of American officials and their families.
The message had its intended effect the Department of State approved the first
of a series of strong demarches to the Croatians. Even then, the Croatians refused to
expel the Iranians involved in the terrorist planning. Nonessential US offidais and their
femilies were evacuated from Zagreb in early May due to Serbian missile attacks on the
city. This resulted in the terrorists having a less target rich' environment and may have
foilecTtheir plans for attack, partKulariy against the families of US officials. But even so,
hostile Iranian activities - iriduding surveillance of Americans - continued at an alarming
Department of State Cable, Zagreb 001608. Apr. 19, 1995 (emphasis added).
170
pace into August when the US again issued a demarche. The Croatians responded that
they were "not in favor" of the Iranians' activities but were "afraid that taking action would
involve Iranian retribution against Croatia.'^' As this was happening, the Croatians
continued to profit economically and militarily from their flowering relationship with Iran.
The Iranians plotting the terrorist actions were never asked to leave Croatia and hostile
activities continued. Fortunately, these actions have not culminated in a terrorist attack, but
that option remains available to Iran when and if it believes the time is right to strike.
Interestingly, the difference in the Croatian attitude between 1993 and 1995 was
mirrored somewhat in the leadership of the US mission in Zagreb. In 1993, the US
Embass/s action was unhesitating. In 1995, however, there was a difference of opinion
within the US Embassy leadership conceming the will of the Iranians to engage in terrorist
acts in Zagreb. Although he does rK)t questton Ambassador Galbraith's resolve to counter
legitimate terrorist threats, Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke has indicated that he and
Galbraith had a recurring difference of opinion about the Iranian threat. Galbraith was of
the t>elief "that K was not in Iran's strategic interest to sanction an attack against the United
States.*^ Neitzke says he "Yound the logic of that Impeccable; with one exception:
terrorists don't think like that; and terrorists hatch subplots or there are revenge killings or
people are executed to embarrass somebody else, or Zagreb is a sideshow in the overall
Iranian-U.S. terrorist relationship for any number of reasons." Neitzke particulariy did not
find the kx:al strategic argument compelling when Iranians were targeting specific vehicles
and apparently specific people.* Neitzke also was unconvinced by the Ambassador's
argument that the US dare not tweak* the Iranians by asking the Croatians to move
against their terrorists. In Neitzke's words, "What had we degenerated to if that was our
point?* Similarty, Neitzke took exceptk>n to the reluctance he sensed in Washington to the
taking of action that might save Arnerican lives out of fear that it could also tead to the
interruption of the arms pipeline.*
In retrospect, it is hard to hoM the Croatian government solely responsible for its
reluctance to respond forcefully to the anti-US tert)rist threat in 1995. To be sure, Croatia's
refusal to take action to prevent an imminent terrorist attack against American citizens
within its borders is deplorable. Even so. however, this end result was foreseeable by the
Administration when H debated the green fight policy. Nevertheless, the Administratkm
accepted the known risk of increased terrorism and it decided *at the highest levels not to
" Department of State Cable. Zagreb 3247, Aug. 25. 1995.
^ Neitzke Dep. at 112. (This and the folk>wing quotes in this paragraph.)
171
interpose ourselves between the Iranians and the Croatians."^' The Select Subcommittee
finds it even more amazing that, even as the terrorist danger was making itself known on
a daily basis in credible reports from Embassy employees, some Administration officials
were inclined to question the threat or. worse, ignore it in order to keep the Iranian arms
pipeline open.
" Galbraith Memorandum.
172
CHAPTER 13
THE GREEN LIGHT AND THE IRANIAN FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE
PART II • BOSNIA
Even more than in Croatia, the US green light to the Iranian arms pipeline allowed
Iran to fulfill its most ambitious designs in Bosnia - for Bosnia, not Croatia, was and
remains the European centerpiece of Iranian hopes and plans for the future. The green
light and other Clinton Administration decisions that denied or rejected the possibility of
allowing other more moderate countries a role in aiding the Bosnian Muslims, in effect,
gave the Iranians what amounted to an exclusive license to assist the Bosnian Muslims.
Through that assistance, the Iranians successfully ingratiated and insinuated themselves
with the political and military leadership of Bosnia to a degree that the US has been
extremely hard pressed in its efforts to extricate them. The entrenched Iranian influence
within Bosnia, particulariy its clandestine influence, is a serious challenge to US interests
in the region and to the hopes of the Bosnian people for a peaceful, democratic, and
Western-oriented future.
^
_ je gravity of the situation was captured well in a Select Subcommittee deposition^
with i ~
There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great
assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with
the Bosnian Government And it is a thing we will live to regret, because
when they l>low up some .Americans, as they no doubt will t)efore this
goddamn thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to
have the time and the contacts to establish themselves welt in Bosnia.'
Before the Green Light
Iran was quick to recognize that the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia - in
particular, the tritnjiations of a beleaguered Muslim community - could give it an
opportunity to entrerKh itself in a European nation. Iran was among the first nations to
recognize Bosnia after it declared itself independent in March 1992. For a few months in
the later half of 1992, Iran, along with several other Muslim states, was able to smuggle
small amounts of weaponry to the Bosnian Muslims, sometimes by ad hoc arrangements
' SelesI Subpommittee Qgcpsition ofJMSHHHBMIjAug. 15. 1996. at 29
(hereinafter^ ^*
ileci Subcommittee p^{x>sitio
173
with Croat officials who would allow the weapons to pass through their territory for a ten
to twenty five percent payment in kind. However, the Croatians closed down this small
scale operation by February 1993 due to deteriorating Croat-Muslim relations and, once
again, the Bosnians were for the most part left to their own devices.' The State
Department in April 1993 characterized the Iranian contribution to the Bosnian war-effort
as having been "relatively small."'
In August 1992. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. head of the radical Islamic Propagation
Organization and newly named director of the Iranian "Bosnia-Herzegovina Support
Headquarters' vigjted Bosnia as a personal representative of the Iranian supreme leadej^
All Khamene'i.
1^/ By April 1993 there were estimates that their
numbers had reached up to 150 soldiers.' On the international front, in addition to
numerous public statements of support to the Bosnian Muslims, Iran was instrumental in
December 1992 in getting the Organization of the Islamic Qj^nference to pass a resolution
calling for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia^ '
Iran's support, even if more rhetorical and moral than substantive, did not go
unappreciated by the Bosnian Muslim government, which was in desperate need of
assistance. Neither were the Iranians hesitant to try to capitalize on this appreciation.
Iran was already hard at work trying to insinuate itself into every element of Bosnian life
through propaganda, the setting up and exploitation of clandestine intelligence
mechanisms, and cultural and political overtures. In comparison with the heyday that
followed the green light, however, Iran's ability to exploit the situation was limited. Iran did
not, for example, even have an embassy in Bosnia. It was only after the US gave the
' MenrK>randum from Ambassador PhDip Wilcox to Secretaiy WanBn Christopher,
Apr. 8. 1993 (hereinafter 7/Viloox Memorandum').
' Wilcox Memorandum.
' Kenneth Katzman. Julie Kim and Richard Best, Bosnia and Iranian Arms
Shipments: Issues of US Policy and Involvement, Congressional Research Sennce
(CRS) Report, Apr. 24. 1996. at 2 (hereinafter *Katzman et al.*).
174
green light that Iran was able to develop a massive, multi-faceted program that would, on
a public level, burnish its image as Bosnia's savior and, on a hidden level, give it political
influence and the reach to build a formidable, well-entrenched clandestine capability to
carry out its anti-Western designs.
Deputy Secretary Talbott observed in a statement cited at the beginning of the
previous chapter that the green light did not open the door to Bosnia for Iran. He is
technically correct: what the green light did was to throw the door wider open and put out
a welcome mat.
After the Green Light
Although the weapons provided after the green light via the Iranian pipeline did not
turn the war around and probably dio little more than help the Muslims better defend
themselves, there is no denying the magnitude of Iran's effort in comparison with its
marginal involvement in the war before April 1994. ^r~'~~
' DCI's Balkap T^k Force (BTF)^
May 24. 1996. at 2.< '
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of LTC John E. Sray, Aug. 29. 1996, at 63
(Hereirufter 'Sray Dep.").
175
With the weapons came an Iranian military assistance infrastnjcture, an expansion
of the Iranian presence, and a commensurate expansion of Iranian activity and influence
Within months the Iranian influence in the military was pervasive. Iranians were
training, advising, and indoctrinating Muslim fighters in facilities throughout Bosnia. By
1996 thousands of Bosnian military personnel, not including police and security forces, had
176
gone through IRGC training courses in Bosnia
[Also, as in Croatia, the IRGC continued to cany out
its *other duties" in trying to export the U-aniao revolution and support terrorist
organizations, including '^'2'33l'3l^-''^MP9HHpVliK
Iranian intelligence activities also increased exponentially. The Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) expanded its assistance, training, and cooperation with
the Bosnian intelligence service, and - niore ominously - it accelerated its clandestine
efforts not known even to the Bosnians. Specifically, Iran moved quickly recruiting well-
placed agents of influence and setting up secret networks throughout Bosnia. The MOIS
also, like the IRGC, worked closely with Hizballah elements in the region and sought to
organize small groups of Bosnians who could form native Bosnian Hizballah-type cells
ultimately loyal to Tehran. The Iranian intelligence service was also working to recruit
individual Bosnians to act as its future terrorists.'^'
On the political and diptomatk: level the Iranians were also much more active in the
months following the green light, although they did not advertise all their activities to the
West Within ten days of the green light, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati made
a highly publicized visit to Sarajevo where he presented Bosnian President Izetbegovic
with a check for one million dollars, and promised to deliver 10,000 tons of diesel fuel.
President lzett)egovic profusely thanked Velayati by saying "While we cannot tell all the
details now. we must understand that our fight for freedom . . . would be less successful
''* Alfred Prados. Julie Kim, and Kenneth Katzman. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Foreign
<ujahideen'). CRS Report. Jan. 29. 1996, at 3 (hereinafter 'Prados et
id.
177
without Iran and its aid.'"
Also within ten days of the green light. Iran appointed its first ambassador to Bosnia,
Mohammed Taherian. Taherian's main responsibility was to manage the Iranian program
of aid to cultivate, wield and influence on behalf of Tehran. Taherian was eminently
qualified for the task by his experiences as Iran's ambassador to Afghanistan in the 1980s,
where he proved himself adept at funneling aid to the Afghan Shiite mujahedin}* The
Iranian embassy quickly became the largest in Sarajevo. For instance, the street on which
their diplomats lived was blocked off by the Bosnian police, and even UNPROFOR forces,
who were supposed to be able to travel freely on their peace-keeping mission, were not
allowed to get close enough to observe the Iranians' comings and goings.^ The embassy
conducted aggressive activities to popularize radical Iranian political and Shi'a religious
thought. This public diplomacy complemented Iran's inauguration on May 10 of pro-
Iranian, anti-Western propaganda radio broadcasts in the region in Serbo-Croatian.
With the backing of Iran and the green light from the Clinton Administration, the
Bosnian government increasingly t>ecame more fundamentalist in its orientation. This
occurred even though the Bosnian people are largely secular. The government installed
loudspeakers on street comers to broadcast the call to prayer in the mosques. Foreign
mujahedin and Bosnian fundamentalists coerced Bosnian Muslims to be more strict in
observing 'proper' Islamic customs. That summer, for example, Bosnian women wearing
bathing suits were beaten and some were even shot for their perceived immodesty. ^■
iais appear to have made
" John Pomfret. Iran Ships Explosives to Bosnian Muslims, Washington Post.
May 13. 1994. at 1 . (The Velayati quote, including the ellipsis. Is given as cited in the
original article.)
^ Katzman et al.. sufHa note 6 at 2.
^ John E. Sray. LTC. Selling the BQsnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware,
United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Oct. 1995. at 6.
" Sray Dep. at 48.
178
In 1995 the Iranians would consolidate and expand their influence and activities
throughout Bosnia and Bosnian society. The IRGC presence remained in the range of
400 personnel in country. The mujahedin presence was, by the end of the year. 1000 or
niore. A UN source estimated 1,000 in October, various press accounts in December
placed the number between 2.000 and 4.000; and the Washington Post on December 9
reported UN figures of 1 ,500 foreign mujahedin and 1 ,500 Bosnian recruits." Although the
mujahedin are not necessarily urtder the direct control of Iran, they share Iran's fanatical
anti-Western beliefs and, consequently, appear to act as tactical allies on the ground in
Bosnia.
Iranian intelligence and terrorist related activities were particulariy noteworthy in
1995. The MOIS developed an extraordinarily dose woridng relationship v^ the Bosnian
intelligence service which it largely set up. In addition to training, the Iranians provided
operational direction aQdLfinancial support This assistance was repaid by Bosnian
assistance to the MOIS.i
By eaij^1996, the Iranians would have some sort of 'special' relations witi
nior Bosnian officials an<f^|
Prados et al., supia note 21 aft 3.
** Department of State. Intelligence arnf Research Bureau ONR), jran/Bosnia!
Frfenri In hlt>^ July 22. 1995.
" Memorandum from Daniel C. Kurzer. Acting Director of INR. to Acting
Secretary. Aug. 30. 1995.
179
>M
[Even though senior Bosnian government officials, such as
Prime Ministerflaris Snajdzic, were becoming increasingly distressed at Iran's burgeoning
influence, the prevaBing sentiment was U)^t the Iranians had demonstrated themselves to
be the Bosnia's only "true friends.""'^'
While the long-term effects of Iran's pervasive influence throughout Bosnia will not
nfuinifest themseh/es for some time, the Iranian presence clearly does not bode well for the
US. Based on past experience. Iran can be expected to continue to target US citizens and
installations for terrorist attacks. Iran's continued efforts to radicalize the govemment and
people of Bosnia and to turn them against the US and the West will drive a wedge between
the free worid and Bosnia. As for Iran itself, the new economic ties with Bosnia will bring
Tehran much-needed foreign capital, undermining the effectiveness of US and UN
economic sanctions against Iran. The ovemding goal for which the Administration accepted
these ominous and substantial threats to US interests - achievement of peace in the
former Yugoslavia - is now jeopardized by the Iranian influence. As the next section
demonstrates. Iran's influence has already presented the Clinton Administration with a
substantial - and pertiaps intractable - problem implementing the Dayton Peace Accords.
The Green Light and the Dayton Accords:
An Expedient Becomes an Impediment
As this report is t>eing written, the Dayton Accords are coming unraveled and are,
on a day-by-day t>asts, being amerxled and modified in perhaps the vain hope of keeping
them alive. If we assume that the accords were rrat flawed in their inception and thus coukJ
have led to peace. ti>en the effects of the green light are even more tragic. President
Clinton and others in the administration argued that the green light decision made the
Dayton accords possit>le.* In reality, the policy expedient of the green light - letting
*" Galbraith's l^ecoid,* May 26, 1995 (Describes meeting between Galbraith and
Haris SHajdzic. Bosnian Prime Minister).
^ E^. President Clinton at the Presidential News Conference with German
Chancellor Helmut KoN (May 23. 1 996).
180
malevolent Iran become the unchallenged benefactor of Bosnia - has undemiined the
Dayton peace Accords.
The facts show that the residual effects of the green light - the well-entrenched
Iranian presence and its pervasive and pernicious influence in Bosnia in effect delayed key
elements of the plan for over six nrranths. It also critically hampered efforts to build a multi-
ethnic, militarily defensible, and economically viable Bosnia during the scheduled one-year
IFOR plan. If IFOR is unable to complete its work within the one year period and the US
extends the deployment of its forces in Bosnia (as appears almost certain), the green light
policy will have been a major K not principal cause.
According to Article III of Annex 1A of the Dayton Accords, all foreign forces,
including freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and advisors were to have been expelled
from Bosnia and Herzegovina rx) later than January 13. 1996, that is, thirty days after the
agreement went into effect. Certification of the withdrawal would allow the US to go ahead
with some of its nmre significant efforts to retHiild Bosnia economically and military so as
to give the national entities recognized by Dayton a reasonable chance of surviving past
the one year IFOR-supervised implementatksn plan. Among these US initiatives is the
release of $100 million of surplus US military equipment and $70 million in economic
reconstruction assistance.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration, either oblivious to or dismissive of
intelligence reporting on the subject, seriously underestimated the degree to which the
Iranians had managed to ingratiate themselves with the Bosnian Muslim govemment and
infiltrate the Bosnian military, intelligence apparatus, and other govemment and public
organizations. In the months after the Accords were signed, the Administration repeatedly
found itself stymied in its efforts to convince the Bosnian Muslims that Iran, who became
their nrtost reliable ally under the green fight policy, now had to be unceremoniously
removed.
Within a week of the signing of the Accords,
181
This defiance of the Dayton Accords and the US became a front-page story on
February 15, 1996 when NATO forces raided the joint Iranian-Bosnian terrorist training
center on a mountaintop near Fojnica. Bosnia. NATO forces seized sixty weapons,
explosives, manuals and booby-trapped objects, including toys and household items. The
NATO forces also confiscated instruction manuals for laying land mines. Pictures of the
Ayatollah Khomeini were prominently displayed on the walls, and the bocl'.r'ielves
contained Iranian and other radical Muslim literature. Admiral Leighton W. Smith. Jr., the
American commander of NATO forces in Bosnia said. "It doesn't take a genius to figure out
what we found here is an abomination. No one can escape the obvious, that there is
terrorist training activity going on in this building and it has direct association with people
in the [Bosnian] govemnrient."" A US intelligence official on the scene noted that "what
is bothersome is the presence of Iranians on the ground There is no complaint that
an intelligence school was run. but methods of ten-orism and kidnaping which obviously
violate intemational accords are our great concerns. And it appears the students were
Bosnians and the instructors were Iranian."*^
On television that night. PreskJent Izetbegovic. was unapologetic. "We have more
places like that [Fojnica] for training people to hunt war criminals We will continue that
** Kit R. Roane. NATO Links Bosnian Government to Training Center for
TefTOrists. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1996, at 1.
43
Id.
182
Having had so little success in its direct dealings with the Bosnian Muslim
government, the Clinton Administration in late Febmary approached over fifty foreign
governments, principally in Europe and the Middle East, ast^ing them to lobby the Bosnians
to cut their ties with Iran. The talking points provided to the ambassadors, taken from
much more specific and damning intelligence reports, actually described the extent of the
US's impatience in Bosnia in the wake of the green light.
- Iran has developed a security relationship with Bosnia as part of its long-
term effort to promote militant Islam and establish a strategic presence in the
Balkans. To achieve these goals, Tehran has followed a multi-pronged
program which includes providing arms, dispatching intelligence personnel
and military trainers and conducting high profile diplomatic efforts attached
to limited economic assistance. Iran's long term goals could undermine
Bosnia's future.
— Over the year, several hundred Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) troops have worked closely with the Bosnian army. IRGC
personnel also are attempting to indoctrinate susceptible Bosnian military
personnel with the k>ng-term aim of creating a religiously motivated Bosnian
military sympathetic to Tehran's interest.
— The intelligence training center near Fojnica, which IFOR raided on
^ Christine Spolar. NATO Says It Raided Tftrmrist Training' School, Washington
Post, Feb. 17. 1996. at A31.
183
February 15, shows dramatically the dangers of the Iranian intelligence
presence.
— We are concerned, however, that Bosnian government officials do not
seem to view the Iranians as a threat to IFOR. US officials had cited the
Fojnica training area to Mr. Silajdzic during his visit to Washington in early
December 1995 as one element of our understanding of the Iranian's
presence.
— Iran continues to have the largest diplomatic mission is Sarajevo including
a large number of intelligence officers.
— Given Iranian experience in providing intelligence training to countries as
well as radical Islamic groups, we are concerned that Iranian intelligence
personnel will try to establish an intelligence training mission with the
Bosnian government circumventing the Dayton requirement that they be
withdrawn.
- islamic donCre - especially Iran - have supplied more the [sic] 10,000
tons of war material to Bosnia, since mid-1 994. Heavy transport aircraft have
delivered arms and other military supplies to Pula airfield in Croatia where
they are moved to Bosnia over land or by air. I^i\has used other third
countries as conduits for its amis shipments.
The talking points went on to note that several Islamic terrorist organizations, including
Hamas, Hizballah, and the Egyptian Al-Gama'at A!-lslamiyyah - which claimed
responsibility for the Octot>er car bombing in Rijeka, Croatia - and extremists from Algeria
and Sudan established a presence in Bosnia eariy in the war.**
Despite this global diplonnatic effort, the Bosnians did little to comply with the Dayton
Accords. In late March, three months after the accords were signed, Bosnia still had not
expelled the Iranians. This, according to several Department of Defense analyses,
revealed that the Bosnian government was unwilling to turn its back on Iran, the country
that had been its best supporter. A US Army report characterized the US as being put
t>etween 'a rock and a hard place.* It noted that in response to a Clinton Administration
threat to withhold nearly $400 millk>n in military training funds unless the Iranians were
expelled, the Iranians offered to train and arm the Bosnians unilaterally. Moreover, the
Department of State Cable, State 038237, Feb. 27, 1996.
184
US's "strong-arm" tactics, combined with the lack of enthusiasm of the Europeans to re-
arm Bosnia, had "convinced most of the Muslim leadership that future support from the
West may be ephemeral." The report concludes that these factors plus the fragile nature
of the Muslim-Croatian federation means the Bosnian Muslims are even more likely to
maintain ties »/ith Iran and the Organization of the Islamic Conference." This assessment
mirrors . a Defense Intelligence Agency judgment: "The Muslims appreciate Iran's
assistance during the conflict .... [They] are unlikely to cut their ties to Iran even if a
Western equipment and training program were in place."" Similarly, a Department of
Defense report frankly concluded that "because Iran has steadfastly helped Bosnia through
times of grave crisis, Bosnia considers it necessary to maintain ties to Iran as a future
source of assistance after IFOR's withdrawal."^' The Defense Intelligence Agency warned
that strenuous US efforts to force the Iranians out could result in Iranian ten-orist reprisals.""
In the period from March through June 1996. the US continued regulariy to
demarche the Bosnian government, which appears to be slowly bringing it closer to
compliance, in May. a State Department spokesman admitted that there were still "a lot"
of Iranians in Bosnia in a "big embassy" and that they make up a large percentage of the
foreign mujahedin who remain.*' Finally, on June 26, 1996 - over five months behind
schedule - President Clinton certified to Congress that the Bosnian government had
fulfilled its obligation to reduce its relations with Iran. The careful wording of the press
statement and its admission of the sccpe and seriousness of the Iranian problem make it
worth quoting at length:
Since the signing of the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian govemment has
made major progress in meeting our demands on foreign forces and in
erKling its military and intelligence relationship with Iran. Although some
irKJividuals have assimilated into Bosnian society and assumed civilian roles.
" US Army Special Operations Command, intelligence Summary (10-96). Mar.
25. 1996.
1996).
Nicholas Bums, Department of State Spokesman, Press Briefing (May 24.
185
there is no evidence of any remaining organized Mujahedin units.
With respect to the Iranians, the Bosnian government has assured
that all IRGC personnel we identified to them have left Bosnia. We have no
evidence that those IRGC remain ....
Although we have never demanded that all Iranian nationals depart
Bosnia or that Bosnia terminate diplomatic or economic relations with
Tehran, we have insisted that the Bosnian government end bilateral
intelligence cooperation in such operational areas as training and
investigations, and end all military ties. The Bosnian government has moved
to end the operational military and intelligence relationship with Iran. It has
renrvsved from positions of authority key officials that were heavily engaged
in intelligence cooperation with Iran, including the former head of the Bosnian
intelligence agency.
Congress conditioned appropriation of the final $70 million for
economic reconstnjction assistance in FY 1996 on the President certifying
Bosnian compliance with these requirements. With this certification, these
funds will now be available to meet the needs of the Bosnian people and to
begin the long process of rebuilding the war-shattered Bosnian economy.
The President's certification also removes a major stumbling block to
commencing the US-led program to train and equip Bosnian Federation
armed forces and to strengthening Bosnia's self-defense capability. We are
eager to move ahead with this program and will do so as soon as final
defense arrangements between Bosnians and Croatians have been
completed."
Missing from this statement is an admission that this foreign policy problem was largely,
if not entirely, self-inflicted. Moreover, the certification is itself highly questionable. Indeed,
intelligence information and a great number of press reports that appeared after the
certification show that only by the most iawyeriy of interpretation can the certification t>e
termed anything but an outright fetsehood.
Within two weeks of the certification, US Ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies arxl
Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch voiced concern to President lzett>egovic
" Mike McCurry. WhKe House Press Secretary, Statement by the Press
Secretary, June 26. 1996.
186
over the continued presence in Bosnia of Iranians and other foreign Islamic militants."
According to press reporting the State Department estimated their number "as less than
100."** However. NATO reports from the period estimated that as many as a hundred
Iranian fighters remained and as many as "several hundred' foreign Islamic militants
remained of all nationalities.**
The Boston Globe noted that the President's certification was wrong - instead of
leaving Bosnia, "several hundred of the Islamic militants simply moved over to the Bosnian
police, with the encouragement of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's Party of
Democratic Action." The Globe went on to discuss the forced marriage of Bosnian girls
to foreigners in order to make the foreigners eligible for citizenship and Izetbegovic's use
of the mujahedin to harass and intimidate political opponents. The newspaper's editors
called upon the Administration to 'make every effort to force Izetbegovic and his henchmen
to disgorge foreign fighters who threaten peace and democracy in Bosnia."**
At about the same time, in early July, the Washington Post printed a lengthy piece
on the open presence of armed, officially-sanctioned, and frequently Iranian mujahedin in
Bosnia. According to the Post, despite the Clinton Administration's public assurances to
the contrary. 'Bosnian officials said they think several hundred Islamic fighters are still
here, and U.S. officials still think they pose a threat to U.S. forces." The article also
referred to the movement of large numbers of mujahedin out of the military and into the
police. The article went on to say that the remaining foreign fighters, who 'are establishing
themselves in a broad swatch of central Bosnia." are principally Iranian and that they are
supported by President Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action. The party uses
them as a "kind of paramilitary guard' to terrorize potential political opponents.' In Zenica.
the mujahedin are amed and are free to do as they please. They are supported by the
"^ Barry Schwekj. CIA Director, tl S Ambassador Query Izetbegovic about
Iranian Fighters, Associated Press Wire Service. July 8. 1996 (hereinafter "Schweid
artk^ie"). See also. ClA Director Deutch Visits Bosnia, Associated Press Wire Service.
July 8. 1996.
^ SchwekJ artide.
'*' Kurt Schori^, preftsiirft ftrnvvs on Karadzk:. Islamk: Warriors. Reuters. July 8.
1996: See also Refet Kaplan. Bosnia Passes Test Is In Line to Receive Millions from
US. Washington Times. June 27. 1996. at A13.
*• EdHorial, Bosnia's Enamias Within, Boston Globe, July 10, 1996. at 18.
187
Islamic Center of Zenica, which is controlled by Bosnian officials who are loyal to
Izetbegovic. The Center seeks to establish an Islamic state and. throughout the war, had
helped fund the Iranian trained Seventh Muslim Brigade. The Center protects the Islamic
militants 'because the men could play an important role in any Muslim state that might
emerge should the Dayton accord collapse."'^
In early August, six weeks after the certification, the Washin0on Times ran an
article by its correspondent in Zenica describing the continued presence and influence of
the mujahedin in organizing "a broad pattern of intimidation." The author observed that,
despite the Clinton Administration's assurances that remaining mujahedin are not in
organized fighting units or 'acting in threatening ways," Bosnians and NATO officers
dispute these assertions. One American officer recounted. "They [the foreign fighters]
stand around us waving their big knives in the air and drawing them across their neck (sic)
saying, 'I'll kill you after the elections, you Jewish pig."** There were also reports in mid-
August that "despite intense US pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to cut their links to Iran
and other radical Islamic states. Bosnian President Alija Izettsegovic continues to cultivate
such connections." ** He was also reported as having recently traveled to meet with
prominent officials in the radical Islamic govemment of Sudan.*°
Cleariy, the Clinton Administration's green light policy has effectively given the
Iranians the persistent foothold they desperately wanted in Europe. That, in turn, has
given the US a serious, unanticipated strategic problem. The US is now virtually impotent
in its dealings with Bosnia, and prospects for peace in the region now appear as bleak as
ever.
" John Pomfret, Mujahedin Remaining in Bosnia; Islamic Militants Strongarm
Civilians. Defy Dayton Plan. Washington Post, July 8. 1996, at 1.
"* Philip Smucker. Bosnia Terropzed by Foreign Soldiers Who Aided Muslims,
Washington Times. Aug. 8. 1996. at A13. .
** John Pomfret, Gemnan Policeman's Departure Boosts Crime in Bosnian City.
Washington Post, Aug. 1 8, 1 996, at A29.
•"Id.
188
CHAPTER 14
THE LEGACY OF THE GREEN LIGHT IN BOSNIA,
TODAY AND TOMORROW
Diminishing Hopes
As this report is t)eing written - at the beginning of Octot)er 1 996 - fewer and fewer
observers of the polKical sKuation in Bosnia expect the Dayton peace process will lead to
its objective: a multi-ethnic, democratic Bosnia. It is already certain that the process, as
originally defined by the Administration, will fail in that quest. We are in the last few months
of what the Clinton Administration pledged was to have been a one-year commitment of
US troops. The process is hopelessly t>ehind schedule, in large part, as we have shown,
due to the lingering Iranian presence in Bosnia. Recently, the Administration has begun
to talk of the "follow-on" commitment of US troops as part of an indeterminant, long-temi
multinational force. Virtually all agree that without such a multinational force, the factions
will resume fighting, and, rested and resupplied, the human carnage and destruction will
be greater than ever.
Of course, the hope now is that a multi-national force will remain and supervise
elections that will populate the democratic political structure envisioned by the Dayton
Accords. The elections, however, are in serious trout)le. They were to have taken place
on Septemt>er 14, but campaign intimidation, voter fraud, and rampant disregard of the
Dayton Accord rules and procedures led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on August 27 to postpone the municipal elections. OSCE's American
director in Bosnia, former US diplonrtat Rottert Frowick, cited "across the board" and
"pervasive" irregularities and stated. "We're trying to do too much in too short a time."^
Although the same problems applied to the presidential and parliamentary elections, the
US succeeded in pressuring the OSCE to proceed with thern. reportedly out of fear that
any backtracking in Bosnia couki affect Clinton's re-electk)n campaign.*^
Under existing circumstances, elections are highly unlikely to advance Bosnia
towards the Ueal of a denxx;ratic, multi-ethnk: state. Although the Bosnian populatton is
^ Chris Hedges. Municipal Elections in Bosnia Postponed, Raising Doubt About
Troop PullQut, New Yorit Times, Aug. 28, 1996, at 6.
' John Pomfret. US Diptomat Delays Local Voting in Bosnia, Washington Post,
Aug. 28, 1996, at 1.
189
anxious to find a political solution that will allow all Bosnians to live in peace, the
Septennber 14 elections showed that the political leadership of the three communities -
Serb. Croat, and Muslim - succeeded in stacking the decks to make sure their supporters,
that is the most revanchist and nationalistic elements, will dominate within their zones of
influence. In this way, elections are simply providing window-dressing for the ethnic
partition of Bosnia, hanjening the lines of division rather than dismantling them. As the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia had predicted, elections in Bosnia "will produce
hard-line winners and xenophobic nationalists committed to the maintenance of hostile,
homogeneous statelets."'
The behavior of the Serb and Croat political factions in this deteriorating process
has been predictable. From the beginning they have sought separation from what they
b.lieve could be a Muslim-dominated, united Bosnia. Indeed, despite a superficial
commitment in Dayton to a unified Bosnia, most Bosnian Sert> and Croat political and
military leaders have as their ill-disguised true objective an alliance with, if not outright
integration, into Serbia and Croatia, respectively. True to fomn, the Serbs have been the
most visible in their flaunting of the OSCE mies. The Croatians, too, as has been shown
in their brinkmanship with the OSCE over the governance of Mostar, are reluctant
participants in the building of secular political institutions. The only remaining hope for the
Dayton Accords, therefore, is that they will provide a framework in which the three factions
will be able to move peacefully towards some form of political partition; the prospect of a
unified Bosnia is all but hopeless.
Izetbegovic and the Radicalization the Muslim Political Leadership
It is the abandonment of secular and democratic principles by the Bosnian Muslim
political leadership, particularly by President Izetbegovic and his Party of Democratic
Action (SDA), that is the most surprising and disappointing failure of the Bosnian political
elite to rise to the challenge of the electoral process mandated by the Dayton Accords.
Under the leadership of President Izetbegovic, the Muslims have, in the years since the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, frequently tried to calm the fears and suspicions of the Serb and
Croat minorities by emphasizing a commitment to secularism and the protedion of minority
denfKx:ratic rights. Increasingly, though, the radicalized SDA has taken refuge in
nationalism and a divisive emphasis on the Islamic identity of Bosnia. The SDA rK>w.
controlling a plurality of the Bosnian population (some forty percent are Muslim), appears
single-rnindedly intent that only Bosnia be unified under its domination.
Id.
190
The behavior of President Izetbegovic and the SDA since the Dayton Accords were
signed - mirroring the worst behavior of the nationalist Croat and Serb parties* - belies
any professed democratic objectives. This unwelcome development is of grave concem
not only to the Croatians and Serbs, but also to the West and to the US. If the events of
this last year are indicative, a Bosnia under the leadership of President Izetbegovic, the
SDA, and allied parties may very well be authoritarian. Islamic, and a refuge for anti-
Western, anti-American radicals.
Who exactly is Izetbegovic and what role will he play in shaping the future of
Bosnia? A senior Western diplomat with long experience in the region has been quoted
as saying, "If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that
he is an Islamic fundamentalist .... He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a
fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia,
and the Serbs and the Croatians understand this better than the rest of us."*
izetbegovic was trained as an Islamic scholar and a lawyer, and in his writings he
shows a deep knowledge not only of Islamic political and religious thought, but also of the
development of Western political philosophy. Nonetheless, over the decades he has been
a constant and strong Islamic political activist and was twice arrested during the Tito era
for his calls for 'Islamization' of the Yugoslavian Muslims.
Two of Izetbegovic's txx>ks are available in the West, Islam between East and West
and The Islamic Declaration. Islam Between East and West is a scholariy work treating
a variety of theological and philosophical issues. The Islamic Declaration, is more
revealing of Izetbegovic's practical political beliefs since it was written to be, as it is
subtitled, 'a programme of the Islamization of Moslems and Moslem peoples."* It was
written in 1970 and illegally copied and circulated among Muslims in Yugoslavia as a
roadmap for the development of a resurgent, politically powerful Islam and the building of
an Islamic state. It is, therefore, of specific interest in seeing what Izetbegovic's leadership
portends for the future of Bosnia.
* John Pomfret, Bosnia's Muslim Leadership Acciisad nf IntimidatJon,
Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1996, at 22 (hereinafter 'Pomfret. Bosnia's Muslim . . .").
' Chris Hedges, Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies. NY Times, Sept.
2, 1996. at 7.
* Alija Izetbegovic. The islamic Dedaration, (1970) (hereinafter The Islamic
Dedaration')-
191
The book's first page gives the goal "Islamization of Moslems' and the motto
"Believe and Fight." It then condemns the East and West "for injecting their ideas and
capital, and by this new form of influence ... to ensure their presence and keep Moslem
nations spiritually weak and materially and politically dependent.'' Izetbegovic professes
that there is a fundamental "incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can
be no peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic faith' and 'non-Islamic' social and
political institutions."* He rejects the Western concept of private property and believes the
islamic state must control natural resources and "all major sources of -30cial wealth."*
Moreover, "the upbringing of the people, in particular via the mass media - the press,
radio, television and film - should be controlled by people of unquestionable Islamic moral
intellectual authority."" He counsels that, through religious revival. Muslims can develop
themselves to a point where they can assume political authority, but that "the choice of the
right moment is always a specific question and depends on a numt>er of factors.
Nonetheless, there is c ^eneral rule: Islamic order should and can approach the
overtaking of mie as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not oniy to
overthrow the non-Islamic rule but develop new Islamic rule."" Izetbegovic also believes
that eventually there is nothing more 'natural' and 'realistic' than for the Islamic states to
join in "supranational structures - economic, cultural and polKical - for coordinated and
concerted action.'^^ Indeed, he t)elieves Muslims must 'struggle to create a large Islamic
federatksn stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, and from tropical Africa to Central Asia.'^^
These views of President Izetbegovic are not particularly radical in the context of
current fundamentalist Islamic political thought; they are, however, completely antithetical
to Western, denrK)cratic values. They are also the kjeological gunpowder present in the
Balkans that the Clinton y^dgiinistration ignored when it added the Iranian spark in the form
of its green light policy.
'Iri.atl.
'Id. at 23.
* Id. at 28.
'• Id. at 38.
"Id. at 45.
'' Id. at 49.
"Id.
192
Since the political process in Bosnia has been open, even if it has not been fair, the
international press has been free to document the radicalization of the Muslim political elite
up to and in the aftermath of. the September 14 elections." During the campaigning.
NATO officials and intennational monitors in Bosnia described an officially sanctioned
campaign to terrorize the political opposition - Muslim and non-Muslim - of P'esident
Izetbegovic. The campaign, orchestrated by the intelligence service, (BAID). regularly
used hundreds of garment agents, police officers, and thugs to disrupt the political rallies
of the opposition.'* These thugs illegally detained and interrogated the opposition, even
resorting to physical abuse and violence. Political parties that were not as stridently
nationalistic and Islamic as the SDA were particulariy targeted for attack.''
This campaign of intimidation was particulariy fierce in its harassment of President
Izetbegovic's most prominent Muslim opponent, former Bosnian Prime Minister Maris
Silajdzic. Silajdzic established a reputation during the war as being more secular in his
orientation than Izetbegovic and concemed about Iranian influence and the radicalization
of Bosnia. Accordingly, he campaigned against the increasing stridency of the Islamic and
exdusivist message of President Izettjegovic and the SDA. Silajdzic rejected Izetbegovic's
belief that in order to unify Bosnia, the Muslims must build a strongly nationalist Islamic
party to counter the Croat and Serb nationalists who want to partition the country."
*' There is also a great deal of intelligence information providing details at a
greater specificity than needed in this report. In this section, the Subcommittee has
drawn upon intelligence reporting only to the degree necessary to complement open
source reporting.
'• Mike O'Connor. The Opposition in Bosnia Faces Terror Tactics. NY Times.
Aug. 19. 1996. at 1 (hereinafter "O'Connor. The Opposition . . .•).
" Pomfret. Bosnia's Muslim . . . supra note 4 at 22.
'• O'Connor. The Opposition . . . supra note 16 at 1.
193
Silajdzic believed the only way to prevent partition is to build secular parties and institutions
open to all Bosnians. For this heresy, SDA youth activists with the help of the local police
and SDA attacked Silajdzic in June 1996, hitting him on the head with a metal pipe."
Because of this outrage, the OSCE stmck seven SDA candidates from the local slate. The
result, however, was an increase in SDA harassment and more illegal police arrests of
opposition party members.^
As observed by Michael Steiner. the second in command of the intemational civilian
effort to oversee the peace agreement, Bosnian Muslim leaders "just don't want the
American and European concept of the free flow of ideas; they want to control ideas.""
The degree to which President Izetbegovic's party has aligned itself with Iran and
abandoned any pretense at secularism was captured in a report from New York Times
correspondent Chris Hedges in September." He reported on a campaign rally held in a
remote mountainous region of Bosnia. Such rallies. Hedges reports, were "not designed
to alleviate the fears of those who believe he [Izetbegovic] wants to set up a Muslim state."
The rally began with religious music, followed by Koranic prayers. Speeches were
drowned out by cries of "God is gresfT in Arabic. White-clad Muslim soldiers wearing green
head-bands inscribed with Koranic verses signaling their willingness to die for Islam, were
in attendance. And, President Izetbegovic himself issued "a call to arms filled with
promises never to forget the sacrifice of the "martyrs.""
Alongside Izetbegovic on the dias was the Iranian ambassador and his Iranian
bodyguards. The ambassador was the only foreign diplomat, indeed the only foreigner,
traveling with the President on the campaign swing. The Ambassador's presence. Hedges
noted "lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the event, one that many American and European
'" Id.; Pomfret, Bosnia's Muslim . .. supra, note 4 at 22; Mike O'Connor, As
Intimidation Persiists. Doubts Grow on Bosnia Vote. NY Times. Sept. 4, 1996, at 14
(hereinafter *0'Connor. As Intimidation Persists. ■•).
** O'Connor, As Intimidation Persists . . .. supca note 19 at 14.
*' Mike O'Connor. Surprising West. Bosnia Hampers Independent TV, NY Times.
Aug. 28, 1996. ate.
^ Chris Hedges, Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies, NY Times. Sept.
2. 1996, at 7.
194
supporters of the Bosnian Government are trying hard to ignore or dismiss.""
In the weeks that followed. Izetbegovic kept up his close contact with the Iranians,
purged his party of supporters "not considered Islamic enough." and continued to
marginalize Serbs and Croatians in the government.'*
The SDA campaign seeks to achieve more than just political objectives. According
to NATO sources, foreign Islamic militants, including Iranian-backed terrorist cells, with the
connivance of Izetbegovic. work jointly with the BAID to fon^gol the "long-term goal" of
setting up a "base for European-wide terrorist operations.""'^
^■iQinqife"j»
Desprte our inclination to overlook the transgressions of the Bosnian Muslim political
leadership because of the temble tragedies the Muslim people suffered in the war. the
leadership's repressive conduct in the recent elections clearly indicates that it has become
the hostage of an ideology the US would normally oppose, particularly in a volatile part of
Europe. It has become increasingly fundamentalist in pushing a radical agenda of political
Islam that has developed out of Bosnia's friendship with Iran. The tragedy is that the
Administration did not pursue a policy in Bosnia to minimize radicalization rather than
throwing the Bosnians into the arms of Iran's ayatollahs.
The Iranian and Foreign Radical Islamic
Presence and Influence Today
A number of press reports in September indicate that the situation regarding the
presence of Iranians and foreign Islamic radicals continues without improvement:
*» See also. Mark M. Nelson. Electmns. Far From Ushering In Peace, Could Be
Prelude to Brflakup of Bosnia. Wall Street Journal. SepL 13. 1996. at 6 (for descriptkins
of Islamic rallies "rife with the sounds and symbols of Islam").
** Chris Hedges. Three Leaders 6f New Bosnia: Pulling in Three Directions, NY
Times. Sept. 18. 1996. at 6.
** Washington Whispers. U.S. News and Worid Report. Sept. 9. 1996. at 16
(hereinafter "Washington Whispers")
195
NATO officials and Western diplomats report that the Iranian-backed Hannas.
Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad organizations still have training camps
throughout Muslinrvcontrolled areas, with many of their members managing
to stay in Bosnia with false documents or else because of forced marriages
to Bosnian women and girls.**
NATO officials estimate that throughout Bosnia as many as a "couple of
hundred' Iranian and other foreign militants remain, particularly in central
Bosnia. The town of Bakotici alone has as many as 50 to 100.*'
President Izetbegovic has shnjgged off requests that he expel a group of
Middle Eastern fighters who threatened to kill US troops and civilians. The
threat was so intolerable that on September 12, the US had lodged a formal
demand that the fighters be expelled."
A senior NATO official stated that there were large numbers of foreign
mercenaries present in Bosnia who are trained as fighters and terrorists.
These mercenaries, who are closely allied with Iranian intelligence, are
awaiting orders to set off car bombs and carry out assassinations and are
"poised" to strike.**
As recently as the fourth week of September, US entreaties to President
Izetbegovic to turn out foreign Islamic militants were "ignored." Nonetheless,
the US again approached the Bosnians with a request that they expel senior
Iranian intelligence operatives.'"
Fundamentalist activities in Bosnia continue to be covertly funded by Iran
and are supported by President Izetbegovic and his close colleague. Deputy
^ Chris Hedges. Outsiders Bring islamic Fervor to the Balkans. NY Times. Sept
23, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Hedges, Outsiders../).
*• John Pomfret, llLS_Protpsts Mideast Fighters in Bosnia, Washington Post .
Sept. T3, 1996, at A34 (hereinafter "Pomfret, US Protests . . .").
* Hedges, Outsiders . . ., supia note 27 at 1.
196
Defense Minister Hasan Cengic."
In these circumstances, it is no wonder that the cun-ent situation in Bosnia has been
characterized as a "time bomb waiting to go off.""
Cengic. a Muslim cleric, is an important player in Bosnian political and governmental
affairs and has obstructed US efforts to reduce Iranian influence in Bosnia. As the senior
Muslim in the Defense Ministry, he is its effectual head. His is a long-time friend of
Izetbegovic, and the two were co-defendants in a 1983 trial for fomenting Muslim
nationalism in what was then Yugoslavia. Cengic. who has lived in Iran, was responsible
for the logistical and financial operations of the Iranian ajjns pjgeline. In addition to beinc
avowedly anti-secular and open in his admiration of Irar "
The British have expressed their concern to the US that someone with this
background and affinity for Iran should be the principal Bosnian administrator of the over
$100 million US program to train and equip the Bosnians.** Interestingly, a senior US
official has also identified Cengic as being "the biggest obstacle" to the snrKX)th operation
of the program.** Difficulties encountered have included Bosnian efforts to shake down the
US assistance program with "taxes" and charging exortjitant prices for simple logistic
services. Even if one were not to know Cengic's background and clandestine affiliation
with Iran, his actions cleariy indicate his objective is to presen/e Iranian and militant Islamk:
influences in the Bosnian military and to keep the US influence to a minimum.
A second individual who is working actively to counter US efforts at minimizing the
mfluence and activities of Iran in Bosnia is Irfan Ljevakovic. Ljevakovic is known for his
"strong ties" to Iran and his wori< in getting the Middle Easterners into Bosnia to help wage
'* Washington Whiispftrs. supia note 25.
" Hedges. Outsidfirs ■ . .. supra note 27 at 1.
*• Pomfret. US Protests . supra note 28 at A34.
" John Pomfret. First Ametican Arms Shipment Arrivfts in Bosnia, Washington
Post. Aug. 30. 1996. at A28.
197
the war.^ Interestingly, Ljevakovic, who was a co-founder of the SDA with Izetbegovic,
now also serves as a senior officer in the BAID secret police.^' At this point it should come
as no surprise that he is the very individual Izetbegovic has made the principal interlocutor
with the US in discussing Iranian and mujahedin issues.
Intelligence ij
frightening detail
rmation confirms much of the above and amplifies it. sometimes in
While the Iranians have lowered their political profiles somewhat, and while their
numbers decreased through early 1996, the US intelligence community has concluded
that, notwithstanding President Clinton's certification, thg^t the Iranian presence in Bosnia
has actually begun to increase again since June 1996.]^
** Pomfret. US Protests , . ., supca note 28 at A34.
198
Moreover, the Administration's asserljj
Iranians have been removed is incorrect.
lat the Bosnians who were closest to the
A US intelligence assessment prepared in September 1996 concluded ti(at the
MOIS actively carries on in Bosnia a variety of activities inimicable to US interests:
1
199
The Iranian Green Light and the Future of Bosnia:
Worrying Signs
in contemplating the ramifications of the Administration's green light policy on the
future, we cannot speculate on each of the possible permutations of the polKlcal future of
Bosnia. It is sufficient here to note that it appears increasingly unlil<ely that Bosnia will
emerge as a stable, multi-ethnic democracy. Either peacefully or through war, there will
likely be a de facto or de jure partition of Bosnia into factions ethnically dominated
autonomous regions or states, possibly followed by annexations of the irredentist areas
into Croatia and Serbia.
Assuming a Bosni9~ Muslim state survives this process, it will be the indelible mark
of Iran as a result of the green light. The Bosnia government uses Iranians and utner
foreign mujahedin as political. Geological, and religious storm-troopers, beating and
terrorizing those who do not subscribe to a nationalist and Islamic agenda. The Bosnian
government has t)een transformed from secularism to a brand of repressive political Islam.
Iran and Bosnia just this year coordinated intelligence and tenorist activities, some of which
were directed against the US. ^BMM^B^^^^BBBBBBBIMWBBBi
^igimi[im|MHBM^aHBHi|^^^^HBBBJThere is little hope that the
B^nianMuslimleaaerehi^varp^^^ ties to Iran and re-embrace
denfK)cratic values.i)WyB|4iSjg^^^^^
This is the grim legacy of the Administration's Iranian green light polk:y, and it must
be acknowledged if we as a natk)n are to work to neutralize it
200
SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS
Much of this report is classified and must undergo a declassification process before
K can t>e shared with the public. That process is, by law, in the hands of the Executive
Branch. Due to difficulties the Select Subcommittee has had with the Clinton
Administration's hidirig behind classification statutes so as to avoid declassifying
embarrassing information — and there is a great deal here highly emt>arrassing to the
Administration - we are not hopeful that this process can be completed successfully,
particularly in the near future.
The Subcommittee feels, however, the need to share with the American people, as
besX it can, the results of the investigation. For this reason we have crafted the following
conclusions in a way that they do not reference property or improperly 'classified'
information. They are, therefore, less precise and comprehensive - and less pointed -
than they would otherwise be, but they may, at least, be shared publicly.
It is our hope that the Administration will relent in its efforts to conceal the history of
this foreign policy fiasco so that the American public will eventually see a reasonably
complete version of the full report which fully documents the conclusions summarized
below - and much, nrtuch more.
1. The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented
foothold in Europe and has recldessly endangered American lives and US
strategic Interests.
The Clinton Administration, unat>le to convince tfie United Nations to follow its lead
in lifting the Bosnian arms embargo and unwilling to abandon its foreign policy philosophy
of assertive multilateralism (which denied the US the authority to act unilaterally), found
itself in 1994 without a vehicle it found acceptable to implement a change in foreign policy
it t>elieved to be in the national interest - the lifting of the Bosnian arms emtiargo.
Accordirtgly, the Administration was receptive when its ambassador to Croatia, Peter
Galbraith - a man rwted by his colleagues for his passionate pursuK of causes, free-
wheeling style, and an open attitude towards Iran - pressed policy-makers to consider a
scheme whereby Iran would be allowed to act as the US surrogate in providing militarily
assistance to the Bosnians.
The President's decision to give Iran a green light in the Balkans altowed Iran to
expand its ecor)omic and dipfomatic relations, as well as establish a military, security, and
201
intelligence presence so expansive it became the largest concentration of official Iranians
outside the Middle East. The consequences have t}een far-reaching and pernicious. They
persist to this day.
In Croatia, a government that had t>efore the green light t>een a consistent ally in
the US's fight against Iranian-sponsored terrorism, was co-opted by the weapons it
received in exchange for being a staging point for the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia.
As a result, after the green light, there was a serious deterioration of cooperation with the
US in countering very real arxj imminent Iranian-Jinked terrorist threats. The US even now
must cope with ttie consequences of Croatia's developing what has t>een referred to as an
"all-but-out-of-control' relationship with Iran in the wake of the green light.
The consequences of the green light policy have been much, much worse in Bosnia.
After the Administration gave the green light. Iran virtually ovemight t>ecame the unrivaled
foreign benefactor of the Bosnian government. As a result, the Bosnian government
became less secular and denrH3cratic and more open in its embrace of a radical Islamk:
political agenda accgp^able to Iran but inimicable to US natbnal security interests and
democratic values.
These disturt>ir)g yet deariy foreseeable devek^pments leave no room for doubt that
the Administration's green light to Iran - of all countries - may have doomed the only real
hope for Bosnia: the devek^pment of social and political institutkjns founded on respect
for human rights arxl denxxvatk: principles. Somehow the Administratnn failed to see ttie
short-term expediency of its Iranian green light was a long-term curse on the Bosnian
people.
Even now, the Administratk>n is having to cope with the fallout from its policy. Iran's
pernicious influence and the Bosnian politteal leadership's private thralldom to Iran are
202
giving the Clinton Administration its nwst intractable, behind-the-scenes problenis in
Bosnia. Despite the Administration's put)lic assurances to the American people and
Congress to the contrary, Iranian influence in the highest Bosnian ruling circles remains
pervasive and Iranian terrorist and intelligence capabilities in Bosnia remain great cause
for US ooncem. The Iranians are biding their time, and the radicalized Bosnian Muslim
political leadership (in contrast to a largely secular population), may yet succeed in tuming
Bosnia into a radical and authoritarian state. There appears to be little hope that the
situation will improve since the Bosnian govemment is fighting tooth-and-nail US efforts to
cut its ties to Iran. The probability that the green light will end up costing American lives
is an too great given Iran's trade record.
What is even more disturbing to the Sut)committee than the disastrous
consequences of this ill-conceived policy is that even after its folly became apparent, the
Administration rejected other specific and readily available options that could have
lessened, if not reversed, the damage that had been done. Instead, it took actions that
exacert>ated the problem and further enhanced Iran's grip on Bosnia.
2. The President and the American people were poorly served by the
Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without due
deiit}eration, full information and an adequate consideration of the
consequences.
The Administration's decision to issue the green light was reached hurriedly and
without a full knowledge of the relevant facts. Tradittonal consultative mechanisms were
drcumvented. The dedskxi arxJ delit)eFative processes were intentnnally undocumented.
Key information was not passed up to tfie Presklent's advisors, and even less information
was made available to the Preskient himself. Moreover, senior NSC and Department of
State officials alkiwed themselves to be forced to rush the decisk)n-making process to
meet an artificially short deadline that discouraged, their conskJeratk>n of other less
dangerous policy optk>ns. As a result, the deciston was made without full conskJeratk>n
of the strategic consequences of giving Iran - the rogue state most hostile to the US - an
effective exdusive franchise to buy influence and peddle terrorism in a voiatile part of
Europe highly vulnerable to fundamentafist agitatnn. hiad the PreskJent and his senk>r
advisors inquired deeper, it is possit>ie that the hazards of the Iranian green light policy
would have been appreciated and. perhaps. avokJed.
3. The Iranian green light policy was Inconsistent with - Indeed antithetical to —
the established policy to Isolate and contain Iran.
The Clinton AdministratkNi has shown an admirable consistency in advocating and
203
enforcing the long-held and bipartisan-supported policy of isolating and containing Iran,
politically, militarily, and economicalty. When presented with the question in the spring of
1994 about Iran's proposal to come into the Balkans and Europe in a big way, the policy
was dear and the answer should have been obvious: 'Just say 'no." That is exactly what
the Bush Administration did two years earlier when presented with almost the identical
situation. It is bafflirig, therefore, that the Administration decided instead to give the
Iranians a green light and held open the door to Europe for them. The Administration, in
an amazing lapse of judgment scuttled its own policy of isolating Iran and instead helped
it develop an extensive and uniquely valuable set of political, military, and economic
relationships in Europe.
It is impossible to reconcile the Administration's much-ballyhooed public policy of
isolating Iran with its secret efforts to help Iran expand and normalize its foreign relations.
4. The Administration's efforts to l(eep even senior US officials from seeing its
"^ngerprints" on the green light policy ied to confusion and disarray within
the government
From the beginning, the Administration realized the green light policy was
'dynamite' and so worked to implement it 'without fingerprints.' Within the Administration,
this meant that only a handful of senior officials were officially aware of it - basically, the
President and a few individuals in the National Security Council and the Department of
State. The CIA, which was responsible for collecting intelligence on emt>argo busting and
Iran, as well as working to support the policy of isolating Iran, and the Department of
Defense, whk;h was responsible for enforcing the amis embargo, were not advised even
at the most senior levels. Moreover, important State Department officials working with key
allies, the UN, and in relevant policy areas continued to work with the understanding that
it remained US policy to oppose violations of the arms embargo. In effect, while the CIA,
Defense Department and most State Department officials were working to counter the
green light policy, a few senior policy makers were secretly working to implement it. This
complete lack of coordination between relevant US agencies on matters of important
natnnal policy was such that, were the consequences not so serious, it would be worthy
fodder for a Shakespearean, if not a Marx Brothers comedy.
5. The Administration's duplicity has seriously damaged US credibility with its
allies.
It is ironic that this Administration - one that has placed such an emphasis on
multilateralism - has in its duplicitous, if not outright deceptive, Iranian green light policy,
given other countries serious reason to doubt the US's good bith in any of its assurances
204
and commitments.
On numerous occasions, senior Administiation officials, including the President,
defended their unwillingness to arm the Bosnian Muslims unless the UN arms embargo
was lifted. Two reasons were emphasized. First the Administration professed an
unbreakable fidelity to the letter and spirit of UN Security Council resolutions, even when
inconvenient for the US, because a strong UN represented the very best possibility of
creating a stable, more just and responsit>le world order. Second, the Administration
repeatedly counseled Congress and other countries that we must keep faith with our allies
in the Contact Group. Any move by the US to break the embargo, they argued, would
endanger allied soldiers on the ground in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR and. therefore,
lead to the evacuatk)n of European troops.
At the same time the Administration was making these high-minded arguments
about the need to respect both intematbnally agreed upon mles and US allies, it was
working assiduously behind the scenes to undermine them. The message this sends is
dear. 1) so long as you publicly support intematranal law, you may privately do virtually ■
anything you want, and 2) it would be a foolish ally, indeed, that trusted this Administratton
to act in concert and in accordance with its agreements.
It is no wonder that our allies have been less willing to follow the US lead during the
past nwnths in any number of international arenas.
In the Iranian green light matter the Administratk>n has squandered our allies' good
will and trust in us. Moreover, it dki so in pursuit of a short-sighted and eventually self-
destructive policy.
6. The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about its Iranian
green light policy.
Rather than follow the traditk>nal practk» of deflecting questions and refusing to
comment on allegatrans of particularly sensitive foreign activities of the US government,
Clinton Administration officials, including Vne PreskJent, directiy and through press
spokesnDen and press statements, repeatedly deceived the American people in an effort
to coverup its secret polk:y of giving Iran a green light to expand its presence and influence
In the Balkans.
These are just a few of many examples:
• The United States is not, underiine not covertiy supplying arms or supporting the
205
supply of arms to the Bosnian government.* (Secretary of State Warren
Christopher)^
• The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other government
regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians We have always made clear
that we were abiding by the arms embargo and that we expected other countries
to do so as well.* (National Security Council)^
• "We are certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly are not tuming a blind eye.*
(Department of State, in response to a question about the US role in getting Iranian
arms to Bosnia.)^
• *No.* (President Clinton in response to a question if the US was involved in
'orchestrating the transfer of arms to the Bosnian Muslims')*
7. The Administration deliberately concealed the truth from Congress regarding
the President's Iranian green light decision.
Despite protests to the contrary in the eariy months of this investigation. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently admitted to the Subcommittee that the
Administration had intentionally not told Congress of the green light it gave Iran in the
Balkans. The Administration's deliberate efforts to keep Congress in the dari( was
inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in the fonmatton and executk>n of US foreign
poik:y that various legislative mandates and executive orders have been designed to
foster. It is Congress' constitutional right to insist that the Executive Branch's activities stay
within the bounds lawfully mandated by Congress and that Congress be consulted on
important foreign policy matters. Consultation with Congress is especially important when
the PreskJent has adopted policies that directly impinge on matters about which Congress
has expressed strong views. Two such matters are dearty the Bosnian amris embargo and
^ Bill Gertz. Perry Threatens 'Massive Air"; Christopher Denies Report nf Cnvt*tt
Arms Shipmantg The Washington Times, July 28, 1995.
' Nattonal Security Coundl, Daily Gukjance Update. Feb. 2, 1996.
' Department of State Cable. State 092370. Apr. 14. 1995.
* The Late Edition: US Denies Funneling Arms to Bosnian Muslims (CNN
televisnn broadcast, July 28. 1995).
206
the US policy to isolate Iran. In taking nrteasures that circumvented the embargo and
fnjstrated the bipartisan Congressional policy of isolating Iran, it is highly disturbing that the
Administration not only did not take any steps to consult with or even inform Congress, but
said things that, in retrospect, can only be viewed as intentionally misleading.
8. Several Administration ofncials gave false testimony to Congress on the
development and implementation of the Iranian green light policy.
The Select Subcommittee, in additton to reviewing reams of documents in its
investigation, took swom deposittons from 27 individuals who were in key posittons of
particular importance for understanding the events under examinatk>n. The Subcommittee
interviewed another 50 or more people less central to the investigatran or who were
directed by the White House not to provkje swom testimony on the basis of executive
privilege. Comparing the statements of several individuals, it is apparent that there are
serious nnaterial discrepancies over several matters central to the Subcommitieu's
investigations.
The Select Subcommittee is truly disturt>ed that it received testimony and
statements from the Natkjnal Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Deputy Natranal Security
Advisor Samuel ("Sandy*) Berger, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and
Ambassador Jenonne Walker that directly contradicts Ambassador Peter Galbraith's swom
testinfK}ny with respect to material issues before the Subcommittee and Congress.
Moreover, the Select Subcommittee is further dismayed that swom testimony
provkled by Ambassadors Peter Galbraith and Charies Redman, both before the House
International Relattons Committee and the Select Subcommittee, is not supported by
evidence uncovered through this investigatton.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee is referring this matter to the Department of Justice
for further criminal 'nvestigatmn.
9. There is evidence that Ambassador Peter Galbraith may have engaged in
activities that could l>e characterized as unauthorized covert action. The
evidence is sufficient to warrant referral to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action within its
Jurisdiction.
There is evklence that Ambassador Galbraith played a signifk:ant supervisory role
with respect to at least one Iranian weapons transshipments through Croatia. Galbraith's
goal in facilitating this transshipment was to affect political and military conditions in
207
Bosnia.
There is also evidence that he had input into or advance knowledge of the planning
and operation of the Iranian weapons pipeline that Iran used to ship arms and gain
influence in the embattled Balkans. There is uncontroverted evidence that he was privy
to operational detaDs concerning the pipeline that woukj ordinanly be known only by active
partidpants in the planning or operation of the pipeline.
To the extent he actively participated in the formation and execution of the Iranian
arms pipeline, there is a high probability that he overstepped the bounds of traditional
diplomatic activities and engaged in an unlawful covert action undertaken in the absence
of a Presidential finding and without timely notification of Congress.
In light of these conduskins we are recommending to the House Intemational
Relatkwis Committee that this Report and the results of this investigation be refen-ed to tlie
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action
within that Committee's jurisdiction.
10. The Central Intelligence Agency exercised sound Judgment in its refusal to
participate in activities that might have otherwise led to an inadvertent and
illegal covert action.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not partidpate in the development of the
green light policy. CIA officers at several levels correctly refused to participate in its
implementation without assurances that A was being conducted within the parameters of
legal support to dipkxnatic activities or a presklential finding. Because CIA officials rightly
insisted on proper legal authorization for the change in US policy to the green light policy
(and, if required, a notificatnn of Congress), the Administration side-stepped the CIA and
dkJ not keep it adequately informed.
K is also ourfirxling that CIA officers acted appropriately in monitoring and reporting
to their superiors what were, to them, apparently rogue activities by senior US State
Department officials. Moreover, senk>r CIA offidals property reported this infonnation to
the appropriate authorities with the Department of State and the National Security Coundl
for their actkm. CIA was put in this awkward situation solely t>ecause of the unnecessary
and unjustifiable secrecy within the Administration concerning its green light policy.
11. The Administration is hiding its embarrassment l>ehind the veil of
classification.
208
Despite the President's assurance to Congress that his Administration would
'cooperate full/ in^its examination of the Iranian green light poTicy, the Administration has
repeatedly placed serious, unnecessary obstacles in the Select Subcommittee's way.
including the withholding of documents and the refusal to allow some officials to sit for
sworn depositions. In addition to its efforts to harriper the investigation, the Administi^tion
is also atxising its authority to classify information so as to avoid letting the Subcommittee
share with the American public what It has teamed.
In July the Subcommittee tested the Administration's commitment to cooperate by
asking the Department of State to review three documents for declassification that are
essential to telling the story of how the green light policy was actually Implemented, as
opposed to how it has been pubfidy portrayed by the AdminlstiBtion. After over one rrwnth
of deliberation and several missed deadlines, the Department finally responded by refusing
to declassify any part of two of the documents and declassifying only approxinrately a half
of the third document. This was despite the fact that a substantial portion of these
documents pertained to events that have been testified about publicly (with "spin") by
several Administration officials.
What most clearly demonsti^ted the Administration's efforts to hide its actions
behind the shroud of classification Is that several sentences and phrases were redacted
from the third document that were clearly unclassified but which would have embarrassed
the AdminisbBtion. This includes, for example, a senior State Department official's
negative characterization of the policy-making community In Washirigton. Follow-up
discussons with the State Department dkl not result in a reconskleration of their obviously
improper action. Accordingly, at the request of Chairman Hyde, the Information Security
Oversight Office has launched an investigation of the Department's behavtor in Uiis case.
209
APPENDICES
A. Budget, Biographies, and Acknowledgments
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE BUDGET AND STAFF
A. BUDGET
House Resolution 416 authorized the establishment of a Select Subcommittee on
the United States Role In Iranian Amfis Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia of the Committee
on International Relations. The budget was approved with the passage of House
Resolution 417 on May 8, 1996. authorizing the expenditure of funds to establish and
cofKluct an investigation. The Majority and Minority Counsel conducted the investigation
in the nxtst economical manner possible. The Congress budgeted $995,000.00 for a
period not to exceed six months.
B. MAJORITY STAFF
Chief Counsel Richard J. Pecker
Richard J. Pocket is presently a partner in the Nevada law firm of Oickerson,
Dk:kerson, Consul and Pocker, engaged primarily in civil litigatk)n. Prk>r to entering private
practice, he served with the United States Attorney's Office in Las Vegas, Nevada as an
Assistant United States Attorney, the Chief Assistant United States Attorney and as the
interim United States Attorney for the Distrk:t of Nevada, appointed to the latter position by
U.S. Attorney General Richard Thomburgh.
During his career as a Federal prosecutor, Mr. Pocker successfully prosecuted
William Potter Gale and other anti-govemment. anti-Semitic tax protestors in the celebrated
'Committee of the States* trail in 1987. a prosecution that set the stage for later efforts
against gnsups such as the Freemen of Montana. In the late 1980's, Mr. Pecker's
significant series of court room vk:tories over fraudulent telemari<eting companies resulted
in his receiving the Directors' Special Commendation Award from the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Chief Postal Inspector's Special Award for Excellence of Performance in
the Administration of Justk». He is a 1980 graduate of the University of Virginia School
of Law. and a veteran of the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps.
Staff Director John I. Millis
John Millis previously worthed for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) as Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence.
Analysis, and Counterintelligence, the subcommittee responsit>le for, atTX>ng other things,
oversight of most CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI intelligence activities.
Prior to his worit on Capitol Hill, Mr. Millis served for 12 years in the CIA's
(211)
212
Directorate of Operations as ar» operations officer and manager in a variety of overseas
posts in Asia and Africa. In 1991-92 he also served as the Director of Central Intelligence's
liaison officer to the National Security Agency (NSA) and Executive Assistant to the Deputy
Director of NSA. Mr. Millis graduated from Wake Forest University in 1975 and attended
graduate school at the University of Chicago and Banaras Hindu University. India. He
received an M.A. and Ph.D. (with distinction) from Chicago.
Deputy Chief Counsel Patrick B. Murray
Patricic B. Murray served as full committee Counsel with the House Judiciary
Committee from January 1995 through May 1996. His primary responsibilities involved
crime issues pending before the Committee. He assisted Chainnan Hyde in the drafting
arvj ultimate enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
was signed into law on April 24. 1996 (P.L. 104-132).
Before rrxjving to Washington in 1995, Mr. Murray was an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northem District of Illinois, in Chicago, Illinois. He served the United
States Justice Department in that capacity since 1990. He was involved in prosecuting
major narcotics offenses, and white cdlar crimes, including mail and wire fraud and public
corruption cases. Prior to joining the Justice Department, Mr. Muoay was engaged in the
private practice of law as an Associate with the firm of Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey,
& Witous P.C. also in Chicago.
Mr. Murray is a graduate of the DePaul University College of Law (J.D.) and
received his undergraduate degree from Creighton University {B.A.).
Associate Counsel Michael K. Young
Michael K. Young, is a Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions:
Director. Center for Japanese Legal Studies and Center for Korean Legal Studies at
Columbia University. Mr. Young was a law deric to Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1976-77. and to Justice William H. Rehnquist
of the United States Supreme Court. 1977-78. He joined the Columbia faculty in 1978.
Mr. Young has been a visiting scholar at tt>e Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo.
1978-80. 1983. a Japan Foundation Feltow, 1979-80 and a visiting professor at Nihon
University. 1985 and Waseda University. 1989. He also served as Ambassador for Trade
and Eroflronmental Affairs. 1992-93; Deputy Undersecretary for Economfe and Agricultural
Affairs. 1991-93; and Deputy Legal Adviser to the US Department of State. 1989-91.
Mr. Young has tieen the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Japan Sodet/s
Publk; Affairs Program; a POSCO Research Institute Fellovr. and member of the Coundl
on Foreign Relatfons. He graduated in 1973 with a B.A. from Brigham Young University
and received a J.D. from Harvard University in 1976, where he sensed as note editor of the
213
Harvard Law Review.
Associate Counsel Stephen F. Smith
Stephen F. Smith is an associate with the Washington, D.C., office of Sidley &
Austin, where his practice focuses on litigation t>efore the U.S. Supreme Court and other
federal and state appellate courts. Before joining Sidley & Austin. Mr. Smith served as law
clerk to Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, of the U.S. Supreme Court, and to Judge
David B. Sentelle, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Mr.
Smith graduated with horrars in 1992 from the University of Virginia School of Law, where
he served as Articles Editor of the Virginia Law Review, and received his undergraduate
degree from Dartmouth College in 1988.
Executive Assistant Julia W. Gaines
Julia Gaines, prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, served as the Legal
Research Assistant fbr the Office of Independent Counsel Joseph E. diGenova from
January 1992 through June 1996. From May 1991 through January 1992, she was the
Minority Staff Assistant fbr the U.S. House of Representative's "October Surprise" Task
Force.
Prior to her government service, Ms. Gaines was the Administrative Assistant for
Menill Lynch and a Senbr Sales Assistant/Insurance Coordinator's Assistant for Kkider,
Peabody & Co.. Inc. In additkin. she was the Senior Sales Assistant/New Accounts
Administrator for Prudential-Bache Securities. She graduated with a Bachelor of Science
degree in Psychology from the University of Florida in 1982.
Senior Staff Associate Janlne E. Doherty
Janine Doherty. prior to joining the Select Subcommittee on June 17, 1996 as
Senior Staff Associate, sen/ed in the office of Congressman Peter T. King (R-NY). During
her year with Representative King, she handled legislative research and constituent
corr^ponder>ce. Ms. Doherty received a B A. in lntematk>nal Politics from the American
University in 1994. and next year plans to pursue a law degree.
Staff Associate Douglas 0. Austin
Douglas Austin joined the Select Subcommittee on July 15. 1996. Prior to his
current position he woiked as a researcher for the Republican National Committee and
prevKMJSly as an intern for the IHouse Republican Polk:y Committee. Mr. Austin graduated
with Honors in 1 992 from the University of Rediands with a B A in Govemment and History
and received a Masters Degree in Intematkinal Studies fix}m Claremont Graduate School
in 1994.
214
Full Commlttes SuppoiLStaff
We would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance provkled from Full
Committee Staff Memt>ers. Christopher A. Baugh, Caroline G. Cooper, Barbara J.
Scantiebury. and Allison K. Kieman. wtK>se tireless work and dedication were
indispensat>le to the completion of this project.
We wouM also like to acknowledge John Mackey for his insights and suggesttons
offered as Liaison to the Select Subcommittee. In addition, the Selec* Subcommittee coukJ
not have succeeded without the valuable expertise of Senior Staff Associate Jo Weber and
Budget/Fiscal Affoirs OffKer Shelly Livingston.
We wouki also like to acknowledge the extensive help in travel arrangements and
security measures provkled by the Security Officer Willie Lobo. In addition, the Select
Subcommittee coukl not have completed any of its wortc without the continued support and
help from Systems Administrator Cheryl Eamshaw in establishing a computer system
whk:h enabled the Sutxnmmittee to not only write its report, but also, through the use of
refTK)vat)le hard-drives. enat>le it to draft a report while maintaining the security of classified
infonrnatun.
C. MIMQRITY STAFF
Minority Chief Counsel Richard Meitzer
Richard Meitzer is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Washington
Counsel. P.C. In July 1996. he was appointed Minority Chief Counsel to the Select
Subcommittee. Mr. Meitzer served for three years as the Chief Counsel to the US House
Committee on Interior and Insular Afbirs. Mr. Meitzer also served as Legislative Director
to US Representative Abner J. Mikva. Mr. Meitzer has conducted numerous investigative,
legislative, and oversight hearings. He is a native of Chicago. Illinois, and received his
undergraduate degree from the University of Rochester and his law degree from
Northwestem University School of Law.
Minority Staff Director Michelle Maynard
Prior to being appointed Minority Staff Director of the Subcommittee, Michelle
Maynard served from 1989-1996 as Professnnal Democratic Staff Member for the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, with lead staff responsibility for the Newly Independent
States and Europe, including Bosnia. Croatia and the former Yugoslavia.
Before joining the Senate Foreign Relatuns Committee in 1989, Ms. Maynard
served for two years with the US Department of State's Public Affairs Bureau. She hokJs
a Masters Degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, and a Bachetor of
215
Science Degree in Political Science from the College of Holy Cross.
Deputy Minority Chief Counsel Charles Tiefer
Charles Tiefer. in addition to his position with the Select Subcommittee, is an
Associate Professor at the University of Baltinx>re Law School. Mr. Tiefer was the Deputy
General Counsel and Solicitor of the US House of Representatives from 1984-1995. In
1987. he was the Special Deputy Chief Counsel for the US House of Representatives
Select Committee Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. Mr. Tiefer has published the Ibe
SBmi-Sovereign Prasident (Westview Press, 1994). and Congressional Practice and
Procedure (Greenwood Press 1989).
Deputy Minority Chief Counsel Charies Rothfeld
Prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, Charies Rothfeld served as a Special
Associate Independent Counsel on the tran-Contra inquiry and a consultant to the HUD
Independent Counsel inquiry. Since 1991, Mr. Rothfeld has been special counsel at
Mayer. Brown and Piatt He served as assistant to the Solicitor General of the United
States from 1984-1988 and as Counsel to the State and Local Legal Center from 1989-
1990.
Mr. Rothfeld was the law derk to Justice Harry Blackmun of the Supreme Court and
to Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit He is a graduate of Cornell University and received a J.D. from the
University of Chicago Law School.
Minority Staff Associate Carrie Y. Moore
Prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, Canie Moore served as the Legislative
Assistant to the Minority Chief Counsel for the US House of Representatives Committee
on Resources, from 1991-1996. Ms. Moore's duties included researching and drafting
legislation. Committee Reports, floor speeches and amendments. Ms. Moore received her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles,
in June 1991.
Minority Staff Associate Usa A. Rich
Prior to her appointment to the Select Subcommittee. Ms. Rich served as the legal
research analyst for both Independent Counsel Daniel S. Pearson in his investigation of
former Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown and Independent Counsel Joseph E.
diGenova in his investigation of former White House official Janet Mullins. Ms. Rich also
wor1(ed as a legal research assistant for an investigative law firm. In 1992, Ms. Rich was
a majority staff assistant on the US House of Representatives "October Surprise' Task
216
Force. Ms. Rich has worked under grant for the Marine Corps Historical Center and served
as an intern to Representative Charles Range! (D-NY). Ms. Rich completed her
undergraduate degree in Beijing. China and cunently is pursuing her J.D. degree from
American University.
D. Special Investigators
The Federal Bureau of Investigation detailed three agents to the Select
Sut>committee for the purpose of conduting interviews and conducting analysis of
documents. They were detailed as a source to be shared by both the Majority and Minority
Staff.
Dave F. Olson, Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Special Agent Olson joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1970 He
has been assigned to FBI Field Offices located in Philadelphia, Boston, Dallas and
Milwaukee where he heM the position of Supervisor. In additk^n, he has had two tours of
duty at FBI Headquarters, in Washington, O.C, and is currently assigned there.
Peter A. Gulotta, Jr., Special Agent
Federal Bureau of investigation
Special Agent Gulotta joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1969. He
has t>een assigned to the Detroit Division, Washington Metropolitan Fiekl Offk:e, FBI
Headquarters, and the Baltimore Oivisk>n. In addition to his assignments as a SA in ttte
field woridng criminal, foreign counterintelligence and applicant matters, SA Gulotta has
served in management as a Field Supervisor, a FBI Headquarters Supervisor, and
Assistant Inspector, and Unit Chief in charge of FBI hiring. Prior to reporting to the Select
Sutxx>mmittee he was assigned to drug investigations in the Baltimore Diviston of the FBI.
Daniel F. Bradley, Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Special Agent Bradley joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1986. He
has t>een assigned to Phoenix, Arizona and Washington, D.C. He is currentiy a primary
relief supervisory assigned to the Washington Field Office.
217
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Select Subcommittee would like to express its appreciation to several
Individuals who assisted our efforts during this investigation.
At the CIA Sandy Chaloner of the Office of Congressional Affairs particularly
deserves warm thanks for her hurdling of bureaucratic obstacles to get security clearances
for Subcommittee staff in record time. Laurie Goodwin of the CIA's Directorate of
Operations also deserves commendation for her cheerful accommodation of staff reaue?*s
for access to CIA materials, frequently on short notice and at odd hours.
Several indivkjuals at the Department of Defense also went well beyond the nomnal
call of duty in helping with the staff clearance process. In particular, we thank Larry
Shockley of the Office of Legislative Affairs and Gigi Blakes and Stephen OToole of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Select Subcommittee also expresses appreciation for the diligent work of the
Capitol Hill Police, specifically Joseph W. Simpson and Penny Womack, who were
instrumental in the processing of security requests. Also, the Police staff responsible for
physKal and technk:al security were always immediately responsive to the Subcommittee's
sometimes unpredictable needs for their services.
The Subcommittee also wishes to thank the exceptk>nal job performed by the US
House of Representatives Office of Offrcial Reporters. Not only dkJ they execute complete
arKJ accurate transcripts, but they dkJ so in an extraordinarily timely fashion. The court
reporters displayed a tremendous dedteatk>n to their wori(. a willingness to travel, and we
are most grateftjl for their persistent efforts. The reporters were: Ray A. Boyum (chief
reporter), Julie C. Bryan, Pamela L. Garland, Marcia D. Stein, and Joseph W. Strickland.
The transcribers were: Angela F. Gallacher, Kathleen A Magmer, Jeanne S. Mayer,
Bemita A. Partner, and Joyce A. Quintero. The Subcommittee also appreciates the
patience and outstanding assistance exhibited by the reporters' chief cleric Jo Ann Hooks,
who accommodated our ever-changing schedule with aplomb.
The Select Subcommittee expresses its appreciatton to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) for generously sharing their information and materials with our staff
during the course of our investigation.
218
In the course of our investigation, the Select Subcommittee found it necessary to
corxluct depositions and further investigation overseas. The Subcommittee especially
thanks Roderick W. Moore, First Secretary, Embassy Zagreb, for his exceptk)nal
assistance during the STAFFDEL to the US Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. Likewise, the
Sut)committee thanks John H. Winant, Second Secretary, Emt>assy Prague, for his
assistance upon our arrival at the US Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic.
Finally, the Select Subcommittee expresses enormous gratitude to the Chaimian
Benjamin A. Oilman and the staff of the Committee on International Relatk^ns for their
support and assistarK^e in conducting our investigatksn. We have prevk)usly mentk>ned
those indivkluals most ctosely associated with our work but woukl also like to mentkjn
Chief of Staff Rk:h Garon, Chief Counsel Stephen Rademaker, Professnnal Staff Members
John Mackey, OavkJ Jung, Hillel Weinberg, and Administrative Director Nancy Bloomer.
B. Correspondence
^^^H %linttdj5taccB Senate
lOMWiuuaiia
i^til 9. 1996
SSa# 96-U92-C
Tbe Hooorable Wanes M ChristnphBf
SecreUry of State
Depanmeni of Slate
Washington. D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretaiy:
On Aprils. 1996. Ite£0»liv<fa7im«iepertcd that "President ainioa secretly gave a
gieeo Ught to covert Iruiaii armi sh^OKflU i«o Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations aims
embargo that the United States was pledged 10 t^bold and the adiainistration's own policy of
isolating Tehran globally as a sumncr of tenonsm." This leoer is to infonn you that the Senate
Select ConuniBee on Inielligeaoe is '•""""^■'g today an inquity into alleged U^. suppoit for
Iranian arms shipmeois to Bosnia. A list of quenioos of particular inierest to the cofluninee is
attached for your information.
The committee would appieciaftB receiving, by April 12. 1996. copies of all published
intelligence since Januaiy 1. 1994. dealing with arms Oows into Bosnia and of all other statements
on this matter that have been provided by an element of the U^. intelligence community under
your jurisdiction u> any OMinber or commiitee of die United States Senate. We also request thai
each element of the U..S. inMfligeocccommiiBiiy provide - by April IS. 1996. to the extent
possible - any "-— Vuhrri "Mrn*' '"•"■g on tto subject, such u cables, electrewk
conesDondentx. internal memoranda, minufa 61 flMiMi. leHeis, ana memoranoa to omcr
—WMlM tu lalMBU pihnh Im hneliflts thai flM y w^«.W nuhiUaca jnteiujencr unauy. we
requdtt ytMU g6upcratioo in maldag pehdhneravailaDle tor such uuervRwsroEpMRioos and
lesiiinony as the committee may requite.
Any questions regarding ds oomrainee's inquiry may be addressed to the committee's Staff
Directors, its General Counsel or Mr. Edwatd Levine of the committee staff, who is leading the
staff group handling this inquiry.
Sincerely.
Arkn Spectd^ I. Robert Kerrey
rtiaiwMii Vice Chairman
Anachmem
(219)
Ambassador Peter Galbraith Memo
HCISE
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Hay 6, 199«
. TS auOnniv «D
I ICLASSFT M I I S ar
I I 0OWHea«gE TS Is t ) S or 1
MeBorandua To tbc File
During an April 29 eveninq aceting with ^, .-)
and Ambassador VunOman, sought for the second / 1» C«
ti»c U.S. advice as to whether Croatia should facilitate arms
transfers fro» Islamic countries, principally Iran, to the
COBH.
/>
'Lhp)
In reply. 1 told that what 1 said the day before
still stood, that I had no instructions froa Washington on how , 'Ml
to advise on this issue. I urged to focus not '
only on what 1 had said yesterday, but on what I had not said.
Ambassador Redman told "It is your
decision to make. He don't want to be in the position of
saying no."
/•\
V)
-(')
in
response to several requests for guidance, I was told by Sandy -.
Vershbow / I (J J
that I was to tell I did not
have instructions at this time. On April 29, at 9:30 P.M.. in
a conversation with Jennone Walker, Jennone conveyed a message
from Tony Lake that my instructions were to say "I had no
instructions" but that Tony had said this "with raised eyebrows
and a smile." On April 30, Sandy-Vershbow again Cold me to ^ ^ij\
relay a no- instructions message to clearly drawing his ^'"/
attention to the idea we were not saying no. Finally, in a May
2 telephone conversation. Ambassador Redman conveyed to me an
instruction from Tony Lake that 1 not report the conversation "/i''
with In a May S conversation, Vershbow said, after I '■'> c.
recounted Redman and »v conversation with that "you and
000382
(220)
221
Chuck have t«ken if exactly where we want to be"
'■>
■u)
In a Hay 6 conversation with Deputy Secretary Talbott.
Talbott said the instructions were no instructions
I . 'hO
explained that anything
short of a SLoteaent that the Croats should not facilitate the
Clow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians would be understood as a
U.S. green light
i\ye
')
embargo .
Talbott said we
did not vant to be seen as undermining the / > (i^ ^
■V
I told him of the order
itot to report the April 29 conversation and asked if be
wanted it reported. He said the answer is almost certainly
yes, but Steve OMMn or Sandy Vershbow would be in tjTUCh.
L'i.
VPeter W. Galbraith
Ambassador
Hay 6. 1994
Tc the best of my knowledge, the facts in this statement
**■• accurate. The conversations described herein were ,. 'f ^
recounted to me by Ambassador Galbraith, and in the case of the ' * -
meeting by the notetaker shortly after
they tcok olacc.
/)
* ..yj^^ y^^—
rti
in
Minority Views
Select Subcommittee to Investigate
the United States Role in
Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia
October 25, 1996
Submitted by:
Rq>. Lee Hamilton
Rep. Howard Bennan
Rep. Alcee Hastings
k.
CM MIUtHA IKMM. IBATKM0
(223)
FOOTNOTE ERRATA SHEET
to acconpany Minority Views, Select Subcommittee to Investigate
the U^. Role In Iranian Arms Transfcn to Croatia and Bosnia
NOTE: The following changes to cites are made to the Octoba 25, 1996 version of the Minority
Views. The corrections are strictly technical in nature to conform to standard Bluebook format
and in no wav alter the information already contained within the cite. The relevant foomote
number is on the left; the corrected format follows.
Chapter One, Section Two: The Umited States Policy Tofvard Bosnia
1 U.S. Security Council Resolution 713, Sept 25, 1991.
37 Hearing iwi Forrit.i Policy Overvi^-w hefore the .Senate Co-nmitt^ nn Foreign Rglahnns,
103d Cong. 1 1-12 (June 30. 1994) (statement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher).
41 Hearing nn 1 1 S Arrinnc Regarding Iranian Ann< Shiprntrntt into Rosnia hefnre the
Senate Select romminef nn Intelligence 104th Cong. 21 (May 23, 1996) (sUtement of
Deputy Secretary Strobe T albott) (hereinafter Talbot SSCI Statement").
43 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 30.
46 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 36-37.
SS Hearing on H S Action* Ri>gar»tin£ Iranian Arms Shipments into Rftsnia before the
Swiate <if\ffA rnmmitte<> on Intelligence 104th CoQg. 48 (May 21, 1996) (sUtement of
Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke) (hereinafter 'Holbrooke SSCI Statement").
75 Holbrooke SSC Statement, at 26.
80 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 22.
Chapter One, Section Four: PubUe and Congressional Knowtedge of Anns Flows
32 Hearing on 1 1 S Action* B<»garrting Iranian Ann< Shipments into Romia before the
Ronate Seliirt Pominiwi^ on Intelligence. I04di Coog. 37 (May 23. 1996) (statement of
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott) (bereinafter Talbott SSCI Statement'^.
Cn^spler Ttt^a, Stction One: the No Instruedons Responu of April 1994
6 Heanng nn Roml. h>.for^ rtte Hoii«^ P^rmanont Selert rnmmittee on Intelligence 104th
Cong. 24 (May 30. 1996) (statement of Ambassador Peter Galbraith) (hereinafter
"Ga»lb".-4ith HPSCI StatemenfO-
1 V Hear-ng nn Iranian Arm* to Ro<nia before th^ Hnii*^ Pwmanent Select Committee on
InieUigencc I04tb Cong. IS (June 6. 1996) (statement of Former Director. Central
LntfiUigence R. James Wools^r) (hereinafter "Woolsey HPSCI Statement*0.
(224)
\
225
Chapter Two, Section Two: Commueiieatioiis and M'acommunications at the CIA
5 (In place of Woolsey HPSCI DqWSition at 1 5] Hearing on Iranian Kmi to Rntfiia.
before the Hoiiw Permanent Select Coinmitt«^ nn tnt>||igfnrf i04th Cong. IS (June 6,
1 996) (sUtement of Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey)
(hereinafter "Woolsey HPSCI Statement").
Chapter Two, Section Four: The May 1994 Convoy
7 Testimony to suffof the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong (May
31,1 996) (SUtement of Jane Green).
Chapter Two, Section Six: Mystery Flights into Tuzla
25 Testimony to suffof the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 27-28
(statement of Col. Richard Herricic) (hereinaAer "Henick SSCI SUtement").
Chapter Two, Section Seven: Thefam^pfissile Incident
33 Hearing on Actions Regarding Iranian Arms .Shipm^ft into Bn«mia h<-fnrf th>; Smatr
Select Comminrf! nn Intf.lligence. 104th Cong. 80 (May 21. 1996) (sutement of Assistant
Secretary Richard Holbrooke) (hoeinafler "Holbrooke SSCI SUtement").
41 Holbrooke SSCI Statement at 84; Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S3; Clark SSCI Dep at
27.
48 Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S6; Holbrooke SSCI Sutement at 86.
SO Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S8-S9; Holbrooke SSCI Sutement at 87, 88.
53 Holbrooke SSCI Statement at 87; etc.
55 Hearing on Romia hefnrp rti*; HmKy PiTmangnt S^l«-rt rommitti^^ nn Tntglligfnr^ 1 04th
Cong. 22 (May 30, 1996) (statement of Ambassador Peter Galbraith) (hereinafter
"Galbraith HPSCI StatemenO-
36 Galbraith HPSCI Statement tf 22.
82 Galbraith HPSCI Statement at 22; Kehon Dep. at 105.
102 Galbraith Select Subcommittee Dep. at 187-I88:GaIbraidi HPSCI Statement at 22.
Chapter Two, Section Eight: The FaO 1994 IniSatne
2 Hearing nn I I.S. Action.< Regarding Iranian Aims Shipmmts into Rncnia h^fniy th^
Senate Selmt Cnrnmiltee rni Intelligeace. 104th Cong. 35 (May 21. 1996) (sutement of
Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrodce) (hereinafter "Holbrooke SSCI Statement").
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y
Select Subcomminee Organization and Structure i
Legislative History
Legislative Mandate
Treatment of Confidential and Classified Information
Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions
Summary of the Investigation
The Situation on the Ground in the Spring of 1994
The International Political Situation in the Spring of 1994
The United States Policy in the Spring of 1994
The April 28 and 29 Meetings
The Actions of the U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb with respect to Senior
Government of Croatia Officials
The Summer of 1994
The Fall of 1994
Communications between the Ambassador Galbraith and the Embassy
Zagreb InteUigence Station Prior to April 28, 1994
The Lines of Conununication between the Senior Intelligence Official at
Embassy Zagreb and Headquarters
The Consequences of FaiUng to Inform Adequately the Senior Intelligence
Officer in Embassy Zagreb
The Role of the Deputy Chief of Mission
The Conununications between the Ambassador and the Senior Intelligence
Officer in Embassy Zagreb
The Communications in May 1994 between the Senior Officials of the
Department of State, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence
Agency
Consultations in Fall 1994 between the Senior Officials of the Department
of State, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency
Congressional Action
Specific Shipments of Arms
CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND ON EVENTS RELA TING TO THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE
Section One
Setting the Stage, The Balkan War 1
1991-1992: War Erupts and the International Reaction
(226)
227
1992-1993: Bosnia Enters the War
1993-1994; Clinton's Bosnian Policy and the Muslim-Croat War
Negotiating the Federation Agreement
The Effects of the Strategic Military Imbalance Between the Waning Factions
1995: The Road to Dayton
Section Two
The United States Policy Toward Bosnia 30
The Bush Administration's Approach
President Clinton's Push to Lifl the Embargo ~ 1993
The Croatian Question — 1993
A Call to Action in Bosnia
Securing the Federation Agreement
Pressure to Lift the Embargo
The Croatian Question ~ 1994
The Downside ~ Iran
The Allies
Additional British Concerns
Reaction to Unilateral Lift and to Nunn-Mitchell
Results of United States Policy
Why the Policy Worked
Section Three
The Role of Congress 60
Congressional action on the arms embargo
The Nunn-Mitchell Amendment
A Continuing Push to Lift the Embargo - 1995
Section Four
Public and Congressional Knowledge of Arms Flows 69
Public Statements by the Administration
Public information
Intelligence information
Briefings
Congressional Delegation Trips/Staff Delegation Trips to Croatia and Bosnia
Congressional Knowledge of the Diplomatic Exchange
Section Five
A Legal Discussion of Covert Action 84
The Executive Branch Did Not Violate the Law
History of Covert Action Requirements.
The No Instructions Response did not Constitute Covert Action.
Neither the Convoy Nor th jHBVMissile Incident Constituted Covert Action
The Executive Branch was not Un3er a Legal Duty to Report the "No Instructions"
228
Response
Executive Branch OfTicials Should Have Disclosed the "No Instnictions" Response to
Congress
The "No Instructions" Response did not Violate International Law
CHAPTER TWO - ISSUES INVESTIGA TED BY
THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE
Section One
No Instructions Policy of April 1994. 106
Weeks Preceding President Tudjman's Question Presentation of the Question to
Ambassador Galbraith
The Question is Posed to Embassy Zagreb Personnel
Contacts with the United States Defense Attache
Events of April 27 and April 28, 1994
Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow Discusses the Matter with the
Undersecretary
Ambassador Galbraith Consults with his
Policy Makers Debate and Formulate a Response to the Croatian Inquiry: Air
Force One Discussions
Ambassador Galbraith Receives "No Instructions" and Responds to the Croatian
President
Events of April 29, 1994: The Question is Posed Again
Ambassador Galbraith Contacts the NSC for Final Guidance
The April 29. 1994 Tudjman Meeting
The Decision to Report Orally to Washington
Other Events of April 30, 1994
Events of Early May 1994: The Days Following the "No Instructions" Response
Section Two
Communications and Miscommunications at the CIA 155
Discoimects at the CIA Leading up to and Subsequent to the May 5, 1994 Meeting
Ambassador Galbraith's Request to theglHHIHVP
Central Intelligence Agency Concern about Covert Activity
The May 5, 1994 Meeting between DCI Woolsey and Secretary Christopher:
Clarification is Sought
May 5, 1994 in Zagreb
Deputy Secretary Talbott Contacts Ambassador Galbraith to Reiterate the "No
Instructions" Response
Ambassador Galbraith Memorializes the Croatian Inquiry
A Pattern of Disconnects at the CIA
Disconnect Between the DiMMarfof Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of
State
Disconnect Between the Director of Central Intelligence and His Subordinates
iii
229
Disconnect at the CIA and the Af\ermath of the May S Meeting
Disconnects Relating to the Law of Covert Action
Leaving thefPHMlBlipin the Dark
Summer 1994 at the CL\
Section Three
Department of Defense and the April 29 Response 184
Information Available to the Department of Defense
The Department of Defense Learns of the April Inquiries
After the No Instructions Response: The Department of Defense Changes Nothing
ThefChief of StatioillReports Department of Defense "Concern"
Rumors that the Umted States was Involved in Covert Action
Section Four
The May 1994 Convoy Incident. 194
Convoys to Bosnia.
The May 1994 Convoy and Embassy Zagreb.
Special Envoy Redman's Contacnvith the May Convoy.
Reporting by the
Section Five
Alleged Meetings between Ambassador Galbraith and the Muslim Cleric Omerbasic . . 206
Visits with the Imam
The^HHBBI^Tries to Identify the United States Officials, but Jumps to
Conclusions
A Case of Mistaken Identification
Section Six
Mystery Flights into Tuzia 216
The NATO Investigation
Attempts by United States and Other Officials to Investigate Flights
Section Seyen
The§fKt§MissUe Incident 223
Media Reports of the Missile Inspection and Informal Investigation by the Intelligence
Oversight Board
Intelligence During the Spring and Summer 1995
Initial Shipments of|m||pMissiles
The Third Shipment and United States Involvement
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and General Clark are Approached About the Missiles
Defense Minister Susak Requests Assistance from Ambassador Galbraith
The Initial Missile Inspection by the Defense^ttache
The Second Inspection at thelHHHUlS Request
The Croatians Arrange to Release the Missiles
iv
230
There is No Evidence to Suggest that Ambassador Galbraith Influenced the Release of
the Missiles
The Lack of Impact Made by thel
Section Eight
The Fall 1994 Initiative 245
Suspicions Within the CIA
HH^HBConcems
The CIA Ceadership's Response
The Directorate of Operation's Concerns
Section Nine
Intelligence Oversight Board 271
Purpose of the Intelligence Oversight Board
Intelligence Oversight Board Investigation
CHAPTER THREE - THE IRANIAN PRESENCE AND THE UNITED
STA TES POLICY TO MITIGA TE IRANIAN INFLUENCE
Section One
Iranian Involvement in Bosnia and Croatia 1991-1996 275
Origins of Iranian Military Involvement
Military Arms
Military Personnel Deployment
Humanitarian Aid
Diplomatic Activities
Intelligence Activities
Economic Support Activities
Iranian Influence Following the Dayton Agreement
Iranian Failure to Achieve its Objectives in Bosnia
Section Two
The Threat of Terrorism to Embassy Zagreb Personnel 294
Iranian Terrorist Presence in Bosnia
. Iranian Tenorist Presence in Croatia
1993 Terrorist Incident
1995 Terrorist Threat
Embassy Zagreb Response
Current Status of Iranian Terrorist Threat
231
Section Three
IFOR Deployment and Potential Risks to United States Troops and Personnel. 308
Mission of IFOR
Clinton Administration Support for United States Troops in IFOR
Congressional Action on Troop Deployment
Information to Congress on Troop Deployment
Dayton Agreement Provisions to Protect IFOR
CHAPTER FOUR - RESPONSE TO THE MAJORITY REPORT
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING FALSE TESTIMONY,
CLASSIFICA TIONAND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Section One
Response to the Majority Report 317
Referrals to the Department of Justice
The Rules of Classified Information
The Rules of Executive Privilege
APPENDICES
Appendix A : Key Names
Appendix B: Acronyms
Appendix C: Depositions and Interviews Conducted by the Select Subcommittee
Appendix D: Selected Congressional Action Relating to the United Nations Arms Embargo
Appendix E: National Intelligence Daily Articles
Appendix F: Selected List of Major Press Articles Regarding Leaks in the U.N. Aims Embargo
Appendix G: Foreign Broadcast Information Services Reporu of Increasing Ties between the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and Bosnia
VI
232
EXECVTIX E SUMMARY
On May 8, 1996. the United States House of Representatives voted to establish and fund
the Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Anns Transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia (the ""Select Subcommittee"). The Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate
and report on all aspects of United States government policy regarding shipments of arms and
other assistance from Iran to the countries of the former Yugoslavia from September 21, 1991
until June 1996. the period in which an international arms embargo was in effect for the region.
The scope of the investigation included the impact, if any, of such policy upon the safety and
presence of United States troops stationed in and around Bosnia, the relations between the United
States and its allies, and upon United States efforts to isolate Iran.
In addition, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on
communications and representations to the people and the Congress of the United States
regarding such policy, the international arms embargo and United States participation in the
international aims embargo. Finally, the Select Subconmiiitee was authorized to determine what
actions were taken to review any of these matters or. conversely, to cover up such matters. In
order to rqx>rt its findings, the Select Subcommittee was empowered to review all relevant
deliberatioiis, discussions, and/or conununications within die United States Govenunent as well
as all conununications between the United States Government and other governments,
organizations, or individuals.
The following Miitority Views to the report of the Select Subcomminee are based upon a
thorough review of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified materials made available by
the Departments of State and Defense (including the National Security Agency), the Central
233
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council as well as press reports, materials
prepared by Congressional Research Service, and other material in the public domain. In
addition, the staff of the Select Subcommittee interviewed and deposed approximately seventy
current or former employees of these agencies as w :!! as two foreign nationals. The Minority
wishes to thank the individuals who were deposed and interviewed as well as the many
employees of the United States Government agencies who spent countless hour: identifying and
making available relevant documents. In addition, the Minority w ishes to thank the investigators
detailed to the Select Subcommittee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their invaluable
assistance. ' : -
Select Subcommittee Organization and Structure.
Legislative History.
On May 2, 1996, the Committee on International Relations (the "Committee") reported
House Resolution 416 creating the Select Subcommittee of the Comminee on International
Relations to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Aims Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia.
The Committee also reported House Resolution 416 which, as amended, esublished a budget of
S99S,000 to be used cither until the Select Subcommittee ceased to exist or immediately before
noon on Januaiy 3, 1997, whichever first occurs.'
Legislative Mandate.
House Resolution 416 charged the Select Subcomminee with investigating the following:
•H. Res. 417. May 2, 1996.
234
( 1 ) The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms
and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of
the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "FRY") during any period that an international
arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect.
(2) The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran or any
other country to countries or entities within the territory of the FRY during the period that an
intemational arms embargo was in effect
(3) .\ny actions taken by the United States Government to facilitate or impede
transfers described in the preceding paragraphs.
(4) Any conununications or representations made to the Congress of the United States
or the American people with respect to the matters described in the preceding paragraphs w ith
respect to the intemational arms embargo of the FRY, or with respect to efforts to modify or
terminate United States participation in that embargo.
(5) Any implication of the maners described in the first three paragraphs for the
safety of United States Armed Forces deployed in and around Bosnia, for the prompt withdrawal
of United States Armed Forces from Bosnia, for relations between the United States and its
allies, and for United Sutes efforts to isolate Iran.
(6) Any actions taken to review, analyze, or investigate any of the matters described
in the preceding paragraphs, or to keep such matters from being revealed.
(7) All deliberations, discussions, or communications within the United States
Government relating to matters described in the preceding paragraphs, and all conununications
between the United States Government (or any of its officers or employees) and other
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governments, organizations, or individuals relating to such matters.*
House Resolution 416 contains a sunset provision providing for the conclusion of the
Select Subcommittee investigation and submission of its flnal report within six months of the
passage of the resolution, or November 8. 1996.
Treatment of Confidential and Oassified Infitrmation.
The Select Subcommittee investigation of United States policy and actions in the FRY
includes fact-finding vtith respect to policy deliberations, intelligence gathering (including
sources and methods), highly sensitive confidential communications between the United States
Government and the governments of other nations, and equally privileged communications
among United Sutes Government officials. The Minority believes the utmost care must be taken
to avoid disclosure of confidential communications between United States and foreign
government officials, policy deliberations within the United States government involving senior
officials in communication with the President, and the sources and methods of intelligeiKe
gathering. For this reason, the Minority has prepared this Executive Summary in a non-classified
format which will be supplemented by extended Minority Views in a classified fonnat The
Miitority also has rejected the view, espoused by some, dut disclosure of highly confidential or
classified information in the media and/or in Congressional hearings places such information in
the public domaiiL Advancing such a view provides leakers of sensitive and classified
informiition with the key to imlock such information at their own discretioru and robs the United
States Government of its legitimate interest in protecting such information. Notwithstanding the
-H. Res. 416, May 2, 1996. at 2-4.
236
need lo protect material which is desening of protection, the Minonty expects the Lnited Slates
Government to exercise the classified application only in cases where the laws and executive
orders clearly apply and to refrain from keeping material classified which is merely
embarrassing.
SUMMAR Y OF KE Y FINDINGS AND CONCLLSIO.\'S
The central issues of the Select Subcommittee investigation include whether the United
States Government ordered, organized or otherw ise encouraged Iran or any other country to ship
arms to Bosnia; whether the United States Go\ emment provided a foothold for Iranian
operations in Europe; whether the United States Government engaged in coven action without
meeting the legal requirement to inform Congress; and how United States policy regarding the
anns embargo affected United States relations with the NATO allies.
The consequences of United States policy are not in dispute. In 1994. Bosnia was
embroiled in a brutal war that threatened to spill over to other parts of Europe. United States
leadership helped bring an end to the fighting among the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs, to
the rape and torture, to the mass executions, and to the sniper attacks on civilians; it has helped
create the conditions to build a new Bosiuan state, and stopped the war from spreading. In early
1994, hundreds of Iranians were present in Bosnia and Croatia. Today, the Iranian fighters have
been forced out.
Based upon the Select Subconunittee investigation, the Minority finds that:
/. From the outset of the Clinton Administration, it was United Slates policy neither lo
oppose nor support third party arms transfers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy tvas
embodied In the "no instructions" response to the Croatian Government's question on the
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United Stales view on the transshipment of arms. It served several important United Slates
interests, and helped establish conditions on the ground that pointed the way to peace.
• During the entire period in which the United Nations amis embargo against the former
Yugoslavia was in effect (September 1991 tt June 1996). United States policy was to
refrain fix>m supplying arms to any party in the former Yugoslavia.
• Pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United States agreed i" 1992 to
participate with its allies in Operation Sharp Guard for the primary purpose of
interdicting contraband destined for Serbia.
• Beginning in Januar.- 'WT, following the inauguration of President Clinton, United - *
States policy was neither to oppose nor support the shipment of arms to the Government
of Bosnia-Herzegovina from other countries, including Iran.
• In November 1994, following enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. United States
ofTicials informed United States allies that the United States would participate in
Operation Sharp Guard for the sole purpose of interdicting contraband destined for
Serbia. In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell amendmenu the United States would take
no action to interdict arms destined for Bosnia or Croatia.
• The "no instuM-tions'' policy served important United Sutes interests: the outgunned
Bosnian Muslims received anns that helped them survive until such time as the
circumstances were ripe for a negotiated peace; the United States avoided a confrontation
with NATO; the peacekeeping force and humanitarian aid workers remained in Bosnia;
no United States ground troops were forced into a combat situation; and the conditions
were established that paved the way to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995.
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//. Throughout the period of the Vnited Sations arms embargo, Iran and other Islamic
countries supplied arms to the Bosnians.
• During the entire period of the United Nations arms embargo against the former
Yugoslav ii all parties to the conflict in Bosnia received arms shipments in violation of
the embargo.
• During the entire period of the United Nations arms embargo, the Bosnian Serb military
arsenal dwarfed that of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.
• Beginning in 1991. several Islamic countries, including Iran, began supplying arms to the
Bosnian Muslim forces
• The supph of arms to the Bosnian Muslims declined from summer 1993 to spring 1994
due to the war between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croat forces.
• The suppl\ of arms to the Bosnian Muslims increased in spring 1994 due to the
Federation .Agreement to end the war between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
forces, and the delivery of the "no instructions" response.
• The number of Iranians in Bosnia peaked before the spring of 1 994. remained constant
until the Dayton Peace Accords, and subsequently declined to the handful that is present
today.
///. The L'nited States took no action to aid arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia.
• At no time did any United States government official take any action to supply arms to
any countr\- or entity covered by the U.N. arms embargo.
• At no time did any United States government official undertake any covert action to
supply arms to any country or entity covered by the embargo, or to ericourage, aid or
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assist in the shipment or transfer of arms to any country in the former Yugoslavia.
• The proposal to expand the pipeline of arms destined for Bosnia through Croatia
originated with Bosnian and Croatian Government officials in the wake of signing the
Federation Agreement in March 1994.
• No United States Government official coordinated, cooperated, conspired with or
suggested to the Bosnian Muslims, the Govenunent of Croatia, or the Bosnian Croats that
the United States be asked to state its view of the transshipment of arms.
• United States Government officials directed Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith to
respond that he had "no instructions" when asked for the reaction of the United States
government to the transshipment of arms through Croatia to Bosnia by the government of
Croatia.
• Ambassador Galbraith carried out his directions correctly and promptly.
• The "no instructions" response achieved United States objectives and was consistent with
United States policy: the shipment of arms to Bosnia was not obstructed, the U.N.
Security Council Resolution was not violated, and serious conflict with the allies was
avoided.
IV. The United States Government did not engage in any covert action and was not
legatty required to inform Congress of its diplomatic exchanges with governments in the
region. However, Congress should have been better informed about the "no instructions"
exchange.
• Information about the shipment ofanns by Iran and other Islamic countries through
Croatia to Bosnia was made available to Members of Congress on dozens of occasions
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through press reports, intelligence reports, briefings, and in connection with stafTand
Congressional travel to Croatia.
• The Administration responded accurately to every question from Congress about the
shipment of arms to Bosnia from Iran and did not set out to mislead Members of
Congress.
• As a policy matter, however, the Administration chose not to inform Congress about the
delivery of the "no instructions" response.'
• The "no instructions" response to the question posed by the Government of Croatia was a
traditional diplomatic exchange.
• The Administration does not routinely disclose to Congress sensitive diplomatic
exchanges between ambassadors and foreign governments.
• The failure of the Administration to inform Congress formally about the exchange among
Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman and a senior official of the
Government of Croatia is not a violation of United States law.
• As a matter of policy, the Administration should have considered informing selected
Members of Congress about the delivery of the "no instructions" response.
V. The Impact of the Iranian arms shipments on the security of United States military
anil civiiian personnel was minimal
' The Select Subcommittee was told by one former Member of Congress that he was
informed about the "no instructions" response at a routine intelligence briefing. It appears that
the briefer was acting independently. The relevant intelligence agency has no record that such a
briefing occurred. Senior Administration policy makers were not aware of this particular
briefing or that information regarding the "no instructions" response had been shared with any
Member of Congress.
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• Any threat to United Sutes militar> and civilian personnel in the region arose from the
presence of Iranians and not the shipment of arms, and Iranians had been present in
Bosnia since 1991.
• The United States did not commit ground forces to Bosnia in any significant numbers
until afier the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995.
• The Da>ion Peace Agreement required the removal of alt foreign forces from Bosnia,
including organizations and individuals associated with Iran and other terrorist states, and
made the United States commitment to "equip and train" the Bosnians conditional upon
compliance with the "foreign force removal" requirement. ■ .
• The President has certified that Bosnia is in compliance with this requirement, and that
Iranian and other foreign forces are present in insignificant numbers only.
• The United States continues to pursue all other avenues to isolate Iran from the world
commimity.
• With respect to the safety of United Sutes military and civilian personnel in Croatia
during the period in which the arms embargo was in effect, the United States and
Embassy Zagreb maintained a high degree of awareness of terrorist threats through
regular Emergency Action Comminee (**EACr) meetings, demarches to the Government
of Croatia to expel terrorists and otherwise assure the safety of United States personnel,
and intense monitoring of possible teirorist activity.
VI. The impact of the Iratiian anms shipments oh United States-Allied Relations
• United States allies were aware that the United States bad been looking the other way
regarding arms shipments from third countries to Bosnia; therefore, the "no instructions**
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response was a continuation of policies that already were tolerated.
• The allies were particularly concerned that hea\7 weapons and artiller>' not be transferred
to Bosnia and the United States Government was confident that Croatia would not permit
heavy weapons to be transshipped.
• United States, NATO, and other allied forces are serving side by side in IFOR and
working together to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords.
Vll. The Executive Branch has acted properly in reviewing actions by United States officials
and in responding to inquiries froir Congress concerning the arms transfers.
• At the request of the White House Counsel, the Intelligence Oversight Board (the "lOB")
investigated concems raised by the Central Intelligence Agency about possible covert
action and reported to the President that no United States official had participated in
covert action.
■ The lOB cooperated with the Select Subcommittee, consistent with the pri\-ileged nature
of its investigation.
• The National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense (including the
National Sectirity Agency), and the Central Intelligence Agency cooperated with the
Select Subconuninee, consistent with the need to protect privileged informatioiL
• No attempt has been made by any oflicial of the United Sutes Government to conceal
any information that would be relevant to the investigation.
yill. Lapses in communication and coordination among United States government officials in
Zagreb and Washington led to confusion and erroneous impressions about United States
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policy among some United States government officials.
• The "no instructions'* response to a senior Croatian Government ofTicial was deliberated
and formulated by the senior policy makers of the Department of State and the National
Security Council over a seventy-two hour period during which direct communications
occurred among the President; the Secretary of State, the Deput> Secretary of State and
the Undersecretary of State; the National Security Adviser and the Deputy National
Security Adviser, and the United States Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia and the
United States Ambassador to Croatia on the ground in Zagreb.
• The "no instructions'* response as well as the report confirming its delivery was conveyed
orally in order to keep to an absolute minimum the number of people with knowledge of
the response.
• All govemment-to-govemment communications between the United States Government
and the Government of Croatia were carried out correctly.
• Miscommunication between an intelligettce conununity representative (an "ICR") in
Croatia ano^pmeadquarters led to inaccurate conclusions about the actions of the
United States policy makers and to unfounded suspicions
Incorrect legal advice provided bjMHneadquarters to an ICR in Croatia caused an ICR
to form inaccurate legal conclusions about the actions of United States policy makers
• Inadequate supervision and guidance of an ICR in Croatia b}^|fheadquaiters led to the
reporting of ^peculation and gossip in lieu of intelligence.
• The CIA was informed contemporaneously about United Sutes policy with regard to the
aims embargo and the "no instructions" response.
• Communications between die senior officials of the Department of State and the Central
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Intelligence Agency concerning the United States policy with regard to the arms embargo
lapsed in April/May 1994 and September/October W94.
• Senior officials in the Department of State and the National Security Council were not
aware that certain officials within the Central Intelligence Agency had an imperfect
understanding of United States policy with regard to the arms embargo.
• Discussions of options for providing arms to the Bosnian Muslims v u an appropriate
and responsible course of action by officials of the United States Government.
• The United States Government considered and rejected the option of asking third
countries to supply zvm^ to the Bosnian Muslims on the grounds that it would be
discovered by our NATO allies and could trigger a negative response including the
withdrawal of the United Nations Protections Force tthe "UNPROFOR"), and the
commitment of United States troops to a combat situation.
SUMMARY OF THE ISVESTIGA TlOy
The Situation on the Ground in the Spring of 1994.
Iranians and other nationals from Islamic countries have been present in Bosnia since at
least 1991, providing military and intelligence training as well as armed support During the
same period of dme, shipments of light aims also reached Bosnia from Iran and other Islamic
countries.
The humanitarian, political and military circumstances facing the Govenunent of Bosnia-
Herzego\'ina (hereinafter '•Bosnia" or the "Bosnian government") and its citizens in the spring of
1994 were dire, especially in the war against the Bosnian Serbs. The enclave of Gorazde was
under siege. The capital of Sarajevo was entirely surrounded by hostile Bosnian Serb forces that
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regularly subjected the residents to sniper attacks, cut such city scrv ices as electricity and other
utilities, and commandeered humanitarian relief shipments intended for the star\ing population.
For the preceding twelve months, the Bosnian .Muslims had been in a state of war with
the Bosnian Croats. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is accessible only by air or by overland routes
through Serbian or Croatian controlled territory, the war with the Bosnian Croats who were
supported by their Croat brothers in Zagreb made it difTicult for the Bosnian Muslims to obtain
either humanitarian assistance or military shipments.
On March 22, 1994, Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed the United Stales-brokered
Federation Agreement. The Frdesation Agreement had political, militai> and humanitarian -. -
significance. The Agreement established the peace between the Bosnian Muslims and the
Bosnian Croats that was the necessary first step toward a more comprehensive settlement; freed
the Muslim and Croat armed forces to direct their attention toward the Bosnian Serbs; and
substantially reduced the potential of further human rights violations by the Bosnian Croats and
Croatians against the Bosnian Muslims. Perhaps most important, the March 1994 Federation
Agreement provided the potential for changing the military and political situation in Bosnia by
creating a unified military front against the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs.
The International Political Situation in the Spring of 1994.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 of Sqrtember 1991 imposed a legal
obligation upon each member nation of the U.N. to respect the aims embargo against tbe
countries of the FRY. By contrast, subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions that addressed
enforcement of the arms embargo (Resolutions 740 and 787) "called upon" each member nation
to enforce the arms embargo against other nations, but did not impose a legal obligation to do so.
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The United States allies opposed a multilateral lifting of the amis embargo against the
Bosnian Muslims and. through political statements as well as through diplomatic and militar>'
channels, informed the United States that a unilateral lifting of the embargo by the United States
would cause the withdrawal of European ground forces participating in UNPROFOR.
The arms embargo was not seamless. Throughout the war. aims reached all three
combatants. The level of arms shipped to Serbia together with those already in the Serb .
inventory dwarfed the arms shipped to Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims, both of which had no
meaningful armed forces prior to the war. The level of arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims
from 1992 through spring 1994 was :olerat'ed by man\ of the participants in UNPROFOR and at
least some nations that subsequently became members of the Contact Group.
The United States Policy in the Spring of 1 994.
The United States Government policy toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
changed in January 1993 with the inauguration of the Clinton Administration. In contrast to the
previous Administration, the Clinton Administration supported the multilateral lifting of the arms
embargo against the Bosnian Muslims in combination with allied air strikes against the Bosnian
Serbs (the so-called "lift and strike" policy).
However, the United States Government also was committed to actions and policies that
reduced to a minimum the potential for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. A
withdrawal would have exposed the Bosnian Muslim military and civilian population to a greater
risk of death and destruction, created a huroaiutarian and military vacuum which United States
troops might have been forced to fill, and precipitated a commitment of United States troops to
Bosnia to help extract the troops of the NATO allies serving with UNPROFOR. To this end, the
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United States Government participated in Operation Sharp Guard and abided by the arms
embargo. In contrast to the previous Administration, the United States neither objected to nor
endorsed arms shipments to Bosnia.
The United States Congress began an extended debate that intensified in the spring of
1994 on ways to help the Bosnian Muslims survive. Members of Congress knew the likelihood
of a multilateral lifting of the embargo was slim. Therefore, the central issue in the debate was
whether the United States should lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims unilaterally.
The Events of March and April 1974,
The Federation Agreement led the Bosnian Muslims to hope that given the new peace
with die Bosnian Croats, they could convince the Croatians to permit the transshipment of
greater quantities of desperately needed arms through Croatia to Bosnia. The Administration and
the United States Government were committed to providing military assistance to the Bosnian
Muslims in die event diat the arms embargo was lifted multilaterally. Many Meml>ers of
Congress thought the need to save die Bosnian Muslims was so critical that it outweighed any
tensions widi the allies.
In mid-April 1994, various senior officials of the Government of Croatia indicated to
United States Govenunent officials at Embassy Zagreb that the United States would be asked
about the United States Government position on die transshipment of arms across Croatian-held
tenitoiy to the Bosnian Muslims. The question was prompted by the efforts of the Bosnian
Muslims to take advantage of tbe Federation Agreement which the Bosnian Muslims expected
would make die Government of Croatia and the Bosnian Croats taan willing to let aims reach
tbe Bosnian Muslims.
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The April 28 and 29 Meetings.
The question posed by the Government of Croatia to Ambassador Galbraith was what the
reaction of the L'nited States Government would be if the Croatian government allowed arms to
be transshipped to Bosnia. The response was formulated by the senior policy makers of the State
Department and the National Security Council over a seventy-t^^•o hour perod during which
direct communications occurred among the President, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and
National Security Ad\ isor Lake who were en route to California aboard Air Force One to attend
the ftmeral of former President Nixon; Secretary of State Christopher w ho was in Egypt fc
meetings with President Mubarak; Undersecretary of State Tamoff who was serving as Acting
Secretary in the absence of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary; and Deputy National Security
Adviser Berger who was in Washington.
The options for responding included telling the Government of Croatia that the United
States would not object to shipments by third countries, that the United States disapproved of the
transshipment of arms through Croatia and would enforce the United Nations arms embargo
against third countries strenuously, or telling the Government of Croatia that the United States
Ambassador to Croatia had "no instructions." The fir^t alternative would risk unduly United
States relations with its allies. NATO members with troops serving with UNPROFOR
adamantly opposed a lifting of the embargo as well as any United States role in ensuring that
arms reached Bosnia. Any hint of United S*'>tes approval of arms shipments might threaten an
UNPROFOR withdrawal.
The second alternative meant that the United States was taking an active step to deny
weapons to the beleaguered Bosnians. It also would undermine and perh^s destroy the
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Federation Agreement. In selecting the third altemati\ e. the policy makers were informed fully
of the likelihood that the "no instructions" response would be treated by the Goxemment of
Croatia as a signal that the United States did not object to the arms transshipment, and that Iran
was likely to be one of the primary arms suppliers. The policy makers also believed that the "no
instructions" response to the Government of Croatia was a traditional diplomatic exchange with
respect to which no Presidential fmding was required.
The "no instructions" response represented a continuation of United Slates policy in
effect since early 1993 to refrain from objecting to arms transshipments to Bosnia. For example,
m April 1993, the Croatian D^fetKe Minister asked United States Special Envoy to the Form:;--
Yugoslavia Reginald Bartholomew for the United States reaction to transshipments of arms (the
identical question asked of United States Ambassador Galbraith one year later). Special Envoy
Bartholomew responded that it was a decision for Croatians to make, and the United States had
no position on the transshipment of arms.
The Actions of the United States Ambassador to Croatia with respect to Senior
Government of Croatia Officials.
Ambassador Galbraith correctly carried out the direction he received from senior State
Department and Naticnal Security Council staff with respect to die question posed by the senior
official of the Goveniment of Croatia. Prior to delivering tiie message. Ambassador Galbraith
thoroughly and accurately briefed senior State Department and National Security Council
officials on the benefits and risks of the various options available for responding to the question
posed by the senior official of the Government of Croatia.
Ambassador Galbraith acted appropriately in offering his recommendation of the correct
response, but did not let his personal view undermine a fair and objective rendering of the
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benefits and risks of the various options available for responding to the question posed by the
senior ofTicial of the Government of Croatia. At no time, either before communicating the
question to senior State Department and National Security Council officials, or after transmitting
the response to the senior official of the Government of Croatia did the Ambassador either
exceed his directions or act inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under the
U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
The Summer of 1994.
' Begiruiing in May 1994 and continuing throughout the summer of 1994, the shipment of
arms from primarily Islamic countries across Croatian-held territory to the Bositian Muslims
increased. Media reports and United States intelligence reporting revealed the extent and nature
of the arms shipments as well as the sources of the arms. The shipments consisted solely of light
arms and at no time included heavy weapons or artiller\°.
The allies were aware of the arms shipments, but issued no demarches or other formal
protests to the Croatian government, the United States government, or the governments
supplying weapons to Bosrua. The acquiescence of the allies was due in part to the fact that the
shipments of light weapons did not constitute a serious threat to the allied troops serving in
UNPROFOR. The British indicated that shipments of heavy weapons would cause serious
concern because they posed a risk to British troops. United States policy makers were aware that
Croatia effectively controlled the type, quantity and quality of the we!q>ons that would be
allowed to reach Bosnia, and that Croatia was unlikely to allow the transshipment of heavy
weapons that could be used against Croatian forces.
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The Fall of 1994.
In September 1994, senior ofTicials of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina
approached senior officials of the United States government with a proposal to impose a six
month moratorium on efforts to lift the embargo against Bosnia. The Bosnians proposed, in
return, that the United States Government provide or arrange to provide military assistance
during the six month period. The Bosnians also sought a commitment from the United States to
lift the embargo at the end of the six month period if the political and military situation in Bosnia
was not stabilized. The United States Govenunent flatly rejected providing arms directly and,
after considering the second aitemative, decided-the United States would not encourage others to
provide arms to the Bosnian Muslims. This position was not altered in subsequent months.
United States Government officials did undertake a military, political and intelligence
analysis involving the Departments of Defense and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Security Council to evaluate whether third countries should be encouraged on a
secret and confidential basis to transship arms through Croatian-held territory to the Bosnian
Muslims. The study involved consulution at a senior level with officials of selected third
countries.
The participants in the study concluded that the United States should not encourage third
countries to supply aims to the Bosnians. Such an effort could not be kq>t secret for any
significant length of time because the transshipment of aims through Cioatian-held territory
would have been discovered by UNPROFOR troops and allied intelligence. The allies would
consider United States encouragement of third countries to transship aims through Croatian-held
territory an afHrmative action by the United States Government to break the spirit and letter of
the aims embargo. Even more important, a United States effort to encourage transshipment
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would be considered by the allies to pose an unacceptable threat to the safety of allied forces on
the ground.
Communications benveen Ambassador Galbraith and an Intelligence Community
Representative Prior to April 28, 1994.
In early December 1993, an Intelligence Community Representative (an "ICR") in
Croatia informedW^eadquarters that Ambassador Galbraith asked about a covert action. The
ICR speculated that the inquiry was motivated by the Ambassador's personal support for the
Muslims, and predicted thai the Ambassador would propose a covert action program to
Washington policy makers. The ICR told the Ambassador that no covert action was undervvay^J*^
In mid- April 1994, an ICR in Croatia informedi||HHjthat approximately five weeks
earlier (i.e., mid-March), Ambassador Galbraith raised the possibility of the United States
informing the Goverrunent of Croatia that the United States \\ ould look the other way \^ith
respect to arms transshipments across Croatian-held territory and the further possibility of Iran
serving as the arms supplier and Turkey as the "go-between." The ICR also infonncijl^ff
headquarters that Ambassador Galbraith said he would raise the possibility with senior policy
makers in Washington.
An ICR in Croatia responded to Ambassador Galbraith that such acti\ity would \iolate
United States law, provide Iran with a firmer foothold in the region, not be sustaitiable nor
deniable, become apparent, be treated as a hostile act by Serbia, eiKourage Croatian military
aspirations, and put United Sutes intelligence assets at risk. The ICR also characterized such
activity as a covert action. In mid- April 1994, an ICR inforniedJlM/neadquarters that,
according to the Deputy Chief of Mission (the "TXTM^^, Special Envoy Charles Redman was
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considering the idea of a coven action along the lines of actions undertaken in Afghanistan?^^^
The accuracy of the reporting on the mid-March conversation by an ICR in Croatia is in
doubt due to the non-contemporaneous nature of the reporting, the fact that Ambassador
Galbraith denies the conversation took place, and the fact that no senior policy maker in
Washington ever was approached by the .\mbassador. The accuracy of the information alluded
to by an ICR with respect (o Special Envoy Redman is in doubt due to the fact that the United
States Special Envoy denies ever entertaining such thoughts (let alone expressing them), and the
DCM denies ever making such remarks to the ICR.
The Lines of Communication behveen an ICR andi
To a significant extent, the strain in the working relationship benveen Ambassador
Galbraith and an ICR in Croatia was the result of inadequate conununication between an ICR
and thepUl The ICR executed the directions received from thejJHduring the period bet%veen
mid-March and mid-November 1994, but the directions often were incorrect or uninformed
In April 1994, an ICR in Croatia was informed byjMpersonnel responsible for Croatia
that the proposed action regarding the transshipment of arms described by Ambassador Galbraith
in mid-March would, if implemented, constitute a covert action for which a Presidential finding
is required. The legal advice given to an ICR was not correct and was rendered without
consulting an attorney. Throughout May 1994. an ICR sought- at times in near deq>eTation--
guidance from headquarters about the United States policy toward enforcing the arms embargo.
The desperation felt by an ICR was due to concern about risking intelligence assets in the
collection of in^rmation about arms shipments if enforcement of the embargo was not a United
States priority,
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As a result of receiving incorrect legal advice, an ICR in Croatia remained deeply
concerned from early May until mid-November that the United States Government was engaged
in illegal covert activity. The concerns of the ICR caused wholly unfounded suspicions to form
about the conduct of Ambassador Galbraith as vsell as the conduct of other tenior United States
Goverrunent officials involved in policy making in the region.
In April 1994. an ICR in Croatia was informed byipWheadquarters that a request made
by Ambassador Galbraith to use intelligence charuiels to communicate policy represented a
serious and substantial misuse of intelligence chaiuiels. The ICR was never informed that the
Director of Central Intelligence. James Woolsey (the "DCI"). did not consider the request to be
inappropriate. The failure to inform the ICR that the request was not inappropriate caused the
official to harbor unfounded suspicions about the request. An individual at/^Hheadquarters
who read the ICR's report and characterized the idea raised by the .Vi}bassador in mid-March as
a covert action also caused the ICR to form unfounded suspicions about the conduct of
Ambassador Galbraith and other senior policy makers^ll^^^
Although an ICR was admonished for editorializing in the reporting, the conduct
continued throughout the sununer and fall of 1994. More efTcctive guidance should have been
provided by thc/p|y Reporting inaccuracies could have been corrected earlier and more
effectively if th^HMhad provided an ICR with accurate legal advice and timely information
about United States enforcement of the arms embargo. As a result of inadequate guidance, an
ICR in Croatia was not informed until November 15, 1994, that the **no instructions'* policy
which the Ambassador asked be communicated through intelligence channels was an accurate
statement of United States policy. An ICR in Croatia also should have been informed about the
limited nature of the DCI's concem about the request made of the intelligence official by the
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Ambassador
The Role of the Deputy Chief of Mission.
A key source of reporting by an ICR in Croatia consisted of remarks made by (he DCM.
In many cases, the remarks were not based on actual knowledge of events, but upon rumor.
gossip and speculation. Although the ICR may have been somewhat overzealous in reporting
these remarks, the willingness of the DCM to engage in this type of conduct over an extended
period of time was a significant contributing factor to the tension at Embassy Zagreb. The
degree and extent of the speculation that the DCM shared with the ICR also caused the ICR to
form unfounded suspicions about the conduct of Ambassador Galbraith and the conduct of other
policy makers. -r*
The Communications between the Ambassador and an ICR in Croatia
Ambassador Galbraith was either unaware of or insensitive to the deep concerns of an
ICR in Croatia. Although the lack of awareness or sensitivity is at least partly attributable to the
unfounded nature of the concerns, closer communication between the v*:o officials could have
lessened the concerns of the intelligence official and avoided some of the coniiision between
senior Washington ofScials of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Communications in Mt^ 1994 between the Senior Officials of the Department
cf State, the National Security Council and the Central InuUigence Agency.
Communications between the senior officials of the Department of State and the Central
IntelligetKe Agency over the United States Government policy and conduct in the Balkans
lapsed in April/May 1994 and in September/October 1994. On May S, at the weekly meeting of
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256
Secretary of Stale Christopher and DCI Woolsey (also attended on this occasion by Deputy
Secretary Talbott), the DCI described a request Ambassador Galbraith had made of an ICR in
Croatia. The DCI said Ambassador Galbraith had asked an ICR to teiyH^BWBI^^
^^^IHHHH^Khat the United States would, in effect, look the other way with regard to
the transshipment of arms through Croatian-held territory to Bosnia.
DCI Woolsey's description of the Ambassador's request set off a chain of
miscommunication and misunderstanding. Deputy Secretary Talbott knew that Ambassador
Galbraith had been instructed to tell the Croatians that he had "no instructions." When he heard
the words "look the other way." he-was therefore surprised. In fact. Ambassador Galbrai'** did .
not tell the Croatians that the United States Government would look the other way.
The DCFs characterization of the message Ambassador Galbraith had transmitted
incorrectly left Deput>- Secretary Talbott with the impression that the Ambassador had expressed
United States support for the transshipment of arms to the Croatian government. The use of the
words "look the other way" by the DCI led Deputy Secretary Talbott to express concern because
it was not consistent with the direction given to Ambassador Galbraith. The "no instructions"
language was formulated to avoid putting the United States government in the position of either
supporting or opposing the transshipment of arms. The "no instructions" response is veiy
dilTerent &x>m the language that the DCI attributed to the Ambassador, Le, saying that die United
States would, in cfTect, look the other way. In fact. Ambassador Galbraith had made his request
of an ICR in Croatia so that an earlier and incorrect description of United States policy conveyed
to a Croatiar^U^B^Hoflicial could be corrected^
Both the DCI and the ICR were concerned that policy not be communicated through
I Unlike an ICR in Croatia, however, DCI Woolsey did not question or
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express concern about substance of the request. In fact, the policy on the amis embargo was not
even discussed by the DCI and the Deputy Secretar>-. The decision of an ICR to refuse to use
^channels to convey the Ambassador's message was appropriate. The level of the
intelligence official's suspicions and concern about the Ambassador's motives was not.
Subsequent conversations among the senior Department of State officials. Ambassador
Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman confirmed that the Ambassador had deliv>>red the proper
response to the Government of Croatia. Because the DCI never expressed interest or concern
about the Ambassador's conversation with senior Croatian government officials. Deputy
Secretary Talbott never got b^k to the DCI to inform him that Ambassador Galbraith and : .
Special Envoy Redman actually had transmitted a "no instructions" response to the Government
of Croatia.
For its partJpMneglected to inform an ICR in Croatia that Ambassador Galbraith had
been instructed to tell the Croatian government that he had "no instructions" regarding the
transshipment of arms across Croatian-held territory to Bosnia. The failure ouflplto inform the
ICR of the "no instructions" response caused the ICR to continue to assume through mid-
November 1994 that United Sutes policy was to enforce the embargo against third country
transshipments of aims through Croatian-held territory to Bosnia and that Ambassador Galbraith
and other United States govenunent ofRciak were taking actions contrary to that policy^
ConsultadoHS lit FaO 1994 among the Senior Officials of the Department of Slate,
the Sational Security Council and the Central InteUigenee Agency.
In Sqjtember and October 1994, \-anous intelligence sources incorrectly rqwited that
senior ofiicials of the United States govenunent were engaged in active negotiations with third
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258
countries to pro\ idf amis to the Bosnians. In reality. United States Govemmenl officials were
trying to determine whether the United Sutes should encourage third countries on a secret and
confidential basis to transship arms through Croatian-held territory to the Bosnian Muslims.
Senior officials of the Government of Bosnia-Herzego\ ina approached United States
Government officials with a proposal that the United States Go\ emment encourage the shipment
ofthird country arms to the Bosnian military. The United States considered, but did not agree to,
the proposal. A great deal of discussion occurred about whether third countries should be
encouraged to transship arms. Various United States agencies were tasked with studying
scenarios, and con\ ersations were h;ld bet*eert senior United States and foreign officials.
Intelligence reports began to cany accounts of these discussions, causing the CIA to become
concerned urmecessarily that United States was actually planning and committing United States
resources to an effon to ship arms to Bosnia.
The CIA expressed concern about the intelligence reporting to National Security Adviser
Lake who brought the concerns to the attention of White House Counsel Abner J. Mikva. White
House Counsel Mik\-a recommended to the President that an Intelligence Oversight Board
investigation be convened to consider whether ( 1 ) Ambassador Galbraith or United States
Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia Redman was directly invoh-cd in assisting a particular
arms shipment reach Bosnia; (2) the Ambassador or the Special Envoy followed the Department
of State directions with respect to the response provided the Government of Croatia on >^ril 29,
1994; and (3) the Ambassador and/or Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard
Holbrooke made an offer to supply arms to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the
summer or early fall 1994.
The Intelligence Oversight Board determined that Ambassador Galbraith and Special
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259
Envoy Redman did not knowingly assist in the shipment of any amis to Bosnia and that they
followed faithfully the Department of State directions in responding to the Government of
Croatia on April 29. 1994. The Intelligence Oversight Board also determined that the
Ambassador and Assistant Secretar>- Holbrooke did not make an offer to supply the Bosnians
with arms.
Congressional Action.
Throughout 1994. the Congress conducted an extended debate on United States policy
towards the Balkans in which the primary topic was whether the United States should lift the
arms embargo against Bosnia unilaterally in the event that the allies refused to lift the embargo
multilaterally. No Member of Congress e\ er called upon the United States to step-up
enforcement of the embargo against third countries generally or against Iran in particular,
presumably because the United Sutes was under no obligation to enforce the embargo and a
majority of the Congress supported the objective of providing arms to the Bosnian Muslims. The
Congress and the Administration recognized that the Bosnians needed a larger and more secure
supply of arms, shared a strong desire to help the Bosnians, and considered the Bosruan Serbs
and the Serb government to bear the overwhelming responsibility for the onset of the conflict
The Administration supported a multilateral lifting of the embargo against Bosnia by the United
Sutes and its allies, but opposed a unilateral lift by the United States. The allies opposed both a
multiUteral and a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia on the grounds that the .
Serbs (and perhaps the Croats) would perceive the action to be pro-Bosnian and launch
preemptive attacks against Bosnian positions; the war would be widened and extended; the
potential for peace set back; and the safety of allied troops jeopardized by the intensified
xxviii
260
hostilities.
The Administration supported a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia
because of the extraordinarily unfair military impact of the embargo on Bosnia and the atrocities
committed by the Bosnian Serbs. The Administration opposed a unilateral lifting of the amis
embargo against Bosnia because it believed the allies would consider the move to be extremely
hostile and would remove their troops from Bosnia; the United States wou'd be forced to help
with the removal which would jeopardize American troops and aircraft; the Bosnian Muslims
would be forced to endure a period of great risk and exposure to the Serb forces; and the war
would become "Americanized " -
The Administration also opposed sending troops to the region except to enforce a peace
agreement to which all the parties had agreed or to li%e up to a commitment made by the Bush
Administration to help extract the troops of the NATO allies in the event of an UNPROFOR
withdrawal. The Administration recognized, however, that the \ acuum created by the departure
of the UNPROFOR troops would have created an opportunity for a larger and more sinister
Iranian presence than subsequently occurred. The allies tolerated the clandestine arms shipments
to Bosnia that had been occurring since 1991, but were very concerned that Congress was
prepared to ignore their opposition and authorize a unilateral lift of the arms embcrgo against
Bosnia (as, in Cact, each House of Congress did agree to do at different times during the sununer
of 1994).
The Administration sought to negotiate an agreement with the Congress to formulate and
implement a policy that mininuzed the potential for a conflict with the allies while maximizing
the shipment of arms to Bosnia. The Congress certainly knew that arms were reaching the
Bosnians: national and interoational news media and the daily intelligence reports identified Iran
xxix
261
as a major supplier of anns to Bosnia during the spring and summer \99i. Yet at no time during
this period of intense debate on the United States role in the Bosnian conflict did any Member of
Congress urge the Administration to stop Iranian arms from reaching Bosnia.
Specific Shipments of Arms,
Throughout 1994, United States Government officials assisted in fteeine detained
humanitarian aid convoys bound for Bosnia even though the officials had no independent means
of checking the content of the shipments. The efforts of the United States Government officials
'Were, in all cases, predicated on ihe assumption that such conxoys contained desperately needfi
humanitarian cargo. Intelligence reporting alleged that Ambassador Galbraith and'or Special
Envoy Redman assisted in freeing a detained convoy bound for Bosnia which contained arms
shipments in addition to or instead of humanitarian cargo. The suspected convoy was identified
as traveling under the auspices of the Bosnian Ambassador to Croatia, although witnesses have
testified that the Bosnian Ambassador was involved in more than one convoy which makes it
difficult to distinguish which convoy is under discussion.
No evidence or testimony connects Ambassador Galbraith to the suspected convoy. The
only evidence or tes'imony that connects Special Envoy Redman to the suspected convoy is a
phone call he received from a Bosnian official. There is no evidence that the Special Envoy
knev^- or had reason to know that the convoy carried anns. Moreover, no evidence exists that the
convoy actually carried anns.
Intelligence also reported that Ambassador Galbraith had met with an Islamic cleric and
suspected arms merchant. No evidence exists to confirm the presence of the Ambassador and the
cleric at any meeting at which arms purchases for or transfers to Bosnia were discussed. The
XXX
262
Ambassador, the cleric and other Embassy Zagreb officials present at the meetings deny that an\
such conversation took place any\\ here at any lime.
Fn February 1995. United Nations personnel reported the detection of aircraft at the
restricted airport of Tuzla. Some United Nations personnel who allegedly heard or obser\ed the
aircraft suggested they could have been United States planes. No evidence confirms these
reports. In 1995, a senior official of the Government of Croatia asked the United States to
investigate whether the cargo of an aircraft forced to land in Croatian territory contained missiles
with chemical warheads. United States personnel examined the warheads and determined that
they were not chemical. No evider.ce exists to' suggest that the involvement of the United States
extended beyond making the examination.
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Chapter One
Section One
SETTING THE STAGE: THE BALKAN WAR
On December 14, 1995, the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia formally
ended almost four years of fighting with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, an accord
spearheaded by United Sutes negotiators. Until that moment, peace had seemed an unlikely
prospect for the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croatians who had been engaged in nearly four
years of brutal war characterized by mass murders, rapes, slave labor and the forced expulsion of
minorities in the name of "ethnic cleansing." The warring parties were criticized by the
international conununity for their brutality, lack of respect for United Nations "safe havens" and
for routinely blocking the passage of humanitarian relief convoys. Some reports calculate the
human cost of the Bosnian war at 250,000 killed; 200,000 wounded; and more than 1 .3 million
displaced refugees.'
1991'J992: War Erupts and the IntemadoHol Reaction.
In June 1991, smunering edmic tensions within the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia came to a peak after tiie legislatures of Slovenia and Croatia voted overwhelmingly
to declare ttieir indq>endeoce. As an immediate response to their secessions, die Yugoslav
govenunent issued a statement claiming such declarations to be "illegal** and "iUegitimate" and
' Lany Q. Nowels, Bosnia Recoin:tnicrion: International Tnitiatives and the IIS Role. CRS
Rqwrt 96-96 F. July 12, 1996, at 1.
1
264
ordered its military to secure their borders/ Two days later, the national Yugoslav People's
Army ("JNA"), whose Commander and a majority of whose soldiers were Serbian, responded
with force and invaded Slovenia to prevent its separation, but the JNA was met with strong
resistance. In Croatia, fighting erupted between Croatian security forces and minority Serb
irregulars, who had the backing of the JNA. The Croatian forces quickly lost an estimated one-
third of the country to the Serb insurgents.' Each of the warring factions, the Serbs, Bosnian
Serbs and later the Bosnian Croats, declared regions of territory as "ethnically pure,
autonomous" areas under their contr-^l, and fiercely fought to protect and expand their holdings.
In response to the civil unrest in Yugoslavia, the European Community ("EC) convened
an emergency meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE").
The CSCE urged the warring factions to accept a cease-fire and sent observers to Yugoslavia to
monitor their compliance and troop movement.* However, throughout the summer of 1991,
while cease-fires were negotiated, signed, and violated, the JNA continued to launch military
offensives in Croatia.
In its third meeting on this subject, the CSCE passed a resolution calling for the
imposition of an aims embargo against all parties to the conflict' On September 25, 1991, the
* Julie Kim. Yugoslavia: rhmnnlngy of Fvente. June IS. 1991- August IS. lOQ-?. OtS
Rqwri 92-689. at 1 (hereinaaer "CRS Chronology 1991-1992").
' Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, Bosnia - Formta- Yugftslavia and IIS Policy. CRS Issue
Brief IB91089. July 8. 1996, at 3 (hercinafler "Woehrel").
* CRS Chronology 1991-1992, at 4. The meeting of the CSCE occurred on July 4, 1991
in Prague. Id.
' The third meeting was on Sept 4, 1991, and occurred in Prague. Id.
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265
Bush Administration, on behalf of the United States, supported the passage of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 713 ("UNSC Res. 713"). The resolution imposed a complete
embargo on all weapons and equipment deliveries to the fomier Yugoslavia - including Bosnia,
Croatia and Serbia.' Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
724, to establish a Sanctions Committee that would monitor compliance with the embargo.'
Resolution 713, in concert with United National Security Council Resolutions 740 and 787
which addressed the implementation of the embargo, called on all nations to abide by the
embargo, but did not legally requue countries to enforce the embargo.'
The United Nations arms embargo was intended to contain the war and prevent the entry
of additional countries into the conflict. One of the consequences of the embargo, however, was
to preserve Serbian militaiy superiority over the other republics due to the Serbs' alliance with
the JNA and the extensive supply of equipment and munitions within the JNA arsenal.*
Throughout 1991, the JNA continued to attack various Croatian cities. In Zagreb,
* United Nations Security Cotmcil Resolution 713, adopted on September 25, 1 991 ,
Article 6 (noting that "all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stabiUty in
Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
yfcapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise'^.
^ United Nations Security Council Resolution 724, adopted on December IS, 1991. See
Article S(b) establishing the Sanctions Committee.
* See Chapter One, Section Five for a discussion of these United Nations Security
Council Resolutions and the aims embargo. United Nations Security Council Resolution 740
was passed on Fd). 7. 1992, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 787 was passed on
Nov. 16, 1992.
* Laura Silber, Allan Little. Yugo55lavia, Death of a Nation 198 (1995) (hereinafter
"Silber^.
266
govenunental buildings, including President Tudjman's ofTices, were shelled. In the coastal
town of Dubrovnik, the JNA cut off the power and water supplies, and severed telephone links
for weeks at a time.'* In November, the Serbian forces finally left Vukovar, a city of 45,000, in
ruins after months of fighting." The first United Nations-sponsored cease-fire went into effect
on November 23, 1991. but quickly collapsed, as intense fighting continued elsewhere in
Croatia."
In January, 1992 the first European Community casualties were reported. Five military
observers sent by the CSCE w ere shot down in their marked helicopter." From this moment, it
was evident that a larger international presence was needed to maintain peace in the region.
Shortly thereafter, the United Nations sent a team to Croatia to lay the groundwork for the
deployment of international peacekeeping troops. With United States support, the passage of
United Nations Resolution 743 authorized the establishment of the 14,000-strong United Nations
Protection Force ("UNPROFOR") for an initial service of twelve months. '* The troops were
composed of platoons from many nations including Great Britain, France, Canada, Egypt,
Malaysia and the Russian Federation and were dispatched throughout the region in areas of
'• Id at 14.
•• Id. at 17.
" Id. at 18.
" Id. at 20.
'* Id. at 24; see also. United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, passed feb. 21,
1992 at Article 2 (which establishes and outlines the responsibilities of the United Nations
Protection Force).
267
heavy fighting and relative calm."
1992-1993: Bosnia Enters the War.
In early 1992, the battle lines expanded into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
April, Serb militiamen and the Yugoslav Anny launched attacks against Bosnian Goverrunent
forces afler Bosnia became the third country to declare its independence from Yugoslavia. The
most ethnically diverse of the former Yugoslav states, Bosnia had been a melting pot of Serbs,
Croats and Muslims. Although the Bosnian Government's predominantly Muslim army was
larger than the Bosnian Serb Army ("BSA*'), the alliance between the Bosnian Serbs and the
JNA tipped the balance of firepower heavily in favor of the BSA, which quickly seized more
than two-thirds of the territory and surrounded the capital city of Sarajevo." In fact, after the
Bosnian Serb Army invaded Sarajevo on May 2, 1992, the front-lines in the Sarajevo suburbs
estabUshed by the BSA partitioned the city and held on for thcrest of the war." The tremendous
disparity in weapons is described in a New Vnric Time.<s article that noted:
[T]he Serbian forces in Bosnia have 300 tanks and the Bosnian Muslims just 2. The
Serbian forces have 200 armored persoruiel carriers and the Muslims 1 or 2. The Serbian
forces have 600 to 800 artillery pieces to two dozen in the hands of the Muslims.'*
'* Julie Kim, IINPROFOR Deployment as of mid-March 1994, CRS, Sept 24, 19%.
'•Woehrel at 6.
■^Silberat233.
"Michael Gordon, inm Raid to Send Arms tn Rnsnians, New York Times, S^t. 10, 1992,
at AlO (hereinafter "Gordon") (citing United States intelligence reports).
268
As these numbers would suggest, Serb forces easily outgunned the Bosnian Muslims, quickly
acquired vast expanses of territory and inflicted high numbers of civilian casualties.
Unlike the other warring factions whose patrons in Croatia and Serbia provided them
with military and financial support, the Bosnian Muslims were forced to look beyond their
immediate borders to acquire arms and other support Despite the international arms embargo,
the Bosnian Government forces acquired some small arms by various means including
purchasing arms on the international grey market, receiving smuggled weapons from private
humanitarian aid organizations, producing some small arms, and receiving clandestine shipments
of weapons via an arms pipeline through Croatia." Other countries came to the aid of the
Muslims: Turkey and Pakistan smuggled small arms to the Bosnian Muslims; the Sultan of
Brunei paid for a shipment of antitank missiles from Malaysia; and Saudi Arabia donated funds
to the Bosnian Government to purchase arms from Hungary and Argentina." The materials
acquired by the Bosnian Muslims in the early years of the war, however, did little to sustain the
troops or mount a strong opposition against the Serb forces. Bosnian President Izetbegovic
called upon the United Nations on several occasions to lift the arms embargo and allow his forces
'* James Risen and Doyle McManus, l is ha<t Options to let Bosnia Get Arms. Avoid Iran,
Los Angeles Times, July IS, 1996, at Al (which notes that Iran sent modest shipments of arms to
Bosiia beginning in 1991Xhereinafler 'TIS Had Options"); sec also. John Pomfret, Ho»
Rosnia's Muslims Dodferf Arms Rmhargo; Relief Agency Brokered Aid from Nations. Radical
Groups, The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al (illustrating how Bosnia's government
purchased hundreds of millions of dollars worth of black-market we^;>ons and smuggled
shipments into Bosnia via humanitarian aid cargo transport); United States Department of State
Fact Sheet: Basic rhmnology of the Bosnia Arms F.mhargo-lran Connection (hereinafter
"D.O.S. Chronology").
^ US Had Options at A6.
269
access to heavy weapons to defend themselves, but his efForts were unsuccessful.
The violence escalated during the spring of 1992. Although cease-fires had been
negotiated and signed, none had held successfully.'' Beginning in 1992, successive diplomatic
initiatives sponsored by the United Nations and the European Union were rejected. Numerous
cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina including Mostar, Gorazde and Sarajevo came under heavy attack
from the Bosnian Serb forces, killing many, trapping United Nations peacekeepers, and making
the delivery of humanitarian aid nearly impossible.'' In May, under international pressure and
the threat of Western sanctions, the Yugoslav Army announced its withdrawal from the conPic%
but allowed its soldiers who were bom in Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain and fight with their
weapons and equipment, thus further solidifying the superiority and military strength of the
Bosnian Serbs. In June, Serbian militia forces fiercely attacked Sarajevo, deploying rockets,
mortars, and artillery." In July, an international airlift to provide food, medicine and relief
supplies to the starving citizens in Sarajevo began.'*
E>espite the reported offenses by all factions, in April of 1992 the European Community
and the United States fbimally recognized the countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and
*' CRS Chronology 1991-1992. Several cease-fire agreements had been negotiated in
1992. By June 1, 1992. at least eight had been signed: January 3, 1992, ^ril 5. 1992. April 12.
1992, April 15, 1992, April 23. 1992. May 6, 1992, May 15, 1992, and June 1, 1992. Id.
"^ Id. at 29.
** Id. at 33.
'* Id. at 36. Before the airiifl ended, some tfaree-and-one-half years later in January 19%.
approximately 13,000 flints carrying an estimated 18,000 tons of medicine and 160.000 tons of
food had landed, making the Sarajevo airiifl the largest in history.
270
Slovenia, and lifted the economic sanctions imposed upon them. In May, these countries gained
admission to the United Nations."' On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council
imposed sweeping economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"), now
consisting solely of Serbia and Montenegro, for its role in promoting the creation of an
autonomous Serb state and supporting Serbian guerrilla forces, federal Yugoslav army units and
the Bosnian Serb Army." Almost one year later in April 1993, these sanctions were further
tightened by the United Nations Security Council which banned the transshipment of goods
through Serbia and Montenegro and froze financial assets abroad.
In the summer of 1992, incidents of ethnic cleansing were v^dely reported. In the
northeast Bosnian city of Brcko, Serb forces systematically executed Muslim men in the prison
camp of Luka. bimates were selected to be interrogated, beaten and killed almost every day over
a two week period.'' In Bosanski Samac, Serb military forces overran the city and carried out an
orchestrated campaign of terror to force Bosnian Croat and Muslim residents to leave the area.'*
Newjiday described the expulsion of 1,800 Muslims from the Bosnian village of Kizluk on a train
as **the latest twist of cruelty in an already brutal war . . . part of a policy by the Serbian-led
** CRS Chronology 1991-1992 at 31.
** Woehrel at 10; see also. United Nations Security Council Resolution 7S7.
'^ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment by the
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against lelisic and Cesic, (Worid Wide Web at:
gopher7/gopher.igc.apc.org:7030/00/cases/Jelisic).
** The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment by the
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Miljlcnvir, Simir, TaHir, TnHnmvif. and Taric, (World Wide
Web at: gopher7/gopher.igc.apc.org:7030/00/cases/Milijkovic).
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271
Yugoslav government to ethnically cleanse historically Muslim areas of Bosnia."**
Detention centers and prisoner of war camps also were uncovered. Prisoners freed from
the camps described them as places where "beatings and torture are an integral part of the daily
regime" and venues of "executions, mass deportations in closed freight cars, forced marches and
a regime of starvation and abandonment to the elements.""
In August, a television crew from the British Independent Television News visited the
prison camps of Omarska and Tmopolje, located in northern Bosnia. Despite the tight control of
prisoner interviews and access areas, the footage shot by film crews "was reminiscent of scerer
from Nazi concentration camps. Gaunt men with protruding ribs stared listlessly fix)m behind a
barbed- wire fence."" Many observers believe that throughout the war, "war crimes" were an
integral component of the political and military strategy of the Bosnian Serb leaders. Although
Bosnian Serbs were perceived to have committed the greatest number of war crimes, Croats and
Muslims also participated in episodes of indiscriminate killing and violence." The Intemational
Red Cross claimed that it had been barred from entering most detention centers, but that all sides
of the Yugoslav conflict were committing these atrocities." The United N'ations felt the need to
** Roy Gutman, Ethnic Cleansing; Yiignslavs try to Deport 1 .800 Miiditns to Hungary,
Newsday, July 3, 1992, at 5.
*° Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serhia's War Tales of Hunger, Tnrturie at Camp in North
Bosnia. Newsday, July 19, 1992, at 7.
*' Ron HoweU, At IJN, Pressure for Armed Reply, Newsday, Aug. 7, 1992, at 5.
" Margaret Mikyung Lee, Raphael Perl, Steven Woehrcl, Bosnia War Crimes: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and I IS Pnliry. CRS Report 96-404F,
May 6, 1996, at 1 (hereinaAer "CRS: War Crimes Tribunal").
" CRS Chronology 1991-1992 at 41.
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272
take action and established the War Crimes Commission in October 1992, to investigate the
reported offenses."
In early 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 808, establishing
the International War Crimes Tribunal." The Tribunal was authorized to investigate and
prosecute persons who were responsible for committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, including violations
of the laws of war, genocide and crimes against humanity, and violations of the Geneva
Convention - intended to protect c'vilians and prisoners of war from willful killing and tortu.e.'
President Izetbegovic charged that Bosnian Muslims were the victims of "genocide" and
implored the world community to defend their freedom and their ability to defend themselves as
its "duty."'^ Increasingly, Islamic nations complained that the tepid response against the Serb
aggressions by the United Nations and western countries condoned the persecution of Muslims.
The forty-seven countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference ("OIC") were naturally
sympathetic toward the Bosnian Muslims. The OIC members also were bound by the United
** CRS War Crimes Tribunal at 2; see also. United Nations Security Council Resolution
780, adopted Oct 6, 1992, at point 2 (establishing the Conunission of Experts to collect evidence
of atrocities).
^ Id. at 4; stt also. United Nations Security Council Resolution 808, adopted Fd>. 22,
1993, at point 1 which provides that "an international triburud shall be established for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in Ae toritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."
^ Id. at 6-7; see also. United Nations Security Council Resolution 808.
" Saul Friedman, Rnsnia's Plea to Summit; Use Forces to Destmy Sert> Guns, I.eader
Asks. Newsday, July 1 0, 1 992, at 7.
10
273
Nations arms embargo, although their degree of adherence to the embargo varied. In December,
1992. the OIC passed a declaration calling for the lifting of the amis embargo." President
Izetbegovic responded to outpourings of support from the Islamic community with public
accolades and declared that "we consider Iran as our greatest friend in the world."'* The
American public was increasingly sympathetic to efforts to aims the Bosnian Muslims and
neither the Bush Administration nor Members of Congress condemned Izetbegovic for
expressing such views about Iran.
Iran views itself as thp "protector of oppressed Muslims worldwide" and was particula-ly
active in its support of the Bosnian Government forces.^'
fbeginning in 1992, began implementing plans to send diplomatic, economic, and
humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian Muslims to make up for the inability of the United
Nations to intervene on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims.*' Additionally, Iran supplied clandestine
military aid and personnel to the Bosnian Government Army.
In September 1992, western news and Croatian government sources reported the first
^ Kenneth Katzman, Julie Kim and Richard Best, RoCTiia and Iranian Arms Shipments:
Issues of IIS Policy and Invnlv«ment, CRS Report 96-360F. Apr. 24, 1996 at I.
" FBIS, Iranian Daily Interviews Izetbegovic, Dec. 30, 1992, at 27.
* Sec Chapter Three, Section One for a discussion of Iran's activities in the region
between 1991 and 1996.
*' DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force,/
May3, 1996,atl.^^gv
11
274
substantial leak and "one of the most brazen efforts yet" to circumvent the arms embargo/' An
Iranian Boeing 747 had secretly landed in Zagreb, Croatia, carrying more than 4,000 guns; more
than one million rounds of ammunition; and forty Iranians in an "apparent attempt by the Islamic
state to smuggle weapons to Muslim forces.'"' The Iranian 747 flight s^jpeared to confirm
rumors that Iran and other Islamic countries had been involved in providing weapons and aid to
the Bosnian Muslims in violation of the arms embargo.^
Although the Muslim forces were desperate for weapons, President Bush responded to
the report of the Iranian weapons delivery by officially protesting to Croatia and the Croatian
Government impounded the aims. Secretary of State Eagleburger recalled, "We made it very
clear that we were adamantly opposed to this going on.'*" U.S. Department of State officials
condemned Iran's attempt to skirt the United Nations arms embargo, but acknowledged that
previous Iranian flights also may have included illegal arms shipments.'
^^uglas Jehl. J
10.1992.atAl.A6.
s Rqwrted, Los Angeles Times, SepL
Id.
** FBIS. Fnrrign Minister nenies Islamic Arms Shipments, Sept. 10, 1992, at 23.
** James Risen and Etoyle McManus, IIS OVd Iranian Arms for Bosnia, OfRrials Say,
Lx>s Angeles Times, Apr. 5, 1996. at Al.
^ Michael nnirfnn, Iran Said to Send Arms to Bosnians, The New York Times, SepL 10,
1992.atA10.
275
1993-1994: Clinton 's Bosnian Policy and the Muslim-Croat War.
During the 1992 Presidential campaign. President Clinton criticized President Bush for
taking little action to support the Bosnian Muslims.^ President Clinton publicly opposed the
arms embargo and argued the United States should do more, including conducting air strikes, to
protect Bosnia.*' Once elected, however, Clinton's foreign policy to aid the Bosnian Muslims
was constrained diplomatically and militarily. President Clinton faced strong resistance to
multilaterally lifting the arms embargo from the European allies, particularly Great Britain and
France which feared that a retaliatory strike by the Bosnian Serbs would endanger their troops on
the ground. In the absence of necessary international support for a multilateral lift of the
embargo. Congress supported a unilateral lift to allow the United States to supply we^ons
directly to the Muslims.^ However, the allies opposed unilateral action by the United States
vigorously. The Administration shared the allies' opposition to unilateral action out of concern
that any Serb retaliation would endanger UNPROFOR troops, that our allies would withdraw
their troops, and because unilateral action by the United States would be z direct violation of the
intematioiul arms embargo." The Administration was concerned about an adverse effect
** US Had Options at A6.
-Id.
'" See Chapter One, Section Three for a discussion of actions in Congress urging
multilateral and unilateral lifting of the United Nations arms embargo.
'* U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet: US Policy Toward Pot<>ntial Arms Shipmmts to
Bosnia! 1994-Prespnt. Apr. 29. 1996. at 1.
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276
unilateral action would have on the adherence to and the success of other embargoes against Iraq,
Libya, and North Korea.
In early 1993, the Clinton Administration supported a comprehensive peace settlement
(the "Vance-Owen plan") sponsored by the two Chairmen of the Peace Conference on former
Yugoslavia, United Nations envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community mediator Lord David
Owen. The Vance-Owen plan would apportion Bosnia into ten provinces, primarily defined
along ethnic lines. The plan would create ten separate provinces, of which three would be
defmed by a Serb majority, three would have a Muslim majority, two would have a Croat
majority, one would be a Croat-Muslim province, and the tenth would be the city of Sarajevo,
which would retain a presence of all ethnicities." Throughout the first months of 1993, the two
mediators negotiated with the leaders of each warring faction to gamer support for the peace
settlement. The Serbs rejected the plan because it required them to return some Muslim pockets
of territory they had already conquered and because the Serb provinces would be isolated from
each other. Bosnian President Izetbegovic criticized the plan for imposing ethnic partitions
across Bosnia, although he felt pressure to accept the plan to gain international approval. In
contrast to the other factions, the Croats supported the plan because it fiilfiUed their objective of
creating autonomous Croat provinces that adjoined Croatia and extended into Bosnia.
The Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to reject the plan and it lost the support of the Ututed
States for diree reasons: first, the United States feared that the plan, if adopted, would be
unenforceable; second the Bosnian Govenunent continued to strongly criticize the plan; and
' Silber at 288.
14
277
third, it would have required 50,000 ground troops to enforce and the United States maintained
its reluctance to send peacekeeping U-oops from the United States anned forces into the region."
After abandoning its support for the Vance-Owen plan. President Clinton looked for other ways
to support a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia.
During his first six months in office, President Clinton worked to establish a more active
Bosnian policy. In June, Secretary of State Christopher announced the first commitment of
United States peacekeeping ground forces to the war, offering 300 United States troops for the
UNPROFOR force in Macedonia." The President also worked successfully within the
international arena to urge the North Atlantic Council to employ "stronger measures including air
strikes" against Bosnian Serb forces (action the NATO Council endorsed)." Preparations for the
use of NATO air power began immediately after the endorsement."
In late April 1993, increasing tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats
erupted into violence. For almost one full year, the Bosnian Muslims found themselves waging
wars on two fronts. Ethnic tensions, an influx of refugees who had been "ethnically cleansed"
from other cities, and the proximity of Croatian HVO troops and Bosnian Army troops in the
same territory caused renegade skinnishes to grow into larger military battles." The war
"Id.
** Julie Kim and Steve Wodirel, Rnsnia-Herr^nvina Conflict: Chmnology of Event.«i in
tht-Fnrmt-r Yugoslavia Tiin« 1, IQQ^-May -^l, 1994, CRS Report 94-522F. June 13, 1994. at 1
(hereinafter "CRS Chronology 1993-1994").
" Id. at 3.
••id.
"Silbcrat294.
15
278
between Bosnian and Croat forces was characterized by surges through Croat villages by the
Bosnian Army, burning and looting as it went." For its part, Croatian HVO troops rounded up
Muslim men in conquered villages." Incidents of ethnic cleansing, massacres and continued
fighting between the Muslims and Croats were widespread.
At the same time, the Bosnian Serb Army continued to advance against the Muslim
forces. In response to the ruthless attack on the Bosnian city of Srebrenica and its subsequent
surrender to the Serb forces in April 1993, and to heavy fighting elsewhere, in June 1993, the
United Nations Security Council parsed Resolution 836 expanding the mandate for the
UNPROFOR troops to include protection of six Bosnian "safe areas."*" The areas included
Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde and Zepa and allowed "all necessary measures"
including air power to support UNPROFOR in its protection of the safe areas." The designation
of the safe areas required UNPROFOR to progress from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement in
these areas and marked the first time in the conflict that the United Nations relinquished its strict
neutrality and committed to the protection of one side over the other." In reality, however, the
declared "safe areas" were far fix)m safe.
As 1993 continued, prospects for peace in the region remained slim. United States
'•id. at 299.
"Id.
•» CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at 1; see also. United Nations Security Council Resolution
836, passed June 4,1993; United Nations Security Council Resolution 824, passed May 6, 1993.
•' CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at 1.
•*Silberat274.
16
279
diplomats attempted to negotiate a cease-fire and union between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
Muslims in August 1993, but provocations and broken promises on both sides caused the
fighting to continue into the fall and winter." In October, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution extending the mandate for the UNPROFOR forces until March 31, 1994." In
November, Bosnian Croat shelling destroyed the famous Old Bridge in Mostar, an international
landmaiic built by the Ottoman Turks in 1566 and a symbol of past unity in a town where the
ethnically-diverse residents had lived in mutual tolerance.
Under pressure from the United States and other nations that advocated the lifting of the
arms embargo, the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution on
December 20, 1993, urging the Security Council to lift the embargo on the Bosnian
government.'^ However, the Security Council did not have the votes to enact such a measure.
Negotiating the Federation Agreement
In February of 1994, Bosnian Serbs attacked a crowded market square in Sarajevo, killing
sixty-eight people, wounding more than 200 and sparking worldwide outrage.** The Clinton
Administration responded to the incident by calling for NATO air strikes against Serb gun
•'Silberat320.
** CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at S; sm also. United Nations Security Council Resolution
871, Article 1 1, adopted Oct 4, 1993. which extends the mandate for UNPROFOR for an
additional period terminating on Mar. 31, 1994.
" CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at 6.
**Id.at8.
17
280
emplacements and encouraging the Muslims and Croats to present a unified defense against the
Serbs. The Serb forces agreed to comply with the NATO demands, thereby avoiding the
threatened air strikes. The front lines did not remain quiet for long. Later in February 1994, the
first combat action in the 45-year-old history of NATO was initiated when United States fighter
pilots downed four Bosnian Serb planes illegally flying in a no-fly zone.''
Throughout the Muslim-Croat conflict, mediators from the United States sought to exert
pressure on both sides to enter into peace negotiations. In February, the United Nations issued an
ultimatum to Croatia to pull its amy out of Bosnia or face sanctions and world isolation." i iie
threat worked. Croatia agreed to withdraw its army and commence serious negotiations for a
Federation. By the end of February, the Bosnians and Croats were en route to Washington and,
over the next four days, negotiated a draft agreement. Despite the year long violence between
the Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the two parties signed an accord establishing a fragile alliance.
President Clinton hailed the pact as "one of the first clear signals that parties to this conflict are
willing to end the violence and begin a process of reconstruction," and The Los Angeles Times
noted that the agreements stirred "hope for a comprehensive settlement" in the Balkans.**
The impact of the Federation Agreement was instnimental to the survival of the Bosnian
Muslims until Ae signing of the Dayton Accords the following year. The most important and
immediate consequence of the Agreement was to enable the Bosnian Army to focus its energy on
•^ Id. at 10.
"Silbcrat322.
** Paul Richter. Muslims, rmats Sign Accords for New Federation, Los Angeles Times,
Mar. 19. 1994, at Al.
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281
the war with Serb forces, and to create a Muslim-Croatian unified defense to put additional
pressure on the Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement/' The Bosnian Army's supply of weapons
and munitions increased as a result of access to Croatian weapons caches and the arms pipeline —
was reopened through Croatian territory." The alliance also enhanced the delivery of needed
humanitarian aid to Muslim enclaves.'^
Despite the momentum provided by successful negotiations to establish the Muslim-
Croat Federation, peace with the Bosnian Serbs was not forthcoming. The Serb forces
continued to hold seventy percent of the territory in Bosnia. In April 1994, gunfire and
explosions erupted again in Sarajevo.^' At the same time, the Serbs launched attacks against
three United Nations "safe havens." Srebrenica and Zepa fell quickly. Gorazde, a city of 65,000
strategically located between two large Serb-held towns in the Drina Valley, was subjected to a
devastating siege. The Bosnian Serbs were attempting to consolidate their territory in the event
that a quickly-moving peace process would freeze existing boundaries.'^ United Nations
officials, however, interpreted the vigorous attacks on the cities in northern Bosnia as retaliation
against the Federation agreement''
^ Silber at 3 19; ses also, Steven Greenhouse, Muslims and Rnsnian rroat.«; Give Birth to
« Nffw Federarion. New York Times. Mar. 19, 1994, at A4.
"Silber at 319.
"Id.
" Julie Kim, Dftaileri rhronology of Events in Bosnia during March-April 1994. CRS
Rqwrt, July 18, 1996, at 4 (hereinafter "CRS Detailed Chronology")-
'^ Silber at 325.
" Id; CRS Detailed Chronology at 4.
19
282
The siege of Gorazde was particularly harsh. United States Special Envoy to the Former
Yugoslavia Charles Redman characterized the attack as "very, very brutal ... we simply had a
bunch of helpless civilians being pounded at point blank range by Serbian tanks."'' At the height
of the assault, Serb gunners were hitting the city an average of once every twenty seconds for an
entire day. Bosnian President Izetbegovic responded with another international call for weapons
to be used in self-defense." The events in Gorazde made absolutely clear the inability of the
UNPROFOR forces to protect the "safe areas" under the existing rules of engagement." The
situation was becoming increasingly dangerous to citizens of Gorazde, the international relief
agency personnel and the United Nations personnel in the city.^
UNPROFOR Commander General Rose demanded Serbian General Mladic put a stop to
the attacks on Gorazde or face NATO action, but the attacks continued." In what President
Clinton described as "a clear call to the Serbs to pull back from Gorazde and resume the
negotiations," NATO jets began to carry out air strikes against the Serb forces with increasing
frequency and intensity to protect the United Nations personnel and civilians." Bosnian Serb
leader Karadzic retaliated by detaining United Nations troops and officials, banning American
'* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles Redman. Aug. 27, 1996. at 29 (hereinafter
'Hedman Subcommittee Dep.").
" CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at 14
•°Silberat327.
•' CRS Chronology 1993-1994 at 13.
20
283
journalists from Serb teiritories and declaring United Nations Commander Rose persona non
grata." The retaliation by the Serb forces hardened allied opposition to a unilateral lifting of the
arms embargo. Bosnian Serbs also blocked United Nations relief convoys from bringing needed
food and medicine to Gorazde." Near the end of April, Bosnian Serb troops began to comply
with NATO deadlines to withdraw their heavy weapons and air strikes diminished."
While the Bosnian Serbs unleashed fierce attacks on the "safe areas" and other Bosnian
enclaves, and the number of civilian casualties skyrocketed, the United States Congress hotly
debated the issues of the arms embargo. During the spring of 1994, both Houses voted to
mandate the lifting of the embargo." The disproportionate impact of the arms embargo had
become increasingly clear to the Administration, Congress, and the American public. Moreover,
the new Federation Agreement between the Croats and Muslims offered the first real opportunity
to forge a peace in the regioa
This is the moment in the history of the Balkan conflict when the United States
Ambassador responded to die President of Croatia that he had "no instructions" with respect to
\«4iether the United States would object if Croatia allowed arms shipments from other countries
to pass through its territory into Bosnia.
Heavy fighting between the BSA and Bosnian Government forces resumed near the town
•'Id. at 14.
" Id. at 15.
•* Id. at 16.
** See Chapter One, Section Three and related appendices on Congressional activity and
policies relating to the United Nations arms embargo.
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284
of Bihac and in Gorazde for several days in July. In August, President Milosevic of Serbia
announced that his government was going to sever its remaining political and economic ties to
the Bosnian Serbs. '^
The FRY government agreed to the deployment of international monitors to verify
Yugoslavia's embargo of goods to the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group suspended some of
the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the United Nations and in September, the United
Nations Security Council approved Resolution 943, easing sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro."
As winter approached, military skirmishes on the ground in Bosnia continued. In
November, continued and heavy fighting was reported throughout Bosnia and the situation in
Bihac, one of the U.N. protected safe havens, escalated to a level which mandated more NATO
air strikes. Also in November, President Clinton signed into law the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment
to prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds to enforce the arms embargo against the
Bosnian Muslims.
ne Effects of the Strategic Military Imbalartce Between the Warring Factions.
The Bosnian Muslim forces clearly were undermanned and outgunned during the war.
As Secretary of Defense Peny would later testify in 1996, "an important and significant &ctor in
' CRS Chronology 1994-1995 at 3.
'" Id. at 4; s«£.alsD, United Nations Security Council Resolution 943, passed September
23, 1994.
22
285
the cause of this war was the dramatic imbalance of forces which existed."" The United
Nations, with the support of the United States, attempted to curtail the fighting in the Balkans by
imposing an arms embargo against all states of the former Yugoslavia. The embargo not only
failed to stop the deterioration of the situation in the fonner Yugoslavia, but in many respects
contributed to further suffering in the region. Instead of reducing the flow of weapons to the
region, the embargo increased the terrible disparity in military power among the factions and
forced the Bosnian Muslims to seek weapons wherever they were available." Unfortunately for
the Bosnian Muslims, the embargo did not prevent arms from reaching the Croatians and the'
Serbs, further exacerbating the weak military position of the Bosnian Muslims.
In an article dated August 2, 1994, the Washington Times carried a chart outlining the
sales and shipments of arms to the warring parties for the period 1992-94 during which the amis
embargo was still very much in effect*" Croatia received the highest dollar amount of arms
among the three countries — receiving over S6S0 milUon in weapons in contravention of the aims
embargo. Halfofthese weapons were of German origin.*' Serbia, which had retained the bulk
** Remarks of Rep. Benjamin Oilman before the House International Relations
Committee, Apr. 23, 1996, at 10 (citing testimony of Secretary of Defense Peny before the
House International Relations Committee, Nov. 30. I99S).
" Gordon at AlO.
"* Paul Beaver, Iran Uses Russian Planes to Supply Bosnian Muslim, Croatian Troops,
The Washington Times. Aug. 2, 1994, at A14 (hereinafter "Arms Chart").
*' Id. According to the chart, S320 million in German-origin arms were sold to Croatia.
This chart does not indicate whether these figures also include the percentage of weapons Croatia
demanded from shipments headed for the Bosnians which transcended its borders. These cuts
were as high as thiiiy percent before die cessation of hostilities in the regioiL
23
286
of the former Yugoslav military at the outset of the war, received approximately $476 million
worth of additional weapons, nearly three quarters of which came from the former Soviet Union.
Bosnia, the neediest country of the three in terms of arms, received just $161 million in
arms from third countries, $20 million of which came from Iran.'"/
Neither Croatia's decision to cooperate with the Iranians and other Islamic countnes in
the reestablishment of the formal arms pipeline between Croatia and Bosnia, nor the formation of
the Federation balanced the scales while the embargo was in place. Bosnia began receiving
deliveries of arms from the Islamic countries on a more regular basis, but Serbia and Croatia
continued to maintain a vast superiority in heavy and sophisticated weaponry.
In late 1994, the Croatian Defense Ministry commented that the current air deliveries of
light weapons into the region were not enough** to aid the Bosnian cause. Of course, argubg for
more we^>ons deliveries to Bosnia was in the interests of Croatia since it received one third of
all shipments that went to Bosnia through its territory.*' At the same time the Bosnian Foreign
Kfinister lamented that it was extremely difficult to get financing and support from many of die
Id.
Memorandum to the File by Peter Galbraith, Sept 5. 1994. (Confidential)
** INR Report, Nov. 18, 1993 (describing the Croatian arrangement before Muslim-Croat
hostilities to take thirty percent of arms shipments to Bosnia).
24
287
Islamic nations that publicly supported lifting the embargo to aid Bosnia's survival in the face of
Serb aggression.**
Serbia also prospered under the arms embargo. By June 1994, the United States had
noted a sharp erosion in the effectiveness of the arms embargo against all countries.*' Leaks in
the arms embargo were most apparent in Serbia where the entire economy was growing in spite
of the economic sanctions against it** The United States sought to impose tighter United
Nations Security Council sanctions against Serbia, but met with strong resistance fix>m the
allies.** Serbia's ability to project its military threat throughout the former Yugoslavia, was
demonstrated in November 1994 when Serbia threatened to bomb Pleso airport, Lucko airfield,
and Zmaj if Croatia continued to supply Bosnian Muslims in Bihac."" Thus, even with
assistance, the Bosnian Muslims found themselves at a disadvantage.
The Bosnian difficulty in receiving arms continued throughout 1995, until the signing of
the Dayton Accords. Unlike Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb forces whose patrons in Croatia
and Serbia provided them with material and financial support, the Bosnian Muslims had to look
outside their immediate neighborhood for support At no point during the conflict were the
** Memorandum to the File by Peter Galbraith, Dec. 16, 1994. (S)
" Memorandum to the Secretary of SUte. June 2, 1994. (S)
**Id.
" Stt Department of Stote Cable, USUN 1931, Aug. 12, 1994, at 1. (S)
'" Department of State Memorandum by Peter Galbraith, Nov. 17. 1994. at 1. The Serb
threat did not materialize as the Croatians explained that they were not aiding the Bihac Muslims
at the time although they had promised assistance in the previous month. Id.
2S
288
Bosnians able to counter the weapons possessed by the Serbs and Croats.'" In addition, Croatia
continued to take a thirty percent cut of the weapons it allowed to transit its territory en route to
Bosnia, negotiated deals with Iran for the delivery of missiles able to hit Belgrade, and amassed a
sizeable stockpile of materiel."' '
Memorandum to the File by Peter Galbraith, June 20. 199S/j
289
The Clinton Administration saw the Federation Agreement as a critical factor in reducing
the disparity in weaponry among the combatants. The most important consequence of the
Federation Agreement was that it allowed the Muslims and Croats to concentrate on the war with
the Serbs. The fact that Croatia reopened the arms pipeline for the Bosnians was an important
secondary consequence.
1995: The Road to Dayton.
In December 1994, former United States President Jimmy Carter concluded a mission to
Bosnia in which he negotiated a four-month cease-fire. The warring parties agreed to several
military and humanitarian demands, including a "cease fire, the ending of Serb restrictions on
humanitarian convoys, the reopening of the Sarajevo airport to aid flights, the protection of
human rights, the opening of the Bosnian Serb territory to United Nations human rights
investigators and the exchange of all detainees and prisoners of war."'" Although the fighting
quieted somewhat, this cease-fire, like all prior ones, began to fray as the April deadline
approached. Negotiations for its extension were finiitless.
Once again, the Seib forces renewed their heavy weifwns attacks against Sarajevo and
"0'
"" Steven Woefarel, Rnsnia-Herce£ovina and Former Yugoslavia: rhronology of Events.
June 1,1 994- July 16, 1Q<)S. CRS Report 95-823F, July 18. 1995. at 8 (hereinafter "CRS
Chronology 1994-1995").
27
290
other United Nations "safe areas." took United Nations peacekeepers hostage and used them as
human shields and potential NATO air strike targets."" By July, the Serbs overran the safe
haven of Srebrenica after NATO air strikes failed to stop their advance. Subsequent reports of
the siege of Srebrenica suggest that thousands of Muslim civilians were massacred and buried in
mass graves at this site.
The Western allies, fearing that Gorazde would be the next safe area to fall, promised
"decisive and substantial" air strikes to protect the city.'" A sustained air strike campaign by
NATO against Serb targets a.id military equipment lasted throughout the summer and includeu
thousands of sorties. While the strikes continued. United States negotiators renewed their efforts
to discuss a cease-fire with the Serb forces. NATO's show of military superiority, together with
Croatia's successful attacks against Serb-held areas of Croatia, created an incentive for the Serb
forces to sit down at the negotiating table."' When the Serbs began to comply with United
Nations demands and affirmed their willingness to sign a cease-fire, international negotiations
sponsored by the United States, the European Union and Russia began in Dayton, Ohio.
Three weeks later, a peace agreement was initialed to create a central government and
two semi-autonomous regions with Bosnian territory divided fifty-one percent to the Federation
and forty-nine percent to the Bosnian Serbs. The agreement also contained provisions on
military arrangements, free elections, human rights and refugee issues. After the agreement was
""1^8112.
'" Chronolngy 1990-199S, Associated Press, The New York Times on the Wd),
(http-7/www.nytimes.com/speciaIs/Bosnia/context/apchrono.html) at 5.
'" CRS Chronology 1994-1995 at 6.
28
291
signed, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1021, to terminate the arms
embargo on all former Yugoslav parties.'" The negotiations for a permanent peace were
formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. at a ceremony in which President Clinton
commented, "I applaud these leaders for making the decision to turn from war to peace. .
.Tomorrow they will begin the hard work of making that peace real."'" To help implement the
Dayton Accords, NATO deployed 60,000 troops, including some 20,000 United States troops, to
participate in an Implementation Force ("IFOR") to patrol the separation of the factions.'" In
addition to contributing to the military force, the United States promised economic, humanitarian
and military aid. The long term fate of the peace process is not yel clear but elections have been
held and the cease-fire has been maintained. The civilian initiatives such as resettling refugees,
providing a basis for economic growth and jobs, and creating a new government structure have
begun. Unlike the situation on the ground in April 1994, there is an absence of war. In this the
Dayton Accords are a success.
"* Id. at 1 1; see also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1021, point 1, adopted
Nov. 22, 1995 (noting fliat the United Nations Security Council "decides that the embargo on
delivenes of weapons and military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1991) shall be
teraiinated.'O
"* Sharon Kfachlis Gartenberg. Tr«ny Signed in Paris to Fomially End Bosnian War.
Bosnia Action Coalition. Dec. 14, 1995 (http://worid.std.com/-slm/paris.html).
'" Julie Kim and Elizabeth Marino, Bosnia and Fomier Yugoslavia: Chronology of
Fv«.u, Ii.ly 10 10Q<-May-<1 1996 CRS Report 96-556F. June 10, 1996, at 13.
29
292
Chapter One
Section Two
THE UNITED STA TES POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA
Upon assuming ofilce in January 1993, the Clinton Administration was forced to deal
with a deteriorating military situation in Bosnia. One option in addressing the problem was to
lift the United Nations embargo that had been agreed to by the previous administration and to
enable the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves. This chapter describes the policy choices that
were available to the Adm-ni<:tration. how the views of the allies and the role of Iran wer taken-
into consideration, and why the policy worked.
The Bush Administration 's Approach.
After war broke out in Yugoslavia in 1991, the United Nations imposed an arms
embargo on the entire country in an anempt to stem the fighting.' The embargo remained in
effect on all parts of the former Yugoslavia despite the fact that the military capabilities of the
newly independent Yugoslav rqjublics varied widely. During the summer and fall of 1992,
political pressure to lift the arms embargo increased in the United Sutes and else"here in
response to revelations of the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Muslims
and Croats. Proponents of lifting the embargo argued that the Bosnian Serbs* inheritance of the
Yugoslav National Anny's (the "JNA'^ equipment pro\ided them w ith a significant miUtary
superiority that made possible ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses. The Bush
' U.N. Security Resolution 713. Sept. 25, 1991.
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293
Administration rejected these calls. '
During Labor Day weekend. 1992. an Iranian Boeing 747 landed at Zagreb ostensibly en
route to Bosnia to deliver humanitarian supplies. Croatian officials inspected the plane and
found weapons and Iranian military personnel. The Croats seized the war materiel and sent the
Iranians home. ' Bush Administration ofTicials noted that the seizure of the Iranian shipment
represented the first tangible evidence of previously unconfirmed reports that Islamic countries
had been providing military aid to the Bosnian Muslims/ The Bush Administration officials also
■ expressed concerns to the C'oats-about reports of Iranian flights.' Ironically, at the same ti"3e
that the Bush Administration was actively seeking to keep weapons from reaching the Bosnian
Muslims, the United States Government confirmed a Newsday report, that the Bosnian Serbs
were operating detention camps where Muslim and Croat civilians were being held, tortured, and
executed.'
President Clinton 's Push to Lift the Embargo - 1993.
President Clinton advocated lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government
= ITS Rule* out Allnwing Bosnia to Arm ltsel£ Reuters. Oct. 14, 1992.
' Michael R. Gordon. Iran f'^ tn *iettA Arms to Bosnians. New York Times, Sept. 10.
1992. at AIO.
• n «; Dgmands Red Cross Have Access to Detention Camps. Associated Press, Aug. 10.
1992 (noting that the Bush Administration was "doing everything in its power to open detention
camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina.'*).
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multilaterally and conducting air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs (the so-called "lift and strike
option"). The lift and strike proposal represented a rejection of the Bush Administration effort
to demilitarize the Balkans by maintaining an arms embargo against all the countries of former
Yugoslavia. The Clinton Administration believed that the embargo worked to the decisive
advantage of the Serbs who were primary perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and other war crimes.
During the spring and summer of 1993. the Clinton Administration sought to convince its
NATO allies to support "lift and strike." but was unable to achieve consensus among the
European allies, and shelved the proposal: When '.he allies said no to lift and strike, the
Administration was not willing to compromise allied unity and initiate a unilateral policy which
might have led to the conunitment of thousands of U.S. troops to a combat situation in Bosnia.
Therefore, the Clinton Administration continued to abide by the arms embargo and participate in
NATO's Operation Sharp Guard interdiction effort in the Adriatic. However, the Administration
no longer interfered with amis shipments by others through Croatian territory.
The Administration pursued multilateralism only to the extent that it served U.S.
interests. The United Sutes adopted a creative approach in which it continued to abide by the
United Nations Security Council resolutions, while simultaneously pursuing its own goal of
allowing the Bosnians to ann themselves. According to Alexander Vershbow, forma Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Sute for European Affairs, the Administration distinguished between that
which it was required to do under United Nations Security Resolution 7 13-- abide by the
' Select Subcommittee Interview of Samuel Berger, Sept. 25, 1996 at 4 (hereinafter
"Berger Subcommittee Int."Kexplaining that the Nunn-Mitchell amendment codified what the
United Sutes was doing already: not enforcing the arms embargo).
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embargo - and that which it was merely "called upon" to do under United Nations Security
Resolutions 740 and 787- enforce the embargo. Vershbow testified that "the Administration,
although it had to abide by the arms embargo itself, was clearK on record as opposing the arms
embargo and. therefore, we felt that it was not necessary for us to aggressively enforce the arms
embargo."* \'ershbow is one of several senior Administration policy makers who acknowledge
the United States had evidence for many months prior to April 1994 that the embargo was being
evaded. Vershbow stressed, however, that the United States "chose as a policy matter not to
send a telegram to our Embassy-{in Croatia] to protest and tell them to cut it out. We chose to
take kind of a -- more of a hands-off neutral stance."^
Reginald Bartholomew, the former U.S. Special Envoy for former Yugoslavia, testified
that his understanding of U.S. policy in 1993 was "the United States would, for its part, respect
the basic pro\isions of the U.N. embargo in the sense of not itself transferring arms. The United
Sutes as a N'.\TO member would, for its pan, participate in the Sharp Guard operation, which
was related, but there it stopped. . .""'
The Croatian Question - 1993
In April 1993, the Croatian Government first sought to ascertain the Clinton
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8, 1996, at 20
(hereinaAer "\'ershbow Subcommittee Dep.").
•id. at 21.
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, Sept 30,
1996, at 22 (hereinafter "Bartholomew Subcommittee Dep.").
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Administration's views on anus shipments to Bosnia. The Croatian inquiry may have been
prompted by an expectation that the Clinton Administration would take a dift'erent approach than
the Bush Administration crackdown of September 1992. The Croatian go\emment had
reasonable grounds to ask such a question since Charge d'affaires Ronald Neitzke (who would
later become the Deputy Chief of Mission under Ambassador Galbraith) had told the Croats two
months earlier that the United Slates strongly discouraged Croatia from serv ing as a
transshipment center."
(The Neitzke statement also conflicted with the fact that arms
shipments were already reaching Bosnia without United States interference. In general terms, the
Neitzke advice reflected the Bush Administration action in September 1992. and not the Clinton
Administration's view.
Defense Minister Susak raised the question about the United States view during a visit to
Croatia in April 1993 by former Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia Reginald
Bartholemew. Specifically, the issue was raised after a breakfast meeting, in which discussion
had focused on rel?*<ons between Croatia and Bosnia, and efforts to encourage the Croats to
exercise some restraining influence on the Bosnian Croats to ease the growing tension with the
Muslims.*-
Defense Minister Susak asked Special Envoy Bartholemew how the United States would
" U.S. Department of State Cable No. 93 Zagreb 00499, February 14, 1993 (SECRET).
'- Bartholomew Subconmiittee Dep. at 13.
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react to Croatia allowing weapons to transit Croatia en route to Bosnia. Bartholomew responded
that the United States could not be put in a position of saying yes or no to the Croatian question.
Bartholomew conveyed to Susak "that we didnt tike a position on this, that we didn't approve.
that we didn't disapprove, that we weren't. . . going to be part of this one way or the other, that
he had to make his own decisions where this was concerned."" The United St.->«es did not want
to be put into a position of policing Croatia's border with Bosnia on the one had or of approving
weapons deals on the other. Either of those positions would have been contrary to U.S. policy.
Bartholomew stated: . ■ • ^.
[W]e weren't going to get into the business of these third-country arms transfers. We
weren't going to be put in the business of approving some, disapproving others. We
weren't going to become party to one way or the other where that was concerned;
enforcing or saying yes to this, no to that. et. cetera. That was quite clearly something we
didn't want to do."
Bartholomew testified that Susak was ambiguous about whether arms already were
flowing into Bosnia. He knew fiom other sources at the time, however, that the Croats were
indeed letting at least some arms pass through, "even in the midst of having rough times with the
Bosnians, because they were getting a cut of it."" Bartholomew also knew that Iran was one of
the suppliers.
The Majority notes that it accepts Mr. Neitzke's second-hand account of events (in which
Mr. Neitzke stated that Ambassador Bartholomew told him the U.S. could not be in the position
"Id. at 18-19.
" Id. at 20.
"Id. at 17.
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of advising Croatia to transship arms to Bosnia) during this period over the first-hand account of
Ambassador Bartholomew. In essence. Seitzke's account is not much different than
Bartholomew's own. It should be noted, that Ambassador Banholomew reported his
conversation with Minister Susak orally to Ron Neitzke, who in tum. sent a cable on the
conversation to Washington nearly two weeks later. "^ .Although the cable states that Ambassador
Bartholomew had cleared it. this does not appear to be the case, .\mbassador Bartholomew
never saw any report or cable on the issue, and does not remember clearing any cable on the
subject.'' Moreover, Mr. Neitzke has testified that Ambassador Bartholomew reported the'
conversation to him in the car on the way to the aiiport for a departing flight which calls into
question when and how Bartholomew would have been able to sign off on Neitzke's second hand
account of the conversation.
One year later. Croatian President Tudjman would pose a similar question to Ambassador
Peter Galbraith. The question was similar, but the context was different. The difference in
context helps explain why Ambassador Bartholomew could confidently offer his view to
Minister Susak that the U.S. had no position and why Ambassador Galbraith felt compelled to
seek expeditiously instructions on how to respond.
In April 1 993 . relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were extremely tense,
but full scale war had not yet broken out between the two groups. That would occur the
foUov^ing month. Ambassador Bartholomew kiiew that some arms were already flowing. He
'* U.S. Department of State cable No. Z^peb 1479. April 27, 1993 (C).
'- Bartholomew Subcommittee Dep. at 3t.
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also could sumiise that the effects of his response would be negligible. In fact, due to "the
outbreak of the war between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, amis did not tlow to
Bosnia in grea: quantities after Special En\oy Bartholer.iew's exchange with Defense Minister
Susak."" In contrast, in April 1994. the Bosnian Muslims and Croats had. weeks earlier, agreed
to a fragile peace. Arms flows had been kept to a minimum during the previous year, and
Croatia was seeking the U.S. view in the wake of the conclusion of the Federation Agreement.
The Croatian question was, therefore, more significant than it had been the pre\ ious year.
Moreover, whereas .A'nbassador Bartholomew was approached o\er breakfast by a
Croatian Minister, Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman were asked by the President of the
country for the official U.S. view. As Ambassador Bartholomew testified. ". . . this was a
breakfast conversation. . . this wasn't being put to me in terms of a formal demarche the way I
understand later on the President of the Republic of Croatia did. in a formal setting to one or at
least two Ambassadors in specifically asking for the United States Government position, et
cetera. This was a breakfast conversation in which my reaction was being sought, and I gave a
reaction which was totally in line with the general outlook of the administration at that time."'^
The U.S. answer on both occasions turned out to be identical. U.S. policy was the same
in April 1993 as it was in April 1994. Ambassador Bartholomew equates the two rqplies: "No
instructions, no position.'*^ He also noted that when Ambassador Redman told President
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ambassador Peter Galbraith. Aug. 19, 1996. at 13
(hercinafier **Galbraith Subcomminee Dep.").
'* Banholomew Subcommittee Dep. at 24.
* Id. at 41.
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Tudjman that the United Stated did not want to be in a position of saying no to the Croatians. '
"he said what I said. . . I mean, in the sense of not wanting to take a position on the thing.""
From the beginning of the Clinton Administration, the United States participated in
Operation Sharp Guard (the NATO operation in the Adriatic primarily aimed at enforcing
economic sanctions against Serbia) but did not undertake efforts to enforce the anns embargo
against Bosnia. Senior officials at the CIA were aware that the Administration was not vigorous
in enforcing the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. Fomier Deputy Director for
Intelligence, Douglas MacEachin. testified that "U.S. policy, in terms of constraining arms
shipments into Bosnia from the Croatian side had never been pursued with the same vigor that
they had been on the Serbian side."'"
The Banholomew advice delivered one year prior to the meeting among Ambassador
Galbraith. Special Envoy Redman and President Tudjman represented the first indication by a
senior U.S. Government ofTicial that enforcement of the embargo would not be pursued
vigorously.
A Call to Action in Bosnia.
In February 1994. a mortar attack on Sarajevo's marketplace led to renewed United States
diplomatic acti\ity oh Bosnia. Already deeply engaged in a parallel but separate effoit to end the
*' Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 51.
~ Bartholomew Subconuninee Dep. at 41.
^ Select Subcommittee Deposition of Doug MacEachin, Sept. 6, 1996. at 58 (hereinafter
"MacEachin Subcommittee. Dep.").
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vicious fightinj; between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the Clinton Administration spearheaded
the successful etTort to issue a NATO ultimatum to entorce a weapons exclusion zone around
Sarajevo. At the same time. President Clinton reiterated L niied States interests in Bosnia. The
policy of the United States toward Bosnia was intended to help prevent the Bosnian conflict from
becoming a broader European conflict maintain NATO as a credible fouc for peace in the post-
Cold War era. help stem the de-stabilizing flows of refugees in the region, and stop the
strangulation of Sarajevo and the slaughter of innocents."'
Unfortunately, the United States had few good choices in pursuing its objective, m earlv
1994. The first option was to increase U.S. military involvement in the conflict. The second
option was to lift the arms embargo multilateralK . The third option was to lifl the arms embargo
unilaterally. The first option had the obvious and sigiuficant downside of committing U.S.
troops to a combat situation and was rejected on the grounds that it was unlikely to command or
sustain public support. The second option had to be abandoned when the Administration was
unable to gamer the support of the allies for such an approach. The third and only remaintng^
option, preferred by a growing number in Congress, w as opposed by the Administration for fear
that it would lead to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the abandonment of the U.N. humanitarian
mission in Bosnia, the flouting of U.N. embargoes by other countries, and the Americanization
of the conflict.^
■' President Clinton's weekly radio address. Feb. 19. 1994, as reported by Federal News
Service transcript.
"' Berger Subcomminee Int. At 4.
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Securing the Federation Agreement.
In March 1994. a positive new development re-energized the Clinton Administration's
efforts. Bosnia's Muslims and Croats signed a feJeration chaner in Washington, and ended a
year of bloodshed between the t\^■o groups. The Federation Agreement had political, military and
humanitarian significance. In addition to ending the fighting, the Agreement f.eed Bosnian and
Croat forces to direct their military- and political attention towards the Bosnian Serbs, opened the
w ay for increased aid supplies to pass through Croatian territory to Bosnia, and reduced the le\ el
of human rights violatioi.^. * - •
According to the former Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia. Charles Redman, who
was the principal negotiator of the Federation Agreement, the primary benefit of the Federation
was to stop the war which would sa\e lives, strengthen the hand of the Bosnian government
through the strategic alliance, and keep the Croatians on the right side. The real strategic
objective, however, according to Redman '^^as to form the basis that w e could build on for an
overall agreement in Bosnia." Once the Federation was formed. Redman testified that he
"immediately went back to work to try to contact then the Bosnian-Serb leadership to see if we
could then build on that into an overall Bosnian settlement"^'
The war between the Muslims and Croats had produced some of the most brutal fighting
of the Balkan war, and had cost thousands of lives. The Federation .\greement represented the
first step to an overall peace between the combatants. However, it was a "fragile animal" ' that
^* Redman Subcomminee Dep. at 27.
" Id. at 35.
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303
could collapse unless nurtured carefully. Keeping the Federation together had to be added to the
United States policy objectives stated by President Clinton the previous month. •" Special Envoy
Charles Redman testified that distrust existed between the Croats and Muslims even as they
became closer because we could not "just ... put them together in a federation and suddenly they
forgot the past." "*
Pressure to Lift the Embargo.
In early 1994, the Administration was faced with additional pressure to "do something"
in response to the Serbs* continued siege of Sarajevo and attacks on civilians in the U.N.
declared safe haven of Gorazde. Members of Congress, the press, and the American public,
largely sympathetic to the plight of the Muslims, began to step up calls for lifting the arms
embargo." Throughout the spring and summer of 1994, Congress voted several times on
measures that demonstrated full support for the termination of the embargo. Although a
consensus formed on the need to lift the embargo, the question of whether it should be done
unilaterally or multilaterally remained. "
*• Id. at 37.
-" Id. at 36.
"* The Majority asserts that Ambassador Galbraith made it clear that he was sympathetic
to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and that he was convinced that the Bosnian Muslims were
desperately in need of weaponry. Majority Report, at 77-78. His views were, in fact, consistent
with those of a majority of those in Congress.
" See Chapter One, Section Three for a more detailed discussion of Congressional action.
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The Administration rejected calls to go it alone in Bosnia At a news conference on April
20. 1994. President Clinton described the situation in Sarajevo. Gora/de and elsewhere in Bosnia
as "increasingly grim" and a "setback for the momentum achie\ ed in recent months." but he
placed a significant premium on "working with our allies, the Russians, and others" to "help the
waning part;°s in Bosnia to reach a negotiated settlement.""" U.S. leadership and allied
solidarity had yielded some small, but significant steps in Bosnia. Secretar. of State Christopher
testified that the effectiveness of a NATO ultimatum to place all heavy weapons threatening
Sarajevo under United Nations control or to remo\ e the heavy \\ eapons to a t\\ enty kilor";ter
exclusion zone around the city was due in large measure to the firmness and solidarity of the
NATO alliance which was !ed in this instance by the United States.'' The allies also shared the
U.S. goal of creating and maintaining a federation between the Bosnians Muslims and Croats as
an instrument to maintain the peace between Bosnian Muslims and Croats and provide the basis
for a quicker settlement to stop the war.""*
The Administration was committed to actions and policies that reduced to a minimum the
potential for a withdrawal from Bosnia by UNPROFOR. For purposes of the Select
Subcommittee invetrtigation. the debate over unilaterally lifting the embargo need not be
rehashed. The depth of opposition to a unilateral lifl within the Administration is important to
'■ The President's News Conference. Public pzpcTZ of the President. Apr. 20. 1994.
" Hearing on Foreign Policy Overview and Budgetary Resources, 103d Congress., 2d
Sess. (1994XstaJement of Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Feb. 23. 1994. at 6).
" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 80.
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note, however, because it influenced how the Administration would respond to the Croatian
question. The Administration believed a withdrawal would expose the Bosnian Muslim militar>'
and civilian population to certain death and destruction and create a humanitarian and military
vacuum which U.S. troops might have been forced to fill. The Clinton Administration also
believed that an UNPROFOR withdrawal would increase the likelihood ihat U.<s. ground forces
would be required to live up to the longstanding U.S. commitment entered into by the Bush
Administration to help the NATO allies extract their troops if and when such an extraction
became necessar\ . '* " *
On April 20, President Clinton outlined his concerns about a unilateral lifting of the
embargo:
First, I \\ ould say that if we ignore a United Nations embargo because we think it has no
moral basis or even any legal validity but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to
stop our United Nations allies from ignoring embargoes that we like, such as the embargo
against Saddam Hussein?. . . Secondly, what are the practical problems with raising the
arms embargo? [)o the Croats, who now have this agreement with the Muslims, support
it? Will it be facilitated? How long would it take to get there? Would that increase Serb
aggression in the short run while we're waiting for the arms to be delivered? There arc a
lot ofpractical problems with it. Do I favor lifting it? I do. Do I believe the allies with
whom we are working now would vote to support it? I don't"
In June. Secretary Christopher outlined what the Administration, in cooperation with the
NATO allies, had accomplished in Bosnia. An agreement had been negotiated between the
Bosnian Muslims and the Croats to end their year-long war, the shelling of Sarajevo had ceased,
and the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde were being enforced. The continuing
violence, he said, made "it \iul that the parties come to a political senlement." The Secretary
" Berger Subcommittee Int. at 4.
** President's News Conference. Apr. 20, 1994.
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emphasized ihe importance of working with Russia and other European partners in Ihe Contact
Group on a proposal to fomi the basis Tor a negotiated settlement. Secretar> Christopher testified
that
"it would be a tragic mistake to undemiine the settlement process which is now quite
promising; to undermine it by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo at this moment. That
would break the cohesion of the NATO alliance." Secretary Christophwr. asserting U.S.
leadership in ensuring that other embargoes were maintained, continued: " It could lead to
a general collapse of U.N. sanctions as an effective instrument in international affairs, and
it could undermine our efTorts in such situations as Iraq and Libya."
Of course, many in Congress believed equally strongly that the United States had a
moral obligation to help the Bost.ians. and that conditioning U.S. policy on a consensus anionic
our allies made neither good political nor good military sense. Many were calling for a lifting of
the anns embargo and. for some of these Members, the immediate objective was using United
States air power to force a Bosnian Serb w ithdrawal from the threatened Bosnian population and
areas and forcing the Serbs to pay a price for its aggression.
The Croatian Question - 1994
In the morrhs prior to April 1994. contact between the Iranians, Bosnians, and Croatians
increased including, in particular, discussion of trade relations and arms deals." The discussions
intensified with the signing of the Federation Agreement. A memo produced by the State
Department Intelligence and Research Bureau in November 1993. foreshadowed what was to
occur a few short months later. |
" (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 30. 1994, transcript pp-H- 12)
'* See Chapter Three, Section One for discussion of Iranian presence in Bosnia.
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B> the spring of 1994. those conditions appeared
to be in place^^^w^^
The question posed by President Tudjman to Ambassador Peter Galbraith shortly after
the signing of the Federation Agreement echoed almost exactly the question put to Special
Envoy Bartholomew one year earlier, "Would the US. object if Croatia were to allow weapons
to transit Croatia en route f^ "^osiva?" The question came amidst ongoing discussions with'i the '
Administration on how to respond to the Bosnian crisis, and more specifically, how to address
the arms embargo issue. The Administration response was not in lieu of a decision on lift, and
indeed, the lift debate continued throughout the summer in the Congress and in the press.
Administration policy makers outlined three options in answering President Tudjman.
The first option was to say that the United States objected. The second option was to say that the
United States did not object. The third was to say that the United States had no instructions.**"
Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that the "no instructions" option was a diplomatic way of
saying that we neither approved of nor objected to what the Croatians were proposing. " Deput>-
Assistant Secretary Vershbow testified that "no instructions" was a "way to neither endorse nor
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott Sept. 5. 1996. at 42-43 (hereinafter
"Talbott Subcommittee. Dep.") Berger Subcomminee Int. at 4.
" SSCI Deposition of Deputy Secretarv- Strobe Talbott, Apr. 23. 1996, at 21.
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approve of something."''
The downside to the "no instructions" response was the likelihood that Iran would be a
probable supplier. Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that:
[AJfter careful consideration we decided that the consequences of any other answer would
be worse. If we had said yes to the Croatians, that is. if we had explicitly, affirmatively
approved the transshipment it would have put us in the position of actively and
unilaterally supporting a violation of the arms embargo. The public disclosure of such a
posture would have caused severe strains with our allies who had troops on the ground in
Bosnia as part of U>fPROFOR and who naturally were giving priority to the safety of
their own people on the ground.*'
!f the allies had discovered that the !Jnited States had endorsed the shipments, a withdrawal of
UNPROFOR might have been triggered. Withdrawal could ha\ e required a substantial U.S.
troop deployment as part of a very dangerous and costly NATO extraction effort. "
On the other hand, saying no to the Croatian request also would have had negative
consequences. If. as a result of explicit U.S. disapproval of the transshipments, the Croatian
government had shut down the arms pipeline; the Federation of .Muslims and Croats would have
been undermined and perhaps destroyed. In addition, the objection might very well have denied
the Muslims the arms essential to their survival."
The **no instructions" response avoided these serious problems and embodied existing
policy. According to Deputy Secretary Talbott:
■*• Vershbow Subconuninee Dep., at 30.
" Talbon SSCI Dep. at 20-21 ; Berger at Subconuninee Int at 4.
"Id. at 21.
*' Talbott Select Subcommittee Dep. at 43.
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It is our honest judgment thai the exchange thai we had with the Croatians in April 1994
did not constitute a change in policy. It was a specific confidential diplomatic exchange
that was consistent with and supponive of a pohcy that had been in place for some time. .
.The back and forth with the Croatians that we are discussing here was totally consistent
with and supponive of that policy.'"
The "no instructions" response neither signaled a change in the United States reaction towards
arms shipments through Croatia, nor signaled a change in the United Staies" compliance with the
embargo. In fact, the "no instructions" response was virtually identical to the response by
Special Envoy Bartholomew to Defense Minister Susak one year earlier.
The Administration oelieved that the Croats would maintain tight control on the type of
weapons which were being shipped to Bosnia, and that they would not allow weapons which it
considered a threat to Croatia to enter Bosnia.'" Ambassador Galbraith testified that the United
States had no control over the arms shipments to Bosnia, although the United States was
interested in collecting as much information as possible:
(Vr^hat went in was overwhelmingly, perhaps exclusively small arms and weapons that
were intended to enable the Bosnian Army to defend itself and the Bosnians to survive.
And the Croats had no interest in the Bosnians acquiring any significant offensive or any
significant heavy weapon, slash high tech weapons capability.''
As theUHH^IHHttcstified, the decision to allow transshipments was a "double edged
sword" for the Croats, and "the Croats were worried about what sorts of weapons the Muslim
forces would get and specifically they didn't want heavy weapons to get to the Muslims because
** Talbott SSCI Dep. at 36-37.
" Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 1 14-15.
*• Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 76-77.
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they feared they would ultimately be used against the Croats.""(
In fact, the Bosnian Croats advaniaye in and control of weapons had been a factor in the
outbreak of war between the Bosnian Croats and .vtuslims the previous year. Croatian forces in
Bosnia could rely on their patrons in Zagreb for weapons supplies, whereas the Bosnian Muslims
were at Zagreb's mercy. U.S. officials were concerned that denying the Bosnians weapons might
lead to a break -down of the Federation and a resumption of war. '°
In instructing Ambassador Galbraith to tell the Croatian Government that he had "no
instructions" with regard lu Croatia allowing arms to transit Croatia en route to Bosnia, the ' '
Clinton Administration walked a fine line bet\veen being sensitive lo the allies* concerns on the
one hand, and not blocking the means of Bosnian survival on the other
The Downside — Iran.
In considering how to respond to President Tudjman's question, the Administration was
aware that Iran had been supplying arms and, absent a clear signal to oppose further
transshipment of weapons, would continue to supply arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
Admimstration officials acknowledge continuation of the "Iranian connection" was the most
significant dow-nside to the no instructions response."
** Select Subconunittee Deposition of§glfgfgM\ug. 9. 1996, at 147-48 (hereinafter
Subcommittee Dep.")- ^^^ *"""
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 27.
" Talbon Select Subcommittee Dep. at 34. For a discussion of the extent to which Iran
was involved in the region between 1991- 1996, see Chapter Three. Section One.
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As discussed previously, the Iranian arms flow was noi triggered by the Administrations
"no instructions" response.
Some believe, incorrectly, that our decision opened the way lo Iranian influence in
Bosnia. By April of 1994. there were hundreds of Iranian mujahideen and Revolutionarv
Guards in Bosnia. So the Croatians" question to us in April of 94 was not an invitation to
open a door that had been closed to the Iranians. That door was already open. Had we
tried to slam it shut, we might very well have also shut down the relationship that was
developing between Croatia and the Federation. .\nd that lesult could have, I believe
almost certainly would have, kept us from ever getting to Dayton.'"
Iran was, moreover, just one of several countries poised to increase the supply and
financing of weapons to Bosnia in the wake of the Federation Agreement. President Tudjmans
question was a generic one. "The question from Tudjman \\ as not can we transship Iranian"'
arms, it was can we tranship arms. .\nd we were witting of course to the fact that a significant
portion of those arms were Iranian, but it was not Iran only."''
According to Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, the .Administration was faced w ith
a set of "lousy choices." "
.\s we negotiated we oflen thought of historical analogies. The one that came to mind
here was Winston Churchill's famous comments about why Britain made cotiunon cause
with Stalin against Hitler. I don't want to put this up into that same level of history. But
it was a legitimate decision for Churchill and he knew full well the consequences. Here
at a much smaller scale, this was done. . . and as soon as the cease fire was in place, as
■= Talbott SSCI Dep. at 22.
'' Emphasis added.
•'■' Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 48.
" SSCI Hearing, Statement of Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, May 21, 1996, at
48 (hereinafter "Holbrooke SSCI Dep.").
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soon as we got to Dayton, we dealt with it. And it has been dealt with.""
The Holbrooke reference to dealing with it concerns the Dauon requirement that foreign forces
leave Bosnia as a condition precedent to United States "equip and train" efforts. In an equally
apt analogy, Holbrooke testified: "When the patient is dying, you first give him oxygen and then
worry about »he source of the oxygen later. And those Iranian shipments. . . kept the patient
alive.""
The Allies.
In the spring of 1994, there were more than 14,300 UNPROFOR troops on the ground in
Bosnia and another 14.500 in Croatia. Of these, more than 15,000 were from NATO countries,
and the bulk of those were from Britain and France. While the Clinton .Administration faNored
lifting the arms embargo, the allies were adamantly opposed to terminating the embargo. There
was a particular concern among the allies that the Bosnian Serbs might target NATO troops if
weapons from a NATO country were seen to be reaching the Bosnian Muslims. According to
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, the allies "fear<ed) that weapons would reach forces
and they might be '.ised against their troops, or in any event, lead to an escalation and make
anyone associated with NATO more \-ulncrable."" In public testimony before the Senate Aimed
Services Committee in June 1994, represenutives of the defense ministries of NATO countries
** Id. at 50.
'" Holbrooke Subcommittee Dep. at 50.
" Select Subcomminee Deposition of Ambassador Robert Hunter, at 40 (hereinafter
"Hunter Subcomminee Dep.").
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with troops on the ground (Denmark. France. Spain, and the United Kingdom) opposed the
lifting of the arms embargo. The witnesses testified that the hfiing of the embargo would force
UNPROFOR to w ithdraw and would inevitably lead to increased L'.S. involvement in the
conflict. "
The Administration took into account allied concerns when decidi.ig hov to respond to
President Tudjman's question. Sensitive to allied reaction, the Administration sought to keep the
exchange between President Tudjman and Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith quiet. Accordine
lo Strobe Talbott, "we w-eie om'ed as hell about leaks. . ."^
Special Envoy Redman testified that despite the fact that the "no instructions" response
confirmed what was already U.S. policy, discretion about the exchange that he and Ambassador
Galbraith had with President Tudjman was critical:
(I)t had implications for our dealings w ith our allies, because they knew we were trying to
lift the arms embargo. They knew that arms were flow ing to the Bosnian go\emment
before this decision as well as after this decision. But it was still important. And it was
obviously important to them, because it actually played out this way, whereas they had
said that UNPROFOR would be out of the country if the United States imilaterally lifted
the arms embargo. When all of thes: reports which started to flow publicly shortly
thereafter, and we shared that information with the allies as well, they didn't make those
threats and they didn't pull out of U">IPROFOR. So it was to me a very important
distinction th:t we had not, ourselves, said we are going to do it and do it. It [2.-ms flows]
did happen to be happening. So it was important, I think that it be handled in a discreet
way.*'
" "Impact of a Unilateral United Suies Lifting of the Anns Embargo on the Government
of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate. One Hundred Third congress. Second session, June 23, 1994, at 1-21.
'^ Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 46.
" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at S8-S9.
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While the allies might not have known about the panicular exchange that occurred in
April 1994, they did become aware of increased amis flows to the Bosnian Muslims. Moreover.
the allies, like the United States, did not object to ihe weapons transfers, .-vmbassador Galbraith
recalled discussing the issue of arms transfers with his European colleagues -- most likely the
Russian and German ambassadors-- and perhaps the British and French ambassadors:
(T)here had been press stories suggesting that arms were. . . flow ing through Croatia to
the Bosnians and noting that the United States was looking the other way. winking,
nodding, whatever the terminology. And I remember this coming up at some occasion
which I was with the other ambassadors and. . . I simply took note of this and I said, have
any of you guys o'ujwCted.' And what I remember well is that not one of them had evtrr
objected. Not one of theii governments had issued a demarche to the Croatian
Government for its role in facilitating the transit of weapons to the Bosnian Government.
And I made note that, as I recall it. that their position was identical to ours."'
The allies were prepared to live with the consequences of the "no instructions" response;
had they been informed of the exchange, however, the allies might ha\e been obliged to protest.
Additional British Concerns.
The British Government, however, did share their concerns about the increase in arms
shipments from Middle Eastern countries to Bosnia with the United States government. A
primary British concern appeared to be that hea\y weapons, which could pose an increased threat
to allied troops, not reach Bosnia. The concerns never rose beyond the level of diplomatic
discussions, and the British did not raise the issue publicly, suggesting that they did not judge the
Middle Eastern arms flows to be of a level significant enough to threaten their troops. Nor did
the fact that the United States refrained from objecting to the shipments stand in the way of the
*^ Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 1 16.
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allied diplomatic etYons which culminated in the Da>lon accords.
Reaction to L'nilateral Lift and to Sunn-Mitchell.
The allies' reaction to proposals for unilateral lifi and to the adoption of the Nunn-
Mitchell amendment stand in sharp contrast to their reaction to the clandestine flow of weapons
from Middle Eastern countries through Croatia to Bosnia. A series of articles in the European
press is highly critical of the U.S. decision to prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds for
enforcement of the arms en-^. rgo For example, ".Xlain Juppe. French foreign minister, said the
U.S. withdrawal from enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia favored those who wanted war
against those who wanted peace. Mr. Francois Leotard, the French defense minister, threatened
to withdraw French troops from Bosnia in the event of "one more step' in the wxong direction."*'
The French Presidential spokesman Jean Musitelli went further: "We regret that our American
allies have acted unilaterally, and without giving much concern for their allies on the ground." **
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd described the expected United States unilateral move as
"a worrying development" while Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen described a
lifting of the embargo as a "bad signal."*'
The implementation of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment also fueled speculation among the
" Lionel Barber and Bruce Clark, FtenclLattaclLLIS-policy-onBosiiiaLRow highlights
drifting apart of! 'S and its European allies. The Financial Times, Nov. 1 7, 1994, at 2.
** EranccBiitain SlamAiS-oyenEmhargaPullQul, Agence France Presse, Nov. 18, 1994.
*' European allies_iirilatcdby.U5.BQsmaJ>ecision. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Nov. 11,
1994.
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allies thai the U.S. was actively involved in a coven operation to help the Bosnians. "America's
decision to stop enforcing the amis embargo against the Bosnian Muslims has split N.MO and
opened a Pandora's box of accusations about the U.S. secret agenda in the Balkans"^ and
[R]ecent reports in Europe that the United States is co\ enly aiding the Bosnian Muslims
are strongly denied by .American officials and appear to be inaccurate in many details.
The frequency of these stories, based on claims by unidentified European officials" and
United Nations officers, increased last week af^er the Clinton Administration decided to
stop enforcing a regional arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslim-led government."
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter said that "There was a concern about the time
of the Nunn-Mitchell that the United States was going to leave allies \Tjlnerable to the movement
of arms."*' A primary concern of the allies appears to be that the prominent U.S. role in
unilateral lift and/or Nunn-Mitchell threatened the cohesion of the alliance. The gist of those
concerns was that "this would bring their troops under greater threat. Some of them, like the
French, also argued that this show ed the United States was violating the U.N. provisions and also
was not pulling its weight as an ally." In fact, the United States was not involved directly in
weapons flows from the Middle East. Nor did the arms flows include heav^ weapons of the kind
that would constitute a grave threat to UKPROFOR troops on the groun(».
" Ed Vulliamy. America's Secret Bosnia Agenda, The Observer, Nov. 20, 1994, at 16.
*^ Secretary Christopher sent Undersecretary TamofTto Paris to reassure French officials
that the United States was not supplying aims to the Bosnians, and to stem rumors of a U.S.
covert operation. Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Tamoff, Sept. 13, 1996, at 27-28.
(heremafler "Tamoff Subcomminee Dep ")
** John Pomfret, U.S. Denies Furopean Claims it is Aiding Bosnian MiiOims,
International Herald Tribune, Nov. 21. 1994.
" Hunter Subcomminee Dep. at 22.
'• Id. at 43.
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It is also important to note that to the allies the issue of concern was arms shipments to
the Bosnians and not the role of the Iranians in the arms shipments. Fourteen of the fifteen
NATO allies have diplomatic relations with Iran. According to Ambassador Hunter, not all of
our European allies share the U.S. goal of isolating Iran: "Some do to some degree and some
believe in what they call, I guess, constructive engagement. Constructive dialogue is the phrase
used by the Germans.""' This difference in allies' views of Iran may explain why there is no
evidence of European allies expressing specific concern that Iran was the source of some of the
arms reaching Bosnia.
Privately, NATO allies expressed some dismay at the break in allied cohesion upon the
revelation by the U.S. press in April 1996 of the "no instructions" response. Although
Ambassador Hunter can recall no specific complaints or comments from NATO allies upon the
publication in April 1996 of press reports about the "no instructions" response, he testified that
he did receive some comments.
If I recall correctly by the timing, the war was over, IFOR was deployed, IFOR
was being successful, and it was a tenor of we are surprised you did this, you
shouldn't have done it, but that is history, in the sense that it did not pose at that
occasion of revelation, an ongoing threat to allied forces. ^
Unlike the reaction to Nunn-Mitchell. European governments' public reaction to the
press accounts was muted. The British Parliament, for example, did not raise the issue with
Briti&ii Ministers during the regular questioning period. European press accounts of the
"Id. at 47.
"" Id. at 50.
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revelation of the Middle East pipeline in April 1996 largely recount the Los Angeles Times
stories and describe plans in the United States Congress to investigate the allegations. They offer
little commentary, and do not include responses b> European leaders. '
Results of United States Policy.
The weapons flow during 1994 and 1995 helped the Bosnians survive until such time as
the circumstances were ripe for a negotiated peace. Weapons deli\ered to the Bosnians
throughout 1994 and 199i were'probabiy not the decisi\e factor in bringing the Serbs to the" '
negotiating table; weapons delivered to the Croatians may have been a more important factor.
The Croatians were in fact, receiving a cut of at least one third of the weapons being sent to
Bosnia. They were also engaged in arms deals of their own. Croatia had a stake in allowing
weapons to transit its territory. The Croatians' goal was to "keep (the Bosnians) in the war or at
least operating effectively and to tie down the Serbs. It's largely a question of geography in that
the Croats' main goal was to retake the occupied parts of Croatia and the Serb forces where were
linked to the Serb forces in Bosnia. The degree to which the Croats could pin those forces in
place would make it easier to launch their attack in occupied Croatia.""* In the summer of 1995.
the Croatians did retake those occupied territories, and together with Muslim forces, did put
Gingrich announces probe oflranian aims shipments to Ro<mia,"Agfnfj; France Presse.
Apr. 24, 1996; Iranian Arms Jo Bosnia was 'arreptahle risk'- Ppnia£fin, Agence France Presse.
Apr. 25, 1996; Tom Rhodes, Clinton Approved Iran's Sfcret Ann<; Deals with RoCTiia, The
Times, Apr. 6, 1996. Rupert Comwell and Mary Dejevsky. riintnn Hit hy Row over Iranian
Arms, The Independent, Apr. 8, 1996, at 10.
Subcommittee Dep. at 148.
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pressure on Serb forces in Bosnia. These factors, combined with NATO air strikes against the
Serbs, created incentives for the Serbs to cut a deal
According to Richard Holbrooke:
(T)he fundamental policy was absolutely correct, and without it. the Bosnian government
would never have survived the winter of 1994-95. and we never would have gotten to
Dayton. It is as simple as that. Sarajevo was in desperate shape a; that point, having
barely survived its war with the Croats, and being under continual assault from the
Serbs'' . . . Policy sometimes offers you only lousy choices. And we took the least lousy
choice and I believe that the outcome more than justified the decision ... the record will
show that the decision of April 94 resulted in the survival of the Bosnians through the
winter of 94-95. and into the summer. °
In going no further than "no instructions" and remaining discreet, the United States
a\oided an allied break on Bosnia. Maintaining consensus among the NATO allies with respect
to NATO air strikes and international sanctions on Serbia was no easy matter." Had the United
States gone further than "no instructions" and actually endorsed the shipping of weapons to
Bosnia, the Clinton Administration believed the sometimes uneasy alliance over Bosnia might
have collapsed.
The alliance did hold together over Bosnia, however. The United States, NATO, and
other allied for:es are serving side by side in IFOR and also are working together to implement
the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. The IFOR arrangements are unprecedented and have
been highly successful.^
*' Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 26.
'* Id. at 48-49.
" Hunter Subcommittee Dep. at 37.
" Hunter Subconunittee Dep. at 47.
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H'hy the Policy Worked.
(I)n the wake of our 1994 April answer to the Croatians -- and I would contend partly as a
consequence of it -- the following happened. The Bosnian armed forces held on and
began to counterattack. The Federation survived to become a cornerstone of the Dayton
Agreement. We averted a crisis in the alliance. UNPROFOR remained in place,
providing humanitarian supplies and helping the Bosnians through another brutal winter.
We bought time for a combination of American diplomacy, NATO air power, and
Croatian and Bosnian military victories to reach an historic peace agreement under
United States leadership in Dayton. The United States is leading an international effort to
arm Bosnia today. The Iranian presence there is down to a handfiil and increasingly
marginalized. ... a tough decision tumed out to be the right decision."
It was Dayton that gave us a chance to get the Iranians out of Bosnia. And the Dayton
accords, we insisted on and achieved a commitment to the !emo\ al of all foreign forces '
from Bosnia. VA-'hile we remain concerned by any remaining Iranian influence in Bosnia
to this day. and continue to insist that foreign forces leave the country, very substantial
progress has been made on this issue, largely through determined American leadership.'"
This much is clear. In 1994, Bosnia was embroiled in a bitter \\ar that threatened to spill
over to other parts of Europe. U.S. leadership helped bring an end to the fighting among the
Bosnian Muslims. Croats, and Serbs, to the rape and torture, to the mass executions, and to the
sniper attacks on civilians; it has helped create the conditions to build a new Bosnian state, and
stopped the war from spreading. In early 1994, hundreds of Iranians were present in Bosnia and
Croatia. Today, the Iranian fighters have been forced out.
The peace in Bosnia may be fragile, but it is simplistic and simply wrong to suggest, as
does the Majority, that any tenuousness in the peace can be blamed on the "no instructions"
" Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 23-24.
•» Talbott SSCI Dep. at 22.
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response." If in the worst case scenario, the peace does not hold, it will be because of reasons far
more complex than the U.S. deliver>- of a "no instructions" response to President Tudjman.
" Majority report at 194-95.
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Chapter One
Section Three
THE ROLE OF COSGRESS
The Administration did not develop its Bosnian policy in a vacuum. The Congress was
involved actively in a public debate throughout the period of the arms embargo. However, the
debate probably was most intense during late 1993 and into the fall of 1994. Like the Clinton
Administration, the Congress was increasingly concerned about the situation on the ground in
Bosnia. Like the Administraticn.'the Congress had to choose between a series of difficult - '
options. Like the Administration, the Congress wanted to end the arms embargo against Bosnia.
But, unlike the Administration, many in Congress believed the United States should withdraw
unilaterally from the arms embargo if the allies refused to end it multilalerally.
Congressional Action on the Arms Embargo.
As early as 1992, the United States Congress was on record in support of U.S. arms
transfers to the Bosnian Government subsequent to the lifting of the arms embargo. In the
summer of 1992. the Congress adopted the Biden amendment to the Fiscal Year ("FY" j 1993
Foreign Operations, Export FinarKing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,' authorizing
the President, pursuant to a lifting of the United Nations embargo, to transfer S50 million in
defense articles to the Bosnian government In 1993, a similar amendment was adopted to the
' Fiscal Year 1993 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, P.L. 102-391.
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FY1994 Foreign Operations appropriations bill. • In 19')3, however, calls to lift the international
arms embargo against the Bosnian government -- or at least for the U.S. to provide arms to the
Bosnians in spite of the embargo -- began to accelerate. In June, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee adopted a Hyde amendment to the FY 1994 State Department authorization bill
authorizing the President to provide S200 million in military equipment to 'he Bosnian
government, in spite of the arms embargo. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted a
similar amendment to the FY 1994 foreign aid authorization bill, after considering an
amendment by Senator Lug?- to require unilateral termination of the embargo. Several
Congressional resolutions considered in 1993 called for the multilateral lifting of the embargo as
one part of an overall policy to bring an end to the war in Bosnia.'
In 1994, calls for the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia intensined. In January
1994. despite the strong opposition of the .Administration, the Senate voted eighty-seven to nine
in favor of a nonbinding Dole amendment to the State Department authorization bill' to terminate
the United States participation in the arms embargo. The deteriorating situation in Bosnia, most
notably the February shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace and the Serb siege of Gorazde in April
1994, led to continued pressure from Members of Congress from both parties to lift the arms
embargo. Impatient v^ith the pace of United States and European diplomatic activity, many
- Fiscal Year 1994 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, P.L. 103-87.
' Julie Kim and Dianne E. Rennack, BosniaJlerccgovina Conflict andJhe-LQ3d
rnngTgjtsr Policy nehate«i and <;iimmary of Major Legislation. CRS Report 94-1008F, Dec.l2.
1994, at 27-28.
■* U.S. Department of Stole Authorization Act P.L. 103-236
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Members concluded that the level of human rights violations in Bosnia had to be stopped even at
the risk of damaging relations with our European allies.
Beginning in the spring of 1994. the Congress devoted an extraordinary amount of
legislative and debate lime to the arms embargo issue. In May 1994. Senators Dole and
Lieberman introduced S. 2042, mandating the termination of the United States arms embargo on
Bosnia and Hercegovina. The debate on S. 2042 made clear that Members were virtually
unanimous about the need to lift the embargo, but divided about whether the United States
should break ranks with the allies ?nd lift the embargo unilaterally.'
United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 prohibited all member states from
shipping arms to the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequent U.N. Resolutions 740 and
787 called upon all members to enforce the embargo against shipments by other countries. The
Dole-Lieberman measure purported to relie%e the United States of its obligation under U.N.
Security Resolution 7 1 3 and to end U.S. panicipation in enforcement activities. First, the Dole-
Lieberman bill would have terminated the United Sutes arms embargo against Bosnia. Second,
the bill would have prohibited the President or any other member of the E.xecutive branch from
interfering with the transfer of arms to the Govemmcnt of Bosnia. In effect, the measure would
have allowed the United States to ship arms and would have prevented the United States from
enforcing the embargo against any third country seeking to transfer w eapons to Bosnia.* Senator
Dole later modified the measure to eliminate the possibility that the nonenforcement of the arms
' Cong. Rec. S5607-S5627 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
* The measure also made clear that it should not be interpreted as an authorization for the
deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia for any purpose.
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embargo would inadvertently allow the transfer of nuclear or other advanced weapons to Bosnia.
The modincation provided that only conventional weapons appropriate to the self-defense of
Bosnia would be allowed. At no lime Jid the moJificuiion or the original measure make any
attempt to exclude Iranian shipments or otherwise limit the source of weapons.
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell introduced an aliemative amendment to S.2042
directing the President to seek the agreement of the NATO allies to temiinate the embargo
multilaterally, and to propose or support a United Nations Security Council resolution to lift the
embargo. If the embargoVcre not lifted, the Mitchell amendment directed the President to
consult with the Congress within five days regarding the unilateral lifting of the embargo. The
amendment further instructed the President, upon the tennination of the embargo, to ensure that
appropriate military assistance was pro\'ided io Bosnia. The Mitchell amendment also approved
and authorized the use of United States air power to implement the NATO exclusion zones
around United Nations designated sate areas and to protect United Nations forces.
On May 12, after e.xtensive debate, the Senate passed the Dole-Lieberman measure as
well as the Mitchell amendment, by identical votes of SO to 49, and proceeded to pass the
underlying bill with the two conflicting measures, by voice vote. While the votes left no doubt
that the Senate favored lifting the embargo, it sent a mixed message on whether the United States
should do so unilaterally. The House Appropriatiotis Committee rejected a Hoyer amendment to
the FY 1995 Foreign Operations appropriations bill which would have barred funds for
enforcement of the embargo. However, the House subsequently adopted a McCloskey Oilman
' Cong. Rec. S 5415 (daily ed. May 10, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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amendment to the FY 1995 Defense authorization bill directing the President to temiinate the
arms embargo and authorizing up to S200 million in militar> assistance. An alternative
amendment sponsored by Representative Hamiltot. supporting NATO and L'.N. efforts to
enhance Bosnia's ability to contribute to its defense was defeated.
The House debate on June 9. 1994, echoed the one that occurred in the Senate a few-
weeks earlier. Proponents of the McCloskey amendment argued that concerns about the situation
on the ground in Bosnia should override any concern about the views of our NATO allies.
Congressman Hyde argued tJiat **America is too important and too moral a country to avert ifc"
eyes from genocide and ethnic cleansing. . ."* Opponents of the McCloskey amendment,
including the Administration, argued that it would intensify the war. lead to the withdrawal of the
United Nations which fed two out of every three Bosnians, end international humanitarian
assistance, terminate the peace process, undermine U.N. sanctions w orldwide. and risk
Americanizing the war.'' Congressman Hamilton warned that if the United States began
supplying weapons, the Serbs might retaliate by targeting UT^TROFOR, in which case:
American forces will be called upon to rescue them. If our allies pull out troops, the
fighting int-nsifies. and we will be called to help. We will be called upon to send
weapons in, and we will be called upon for U.S. troops to help keep the delivery routes
open. But in a larger sense, we become responsible for Bosnia's fate. Bosnia becomes a
client. Our prestige and our power will have to be used to assure a Bosnian victory. We
cannot go at it halfway.'**
In a replay of the May debate, the Senate took up the arms embargo as part of its
' Cong Rec. H4241 (daily ed. June 9, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
' Cong Rec. H4234 (daily ed. June 9, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
"Id.
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consideration of the Defense authorizaiion bill. On July I . the Senate adopted by a vote of 52 to
48. a Nunn-Wamer amendment endorsing the elTons of the contact group and expressing the
Sense of Congress that if the Bosnian Serbs do not respond constructively to the peace
negotiations, the President shall propose or support a U.N. Security Council resolution to
terminate the arms embargo. On the same day, the Senate rejected by a vote of SO to 50 a Dole-
Lieberman amendment mandating a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
The FY 1995 Defense authorization bill became another \ehicle for debate over the
United States policy on the ^-^» rmbargo. The Administration and a bipartisan group of
Congressional Members wanted to make the multilateral lifting of the arms embargo a condition
precedent to supplying the Bosnian Muslims. A bipartisan group of opponents wanted the
United States to arm the Bosnian Muslims regardless of the views of the allies.
Because Members on both sides of the debate wanted arms to reach the Bosnian
Muslims, the issue of stopping arms from reaching Bosnia never arose. In effect, the September
1992 decision by the Bush Administration to stop arms from reaching the Bosnians in order to
demilitarize the region was ignored during the Congressional debate on the arms embargo.
The Nunn-Mitehdl Amendment.
In seeking to reconcile the conflicting provisions on the aims embargo, the conference
conunittee on the Defense authorization bill adopted language providing that the United Sutes
would seek a United Nations resolution ending the arms embargo by the end of October and
commence supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims if the Serbs did not agree to the peace
plan by October 15, 1994. If the United Nations did not terminate the embargo, no U.S. funds
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could be used to enforce the arms embargo after Nov ember 1 5 The compromise language also
required the President to submit plans to. and consult with. Congress on lifting the arms embargo
unilaterally and on providing training to Bosnian Government forces outside the territory of
Bosnia. The conference report for H.R. 4301 was approved by the House on August 17, 1994,
the Senate on September 13. and the bill was signed by the President on Of-tober 5. Thus, as
early as August 17, approximately three and one-half months at^er the Galbraith and Redman
meeting with President Tudjman, the House of Representatives had voted to eliminate United
States flnancial support for enforcement of the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and to se:
in place a process that could culminate in the shipment of United States arms to Bosnia.
In the meantime, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Detense appropriations bill
(H.R. 46S0) mandating the unilateral lifting of the embargo on .\ugust 1 1 . The measure,
sponsored by Senators Dole and Liebemian passed by a vote of 58 to 42. A Nunn-Mitchell
amendment similar to the language adopted by the Defense authorization conference also passed
by a vote of 56 to 44. At no time during the debate on the Defense authorization bill or the
Defense appropriations bill did any Member seek to impose or even discuss a mechanism to
limit the flow of arms to Bosnia. Nor did the debate on the Nunn-Mitchell language ever address
the issue of Iranian or other sources of weapons flowing to Bosnia. The language of the Nunn-
Mitchell amendment prohibits the use of Defense Department funds for enforcing the arms
embargo against Bosnia — regardless of whether those weapons come from Iran or any other
country. The complete and total abseiKe of any mention of an Iranian role in arms shipments
should not suggest that Congress was either unconcerned or unaware of the Iranian role. Rather,
the debate demonstrates that the priority of the Congress, like that of the Clinton Administration.
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was to get arms to Bosnia.
Both the Nunn-Mitchell and the Dole-Liebemian provisions were dropped in conference •
- in part because the Nunn-Mitchell language was already included in the Defense authorization
bill that was on its way to becoming law. Assistant Secretar>- of State Richard Holbrooke
commented that the Nunn-Mitchell amendment "actually required the Administration to act in a
way that ... is completely consistent with the Galbraith-Tudjman conversation. That is. under
Nunn-Mitchell, no funds, personnel, or United States activities of any son could be used to
enforce the arms embargo."" He continued: "I would say that basically what Galbraith di was
consistent with the law as it was about to be passed.*'"
A Continuing Push to Lift the Embargo -1995
In 1995, the debate over unilateral lift continued. In January, Senators Dole and
Lieberman introduced a bill to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia.'' .An identical version of
the bill was introduced in the House by Representative Chris Smith in March." In June, the
House approved an amendment to H.R. 1561 containing provisions similar to those in the Dole
Lieberman bill. Th^ Senate approved S. 21 on July 26 by a vote of 69 to 29. Oh August 1. the
House approved S. 21 by a vote of 298 to 128. President Clinton vetoed S. 21 on August 1 1,
" Hearing on U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments into Bosnia before the
Senate Select Comminee on Intelligence, IWih Cong. 30 (1996) (sutement of Assistant
Secretary Richard Holbrooke).
'= S. 21. I04th Cong. (1996).
" H.R. 1 172, 104lh Cong. (1996).
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arguing that the bill would undermine chances for peace, lead to a wider w ar. and likely result in
the rapid withdrawal of L'NPROFOR from Bosnia, with U.S. military suppon." Momentum
toward a settlement increased by the end of the summer, .\fter N.ATO launched its air strike
operation against Bosnian Serb military targets in late August 1495. Senator Dole postponed
Senate action on overriding the President's \ eto.
'* Julie Kim, Bosnia: Legislatioo-on LiftiiigJhej\nns-Embargo.i04th CongressUst
Session. CRS Report 96-347 F. Apr. 17, 1996. at 1-2.
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Chapter One
Section Four
PUBLIC AMD COSGRESSIOSAL KSOn LEDGE OF ARMS FLOWS
Public Statements by the Administration.
From 1993 through 1995, members of the Administration were asked whether the United
States abided by the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. As discussed elsewhere in the Minority
Views," the United States had a legal obligation to refrain from providing any weapons and
military equipment to the cc- tries of the FRY." The United States had no intemationa' ' ^-1
obligation to enforce the embargo against third countries, however.' In practice, the
Administration carefully walked the line bet\veen that which it was prohibited from doing and
that which it was simply called upon to do.
As the Administration was not required to enforce the embargo against third countries, it
chose not to do so. However, the Administration did not wish to aimounce or confirm the policy
of not objecting to aims shipped to Bosnia by third countries. To do so risked exposing the
Bosnian Muslims to even more slaughter. Consequently, the Administration sought to walk the
fine line of not sending United States aims, but not objecting to arms sent by third countries.
" Stt Minority Repoit. for a discussion of United States Obligations Under International
Law, at Section 1, Chapter S.
" United Nations Security Council Resolution 713. 1991.
'" U.N. Security Council Resolutions 740, 787 (1991); seejdsQ Minority Repoit
discussion of United Sutes Obligations Under International Law, at Section 1, Chapter 5. Some
Members of Congress also argued that under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the
Bosnian Government had the inherent right to self-defense and that the arms embargo therefore
did not apply.
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The Majority Report identifies several instances when the Administration did not walk
the fine line perfectly.'" Most, if not all of the examples, occur in 1995 following enactment of
the Nunn-Mitchell amendment which, in essence, prohibited the United States Government from
enforcing the arms embargo with respect to Bosnia. Thus, any references made by
Administration spokespersons about abiding by the U.N. Security Resolutions applied only to
U.N. Security Council Resolution 713.
However, the United States also had international political reasons for avoiding a
confirmation of U.S. nonenfi- -cement of third country compliance with the embargo (at least in
the six months before enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment). To have confirmed publicly
U.S. policy with respect to nonenforcement would have led to a confrontation with the allies.
Therefore, the Administration elected to ignore aims shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, but to
refrain from making this decision public.
The United States did not. how ever, approve, permit or support arms shipments from
Iran or any other country to Bosnia. The position followed by the Administration was very
carefully and narrowly circumscribed: starting in 1993, the United States neither approved of nor
opposed arms transshipments through Croatia to Bosiua from any source, including bar.. By
hewing to this policy line, the United States neither violated the U.N. Security Council
Resolution nor triggered a confrontation with the allies.
As the Majority Report points ouc in the months prior to enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell
amendment, two Administration ofHcials made sutements that the United States was enforcing
'* Majority Report at 33.
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333
the embargo. The other incidents referred to in the Majority Report involve news accounts
quoting unnamed Administration ofTicials. and three sets of Administration press guidance that
may never have been used. The Majority concludes, based upon these examples, that the United
States falsely and consistently denied any U.S. role in the Iranian arms pipeline. The fact is that
the United States hcd no role in the Iranian arms pipeline. Therefore any and all such denials of
such a role would be accurate. The Minority would agree that the two statements made by the
State Department that the U.S. expected the arms embargo to be respected by third countries
were not accurate reflections of United States policy, but the Minority does not think that two '
offhand statements by State Department oflicials amount to pattern or practice of misleading
statements.
Moreover, the Minority categorically rejects a number of the characterizations of
Administration comments made by the Majority. Administration officials did say that the United
States was not covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to the Bosnian
government." National Security Council press guidance did state that the U.S. did not cooperate,
coordinate or consult with any other government regarding the provision of arms to the
Bosniaits.^ Both statements are true. As discussed elsewhere in the Minority Views, the "no
instructions** response did not amount to either supplying or supporting the supply of arms, and
certainly cannot be characterized as coq>eration, coordination or consultation with the
Government of Croatia or any other government to provide arms to the Bosnians.
'* Majority Report at 34.
-'Id.
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334
On April 20. 1994. President Clinton addressed the Bosnian situation at a news
conference. The President's statement was devoted to making the case for stronger action
against Serb aggression. He spoke of the siege on Oorazde and the shelling of Sarajevo.
President Clinton identified the United States objective; to make the Serbs pay a higher
price for their acts of violence in order to push them to the negotiating table. Tne President
continued, "in pursuit of that policy, we must take further action.""' The President
acknowledged the need to work with the United States allies, but it was clear that he expected the
United States to be leading .iie effor: to rein in Serb aggression by word and action. ' '
Of course. President Clinton was not aware of the quer\ which President Tudjman would
deliver to Ambassador Galbraith the following week. Nevertheless, the remarks made by the
President on April 20 demonstrate a commitment by the United States to do what it could to help
the Bosnian Muslims so long as the United Nations Security Council Resolution was not
violated and the allies did not threaten to pull out of the peacekeeping force.
Public information.
Information that anris were flowing to Bosnia was readily available to Members of
Congress and their staffs." Readers of The WashingtoiLEosl and viewers of CNN were
informed in the spring of 1994 that Iran was one of the countries supplying weapons to the
-' Clinton News Conference, AP Online. Apr. 20, 1994.
"" For a list of press accounts of arms flows to Bosnia, see Appendix F.
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Bosnian Muslims."' Some news accounts noted that governments, including the United States
Government, were turning a blind eye to the shipments/* Many of the news accounts were
highly detailed. For example, an August 2. 1994. Washington Times piece contained a chart
chronicling arms shipments to Serbia. Croatia, and Bosnia, from .'^pril 1992 to April 1994.
During that period, Iran was reported to have shipped S20 million worth of arms to Bosnia and
another S5 million worth of arms to Croatia. By contrast, the countries of the former Soviet
Union were reported to have shipped S360 million in arms to Serbia, while Slo\ akia reportedly
shipped SlOO million in wevans •" From August 1992 to September 1994, well over a doz;n
articles describing leaks in the embargo appeared in major new spapers."" Many of these news
stories ran on the front page.
During floor debate on legislation to lift the arms embargo on June 24. 1994. Senator
John McCain expressed concern about reports of Iranian flows and read into the Congressional
RecQid an article from that day's Washingtoa Times chronicling Iranian arms deliveries to
" John Pomfi^t, Iranian Ships Explosives to Bosnian MikIIitk;; Fmharg.-i-Bustlnfi Targn
■ , The Washington Post, May 13. 1994. at Al, A43; Ralph Begleiter. We^jons
Flowing to Bosnia in Violation of ! J K Fmhargn. CNN. June 7. 1994.
•* Bill Geitz, Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia; Aid to Miislim<: Gets 1 i «; 'Wink',
Washington Times. Jun. 24. 1994. at Al .
-* Paul Beaver. Iran uses Russian Planes to Supply Bosnian Muslim, Cmatian Troops.
Washington Times. Aug. 2, 1994, at A 14.
-• See Appendix F for a selected list of major press articles regarding leaks in the United
Nations aims embargo.
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Bosnia.'* In addition, on August 1 1 , 1994. during the debate on the Nunn-Mitchell amendment to
the Defense Department authorization bill. Senator Dole acknowledged awareness of intelligence
reporting on arms shipments to Bosnia when he expressed concern that Nunn-Mitchell would
continue to permit United States intelligence personnel, other than Defense intelligence
personnel, to collect intelligence on arms shipments'* In June 1995, Senator Dole again referred
to the Iranian shipments, acknowledged Administration knowledge of those shipments, and even
suggested that the Bosnians were justified in receiving those shipments:
The fact is the arms embargo has guaranteed that Iran is a key supplier of arms to Bosnia
and administration oflicials have actually used that fact to argue that there is no need to
lift the arms embargo. What other choices do the Bosnians have? They are going to find
weapons where they caii find weapons.'^
Those who followed Bosnia issues more closely also could find reporting on the issue in
the European press and in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) daily reports, an
unclassified translation of foreign new s articles and broadcasts published by the CIA.^" Since
1991, FBIS carried at least 35 pieces chronicling the growing economic and political ties
between Croatia, Bosnia, and Iran.
Intelligence information.
Intelligence reporu made available to Congress also chronicled leaks in the arms
'' Bill Gertz, Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia; AidJO-Muslims Gets 1 1 S * Wink', The
Washington Times, Jun. 24. 1994, at Al .
-* Cong. Rec. SI 1265 (daily ed. Aug. II, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
" Cong. Rec. S7880 (daily ed June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
'" See Appendix F for a listing of foreign press reports.
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337
embargo. Products containing information on violations of the arms embargo included the
National Intelligence Dailies ("NIDs"). the Militar>' Intelligence Dailies ("MEDs"), daily and
weekly situation reports prepared by ih^|^/Balkan Task Force ("BTF"). and periodic special
reports. " Deputy Secretary Talbott told a Senate Committee that "you had a lot of the same
information available to you that we were operating on within the Executive branch. . . I am
referring to classified information about many things, but including the flow of Iranian arms into
Bosnia that was generally available to the Congress more or less contemporaneously to when it
was available to us." '" C5s2
The National Intelligence Daily is provided on a regular basis to the Members and
appropriately cleared staffs of eight Congressional Committees. In 1994, the Committees
included the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, the
House Intelligence Committee, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on National
Security, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate .\rmed Services Committee, the
Senate Intelligence Conunittee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on
Defense.*' The House and Senate leadership and their appropriately cleared staffs also had
access to these materials. In addition to the more than 120 Members of the House leadership and
relevant Conunittees and the nearly 60 Members of the Senate leadership and relevant
*' See Appendix E for a list of dates of articles in the NIDS contaii\ing information on
anas shipments to Bosnia.
'- SSCI Hearing. Sutement of Strobe Talbott, Sept 1996, at 37 (Hereinafter "Talbott
SSCIDep.-).
*' Lener from David P. Holmes. Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs, to Michelle
Maynaid. (Oct. 8. 1996).
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338
committees to whom intelligence repons are made available on a daily basis, other Members of
Congress can review the NIDs and other intelligence material upon request. In 1994, 520 House
and Senate Committee staff members held the necvssary clearances to review the NIDs and other
highly classified intelligence products.
Between January 1994 and December 199S^fpimBthe VID carried reports of
actual or arranged arms shipments to Bosnia; many of them specifically referred to Iranian
shipments transiting Croatia en route to Bosnia, ''i
The Bosnians were making these requests in
the wake of the Federation Agreement. The Croatians. in turn, sought the United States view.
The suggestions made by some that the request was initiated by United States government
officials cannot be given any credence in light of the March and April intelligence reporting!
Other intelligence products also carried reports of arms embargo violations. For
example, from April 1994 through August 1995. infomiation about actual arms shipments and/or
Iranian activities in the region appeared in^pHWof the Balkan Task Force's Daily Situation
Reports. These reports were provided to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, to the
Subcommittee on National Security of the House Appropriations Committee, and to the Senate
Security office for review by Members and appropriately cleared staff of the Senate Foreign
^ See Appendix E.
339
Relations Committee and Senate leadership.|
The intelligence reporting on arms shipments to Bosnia should not be considered in a
vacuum. Intelligence reports also contained intbmiation about w capons transfers to Serbia from
third countries, as well as transfers to the Bosnian Serb forces in violation of the amis embargo.
The disparity' in arms shipments between the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and the
Bosnian Muslims on the other is dramatic evidence of why providing the Bosnians with arms
was so crucial in the spring of 1994. Absent these shipments, including the Iranian shipments,
Bosnia might have been coT^lcteiy overrun. ^
Briefings.
Members and staff also were briefed on the situation in Bosnia on a regular basis. In
1994, the State Department conducted a minimum of thirty- five briefmgs on Bosnia, and in
1995, it conducted nearly 1 SO.' TheMBBalkan Task Force also conducted numerous
briefings on all aspects of the situation in Bosnia, including the military situation, violations of
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and violations of the arms embargo against all of the
republics of die foimer Yugoslavia. According to CIA records, the issue of arms transfers was
discussed on at least fourteen occasions beuveen February 1994 and December 199S."
Former XiS. Senator Dennis DeConcini. Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
^ XiS. Department of State Bosnia Briefings Calendar. According to the State
Department, entries between January and September 1994 may not be complete.
" Attachment to Letter fixjm David P. Holmes, CIA, to Michelle Maynard, Oct. 8, 1996,
at 1-2 (noting the number of briefings given by the Balkan Task Force at which the issue of arras
flows to Bosnia was discussed).
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340
Intelligence in 1994 recalls being briefed as early as 1992 about clandestine arms shipments to
Bosnia from Iran and other Islamic countries. In May 1994, Senator DcConcini and other
Senators were briefed by Director James Woolsey of the Central Intelligence Agency about arms
shipments to Bosnia from Iran and other Islamic countries. Senator DeConcini also remembers
reading press reports about Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia in May and June 1994. but recalled
specifically being briefed on the issue prior lo reading the press reports. He further recalls being
told by a briefer from the Central Intelligence Agency in early May or late June of 1994 that
Ambassador Galbraith had !eliverid a "no instructions" response to President Tudjman.^Ql|^
Congressional Delegation Trips/Staff Delegation Trips to Croatia and Bosnia.
According to State Department records, nearly forty Congressional and suff delegations
traveled to Croatia in 1994 and 1995. During these visits. Members and staff had the opportunity
to discuss with Embassy officials a wide range of issues related to the Balkan conflict. Most
received a country briefmg from Ambassador Galbraith. The .\mbassador testified that he
discussed the general issue of the arms flows to Bosnia with Congressional Members and staff
who visited Zagreb iii the summer and £all of 1994." Galbraith discussed with members of
delegations "the fact that arms were flowing to the Bosnians, that Iran was one country that was
** Select Subcomminee Interview of the Honorable Dennis DeConcini, Oct 7, 1996, at 1
(hereinafter "Select Subconuninee Int of Hon. DeConcini*^.
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Galbraith. .Aug. 19, 1996, at 91 (hereinafter
"Galbraith Subcommittee Dcp."). In particular, the ambassador discussed the issue with a
Senator as well as a foreign policy advisor to another Senator, both of whom visited Zagreb in
June 1 994. Ambassador Galbraith also testified that it is conceivable that he discussed the issue
of arms flows with a second Senator during that time.
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341
supplying them, and that we were not objecting."*" He did not. however, inform anyone of the
specific exchange with President Tudjman.
Ambassador Galbraith had discussions with Senators in the context of the Congressional
debate over the unilateral lifting of the anms embargo. Ambassador Galbraith made the point that
there were many negative consequences to unilateral lift, and that, "in any event, arms were
reaching the Bosnian Muslims.**" Galbraith testified that while he cannot recall whether he
mentioned that Iran was one of the suppliers, he would not, in theory, have been reluctant to
mention such a fact'- During a June 1994 trip to Zagreb, congressional staff asked Amba^s-'c' t
Galbraith about intelligence reports recounting weapons shipments into Bosnia from Iran and
possibly elsewhere. Ambassador Galbraith confirmed the accuracy of those reports, and that the
United States was not objecting to those shipments.*' Ambassador Galbraith also testified that in
a phone conversation with a senator on the issue of the arms embargo, he pointed to the fact that
arms were getting through to the Bosnians as a reason that a unilateral lifting of the arms
embargo was not necessary.**
The Administration made no attempt to restrict Congressional knowledge about the flow
of arms to Bosnia. As Deputy Secretary Talbott testified, "... the Congress was, broadly
speaking, aware, as we were, of the Iranian connection in Bosnia because it was reported on a
•ld-at88.
*'Id.at9l.
'^ Id. at 138-139.
*• Id. at 93.
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reg^ular basis in intelligence channels and appropriate staiT." '*
Despite the published reports, intelligence reporting, briefings, codels and stafifdels. no
Member of Congress and no staff person ever requested the .Administration to take action to stop
the weapons transfers. Under secretary of State Tamoff, who was "fairly systematically involved
in briefing Congress" on Bosnia issues, recalls no questions being posed about what the United
States should do, if anything, to prevent Iranian arms fix>m reaching Bosnia. **
Some Members of Congress have asked rhetorically whether the Congress should be
getting its information froii. press accounts. The rhetorical question is disingenuous. ' *
Intelligence materials are made available precisely so that Members do not have to rely on press
accounts. Members who choose not to review or be briefed on the intelligence reporting are, in
effect, choosing to rely upon press reports.
Congressional Knowledge of the Diplomatic Exchange.
While there is ample evidence that Members of Congress and their staf!s were aware that
arms were flowing to Bosnia with the full knowledge of the U.S. Administration and the allies,
the Administration did not seek to disclose the particular diplomatic exchange between
Ambassadors Calbraith and Redman and President Tudjman on the issue to any Member of
** Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, Sept S. 1996, at SO (hereinafter
"Talbott Subcommittee Dep.").
*• Select Subcomminee Deposition of Peter Tamoff, Sept 13, 1996. at 37 (hereinafter
Tamoff Subcomminee Dep.").
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Congress or iheir staff/ The failure of the Administration to inform the Congress about a
diplomatic exchange between a United States Ambassador and a foreign head of state is not a
violation of law. Nevertheless, the timing of and circumstances surrounding the meeting were
unique, and the Administration should have considered informing a select group of Members
about the Croatian inquiry and the United States response.
The consensus testimony of United Slates foreign policy and military officials to the
Select Subcommittee confirms that directing .Ambassador Galbraith to tell Tudjman he had "no
instructions" was the right c\v :ce Policy makers also had confidence that that the "no
instructions" re^wnse was consistent with the sentiment in the Congress given the overwhelming
Congressional votes favoring assistance to the Bosnian Muslims that had occurred in the
preceding months.
I think the w^y we approached the issue is to say that we believed it was consistent with
strong sentiment in Congress which we shared; namely, that the arms embargo was
un&ir. disadvantageous to the Bosnian Government, and therefore, what we decided with
reelect to the specific issue that was put to us in late April of 1994 was not inconsistent
widi the view in the Congress and the country . which the administration shared, and that
was that there was unfairness about the arms embargo and it was advantageous to the
Muslim adc"
The AdministratioD regarded the conversation among Special Envoy Redman and
*^ Fonner Senator DeConcini informed the Select Subcommittee that he was informed of
the **no instructions*' response delivered by Ambassador Galbraith to President Tudjman at a
routine intelligence bnefing. It appears that the briefer was acting iiKlependently. The CLA has
no record that such a briefing occurred. Senior Administration policy makers were not aware of
this particular briefing or diat information regarding the "no instructions" response had been
shared with any Member of Congress. Select Subconunittee Int. of Hon. DeConcini at 2.
'* TamofrSubconunittee Dep. at 18-19.
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Ambassador Galbraiih and President Tudjman as a diplomatic exchange consistent with existing
pohcy" witli respect to which Congressional notincation under section 662 of the National
Security Act of 1947 was not required.*" Consequently, the Administration kept the specific
exchange between U.S. diplomats and Croatia's head of state confidential. "As for keeping the
transaction, the exchange confidential, of course we wanted to keep it confidential. We would
try as best we can to keep much of our diplomatic actixity confidential." "
Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that the Administration chose to be discreet about the
exchange due to "the delicate state of our relationship with our allies who had troops on the
ground. There is a real chance - this is all hypothetical of course - if we had taken a course of
action or briefed it ... to the Congress and it had leaked, there is a good chance that our
European allies and the Canadians might have pulled out. in which case disaster would ensue."''
The Administration's concerns about leaks and the impact of leaks upon U.S. allies are
legitimate. In this case, however, resolving the concerns by withholding the information from all
" Id. at 46.
"* For a more thorough discussion of notifications required under the National Security
Act of 1974, see Chapter One. Section Five, which discusses the history and application of
Covert Action requirements.
«flie
*' Hearing on U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian Anns Shipments into Bosnia before i
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 26, (1996) (suiement of Strobe Talbon).
This decision was not unanimous, however. At least one senior Administration official, Richard
Holbrooke, suggested that a select group of leadership of both parties be informed about the
diplomatic exchange with President Tudjman. However, that recommendation was rejected.
See: Select Subcomminee Deposition of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Sept 27, 1996, at 10-
1 1 (hereinafter "Holbrooke Subconunittee Dep.").
" Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 47.
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Members of the Congress may have been extreme." The delivery of the "no instructions"
response was clearly relevant to the Congressional debate about the arms embargo. The central
figures in the debate such as the Majority and Minority leaders, the Chairman and Ranking
Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs and
Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees are
accustomed to managing highly confidential information in a discrete way. The failure to
provide the information to any mejnber can lead to distrust and suspicion when, as is almost
always the case, the information is finally revealed. The fact that the Congress was moving
toward a position equivalent to the "no instructions" response suggests that selected Members of
Congress could have been informed.
However, while the failure to inform any Members cf Congress was a mistake, the cure is
not to enact a statute that requires Congressional consultation in the case of a diplomatic
exchange. The Administration should maintain the discretion to decide when and how to inform
Congress of a diplomatic exchange. In this case, the discretion may not have been exercised as it
should have been. A response to a head of state or. an issue of enormous international
significance that occurs at the same time that Congress is debating the very same issue justifies
limited disclosure to selected Members of Congress. Had Members been informed in this case,
many of the questions that the Select Subcommittee considered might never have been asked.
" See Chapter One, Section Five for a legal discussion of the Intelligence Authori2ation
Act of 1991 and the rationale behind the omission of diplomatic exchanges as a matter that
would require Congressional notification.
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Chapter One
Section Five
A LEGAL DISCVSSIOS OF COVERT ACTIOS
The most serious of the issues reviewed by the Select Subcommittee is whether any official
of the United States Government violated the law . The success of a policy does not. in any
circumstances, justify illegal conduct. The Minority considered these allegations with the utmost
seriousness. Attorneys with the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and the
. Department of State were consulted. The conclusions are clear. No violations of law occurred, and
no conduct that even approaches a violation of law took place.
The Executive Branch Did Sot I'iolate the Law.
The U.S. Govenunent activities investigated by the Select Subcommittee implicate legal
requirements of three sorts: the regulation of coven actions, the reporting requirements relating
to intelligence activities, and U.S. obligations under international law . There can be little doubt
that Executive Branch actions were consistent with all of these legal requirements. But while the
failitre of Executive Branch oHicials to inform Congress of the **no instructions" response was
not a violation of law, it may have been an error of judgment.
History of Covert Action Requirements.
The history of the restrictions on coven action, which demonstrates the care and precision
that have gone into formulation of the statutory defmitiotu has been set out in prior congressional
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commiuee repons ' The first congressional attempt to regulate the conduct of covert actions,
which was prompted by reports of U.S. involvement of the ouster of the Allende government in
Chile, occurred with the enactment of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act in 1974. This provision barred the CIA from conducting non-intelligence-gathering
"operations" in foreign nations unless the President first informed Congress of the importance
and nature of the activity. The term "operations" was not defined in the statute or discussed in its
legislative history ."
At the time that the H'lghcs-Ryan Amendment was passed, the CI.\ considered "covpn
actions" to be "any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments.
organizations, persons or events in support of United States foreign policy."' The scope of this
definition was illustrated in a detailed discussion of the coven operations conducted by United
States intelligence agencies since the drafting of the National Security .\ct of 1947 conducted by
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence (the "Church Committee"). The Church Committee
' Sec H.R. Rep. No. 705, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1988).
^ Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-559. § 662 (1974). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment
staled, in pertinent part, that '[n]o funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act
may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence .Agency for operations in foreign
countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until
the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States
and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate
committees of the Congress • • • ." 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1994) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 102-88. tit
VI, § 601. 105 Sut. 441 (1991).
' See Spnatp Slflprt Cnmrn to Smdy Governmental Operations With Respect-to_Imelligeilce
Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1 at 141.
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noted that by 1953 major covert operations were under\\a\ in 4S counines. and that several
thousand such projects had been undertaken between 1961 and 1976' In its exhaustive review of
U.S. intelligence activities, goals, and policies, however, the Church Committee did not propose
a more narrowly tailored definition of covert action.
In 1980 Congress enacted the Intelligence Oversight Act. which modified the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment and added a new Title V to the National Security .\ct. The 1980 statute dealt
with intelligence oversight in general and covert actions in particular. The .Act provided that
covert actions and other "intelligence activities" were within the scope of the CI.\ "operations '
that required Presidential findings and reports to Congress." In addition, the 1980 legislation
specifically required all executive branch entities involved in intelligence matters to keep the
congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities,
including any significant anticipated intelligence activity."
The phrase "significant anticipated intelligence activity" vvas explained in general terms
as covering "covert operations" and "certain other intelligence activities specified in consultation
with the executive branch."* The term was intended to encompass "the f j11 range of intelligence
and intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the two select commitiees." The
Senate Report makes clear that the phrase "significant" was meant broadly:
* Id. at 153.
' See Pub. L. No. 96-450. § 501(a).
• H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1350. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16. teprinlcdin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4212.
'Id.
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An anticipated activity should be considered significant if it has policy imphcations. This
would include, for example. ac5i\iiies which are particularly costly financially, as well as
those which are not necessarily costly, but which have * • • [significant] potential for
affecting this country's diplomatic, political, or militar>' relations with other countries or
groups. * • • it excludes day-to-day implementation of previously adopted policies or
programs.'
On the other hand. Congress made no attempt to define the terms "covert action" or "intelligence
activity." Instead, the committee reports indicated, rather unhelpfully, that the Executive Branch
and the congressional intelligence committees expected to work together "to delineate the
matters covered by this provision.""*
The Executive Branch, meanwhile, took it upon itself to fill in some of the definition gaps
in the statutes. Executive orders issued by President Carter in 1978 and President Reagan in
1981 explicitly recognized that "diplomatic activities or the collection and production of
intelligence or related support functions" are not w iihin the definition of "special activities" (a
euphemism for coven actions).''
The concepts in the executive orders and the understandings that had evolved bet>^een
Congress and the intelligence agencies were incorporated in the current statutory definition of
• S. Rep. No. 730, 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 8, reprinted Jn 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192. 4198 (quoting
Report of the Conuninee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, to Accompany S. Res. 400, 1976,
at 26-27).
•M.
" Executive Order No. 12.036. § 4-212. 3 C.F.R. 112. 134 (1979); Executive Order No. 12.333,
§3.4(h), 3 C.F.R. 200. 215 (1981); see also Executive Order No. 11.905. § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. 90. 91
(1977) (excluding the "collection and production of intelligence and related support functions").
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"covert action." vvhich was enacted in \'M\ The dL'Tiniiion pro\ idcs
As used in this subchapter, tlie tcnn 'coven action' means an acti\ it> or acliv mes ofllie
L'niied Slates Government to inlluence polmcal. economic, vr n\ihtar> conditions abroad.
where it is intended that the role olthe L niied States Cjovemnient w ill not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly, but does not include ( 1 1 acti\ ities the primary purpose of which
is to acquire intelliijence. traditional countcr-inielliyence activities, traditional activities to
improve or maintain the operational securitv ofLnited States Government programs, or
administrative activities; (2) traditional diplomatic or military' activities «r routine support
to such activities; (3) traditional law enforcement activ ities conducted by United States
Gov emment law enforcement agencies or routine suppon to such activ ities; or (4)
activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities descnbed
in paragraph ( 1 ). (2). or (?)) of other Lnited States Government agencies abroad. '
Congress intended that the del'inition would not "exclude aiu activ nv which heretofore ha[<»)
been understood to be a coven action, nor to include anv activ it\ not heretofore understood to be
a coven action."''
The .\o Instructions Response did not Constitute Covert Action
Viewed against the controlling definition, the no-instructions policy and the actions taken
by L'.S. officials to implement it cannot be viewed as coven action.' There is no suggestion in
the language of the coven action dermition. or ir the statutorv' formulations that preceded the
cun-ent definition, thai a U.S. request to a third coui.iry -- much less a refusal by the U.iited
■^' Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-SS. ^ 503(e). 105 Stat. 429 (codified at
50U.S.C. §413b(e)(1994)).
*' H R. Conf Rep. No. 166. l02dCong.. 1st Sess 28.repnnied in 1991 U.SC.C.A.N. 193.25l;see
also S. Rep. No. 85. 102d Cong.. 1st Sess. 42. repnnted m 1991 U.SC.C.A.N. 193. 235 (the
definition is intended to "reflect current practice as it ha[d] developed under the Hughes-Rvan
.Amendment and the Executive Order defnition of special activ ities'").
*" See Chapter Two. Section One for a discussion of the need for and fotinulation of the "no
mstrvictions" response.
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Slates to respond to an inquirx' ffoiri a third countn. -- constitutes coven action on the part of the
United States. To the contrar>-, the covert action definition specifically excludes "traditional
diplomatic * • * activities." This exclusion reaches the "use of diplomatic channels or personnel
to pass messages and conduct negotiations between the United States and other governments or
foreign entities. Traditional diplomatic activities, in this context, include activities long
understood and accepted to be diplomatic in nature, including the use of private citizens as
intermediaries."''' The exchange between Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman falls
well w ithin this traditional ^if lonatic category-.
This conclusion is confirmed both by longstanding practice and by clear legislative
history. The CIA legal staff indicates that the Agency never has regarded U.S. requests to third
parties as constituting covert action on the part of the United States, an understanding that
predated the 1991 legislation. That background is of special significance because the 1991
definition was intended to "reflect the [pre-1991] practice.""
Indeed, Congress made a conscious -- albeit controversial -- decision to exclude requests
to third countries from the definition of covert action enacted in 1991. As originally passed by
both Houses and presented to the President, the statutory definition expressly provided mat "[a]
request by any department, agency, or entity of the United States to a foreign government or a
private citizen to conduct a covert action on behalf of the United States shall be deemed to be a
' S. Rep. No. 85. supra, at 45.
' S. Rep. No. 85. supra, at 42.
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coven action. Recognizing that the Bush administration objected to this language, the
Chairmen of the House and Senate intelhgence committees wrote to the President, staling that
Congress did not intend the provision to foreclose or inhibit certain contacts with third parties:
[This provision is not intended) to preclude the informal contacts and consultations which
would be required prior to the United States officially requesting a third country or
private citizen to undertake [covert action] on its behalf Only once it had been deter-
mined that such assistance was feasible and is made the subj:ct ofan official request by
the United States Government would the requirement for a finding and reporting to the
intelligence committees come into play. That is, indeed, consistent with the understand-
ings that have long existed between the Administration and the two committees.'
President Bush nevertheless pocket vetoed ihe bill, pointing to the third-party language.
among other things. The President was concerned that this provision:
could have a chilling effect on the ability of our diplomats to conduct highly sensitive
discussions concerning projects that are vital to our national secunty. Furthermore, the
mere existence of this provision could deter foreign governments from discussing certain
topics with the United States at all. Such a provision could result in frequent and divisive
disputes on whether an activity is covered by the definition and whether individuals in the
executive branch have complied with a statutorv- requirement."
The Senate responded to the pocket veto by attempting to accommodate the President
while retaining specified third-party activities within its definition of covert action. Although
eliminating the language targeted by President Bush, the Senate would have provided that 'covert
action* means an activity or activities conducted by, or on behalf and under the control of, an
'* S. 2834. 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1991).
" H.R. Rep. No. 37, 102dCong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
" Sec Memorandum of Disapproval for the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Plb.
Papers 1729-30(1990).
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clement of the United States Government * * *."" The Chaimian of the Senate Select
Committee on hitelligcnce explained that he and the Administration had been unable to asircc on
the precise degree of U.S. control necessarv' to satisfy this definition:
[\V]e have agreed to drop the word "requests." which was at the heart of the President's
concern, but to amend the definition of co\ en action to clarify that any covert action
which is undertaken "on behalf of the United States and under" its control will require a
finding and notice to the Congress, In [Senate] repon language on this provision, we go
on to stale that we regard any situation where the United States is providing funding or
other forms of significant assistance to a third party, or U.S. personnel are involved in
providing direction and assistance to a third party to undertake a coven action on behalf
of the United States, we consider these situations to require pnor Presidential approval .
and reponing to the L ongress.
The administration agrees with this approach. What we were unable to agree on is
whether the circumstances cited in the repon language were the only circumstances
where U.S. control of a third party [sic] might constitute a coven action. The
administration would, indeed, have preferred descnbing these circumstances as the only
ones where U.S. involvement might constitute control for purposes of the definition. My
personal view is that there could be circumstances other than those cited specifically in
the repon language where U.S. involvement might constitute control. The repon
language is silent on this point, however, setting fonh only the circumstances where
agreement was possible."'^
The House took a different tack. As the Chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence explained, "[w]e proposed a compromise designed to make certain
that the same approval and congressional notification standards apply to coven actions
undertaken for the United States as apply to those undertaken by the United States. That
compromise, which would have made clear that covert actions directed, controlled, or induced by
"S. 1325, § 503(e) 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
-" 137CONG. Rec. S9211 (daily ed. June 28, 1991 ) (statement of Sen. Boren).
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the United Stales had to be reported to Congress, was rejected."' The House bill therefore
omitted all mention ol" requests to third countnes."
The Conference Committee ultimately adopted the House position. .As Representative
Shuster explained:
The "third party request" provision was of great concern to the President because it was
capable of such a potentially broad interpretation that it could have seriously interfered
with the conduct of sensitive foreign relations. Detailed and lengthy efforts were made to
appropriately focus the original language, but the problem of defining the outer limits of
the provision without disrupting legitimate diplomatic relations ultimately proved too
complex. In view of this seemingly intractable problem and the significant progress
made on the other issues, the conferees decided to drop the "third pany request"
provision."*
President Bush signed the legislation, declaring himself "pleased that the Act. as revised, omits
any suggestion that a request' by the United States Government to third parties may constitute
'covert action" as defined by the Act."''
This history clearly establishes that U.S. requests to third countries do not constitute
covert action on the pan of the United States. President Bush specifically objected to the third-
party language in the initial version of the covert action definition; as enacted, the statute omitted
both that language and the weaker third-paity provision in the proposed Senate replacement.
This is persuasive evidence that a request to a third party is not coven action. As a consequence.
=' 13? Cong. Rec. H2621 (daily ed. May 1, 1991) (statement of Rep. McCurdy).
"U.
-■' 137 Cong. Rec. H6161 (daily ed. July 31. 1991) (statement of Rep. Shuster).
-* Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1455, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
1137 (Aug. 19, 1991). rcprinledjn 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 257.
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even if the no instructions response is regarded as a rcqucsi that Croatia itself engage in covert
action, such a request should not be regarded as covert action on the pan of the United States.
Beyond that, of course, the communication of "no instructions" was not a L' S. request for
action; it was the absence of a veto on action proposed by Croatia. The Minonty regards this
difference as significant. Giving covert action status to a U.S. decision not to object to a third
party's proposed activities would have very broad implications. Variations on this situation
undoubtedly arise with great frequency, as allies give the United States a "heads-up" about
contemplated action. Does .uiiure by the United Slates to object to these proposals require a
presidential finding? In this light, treating .Ajnbassador Galbrailh's exchange as covert action
would create insuperable line-drawing problems, lead to bureaucratic paralysis, and discourage
communications from other nations. These are precisely the consequences that President Bush
sought to avoid with his 1990 veto.
Indeed, Representative Shuster made just that point in explaining the considerations that
led to elimination of the third-party provision from the 1991 legislation:
It is not too difficult to envision this uncertainty [that would result from treating
communications with third countries as covcrt action] at work. Consider the case of an
animated confidential exchange between a United States and foreign official concerning a
sensitive international threat to our two countries' mutual interests.
Suppose the U.S. official says, "We know you have the capability to moimt a particular
covert action, which we believe might neutralize this threat on behalf of both our vital
interests. Why don't you undertake that specific covert action?"
Now, is that a request which is subject to the covert action approval and reporting
requirement, or is it merely seeking an explanation of our ally's policy? Reasonable
minds might reach different conclusions.
But if the poor U.S. official in a faraway foreign country, attempting to represent the
United States in such a situation, has to constantly worry about whether such statements
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might later be determined to be an unlaw tul request for a third pany co\ en action, he
may well feel compelled to exercise sinnjient self-censorship, not conducive to the
effective conduct of his foreign affairs responsibility.-'
Seither the Convoy nor ihegj^m.\fissile Incident Constituted Covert Actioi^^j^l^
The other incidents that have been the subject of the Subcommittee s inquiry also did not
constitute covert action -- a conclusion shared by legal staff at the CI.\. who do not believe that
any events related to the Subcommittee's investigation amounted to coven action. Two episodes
warrant brief mention.
First, efforts by U.S. ofTicials -- if they occurred -- to assist humanitarian convoys en
route to Bosnia cannot be considered coven action for the simple reason that these were not
actions where, in the statutory terms, it was "intended that the role of the United States
Government [would] not be apparent or acknow ledged publicly."-" Public activity cannot fall
within the definition, even if the action is intended to mislead a potential adversary, or if the
specific objectives of an activity are publicly misrepresented or are concealed altogether."' That
would be so even if the United States had reason to believe that some convoys might contain
arms; the legislative history indicates that U.S. activities are not covert actions simply because
the U.S. objectives are misrepresented or concealed. In any event, U.S. intervention, if it
■' 137 Cong. Rec. H2623 (May 1, 1991) (statement of Rep. Shuster).
See Chapter Two, Section Four for discussion of the humaniurian convoys.
•■ Sec H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 166, supra, at 29; S. Rep. No. 85. supra, at 43.
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occurred at all. did not go beyond requesting action b> third panics, which should not be consid-
ered covert action for the reasons explained above.
Second, the inspection of Iranian missiles by U.S. military personnel does not constitute
covert action."' The inspection was not "an activity • ♦ * to influence political, economic, or
military conditions." It was not a U.S. -initiated attempt to achieve a particular policy goal;
instead, it was a technical support function designed to assist an ally's activities. U.S. officials
thus did not ask. and were not told, what happened to the missiles after the inspection.
Moreover, requinng a presidential finding for the sort of on-ihe-fly, reactive act" v
represented by the missile inspection surely would be most impractical; even if the inspection
were thought to fall within the literal terms of the statute, the exclusion of such fast-moving
activities from the covert action definition finds clear support in the legislative history.
Describing the historical treatment of coven actions, the Senate Repon indicated:
[Certain] activities that may literally fall wkhin the definitions [of covert action] but for
which it w ould be impractical to seek Presidential appro\ al and report to Congress on a
case-by-case basis, have been assumed not to be covert action. To some extent. Congress
has known of and acquiesced in this practice and has worked with the executive branch to
develop mutually agreeable understandings of the reach of the rejjoning requirements.''
The exclusion of such actions from the definition therefore reflects the historical practice that
Congress sought to codify.
The Executive Branch H'OS not Under a Legal Duty to Report the "So Instructions" Response.
■' See Chapter Two, Section Seven for a discussion of U.S. activities regarding inspection of Iranian
missiles.
■" S. Rep. No. 85. supra, at 42. See H.R. Rep. No. 705, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988),
accompanying H.R. 3822
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The Executive Branch w as not under u legal obligation to report the 'no instructions"
response as an intelligence activity. Since I9S0 the heads of all agencies ■■in\oKcd in
intelligence activities" have been obligated lo "keep the intelligence committees tully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities."' The statute includes no definition of the
intelligence activities that are subject to this mandatory reporting requirement; liie legislative
history indicates only that the tenn "is intended to encompass the fiill range of intelligence and
intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the two select committees."''
It nevertheless is p. "bly clear that, a' least in the ordinary case, diplomatic exchansrc»
such as the "no instructions" response do not qualify as "intelligence activities" within the
meaning of the statutory term. The covert action definition reflects the recognition that
diplomatic and intelligence activities constitute distinct categories; there is no reason to doubt
that the same distinction applies under Section 413a(l). Similarly, the specific intelligence
activities discussed in connection with the 1991 legislation -- "covert paramilitary operations,
propaganda, political action, election support." and, of course, intelligence collection and
counterintelligence measures"' — have no similarity to diplomatic exchanges. That conclusion
has an obvious comfnon sense basis: requiring reports on all diplomatic exchanges touching on
intelligence matters would be inordinately burdensome and would involve diplomats in the
"50U.S.C. §413a(l).
" H.R. Conf Rep. No. 1350, supra, at 16 n.l.
'- S. Rep. No. 85, supira, at 42.
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drawing of unmanageable lines. Under current practice, such exchanges are not regarded as
subject to the mandatory reporting requirement.
Executive Branch Officials Should Have Disclosed the "So Instructions"
Response to Congress.
Concluding that the E.xecutive Branch was under no legal obligation report the '.lo
instructions" response, however, is not to say that the Galbraith-Tudjman exchange -- and the
policy considerations that underlay the response to President Tudjman •- should have been
w ithheld from Congress. In fact, it is the Minorit\ view that the better course may ha\ e been for
E.xecutive Branch officials to have notified selected Members of the appropriate Congressional
committees or, perhaps, the Congressional leadership.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that Executive Branch officials meant to
mislead the Congress. There is absolutely no evidence that Executive Branch officials made
misstatements in official presentations or in answers to congressional inquiries. Moreover.
Executive Branch officials did not regard the "no instructions" response as a change in policy.
As discussed at length in the previous section, intelligence data noting shipments of Iranian arms
were distributed widely in Congress.
Having that said, the Minority does not consider the "no instructions'* respotue to be the
kind of routine diplomatic exchange that need not be called to congressional attention. A number
of considerations -- both singly and in combination — suggest that the better course may have
been for the Executive Branch to inform Congress of the "no instructions" response.
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First, the "no instructions" response was -- and plainK understood by Executive Branch
officials to be -- a matter of considerable iniponance. The policy was significani enough that,
within the space of some seventy-two hours, it went from .\mbassador Gaibraith through sc\eral
levels at the State Department to the Secretary of State and the National Security .Adviser and.
ultimately, to the President himself. This close attention to the matter within the State
Department and the National Security Council was no doubt w arranted: the answer to President
Tudjman's question had a significant impact on the status of the Muslim-Croat Federation, the
survival of the Bosnian government, and U.S. relations with its closest European allies.
Second, notification would have been of particular importance because the "no
instructions ■ response was clearly relevant to a contentious issue being debated in Congress at
the time. The question whether to lift or modify the embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia w as a
matter of intense and continuing discussion through the spring and summer of 1994. Disclosure
of the "no instructions" response, and of the policy considerations that underlay the United States
decisioo, would have been appropriate. At a minimum, notification likely would have led to
more informed decision-making by Members of Congress.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, although the possible adverse reaction by U.S.
allies gave Executive Branch officials good reason to keep the Tudjman-Galbraith exchange
closely held, the Administration could have struck a more reasonable balance between the desire
to minimize the risk of leaks and the wisdom of informing key Members of Congress. The
Administration would ha\ e been w ise to consider the comments made in response to the
argument that covert actions are too sensitive to disclose to the intelligence conunittees or to the
congressional leadership:
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In the final analysis, it's a question of balance. We must balance the harm that may result
from the disclosure of a secret auainsi the value of consultation and independent adv ice
for the President prior to the initiation of a coven action Have not the events of recent
years shown us that the President needs that kind of adMce in ail circumstances? When
covert actions are contemplated that will have profound effects on our securitv interests,
the balance, in our democracy, must be struck in favor of pnor consultation.
I the long ran it will serve us best."
The issue before the Select Subcommittee does not invoU e a covert action, but the same
need for balance applies. Indeed, had Congress been notified of the "no instmctions" response
in a timely fashion, much of the suspicion and skepticism that prompted the current investigation
might have been prevented.
The "So Inslructions" Response did not Violate International Law.
The remaining area of legal inquiry involves the United States' international obligations.
On this score, the decision not to affirmatively enforce the embargo against third countries -- a
decision embodied both in the no-instnictions policy and in the Nunn-Mitchell legislation -- did
not violate international law.
The United States' legal obligations concerning the arms embargo were set out in a series
of United Nations resolutions. U.N. Security Council Resolution 713, which imposed the em-
bargo, plainly was mandatory. It provided that the Security Council:
Decides, under Chapter VTI of the Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for
purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a gen-
eral and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugo-
" H.R. Rep. No. 705, supra, at 14-15, quoting Statement of Rep. Hamilton, Feb. 24, 1988.
Subcommittee on Legislation, Permanent Select Comminee on Intelligence, pp. 5, 6, and 7.
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slavia until the Security Council decides othcroisc following consultation between the
Secretar> -General and the Government of Nuyoslav la. ■■
In contrast, the other embargo-related resolutions, which addressed enforcement of the
embargo, were quite different in form. L .N. Security Council Resolution 7S7 authorized, but did
not require, U.N. member states to take steps to enforce the amis embargo established in earlier
resolutions. It provided:
The Security Council, * • * [ajcting under Chapters VIl and VIII of the Charter of the
United Nations, calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or ar-
rangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as mj'v
be necessary under authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and ourvvard n'Ti-
time shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure
strict implementationof the provisions of Resolutions 715 (1991) and 757 (1992). "
Similarly, U.N. Security Council Resolution 740 "(c]alls upon all States to cooperate fully with
the [sanctions] Committee • * *. including reporting any information brought to their attention
concerning violations of the embargo.""
Resolutions 787 and 740 do not have the force of international legal obligations. VNTiile
some resolutions of the Security Council are binding on member states -- under Article 25 of the
U.N. Charter (emphasis added), "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the dttisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" ~ it is quite
" Resolution 757 is similar to Resolution 713. setting out in detail the obligations of member states
to implement sanctions against the remaining Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
" See U.N. Security Council Resolution 787.
" See U.N. Security Council Resolution 740.
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clear thai not all resolutions of the Security Council impose nundaton. obligations " Some reso-
lutions are not "decisions." others may not be made "in accordance with the [] Charter." and
many simply are not intended to be binding. "
In detemiining their legal status, it is useful to contrast Resolutions 787 and 740 with
Resolution 713. which established the embargo. The text of Resolution 713 displays everv ele-
ment necessar>' to come within the mandatory terms of .\rticle 25: it uses the express language
of "decision" as the operative verb; it identifies the source of the Council's power to act (Chapter
VII. which contemplates dceisioiTs. a.s opposed to the non-binding recommendations authorizecl
under Chapter \I); it uses language of direction ("shall"), exhibiting an intent to bind member
states; and it is directed at "all states."'" Violations of its mandate to implement an arms embargo
necessarily are \ iolations of a member state's treaty obligations under the Charter, and thus are
inconsistent with international law.
' Scholars, judges, and diplomats agree that the reach of .\rticle 25 remains unsettled, both in theory
and in practice. See, e.g., Bruno Simma (ed.). The Chaner of the L'niied Nations: A Commentary
409 (1994) ("the scope of art. 25 is also open, since the term decision' [] as used in thi"! provision
cannot refer to all pronouncements of intent by the [Security Council] made under the terms of the
formal voting procedure"); Renata Sonnenfeld, Resolution.s of the United Nations Security Council
121-122 (1988) (noting "the ambiguity of the term 'decision'" and citing an official U.N. publication
noting that the article had not been subject to much debate or clarification).
" See. tg.. Bruno Simma (ed.). The Charter of the U'nited Naiion-s: A Commentary 409 (1994) ("the
notion of decision' within the terminology of the CJianer is not unambiguous"); Oscar Schachter.
United N,ationsJ.a\tinJhc Gulf Conflict. 85 Am. J. |iifl L. 452. 463 n.31 (1991) (referring to "[t]he
important distinction between binding and nonbinding decisions"); See_alsQ Craig Scott, et_aL, A
Memorial for Bosnia, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 126 (1994) ("Clearly, .Article 25 does not operate so as
to make all Security Council decisions binding").
" U.N. Security Council Resolution 713.
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Resolution 7S7 differs in significant ways Its operative verb ("calls upon") reflects ex-
hortation rather than decision, and there is no language directing members to perform panicular
acts/" The scope of the request is deliberately ambiguoiiS. referring to "such measures commen-
surate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary " " By necessity the resolution's re-
ques' applies not to all states, but only to those with the ability to halt shipping and to ensure
implementation of the embargo. Resolution 787 thus cannot be understood to impose an affirma-
tive, binding obligation.
Resolution 740 bears -vcn lewer hallmarks of a binding "decision." It merely "calls
upon" states to "cooperate" w ith the sanctions committee.^" The hortatory operative verbal
phrase, as well as the discretionary element (seeking generalized "cooperation").'' emphasize that
this resolution is of a wholly different character than Resolution 713.
The intent of the Security Council — determined by reference to the language and effect
of a resolution — often determines whether a resolution is binding." The language discussed
above demonstrates that the Security Council (in Resolution 713. for example) knows how to
make a forceful, binding decision subject to Article 25 of the Charter. The fact that the roughly
*■ U.N. Security Council Resolution 787.
"Id.
*' U.N. Security Council Resolution 740.
"Id.
" See Simma, Charter at 413; see also LegalConsequencesJiar-Statesijfjhe-Coniinued^esencfcof
South^AMcainJJamihia. (SQuthJ^'esLAMcaX^Qtaithstanding Security Council Resohition 226
(Advisory Opinion), 1971 1.CJ. 16, 53 (1970) ("The language of a resolution of the Security Council
should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect").
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contemporaneous laniiuagc of Resolutions 7S7 and ~4i) differs from that of Resolution 713 in
important \^ays demonstrates that the Security Co-jncii did not intend those resolutions to have
the same bmding effect.
Comparing Resolutions 787 and 740 with other recent resolutions confiiros that they
should not be ^.onstrued as imposing international legal obligations. The closest parallel to the
resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia are those addressing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
which provide the only other recent example of the Council's systematic use of its Chapter VII
authority to adopt bmding decisions/' Notably, the Yugoslavia resolutions parallel the '.:. ^
resolutions in significant part. Resolution 661 (using the temi "Decides" and mandatorv- lan-
guage similar to that in Resolution 713) imposed obligations on member states to effect an em-
bargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait.'" Resolution 665 (in which the Council used "Calls upon"
as the operative verb and adopted language virtually identical to that used in Resolution 787)
authorized certain states to use additional measures to enforce the embargo.'
■" Together, these t\\ o instances represent a significant departure from the Security Council's prior
practice, which had been largely hamstrung by superpower conflict. See Simma, Charier at 416
(1994) ("The first case in which the [Security Council] took a whole series of binding decisions under
Chapter VII relates to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait"); id. at 418 (noting resolutions concerning
Yugoslavia and Somalia); see also Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner (eds.). United Nations
1 egal Order 62 (1995) ("Because of the substantial paralysis of the Security Council throughout the
Cold War years, that is. during most of the Council's existence, the fiill extent of the Council's powers
has not yet been explored").
** U.N. Security Council Resolution 661.
'■ Resolution 665 provides: "[t]he Security Council * * * CaIls_upQn those member states co-
operating with the Gov emment of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of
the Security Council to hah all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify
(continued...)
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The Security Council resolutions concerning the Persian Gulf crisis have been closely
scrutinized in recent years. The authorities agree that Resolution 065 (and. by extension. Resolu-
tion 787) was merely an authorizing resolution, not a mandator.' one. It "plainly cannot be con-
strued as imposing any bindmg obligation on the United States."'" One scholar explained the
point in detail:
At first blush, this resolution [665] may appear to be a decision of the Security Council
obliging the United States to use armed force. But close analysis reveals that it is not.
* • • Neither this resolution nor any previous Security Council resolution requires any
member state to deploy maritime forces to the area. * * • Even if a state becomes subject
to the resolution by'tj.-.ng that action, it retains full discretion to determine which mea-
sures, if any, are "commensurate to the specific circumstances," and whether they are in
fact "necessarv."'^
■* (...continued)
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure stnct implementation of the provisions related to such
shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990)."
'' Michael J. Glennon, The Constilulion and Chapter \ II of the United Nations Charier, 85 .\m. J.
Ini'lL. 74, 82(1991).
*' Glennon, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. at 82. See also Alyssa Pyrich, Recent Developments, T Inited Nations:
AuthorizatioDS_of-Use j^LEorce. 32 Har\-. Int'l L.J. 265. 267 (1991) (Resolution 665 "authorizes
states with forces in the region" to use forcible measures); Christopher John Sabec, Nolejie
Security-CrcuilciLCcJieSLi)f-Age: An Analysis of the International I cgal Response to the Tragi
Invasion^Kuwait, 21 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 63. 72 (1991) (Resolution 665 "authorized military
action to halt maritime trade with Iraq")
This understanding of the effect of Resolution 665 (and, by extension. Resolution 787) is
consistent w ith the Security Council's permissive (non-binding) authority over military cfibrts. "A
request to use military force in the absence of any special agreement [under Article 43] is not legally
binding." Matthew D. Berger, NQte^lmplementinga-United Nations Security Council Resolution:
Tlic_Eiesident!s_Po*er.taL'sc_£Drce Without the Authorization of Congress. 15 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 83. 93(1991). See also Schachter & Joyner, United Nations Legal Order at 281 . In
the two instances in which the Council expressly authorized military action (Korea and Kuwait), it
did not oblige member states to participate, but merely permitted the action. See Eugene V. Rostow,
Until Whatl Enforcement Aclion_oiLColleclii:c_SelfJ)efensc2, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 506, 508-509
(continued...)
-104-
367
The clear conclusion, then, is that the resolutions calhny upon member states to aid in
enforcing the embargo were hortaton. . As a consequence, the "no instructions" response -- in
which the United States decided not to take affimiaiive steps to prevent a violation of the em-
bargo — was consistent with the I'nited Stales obligations under international law.
"(...continued)
( 1991 ). Likewise, where the Council authorized forcible measures to enforce a sanctions regime (in
Resolutions 665 and 7S7), it did not impose any binding obligation on states to take enforcement
action, nor would it ha\e authority under the Giarter to purport to do so. Thus, even if the Security
Council clearly stated its intention to act under Article 25 in a resolution such as 665 or 787, the
obligation by its terms would not apply because the "decision" of the Council would not be "in
accordance with the [] Charter."
-105-
368
Chapter Two
Section One
THE .\0 1.\STRLCTlOyS RESPOSSE OF APRIL 1994
At the hean of the Select Subcommittee investigation are the conversations among
Ambassador Peter Galbraith, Special Envoy Charles Redman and Croatian President Fran.io
Tudjman. President Tudjman asked what the United States reaction would be to the
transshipment of arms through Croatia to Bosnia, and the Ambassador and the Special Envoy
replied that they had been given ".lo instructions" on how to respond. The Minority believes tnat
the detailed account that follows is the most accurate exposition of the meeting between
President Tudjman and these two diplomats and of the events leading up to, and following, the
meeting. This account not only establishes the care with which the instructions were
implemented, but also puts into perspective the minor inconsistencies that occur in any retelling
of events by witnesses more than two years after they occurred.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Clinton Administration weighed several options
before determining that the "no instructions" response to the Croatian inquiry about arms
shipments to Bosnia would be the most tenable. The policy makers in Washington and the
implementors of that policy in the region carefully considered three options before agreeing on
the United States response to Croatia. The testimony of the participants and the written record of
events make it absolutely clear that neither the response nor the events prior or subsequent to the
delivery of the response were a rogue operation instituted by an isolated ambassador. Although
the time in which the decision had to be formulated and presented was short, and top policy
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369
makers were spread throughout the world.' a successful effort was made to coordinate the
response within and between the necessary- agencies."
The Administration reached its decision to proceed with this response knowing that the
Croatians were likely to see it as a signal to reestablish a fomial arms pipeline and that the
Iranians would be the primar , although not sole, source for the weapons. The Administration
carefully considered the extent to which the response would allow the Iranians more access in the
region than they possessed already. The following is a detailed description of the events
surrounding the formulation of the "no instructions" response and its delivery to the Croatian
government.
Weeks Preceding President Tudjman 's Presentation
of the Question to Ambassador Galbraith.
Although the date when the Croatians first began giving serious thought to reestablishing
the arms pipeline to the Bosnians cannot be fixed exactlyj
J By February - March 1994, hostilities
' On April 27, 1994, Secretary ofSute Christopher was traveling in the Middle East.
President Clinton, Anthony Lake, and Strobe Talbott were traveling to California for the Nixon
funeml.
- Select Subcomminee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, Sept. 5, 1996, at 45 (hereinafter
"Talbott Subcommittee Dcp.").
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370
had ceased, and the Croatian and Bosnian go\cmmenls had aurccd to a new Federation
negotiated by the United States and adopted in March 1994 ("the Federation Agreement 'l.'^ The
success of the Federation Agreement not only meant a cessation of the needless humanitarian
suffering, but also represented the beginning of a new military alliance more capable of resisting
Serb forces.'
With the diminishing tension between the two countries, the Bosnian government
approached the Croatians regarding the reestablishment of the formal arms pipeline. Iran, which
already was committed to the Bosnian cause, recognized that the Federation represented an
opportunity to enhance its status as Bosnia's most important friend within the Islamic world.''i^
Two.
' For an extensive discussion of the Federation agreements, see Chapter One, Section
* In his testimony before the House Pennanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Ambassador Galbraith explained that during the Muslim-Croat war it was extremely difficult to
get weapons into Bosnia. House Permanent Subcomminee on Intelligence Deposition of Peter
W. Galbraith, May 30, 1996, at 24 (hereinafter "Galbraith HPSCI Dep."). United Slates
diplomacy in the region was therefore aimed at ending the war and solidifying a military alliance
that could bolster the Bosnian Muslims' resistance to the Serbs. Id. See also. Select
Subcoimninee Deposition of Ronald Neitzke, Aug. 7, 1996, at 40 (explaining that after the battle
in Mostar on May 7, 1993, it would have been inconceivable for any Croat national to advocate
supplying arms from any source to the Muslims) (hereinafter "Neitzke Subcommittee Dep.").
' Iran desired to be a key player in Bosnia since the onset of the Balkan conflict. The
plight of the Bosnian Muslims was a popular cause in Iran and was exploited by the Iranian
leaders internally and within the Islamic world community. The role of Iran in the region is
discussed more fully at Chapter Three, Sections One and Two.
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The Croatians were receptive to the Iranian proposal to resume the arms pipeline to
Bosnia well before the April 28 meeting between Tudjman and .Ambassador Galbraiih. The
intelligence also establishes that Iran. Croatia, and Bosnia independently discussed anns
transshipments well before Croatian officials approached United States officials and the question
w as posed formally to Ambassador Galbraith.
The Question Is Posed to Embassy Zagreb Personnel
In fact, the first inquiries from Croatian officials about the United States position on such
shipmentamUmUJHHHJ^^^m^^^Hf^^^^^^H^^HII^^^^I^^I
According to cables fix>m Embassy Zagreb, on April 18. 1994, Charles Redman, the
United States Special Envoy on former Yugoslavia, met with Croatian Foreign .Minister .Mate
372
Granic
Apparently. Foreign Minister Granic was too subtle in his nresentation of the issue to
Special Envoy Redman
_ J Apr. 20, 1994. Although theJgMBBBjWpand the Deputy
Chief of Mission ("DCM") both'feported this meeting through their channels, "Special Envoy
Redman was unable to recall this meeting specifically. See Select Subcomminee Deposition of
Charles Redman. .Aug.. 27, 1996. at 30. 3l("I returned to Washington on the 19th . . .1 just dpn't
know if I saw [Granic] on the way out.")(hereinafter "Redman Subcommittee Dep.").
'* Galbraith Subconuniltee Dep. at 20. Despite the fact that he had drafted both reporting
cables, the DCM does not recall having known of this meeting in April 1994. Neitzke
Subcommittee Dep. at 152-53. According to him, his first awareness that the Croatians were
seeking a United States policy statement was in a meeting with Foreign Minister Granic on April
27. 1994. Id. at 153.
Id.
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373
^^hat the Foreign Minister was expected to. but did not. ask Special
Envoy Redman whether the "United States is prepared to pressure Bosnia Herzegovina to stop
asking Croatia to transship [weapons]."" Granic therefore tailed to ehcit a tomial reply from the
United States or indicate in any way that the Croatians were seeking an explicit response
concerning the United States position on the resumption of the arms pipeiin^^^^/^
This seemingly inconsistent position reflects the division within the Croatian government
the of the arms pipeline pBi^BBHH^HHBilHiil^^HIHB^^^^H
ijjihere were some w ithin the
government. Mate Granic and Vliro Tudjman among them, who disagreed w ith this policy.
However, even among the dissenters, the objections to the transshipments varied. For example.
Foreign Minister Granic was concerned about the pipeline's effect on the peace process,"
whereas Miro Tudjman wanted to minimize Iranian involvement."' Miro Tudjman attempted to
" Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1567. Apr. 19. 1994.
r Subcommittee Pep, at 11-12.
HI
374
ad\ance this position when he exploited his.
The reality of the situation was, however, that President Franjo Tudjman retained
ultimate authority over the decision, and he apparently had agreed to the transfer of arms via
Croatian territory."' The only remaining issue for the Croatians was what effect, if any, this
decision would have on relations with the United Stales: that was the real reason for posing the
question to United States officials."
The Deputy Chief of Mission ("DCM") reported both the meeting be^veen the foreign
I —
minister and the Special Envoy and theHIB^^Bm^HB||HBHH^|^^^HH
■■■■■^■■^■■■■feiijand explained that the question of arms to the Bosnians was in
•department of State Cable, Zagreb 1597. Apr. 21, 1994, at 1 (hereinatier "Zagreb
lS97")-J0BHBBPBH|^Apr. 21, 1994. fiiB2ubcommittee Dep. at 21-22!^
>ubcommittee Dep. at 136. Th^m^m^Blexplained that Tudjman was a
very strong leader who would njake the decision regarding the resumption of the formal arms
pipeline on his own. Id. ^_55^^_
"' See Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 6-8 (commenting on what tvpe of response the
Croatians were seeking from the United States).
'* The first of these cables was dated April 19, 1994, and the second April 21, 1994.
Although both these cables report on the meeting Special Envoy Redman had with Foreign
Minister Granic, DCM Neitzke noted in the cable that Special Envoy Redman had not reviewed
them.
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375
the fore. On April 21. 1994. the DCM reported that the Croaiuns would certainly be lookiny for
an official response from the United States and would cooperate pro\iding it was in Croatia's
interest to do so.' The DCM requested guidance from the Dcpanmeni on this matter." These
cables circulated throughout the Department of State but in the absence of a formal request by
the Croatians, the formulation of a response was not initiated." There were, however, informal
discussions about the Croatian inquiries in Zagreb,"' and the Department had been placed on
notice that the question could arise again. ^^^^"^^
^v as concemed
appropriately about the Croatian intentions, the reporting is incomplete and misleading.
' The failure to talk to the Special Envoy is significant in this case
since the Special Envoy does not remember the meeting."^
^^
"Zagreb 1567 at 1.
-* Department of Sute Cable Zagreb 1597, Apr. 21, 1994, at 1.
'' The cable circulated >^ithin the Department of State on April 22, 1994. An electronic
mail message conveys that the Department did not respond to the Croatian attempt to obtain a
United States position on the matter because the request was informal. Department of State E-
Mail. Apr. 22. 1994, at 1. The e-mail's author recognized the question's potential importance,
however, and noted that it should not be dismissed out of hand. Just ubled until more formally
presented. Id. In his conversations with Department of State officials during the week of April
27, 1994, Ambassador Galbraith reminded them that the Department had known about this issue
for several days. Galbraith Subcommittee. Dep. at 20.
■* Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 1 1 1.
^ Redman Subcomminee Dep. at 30.
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376
Second, in his cable. the/IHP^^BA/rclaycd a preMousl> un-mcmbriulizcd
conversation from early-March 1994 in which Ambassador Galbraiih discussed with ihejt
/a possible covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims The assistance likely would be
from Islamic countries such as Iran or Turkey, not the United States, and would traverse Croatia
(the only land route to the Bosnians) without objection by the United States'*
Thel^^HmB|^reponed that he told the Ambassador during the March conversation
that he was not in the position to make policy and referred the .Ambassador lo policv makers at
the National Security Council oi ihe Department of State to address the requisite finding ana
legal issues. Th£M|m||mi|^Blso reported that he opined to the .Ambassador that such an
action would be a mistake, and the Ambassador remarked that he would bring the idea to
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.' Th^gMB^JB^did not memorialize this
conversation at the time (in March) because he did not think it was an issue worth reponing. The
Alil^BBBBJ^testified to the Select Subcommittee that he orally informed the Central
I Apr. 20, 1994. In this cable, thejIlHB^HIBvrecounts
that the Ambassador suggested tflafTurkey serv e as the cutout point for possible arm« shipments
to the Bosnian Muslims irom Iran. The Majority concludes that this statement is indicative of
the fact that Ambassador Galbraith actually orchestrated the Croatian inquiiy regarding the
resumption of the arms pipeline. This line of argument is not credible. It was well known
within the foreign policy and intelligence communities that the Islamic countries, particularly
Turkey and Iran, were interested in helping the Bosnians. Throughout 1993. the President of
Turkey made repeated contact with United States and United Nations officials to encourage
either the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia altogether, or supplying arms to the
Bosnians directly despite the embargo. See, e.g.. Department of Sute Cable, Nov. 8, 1993. The
factjhat Ambassadty Galbraith incorporated this well known knowledge into a discussion with
theg|P^^BH|^- who also should have been aw are of Turkey's interest in aiding the
Bosnians -.isjtp way indicative of his having orchestrated this deal among Iran, Croatia, and
Bosnia.'
'mya^
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377
European desk officer of the conversation: but the desk officer docs not remember the
conversation and did not report the con\ ersation to anyone wiihin the European branch.^
In his Apni 20 cable. theJ^pHBHlMtied the March idea raised by the Ambassador
to the comments made by Foreign Minister Granic and requested guidance homM/^J
headquarters. TheN^|BHHWBssumed that Granic's conversa'ion was evidence that
Ambassador Galbraith had proceeded with the idea he had discussed in March. In addition, the
/m^m^pBr^potted on information provided by the DC.M that the Special Envoy was intent
on initiating an "Afghan style" Operation to arm the Bosnian Muslims and circumvent the arms
embargo.'' In subsequent testimony to the Select Subcommittee. ihelllMWI^Wfctesiil'ied
that the Croatian inquiries caused him to \\onder %vhether the March inquiry by the Ambassador
had gone forward and a covert action proposal w as under consideration. " The/||BBBBH^^
presents no factual basis for concluding that an inquiry- addressed to him by the Ambassador in
the sanctity of the United States embassy, if it occurred at all, is related to an inquiry addressed to
the Special Envoy by the Croatian foreign minister five weeks later.
By stringing these conversations together in one cable, the MBI^B^Bif gave the
impression that the question being raised by the Croatians was based on the earlier Galbraith
inquiry. This report is a compelling example of why the^^BMlBMVMas admonished on
several occasions about the quality of his reporting. The/^BHIBBHsuspicion over a
theoretical discussion the ambassador allegedly had with him about finding ways to arm the
'" Special Envoy Redman has no recollection of ever expressing such an interest during
his time as Special Envoy. Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 86.
ubcommittee Dep. at 25. (
lis
378
Bosnian Muslims was extreme. If an Ambassador must be concemcd about conducting a
theoretical discussion with one of the most knowledgeable people in the embassy, then the
United States government will be denied a thorough ainng of views and ideas. In addition, the
report contains rank hearsay that amounts to little more than gossip and rumor mongering with
respect to the tales told by the DCM about the Special Envoy. This reporting of such gossip and
rumor about U.S. officials is not intelligence gathering and, when it contains an accusation of
illegal activity, is absolutely wrong. Moreover, ihegjjfl^^ll^failid to consult with or
corroborate any of these stories involving such U.S. officials. Finally, both the .-Vmbassador and
the Special Envoy deny the accuracy of the reports, and the DCM denies making the comment
about the Special Envoy!^^5S^^
On April 21, 1994. ihej^t^^^fZ/fMreponed to headquarters on his conversations
witlgH^Bil^H^^H^^^B|||[^PI||^^^^B^hregarding the shipment of arms
to the Bosnians.^' According to thal^BmH^^^I^^BKexpressed ambivalence
toward the resumption of shipments from Iran and elsewhere and asked the Ututed States to
identify' any such shipments so that Croatia could interdict. Th^^J^Bmi^Hresponded that
the United States enforced the arms embargo and expected others to do the same. The irony of
the reporting by t^T^jH^BHs'^ ^^^ ^^ appears to suspect the motives and intentions of
the United States government colleagues far more than he suspects the Croats. For example, the
uncritical report of the remarks b)fim|B||^M'ail to note that he is an ultra-nationalist who
had strong reasons to oppose any arms for the Bosnians in order to ma-ximize Croatian territorial
379
gains in Bosnia. Moreov er.MDB^^H^H regardless of his \ leus on shipping amis lo the
Bosnian Muslims, had strong reasons to «ani United States intelligence on arms shipments in
order to make certain that Croatia received its cut of all arms traversing its territory. The fact that
the^H^B^BBfcyfails to provide this t>pe of intelligence assessment is surprising^^l^
TheflH^ll^B^/ reporting on April 20 and 21. 1994. alarmed his headquarters in
the United States by giving the impression that an unauthorized covert action might be
underway. On April 21. 1994. headquarters responded infomims the^HBHm^Wlhat the
idea shared by the ambassador in March clearly fell within the definition of a covert action.
The reporting also led to a series of responses b\iiByheadquaners that contained wholly
inaccurate legal advice by desk officers without any legal consultation or supervision. This
advice was wrong, but it was relied upon by thai^^^H^B^hroughout his dealings on this
matter with the Ambassador. In testimony to the Select Subcommittee. theMBHMBIh/
acknowledged that he believed United States acquiescence to the transshipment of Iranian arms
through Croatia into Bosnia would be a covert action.'" This incorrect legal advice ultimately led
thei^HHIBilMo conclude that the "no instructions" response suggested a covert action was
''^|H(Such an operation would require a presidential finding and notification of
Congress. Ketnphasis added)./
fFoT a discussion of the
elements of covert action and what activity actually necessitates a Presidential fmding, see
Chapter One Section Five, supra. The Deputy Chief of Mission indicated to the Subcomminee
that an issue as important as this would have prompted con§ultation with supervisors and covert
activities specialists. Select Subcommittee Deposition of^BlBBMBHAug. 16. 1996, at 36
(hereinaftei^ifcigSSubcommittee Dep"), In this instance, however, "thgiDeputy Chief had no
specific recollection of having gone to her superiors bef(are ipfoH^ing th^flfli^lh^Blthat
the Ambassador's proposal would require a flnding. Id.
M
[Subconunittec Dep. at 25
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underway. This miscomniunicaiion in mid-Apnl contributed to the breakdown of
communication betweenMWheadquarters and the rest of the Execuine Branch The confusion
caused by this miscommuniation was compounded at Embassy Zagreb by multiple conversations
bervv een the|^|HB^HQnd the DCM in which the latter offered up rumors and speculation
about confijsion at the Department of State. negati\e attitudes tow?rd the Ambassador and the
Special Envoy, and activities of various United States officials, all of which was dutifully
reported by ihd^/ft^f^^^j The miscommunicaiion about the "no instructions" response
and surrounding events in the Balkans that occurred between the C\.\ and other Executive
Branch agencies is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. Section Two of the .Minority Views!
Contacts with the United States Defense Attache.
On or about April 18, 1994. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Herrick, the United States
Detense Attache to Croatia, " met \\ ith Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak at the Croatian
Ministry of Defense." The Defense Minister wanted the assistance of the United States in
cleaning up the remnants of an exploded ammunition dump outside of Zagreb."
'' In addition to serving as the military adv iser to the ambassador, the Defense Attache
serv es as a diplomatically recognized military observer in an accredited country. Select
Subcommittee Deposition of LtCol. Richard C. Herrick, Aug. 20, 1996, at 13 (hereinafter
"Herrick Subcommittee Dep.*').
" Id.
" Id. at 13, 30. The Croatian request required an experienced United States military team
to provide technical assistance to the Croatians on retrieval of unexploded ordnance that was
lying in a Zagreb suburb. Id. at 13. Once Ambassador Galbraith learned of the matter, he
contacted the Departments of State and Defense and informed them of the request. Although the
Department of Defense initially was concerned that such aid would constitute military assistance
in \ iolation of the U.N. embargo, the Department of State and others determined that such
assistance was not in violation of the embargo and could proceed. Id. at 30. The Department of
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^'"JThroughout its Final Report, ihe Majority alleges
that Ambassador Galbraith was instrumental in the coordination and implementation of the arms
pipeline. Given that Defense Minister Susak had been approached by so many different people
over the course of one week, it is obvious that this was not an endeavor coordinated by
Ambassador Galbraith. but rather a Bosnian initiative in which the Croatians and Iranians were
active participants
^'^^^
State concurred with Ambassador Galbraith's conclusion that this amounted to humanitarian
assistance. Id. This request for assistance is similar to a request for assistance with a missile
inspection posed by the Croatians a year later which is discussed, infea. Chapter Two, Section
Seven.
*> Id. at 14.
382
The Susak inquiry did not surprise the Defense Attache. He knew that despite the arms
embargo in place throughout the region, weapons flowed to the w arring parties/" The Defense
Attache informed the DCM of his meeting with Minister Susak upon his return to the emoassy/
The DCM recommended that the Defense Attache forward a report of the conversation through
* Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 16. Herrick noted as an example weapons he had seen
in the Croatian army that could not have been part of its inventory unless weapons were
streaming through the embargo. Id.
^' Herrick Subcomminee Dep. at 1 8. The DCM was in charge of the embassy at the time
the Ambassador was on travel.
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his usual channels " Such routine reporting would include nonrying ihe ambassador of the
exchange upon his return.
In the days following, various members of the country team in Embassy Zagreb
anticipated further Croatian government queries to United States officials about the United States
reaction to opening an arms pipeline to Bosnia. At no time was any member of the country team
approached about United Stales arms being supplied, or about the United States undertaking any
other action on behalf of the Bosnians. Each inquin, and approach sought only the United States
reaction to arms transshipped through Croatia to Bosnia. .Mihough the|[^BB^mk[dia not
remark on the consistency of the inquiries, they constitute firm evidence that no broader United
States role expected. The^H^^BlSBkleamed fron^||^^BPm^BBI^IBjpvas
planning to ask .\mbassador Galbraith what the United States reaction would be if Croatia
allow ed w capons to flow to Bosnia. The number and \ ariety of sources w ithin the Croatian
government who raised the same question of arms shipments with U.S. government officials
during the week of April 18. 1994. is additional evidence that the March discussions between the
Ambassador ard '^^^MBBB^W^^^'^^ unrelated^^^^^^^
Ambassador Galbraith was traveling when the Croatian inquiries occurred, but he
returned to the embassy on April 24, 1994." The Ambassador learned for the first time of the
Croatian request for the United States reaction to arms transshipmenu to the Bosnians.'*" The
"Id. at 18-19.
" Ambassador Galbraith had attended a Chief of Mission conference in Brussels and
traveled in Italy prior to returning to the embassy. Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 5.
'"Id.
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DCM described the Croatian attempt to raise the issue w ith Special Envoy Redman during a
meeting with Foreign Mmisier Granic.' Based on this infomiaiion from the DCM. the
Ambassador decided to meet with the Croatians to understand better w hat was needed from the
Department of State in terms of guidance.""
Ambassador Galbraith also met with the Defense Attache. 'helj0^^^^^m..:\d the
DCM to be briefed on events that occurred while he was gone." .\mong other things, the four
discussed the Croatian inquiries regarding the United States reaction to the resumption of a
formal arms pipeline between Croatia and Bosnia.^ The discussion focused particularly upon
the potential Iranian involvement in an arms pipeline." According to the Defense Attache, none
of the participants "felt comfortable dealing with Iran.""" The Defense Attache sensed a division
within the Croatian Government about dealing with Iran." Defense .Minister Susak for example
did not favor the relationship with Iran, but he recognized that an agreement to transship Iranian
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 5.
" Id. Neitzke had explained to -\mbassador Galbraith that Granic had not been clear in
his discussions with Rediiian that the Croatians were seeking a policy stance from the United
States. Id.
" Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 19;f[pMSubcomminee Dep. at 21. DCM Neitzke
does not recall having been in a meeting in whichlne ambassador was made aware of the liaison
and defense channel inquiries. Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 63.
'* Id.; see also.j^pMrSubcommittee Dep. at 24 (describing a meetirig.a> wsbich he and
the Defense Attache relayeHtheir individual discussions with the Croatians).
" Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 23.
"Id.
*■ Id. at 15.
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weapons to the Bosnians uould provide weapons for Croatia " Th<^|pBi^BBBl/prev iously
was aware that ths^^^^pfficial and the foreign minister were skeptical of the plan.
Among the tour embassy officials. ihej^piB^BlBK u as most vocal in his opinions
against Iran." The DCM also was uncomfortable with the Iranian involvement.'"" According to
the Defense Attache, no one really objected to the arms getting to the Muslims because each
accepted that the Muslims could not defend themselves."' Thus, each of the four was on notice
that the Bosnian Muslims were receiving arms, including Iranian arms. Moreover, no one
expressed the view that the United States should stop the arms tlow by telling the Croatian
government to resist the transshipment.^^^^^^^
According to the (HIBMi^l^^J^rnbassador Galbraith questioned the accuracy of the
Defense Attache's response to Susak and asked him to arrange a meeting with the defense
minister so that Susak could pose the question directly to the .Embassador."' Ambassador
Galbraith wanted the question posed in the foreign policy channel rather than the defense or
■' Id. at 16. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Croatians had transshipped
weapons previously to the Bosnians prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Bosnian Muslims
and Croats. It was standard practice for the Croatians to take a minimum of twenty-five percent
of the weapons for themselves.
" Id. at 23.
"" Id.; Neiizke Subcommittee Dep. at 157.
" Id.
subcommittee Dep. at 24. Although LtCol. Herrick recalled the ambassador's
query about hirfesponse to Susak, he does not remember ever being asked by Ambassador
Galbraith to arrange a meeting with the Defense Minister so that the question could be posed to
him. Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 21 . Galbraith also had met with Foreign Minister Granic
upon his return. Id. Susak and Granic both indicated that in his meeting on April 28, 1994,
President Tudjman would raise this question formally with the .Ambassador. Id. at 6, 8.
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intelligence channels so that an au(horitati\ e forciun policy response could be formulated and
communicaled. The Ambassador also anticipated the question being posed b\ the Croatian
president and wanted the Depanmcnt of Slate to begin consideration of the request in the e\ent
the Croatians posed the question again formally. "'/
Events of April 27 and April 28, 1 994.
Dating the period between April 27 and April 29, 1994 the United States response to the
Croatian question was formulated' and debated. Senior officials at the National Security Council,
(he Department of State, and Embassy Zagreb remained in constant communication via
telephone calls, meetings, and cables. The .\mbassador transmitted a cable in which he
advocated a response favorable to the transshipment of arms; however, he also addressed the
risks and benefits of doing so, including the likely involvement of the Iranians.*^
Sometime during the three days prior to April 28, 1994,°" Ambassador Galbraiih spoke by
telephone to Alexander Vershbow , the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs (the "DAS"). The Ambassador recounted what he and other embassy officials
■Subcommittee Dep. at 3 1 ; Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 64
" Department of State Cable by .Ambassador Galbraiih, Apr. 27. 1994.
*' Vershbow maintained contemporaneous notes of his con\ersations regarding the
Bosnian issue with Ambassador Galbraiih and others. The notes, however, were not dated at the
time and Vershbow subsequently added dates to his notes. The page memorializing this call has
the dates 4/25, 4-'26 and 4/27 wTitten at the lop to indicate when the conversation may have
occurred. In a cable dated April 27, 1994. Mr. Vershbow makes reference to a conversation he
had with Ambassador Galbraith on "Tuesday." so it is likely that this conversation took place on
April 26, 1994.
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had heard from the Croatians, namely that the Croatians «cre I'eeling pressure from the Iranians
and Bosnians to begin supplying arms to the Bosnians. Ambassador Galbraith indicated that he
had a meeting scheduled with President Tudjman and he believed President Tudjman might use
the occasion to ask the United States reaction to transshipment of amis, including shipments
from Iran, through Croatia to Bosnia." Ambassador Galbraith and the DAS discussed the
implications of the Croatians reestablishing the pipeline including the likelihood that the arms
shipments w ould be detected by NATO and UNPROFOR forces."'
Ambassador Galbraith emphasized the importance of the matter to Croatia and the united
States and the need for guidance quickly. He also indicated that the guidance should come from
a higher authority than the Deputy Assistant Secretary ." .Ambassador Galbraith informed
Vershbow that the Croatians would take a percentage of the weapons for themselves as
payment.'^ The Ambassador requested instructions in the form of a cable and again advocated a
response that would promote the Federation.
Follow ing the telephone call. Ambassador Galbraith sent a cable to Washington
specifically addressing each of the points discussed with Vershbow and requesting immediate
** Select Subcommittee Deposition of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8, 1996, at 14
(hereinafter "Vershbow Subcommittee Dep."); Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 16.
*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 14-15.
'-Id. at 15.
«4
Id
at 16.H
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guidance. ' Ambassador Gdlbraith auain addressed the Iranian concern and noted that Croatia
should be cautioned against becommu too close with Iran. .Ambassador Galbraith explained
that opening the pipeline would pave the way for increased arms flov^s from other counines
besides Iran, but that Iran - which was so eager to be seen by the world as Bosnia's savior - was
in the best position to provide arms immediately. ' He also reiterated his belief that blocking this
arrangement between Bosnia and Croatia would be disastrous to the Federation which was
absolutely critical to peace in the region
Deputy Assistant Sccietaiy V'ershbow characterized this conversation as the correct wa>
for "[.\mbassador Galbraith] to bring an issue like this" to his attention. V'ershbow
acknowledged that the ambassador was advocating a certain position, namely that the arms
should be allowed to proceed, as any ambassador would on an issue of importance. ' It was an
ambassador's responsibility to recommend positions to facilitate the formulation of policy in
Washington. V'ershbow believed that the Ambassador was pro%iding Department officials with
'" Department of State Cable. Apr. 27, 1994.
^' Id. The Croatian-Iranian-Bosnian relationship was a constant subject of concern for
the United States. As mentioned throughout the Minority \'iews. the Iranians had already
established themselves in the region by April 1994 (some estimates trace Iran's presence back to
1979). Whenever the subject oflranian involvement arose. United States officials responded that
caution should be used and reminded the Croatians and Bosnians that if they aligned themselves
with the west, strong relations with Iran would not be tolerated. United States officials
recognize, however, that most European countries maintain diplomatic ties w ith Iran and that
Bosnia, as a European country with a largely Muslim population, was unlikely to sever all ties to
Iran, so they consistently encouraged the Bosnians to temper their dealings.
" Id.
" Vershbow Subconunittee Dep. at 1 7.
" Id. at 54.
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as much infomiation in advance so that ihey could make a decision promptly before his meeting
with President Tudjman. "
Deputy Assistant Secretary- I 'ershbow Discusses the Matter with the Undersecretary.
Following his conversation with Ambassador Galbraiih. Vershbow met with
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter TamofTC'the Undersecretary"),'" the principal person
overseeing the Bosnian issue for the Depanment. This meeting concerned a variety of issues
relating to Bosnia. Undersecretary Tamoff informed the DAS that Thomas Donilon, the Chief
of Staff for the Secretary of Siafe, had sent a message from Secretary Chnstopher encouraging a
"quick response" to .Ajiibassador Galbraiih's query. ' The Secretary did not believe that the
meeting with President Tudjman should be an "anificial" deadline for the United States to
formulate a response; " however, if a response would be required he did not want the
'Id. at 17-18.
■' Ambassador Galbraith attempted to contact Tamoff directly by telephone prior to the
Vershbow meeting but was unsuccessful. Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 30.
■ Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 18.
'id. at 27; Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 6. According to Vershbow, Secretary of State
Christopher was traveling during this time and Donilon would have been accompanying him.
The fact that Donilon had sent a message about this issue suggested to Vershbow that
Ambassador Galbraith's cable of April 27 had been received by at least some in the Department
prior to his meeting with Tamoff. Id. at 27. Donilon could not recall the exact conversation
memorialized in Vershbow's notes although he did not dispute the accuracy of the quote
attributed to him. Select Subcommittee Deposition of Thomas Donilon. Sept. 12, 1996, at 15-16
(hereinafter "Donilon Subcommittee Dep.").
' According to a cable transmitted to Ambassador Galbraith by \'ershbow on April 27,
1994, the Secretary had expressed his view that the United States not respond to such an
important inquiry according to someone else's - in this case President Tudjman's - timetable.
Vershbow explained that as of April 27, the Department had no guidance for Ambassador
Galbraith on the Croatian inquiry. This cable, which in subsequent testimony neither Vershbow
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Ambassador to be left withoui a response and he wanted that response earefully formulated and
conmiunicatcd.*"
Administration officials were aware that arms had been and were continuing to reach
the Bosnian Muslims despite the arms embargo. The import of the question being posed to
Ambassador Galbraith, therefore, was not whether Croatia should send arms in a formal way. but
rather how the United States would react to such shipments.*' Tamoff and Donilon had
discussed already the issue of how to respond to President Tudjman's second request for the
United States position on the arm's transshipments." and were aw are that Iran was a likely arms
supplier." Donilon and Tamoff relayed this information to the Secretary personally.'^
nor .•\mbassador Galbraith recalled, contributed to .Embassador Galbraith's belief in the earlv
morning hours of April 28 that "no instructions" really meant that the Department had not yet
formulated a response.
'" Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow 's Contemporaneous Notes. Vershbow 's notes
indicate that Donilon reported that there was to be "no funny business" in the region which
reflected the Secretary's commitment to having a coordinated response to the Croatian inquiry.
" Tamoff Subcomminee Dep. at 11 .
'• Donilon Subcommittee Dep. at 1 1 .
" Id. at 16. Donilon concurred with others involved in formulating this policy that the
issue of Iran was cause for serious consideration and debate and likely was the reason it took so
long to respond to Ambassador Galbraith's request for guidance. Id. Donilon explained that the
Secretary also was deeply concerned "on an ongoing basis about the Iranian presence in the
Balkans." Id.
" Id. at 12-13; TamofTDep. at 10. When Tamoff learned of this issue, he maintained
close contact with Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and the Secretary because he
believed that it was a timely and sensitive issue. Tamoff Dep. at 10.
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391
Vershbow recalled that there was no other discussion about the Galhraith cable as ever.one
present generally seemed to be aware of its contents ""
Vershbow and Tamoff concluded the meeting after discussmg other matters related to
Bosnia. Although the Croatian inquiry- was a highly sensitive matter, the need to address so
many other significant issues conceming the region limited the amount of time devoted to the
response at this meeting. Throughout the day, however. Administration officials continued to
discuss the options available to them and to shape a response to the impending question."'
Deputy Assistant Secretary V'ershbow"s contemporaneous notes contain reference to a
second phone call, probably initiated by Ambassador Galbraith. on .April 27, 1994.' In this
conversation. Ambassador Galbraith infomied Vershbow that his meeting with President
Tudjman had been scheduled for 1 1 .30 a.m. the following day." .\mbassador Galbraith also
continued to discuss with Vershbow the Lnited States reaction to arms shipments through
Croatia.
Ambassador Galbraith expected a formal request by President Tudjman on the United
States reaction »o -"ms being sent through Croatia to the Muslims.'" Reference also was made in
" Vershbow Dep. at 28-30. Undersecretary Tamoff recalled that he received the cable
from Ambassador Galbraith almost immediately after it arrived and he was aware that Vershbow
and others had seen it also. TamofT Subcommittee Dep. at 10.
*' See. e.g.. Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 30-31 (noting that simultaneous discussions
were occurring within the NSC. the Department, and aboard .Air Force One about this issue).
'" Contemporaneous Notes of Alexander Vershbow, Department of State.
"Id.
" Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 32.
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392
Vershbow's notes to a lunch between Galbraith and Minister Susak which probably provided the
basis for the additional information he shared with Vershbow durins; this second con\ersation.'
During this conversation. Ambassador Galbraith informed Vershbow that the Croatian Pnme
Minister was scheduled to visit Tehran on April 29, 1994. for the express purpose of discussing
arms shipments."' Accord-ng to Galbraith, the Iranians felt there was "nothing to discu.>i if
Croatia would not act as a channel.""" The scheduled visit suggests strongly, therefore, that the
Croatian Prime Minister fully intended to agree to arms transshipments. ' Other^vise. he would
have had no reason to travel to Tehran.
Ambassador Galbraith also told the DAS that the arms would arrive via Boeing 747
aircraft and reiterated the Croatian intention to take a cut of probably fifty percent.'" The
*' Id. Although Vershbow did not recollect whether or not the lunch had occurred by the
time of this second conversation, it is likely that it had. Galbraith had met with Susak in order to
ascertain what it was the Croatians were seeking from the United States. Galbraith
Subcommittee Dep. at 8.
" Vershbow Subcomminee Dep. at 32; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 9.
'=Id.
" This is also indicative of why resumption of the pipeline was so important to the
success of the Federation. Croatia already had agreed to allow arms to transit its territory and for
reasons of its own was seeking to ensure the United States would not object. If the United States
pressured the Croatians not to resume the arms flows, Bosnia would have been betrayed by her
alleged new ally and the Federation would have faltered. This is why a carefully crafted
response that ensured absolutely no action on the pan of the United States was so important and
why the "no instructions" response was ultimately conveyed and w as successftil in maintaining
United States and Croatian/Bosnian interests in the region.
"* Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow 's Contemporaneous Notes, Department of State.
Ambassador Galbraith does not recall the specifics of this conversation but explained that his
primary focus was on the political decision that had to be made by the Department. Galbraith
Subcommittee Dep. at 16.
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393
Majority states that this is clear evidence thai Ambassador Galbraith was an active panicipant in.
if not the originator of, the entire arms pipeline dcal.^" Aciuallv. this statement confimis what
officials at Embassy Zagreb already understood: the Croatians had agreed to the resumption of
the arms pipeline which they believed was highly beneficial to them."" and were seeking added
support for that decision from the United States. Furthermore, this is exactly the same method
employed by the Iranians and Croatians prior lo May 1993 for tunneling arms to the Bosnians*
Given the wide distribution of this information and its availability to anyone having any
responsibility for monitoring th£ Balkan issue, it is difficult to understand how the Majonty
could possibly presume that this is indicative of Ambassador Galb-^aiths active participation in
the agreement to reestablish the formal arms pipeline."'
' Majority Report at 92-93.
** Intelligence and military analysts suggest that not only did the pipeline provide
additional weapons for Croatian stockpiles, but by enabling the Bosnians to defend and maintain
territory against the Serbs, the Croatians could concentrate their efforts on recapturing Croatian
territory still held by the Serbs.
— " There is a vast amount of intelligence that discusses thq
^farms shipments that was well known to the foreign policy and intelligence communities prior
*to April 1994. Given the terrain in the region and the strong enforcement of the embargo by
Operation Sharp Guard participants, cargo flights were the onl> way to get arms to the Bosnians.
Furthermore, Boeing 747s arc commonly used cargo planes. The only significance of the use of
747s is that they are incapable of ferrying heavy weapons so this is indkatiiie of the fact that the
Bosnians only were being supplied with small arms by the Iranians.^tlp^^^
" The Majority also makes note of the fact that no one within the Administration
questioned what type or quantity of arms would be shipped to the Bosnians. The fact is
Ambassador Galbraith in effect told the DAS exactly what type of arms would be arriving; small
arms. If the arms supply was to resume via air shipments from Iran, the only arms that could be
delivered would have been light weapons, ammunition, and raw materials, all of which had been
shipped previously beginning in 1992. The Administration and intelligence officials had no need
to request the specific information from the Croatians because they already had it.
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394
As in their previous discussion. Galbraiih addressed the down sides of the decision,
including the Iranian factor, for the Bosnians. Croatians. and the United States/"' Ambassador
Galbraiih and the D.'VS discussed the ditTerent options and agreed that the same type of non-
responsive response would be ihe most appropriate.'" The Ambassador expressed concern about
how a "no instructions" response would be interpreted by the Croatians. In both the April 27
cable and his discussions with Vershbow. Ambassador Galbraith suggested that the Croatians
would take a "no instructions" response literally and postpone any decision until they heard from
the United States difrerently.""/_
"'^'■[Ambassador Galbraith suggested conveying a more clear
response to President Tudjman than "no instructions" which would gi\ e the impression that a
further response was forthcoming.""
" See Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 52-37. In his .April 27. 1994 cable. Ambassador
Galbraith also warned that Croatia should be cautioned against building too strong a relationship
with Iran.
"° Id. at 36-38. Vershbow explained that this option clearly was the best because it
provided a way to "shore up" and maintain the Federation, which was the focus of United States
diplomacy in the region at the time. Id. at 39-40. As a result of that focus, it was implicitly
understood that a neutral stance "would likely lead to the opening of the arms flow." Id. at 40.
'*" Galbraith April 27. 1994 Cable at 1 ; Vershbow Subcomminee Dep. at 40.
"*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 40. fl^fVUHIJiHM/that the Iranians were in
the best position to provide arms on a continuous basis immediately. Once the pipeline had been
reestablished by the Croatians, aimsshiptjients from other countries such as Turkey and
Malaysia could proceed in camest^ilifaj^^^
'"" Id. at 40-41 . Although "no instructions" is an understood term within diplomatic
parlance. Ambassador Galbraith recognized that President Tudjman may not possess the
diplomatic knowledge to understand the nuance of the response. President Tudjman was an
academic by background and, while a capable president, had not been on the international scene
for many years. Ambassador Galbraith had hoped to convey a response with the same
132
I
395
During this con\ersaiion Ambassador Galbraith intinuiod thai the resumption of an arms
pipeline would appeal lo the members of Congress in fa\or of lifting the arms embargo.' "' The
Ambassador and Vershbow also discussed the implications of a United States role in the
Croatian decision to supply arms. Ambassador Galbraith and N'ershbow concurred that, while
United Nations Security Resolution 713 called on states to comply with the arms embargo, it did
not require enforcement of the embargo against other countries '" Ambassador Galbraith
reiterated the importance of making a decision"" on this matter so that he would arrive at the
meeting with President Tudjman with guidance." \'ershbo\\ ended the conversation by
connotation as no instructions, but one that would be more easily understood by the Croatian
president.
'" Id. at 42. Throughout 1994 and 1995. Congress anempted to enact legislation that
would lift the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. There was consensus both in the .Administration
and Congress that the arms embargo was punishing the Bosnian Muslims unfairly. For a
detailed examination of congressional involvement in the Balkan conflict, see Chapter One,
Sections Three and Four (detailing congressional initiatives and know ledge throughout the
Balkan conflict). According to Vershbow's contemporaneous notes. .Embassador Galbraith
believed that Congr*"^ would see the resumption of arms as a positive step toward helping the
Bosnians. Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 42-43.
'"■ See U.N. Security Council Res. 713, Sept. 25. 1991; Vershbow Subcomminee Dep. at
45-46.
106
Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 48.
"" Id. Ambassador Galbraith was aware that there were differing opinions on resumption
of the pipeline within the Croatian government. As Foreign Minister Granic had intimated in
discussions with Special Envoy Redman, and as the intelligence liaison had indicated, some
were opposed to the shipment of arms, particularly those from Iran. Others such as Minister
Susak approved of the arms shipments primarily because the\ would increase Croatian
stockpiles. Ambassador Galbraith and the DAS believed how ever, that the ultimate decision
would be made by President Tudjman alone. See id. at 5 1 .
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396
assuring Ambassador Galbraith that the Depanmeni was working on the maiter and that he
would have the necessan. guidance.""
Ambassador Galbraith Consults with His^
At the end of the day on April 27. Ambassador Galbraith met with the^HJ^HHBWio
discuss tha^^BHH^^H response tc/^MmBlWquestion about the United States
^ ~ -J i-^ — \ ^'—'
reaction to the transshipment of arms through Croatia.' " Like the Defense Attache's response to
a similar question posed by Minister Susak. ihe/^mB^BBHBI^BBH^BAvhat he
believed was the United Staiei po.icy on the arms embargo." ^3^^^
Possessed with the know ledge learned from Vershbow that new guidance was imminent
and concerned that theMHHHH^|<uid Defense Attache responses to the Croatian inquiries
within their respective channels may ha\ e been mcorrect. the Ambassador instructed th^^Q
fl^BHto indicate that the United States policy was under review if the issue were raised again
^^!^"VBi9Ll °^ l'^"^'' ^*'^' ^° tekqJtfitt^/^tdio the .\mbassador. Of course the
source of the Ambassador's concern was not only that an incorrect policy had been transmitted.
'"' Id. at 61. Vershbow did not, however, inform Galbraith that such guidance would be
in writine. Id.
_ '"" Qalbraith Subcommittee Dep. at lOJ
""Id.
Id.
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397
but the fact that thelfliMMI^^fhad used the intelligence channel to transmit policy w ithout
first consulting with him."^^i^J^
The j^^H^BHvrefused the Ambassador's request on the grounds that the response
the Ambassador hoped to provide first required a presidential t'mding'" and specific instructions
from "Washington[, D.C.)'"" The|PM— fcbgreed that all policy-related questions
should be addressed to the Ambassador.'" There is no indication, however, that thc^fB^'
^^■wacted upon the Ambassador's request to hav^|^pMmm|[call the .\mbassador
directly, although the/mBBHBBcontinued to discuss the ( 'niled Stales reaction and its
results w ith|j||PB^9Bljihroughout the spnng and summer of 1994.
The conduct of th^^PIBmBp^reated special ditTiculiies for the United States
policy makers in general and the Ambassador in panicular. The MHimBBhkl ready had
used the^pi^^|^^PM|^o communicate what he believed to be United States policy. The
communication was soon proven to be incorrect, but the i^^B^BIHviow refused to
"" In the wake of Iran-contra, use of the intelligence channels to transmit policy generally
isdiscouraged by the CIA. Woolsey HPSCI Dep. at 15. If a special relationship exists between
2lflHBBH^MM|HiBHl^B|BM^'hich places him in a better position than the
Ambassador to transmit policy effectively to the government, the channel may be used. Select
Subcommittee Deposition of Janet Andres, Sept. 30, 1994, at 24 (hereinafter "Andres
Subconumnee Dep."). The transmission of policy alwavs is at the discretion of the Ambassador.
'" For a discussion of presidential findings, see supra Chapter One, Section Five.
^^^ _ /April 28, l994^J|ta|Subcommittee Dep. at
2S.ld^l^3d informed th^^j^^on .April l^^VnA that the "question oTtTroatian assistance in
the circimivention of the embargo in exchange for a cut has come to the fore" in light of
Redman's meeting with Granic on April 18. 1994.fl|pBBHm0B^i7April 20, 199
Subcommittee Dep at 25. Id. at 26-2
135
'^
398
communicate the correct information. Moreover, the fact thatJ
^^m^BHHHII^^creatcd a particularly high probabiht> that the President would
be confused if a response different than the one givenjjplBKwas communicated directly to
him. This is precisely what occurred. Ironically, as a consequence of this conversation w iih the
.\mbassador, thnM^^BHH^^egan to report more aggressiNcly on the conversations he had
with, or were related to him by. United States embassy personnel about the issue of arms
delivered through Croatia to Bosnia.""'
Policy Makers Debate and Formulate a Response to the Croatian Inquiry:
Air Force One Discussions.
On April 27, 1994, President Clinton. National Security Advisor .\nthony Lake, and
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott (the "Deputy Secretary") tra\eled to California aboard .\ir
Force One for the funeral serv ices of former President Richard M. Nixon. During the trip,
Talbon and Lake discussed .\mbassador Galbraith's impending question from the Croatians"
as well as the various options available to respond to this request."* Deputy Secretary Talbott
"JlflHSubcomminee Dep. at 26-27
"" Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 30.
'" Id. There were three options considered seriously for the response to President
Tudjman. The first option was to approve the shipments outright. Such action would be known
to our allies who were opposed to the lifting of the embargo and could be seen by the Serbs as
the United States declaring alliance with the Bosnian Muslims. The second option would be to
inform President Tudjman that the United States opposed the shipments. As Ambassador
Galbraith suggested, such a position could lead to the breakdown of the Federation and the
further military strangulation of the Bosnian Muslims. The final option was to inform President
Tudjman that the ambassador had "no instructions" thus allow ing the Croatians to pursue the
proposal while not offending the allies. For a detailed analysis of the available policy options.
see supra Chapter One, Sections Three and Four.
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399
and Lake, as well as the other policy makers iiuojvcd. readied a consensus that the "no
instructions" response was the best option a\ailablc to the L niied States ''' Talbott and Lake
knew that the Iranian presence already was established in the region because of the onaoine
hostilities and that the only way to remove them would be through estabhshing peace. The
continuation of the Federation and the establishment of some military balance among the wanine
factions was essential to that peace.
Reestablishing the pipeline likely would accomplish the latter two requirements:
therefore, the United States accepted the Iranian presence as a necessar>' risk.'"" In reaching ihis
decision, the policy makers carefully considered the Iranian factor when weighing the available
options and clearly realized that an increased Iranian presence was a drawback to this option.'"'
The "no instructions" response, however, represented w hat the National Security Ad\ isor and the
Deputy Secretan- believed to be the best of the imperfect options a\ailable to the United States.
The "no instructions " response did not reflect a change in the United States policy toward
the embargo; the Clinton Administration vehemently opposed the application of the embargo on
the Bosnian Musli»"s and had taken only minimal steps to enforce the embargo against them.'"
'" TamoffSubconunittee Dep. at 8.
'^ Talbott Subcomminee Dep. at 34-35. See also Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 9
(noting that "it was conmionly held that the Iranians were already present in Bosnia.").
'■' Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 34.
'-- Prior to war breaking out between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in May
1993, routine shipments of arms were detected by Western intelligence sources. Except for those
interdicted at sea, none of these known shipments were stopped during the Clinton
administration. Even after the war had restricted the formal pipeline between Croatia and
Bosnia, arms continued to trickle in to the Bosnian Muslims. Intelligence indicated that these
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400
Further, ihe "no instructions" response would not constitute a violation of the arms embargo b\
the United States'" Responding in this manner allowed the United Slates to avoid taking a
position that was opposed by our allies, maintain the efficiency of the Federation which the
United States saw as imperative to securing peace in the region, and enable the Bosnian Muslims
to obtain light arms.
National Security Advisor Lake presented the proposed response to President Clinion
aboard .\ir Force One.'"' The President affirmed the course of action that had been outlined for
him.'"" Deputy Secretary Talbott contacted Undersecretary Peter Tamoff who was .Acting
Secretarv in Talbott's absence, to make certain that the response and the reasons for it w ere
conveyed accurately.'"' Tamoff relayed the decision to Thomas Donilon who informed the
Secretary of State of the President's decision.'"" .Although the Secretary had not participated
arms were available on the black market, smuggled in on relief convoys, or transported by
UNPROFOR contingents.
'■■ United Nations Security Resolution 713 required states to refrain from delivering arms
to any state of the former Yugoslavia but it did not require states to enforce the embargo with
regard to third countries.
'-''Id. at 31.
•"' Id.
'-* Id. at 32. Undersecretary Tamoff recalls having discussions on this issue with Sandy
Berger. the Deputy National Security Advisor. According to TamofTs recollection, Berger was
in touch w ith Air Force One and he actually informed Tamoff that the instructions to Galbraith
were to convey "no instructions." Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 5. Although witness
recollections differed slightly on this series of conversations, the Minority concludes that
Undersecretary Tamoff and other key figures were kept adequately informed throughout the
process.
'■" Donilon Subconunittee Dep. at 13. Tamoffhad been in contact with Donilon
throughout the day and the Secretary was aware fiiUy that these policy discussions were ongoing
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401
directly in the policy discussions occurring in Washington and aboard Air Force One. he
concurred with the decision.'"'
The Majority takes note that none of the options considered b> the Administration
included prohibiting Intnian arms from transiting Croatia, but allowing "more palatable and less
dangerous sources" of arms to arrive.'^ But the question posed to 'Jnited States officials
throughout April 1994 by the Croatians was not what the United States position on an Iranian
arms pipeline to the Bosnians would be. but rather, whether the L'nited States would object to the
resumption of the arms pipeline wiiich consisted of. among others. Croatian. Turkish. Malaysian,
South African, and Iranian arms. An attempt to exclude Iranian weapons to the Bosnians would
have created very difficult practical problems. The United States would have been forced to be
more active in securing arms from other countries which would have created problems with our
allies; and it would have forced the Bosnians - and the Croatians - to become more dependent on
in Washington and aboard Air Force One. Id; Tamoff Subcoirunittee Dep. at 7.
'"* Donilon Subconunittee Dep. at 15. Donilon testified that the Secretary gave no
opinion on the matter other than an "okay" when informed of the policy decision. Id.; see also
Tamoff Subcommittee I>ep. at 8 (explaining that the bulk of his conversations with the Donilon
and the Secretary concemed the available options and risks involved in each response). Donilon
explained, however, that if the Secretary had any concerns or disagreements with the position, he
would have registered those with the policy makers in Washington directly. Donilon
Subcommittee I>ep. at 14-15; Tamoff Subcommittee Dep. at 10. The Department of State has a
system in place whereby the Acting Secretary has the full authority to act while the Secretary is
traveling without seeking the Secretary's input into a particular matter. Id. at 33-35. If,
however, in an instance such as this one the Acting Secretary believes that the Secretary should
know of the events occurring, an elaborate communications network is available. Id. at 34. In
this case Undersecretary Tamoff believed the issue important enough to keep the Secretary
informed throughout the entire process.
'-'' Majority Final Report at 97.
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402
the United States to screen all the arms entennj: the region to ensure they were noi Iranian Such
an etTort would ha\ e attracted more attention to the shipments and impeded the arms tlow . The
whole purpose of the "no instructions" response was to make sure thai the United States took
absolutely no active position on the arms pipeline.
Ambassador Galbraith Receives ".\o Instructions" and Responds
to the Croatian President.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow contacted .Ambassador Galbraith in the early
morning hours of April 28, 1994, 'and relayed the Administration's response.' ' 0\er an open
line from his home, Vershbow informed Ambassador Galbraith that he should tell Tudjman that
he had "no instructions."'" At the time. Ambassador Galbraith understood this to mean that the
State Department had not yet formulated a response.""
Ambassador Galbraith went to his meeting with President Tudjman."' The meeting
"° Ambassador Galbraith believes the telephone call came at 6:30 a.m. Zagreb time.
Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 2 1 .
'" Vershbow Dep. at 63. Vershbow could not recollect on whose authority he made the
call, but he presumed it came from Undersecretary Tamoff. Vershbow admits that this phone
call may have been "rather cryptic" because it was made on an unsecure line from his home.
Vershbow made the telephone call late at night, Washington time, to compensate for the time
difference and not wake the ambassador too early in the morning, Zagreb time. Id.
'" Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 22. In hindsight, however, the Ambassador believ es
that he was aware through his earlier conversations that the "no instructions" response was
heavily favored in Washington, but because Vershbow was on an open line the specificity of that
decision was not conveyed. Id.
'" Also in attendance at this meeting was Tom Minnacht, the economic officer for the
embassy who served as a note taker, and possibly Professor Paravic, a Croatian national w ho
serN-ed as President Tudjman's translator although the President did speak English. Galbraith
Subcommittee Dep.at 23.
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403
concerned a variety orissues outside of the amis transshipments."' and when President Tudjnian
posed the question. Ambassador Gaibraith intbmicd him that he had no instructions because
Washington had not yet issued a response.' " Ambassador Gaibraith believed thai President
Tudjman was not satisfied with this answer and had hoped for something more definitive.""
After the initial meeting with President Tudjman. Ambassador Gaibraith sent a cable to
the Department of State reporting the details of his conversation and requesting further
guidance." Ambassador Gaibraith's cable \% as critical of the position in which he had been
placed as a resuh of having :o tell President Tudjman that he had no instructions. AmbasscJ,_r
Gaibraith reiterated his belief that this quer> by the Croatians was of great import and should be
treated as such by the United Stales.' * Ambassador Gaibraith believed strongly that the United
States should be able to respond to a diplomatic request in a timely manner, especially one with
as much potential significance to the survival of the Bosnian Muslims and the future of the newly
created Federation and the success of peace in the region.' '' Ambassador Gaibraith cabled
'" Id. at 24-25; Gaibraith Cable, Zagreb 1721, Apr. 28. 1994.
'" Galbraiih Subcommittee Dep. at 23.
'"Id. at 25.
'" Gaibraith Outgoing Cable. Apr. 28. 1994.
'" Id. Gaibraith explained in testimony that although arms had flowed previously to the
Muslims via Croatia, it was a trickle of linle significance. Funher, Croatia had faced United
States as well as international sanctions in February 1994 resulting from its support of the
Bosnian Croats during the Muslim-Croat war. Having emerged from that, Croatia did not want
to take any actions that would run afoul of United States policy and possibly bring sanction
threats again. Gaibraith Subconuninee Dep. at 27. This is why the Croatians broached the
subject at all with the United States and why it was of such importance to them. Id.
'"Id. at 27.
141
404
Washington but heard nothing in response until his convcrsaiioii uith Jcnonnc Walker on Apnl
29. 1994."
Vershbow testified that on the afternoon of Apnl 28. 10')4. he discussed the Croatian
inquiry with .Embassador Charles Redman.'^' \ershbow's notes of the conversation record
Redman remarking to Ver<;hbow that President Tudjman had requested his presence in Zagreb to
discuss, among other things, arms shipments from Iran.'''" Redman indicated to Vershbow that
he would go to Zagreb on Friday afternoon and. if he had instructions, he would con\ey them.''''
'"^ Id. at 28. Ambassador Galbraith did not recall having any other conversations with
Vershbow on April 28; however, Vershbow believes that he spoke again with Ambassador
Galbraith on .April 28 to clarify that the United States position on this matter was that the
ambassador had no instructions w ith regard to the Croatians facilitating arms transfers to the
Bosnians. \'ershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 63.
'■" Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 70. Vershbow's contemporaneous notes place the
conversation at 12:45 p.m., Washington. D.C. time. Special Envoy Redman has no recollection
of this conversation. Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles Redman. .\ug. 27, 1994 at 38
(hereinafter "Redman Subcommittee Dep."). Special Envoy Redman frequently telephoned ihe
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense during his
negotiations. See, e.g., Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 39 (noting, '"I was in touch with as many
people as I could all the time"); Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at; Select Subcommittee
Interview of Jenonne Walker. Aug.. 21, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Walker Subcommittee
Int.")( stating that "when Charles Redman was Special Envov he had almost daily contact w ith
the NSC staff. . . .").
Special Envoy Redman had been appointed by President Clinton to replace the former
Special Envoy Reginald Banholemew. Redman had just concluded the Washington Accords and
was in the midst of continuing Federation agreements and Contact Group meetings during this
time.
'*- Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 70. Redman recalls that the purpose of his meeting
with President Tudjman was to brief him on the contact group meetings. Redman Subcommittee
Dep. at 41.
'*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 70-71. Vershbow could not recollect how this issue
had come to Redman's attention. He surmised that Redman had become aware through
Galbraith's reporting cables. Id. at 70. In addition to many executive agency and Department
142
405
Vershbow cannot recollect clearly whether he informed Redman of the emerging "no
instructions" policy, but assumes that he must ha\e since the call would have been on a secure
telephone line.'"
Events of April 29, 1994: The Question Is Posed Again.
On April 29. Vershbow drafted a cable to Ambassador Galbraith which was never
transmitted."' Vershbow testified that the cable had been wnnen after at least one of
Ambassador Galbraith's meetings with President Tudjman. and given the time difference, may
have been written after both meetings."" The cable was merely a written record of the
instructions that Galbraith already had received orally, according to Vershbow."" The "'no
instructions" response was the formal United States position on the matter and the cable merely
personnel, Redman was 'lagged " to receive .Ambassador Galbraith's outgoing cables. See
Galbraith Outgoing Cable. Apr. 27. 1994.
'" Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 72. Vershbows recollection could not be refi-eshed
by his notes as there is no indication of what he told Redman during the call. During this
conversation, Redman further explained that in his dealings w iih Bosnian Prime Minister
Silajdzic, it was the Bosnian belief that the Croats wanted money rather than arms and that
pending economic contracts with Iran were beine held up through "Bosnian/Iranian contrivance.'
Id. at 71.
"'Id.
"*ld.
" Id. at 63. Other than the cryptic "no instructions" response he received from
Vershbow in the early morning hours of .April 28, 1994, Ambassador Galbraith does not recall
speaking with the DAS prior to his conversation on the evening of April 29, 1994 with Jenonne
Walker of the NSC. Vershbow believes, however, that he ma> have telephoned Ambassador
Galbraith again on April 29 to reiterate the "no instructions" response and that it was after this
call that the cable was drafted. Id. at 61. 63.
143
406
was an ex post facto historical record of those instructions "'
Special Envoy Redman arrived in Za;:reh on April 29. 1994. and together with the
Ambassador, was scheduled to have dinner with President Tudjman."" Ambassador Galbraith
expected that President Tudjman would renew his inquiry as to the United States reaction to
Croatia's transshipment of arms to Bosnia.
.Embassador Galbraith telephoned Special Envoy Redman prior to his arrival at Embassy
Zagreb' '" and asked the Special Envoy to his residence prior to the dinner as he had something to
discuss with him. Ambassador Galbraith was eager to engage Special Envoy Redman on the
anticipated request prior to the meeting because of his knowledge of the region and of Balkan
issues.'" .Ambassador Galbraith believed that the Special Envoy's involvement would elicit a
response from Washington and that his presence at the Tudjman meeting would be beneficial
Ambassador Galbraith Contacts the \SCfor Final Guidance.
That evening. Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman met in the embassv
residence. Ambassador Galbraith elaborated on his earlier, crvptic message and explained that
Id. The draft cable read in pertinent part:
If the subject [of arms shipments through Croatia] is raised again, you should sute that
you have no instructions on this maner This has been reviewed at high levels within
the United States govenunent.
'" Redman Subcomminee Dep. at 41.
""Id. at 40.
'*' Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 35.
'" Id. at 35-36.
144
407
he was still awailinu further guidance on responding lo the fonheoming Croatian question.'''
Ambassador Galbraith informed Special Envoy Redman thai lie would call the National Security
Council ("NSC") to see if he could obtain further guidance.' Special Ensoy Redman
concurred because he also felt that this issue was particularly important to the future of the
Federation.'*"
The Defense Attache also was present at the residence'"" to discuss the recent request for
technical assistance from the Croatians " as well as the anticipated question from Tudjman.'"'
The Defense Attache place-- the call to Jenonne Walker at the NSC'"^ on behalf of .\mbass"djr
Galbraith.""' Ambassador Galbraith first discussed Susaks request w iih Walker and then
'-'Id. at 41.
''' Id.; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 30.
'■' Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 42.
'" Henick Subcomminee Dep. at 25.
" Id.; see, supra n.9 (discussing the Croatian request for assistance with an exploded
ammimition dump.) The Defense Attache and Ambassador Galbraith had discussed this matter
previously and had concurred that they should telephone Walker. Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at
27. LtCol. Herrick indicated that the United States did send a team to assist the Croatians with
the ammunition dump "within the next couple of days" after this telephone call. Id. at 30.
'" Redman Subcoinmittee Dep. at 42. Ambassador Galbraith believes that he may have
discussed the ordnance matter with Jane Hall, another NSC staff person, prior to speaking with
Jenofuie Walker, although both conversations occurred during the same telephone call. Galbraith
Subcomminee Dep. at 30.
'" Jenonne Walker was the senior NSC staff member responsible for the Balkans.
'*° Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 26.
145
408
informed her of the impending meeting with President Tudjman.'"'
Special En\oy Redman and the Defense Attache were present in the room dunng
.\mbassador Galbraith's conversations with Walker about the impending question from the
Croatians.'"' Walker informed the ambassador that the response to the question was to be "no
instructions."'"' Ambassador Galbraith understood Walker was relaying these instructions
directly from .\nthony Lake.'" Ambassador Galbraith was told that Lake had relayed the
instructions with '"a smile and a raised eyebrow."'^' When .Ambassador Galbraith concluded his
conversation, he had no doubi iha' the "no instmctions" response was the formal United Staui
reply to be conveyed to the Croatian government and that it \\as supported by both the National
'*' Henrick Subcommittee Dep. at 26.
'"-U.
'" Jenonne Walker recalls telling Galbraith that he was to inform President Tudjman
"that the United States would comply with the embargo, but that he had no instructions as to
Croatia." Walker Subcommittee Int. at 1.
"^ Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 29. Jenonne Walker recalls giving Galbraith the no
instructions advice prior to discussing the matter with Anthony Lake. Walker Subcomminee Int.
at 1. Walker stated, however, that Lake concurred with her instructions to Galbraith and, in fact,
instructed her to reiterate them for Ambassador Galbraith. Id. The fact that Walker does not
recall events in the same sequence as the other witnesses to this conversation is not a matter of
substance as she does recall that the instructions given to Galbraith were 1 ) the United States
complies with the embargo, and 2) there are no instructions with regard to the Croatian question
which is consistent with the testimony of other witnesses.
"' Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 3 1 . Jenonne Walker does not recall whether she
contacted the Ambassador again after discussing this matter with Anthony Lake, bu; she believed
it logical that she would have. Walker Subcommittee Int. at 1-2. Walker had no recollection of
Lake confirming the "no instructions" with a smile and raised eyebrows. Id. at 2.
146
409
Security Council and the Department of Slate.""'
After Ambassador Galbraith ended his conversation wiih Walker. Special En\ov Redman
spoke 10 her.'"' Special Envoy Redman talked with Walker for five or ten minutes'"' about his
meetings with the contact group and other matters.'"" At the conclusion of the conversation.
'"■ Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 37-38. Prior to this conversation with Galbraith and
Redman, Walker was aware of the "no instructions" policy although she could not recollect from
where. Walker Subcommittee Dep. at 2. Walker recalls conveying this guidance to Alexander
Vershbow at the Department of State at some point after her discussion with Lake and receiving
assurance from Vershbow that ije would run it through his chain of command to ensure that
Ambassador Galbraith received the correct instructions Id. It is her belief that Vershbow told
her that Galbraith had been told by the Department of State that the United States abided by the
embargo and expected Croatia to do the same. Id. at 2. Vershbow, however, only recalls giving
Galbraith the temporary "no instructions" policy. Special Envoy Redman also does not recall
telling Walker that these were the instructions Galbraith had received from the Department of
State. Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 43.
This was an extraordinarily busy and delicate time for the policy makers involved in
obtaining peace within the Balkans. Literally hundreds of phone calls and hours of negotiations
occurred daily. The fact that witnesses have difTerent recollections of the timing and exact
wording of a few conversations over the course of days is not significant in light of the overall
circumstances in which they occurred. As stated throughout this Section, the Minority affords no
special significance to the fact that witness recollections of these events do not coincide
perfectly.
'*■ Herrick Subconunittee Dep. at 31. Jenonne Walker does not recall the conversation
being initiated by the Defense Attache on behalf of Ambassador Galbraith. It is her belief that
the telephone call was initiated by Ambassador Redman. Walker Subcommittee Int. at 1 .
According to Walker, Redman telephoned her from Zagreb because he believed that Ambassador
Galbraith had received instructions on this matter that both "surprised and troubled" him. Id. He
then put Galbraith on the telephone. Id. None of the other witnesses interviewed by the Select
SubcoiTunittee recall the events of this evening in the same manner as Jenonne Walker. It is
possible, due to the lapse of over two years, that the witnesses recall certain things with varying
clarity. The Minority Staff does not consider this discrepancy material to the events that took
place or this investigation.
'" Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 31.
'" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 44. Redman characterized his conversation with
Walker as typical of his daily debriefings on negotiations that he would give her whenever
147
410
Ambassador Gjibrailh and Special Envoy Rodman left for the nicctinu \vith President Tudjnian:
the Defense Attache did not accompany the Ambassadors to the meetini;.'
The April 29, 1994 Tudjnian Meeting.
On their way to the meeting with Tudjman. Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy
Redman discussed the dehvery of the United States response to President Tudjman.' ' Both
officials considered the diplomatic exchange to be of the utmost importance, and wanted to be
sure they con\ eyed the policy correctly and in a manner that \v ould be understood clearly by the
Croatians.' • The United States foreign policy community had expended great effort over the last
seventy-two hours carefully crafting the response and it was imperative that the language not be
misconstrued.
Before the dinner with Tudjman. the .Embassadors met with the President in his upstairs
office at the presidential palace.' ' When Tudjman asked the question. .Embassador Galbraith
replied: 'I have no instructions, but pay attention to what I am not saying."' ' President Tudjman
possible. Id. at 45. To the best of his recollection, he had no independent conversation with
Walker about the Croatian question. Id. at 44-45.
'"' Herrick Subconuninee Dep. at 32.
' ' Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 47.
'^ Id. Ambassador Galbraith had expressed earlier in his conversations with the Deputy
Assistant Secretary his concerns that a pure "no instructions" response might not be understood
accurately by the Croatians. It was, therefore, extremely important to Ambassador Galbraith that
he deliver the response as succinctly as possible. Id. at 48 (noting that 'Ihis question was from
the President of a country to which [Ambassador Galbraith] was accredited, so he wanted to be
responsive and he wanted to responsive in accordance with policy.").
'"'Id. at 50.
'"* Galbraith Subcommince Dep. at 38.
148
411
listened carefully to the response but both Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman
believed that he did not completely understand what v\as bcinj; con\e\ed.' "
As the meetmy adjourned and the three proceeded dovsnsiairs to dinner. President
Tudjman pulled Redman aside' " and asked the Special Envoy what .\nibassador Galbraith's
response meant and if there was something more that could be told him.' ' Special Envoy
Redman responded, "It's your decision. We do not want to be put in the position of saying
no.'" ' President Tudjman had no outward reaction to this response nor did he raise the issue
again throughout the dinner " Both Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman be'\fved
at that point that the Croatians understood that the United States would not object to the Croatian
decision to transship arms to the Bosnians. "
The Decision to Report Orally to Washington.
After the dinner Galbraith and Redman discussed how to repon to Washington on their
Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 50; Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 38.
' * Id. According to Ambassador Redman, it w as a Croatian tradition to conclude
business and proceed downstairs for a short cocktail and dinner. Redman Subcommittee Dep. at
50.
•"Id. at 51.
' ' Id. It is important to note that this was not the first time such a question had been
posed to a United States Special Envoy. In April 1993. the United States Special Envoy was
Reginald Bartholcmew, the current Ambassador to Italy. During the month of April,
Ambassador Bartholemew was approached by Defense .Vlinister Susak and asked what the
United States position was on Croatian facilitated arms shipments to Bosnia. See, pages 33-38,
supra. Special Envoy Bartholemew responded exactly as Special En\oy Redman did nearly a
year and half later: "We do not want to be put in the position of saying no."
' ' Redman Subconmiinee Dep. at 51.
"" Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 39; Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 51.
149
412
encounter with Tudjman.'" Special En\oy Redman was scheduled to depart Zagreb for
Washington. DC. the next day"- and the two agreed that Rodman could brief the appropriate
officials orally at that time. Special Envoy Redman remarked that an oral response was
consistent with the fact that the response had been received orally.'" Special Envoy Redman
told Ambassador Galbraith that he would contact him about sending a follow-up cable.'*''
Special Envoy Redman met with the National Security .Advisor upon his return to the
United States.'" The meeting primarily concerned Redman's work with the Contact Group.""
Redman also briefed Lake «. ,t ;he Tudjman meeting and informed him that he and .\mbassaoor
Galbraith expected the Croatians to proceed with the shipments as a result of the United States ,
response." The National Security Advisor nodded his understanding of this expectation. "
Special Envoy Redman asked Lake if he desired further reporting from Ambassador
'" Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 40.
"" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 52.
'" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 40; Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 40. Ambassador
Redman explained that reporting orally was far more efficient given the fluid nature of events in
the Balkans. There was no time to sit down and write long reports of events. Redman
Subcommittee Dep. at 79.
'** Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at 40.
"" Redman Subcomminee Dep. at 52. Redman "typically reported to Tony Lake
whenever he came back from a mission." Id.
'" Id.
"" Id.
'" Id.
ISO
413
Galbraith on this matter.'"' Lake indicated that no lurihcr rcponing on the matter would be
necessar\." Special Envoy Redman telephoned Ambassador Galbraith and infonned him that a
reporting cable would not be necessar>.' '
There has been wide debate about why this meeting was not memorialized in some
written record and whether Special Envoy Redman's oral report to officials in Washington was
out of the ordinary. The Minority concludes that there was nothing incorrect in the decision to
report this matter orally. It was expected that the United States response would have immediate
results"" and notification of the responsible officials in a timely manner was essential, c ,"ole*
traffic, even that with restricted distribution, was distributed widely. '■ and given the
Administration's desire to keep the exchange closely held, wide distribution was considered
unw ise. Time also was a factor to be considered when using cables to report important e\ ents; it
often took several days for cables to reach the various people who needed the information. The
decision to have Special Envoy Redman deliver the results orally ensured that the proper policy
makers were notified promptly and thoroughly of the meeting results. The decision to report
orally also war in keeping with the way this policy decision had been handled throughout the
'" Id. at 54.
"°Id.
'" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 56; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 42.
'"' As discussed supra pages 130-131, Ambassador Galbraith knew that the Iranians and
Croatians were scheduled to meet on this matter the very next day. If, as expected, the Croatians
took the United States response to mean there would be no United States objections to the
transshipments, those shipments could be arranged immediately. In fact, the first shipments of
arms for the Bosnians were transshipped the following week.
"' Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 40-41.
!51
414
United Sutes govemment'*' and reflects no deviation from accepted diplomatic practices,
particularly as they occuiied with regard to the highly fluid nature of the Balkans.
Other Events of April 30, 1994.
On April 30, Croatian Prime Minister Valentic arrived in Tehran. Valentic and his .
delegation met with Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Edib Buk\ic, who had arrived the day
before, and Iraiuan First Vice President Habibi.'** According to foreign press reports, the
meetings concerned "resolving the Bosnian crisis and humanitarian aid,"'** but likely also dealt
with the resumption of ttw arms pipeline.'*^ On this same day. Vershbow recalls that he bpoke
again with Galbraith and reiterated that "no instructions" was indeed the United States re^wnse
to the Croatians.'**
'** See. &g., Donilon Subcommittee Dep. at 19, 20 (noting that to his knowledge all
debate took place orally).
'** FBIS Rqxwt, Apr., 29, 1994.
'** FBIS Rcport^'Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, China. "May, 1, 1994.
'" FBIS 1
'** Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 63. Vershbow knew by Ais time that diese
instructions had been passed to Tudjman by Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman,
but it was his intention to clarify diat diis was not, m fact, an interim re^wnse, but the only
reqxMise that the United States was to give on the matter. Vershbow may have been reiterating
tile "no instructions" policy as a resuh of a conversation with Jenonne Walker. See Walker
Subcommittee Int at 2. (Walker relayed the "no instructions" information to Sandy Vershbow
wtw advised that he would pass it through the Dq>artment of State.)
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415
Events of Early May 1994: The Days Following the "So Instructions" Response.
As mentioned above, on May 2. 1994. Special Envoy Redman telephoned Ambassador
Galbraith and informed him that Lake had been briefed on the Apnl 29, 1994 Tudjman
meeting.''" Special Envoy Redman indicated that Lake saw no need for funher reporting on the
matter by Ambassador Galbraith." .M that point, neither the Special Envoy nor Ambassador
Galbraith was concerned about the lack of written reporting since both were confident that the
response had been delivered correctly and the meeting reported accurately to the National
Security Advisor.''' Accoioing to Special Envoy Redman, this e.xchange was his last
involvement with regard to the "no instructions" response.""'
By May 2. 1994, the arms pipeline had been reestablished firmly .•'' .Mso around this
'** Redman Subcomminee Dep. at 54; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 42.
""* Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 56; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 42.
""" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 43; Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 56, 89.
Ambassador Redman testified that he informed Anthony Lake fully on what had transpired
during the meeting with President Tudjman and Ambassador Galbraith including the delivery of
the "no instructions" response and Rgdman's further clarification to the Croatian president.
Redman Subcommir.ee Dep. at 89. ^
/After receiving
confirmation that the Croatians had acceptgrf ttjc proposal to transship aims to the Bosnian
Muslims, the Balkan Task Force repcnedf^B^n the Iranian arms shipments to the region as
well as the efforts of other countnes such as Turkey and Malaysia to send arms to the Bosnian
Muslims. This information was disseminated periodically in the National Intelligence Daily
which is delivered to Congress, the \Miite House, and other Executive Branch agencies. For a
list of National lnt^UigenceJ)aily references to the arms shipments, see Appendix E of this
report. '
416
time, the Defense Aitachc learned whal had transpired at .\nibassador Galbraith and Special
Envoy Redmans meeting w ith President Tudjman Jrom the DCM." " Neitzke relayed to the
Defense Attache that the question had been poscd to Ambassador Galbraith by President
Tudjman twice in the last few days and that .\nibassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman
had responded with "no instructions.""'" The DCM also discussed the events of the preceding
week with thsfH^PHB^^ At the conclusion of their conversation, the DCM told the
ilfl^flHBHfnot to record the conversation and to keep their discussion to himself '"
The DCM ^vrongly assi-med that because .\mbassador Galbraith had been told no fw.ir
reporting was necessary, policy makers in Washington did not want to be associated with the
policy. The DCM took his speculation to the JHH^PI^m^vho immediately disregarded the
DCM's request and reponed the conversation to his headquarters. It is this tvpe of rumor
mongering that contributed to the overall confusion bet\^een ihegKKttlt^^md his
headquarters, the Cl.A and other Executive Branch agencies, and, within Embassy Zagreb,
between the Ambassador and the i
^ Herrick Subcommittee Dcp. at 32.
-°* Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 32. LtCol. Herrick only remembered this conversation
generally when he testified. Id. Although the phrases "listen to what 1 am not saying" and "\\e
don't want to be in the position of saying no" were familiar to him, he attributed them to
accounts he had read in newspapers of these events rather than his conversation with Neitzke at
the time. Id. at 32-33.
•"* Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 1 74;|(BBi|gSubcommittee Dep. at 42. ^s noted
throughout this report, much of the information contained in theMp^HliVPi^i'cp<>t^>"S
cables is attributed to the DC^. The DCM^by^conu^t in his testimony, attributes most of his
knowledge of events to thq
■"' See, JIMBB^JB^ May 5. 1 994jj— gfeubcomminee Dep. at 34.
Neitzke did not recall admonishing tfi^lBll^hlJB^^bout making a written record of the
conversation. Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 1 74.'
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417
Chapter Two
Section Two
COMMUNICA T10\S A.SD MISCO.\fML.\ICA TIOSS A T THE CIA
Throughout the summer and fall of 1994, a series of miscommunicaiions. uninformed
legal judgments and inaccurate reporting within the Central Intelligence Agency created
confusion th^t rippled through the Agency. The CIA confusion had the unfortunate result of
creating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust directed toward Ambassador Galbraith that was
not justified by the facts. The confusion could have been averted by better supervision within the
Agency, improved procedu.wS lordisseminating legal opinions, and higher standards fr>'
reporting.
The most significant of the miscommunications occurred prior to and in the aftermath of
the May 5, 1994 meeting between James Woolsey, the Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI") ,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.' Several
months later, in late September and October 1994, a second round of suspicions about the
activities of Ambassador Galbraith and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke arose. Lapses in
communication dating back to May and the extensive reporting of rumor and gossip along with
intelligence by tht^jf/lfl/^^fuelcd these suspicions. On October S, Director Woolsey
raised the suspicions brought to his anention by CIA personnel with National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake.'
' A brief discussion of the May 5 meeting follows below.
' A more detailed discussion of the events surrounding the October 5 meeting can be
found in Chapter Two, Section Eight.
ISS
418
Disconnects at the CIA Leading Up to and Subsequent to the .\fay 5 Meeting.
The CIA was informed fully that the Croatian Government was seeking the United States
view toward Croatia allowing weapons to be transshipped en route to Bosnia. On April 29.
1994. Ambassador Galbraith sent a cable to Washington reporting on his April 28 meeting with
President Tudjman. The cable recounted that the Ambassador told President Tudjman that he
had "no instructions" on the issue of Croatia allow ing arms to transit Croatia en route to Bosnia.'
The CIA received a copy of this cable which was read by^|H0BBMBk/the Chief of the
Interagency Balkan Task Force (" the Chief IBTF"), among other^
Ambassador Galbraith s Request to '^'^MdBlBBiB'L/ ^
Ambassador Galbraith discussed the maner with theMBBBWByafter receiving word
from Special Envoy Redman that the deliver, of the "no instructions" response had been
reponed to the Washington policy makers. As a general rule. th^BmHH^^houId not
be used to transmit policy.' In this case, however, the prior use of theABIHHMo convey
* U.S. Department of State Cable, April 29, 1994. Ambassador Galbraith mistakenly
understood his no instructions from the State Department to mean that the State Department had
not yet formulated a response to the Tudjman question. Accordingly, Galbraith was seeking
further instructions in the April 29 cable.
■* Al early stages of the inquiry, the Chief of the Balkan Task force did not contirm this.
At a later stage of the inquiry, the CIA produced a memorandum for the record by Chief/TBTF
which confirmed tha^Jichad received the Arnbassador's cable and that he had connected it with
thHatercable by the^0BHH|BHBy However, there is no indication that^B^
^^BPB niade his supe^grs aware thatjKe Ambassador had describe^ Ms "no instructions"
response not only to th^^^BBBH^^but directly, in writing, tq^^^eadquarters. Such
informatioii would have demonstrated that aian early stage, the Ambassador was evidently
willing to keep the CIA fully informed.^l^^^^
' In the wake of Iran-contra CIAflHMBBiMlmMii^Aiave been instructed that
their role is one of intelligence gathering and that if any activity iKey undertake could influence
world events, they are to seek guidance from headquarters. Woolsey HPSCI Deposition at 15;
Select Subcommittee Deposition of Janet Andres. Sept. 30. 1996, at 23 (hereinafter "Andres
156
419
policy, the good relationship between thq
^^^^^^^^^^■■■■■■mmilJJIPBHlfl^^ led the to
believe that the^flmMHlBhl^hannel uas an appropriate a\enuc for them to \erify L'nited
States policy.'' The Croatians also believed, because of the intimacy of the United States -
Croatian^9^9r^'3ii<>"^>iiP' that the/jm^BBl^would be knowledgeable about any policy
change or directive.''
Subcommittee Dep.")
' Neiuke Subcommittee Dep. at 161. Janet Andres, who served as DCl Woolsey's
executive assistant and one of the first people to brief the DC! on the Embassy Zagrebputters,
explaippd that this is exactly the type of scenario in which an ambassador jnay use iu£jBHiB
■■■^to convey a policy message. "[YJou do have cases where the^l^as special channels
that are better than the Ambassador because of the ts^itional relationships and personalities
involved." Andres Subcommittee Dep. at 24.^^;^^^
'Id. I
' The previous week, the^flBSHBI^had informed Ambassador Galbraith of Miro
Tudjman's knowledge of the impending request for the United States position on the Croatian
arms transshipments. See supia, pages 121-122 (discussing the/gp— B^discussion
\yith Ambassador Galbraith upon his return to the embassy).^J|^^>
157
420
'J The miscommunication becomes even more pronounced if it affects
negatively the accuracy of information coming back through thepimMf channels to
headquarters, as clearly was the case at Embassy Zagreb." C^^
To assure that President Tudjman was not confused bv the incorrect statement provided
pBB^^HUmi^BBMlfcJ Ambassador Galbraith asked the^pmMli^B|to contact
/JHBBV^P^and inform him that a "no instructions" response had been delivered toH||^BK
by the United States on April 2S and April 29, 1994.'- The J^^BMBl^e fused the request
pending written instructions from Washington. WTien the ambassador explained that the
instructions had been passed to him orally, thenf/fH^U^gJagain refused the request. After
^hat the^lBIHIII^/characterized as a heated discussion, he reported the conversation to
/^yheadq uarters and requested guidance. Th^4MHHito(>nformed headquarters that
unless he heard otherwise, he would assume that the United States would not impede the arms
flow,'" although he reiterated his request for clarification on this point^^^J^^*
The Majority has suted that the CIA was kept in the dark about Department of State
policy making. The testimony and reporting by theJUMJ^^pis incontrovertible evidence
that the^|||was informed fully and in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, theMp
'*" Andres Subcommittee Dcp. at 25.
" Id. Andres explained that if the information coming through the channels is not
accurate, it gives the wrong impression in "Washington" of what is occurring in the field and
guidance cannot be developed accurately. Id.
May 4. 1994
158
>»^
421
chose neither to accept the truth nor to act upon it.
As demonstrated by subsequent events, the characterization of events by ihe^
not only caused concern within the CIA. hut contnbuied to the significant
miscommunication between the Agency and the Department of State. Thd
repeatedly referred to a United States agreement not to impede the arms flow. This reporting
strongly suggested to the CIA that Ambassador Galbraith used similar terminology in his
meetings with President Tudjman. In fact, the .■\mbassador carefully and clearly a\ oided any
kind of agreement with the Croatian president and certainly avoided any agreement not to
impede the arms flow. The critical aspect of the "no instructions" response was its tot:.',
avoidance on the part of the United States to agree to do anything.
Central Intelligence Agency Concern about Covert Activity.
On May 5. 1994. they^^BBHIto/sent a reporting cable detailing his discussions with
.Ambassador Galbraith regarding the no instructions response to President Tudjman. This cable
became the focal point of concern surrounding this issue among Central Intelligence Agency
senior staff. Two facets of this cable caused some CIA officials to question activities occurring
in Zagreb. The firsi and most alarming aspect was the request of the Ambassador to thq(WBB^
^^MHto convey a message througlY<^B»Ehannels. The overall involvement of the Iranians in
the anns shipments also troubled some CIA officers given Iran's turbulent history with the
United States and the CIA.'' The Director of the CIA. however, did not have any particular
" See, e^. Select Subcomminee Deposition ofgl^B— fcgjAu^ 16, 1996, at 58
(noting the implications of Iranian weapons shipments) (hereinafter '/BBH^ubcommittee
Dep.**); Select Subcommittee Deposition of James Woolsey, Sept. 13, 1996, at 9 (explaining that
the United States had a policy of containing Iran because of hostility to the United States and
159
422
concern about the Ambassador's diplomatic exchange « ith the Croatian President^
The primar\ concern of th<^^|MlB^BM^\vas the pohcy which he had been asked to
convey to th^jipiBBHBPby the Ambassador. Th<]|I^^BlMHfetf^e fused to accept the
legitimacy of a response that might lead to increased Iranian amis shipments absent something in
writing from headquarters or another executive agency.'" Thus ihaW^I^HB^epeatediy
asked for confimtation from headquarters that the United States policy was in fact what
Ambassador Galbraith had told him.
The cable troubled^H^^^HHMy the Deputy Chief of the^^B^^^BIlf within
'Given his request for guidance
and her own alami/^^p^^|^BB[ informed her supervisors m theJ0|^^HIHmf||f of
the matter in one of the daily meetings the branch held to discuss problems or issues of
importance." The branch decided to bring the matter to the attention of the Director of Central
Intelligence so that he could address what the Operations Directorate saw as a misuse of the
channel. ^ Thus, theJ^^^mHHpj^Uiursued the procedural issue of the use of
thei^^^Mchaiuiel while the^^femiMM^was trying to determine the accuracy of the
other allies) (hereinafter "'Woolsey Subcommittee Dep.")
" ThqfJMI^fcMiBifcfexplained in his cable that he was certain once the Iranian
involvement was exposedThe United States would have halted the proposed shipments and he
therefore was shocked by Ambassador Galbraith's assertion that this was ptflicy.
'' One ofa^HPI^feB^Wresponsibilities was toreview the(^^H
[and respond to them as necessary or requested^**^-^
Subcommittee Dep. at 49
5^
160
423
message he had been asked to convey lo hi&flBMblTice?
/^^^|mpSM)repared a memorandum of talking points for the Director of Central
Intelligence lo use in his weekly mcetini! with the Secretar> of State**^ The talkmg pomts did not
focus on the "no instructions" position that Ambassador Galbraith had conveyed to the
Croatians, but rather the notion that the Ambassador had attempted to convey that position
through thej|jpBB|MH|HHU|J|||received expedited approval of her talking points
and had them delivered to the DCI shortly before his meeting with the Secretary of State. The
basis for the extreme concern felt by||P[[0H|M^^ as her belief that Ambassador Galbraith
sought to involve the^^MUMjIy n an idea, first brought to her anention on April 20. ^594
by th^^^B^^BBft'iat she believed amounted to covert action. The prospect of CI.\
involvement in a scenano reminiscent of the Iran-contra affair was particularly troubling to her^^j^^
The Director of Central Intelligence was briefed on the matter by the Deputy Director of
Operations ("DDO") and his executive assistant sometime on May 4 or May 5. 1994."' Around
the time he was briefed, the talking points and underlying cables thav^BlMHHB^prepared
were made available to him." At some point either on May 4 or the morning of May 5, 1994, as
the Director learned of the issue from his Director of Operations, Doug MacEachin - the Director
^J^lNormally. talking points for the Director's meetings with the Secretary would be
prepared ana placed in a briefing binder in advance of his meeting. Id. at 51. Iiuhis instance,
the decision to bring the matter to the Secretary's attention occurred rapidly and^^PB^^
^■■Mdraftedjb^ talkingppin^s quickly so that they could be included in the Director's
briefing papers.jtt|at SO. ^r'^^H^
''^■at 12. A notation on the talking points prepared b>nHiiBl^BHHndicates that
the Directgr^as "sei^d with" the maner as of May 5, 1994. CLAtalking Points, May 5, 1994,
Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 13.
161
424
of the Intelligence Directorate ("DDI") - also became aware olthc cable traffic from ih^WBi
^B^I^^H^PY Either^^^^mH^the head of the Balkan Task Force, or John Gannon,
the Director of the Office of European .Affairs, orally brieted MacEachin about the Zagreb
exchanges.'' .MacEachin learned that, based on '-he||mi|^Bp(cable. there was ereat
concern that the ambassador had requested <h<^^H|HHHf'*^ facilitate arms shipments. '^3|^L
MacEachin did not see the underlying cables and was given only enough information to
know that the DCI intended to raise the matter with Secretary' Christopher at their May 5. 1994
weekly meeting."" The Cl.A concerns were based on imprecise characterizations ofthej<— ^
■■■III cables and did not reflect thej(|^^BH^B(actual concerns. As a result, CIA
Washington and^l^^MHb^egan to work at cross purposes w iih regard to understanding the
"no instructions" policy!^5i^[^^.
On May S. Q\.\ headquarters cabled th^H^HB^B/with an interim response to his
request. The cable informed the{^M^^MM[ that the DCI was seeking clarification from the
NSC, and that the^|MpBlilB|hphould not broach the arms issue u iiMHHIBftn'cn'iing
the outcome of the DCI's meeting. The interim response did not indicate what clarification the
CIA was seeking; had it done so, much of the confusion that resulted later may have been
"' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Douglas MacEachin. Sept. 6, 1996, at 6
(hereinafter "MacEachin Subcommittee Dep.")
=' Id. at 8.
__"' Id. The concern w« among the senior staff who had re\iewed the cables and talked
"* Id. Normally, Admiral Studeman. the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, would
attend these meetings but he was out of town. MacEachin's primary purpose at this meeting was
to serve as a note taker so he was briefed with enough infonmation to take adequate notes at the
meeting. Id.
162
425
'"ts;^
avoided ^__
The May 5, 1994 Meeting bctneen DCl tt'oohey and Secretary Christopher:
Clarification Is Sought.
On May 5. 1994. DCl Woolsey had his regularly scheduled meeting at the Department of
State with Secretary Warren Christopher." The DCl infomied the Secretary and other
Department personnel that the^l^^^BlHhad been asked to inform hisit^HH^^Hthai
the United States would in effect look the other way to Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian
Muslims."' The DCl also informed the Secreiarv' that he had phoned .\nthony Lake and brought
this matter to Lake's attention."" Deputy Secretary Talbott acknowledged that he had receis ed a
telephone call fi-om Sandy Berger. Lake's deputy, informing him of the conversation Uiiii Lake
and the DCI's concerns.'' To the DCl and his subordinates, the fact that the/
thought he had been requested to take direct action to facilitate the arms flow was the core issue
to be resoiNed.' Deputy Secretary Talbott. however, focused on the substantive message that
was being communicated and not the means of the conununication. Talbott worried, based on
"' Also present at the meeting was MacEachin, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Philip Wilcox. Id. at 5; Select
Subcommittee Interview of Philip Wilcox, Aug. 14, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Wilcox
Subcommittee Int.").
"' MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 13; Memorandum for the Record, May 5, 1994 (D.
MacEachin, drafter).
^ Id. at I S. As the CIA worked on a response to thelflpi^BBH^ request for
guidance, an interim cable was sent infomiing him that the maner had beenjaken to the Director
and a recommendation made that he discuss the issue with Anthony Lakey
^■■■■P^^HBHHMay S, 1994 (TS). It is likely that this telephone call occurred as a
result of that recommendation^^^^\
'»Id.
" MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 14.
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426
the DCI's recount of what the^^^BHSMl^ad reported, that instead of "no instructions"
Ambassador Galbraiih had responded in some other way. Talboit therefore told the DCl that
Ambassador Galbraith instructed on several occasions, and at least once "tartly." that he was to
respond that he had "no instructions" to any Croat query on the subject/" Talbott told the DCI
that he would call Ambassador Galbraith and reconfirm his instructions." Following this
exchange, the DCI and Secretary Christopher moved on to other agenda items.
May 5, 1994 in Zagreb.
After a meeting with General Joulwan. the Commander of United States forces in
Europe." the Ambassador requ -. ed a ride to the embassy from the Defense .Attache so tl. ; •■ .
could use a secure telephone.^ Before arriving at the embassy, the two stopped at the DCM's
home and discussed the issue of arms transshipments to the Bosnians.' Ambassador Galbraith
and Neitzke discussed "cryptically" the "no instructions" response that had been given to
"Id. at 17.
" Id. at 19.
" MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 18.
" General Joulwan was responsible for the military operations within Europe while
General Keeler, also at European Command ("EUCOM") was responsible for the diplomatic
exchanges among the military in the region. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Deposition
of General Wesley Clark, Juiie 24. 1996, at 27 (hereinafter "Clark SSCI Dep"). The meeting
was to discuss Croatian intelligence information that the Defense Anache had received which
indicated that the Serbs were planning an attack on Bosnian territory leading to the Brcko
corridor. Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 34.
" At this time, the residetjce had not been equipped with a secure telephone.
Subcommittee Dep. at 1 26.^SSfc^
'' Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 35.
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427
President Tudjman." The Ambassador and the Defense Attache left Neitzke's residence for the
embassy. The Defense Attache look the Ambassador to his office to use the secure telephone
there while he worked on administrative matters.*"'
On May 6, 1994.''* Vershbow telephoned Ambassador Galbraith to deteimine if there was
any question about the "no instructions" response." Vershbow wanted to ensure that
Ambassador Galbraith understood that the "no instructions" response was not to be embellished
in any way.^ Ambassador Galbraith recounted his delivery of the message to, and Special
Envoy Redman's brief exchange with. President Tudjman. At the conclusion of this retelling.
Vershbow pronounced himself tonpletely satisfied with the .Ambassador's handling of the ■
matter.*' and commented that .Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman had positioned
''' Id. Herrick testified that the discussion was cryptic because it was believed that
Neitzke's residence was unsecure. Id.
" Id. at 35.
*" Galbraith Memorandum for the File. May 6. 1994, at 1. Ambassador Galbraith testified
that this con\ersation occurred on May 5, 1994 rather than May 6, 1994. Given the
contemporaneous nature of the memorandum, the Minority believes the call came on May 6.
" Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 96. According to Ambassador Galbraith's
recollection, this call occurred prior to his discussions with Talbott. Galbraith Subcommittee
Dep. at 44. Vershbow does not recall Talbon directing him to make the call and was uncertain
whether it occurred prior to or after Talbon had spoken to Galbraith personally. Vershbow
Subcommittee Dep. at 96-97.
" Id. at 95. Galbraith recalls the conversation as more pointed. Galbraith believes that
Vershbow telephoned initially "to rap his knuckles" and to question whether he had succinctly
delivered the no instructions response the way it was intended by policy makers in Washington.
Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at 43-44. Vershbow has no recollection of being asked to
reprimand Ambassador Galbraith for his delivery of the no instructions response. Id. at 99.
*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 96; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 44.
165
428
ihe United States exactly where it should be."
Prior to this conversation with Vershbow. Ambassador Galbraith did not realize that there
was confusion in Washington concerning his "no instructions" delivery. He learned from
Vershbow. however, that the DCI had raised the issue with Talbott and that had precipitated
Vershbow's inquiry.'' When his conversations with Vershbow ended. Galbraith attempted to
reach Strobe Talbott but was unable to do so.
Deputy Secretary Talbott Contacts Ambassador Galbraith to Reiterate
the "So Instructions" Response.
On May 6, 1 994. Strobe Talbott telephoned .Embassador Galbraith." Talbott explained
that his call was premised on the previous day's meeting between the Secretary and the DCI.'
The concern expressed by the DCI that the Ambassador may have exceeded his guidance
prompted Talbott to seek reassurance that the policy had been conveyed effectively.'* Talbott
believed it important that the Croatiars not be left with the perception that the United States had
given them a green or amber light on this initiative to supply arms to the Bosnians." Talbon
recognized that the United States was in the delicate position of balancing the need to promote
the Federation on one side and protect the allegiance among the United States allies enforcing the
** Galbraith Memorandum to the File. May 6, 1994. at 1 .
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. ai 45, 130.
** Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, Sept. 5. 1996, at 14 (hereinafter
"Talbott Select Subcommittee Dep.").
'"Id. at 16.
*' Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 16-17.
*' Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at 47.
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429
arms embargo on the other.'' If the allies perceived a L'nitcd States erocn lijjht. relations would
become complicated.'' In addition to the complications that a disclosure of a confidential
diplomatic exchange would cause, the fact that it involved the Iranians could have promoted
further controversy.'"
After talking to Ambassador Galbraith. however. Talboii \\ as satisfied that the policy had
been conveyed correctly and that Ambassador Galbraith understood there was to be no expansion
of the pure "no instructions" guidance." Ambassador Galbraith concluded the conversation by
asking Deputy Secretary Talbott whether or not a reporting cable should be prepared on the
meeting.'* Talbott inform*. _ .\mbassador Galbraith that he should wait to hear from e''^--r S-andv
Vershbow or Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Steve Oxman." At the
conclusion of this conversation. Ambassador Galbraith was confident that the record had been set
straight."
Following his conversation with .Ambassador Galbraith. Deputy Secretary Talbott
contacted Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow." Talbott relayed to Vershbow what he and
*° Id. at 21. Sec also Galbraith Memorandum to the File, .May 6, 1994 (discussing
Talbott's concerns about the implications of a perceived green light).
" Talbott Subconunince Dep. at 21.
'- Id. at 22.
" Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 18.
** Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at SO
" Id. at 50; Galbraith Memorandum to the File, May 6. 1994.
'* Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 52.
*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 73.
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430
Ambassador Galbraith had discussed earlier that day. Talbolt expressed some concern that the
"no instructions" response had somehow gone "off track" when it was explained to Ambassador
Galbraith by the National Security Council on April 29.'" Talbott further explained that Special
Envoy Redman had been involved in clarifying the "no instructions" response and that
Ambassador Galbraith had shared with President Tudjman at an earlier meeting that
"Washington hadn't made up its mind yet" on what response to pursue." In this regard, Talbott
expressed concern that Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman had exceeded the pure
"no instructions" delivery.*" Vershbow and Talbott agreed that it would be best, however, to let
the situation stand" given thatihe essential meaning of "no instructions " had been conveyed
correctly by the Ambassadors.'"
Deputy Secretary Talbott then discussed the issue of a wTitten record of the events with
Vershbow. He reiterated Ambassador Galbraith's request that the delivery of the response and
surrounding events be memorialized."" Talbott offered the view that if such a record were made.
'' Id. According to Vershbow "s contemporaneous notes, Jenoiuie Walker gave
Ambassador Galbraith the "no instructions" response "exactly [as the] Secretary thought [they
should be]" but that Tony Lake had requested the response be delivered with raised eyebrows
and a smile. Id. Because of the NSC interpretation of the "no instructions" response,
Ambassador Galbraith had focused President Tudjman's attention on "what he didn't say." Id.
" Vershbow Subconunittee Dep. at 78-79.
*»ld.
" Vershbow Subcomminee Dep. at 80.
*" Seiiate_SelecLCQmmittee-onJiitelligence Hearing on U.S.ActionsL-Regarding Iranian
Arms <;hipmpnt«i tr» Rn«;nia May 23. 1996. at 53-55 (hereinafter "Talbott SSCI Hearing").
*' Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 80.
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431
there should be only one copy in light of the matter's sensiti\ it> ." \'ershbo\s concurred in this
assessment. Events overlook this discussion, however, and no official written record of the
exchange was created."' Although no contemporaneous wntten record was prepared, the
testimony of the participants strongly indicates that a written record was not rul;d out. The
testimony also indicates that Deputy Secretary Talbott objected to a reporting cable only because
of the inability to control distribution in an effective way.
Ambassador Galbraith Memorializes the Croatian Inquiry.
After .Ambassador Galbraith's discussion w ith Deputy Secretary Talbott. the Ambassador
discussed the affair w ith the DC.M. He had not heard from Vershbow or Oxman as Deputy.
Secretary Talbott had indicated he would.* Although it was relatively common in the context of
Balkan diplomatic activities not to have a wrinen record of events, the .Ambassador felt that a
record of what he believed to be a very significant event should be retained."
** Id. at SO-81. Vershbow opined that the concern about a wTitten record stemmed from
the potential allied reaction to the "no instructions" response. As discussed in Giapter One,
Section Two, the allies maintained the arms embargo in theory as a way to protect their troops,
even though throughout the course of the arms shipments they too turned a blind eye. Id. at 81.
The delicate positions of the United States and the allies as a result of this approach to the
embargo required a "low profile" according «.o Vershbow and Talbott to protect everyone's
interests.
" On May 6 or 7. 1994, Strobe Talbott had a conversation with Samuel Berger, the
Deputy National Security Advisor. According to notes made by Vershbow of the conversation
as it was related to him by Talbott, Baser believed that a written record of evenU would be
"dynamite." However, the prcx-ailing view still was that if a written record was made, there
should only be one copy. Vershbow Subcommittee Dep. at 93, 95. Talbon also made reference
to Jenonne Walker being "disciplined" t>ecause of her role in the conveyance of the no
instructions. Id. Walker has no recollection of having e\er been disciplined because of her role
in this matter. Walker Subcommittee Int. at 2.
^ Galbraith Subcomminee Dep. at 50.
* Id. at 51.
169
432
At the DCM's suc^cslion, Ihe Ambassador wrote a memorandum to the record. The
Ambassador was wary of the confusion in Washington over his deliver^' of the "no instructions"
response and felt that it might be in his best inlorcsi to create a written memorandum describing
the precise recitation of the response.''" Moreover, such a written record was not inconsistent
with the direction of the Department which only precluded a cable report, .\mbassador Galbraith
recounted the events surrounding his conveyance of the "no instructions" response to President
Tudjman on April 28 and April 29. 1994, as well as the subsequent conversations he had with
policy makers in Washington during the first week of May. Ambassador Galbraith noted that
Vershbow believed the situation was exactly where people in Washington wanted it to be and
that Talbott concurred that the response was conveyed accurately.
The memorandum was signed and dated by the Ambassador and witnessed by the DCM.
On the following day. as was his consistent pattern, the DCM told ihe/HHII^BfeiB^bout the
Ambassador's business, in this case the content of discussions as he knew them and the content
of Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum to the file. " TheABBBHtfHwroncurred with the
** Id. at 52. Ambassador Galbraith anributcs the cqnfiision and concern in Washington to
the infonnation reported to the CIA by thq^j^BBMBJ^d the CIA's subsequent
interpretation of that information. Id. at 51, :
m aiinouics inc com us
** Contrary to the allegations that Vershbow had disagreed w ith Ambassador Galbraith's
delivery of the "no instructions" response, Vershbow testified that he came away from his
discussions with the Ambassador feehng "satisfied that he [and Special Envoy Redman had] left
it in the right place." Vershbow Subcomminee Dep. at 1 15.
^ This conversjition with the DCM was giemorialized by th^4|[9HIV^M in a lengthy
cable to headquarters.y^HHHBl^^^inHMay. 7, 1994. During his Subcommittee.,^
deposition, Neitzke waTunable to recall this pSfucul^ conversation with thq^i^HHHHWin
any detail. Neitzke Subcomminee Dep. at I^^- r^flh^
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433
Ambassador's decision lo create the memorandum. ' In their conversation, the DCM speculated
that he thought pohcy makers in Washington were abandoning the Ambassador and the "no
instructions" response. And. as was his consisicni pattern. th^^PH^^B^^rcported the
speculations by the DCM. Th&ip|PliH^^also attributed to the DCM the remark that
"Washington never intended Croatia to allow Iran to bring in so many deliveries so quickly." By
May 7, 1994. however, only one shipment had been delivered " by the Iranians and the regular
flight of small arms from a variety of sources had yet to begin. C^^^l^^
Throughout the month of May, thqV|m^Ki^^f and the DCM continued to speculate
and comment upon the act us of the Ambassador, and theg|^HM^^^B^ontinued to repp"
those discussions to his headquarters as if they were matters of intelligence fact-finding. The
/^WWB^^^fcplso continued to request clear guidance from his headquarters, which did not
materialize until November 1994 when the DCI finally visited the region. At the same time the
DCI cautioned than^HHIB^H^HBBi^^/about reporting on their colleagues w ithin
the embassy. This message apparently was directed toward th«|^BHBlfept Embassy
Zagreb. DCI Woolsey's Special Assistant, Janet .\ndres. admonished th^fl^BMi^Wfor the
rumor and conjecture contained in his cables. ' She explained to theyWBU^BBByiat such
^' CLA headquarters had cabled thoVHHHHBBto inform him of the DCI's meeting
with Talbott and Christopher and his discuSSttms with CSEe so he wasjware that discussions had
occurred in Washington. Unfortunately, the advice th^^Hp0B^k|^eccived was based on
his convolujed reporting ami the inaccurate interpretation at headquafters of that reporting. As a
result, thcM|PM^MM^as^ltl;^per these discussions, there was no change in United States
policy re: uieMms embargo.*^
vastoy^per th
'- Neitzke Subconuninee Dcp. at 183.
' Memorandiun to the File by theMBUBl^MNov. 1 7, 1994. This is not the first
time that theJ^B^M^^ad been aomonished about his reports. In at least three cables
171
434
reports become pan of the written record of e\cnis and if presented to Congress or another
investigative body, would reflect an inaccurate picture of what was occurrinu at the Embassy. *
As subsequent events demonstrate, this is exactly what happened. ^^$w^
A Pattern of Disconnects at the CIA.
There were at least six major disconnects related to the delivery of the "no instructions"
response either within the CIA or berw een it and other Executive Branch agencies. These
miscommunications bred mistrust, suspicion, and false accusation against United States officials
including the Ambassador.
Disconnects Between CIA Washington and ihe/tK^I^^^/^fl^gtj C^^W
The flrst major disconnect was betw een CIA headquarters and thefl^MIHI^ Both
the May S Talking Points for the DCI and the oral briefrngs of the DC! and the DDl focused
solely on one issue: the propriety and appropriateness of the request by .Ambassador Galbraith to
the^||P^H^^}to informflP^MVPlriliH^BHWI^V^HftAbat the United
States had "no position" on the enforcement of the arms embargo. Neither the May 5 talking
points nor the oral briefrngs specify that the Ambassador already had conveyed the "no
instructions" response to President Tudjman's query about the United States reaction to the
transshipment of arms through Croatia. The May 5 talking points also give no hint that the
Ambassador had told theJI^HHBlHBBHi^HMF'^'''^ '^° instructions" response to
begifuiing in the first week of May the^SBHlB^was told to refrain from editorializingjijid
commenting upon the actions of others at Embassy Zagreb. Nevertheless, theHHHHm^
continued to r^^rt the conjecture and assumptions presented to him byJhe PCM and the
jfficer without any substantive corroborating evidence?!
■m?^
172
435
President Tudjman. nor do they mention the fact that in the face of thdWHBlBfi refusal
to convey a message tO|MpBl|a^he Ambassador asked thlMI^^B^^o ha\
[ approach the Ambassador on the issue^^%fc^^^
Ultimately, the failure to resolve these disconnects contributed significaiitly to the
J suspicions about the Ambassador and. subsequently, about Assistant Secretary
Holbrooke. Based upon advice ftoni|fBBB^^^BH||^^^^^^H|M^^^^^^^^
■^■Iffcelieved that the "no instnictions" response was a covert action.* The DCI. in contrast.
was concerned only that the use of the^l^gggg^^oi be used to convey policy.
Moreover, the Director was rot m-tde aware of the fact that ihej^^^fflffjhad used the
^HlB^HI^Hf fifteen days earlier to impart an inaccurate version of United States policy
with respect to enforcement of the arms embargo^^i^^L
In fact. CI.A headquarters had no interest in the response con\ eyed by the United States
Ambassador. .As^i^ll^fe^gJtestiried: "had the .Ambassador not asked th(^B|||||[^
^i^Wio communicate policy to the Government of Croatia, •^ve probably wouldn't have been
managing the Ambassador's activities at all.""' In other words, she noted, "my principal
responsibility was making sure that CIA personnel acted appropriately," not the Ambassador's
activities.'" ^^^^^
Moreover, the May 5 talking points failed to convey the nuances of what the
Ambassador, acting on careful guidance fiom Washington, was doing by his "no instructions"
• See subheading "Disconnecu Relating to the Law of Covert Action" in this same
Section.
ubcomminee Dep. at 77-78.
173
436
response. [WttK^KIKmf°^ example. \\ as not interested in the nuances of the "no
instructions" response: "I'd like to leave this area of questioning to the diplomats, as I'm not a
diplomat, and I have not had diplomatic training. Td like these subtleties to be explained by
people who understand them better. . . . Its like asking somebody who is not a dentist to fill a
tooth."'''
Similarly, it appears that the oral briefings of the DCI and DDI omitted completely the
actual response the Ambassador provided to the Croatian president on April 28 and 29. The DCI
was not informed of the response by Ambassador Galbraith: "It wasn't our business to oversee
Galbraith's communications with the Croatian Government unless he was involved in conducting •
a covert action of some sort, and this didn't come up or wasn't really on the screen, I think, on
May 5. We were concentrating on what he had asked theJ||liflB^ft^/ r^^^
Had the "no instructions" response been discussed with the DCI, he could have assuaged
the concerns of the CIA personnel who were raising legal questions about the Ambassador's
actions. As the DCI himself explained:
In my judgment, very much because of President Bush's veto of the 1991
authorization bill for intelligence and the back and forth with Congress that
occurred in the context of that veto, traditional diplomatic communications,
including even the suggestion of a covert action by a United States diplomat to
another country is - does not itself constitute covert action. And certainly
standing mute, even standing mute in such a way as to say you have ''no
instructions," and to wink or nod or anything like that, for a diplomat, for a State
Department ambassador, in my judgment did not then and does not now constitute
I Subcommittee Dep. at 82. .As events unfolded, the failure I
to be as circumspect about questions.A(law' as she was about questions'^Cdiplomacy
and dentistry created special problems for the " ~
"* Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 16.
174
437
covert action.
For almost six months, the ^i^WlMg w as left in a state of ienorance. Thus, the belief held
''y ''^^^I^Klfl^feill^Hl^^pi^ from May through November 15 that the United
States Ambassador to Croatia was engaged in a coven acti\ ity was, in the words of the DCI.
wrongly heldT^^^PI^^
Disconnect Between the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Deputy Secretary of State.
The second major disconnect was between the DCI and the Deputy Secretar>- of State.
The DCI had taken up the matter of the use of th»B^|^^H^»in a telephone cai'. with
National Security Adviser Lake, and in person at the .Vlay 5 meeting with Secretary of State
Christopher and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. When the DCI w as informed at the May 5
meeting that the Ambassador had conveyed a "no instructions" response to President Tudjman
on April 28 and 29, Director Woolsey had no concern whatsoever about the legality of
Ambassador Galbraith's actions.^^^^^^^
To the DCI and his subordinates, the fact that theMMHflBfhought he had been
requested to take direct action to faciliute the arms flow w as the core issue to be resolved."
Deputy Secretary Talbott, however, focused on the substantive message that was being
communicated and not the means of the communication. Based on the DCI's account of the
report. Deputy Secretary Talbon was concerned that instead of "no
I
'"Id. at 21.
" Select Subconuninee Deposition of Douglas MacEachin, Sept. 9, 1996, at 13
(hereinafter ""MacEachin Subconuninee Dep.'*); Memorandum for the Record, May 5, 1994 (D.
MacEachin, drafter).
175
438
instructions." Ambassador Galbraith had responded in some other way thai u as inconsistent w ith
his directions from Washington. Deputy Secretary Talbou"s comments to the DCI about
Ambassador Galbraith being told "tanly" that he was not to go beyond the "no instructions"
response, w ere based on his niisimpression (gleaned from his conversation w ith the DCI) that
Ambassador Galbraith had not executed his instructions properly. Deputy Secretary Talbott told
the DCI that he would call Ambassador Galbraith and reconfirm his instructions.'' He did so and
was reassured that Ambassador Galbraith had indeed conveyed the "no instructions" message as
directed, i
The DCI. a former diplc-T it, was aware of the range of diplomatically expressive
possibilities surrounding such a response. The DCI testified that such a response "can be heard
and communicated different ways and can arise in different circumstances inside the U.S.
Government. . .""" He elaborated:
[I]f they wanted, either the White House or the State Department wanted to have a new
policy, but to have the .\mbassador communicate that policy very subtly by saying, T
have no instructions.' wink-wink, nod-nod. that is certainly a reasonable thing to do in
diplomacy. . . .
[I)n the abstract, there may be some diplomatic reasons one wants to do things that way,
and there's no - no law against it as far as I know."
Disconnect Between the Director of Central Intelligence
and his Subordinates.
The third major disconnect was between the DCI and his subordinates. The DCI did not
•= Id. at 19.
•' Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 23.
** Woolsey Subconunittee Dep. at 42.
176
439
share the same levels of concern as did some of his subordinates about the ambassador asking
th^fp^mUH'to convey a message througn|||p|HHHH The DCI was not at all critical
of the Ambassador for having asked gp|HIBHHBHmi^|^ for helpTl
I have said before, and Ibelievcthis-is the case, I don't think it was improper for [the
Ambassador] t^^skth^HBBI^Ir^ hat he asked him. But I do believe it was quite
proper for th^0^feifl|o turn hin) down. And had personal relations between the
rwf) heen highly^gprdial. that conversation might have gone ver>' simply of his saying to
th^UHHi^Bl '^3n you give me a hand. . . . ^'*^^^
And [upon refusal] the Ambassador could conceivably have said. "Oh. I hadn't really
thought of that. That is really fine. Don't worry about it.
Thaptould have been the end of it. There is notiiing wrong with ambassadors andj
mH[ trying to get things sorted out and talking to one another. But if that had happened,
this all may never have come up.t^^^^^^^
(however, was extremely alarmed by the request. The DCI's lack of
concern was not communicated to those who had briefed the DCI in preparation for the May 5
meeting, toflHHHH^Hlwho prepared the May 5 talking points) or to th^
J^BBm^^H therefore, continued to ascribe nefarious motives to the Ambassador, which
nourished the suspicions of theJ^HH^^^J
Disconnects at the CIA in the Aftermath of the May 5 Meeting .
The next significant communication gap occurred after the May 5 meeting. Th^
^BHHHIHI^BB^BMmc to attach great significance to one particular sentence in a cable
he received describing the May 5 meeting - yet that particular sentence was one that had not
even come up in the meetings
Id. at 40.
177
440
On May 6. 1 994.pj||headquaners cabled (hejlBBHlB^regarding the DCIs
meeting with Deputy Secretary Talbott." The DCI delegated the task of preparing the follow-up
tnemorialization of the meeting to the DDL Lnfonunatel\. the DDI did not author the cable. The
cable was prepared by staff of the Operations Directorate (the ••DO"), who had not been
represented at the May 5 meeting."" The DO staff cable drew upon the DDI's memorialization of
the meeting, out improvised an addition at the end that had neither been discussed at the May 5
meeting nor included in the DDI's memorialization. This improvised addition was the
prospective announcement that if any change in policy occurred, the recipients of the cable
would be kept informedL^^^^^^
Policy was not discussed at the May 5 meeting. Of course, there was no reason to do so
since the policy makers were clear on the policy, and the DCI had not raised the issue - or
indicated in any w ay that he had a concern about policy. The DCI did not express either in the
meeting or afterAvards any intention of keeping anyone informed of an>ihing, and the DCI had
not even read, let alone cleared, the outgoing cable. .Accordingly, the DCI was not aware that the
^||^iHHHB}was anticipating that he would be informed by/IH^eadquarters of the
Admiiustration's policy regarding enforcement of the arms embargo. According to Director
Woolsey:
As it became clearer, later in May and into June, that the U.S. Government was
essentially acquiescing in the shipments through, there wasn't any particular {imblem at
that p>oint that I knew of that I had to solve^ith respect to the^PBriHH^So
basically I don't think I thought about th^BBBHBj^hat much late in May. early in
•* MacEachin Subconuninee Dep. at 78.
•' Id. at 76-77.
178
441
however, was consumed w ith worry about
policy. IW^headquaners led him to believe that the United States polic\ w as to enforce the
arms embargo against third parties. .Embassador Galbraiih told him the Lnited States policy
was to neither to object nor to support the shipments of arms to Bosnia bv third parties. The
/^■■■■■Mbelieved JpB^eadquarters. He therefore concluded that at the very least, the
Ambassador was not being truthful and perhaps, the Ambassador was acting illegally. The,
^^H|^|l report is notable both for expressing his suspicions and for seeking fiilfillment of the
promise made in the May .able that he would be kept informed of policy changes. Th
^^imi^estified that: "w hat was conveyed to me was that . . . they would inform me when
there was a policy change. . . .[T]he definitive line was the bottom paragraph, which was there
was no change in policy. We will inform you when there is. That was that
■^
Disconnects Relating to the Law of Coven Aaion.
A fifth miscoimnunication occurred regarding the legal interpretation of the
Ambassador's activities.flHHHHHI^(was not a lawyer, but she rendered a legal opiiiion to
thejjpiHHH^VKnat assistance from third countries to Bosnia through Croatia would
constitute a covert action. This incorrect legal advice ultimately led th^fl^HIB^fto
conclude that the "no instructions" response suggested a covert action was underway.
In depositionspBMMHHBBi^(admitted, "[h]a\ing refireshed my recollection, I can say
Woolsey Subcommittee Dep.
^elect Subcommittee Deposition offl|^HiH0lAug. 9, 1996. at 41 (hereinafter
ubcommittee Dep."). ^j^)
179
442
ihat there is no evidence on this cable that I consulted \v ith a leeal officer."' She did not consult
with anyone from the CIA General Counsel's oftlcc about legal matters. As previously quoted.
the DC!, upon receiving an opinion from the General Counsels office regarding President
Bush's veto of the 1991 Intelligence .Authorization .Act. fully understood that deliver)' of the "no
instructions" response to the Goveminent of Croatia was not a covert action. In fact, the DCI
testified that he "was certainly not under the impression in early May that silence on part of an
American diplomat, however, whatever body language was put with that silence, or saying 1
have no instructions,' would constitute covert action, even though I hadn't at that point focused
on the '9 1 veto.""' C^^ii^- -
Unfonunately, thejHHHBHHI^HIii^BH^^^^ '^^ '° believ^flHHHI [
analysis that a covert action had, at the very least, been considered. If she had not rendered legal
advice, or if the advice had been corrected, the ■^■■BpH might ha\e refrained from
reporting con\ ersations and incidents that he believed w ere suspicious. .After receiving a report
about the May S meeting, theM||||||mm[^"saw that Iranian aims were flowing, so that told
me something had happened. Of course, I knew something had happened. The question was
whether. . . .it was a potential illegality, based on previous guidance."*' The "previous guidance"
to which thqUBMMBIPy^fc"^*^ ^'^ '^^ inaccurate legal guidance provided in
I cables.
'•s^
ISubcommittee Dep. at 40
" Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 2 1
'"•^^"'Subcomminee at 42
180
443
Leaving //li'jHHBHBV/'" fl>^ Dark.
The CIA missed another opponunity lo infonu ihe^HI^^Bmfabout the status of
United States policy on the amis embargo after a May 20. 1994 meeting at w hich the DCI
learned that United States policy was not to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia.
There was a meeting sometime in May. I believe. . . . Apparently there was a meeting in
which the principals discussed in some fashion whether to press the Croatians to stop
deliveries from Iran, and that discussion would seem to suggest that we were not at that
time pressing the Cioatians to stop deliveries.
So probably . . . that could well have been one of the factors that led me. indeed all of us
at the Agency, to believe that the policy of the embargo against Iran was not at that time
being pressed or really enforced by the United States.'"
Unfortunately, not "all" of the individuals at the Cl.A knew this to be the United States policy.
Th^^P^^^HH^^mH^fwas informed for more months
Thus. the^^m^^mmi^milllHsuspicions in the aftermath of May 5
appear to have resulted from his multiple handicaps and confusions. He had been misled about
the law by his immediate superior at headquarters. Neither the fact, nor the nuances, of the
Ambassador's '"no instructions" response had been communicated to the DCI for clarification
with the State Department. Most important, the guidance cabled back led th<
anticipate getting further information on something which the DCI did not intend to provide
Summer 1994 at the CIA.
Thi
continued to harbor unfounded suspicions about
" Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 26-27; An NSC list of documents briefed to
Subcommittee staff lists a May 20 principals meeting. (This list was prepared for the Select
Subcommittee by members of the NSC.) In all likelihood, a representative from the Department
of Defense as well as of the CIA ^as at that meeting.
181
444
the Ambassador's actions on the basis of these communications disconnects. In Washington,
during that summer of 1994. discussion of Bosnia policy shifted to Capitol Hill, where the
Congress debated and subsequently adopted legislation regarding the arr.is embargo." As the
DCl testified: "The events of early May were, for all practical purposes. ! think, ovenaken by the
passage of Nunn-Mitchell."" The Deputy branch chief also understood that "Nunn-Mitchell
prohibited, as far as I understand it, enforcement of the arms embargo against the Bosnians."
including weapons from Iran.*"'
The degree to which the^HI^HB||f was either misinfonned or not informed about
the facts, the policy and the law undoubtedly contributed to the quality of his reporting. As
discussed elsewhere, the lack of guidance provided to him and the tendency of both thq
VHHand the Deputy Chief of Mission to rely upon rumor and gossip in addition to intelligence
was an unfortunate combination. Clearly, CIA headquarters must devote more attention to the
dissemination of legal adv ice and to the need to respond to requests for guidance from the field.
The reporting from Zagreb came up through CIA headquarters to the DCIs Executive Assistant,
who explained: "I thought there were grave questions about whether he was an accurate reporter
of what was actually going on H«BHi^^^BHBHimBpv'as not one of the
old hands, put it that way. The smaller stations, they tended to be younger ofRcers with less
experience.**' The DCI's Executive Assistant further explained:
** See the separate section on Congressional action: Chapter One. Section Three.
'* Woolsey Subcomminee Dep. at 7 1 .
*7Mp^BlSubcomminee Dep. at 71.
*' Andres Subcommittee Dep. at 25.
132
445
one of my concerns. . . .[about i]nromiation coming back ihrough iratfic from ^^^i^tl
back to Washington [was] that it may not accurately reflect what really was going on so
[it) was creating t^e^Long impression about what «as going on and because -- again. 1
did not know th^§JI|personally. but just the tone of some of the communications
suggested to me that he might not be. have the besi^udgmeni and be the most solid
person. So that was certainly a concern.^
Id.
183
446
Chapter Two
Section Three
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE APRIL 1994 RESPONSE
The Department of Defense generally, and the defense attaches in Embassy Zagreb
particularly, dealt with delivery of the "no instructions" response in a far more restrained way. In
so doing, they avoided the confusion and misinformation which marked the Central Intelligence
Agency handling of the matter. In large part, this was due to strict adherence to reporting only
intelligence and not rumor and £'i'^ip, to accepting the fact that policy making is the bailiwick of
the other Federal agencies; to a general understanding of the law; and perhaps most important to
a willingness to accept the word of colleagues over those of foreign officials and intelligence
contacts.
Although Department of Defense personnel did not participate in the formation of the "no
instructions" response to the Croatians,' the Department did receive information regarding the
events leading up to and following Ambassador Galbraith's conveyance of the response to
President Tudjman on April 28 and April 29, 1994. Whereas thellHHBIH refused to
acknowledge delivery of the response or accept its consequences, the Defense Attache continued
to perform his duties and avoided rqwrting on embassy personnel and speculating about their
motives.
Neither the Defense Attache nor his superiors at the Department of Defense sought to
thwart the consequences of that response, or believed that the role in delivering the response by
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Tamoff, Sept. 13. 1996, at 53 (hereinafter
Tamoff Subconunittee Dcp.").
184
447
Ambassador Galbraith or any other United States official suggested a coved action without the
requisite findings. In fact, when presented with allegations of possible United States covert
activity. Department of Defense personnel repeatedly denied such allegations and reported as
such through their respective channels.*
Information Available to the Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense was privy to the same intelligence that was available to the
other executive branch agencies during the Spring of 1994. Cable traffic J|Pi||^pnd
intelligence reports were created by or provided to the Department of Defense on a routine basis.'
To deal with the constantly changing situation in the Balkans, the Department of Defense created
the Bosnian Task Force within the Secretary's office. The Defense Department would receive
' Accusations of possible United States covert activity arose in a variety of circumstances.
The Defense Attache in Paris routinely heard allegations that the United States was conducting
all types of covert activities. General Rose, the Bntjsh comqiander of UNPROFOR also heard
such rumours which he passed on to his AmericaigMH||^uiaison. The Defense Attache in
Zagreb also received intelligence reports of alleged United States activity. There were also
repeated sightings of "American military personnel" training the Bosnian Muslims which turned
out to be American mercenaries unassociated in any way with the United States government or
military personnel stationed in the region. In each of these cases. Department of Defense
personnel denied the mmouis and requested specific evidence to corroborate the claims; none
was ever forthcoming^N^^^^
' In addition to cable traflic provided by the defense attaches and military conmiands
around the world, the Defense Department received intelligence from such sources as the
Department of State (Secretary's Morning Summaries), the Central Intelligence Agency
(National Tntelligenrj! Daily, Balkan Task Force and NESA reports), and the National Security
Council (through Principal's Meetings and NSC summaries). The Department of Defense also
provided its own intelligence assessments such as the Defense Intelligence Report and briefings
to other Executive Branch agencies.
185
448
information directly from the region from U.S. Special Envoy Charles Redman who made it a
point to contact the Department of Defense about matters whenever possible.'
In light of the available information, the Department of Defense was fully capable of
assessing the situation in the region and evaluating a potential threat to United States troops
serving there.' The Department used this information to formulate its policies with regard to
UNPROFOR, participation in Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, and the coordination of
humanitarian aid air drops. The Department of Defense also used this vast array of information
to prepare the further deployment of United States troops to the area in the event peace should oe
established in the region or in the event that UNPROFOR should be forced to withdraw.
The general availability of information about the region allowed Department of Defense
personnel to keep fully informed about attempts by third countries to circumvent the arms
embargo and supply the Bosnian Muslims. The Department of Defense, through a variety of
intelligence sources, also knew that the Iranians were eager to aid the Bosnian Muslims in order
to increase their stature within the Islamic community and within Bosnia.
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles Redman, Aug. 27, 19%, at 6 (hereinafter
"Redman Subcommittee Dep.**). Ambassador Redman would speak generally with Deputy
Assistant Secretary Joe Kruzel or Under Secretary Walt Slocombe. Id. Contact with these
gentleman would ensure that the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
be apprised of any new developments.
' Prior to the deployment of IFOR, the United States had approximately 300 service
personnel serving in various edacities in Croatia.
186
449
The Department of Defense Learns of the April Inquiries.
The Defense Attache at Embassy Zagreb was one of the first United States officials to be
contacted by the Croatians regarding the reestablishment of the formal pipeline." The Defense
Attache reported in a cable dated April 25, 1994, an April 18, 1994 conversation he had with
Defense Minister Susak. The Defense Attache reported in detail what Defense Minister Susak
had told him and that Susak was seeking the United States position on the resumption of the
formal pipeline. The Defense Minister needed a response in order to lay to rest the 1992
demarche issued to Croatia by the United States regarding an Iranian arms flight.' The u-'fense'
Attache reported further that the Croatians and Bosnians had been discussing this matter for quite
some time, and the establishment of the Federation was seen by the two parties as the necessary
catalyst for the resumption of the arms pipeline. The Defense Attache also commented that
despite Defense Minister Susak's interest in the United States position, the Croatians were very
likely to restart the formal pipeline even without United States acquiescence.' The Majority has
suggested that Ambassador Galbraith put together the pipeline. The Defense Attache reporting
demonstrates that this suspicion is unfounded.
* For a complete discussion of the Defense Attache's contacts with Croatian officials, see
Chapter Two, Section One.
^ Department of Defense Cable,J^IHBHH||BApr. 25, 1994. ^fl
• Id. The Defense Attache reported that since Federation Ulks on March 12, 1994, the
Croatians and Bosnians had been discussing the resumption of the formal arms pipeline. Of
initial importance to the Bosnians was the transshipment of materiel that had been stockpiled by
Croatia during the hostilities that had been intended for the Bosnians. Id. These would be the
first shipments through the reestablished pipeline.
187
450
After the No Instructions Response: The Department of Defense Changes Nothing.
The Defense Attache informed Ambassador Galbraith about the Susak meeting and was
generally aware that the Ambassador was seeking guidance to respond to the Croatian request.'
Unlikg^pp^ersonnel who reported on such policy matters and other intra-embassy
conversations, the Defense Attache did not prepare reports on these discussions or the
Ambassador's diplomatic activities." Through intelligence reporting and other sources,
however, the Department of Defense became aware that the Croatians had decided to proceed
with the reestablishment of the p-peline. (^^^i^^^
In early May 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry asked about the amount of weapons that
would be arriving in the region and the extent to which the allies were aware of the shipments,"
based on reporting he received on Iranian arms shipments from the Defense Attache Zagreb.'^
Secretary Perry never raised the diplomatic issue with the Central Intelligence Agency" or any
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of LtCol. Richard Herrick, Aug. 20, 1996, at 19, 25
(hereinafter "Herrick Subcommittee Dep.").
" Id. at 33. The Defense Attache explained that the circumstance surrounding the "no
instructions'' response were "purely . . . political" and not something he would report through his
channels. Id.
" Herrick Subconunittee Dq>. at 42.
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of James Woolsey, Sept 13, 1996, at 5-7 (hereinafter
"Woolsey Subconunittee Dep.'^. The DCI had no recollection of discussing this mattCTjt alj^
with the Secretary. Id. at 5. The Defense Attache recalls, however, being told by the/_
IHl[||that DCI Woolsey had discussed the matter with Perry. Id. at 39-40. Because the
Defense Attache understood the "no instructions'* response to be a policy matter, and he had
received no inquires about it from his headquarters, he assumed that Secretary ^etiy was well
informed and there was no need for him to be further involved. Id.
188
it Secretary Petiy \
at40>^^^^
451
other Executive Branch agency.''' Nor did Secretar>- Perry ever raise concerns that the response
amounted to a covert action.'^ The IMWBBBBf speculated that the failure by the Defense
Attache and the Department of Defense to share in his concern about a possible covert action
reflected a lack of knowledge. He reported on May 12, 1994 that the Department of Defense had
contacted the Defense Attache regarding the anms shipments," and speculated that the
Department of Defense was "in the dark."" The speculation was not based on any contacts with
the Department and contradicted his own earlier reporting.'
iiaiion was noi os
ting-xSs^
TheJfK^^^K/ffiepom Department of Defense "Concern. "
Although the Minority found no evidence in the thousands of pages of documents
provided by the Department of Defense to suggest concern about the United States response to
Croatia's reestablishment of the arms pipeline, thap|^HHHM'°°^ '^ "P*^i^ himself to
continue reporting throughout the summer 1994 that the Department of Defense was concerned
" Secretary Perry could have raised the issue in a Principal's Meeting at the National
Security Council on May 20, 1995. At that meeting the question was raised if anything should
be done about the Iranian arms shipments but the topic wasjabled and n^jy brought up again. If
the Secretary had as much concern about the matter as the^fHHB^Hpntimated, this would
have been the most opportune time to Fo^se the matter. It is also ofnotetfiat the DCI failed to
raise the matter at that meeting. ^«^^^)
" Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 7.
lay 12. 1994.
■•^I
" When reporting to headquaqers earlier in the week regarding what he believed to be
happening at Embassy Zagreb, thei|[|HBHmBiioted that the Defense Attache had reported
his conversations with Susak through his channels.*^
189
452
about this policy and its results. In his cables. th^B^Bimw reported general comments
made to and by other United States oflicials regarding the Department of Defense in a way that
made it appear that the Department of Defense, like the CIA, disagreed with the United States
position in the region. This is simply not true. f_^^Ti n _
For instance, thejBHBBBIBf reported extensively on meetings among Embassy
officials prior to a summer visit by Secretary of Defense Peny to the region. According to the
/■■■■■^Hhe received a telephone call from the Department of Defense inquiring about
the number of arms shipments the Bosnians were leceiving and the frequency of those
deliveries.'* TheJBHBHI^BJnoted that this was an unusual request which confirmed his
speculation that the Department did not know what was going on in the region. Actually,
Embassy Zagreb was the premier source for intelligence on these shipments and given that they
did impact on the military situation in the region, it would be natural for the Department to want
the most current information prior to the Secretary's trip^^^^l^
The^^HIHIJlBf also recalls that the arms shipments might be raised by Defense
Minister Susak in his meetings with Secretary Perry . This issue was addressed by the Defense
Attache in a meeting with th^HpmHHW^^ ^^ Ambassador prior to the Secretary's
arrival.'" Th&plHi^|Bputifully reported this conversation, as still more proof that the
Defense Department was in the dark on matters and that the Ambassador was preventing the
Defense Attache from responding. In fact, the Ambassador offered to discuss the shipments with
!; Select SubcommittetL^epos^tion of^PHHHIIf Aug. 9, 1996. at 76 (hereinafter
Subcotimiittee Dep.").
" Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 39.
190
453
Secretary Perry personally which is hardly indicative of a desire to keep matters from the
Department of Defense.^C^^^
Of course the Department of Defense would be concerned about any arms shipments
reaching the region and their possible impact on the war and United States personnel in the
region. This concern does rot translate, however, into a concern about the April 1991 response.
In at least three cables during the summer 1994, the|PMHPBI^ppressed the view that the
Department of Defense did not know what United States policy in the region was. although he
had absolutely no first hand evidence that this was the case. L. — ' /"■*
Furthermore, even if the Department of Defense was unaware of the policy response, it
was not the responsibility of theflHBHHMJto make an issue of something that the
Department of Defense had not chosen to raise on its own. This type of second-hand reporting
fueled the erroneous speculation at the CIA that unfounded covert activities were occurring
without consulting the CIA or the Department of Defense; speculation which ultimately led to
the lOB investigation and the establishment of this Select Subcommitt^
" ThMlpMl^^attributes a statement to the Ambassador that he wished the CIA
and DOD would get on board with the policy in the region. The Ambassador has no recollection
of this comment nor does the Defense Attache, Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 45, but if the
Ambassador did make the comment, it would suggest that the Ambassador did M^'^rttok^^
matters from these agencies. He repeatedly discussed ongoing events with the'^PHMH^i
who reported virtually everything that was said to him, and he discussed matters with the
Defense Attache whgjbad first hand involvement in the earlier April exchanges as well. No
where except in the]flBBBBHRcomments is there a suggestion that the Dq>aitment of
Defense was not awarTgenerally of events as they unfolded or that it was overly concerned about
them.^ji^
^^ 191
454
Rumors thai the United Stales IVas Iin-olved in Covert Action.
Throughout the time in which the United States was involved actively in the Balkan
crisis, allegations of covert action to ann the Bosnian Muslims emerged." The allegations varied
from air drops of weapons and uniforms to personnel training; none of there allegations were
credible. Department of Defense personnel often encountered these allegations and always
denied their validity." It is ironic that while theipHlBHH^^ asserting that the
Department of Defense also suspected that covert activity was occurring in the region, the
Department of Defense was doing everything it could to dissuade such thinking. General Vesie>
Clark, for example, who was responsible for the formulation and coordination of all policy for
the Department of Defense, patently denied that the United States could be involved in such
activity." Within the Department, even those who disagreed with the United States Government
view of the Bosnian Muslims as the wars' primary victims did not believe that the United States
was involved in covert activity."
" Allegations of United States covert activity most frequently appeared in the European
press. In May 1994, I^ Canard F.nf.haine repotted that the United Sutes had been conducting
night air drops to the Bosnian Muslims and that French troops had "closed their eyes" to such
activity because it was so limited. No such activity occurred, however, the only air drops
conducted by the United States being humanitarian aid relief coordinated within the international
community.
" SSa Deposition of Gen. Wesley Qark, June 24, 19%, at 34-35.
" LtCol. John Sray served as G-2 to General Rose the UNPROFOR commander in 1994.
iMthough Sray believed that the United States favored the Bosnian Muslims, he did not believe
192
455
Thus, the Department of Defense did not take an active role in the diplomatic exchange in
April 1994, nor set out on a course to undermine the response or the policy makers who
instituted it. Where there were legitimate questions about weapons shipments or the level of
allied awareness of the shipments, those questions were raised with those most knowledgeable;
namely thefl^lV^BHHHH^^^pwhose intelligence reporting on the arms
deliveries into Bosnia was extensive and relied upon heavily. Unlike the CIA, the Department of
Defense did not undertake to report on second and third hand conversations or speculation to
imply that covert activity was occurring in the region. The Department of Defense went about
fulfilling its mandate of collecting intelligence and providing troop support and security to the
region.
that favoritism extended to covert activity. Further, he and General Rose, who is British, did
whatever they could to dispel such rumors when they arose. Select Subcommittee Dep. of LtCol.
John Sray, Aug. 29, 1996, at 15-16 (hereinafter "Sray Subcommittee Dep.").
193
456
Chapter Two
Section Four
THE MA Y 1994 CONVOY INCIDENT
The overriding objective on the ground in Bosnia in 1994 and throughout most of the war
was to provide food, clothing and medical supplies to the Bosnians. The primary means of
delivering these supplies was relief convoys. The convoys numbered in the thousands and were
often stopped by Bosnian Croats to harass the Muslims. Often, the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees which administered the United Nations convoy relief operation
would contact United States Government officials for assistance in gaining the release of
detained convoys. On many occasions. United States officials would intercede to expedite the
progress of these convoys. Intelligence and other sources raised suspicions about whether some
relief convoys may have carried weapons in addition to humanitarian supplies. The Minority
believes that some convoys did carry weapons, but found no evidence to suggest that any United
States Government official knowingly assisted in the relief of such a convoy.
On May 13, 1994 The Washington Pnst published two front page stories related to
Bosnia.' The first recounted the Senate's two narrow votes to unilaterally and multilaterally lift
the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. The second story rqwrted details of the first delivery
of an Iranian arms shipment to the Bosnian Muslims, including the plane's landing in Zagreb and
the weapons passage into Bosnian territory. The account also detailed Bosnian attempts to have
' Senate Votes Arms for Rnsnia, The Washington Post, May 13. 1994, at Al; Thomas
Pomfi^ Iran Ships F.xplnsives to Bosnian Muslims, The Washington Post, May 13, 1994, at Al
(hereinafter 'Tomfret").
194
457
United Stales ofTicials in Vienna intercede on their behalf when the convoy carrying weapons
was stopped by the Bosnian Croats."
According to the Washington Post article, an Iranian arms flight arrived in Zagreb, and
was quickly offloaded to a convoy for transport to Bosnia by Croatian officials. The convoy
traveled without incident through Croatia but was halted in Tomislavgrad, located just inside
Bosnia. Apparently Bosnian Croat forces stopped the convoy because they wanted a portion of
the weapons on board. Bosnian officials sought to use diplomatic pressure to obtain the
convoy's release. The article reported that Bosnian officials contacted the United States embassy
in Vienna on May 10, 1994, seeking assistance with the problem.' The call came to Embassy
Vienna because it was hosting ongoing negotiations between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims
regarding the terms of the Federation Agreement,* and it was logical to seek a solution at an
event where all the parties were convened. The article reported that the Bosnians sought the
Croatian government's assistance afler having.no success with the United States embassy. The
Croatian government intervened and finally arranged for the passage of the convoy.'
The article does not suggest United States involvement in the convoy. To the contrary,
the article explains that the United States could do nothing to facilitate its release.* When the
article was received at Embassy Zagrd>, however, the DCM and thefllH^^HMbegan
' Pomfret at A43.
'Id.
*Id.
'Id.
•id.
195
458
speculating on who had been contacted about the convoy in Vienna. Th^Bl^l^^HiP[
coupled the speculation with indications that the Bosnians may have placed requests to release
the convoy to Embassy Zagreb and reported taJB^neadquarters the DCM's speculation that
Special Envoy Redman may have intervened on behalf of the arms convoy. The report fueled
suspicions at the CIA that certain United States officials were engaged in covert activity to arm
the Bosnian Muslims. Ultimately, these suspicions regarding the convoy were elevated to a
sufficiently high level to comprise part of the^investigation undertaken by the Intelligence
Oversight Board in November 1994.
The Minority concludes that Special Envoy Redman did not intervene knowingly to have
an arms convoy released. Some circumstantial evidence suggests that Special Envoy Redman
may have made a call from Vienna regarding a convoy during the first week of May 1994. The
source of that evidence, however, testified that Special Envoy Redman had no knowledge or
awareness of any arms on the convoy.^ Further, no evidence of any kind exists to suggest that
Ambassador Galbraith or any other United States personnel facilitated the release of this convoy
or any prior or subsequent arms convoys.
^ Special Envoy Redman's Intelligence Assistant testified before staff of the Senate Select
Conunittce on Intelligence that Special Envoy Redman received word that a blocked convoy was
the reason for the breakdown of the negotiation talks. Special Envoy Redman suggested to the
United States delegation that perhaps he shgyld make a call to have it released in order to allow
the negotiations tpprocecd. Testimony oMIBIBtfSenate Select Committee on Intelligence,
May 31, 1996. ^HiflBhas no firsthandknowledge if Special Envoy made the call, but within
hours, the talks resume(flnd there was no more discussion about a convoy, so she assimied he
had acted. Id. ^>i^^
^^^ 196
459
Convoys to Bosnia.
Virtually every person inter\iewed by the Select Subcommittee who had been stationed
in or operated out of Embassy Zagreb, testified that the issue of humanitarian convoys was one
they dealt with on a daily basis.' Humanitarian relief convoys were virtually the only way
supplies and materiel could reach the besieged Bosnian Muslims. As a result, ensuring the safe
and continuous passage of convoys through foreign territory was a large part of any negotiations
in the region.' During 1993, for instance. Ambassador Galbraith demarched the Croatians
regarding their lack of enthusiasm for helping humanitarian relief convoys. It was essential to
areas such as Tuzla and Sarajevo that humanitarian and commercial convoys be allowed into
Bosnia.'" The success of these convoys depended in large measure on Croatian willingness to
pressure the Bosnian Croats to allow blocked convoys to pass."
• Sm Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Galbraith, Aug. 19, 1996, at 133 (stating
that convoys were a regular business for embassy [Zagreb]) (hereinafter "Galbraith
Subcommittee Dq)."); Select Subcommittee Deposition of Thomas Mittnacht, Aug. 14, 1996, at
IS (explaining that a typical day in 1994 would find him spending a couple hours a day on the
humanitarian situation including how many convoys were moving) (hereinafter "Mittnacht
Subcommittee Dqi.'O; Select Subcommittee Deposition of Lt Col Heriick, Aug. 20, 1996, at 100,
152 (noting his involvement in getting convoys released sometimes twice a month during 1993
and 1994)(hereinaftcr**HeiTick Subcommittee Dep."); Neitzkc Subcomminee Dep. at 247
(noting that from 1993 on, one of the mo«« frequent topics with the government of Croatia was
trying to get them to intervene ... to allow passage of . . . relief convoys ).
* Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 133.
'" Id. Ambassador Galbraith explained that commercial traffic was essential to the
reestablishment of these communities. Id.
" Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 247.
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460
As a result of this near constant diplomatic activity regarding convoys. United States
personnel in the region, particularly those in Embassy Zagreb, became so accustomed to
handling requests about convoys that the May 1 994 convoy was not distinguishable from other
convoys.'^ No one gave the convoy any thought until the Intelligence Oversight Board launched
its investigation into what role, if any. United States personnel may have had in facilitating its
release."
The May 1994 Convoy and Embassy Zagreb.
At some point during the first week of May, Ambassador Biserka Turkovic, the Bosnian
Ambassador to Croatia, contacted Ambassador Galbraith and requested his intervention with the
Croatian government to facilitate the release of a convoy.'^ She explained to the Ambassador
" Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 100-04 (noting his surprise when he learned during
Senate testimony that the convoy was a concern); Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 383 (explaining
that the Bosnian Ambassador's hysterical state was the only reason the convoy was memorable);
Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles Redman, Aug. 27, 1996, at 127 (indicating that this
convoy made no impression on him until others began asking about it months later).
" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 127-28.
** Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 131; Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 248j^^9>(
Subcommittee Dep. at 127-28; Herrick SubcommiUee Dep. at 104. The Majority Rqmrt asserts
that Ambassador Turkovic had attempted to convince the U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor
Jackovich, to join her in the convoy but that he declined the invitation. See Majority Report at
1 36. While Ambassador Jackovich testified that Ambassador Turkovic had asked him to join a
convoy, he suggested that "I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing. See Select
Subcommittee Deposition of Ambassador Victor Jackovich, Aug. 29, 1996. at 58 (hereinafter
••Jackovich Subcommittee Dep."). He fiuther testified that he is not sure whether the convoy
ever traveled to Bosnia. The convoy Ambassador Jackovich described was to have traveled fiom
Zagreb to Tuzla. Its route was to have been cast through the Slavonia region of Croatia then
south through a small stretch of Serb-controlled and then Federation territory to Tuzla. Id. at 59-
61. The convoy led by Ambassador Turkovic in May, on the other hand, was stopped in
198
461
that her convoy was trapped between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian territory." Ambassador
Turkovic expressed hope that the Ambassador could convince the Croatian government to
persuade the Bosnian Croats to let the convoy pass.
Ambassador Galbraith did not intervene on the Bosnians behalf." Although no tangible
evidence had been presented to the Ambassador suggesting that the convoy may ha\ c be:n
carrying arms, he believed that arms may have been part of the cargo and did not want to be
involved.'^ Ambassador Galbraith had become aware that an Iranian cargo plane had landed at
Zagreb airport" and he reasoned that if the convoy had originated with that shipment, he w ould
be overstepping United States policy on these shipments." He believed that his involvement in
such a convoy would give the appearance of United States complicity with the arms shipments
which contravened the policy response he and Special Envoy Redman had just delivered to
Tomislavgrad, which is in Hcrcegovina, near the Croatian border. A knowledge of geography
would demonstrate that the convoy that Ambassador Jackovich was asked to lead coulc^not be
the same one about which Ambassador Turkovic called the U.S. embassy in May^
»Id.
'* Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 133; Select Subconunittee Interview of Anthony
Harrington, July 25, 1996, (noting that the lOB found no evidence to suggest that Ambassador
Galbraith had intervened to release the convoy).
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 133.
" Ambassador Galbraith had received press inquiries prior to the publication of the
Washingtnn Pn<rt article and these journalists had informed him of the Iranian cargo flight. Id.
Based on this information. Ambassador Galbraith deduced that the convoy may have resulted
from the Iranian flight Id.
"Id. at 138-39.
199
462
President Tudjman.-" Ambassador Galbraith did not want allegations suggesting that the United
States was urging the passage of weapons, as that was not the intended policy position.-'
The media became very interested in the convoy story" Because the affair was
thoroughly reported in the media it was discussed in the country team meetings. Numerous
journalists contacted the embassy for the United States reaction to the Iranian cargo flight and
Ambassador Turkovic's convoy.*' The Ambassador and the public affairs officer simply
responded "no comment," because they lacked knowledge of the incident. Once the media
interest in the story subsided, th? embassy had no further discussions about or involvemei. .. ai
the convoy.
Special Envoy Redman 's Contact with the May Convoy.
Special Envoy Redman was in Vierma, Austria during the first week of May negotiating
with the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims on various aspects of the Federation. During
one of the negotiation sessions, the process stalled and the delegations departed.^* The U.S.
delegation learned subsequently that the breakdown was the result of a convoy being blocked by
«Id.
"Id.
^ Hovanec Subcommittee Dep. at 40.
" Id. at 42; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 133.
^ Select Subcommittee Interview ofipBMMAug. 21, 19%, at 1 (hereinafter jH^BM
Subcommittee Int.")
200
463
the Bosnian Croats.'* In order to proceed with the negotiations, the Bosnian Muslims asked
Special Envoy Redman to get the convoy released.'" Special Envoy Redman does not recall
intervening on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims to have a convoy released,"' but soon after the
request was made the talks resumed and there was no more discussion of convoys.''
Neither Special Envoy Redman nor any of his staff had any knowledge that the convoy
might have contained arms.^ Special Envoy Redman's only concern was the effect the
blockage was having on the negotiations and the need to remove the impediment. Special Envoy
Redman had dealt with convoy issues in the past while negotiating the winter relief efforts in
Bosnia." Special Envoy Redman relied on the mechanisms created by the UNHCR to monitor
the flow of convoys and what they contained;" he concentrated his efforts on obtaining
"Id.
"Id.
" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 127-28.
Subconamittee lot at 1.
" Id.; Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 127, 129.
" Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 128-29. -
" According to officials with the UNHCR, convoys had to be cleared at least one week in
advance by all parties of whose territory the convoy crossed. Minority Staff Telephonic
Interview of Arme-Willem Bijleveld, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Bijleveld Minority Int").
At each checkpoint along the route, the convoy could be subjected to a ftill or spot inspection.
Id. The convoys often would be blocked until a settlement conducive to all parties was reached
which often meant the splitting of the convoy's cargo. Id. The mercurial nature of the warring
parties and individual security guards made the issue of convoys a daily battle for UNHCR and
those working to facilitate convoy traffic. Id.
201
464
guarantees that the convoys could flow unimpeded.'' Special Envoy Redman and his diplomatic
counterparts had neither the mandate nor the time to determine what was contained on each
convoy entering Bosnia."
Reporting by 'Ae^H^HIBBt |
On May 14, 1994, the;WWHBfc[ reported to his headquarters about a conversation
he had with the DCM concerning the WashingtOiLPost article. During this conversation the
DCM informed thej^H^mjUof the "hysterical" telephone call Ambassador Turkovic had
placed to the Embassy." The DCM told theflHBViBHthat Ambassador Turkovic wanted
Ambassador Galbraith to intercede with the Croatian government, but he refused to do so.'^ The
DCM also told thM^HI^P^Bthat Special Envoy Redman had been contacted in Vienna.'*
The DCM believed that someone had intervened to have the convoy released and it was likely
" Redman SubcommiUee Dep. at 128-129.
'' Id. at 133. Special Envoy Redman explained that neither he, the European presidents,
or the foreign ministers could determine if humanitarian reUef was the only thing on the convoys;
such things fell under the control of the UNHCR. Id. In May 1994, for example, there were
308,000 people affected by the war in the Southern region of Bosnia to which this convoy was
headed. In that month alone almost 2,600 metric tons of food were delivered by U.N. and
privately sponsored convoys. In the midst of the difficult Balkan negotiations, it would have
been virtually impossible for the Special Envoy or any other diplomat to determine what one
particular convoy contained on a given day.
^ Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 248;lHHSubcommittee Dep. at 127-28
{[Subcommittee Dep. at 127-28. In his_Subconunittee testimony, the £>CM was
noncommittal as to whether he in fact said this to thtjBUBfc^j Neitzke Subcommittee
Dep. at 38:i^6*fc^
2011
465
Special Envoy Redman." The DCM did not explain the source of his belief that Special Envoy
Redman or the United States had intervened despite the fact that the Washington Post asserted
that no United States official helped to satisfy the Bosnian request^^S^i^
Since April 1994, the DCM suggested, and thefl|HB||Wreported, Special Envoy
Redman had attempted to find a way to arm the Bosnian Muslims. In a report to headquarters on
April 20, 1994, thejBBIHMfcxplained that the DCM told him that Special Envoy
Redman and perhaps others were considering a covert action plan similar to the United States
role in Afghanistan to circumvent the aims embargo." Special Envoy Redman has no
recollection of pursuing any such proposal and was unsure of the source of the statement." The
DCM also could not recall telling thejI^IHHHthat the Special Envoy was considering a
covert action plan. \Z^^^^^
Throughout the summer the DCM continued to encourage speculation about Special
Envoy Redman. In July 1994, he commented to the^|mHH||ilhat Special Envoy
Redman's key role in the entire affair was not well known in Washington." ^^flHHUft
m^Hkwho by thi^ time had been instructed repeatedly by his headquarters to rqx>rt anything
that looked like United States involvement in arming the Muslims,*' dutifully rqxnted his
" Sec Neitzke Subcommittee Dep. at 247 (explaining that he did not personally intervene
but that he was sure [the United States] intervened; Redman may have intervened. . . .^.
^2^PMHBB^BH|Apr. 20, 1994.
** Redman Subcommittee Dep. at 86.
IJuly26, 1994
" Althouglt^he was cautioned to refrain^m editorializipg on the issue of aims
thouglt^he
shipments, theHH:x>ntinued to encourage thM^^HHtBro report including information
466
conversation with the DCM. This report added to the inaccurate and growing suspicions at the
CIA that something was happening to which it was not privy^T^^i^^^^
ThdlHHB^Wreporting of the DCM's unsubstantiated claims that Special Envoy
Redman intervened in this convoy, together with other reporting of the DCM's allegations led to
increased skepticism at the CIA about what was happening at Embassy Zagreb. In a
conversation with Special Envoy Redman's intelligence assistantJpmi^mi|HH^
■■■kalso voiced concerns about Special Envoy Redman's role/- ThaMHBHMftold the
C^ ■ ^
mtelhgence assistant about his belief that Special Envoy Redman had helped precipitate the
Iranian arms flows during his meeting with President Tudjman and Ambassador Galbraith and
related that to his alleged involvement in the May 1994 convoy." Special Envoy Redman's
assistant explained that there was no reason for Special Envoy Redman to take an active role in
any Bosnian-Croatian matters other than to bring the parties to negotiation." It was her opinion
that th(||PPHllH^Bvas exaggerating Special Envoy Redman's role in the whole affair.^'
Because of the DCM's persistent speculation about Special Envoy Redman's
involvement and thejMBBBHMpersistent reporting of conversations with other embassy
personnel, the lOB was asked to investigate whether Special Envoy Redman facilitated the flow
he obtained in^onversations with other United States embassy personnel. The CIA repeatedly
instructed theMBI^HIIflBto continue reporting information as he had been between 4-1 1/94.
"M
^ Subcommittee Int at 1
204
467
of arms to Bosnia. The lOB concluded that circumstantial evidence existed to suggest that
Special Envoy Redman had done something for Ambassador Turkovic's convoy, but even if he
had interceded, Special Envoy Redman lacked any knowledge that the convoy contained arms.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter One, Section Five of the Minority Views regarding the
definition of covert activity, even if Special Envoy Redman had known that arms were on board
and had facilitated the release of the convoy, his actions would not have constituted a covert
actionT^^^^^^^^
The Minority concludes that had it not been for this rampant speculative reporting, the
May 1994 convoy would have been no more significant than the thousands of other convoys that
traversed the region during the war. The allegations of misconduct and possible covert action
were wholly unsupported by any evidence and should not have been accorded the level of
significance that was afforded them. The Minority also believes that the CIA must do a better job
of distinguishing between speculation and gossip in intelligence reporting. The speculation by
the DCM about Special Envoy Redman was rumor and gossip, not intelligence.
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468
Chapter Two
Section Five
ALLEGED MEETINGS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH AND THE
MUSLIM CLERIC OMERBASIC.
The transshipment of arms from Iran and other Islamic countries to Bosnia through
Croatia undoubtedly involved the work of middlemen, arms dealers and other shadowy figures.
The shadowy figure who emerged in the Select Subconunittee investigation was Imam
Omerbasic, the religious leader of the Muslims in Zagreb. The Minority shares the belief ihat •
Imam Omerbasic played a role in arranging arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims. However,
the Minority strongly objects to any effon to connect the Imam's role to any United States
Government official. For example, Imam Omerbasic met with Senator Bob Dole who also was
sympathetic to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims. To suspect Senator Dole on the basis of a
meeting and his sympathy for the Bosnians would be ludicrous. To do so in the case of
Ambassador Galbraith is equally so.
Celebrating the End of Ramadan.
One of the first allegations that United Sutes officials may have been involved in covert
attempts to arm the Bosnian Muslims surfaced in April 1994, before the United States responded
to Croatia's inquiry about the resumption of the formal arms pipeline to Bosnia, i
206
469
'^
Upon receipt of the cable, the||^HHB||[attempted to ascertain if anyone in the
embassy had met with the cleric or had any information about the identification of the United
States officials. After learning that the Ambassador and the Economic Commercial Officei^Tiad
been at the Mosque the month prior, the^^HMBHI^cabled back to^Hheadquarters before
checking all the facts and reponed that i^was the Ambassador who had met with the cleric and
discussed the conveyance of anns^^^^i^^
Testimony and documents reviewed by the Select Subcommittee stafToffer no evidence
to suggest that a secret contact or conversation between the Ambassador and the cleric ever
occurred and that supplying Bosnia with arms was ever discussed.
Visits with the Imam.
The Select Subcommittee has coniinned with various Embassy Zagreb personnel that the
cleric was a well known figure in the Zagreb Muslim community who often appeared on
television and in the press to discuss the Bosnian Muslim condition. As such, the Ambassador,
* The Economic Commercial Officer was responsible for maintaining the Embassy's
contact with the religious communities in Croatia.
207
470
other Embassy Zagreb personnel and visiting Members of Congress and staff paid courtesy calls
on the Imam, when appropriate. For instance, in an interview of the Imam by the Select
Subcommittee, Mr. Omerbasic acknowledged meeting with Senator Dole and Representative
McCIoskey on their trips to the region."' Certainly if the Ambassador or any other United States
GoverTiment official in Croatia had discussed with the cleric a rogue operation to provide the
Bosnians with arms, the Embassy would be reluctant to facilitate meetings between Members of
Congress and the Imam out of concern that the cleric might disclose the illicit operation.
The Majority Report asserts mat Ambassador Galbraith and Cleric Omerbasic met a
number of times between August 1993 and April 1994. The Select Subcommittee heard
testimony from several sources who described the infrequent contact between the Ambassador
and the cleric; limited to one or perhaps two meetings between the Ambassador and the cleric*
' Select Subcommittee Interview of Imam Sevko Omerbasic, Aug. 21, 1996, at 1
(hereinafter "Omerbasic Subcommittee Int."). The Majority report characterizes Mr.
Omerbasic's answers to staff questions during this interview as "demonstrably false." However,
the Majority report offers no evidence to support this comment. In the absence of proof, the
minority does not similarly question the portion of the Imam's interview relating to his contacts
with Ambassador Galbraith.
* The Majority report cites two sources for its assertion that "several meetings" occurred
during 1992-1993: the Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charlotte Stottman, Aug. 10, 1996
and a Memo of Interview of Teni Lee Baker prepared by Julia Gaines and Janine Doheity. The
Minority questions both of these cites. First, during her deposition, Ms. Stottman claimcxl that
the name Omerbasic "was familiar" and that he came to the Embassy "more than once." Id. at 38.
Ms. Stottman did not offer and the Select Subcommittee was unable to determine any
corroborating evidence to prove that the Imam ever visited Embassy Zagreb for any purpose. In
subsequent interviews, colleagues of Ms. Stottman noted that she was moody and perhaps the
victim of a split personality. Further, upon attempting to corroborate Ms. Stottman's memory of
factual issues, she was found to be in error on many occasions. In light of these factors, Ae
Minority has difficulty relying on her recount of events and questions her credibility. See Select
Subcommittee Interview of Terri Lee Baker, Aug. 19, 1996; Select Subcommittee Interview of
Shane Pitzer, Aug. 30, 1996; Select Subcommittee Interview of Duska Djuric, Aug. 21, 19%.
208
471
The first meeting took place in July 1993. when the Ambassador made a courtesy call on Imam
Omerbasic at his ofTice in the Zagreb Islamic Center* It is customary for a new Ambassador to
pay a courtesy visit to all government officials and community leaders - including religious
leaders. The embassy Protocol Affairs Officer, arranged the meeting and Susan Hovanec, the
embassy's Public Affairs Offi-er, accompanied the i»jnbassador to the meeting." While their
discussion lasted more than an hour, in part because it was facilitated through an interpreter, the
conversation centered mostly on the war and the vast number of Muslims who were dying as a
result. Ms. Hovanec characterized the meeting as a "sad recital of suffering."'
Second, the Select Subcommittee Interview of Tern Lee Baker, Aug. 19, 1996, at 1, accurately
noted that Ms. Baker had no knowledge of an individual named Imam Omerbasic and it is
therefore unclear how she would be aware of "several meetings." Additionally, in a
Memorandum of Interview of Terri Lee Baker prepared by Carrie Moore, Ms. Baker is noted to
have stated that she never scheduled meetings for the Ambassador and Mr. Omerbasic.
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Susan Hovanec, Aug. 7, 1996, at 33 (hereinafter
"Hovanec Subcommittee Dep.").
* Id. at 33-34. Ms. Hovanec testified that the Embassy Protocol Affairs officer, Ms.
Duska Duric, probably made the arrangements for the meeting, but that she (Susan Hovenac)
also may have arranged it Later, Ms. Hovanec remembers that Economic Commercial Officer
Tom Mittnacht also may have scheduled the meeting. Id. at 77. Ms. Hovanec claims that one of
the reasons she accompanied the Ambassador to the meeting was because she speaks Croatian
and was able to certify that the interpreter's translations between Ambassador Galbraith and Mr.
Omeibasic were conect
' Hovenac Subcommittee Dep. At 34. SM_alsQ, Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter
Galbraith, August 19, 1996, at 77, 80 (hereinafter "Galbraith Subcommittee Dep."). Ambassador
Galbrith did not offer any information about this meeting during his deposition. Although the
Ambassdor did not recall having met Imam Omeibasic prior to March 13, 1994, he did not
exclude that there might have been some other occasion, for instance the Fourth of July party in
1993, when they may have met Ambassador Galbraith did recall generally paying a courtesy
call with "some Muslim leaders" in the summer of 1993, but he was unable to identify anyone in
particular. Id.
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472
The second meeting between the Ambassador and Imam Omerbasic, if it occurred at all,
may have occurred on Sunday. March 13, 1994, the last day of the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan.' Ambassador Galbraith and Tom Mittnacht, the embassy's Economic Commercial
Officer, had been invited to attend a gathering (the feast of Eid) to mark the end of Ramadan.
Dr. Izet Aganovic, the President of the Merhamet relief organization and an individual with
whom Mr. Mittnacht had frequent business contact, had extended the invitation to the
Ambassador.' At 8:30 am on March 13, the Ambassador and Mr. Mittnacht went to the mosque
to attend the early morning celebration in a show of solidarity with the Muslim community in
Zagreb.'" Both the Ambassador and Mr. Mittnacht characterized this event as a festive occasion
in which mere pleasantries were exchanged, rather than a business meeting." The Ambassador
testifies that March 1994 was the last time he met with the cleric.'" (The Ambassador's
* Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 77.
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Tom Mittnacht, Aug., 14, 1996, at 46 (hereinafter
"Mittnacht Subcommittee Dep."). Mr. Mittnacht testified that, in the course of his day to day
work tracking progress of the humanitarian aid convoys and organization relief efforts, he had
frequent contact with relief organizations including Merhamet and its director, Dr Izet
Aganovic.
"* Mittnacht Subcommittee Dep. at 47.
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 78; Mittnacht Subcommittee Dep. at 47-48.
" Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at 79. The Majority Report notes the presence of the
business card of Mr. Omerbasic in the Ambassador's Rolodex as recently as August 1996,
perhaps as a suggestion that the Ambassador and the cleric had a great deal of contact despite the
Ambassador's firm recollection to the contrary. The Minority is not aware of how the Majority
obtained information about the contents of the Rolodex, as no copy of the Ambassador's
Rolodex was ever requested by, received, or made available to the Select Subcommittee. A
photocopy of Omerbasic's business card appeared in the Select Subcommittee files on October
22. 1996.
210
473
recollection of the cleric's presence during the post-Ramadan meeting may be in error, however,
as Mr. Mittnacht testified that the cleric was not present. In addition, the cleric informed the
Select Subcommittee that he did not specifically recall attending the Feast of Eid.").
The
Tries to Identify the United States Officials, but Jumps to Conclusions.
v^-^^^
In late April 1994, six weeks after the Ramadan celebration, thej
" Omerbasic Sabcommittee Int. at 1. The cleric remembered meeting Ambassador
Galbraith in 1993, but did not specifically recall if he or the Ambassador were present at the feast
of Eid in 1994.
_-- Jl Select Subcommittee p^o^on o;
MBiVSubcommittee ^^•")-^'^l|^^
(Subconmiittee Dep. at 6!
Aug. 9, 1996. at 61-62 (hereinafler
474
I If United
States ofTicials had attempted to obtain arms for tiie Bosnian Muslims, it is highly unlikely that
the Imam would have waited a month to report such an important contact and request to his
Iranian contacts!
The^lPB^^HHspeculated that the meeting between the United States officials and
the cleric involved "apparent collusion" with Iran on the delivery of arms and tasked his Deputy
to approach the embassy's Economic Officer Tom Mittnacht to inquire what United States
officials had met with the cleric." After Mr. Mittnacht replied that he and the Ambassador were
at the Eid celebration at the Mosque in March.i
Idid not ask Economic Officer Mittnacht what had transpired at the meeting" and
consequently, filed an incomplete cable back to his headquarters that merely offers that the
Ambassador may be one of the unidentified officials.
When the Ambassador returned from travel, th^^|^B^HBBlf approached him about
the intelligence report. Ambassador Galbraith reviewed the report, verified his presence at the
! on Intelligence hearing,Apr. 31, 1996, (testimony of the
^t 16; The^HUHJ^^did not iqpproach thgEmba
Zagreb q^cer personally when investigating his concern, instead, he asked hi^
: a generic request about what United States officials may have met with the
Imam.
'QnThis is most curious because the cable has no refe[ence4^ a date of the alleged
meeting between the cleric and the U.S. government ofTicials. ,
•IT!9^
212
475
Mosque the month before, and denied discussing the issue of arms at all with the Imam.""
Because he did not ask for any additional infonnation from Economic Affairs Officer Mittnacht
or Ambassador Galbraith, th^fl^HBHHlcable was filled with inaccuracies and
speculation. For instance, th^jH^B^H^Pffailed to report in his cable to headquarters that
Mr. Mittnacht did not think that the cleric was present at the feast of Eid and that the
Ambassador, therefore, may have been in error in remembering that Mr. Omerbasic was present
at the event.'' TheJHHiH^^did not check, nor did he report that both Mr. Mittnacht and
the Ambassador were in each other's presence during the entire event and that no discussion of
arms shipments occurred." Finally, the reporting inaccurately portrays the character of the
event; referring to it as a meeting rather than a festive event to mark the end of Ramadan to
which the local press was invited. At best, the reporting is speculative and incomplete. At worst,
it appears to be intentionally misleading since it states as fact that Mr. Mittnacht said that he and
the Ambassador met with the cleric, but fails to include Mittnacht's true recollections that the
cleric was not present, that arms were not discussed^H
ubcommittee Dep. at 30.
" Mittnacht Subcommittee Dep. at 45. When asked if he had met the cleric, Mittnacht
replied that he recalled meeting the cleric in November 1992, and then says "I have to confess, I
believe it's been said that he was at this meeting in March of 1994, but I don't distinctly recall
him being there." See also, Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 78 (explaining he remembers
meeting the cleric at the feast of Eid).
" Mittnacht Subcommittee Dep. at 48 (explaining Aath^jtoes not recall any instances in
which he might not be within earshot of the Ambassador); jH^l^ubcommittee D^ep. aHO
(noting that Ambassador Galbraith said he never discussed arms with the cleric)
213
476
In response to a question posed to the cleric asking if the Ambassador ever was involved
in working to arm the Bosnian Muslims, the cleric replied that "unfortunately" that was not the
case." The Imam explained that if the Muslims had received weapons from the United States,
they would have not have suffered as many casualties." The cleric went on to state that he had
no knowledge of any United States officials involved in arming Bosnia." That Imam Omerbasic
expressed disappointment that the United States had not supplied arms to the Bosnian Muslims,
further casts doubt on the possibility that Ambassador Galbraith or any other United States
official ever had made an offer of arms.
A Case of Mistaken Identification.
The record is clear. The Ambassador first met Mr. Omerbasic in July 1993 on a courtesy
call. Anns were not discussed. The second possible contact between the Ambassador and the
cleric with respect to which none of the participants - including the cleric - has a clear memory
of who attended, was a social event covered by the press in which no discussion of anns
occurred. Two years later in May 19%, when the new Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Finn
made a courtesy call on the Imam, the cleric noted that he was the first official fix>m the Embassy
the cleric had met with in two years."
" Omerbasic Subcommittee Int. at I.
" Select Subcommittee Interview of Robert Finn, Aug. 18, 1996, at 2.
214
477
(but no credible evidence exists to confirm the speculation by the
I that United States government officials were "colluding" with Iran on weapons. In fact,
the speculative, incomplete and inaccurate nature of the reporting created suspicions within the
CIA that a covert operation, spearheaded by Ambassador Galbraith, was underway. This was
wildly disproportionate to the facts.
215
478
Chapter Two
Section Six
MYSTERY FLIGHTS INTO TUZLA
Among the most publicized allegations of United States involvement in arming the
Bosnian Muslims involved the February 1995 reports of United States cargo aircraft landing at
Tuzla airport. These reports were investigated at the time they occurred by NATO, the Defense
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. No evidence confirming the reports was
discovered. The Minority a)*-' has not been able to identify credible evidence of the alleged
flights.
The reports of phantom C-130 cargo planes escorted by fighter jets first surfaced in the
public media in February 1995.' According to press accounts," United Nations peacekeepers
reported hearing and seeing cargo planes escorted by fighter aircraft flying over the Tuzla airport
' Allegations that the United States was conducting covert arming of the Bosnian
Muslims in Sarajevo were not new. A United States Army colonel stationed with the
UNPROFOR commander heard similar allegations as early as 1994. These allegations likely
were premised on the fact that the United States regularly conducted humanitarian food drops in
tfie Tuzla region fron-. C-130s stationed out of Germany. He believed, and the commander of
UNPROFOR concurred, that these rumours were being circulated "by people who felt it in their
interest to do so." Select Subcommittee Deposition of LtCol John E. Sray, Aug. 29, 1996, at 16
(hereinafter "Sray Subcommittee Dep."). In 1994 the colonel and others 6x)m European
Command investigated the allegations and confirmed that there were food drop operations being
conducted and no covert activity on the part of the United States. Id. at 21 . The rumours that
carried through 1995 that the United States was involved in some sort of covert operation likely
stemmed from these earlier rumours.
' Ses, e^, NATO Finds No Trace of Mystery Bosnian Aircraft, Reuters, Feb. 12, 1995
(United Nations peacekeepers reported fnsh sightings of mystery aircraft); Robert Fox, Hercules
Flights Never F.xplaineri, The Daily Telegraph. Jun. 2, 1995, at 1 (Flights of a C-130 Hercules
were heard landing at the Tuzla airport in February); UN. Says There's No Proof of Arms
Shipments to Bosnian Moslems, Deutsche Press- Agentur, Mar. 1, 1995 at A9 (U.S. Built C-I30s
are speculated to have been used by the United States or Turkey to run covert operations).
216
479
on the nights of February 10 and 12, 1995.' On the evening of February 10, 1995. a patrol went
to investigate the alleged flight but retreated after being fired upon by Bosnian Muslim forces.'
Although no cargo or other aircraft actually were observed on the ground at any of the four
airstrips which comprise the Tuzla airport region, the press reported speculation that the United
States was involved. Press speculation about a United States role in the flights persisted »^ecause
it was believed that the C-130s may have been conducting maneuvers such as air drops of high
technology weapons that could have only been performed by only a few countries such as the
United States, France, and Britain.'
On both occasions, NATO, the entity responsible for maintaining the no-fly zone over
Bosnia, found nothing to verify that the flights had taken place.' The speculation continued,
however, because the United States had primary responsibility for the monitoring of the no-fly
zone via radar and other aircraft and thus presumably could have allowed the flights to proceed
"undetected." Some alleged that the United States also would have been in the position to know
when radar coverage of the Tuzla area would be diminished sufficiently to permit clandestine
' Catherine Toups, Ttii«t«!ia DemanHs Answers at ll.N.: Suspects Secret Arms Drops in
pnsnia Denying Fmhargo. The Washington Times, Feb. 25, 1995, at A9.
* I T S TiimaH Rlind Fye tfi Ai"<'"P ♦" »"<:"!«" Muslims. Reuters, Oct. 30, 1995.
'Id.
* See I IN. Says T^prp'c Nn Pmnf of Arms Shipments to Bosnian Moslems. Deutsche
Press-Agentur, Mar. 1, 1995 (sUtement by U.N. spokesman Fred EckhardXThere is no proof to
support the theory that U.S. cargo planes have recently made weapons drops to the Bosnian
Moslems).
217
480
flights.'
On February 24, 1995, the Russian delegation to the United Nations Security Council
asked for a formal report from NATO and the United Nations on the mystery flights.' NATO
subsequently launched a military investigation into the matter. Military investigators traveled to
Tuzia and interviewed eye w-tnesses in order to reconstruct events.' "Hie military investigation
concluded that the flights observed by the Norwegian members of UNPROFOR on February 10
and 12, 1995, were attributed to "scheduled . . . NATO flights.'"" NATO released the results of
its investigation on March 1, 1995." Despite the NATO investigation, questions continued to
linger within European circles about the Tuzla flights and possible United States involvement.
Press reports continued sporadically throughout 1995, quoting unidentified U.N. officials
alleging that the flights "had been a weapons delivery" and that "the United States had approved
of the. . . operations.""
' INF Memorandum, Feb. 21, 1995, at 1. At the time, only one AW AGs radar plane was
monitoring the area over Bosnia, and Tuzla was located at the edge of the AWACs' effective
range. Id.
'Id. In his address to a closed session of the Security Council, Yuri Fedetov, Russian
Special Envoy to the United Nations called the alleged flights "a cause for concern." Id.
*Id.
" Id. On January 17, 1995, NATO resumed close air support C'CAS") training over
Bosnia. INR Viewpoint, Jan. 21, 1995, at 2. These training missions were not publicized widely
and it is likely that ground UNPROFOR were not informed about them in advance.
" NATO Sayj; TnvtHrtigatinn Finds No Evidence of Arms Drops. Associated Press, Mar.
1, 1995.
'^ Id.
218
481
The NA TO Investigation.
According to the report prepared by the NATO investigative team, beginning at
approximately 5:45 p.m. on February 10. U>fPROFOR personnel located in Sector Northeast
reported the sighting of a transport type aircraft with two fighter escorts." According to the Air
Operations Coordination Center ("AOCC") in Sarajevo, these planes were seen landing at the
Tuzla West airstrip.'^ Approximately one hour later, U.N. monitors also began receiving reports
of fixed wing activity around Tuzla.'* In all, four reports of fixed wing activity were lodged on
February 10, 1995." The second report occurred in the early evening of Sunday, February \1,
1995. U>fPROFOR personnel began reporting "jet noise" over Tuzla. Reports of fixed wing
aircraft filtered into NATO and United Nations monitoring centers for nearly an hour. While
attempting to ascertain if a plane had landed at that Tuzla West airstrip, a team of Nordic
" Col. Timothy Jones, Final Report of Possible Fixed Wing Flight Activity at Tuzla, 10
and 12 Feb. 1995, NATO/UNPROFOR Investigative Team (hereinafter 'Tuzla Final Report").
"Id.
" Press reports of the flights indicated that they took place at the 'Tuzla airport" This is
actually a misnomer for a collection of four airstrips located within the Tuzla area. A description
of each of these air strips is helpftil in understanding the unlikelihood that arms deliveries by C-
1 30 type aircraft would have taken place within the area. Tuzla main," an asphalt runway of
nearly 7,000 feet, was under the control of UNPROFOR Northeast forces during 1995. This
would have been the only available runway for the C-130s to use. The *Tuzla Highway Strip,"
located approximately six kilometers east of Tuzla Main, generally was unobserved by
UNPROFOR although it was considered usable, but was not of the appropriate length for use by
C-1 30s. 'Tuzla East" lay another kilometer east of Tuzla Highway. Tuzla East was a grass strip
that was unusable at the time these alleged flights occurred. The final airstrip in this collection
was designated 'Tuzla West" Tuzla West, located four kilometers southwest of Tuzla Main,
was covered with piles of dirt rendering it unusable. Tuzla Final Report
"M.
219
482
UNPROFOR troops was surrounded by Bosnian forces and prohibited from examining the
airstrip."
The Select Subcommittee reviewed documentation provided by the Department of
Defense, including the final report issued by the NATO investigative team, and interviewed
numerous individuals will, knowledge of the rumours and investigaiions of them. The Minority
concludes that no credible evidence exists to substantiate the claim that the United States
delivered arms to the Bosnian Muslims via cargo flights on February 10 or 12, 1995."
Attempts by United States and Other Officials to Investigate Flights.
TheJHIH^^BlBlso was aware of the alleged Tuzla flights." Around the time that
the flights occurred, thejBI^M^B^^^ceived a great deal of cable traf!ic and reporting on
the incidents from military and regular intelligence channels.^ Despite the lack of physical
evidence that such flights had occurred, and the absolute lack of United States involvement in the
" Tuzla Final Report.
" United Nations peacekeepers reported activity in the Tuzla vicinity again on February
17, 1995. This activity included reports of five Bosnian government helicopters landing and
taking off fiom Tuzla airport This activity was not part of the NATO investigation because that
investigation concerned sdlegations of fixed wing aircraft activity only. The Select
Subcommittee has determined, based on interviews and review of available material, that these
flights were not part of any United States covert action plan to supply arms to the Bosnian
Muslims.
'jf|B( Subcommittee Dep. at 54.
^ The ll^BIHIH testified that general rumors about United States covert activj^^
repeated throughout the intdugence channels were covered "ad nauseam" within the pTess^^fai
54-56. The Tuzla flights were afforded particular attention in intelligence channels and the
media, vj^ ^^^^^^^
220
483
matter, the alleged flights were taken seriously because if such an action had been conducted by
the United States, it would have caused significant friction within the allies."' Assuming that
any such flight would have had to fly over Croatian air space, ihegtKKtt^^^ undertook his
own investigation of the flights." The^MI^H^Hcould not prove that the flights had taken
place. His investigation led him to believe that if any flights other than those sanctioned by and
known to the United Nations and NATO had occurred, they were likely of Iranian or Turkish
origin." He found no evidence indicating the United States had any role in the flights."
" SttjHHSubcoau^ttee Dep. at SS (noting that the flight allegations were causing
friction within NATO).
ubcommit
'^^■^Subconunittee Dcp. at SS.
** Herrick Subcommittee Dep. at 64
"Id.
''Id.
^HenickSSaDq). at 27-28
7^
221
484
General Wesley Clark knew of the alleged Tuzla flights although he had no official
responsibility for investigating them." Because of his position, General Clark was in contact
with UNPROFOR regularly. UNPROFOR commanders explained to him that they had no
evidence to suggest that a C-130 had landed at Tuzla nor did they have anything suggesting
United Sutes participation in a covert operation to arm the Bosnians." After the alleged flights
in February 1995. General Clark heard of no more phantom flights to Tuzla."
'* U. at 64-65.
" Id at 65.
^ Heiiick Subcommittee Dep. at 66.
*' Clark Subcommittee Dq). at 61.
" Id. at 62. According to General Clark, UNPROFOR was so perplexed by the mystery
flights, they placed a tank fitted with a thermal site at the end of the ninway to detect any
possible flights. Id. UNPROFOR did not detect any flights.
Id.
222
485
Chapter Two
Section Seven
THEMj^^MISJILE ISUDEST
The incident that appears to have attracted the most concern involves a shipment of
jiUiymissiles from Iran that was stopped in Croatia. The Croatian authorities asked the United
States Government to inspect the missiles for chemical warheads. The Defense Attache at
Embassy Zagreb, accompanied by two different intelligence officers, inspected the missiles on
two separate occasions. Th. ofdcials concluded that the missiles did not contain chemical
warheads. No credible evidence to indicate any other United States involvement in the missile
shipment was determined. The Majority alleges that Ambassador Galbraith was involved in
pressuring the Croats to release the missiles to the Bosnians. The sources for the allegation are
two Croat officials whose credibility and veracity have been challenged in a general way by a
number of other Americans, and whose account of this event is inconsistent t^th the account of
all other United Sutes officials involved with the missile inspection.
In a May 21, 1996 article. The I jts Angeles Times reported that in September 1995 the
United Sutes was involved in the inspection of a shipment of missiles destined for Bosnia from
Iran,' The article alleged that United States officials had gone beyond passive acknowledgment
of the arms pipeline to a direct role in facilitating ttte arms flow.' The article claimed that the
CIA and the military, after overcoming their alarm at the we^wn's potentid, permitted them to
IMMCIII ia(IUl UIC
' James Risen and Doyle McManus, '.
Iran. Los Angeles Times. May 21, 1996, at Al (hereinafier "LA Times Article").
'Id.
223
486
be released to the Bosnians under the direction of Ambassador Galbraith.'
The Select Subcommittee undertook a detailed investigation of these allegations. Staff
reviewed official reports and documents generated about the shipment, including the cable traffic
of both the Defense Attache and theWKI^KKKt^in Zagreb; interviewed numerous witnesses
with first hand knowledge of the events; and reviewed media accounts anc* Congressional
hearing testimony.
The Minority concludes, in direct contradiction to the findings of the Majority, that the
inspection of the missiles by United States military and intelligence personnel was conducted for
the sole purpose of determining whether the missiles were armed with chemical warheads. The
Minority also concludes that the inspection was consistent with the terms and conditions of the
Nunn-Mitchell amendment. The Minority concludes ftirther that the inspection was appropr.ate
for this limited purpose in order to protect United States civilian and military personnel from the
risks of introducing chemical weapons into the region.
The Minority found no credible or substantive evidence that Ambassador Galbraith. the
Dr any other United States government official facilitated or encouraged the
release of these missiles and does not agree with the Majority's decision that referral to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for further investigation of this matter is
warranted. The inspection did not amount to covert activity. .As discussed supia Section Five of
Chapter One, the inspection of the missiles by the Defense Anache and subsequently by a missile
expert did not amount to "an activity ... to influence political, economic, or military conditions,"
'Id.
224
487
rather it was a technical support function to assist Bosnia that tails well within tlji^excepiion to
covert activity for "traditional military activities or routine support. • /
And, although the Minority wholly disagrees with the Majority conclusion that
Ambassador Galbraith did pressure the Croatians to release the missile. e\en if he did. such
action falls outside the scope of covert action. "[A] request by the United States government to
third parties [does not] constitute covert action as defined by the Act.'" To argue that any action
taken by Ambassador Galbraith neither is supported by the facts nor does it comport with the
law.
Media Reports of the Missile Inspection and Informal Investigation
by the Intelligence Oversight Board.
According to the Los Angeles limes article, the Croatians seized the missiles in
September 1995 and held them in Pula.* The article reported that Croatian Defense Minister
Gojko Susak was concerned that the missiles contained chemical warheads and, if so,
represented a sharp escalation in the types of we^)ons being shipped.* The article reported that
American officials reacted with alarm to Susak's news, and an immediate investigation by
Central Intelligence Agency and United States Army personnel was undertaken." The missiles
* Statement by President George Bush upon Signing H.R. 1455, Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1 137 (Aug. 19. 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 257.
■' LA Times Article.
'Id.
'Id.
225
488
were released to Bosnia at the behest of cenain Lnited States officials including Ambassador
Galbraith after the investigation determined thai the missiles contained no chemical or hiulogical
agents'
The Intelligence Oversight Board ("lOB"). which had concluded in May 1995 that no
United States covert activity to arm the Bosnian Muslims had occurred in 1994, mitiated an
informal review of the "missile allegation" as a supplement to its report.' Based on interviews
with key United States individuals, the lOB determined that no e% idence existed to suggest that
.\mbassador Galbraith. th^jH^^^BBfor any other United States official pressured the
Croatians to release the missiles."
Intelligence during the Spring and Summer 1 995.
Following enactment of the N'utm-Mitchell amendment in November 1994. and
throughout 1995,1
*Id.
' Select Subcommittee Interview of .\nihony Harrington, July 25, 1996 (hereinafter
"Harrington Subcommittee InL*0.
'" Id. Because interviews with the United States ofiHcials clearly indicated that no covert
action had taken place, the lOB did not interview Croatian officials. Id.
" Senate Select Committee on IntelligencePeposition of|HBi^Bi^|[May, 31,
1996, at 50 (hereinafter "Schindler SSCI Dep.").jJB— MB^was direclOLof the
Interagency Balkan Task Force ("IBTF*) of the Central Intelligence Agency./^
JThe IBTF provided intelligence
summaries for the National Intelligence nailie«; which were circulated throughout Congress and
::26
489
^SCIDep.atS4.
|^uIy26,199S.at2.
rSSCI Dep. at 54'
'^■■■^^^■^^'^'July 22, 199S;secabQ Select Subconunittee Dqwsition ol
^ug. 9, 1996. tt l(3&(heteinafle(VH|Pubconuninee DepO-
227
490
Initial Shipments ofi
Subcomminee Dq>. July 28, 199S.dHQMnissiles
have a range of approximately 100 kilometers. The missile warhead is generally iugh explosive
that detonates upon impact. Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 43. The Iranians initiated jale^f the
[to the foreign public in 1993. Jane's Intelligence Re\new, June 1, 1995.*^
491
The Third Shipment and United States Involvement.
m
^^
The Bosnians may have
been concerned that if they did not inform the Croatians directly about the shipments, and they
learned of them subsequently, the Croatians would use the shipments as an excuse to cunail the
pipeline/' Of course, the Croatians would insist on their cut if they were informed of the
"^
fGalbraith Subconuninee Dep. at 77'
229
492
contents. Although the United States «as aware that the missiles were being shipped, the Nunn-
iMitchell restnctions prohibited the shanng ol" intelligence regarding the missiles. As events
unfolded. ho\\e\er. the Croatians gained independent knowledge that Iran was shipping missiles
to Bosnia!^^^^^
On August 29, 1995, an Iranian air force cargo plane w as forced lo land at Split, Croatia
when bad w eaiher prevented it from entering Bosnian tenitor\ . The Croatians then diverted the
plane to Pula. Croatia. The Croatian government seized the plane at Pula, examined the contents
and determined that it contanied missiles. 1 he Croatians expressed concern that the misiiles
warheads^^fPI^^HHimmfmHU^HIHi^lBllft
likely, how ever, tha(^^BBf>nitial anger was directed at the Bosnian and Iranian efforts to
more I
keep the shipments secret to a\ oid paying Croatia its one-third cut. In fact, the concern over
chemical weapons may have been a sham. The Defense Attache testified before the Select
Subcommittee that when hajnspected the missiles at the airport, he discovered that the crates had
never been opened." v-::»^^^.,^
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and General Clark Are Approached About the Missiles.
The Majority grossly mischaracterizes and attempts to downplay the involvement of any
Aug. 9, 1996, at 102-03
-* Sejeet Subtymmittee Deposition o
(hereinafter Jl^l^kpubcommittee Dep.").
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of LtCol. John Sadler, Aug. 21, 1996, at 14
(hereinafter "Sadler Subcommittee Dep.~).
230
493
United States official in the^^BBbther than Ambassador Galbraith's alleged manipulation of
the Croatians to release the seized missiles to the Bosnians. The Majority misrepresents the facts
and relies on innuendo and circumstantial statemei.;s from less than credible Croatian sources.
The Majority relies, therefore, on less than credible reports by a^^^iV^Mpvho neither
agreed with the United States policy nor the actions of his .Embassador, to pron.ote a suggestion
that Ambassador Galbraith in some way committed a breach of covert law is specious.
In August 1995. Richard Holbrooke, who had been ser\ing as .Assistant Secretary for
European and Canadian .\ffairs since September 1994. began an intensive five month missio.r.o
bring peace to the region. Traveling with him throughout Europe and the Balkans was General
Wesley Clark, Director of Strategic Plaruiing and Policy for the Department of Defense.''
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and General Clark were accompanied on this mission by
representatives of the NSC. Department of Defense and Department of State.
During one of many meetings with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman they attended in
August 1995," Defense Minister Gojko Susak approached Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and
expressed concern about the seized shipment." The Croatians claimed that the shipment would
be a violation of the rules of war and international law if it contained some sort of chemical
" General Clark had been touring the Contact Group and other allied countries with
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake prior to meeting Assistant Secretary Holbrooke in
London for the second leg of their shuttle diplomacy. Select Subcomminee Deposition of
General Wesley Clark, Sept. 4, 1996, at 4748 (heieinaaer "Clark Subcommittee Dep."). In
addition to the Contact Group countries. Lake and Clark traveled to Spain, Italy, and Turkey. Id.
'' This meeting likely took place at the presidential palace in Zagreb. Croatia. Id. at 51.
" Senate Select Conunittee on Intelligence Deposition of Richard Holbrooke, May 21,
1 9%, at 80 (hereinafter "Holbrooke SSCI Dep.").
231
494
warhead.'* Defense Minister Susak requested assistance from the United States in determining
what t>pe of warhead was contained in the missiles."
Assistant Secretar> Holbrooke turned to General Clark and asked him to look into the
matter."' General Clark attempted to contact the European Command ("EUCOM") headquarters,
but was unsuccessful.' Next, General Clark contacted the Defense Anache at United States
Embassy Zagreb. Lieutenant Colonel John Sadler, the new Defense Attache at Embassy Zagreb,
informed General Clark that embassy officials already were aware of the shipment and had
dispatched a joint military and intelligence team to investigate.'' General Clark subsequently
reached General Keller, EUCO.M commander, and informed him of the situation." General
Keller promised Clark that he would "make sure it was worked on."" Neither Assistant
Secretary Holbrooke nor General Clark had an>lhing more to do with the missile shipment after
" Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 80, 84.
" Id. at 80.
" Id. at oO, 54; Clark Subcommittee Dep. at 50.
'' Senate Select Conuninee on Intelligence Deposition of General Wesley Clark, June 24,
1996, at 26-27; see also, Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 84 (Clark . . . called the European Command
headquarters in Stuttgart).
" Clark Subcommittee Dep. at SI. As discussed below, LtCol Sadler was involved in the
inspection of the missiles, however, he does not recall receiving the phone call from General
Clark. Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 20.
" Clark SSCI Dep. at 27. Clark had no record of the telephone call and was unsure
whether he reached General Keller that evening or the following morning. Id.
232
495
these initial exchanges."
The Croatian request for United Stales assistance with inspecting the missiles did not
come as a surprise to General Clark'" or Assistant Secreiar. Holbrooke. Defense Minister Susak
knew that EUCOM possessed the technical e.xpertise in this area that the Croatians lacked.^'
According to Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, the United States routinely will oblige such
requests as a matter of courtesy given the proficiency of the United States Army in the area."
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke did not discuss the decision to proceed with the inspection
with officials from the Department of State or other executive branch agencies in Washington. ''
Assistant Secretarv' Holbrooke decided that if chemical warheads were a possibility, "it was an
immediate issue to be looked into""* given the Croatian concern expressed by Defense Minister
Susak.'' The missiles, however, were not a primarv- focus for either General Clark or Assistant
*' Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 84; Clark Subcomminee Dep. at 53; Clark SSCI Dep. at 27.
** Clark Subcomminee Dep. at 55.
" Holbrooke SSCI Dep at 95.
" Id. Another example of technical assistance provided by the United States involved the
cleanup of unexploded ordnance from an ammunition dump explosion outside Zagreb discussed
supta. Chapter Two. Section One.
. *' Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 84.
**ld.
' Id. at 93. It is important to note that although the Croatians expressed concern over the
possibility of chemical weapons on board the aircraft. Defense Minister Susak waited until after
the negotiations had concluded for the day to raise the issue with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke.
Id. at 92-93.
233
r
496
Secretary Holbrooke" who were in the midst of intense shuttle diplomacy involving trips to three
to four countries per day." The missile issue, while miportant. was not ■fundamental" to the
mission that the two men were attempting to accomplish in the region." Neither General Clark
nor Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was asked to convey the results of the inspection to the
Croatians, " nor were they asked to facilitate the release of the missiles oi...e thev had been
inspected." Neither General Clark nor Assistant Secretary Holbrooke pursued the missile
incident in any formal way after this initial involvement.''
Defense Minister Susak Requests Assistance from Ambassador Galbraith.
In addition to informing Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and General Clark of the missile
shipment. Defense Minister Susak specifically asked .^nbassador Galbraith to send someone
down to Pula to inspect the shipment.'' Susak told Ambassador Galbraith that he believed the
** Clark Subcommittee Dep. at 56; Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 86.
"Id.
** Clark Subconunittee Dep. at 58-59; Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 87. 88.
*' Clark Subcommince Dep. at 53.
" Clark SSCI Dep. at 28,
" Holbrooke SSCI Dep. at 87; Clark Subcommittee Dep. at 53. In a later trip to Croatia,
General Clark asked the Defense Attache what had happened to the missiles and was told that
they had been found non-chemical and sent on apparently to Bosnia. Clark SSCI Dep. at 27;
Clark Subcommittee Dep. at 52.
^ Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 74.
234
497
cargo was suspicious which is why he warned L-nited States oxpens to examine it." Ambassador
Galbraith met with his Defense Attache and agreed thai the Defense Attache should travel to
Pula to examine the weapons." The .Ambassadoi did not "order" the Defense Attache to Pula.
the decision was made mutually.'
The Majority posits that because the .\mbassador also knew of the missile shipment, he
therefore was instrumental in its release and in direct contradiction to the testimony of General
Clark and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke." The simple fact is that Susak treated the missiles the
same way as he had the u.-...vpldded ordnance from, his ammunitions dump; he requested the "
assistance of the United States and he did so with a variety of sources. The fact that both the
Ambassador and General Clark undertook to assist the Croatians with this matter does not lend
any more credence to the notion that Ambassador Galbraith did something illegal or even
suspect. It simply means multiple people were working on the same issue.
Furthermore, there is no discrepancy in the testimony. Both Ambassador Galbraith and
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke recall Susak discussing the matter with each of them at the end of
a meeting at the Presidential palace.** In fact, the only person whose testimony on the matter
" Id. at 75; Galbraith HPSCl Dcp. at 22.
** Galbraith HPSQ Dqp. at 22; Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 12.
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 74. TheffffiSBBMestified that he v^ as present
at this discussion but neither the Ambassador nor the Defense Attache recall him being there.
Id.; Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 12.
" Sec Majority Final Report at 139 (noting that "the testimony of the U.S. officials
involved is in conflict *^.
" Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 73.
235
498
directly conflicts with anyone else involved in the matter is ilut of th^^^^^^^^H"' Unlike
the Majority, however, the Minority docs not take issue v\ ith the difforinu recollection of
witnesses almost a year after the events occurred.
The Initial Missile Inspection by llic Defense Attache.
The Defense Attache made arrangements to travel with a Croatian defense official to
Pula." The airplane to be inspected was in a secure section of the airport and appeared to be
guarded."' The Defense Attache and his assistantjlUHHHHIHHHHI^^Hl^^
examined the exterior of the cargo, and discovered the missiles on board/^ The
Defense Attache was not familiar with the missile type and could not determine with certainty if
there jvere chemical weapons." The Defense Attache and his assistanj
lade annotations of what the\ found to forward for analysis.** The
"Th
ecollects that Susak talked directly w ith the Defense Attache
during a meeting he attended^ith^ssistant Secretary Holbrooke andsthat conversation was then
relayed to the Ambassador. yViWSubcommittee Dep. at ^^^-^^^^
Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 12.
•-' Id. at 13.
^ Sadler Subcomminee Dep. at 14. The Defense .Attache and his assistant counted the
components of three missiles on board the aircraft. Id. at 15. The missiles were broken down
into components and packaged in a total of nine conuiners with virtually no room to maneuver
within the cargo hold. Id. at 49.
"Id.
236
499
iN^o did not share the results of the inspection with any of the Croatians present."" ^5^.
The Defense Attache orally reported his findings to Defense Depannient officials in
^^■ashington and explained that he had been unable to identify the type of missile. ' The Defense
Attache also informed Ambassador Galbraith and theM^^B^^bf the results of the
inspection."^ ThgfMBBi^WBy^^P' abreast of the developments by staying in touch with the
Ambassador and the Defense Anache.'*
The Second Inspection at theMfl////^ttf^equest.
The United States could not determine whether the missile w arheads were chemical based
on the information gathered during the first inspection.^' The^HIBHHkasked the Defense
Attache if he would return to Pula with a missile expert from th^BUo re-inspect the missiles."
The Defense Attache agreed to return if .Ambassador Galbraith and the Croatians approved.''
The interest of tha^HHU^^Whad more to do with taking advantage of an intelligence
gathering opportunity- than fulfilling the Croatian request. ' The |H|^|BMBRvanted to
'■ Id. at 15.
" Id. at 16.
" Id. at 17.
'^jWpBfBubconuninee Dep. at 100-02.
J|W(at 101 ; Sadler Subcotnminee L>ep. at 18
' Sadler Subconuninee Dep. at 18.
Md.
ubcommittee Dep. at 101
237
500
■^
exploit the opportunity to gain intelligence on Iran's weapons technology!'*
Six days after the initial inspection, the Defense Attache esconed an intelligence missile
expert back to Pula.'* The cargo had not been moved, and the Defense Attache repeated the
same inspection techniques with the missile expen that were performed on his first trip." Upon
returning to the Embassy.^ the missile expert informed theJ^mBH^^n ^^^^ although the
type of weapon was as yet undetermined, nothing indicated chemical or biological warheads.'"
Two days later intelligence analysts informed the Embassy that the missile warheads were not
chemical in nature.'
^•'^
T!
'Id.
* Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 19.
Id. at 21.
" Id. at 22.
^ Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 22.
" Id. The missile expert reported both orally and w ith wTJtjen regprts to the embassy. Id.
imelligence analysts informed the Select Subcommittee that theMjMniissiles cannot be fitted
with chemical warheads. Iranian Analysts Briefing, Sept. 11, 199S,'at 4. T^Sj^
*- Galbraith HPSCI Dep. at 22;|H^fDep. at lOS. The^^Ml^lkxplained to the
Select Subcommittee thaUbe it^dligence community Routinely utilizes such opportunities to
acquire new technology. jfll|BPep. at 105.*
238
501
•i'-
At no time did Assistant Secretarv Holbrooke. General Clark. .Ambassador Galbraiih. or
any other American do more than authorize an insjjection of the missiles to determine w heiher
they possessed chemical warheads. Initially, the United States was concemed only with the
possible introduction ofchemical weapons into the region, although thef40^M^^^M>ecame
interested in purchasing a missile for subsequent analysis. In fact, the United States was
prohibited from responding to a Croatian request to detain the missiles, because to do so would
have violated the Nunn-Mikheli amendment.
The Croatians Arrange to Release the Missiles.
Western intelligence indicates that ofTicials within the Croatian government debated for
several days about allowing the shipment to proceed to Bosnia. During this time, Bosnian
ofTicials repeatedly sought the release of the missiles by the Croatians" In early September
1995, Susak met with the Defense Atuche on an unrelated matter.
502
The Majority's Final Repon attributes the release of the missiles to the Defense Attache's
response to Susak: "Sadler . . . then said he could not comment on that. Susak got the message,
and the missiles were sent along to the Bosnia Muslims.""" This is simply not the case. The
Defense Attache's response*' accurately represented United States policy to refi^in from taking
any position on arms shipments from third countries Of course, the Nunn-Mitchell amendment
prohibited the Defense Anache from any action that would impede the release of the missiles.
Ultimately, the decision to release the missiles was made solely by the Croatian
" Sadler Subcommittee Dep. at 27.
"Id.
'' Id. at 50.
•• Id.
" Majority Repon at 140.
•" Sadler Subconunittee Dep. at 27.
240
503
government.
""^ "^ '*/At a
dinner with Ambassador Galbraith in 19%. the Defense Minister explained to the Ambassador
that he had released the missiles but had kept one for Croatia^' which would have been in
keeping with Croatia's demand for a share of all weapons transiimg the country. The Defense
Minister explained that the missiles had been released because it marked the end of the arms
shipments for Bosnia." and the release had been negotiated at a summit between the t\vo
presidents."" Not once did the Defense Minister suggest that he had been pressured to release the
missiles by the United States government.
There Is No Evidence to Suggest that Ambassador Galbraith
Influenced the Release of the Missiles.
Neither the intelligence nor the testimony recei\ed by the Subcommittee suggest a
credible basis for the Majority's assertions that .\mbassador Galbraith or any other United States
" Id. at 27; 50.
missiles were released on September 13. 1995.
__ ^ ^ubcommineeDep. at 105. Such action by
the Croatians would be in keeping with their demand of one-third of all weapons deliveries
through their territory, although the Croatians would not be able to use the w eapon as
intelligence does not indicate they have launch capability. "
«4
Galbraith Subconunittee Dep. at 158.
"Id.
'*Id.
241
504
official exerted pressure on the Croatians to release these missiles. The only two reterences to
United States pressure were made to ihe^^HH^Bi^b> members of the Croatian
goveriiment. mid-September 19954l^HBHHH^Hfl^^^^^^^^^l^ftl'the
decision to release the missiles had been coordinated \v ith "you guys" - implying United States
.^
govemment officials." Thd^BIBi^^HH^I^^^^H^^^^^Bl'had not been
involved. /^I^B^^IKhat it w as other "USG officials."'^ Months after the missiles were
released to BosniaJ
claimed that Ambassador Gaibraith had forced the release of the missiles."!
The credibility oMUpHHHHHI^^/on this matter is suspect. First, the
allegations of involvement by .Ambassador Gaibraith or any other .American are inconsistent with
the recollection of each .American involved in the incident, including th?
Second, i
I the Defense Attache or the Ambassador.'*
Third J^HB^^^Mdid not register his claim until several months after the incident.'"'
L Subcommittee
Dep. at 104. C^^^
The,^
242
505
Ambassador Galbraith has testified under oath that he had no role in the release of the missiles.
In sum. the Majority's allegations that intelligence indicates Ambassador Galbraith was
instrumental in releasing the missiles rest solely on unsupported accusations and not
corroborated intelligence information. There is nothing but innuendo to suggest that
Ambassador Galbraith facilitated the release of the missiles and the Minority cnooses to base its
conclusions on facts rather than innuendo./
The Lack of Impact Made uy tfte/,
ThdHHHtnissiles did not change the strategic balance within Bosnia.^l
■Hljl At best, th^^p^f r
provided a
morale boost to the Bosnian Muslims and a signal to the Croaiians that it would be against their
interest to abandon the Federation. .
'^
'"-' Galbraith Select Subcommittee Dep. At 187-88: Galbraith HPSCI Dep. at 22.
'"' Select Subcommittee Iranian briefing at 4.
'~ld.
243
506
The Minority concludes that the United Slates involvement in this matter violated no
international or United States law. The assistance provided in response to the Croatian request in
determining th>: type of missile on board the cargo plane was appropriate and should ha\e been
made available to a United States ally with a similar question. The Minority also found no
credible evidence to suggest that Ambassador Galbraith or any other United States official,
encouraged or facilitated the release of these missiles. In fact, had the United States attempted to
block the missile shipment, the Nunn-Mitchell amendment likely would ha\ e been violated.
244
507
Chapter Two
Section Eight
THE FALL 1994 INITIATIVE
During the summer of 1994, the United States undertook an analysis of a possible covert
action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. This option was rejected, however, because the United
States determined it impossible to sustain such an activity for any extended period of time. In
the fall of 1994, the United States also considered whether third countries should be encouraged
to transship anns through Croatia to Bosnia. The "third country option " was initiated, in part, to
respond to a proposal made by the Bosnian government to suspend its demands for lifting the
embargo in return for an increase in arms shipments. This proposal also was rejected due to the
risk that the allies would discover the arrangement and accuse the United States of a breach of
the arms embargo.
During the fall of 1994, individuals within the CIA nevertheless became suspicious that
U.S. officials, including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the new Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs, were involved in a covert program to pro\ide arms to the Bosnian
Muslims for which a PresidenHal finding as required by law had not been made. The
srted on a series of incidents during the summer and fall of 1994
that he thought suggested senior U.S. officials were involved in such activity. Individuals within
the CIA's Operations and Intelligence Directorates independently developed and reported to CIA
leadership their suspicions about the activities of U.S. officials with regard to arms deliveries to
the Bosnian Muslims. These suspicions were based in part on reporting by th^JmBBI^^yf
intelligence and in part on comments and rumors conveyed to him by the Deputy Chief of
245
508
Mission at Embassy Zagreb (the "DCM").
In September and October 1994, various intelligence sources incorrectly reported that
senior ofTiciaJs of the United States government were engaged in active negotiations with third
countries to provide arms to the Bosnians. In reality, United States government officials were
simply exploring options of whether and how the Bosnians might be armed. The exploration of
options was, in part, a result of the pressure the Congress was putting on the Administration to
lift the embargo.
Prime Minister Harris Siladzic and President Alia Izetbegovic, had approached
Ambassador Holbrooke and other U.S. officials with a proposal that the United States encourage
third country arms supplies to the Bosnian military.' In return, Bosnia would delay for six
months its calls for a lifting of the arms embargo. The United States entertained but did not
agree to the proposal. Ambassador Holbrooke acknowledges that he was approached by Bosnian
Prime Minister Silajdzic regarding support for arms deliveries:
. . . when Prime Minister Silajdzic approached us and asked if we would support his
existing — and I want to stress the word existing — requests to countries for assistance to
keep the government alive through the winter 94-95, 1 believed that the request deserved
a favorable reply, provided it did not constitute a covert action ... I played no role in
developing a covert action plan or proposal, nor did anyone else in the United States
government in the summer of 94.'
' This was not the first time the Bosmans had approached U.S. officials with this
proposition. In Sept. 1994, Siladzic and Izetbegovic had proposed the 6 month moratorium in
exchange for U.S. covert aims or continued supplies from third countries to Special Envoy
Charles Thomas. Department of State Cable, Vienna 8242, Sept. 19, 1994.
' Hearing on U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments into Bosnia before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 35, May 21, 1996 (statement of
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke).
246
509
The intense level of activity undertaken by United States Government officials to
determine whether third countries should be encouraged to transship arms, coupled with the
incorrect understanding (of selected intelligence officials) about United States policy on the arms
embargo, led to inaccurate intelligence reporting. The reporting caused unnecessary concern at
CIA headquarters that the United States was planning and committing U.S. resources to an effort
to ship arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
The suspicions were brou_ght to the attention of James Woolsey, the Director of Central
Intelligence (the "DCI" or "Director") who raised the issue with Anthony Lake, the National
Security Advisor to the President. After a review of available information by the NSC staff, the
NSC referred the matter to the White House Counsel who requested an investigation by the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board (the "lOB"). The lOB found no evidence that U.S.
officials were engaged in a covert action in Bosnia and no evidence &at U.S. officials knowingly
took any action to facilitate the transshipment of arms to Bosnia.'
Suspicions within the CIA.
Thd|^HHiHHHmA/nad been reporting on the issue of arms flows to the
Bosnians since April 1994. He was aware of the "no instructions" response that Ambassador
Peter Galbraith had delivered to Croatian President Tudjman in April in response to Tudjman's
question regarding United States views on Croatia allowing arms to transit Croatia to Bosnia.'
' Select Subconunittee Interview of Anthony Harrington, July 25, 1996, at 1-7
(Hereinafter "Harrington InL").
* See Section One. Chapter Two for a full discussion of the no instructions response.
247
510
He remained confused about United States policy on enforcing the embargo, however, and
harbored suspicions that the United States Ambassador's actions may not have reflected actual
U.S. policy.
Throughout the summer and fall, thefH^^HS^sought clarification from
headquarters about United States policy with regard to the arms embargo, and he continued to
bring to headquarters' attention incidents and reporting which he believed suggested that certain
U.S. officials might be running a rogue arms supply operation. In addition to actual intelligence,
thelf/ftlKIKf^hased much of his reporting on information, gossip, and speculation by the
On September 30, 1994^pi^|0Bfe)the Chief of the^MH Balkans Task Force
informed Deputy Director of Intelligence Doug MacEachin (the "DDI") about his concerns that
U.S. officials might be involved in brokering arms transfers to the Bosnian Muslims. According
to MacEachinJHIHMshowed him cables dated from the beginning of May 1994. MacEachin
testified that he had been briefed on these cables in May, but he did not read them until
September 30, at which time he believed "reading [them] sounds worse than it did [previously]."'
In particular, ■mUdescribed intercepted conversations that appeared to refer to an
aims shipment involving the United States'.' MacEachin requested thatf^^BBfcompose a
^
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Doug MacEachin, Sept. 6, 1994, at 29. (hereinafter
"MacEachin Subcommittee Dep.")
•Id.,
248
511
^
^
memo on his concerns so that MacEachin could forward it to Director Woolsey.
testified that he wrote a memo on October 3, and on October 5, revised the memo at
MacEachin's request to include additional infoimation from the Directorate of Operations.
MacEachin, in turn, forwarded the revised October S memo to the DCI. MacEachin
testified that he was particularly concerned aboupHm^jmemo because the information had
come from a variety of sources
There is no indication that during this chain of events any input was sought or obtained
from the General Counsel's office. The DDI recalls that at this time he, like others at CIA, were
highly distracted by the Ames affair, it was all he could do to move the short memo along.
Concerns. ^C?^'**
■outlined the following six concerns in his memo for the DCI:"*
1 . On September 2,HHiBfbriefed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Assistant
M
at 29-30
* Senate Sel^ Committee oitlntelliggye Interview o^BHIHII^^May 31, 1996
(heremafter "SSCIpBi^^Int")-iB^HS'°''°^ contains infoppation based on his own
conveijations as well as informatioQ^ulles) from cables sent by th^^HH^^HHHW and
* MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 94. MacEachin learned of the cables in May prior to
accompanying the DCI to a meeting with the Secretary of State during which they were
discussed in part
'" U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum by
249
Oct 5, 1994:
'"^
512
Secretary of State for European Affairs designate, regarding Bosnia. According to|
Holbrooke was interested in the number of shipments reaching Bosnia. As a matter of practice.
the CIA briefs all incoming Assistant Secretaries of State, and th&|B|H|(briefmg of
Ambassador Holbrooke was routine. MacEachin notes thapMBBj^xpressed no concern
about Holbrooke or the conversation contemporaneous with the September 2 briefing. Only in
hindsight dicWH^BKonsider his conversation worthy of reporting.'
When Director Woolsey read the memo, he had a considerable basis of knowledge that
his subordinates lacked. The DCI recalled that Richard Holbrooke, whom he had known tor
fifteen or twenty years, was
not only . . . showing up as Assistant Secretary [in September], but [he] was traveling to
the region and talking to people, as was entirely appropriate, about this issue . . .
Generally speaking, it seemed to me that he was being his typically very active self in
gening around Europe and talking to allies and Ulking to the Bosnians about, what can
we do to help? How can we change things? How we can affect things?'^
In other words, the DCI was not alarmed by reports that Holbrooke was interested in
" MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 99.
" Select Sub'onunittee Deposition of James Woolsey, Sept. 13, 1996, at 45, 47
(hereinafter "Woolsey Subcommittee Dep.").
250
513
details on shipments reaching Bosnia.
2. Tho^P^BHSWat Embassy Zagreb reported in a September 26 cable that
Ambassador Holbrooke supported a continued flow of arms and that Bosnian President
Izetbegovic had begun to talk of a six month delay in lifting the arms embargo in exchange for
the delivery of weapons from East German stocks. The^|HH^^Bfalso had reported that
the Deputy Chief of Mission said that the proposed relocation of the Bosnian Embassy from
Vienna to Split was designed in part to facilitate the flow of weapons to the Bosnians^
Although the following information was not mentioned specifically ii)flBH[ii^men"),
the September 26 cable also reported that the Deputy Chief of Mission told th^^|
that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke indicated the French and British would look the other way.
The E>CM expressed his own doubt about the allied reaction and said that an initial installment of
$50 million had been set aside by the U.S. Government for such a plan, for which Ambassador
Galbraith was to act as a "focal point." According to thqUHHH^^phe idea was pushed by
Galbraith." ,
In fact, Assiotant Secretary Holbrooke was advocating a plan in which the United States
would endorse the shipment of arms to Bosnia by third countries .<)
5Sl
rSept. 26, 1994 (hereinafter
514
The United States considered, but ultimately rejected the
Bosnian government proposal -- although the Administration did nut formally notify the Bosnian
Government of its decision. " The Bosnian Government proposal, even if implemented, would
not have constituted a covert action.'
3.
'* Department of State Cable. Vienna 8242, Sept. 19, 1994 (S).
" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, Sept. 27,
1 996, at 42 (hereinafter "Holbrooke Subcommittee Dep.").
"Id. at 44.
" The definitions of and situations that constitute covert action are discussed in Chapter
One, Section Five. In brief, the covert action rules do not apply when the activity is financed or
undertaken by a third country. Even if a U.S. official were to request that a third country take
such action, it would not constitute a coven action.
2S2
515
Both the third country optio.i and the option of direct U.S. covert assistance were
rejected. However, DCI Wooisey testified "although there clearly was some discussion of
possibilities of military assistance in which [the Chief of the Balkan Task Force] and [the DDI]
called to my attention early in October, it didn't strike me as anything more than exploring
possibilities."" The DCI further explained why he took a benign view of the discussions by State
Department personnel being brought to his attention:
[A]s a general proposition, it, in my judgment, would not have violated and does not
violate the law for an Assistant Secretary of State or an ambassador to say to a Croatian,
or for that matter a German or a Brit or a Frenchman, 'Hey, should we think a covert
action here to help the Bosnians?* That is the turf that I think — at least that turf and quite
possibly something rather more in the way of advocacy than that, that President Bush
protected with the *9 1 veto."
" Wooisey Subconunittee Dq). at 47.
'"Id. at 63.
253
^submitted a request for infonnation about whether a covert U.S. program was underway.
U.S. military commanders based in Naples with the Joint Task Force ("JTF") Provide Promise
had been "picking things up" that suggested such activity might be occurring.^j^fc^^
Concerns about covert activity were based on unsubstantiated reports by personnel
serving at the Naples facility.
517
^■Jjha^fhdvhed headquarters thai the
colonel was preparing to brief Admiral Smith, the NATO Commander for Southern Europe
(CINCSAEUR) on the issu^^^^^^^
CIA headquarters was confident that the report was not trae. In a reply cable on the same
day, CIA headquarters labeled the report a "misconception " The cable noted that any covert
action would require a finding, and that there was no such finding." The DCI testified that he
had attended this principals meeting which had occurred in mid-September. The President did
not attend, and no such discussion occurred.'*
6.1
P^However. the United States had no role in the
'* Woolsey Subconrniittee Dep. at 48-49.
518
The CIA Leaders/lip *s Response.
MacEachin, and others in DI knew of the April "no instructions" response and
at the time had been anxious to ensure that the issue be brought to the attention of the DCI for
clarification with National Security Adviser Lake and Secretary Cliristopher.
The April events did not appear to be a concern of the Director of Intelligence when the
new suspicions arose in the late sununer/early fall. ^flHlp for example, included no reference
to the April events in his memo to MacEachin. MacEachin, for his part, testified that he thought
the April exchange had been clarified on May 5 when the DCI and Talbon spoke and the matter
had been resolved. MacEachin "walked away" from the May 5 meeting "thinking the issue was
over.""' MacEachin offered: (
Now did we see arms shipments? Yes. But we had been seeing some shipments before
this. Not a huge volimie, but everybody was trying to sneak arms to every participant out
there...the fact that it seemed to increase after that (May 5 meeting) was something that
we watched, reported on routinely, measured, but I didn't associate that with this other
discussion.^'
For example, according to two memos
MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 24.
"Id.
256
519
In addition to Admiral Studeman and Mr. McEachin,
Under Secretary TamofTand representatives of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research attended these meetings." In testimony, however, when asked if he was aware that
in August and September "there were proposals very much on top of the table under discussion
for whether there should be a covert action to provide arms,'' Mr. McEachin replied: "No, I was
not." He testified that he did not attend anyjneetings on the subject, and that he did not recollect
any proposals." He continued:
Now, it's possible that a meeting or meetings were held to work up a proposal. Quite
frankly, it was more common for the proposals to be brought to us, not for us to go to
som^kidy and say, I'd like to jump into diis mud pool..! say all of that^ way of saying,
if there had been such meetings, «iiy the hell would I be there ... If thae were meetings .
. . I wasn't at them."
" U.S. State Department Memo to the Files, from Thomas Fingar, Augiist 26, 1994.
" U.S. State Department Memorandum to the Files, September 8, 1994.
*Id.
" MacEachin Subcommittee Dep. at 95.
" Id. Mr. MacEachin's sworn testimony contradicts the written record. Unlike the
Majority, however, the Minority does not assume that contradictions among testimony or
between testimony and the written record necessarily constitute false statements or require
257
520
Accordingly J^^I^^BBf^'^"^^'^^ ^^'^''^ liitting Mr. MacEachin cold.
As discussed above, MacEachin forwarded'fl^MBMmemo to DCI Woolsey. The DCI
sought to defuse the concerns and suspicions harbored by some at the CIA. First, the DCI was
aware of the context for some of the reports, namely that there was consideration at senior levels
of the U.S. Government of possible options to get arms to the Bosnian Muslims. For various
reasons, perhaps including protection of the "need to know"criteria, some CIA officials simply
were not aware that the U.S. Government was exploring options with regard to the arms
embargo. The DCI, however, testifled that when
the extent of Holbrooke's travels and efforts came to the anention of the [Chief of the
Balkan Task Force] in part through intelligence reports of what foreigners were saying
about meetings and travel and so forth[,] and this was one of the things that the [Chief of
the Balkan Task Force] raised with the [DDI] and then the [DDI] with me, which led to
the October 5th meetiixg,with Lake.. .It didn't strike me as anything more than exploring
possibilities.''
Second, the DCI, himself a lawyer, had sufficient understanding of the distinction
between diplomatic activity and covert action. He testified: ,
Well, I mean, it was not covert action to research. It is not even covert action to talk, if
. you a^^ diplomat, to foreign govemrnents about it. It is not even,^a5C05^g to the Bush
veto - protected by the Bush veto, it wouldn't even be covert action to urge covert action
on a foreign government, if you were an American diplomat. It might get into covert
action if you were concretely planning it and helping manage it.
But none of this traffic or the material inHjIIHMmemo seemed to suggest the latter .
. . By that time, in terms of not enforcing other bamers against other people, any other
people sending weapons into Bosnia, that had been decided by the passage of Nunn-
further investigation.
" Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 46-47.
238
521
Mitchell.. . . "
Director Woolsey also received legal advice from the CIA General Counsel, who had a
part in drafting the Bush veto message of the FY 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act," and
therefore had extensive knowledge of the law as it related to covert action. The DCI was
confident in the legal advice he was receiving. He did not expect, however, that the reports he
was receiving should contain legal analysis. "I don't know whether they were [legally
knowledgeable] or not; and in a way, it didn't matter ... I wouldn't want my subordinates
making fine-grain judgments about legalities in something like this and only giving me advic;
based on their own assessment of legal matters."^'
Third, the DCI attempted to get to the bottom of the reports by discussing them directly
with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. The DCI testified: "I imagine what triggered my getting in
touch with Dick [Holbrooke] was probably this report back from Galbraith essentially denying
[the allegation]," and "more than likely, I called him on a secure phone and said, 'Hey, Dick,
what's up? Galbraith said you had this meeting, and did covert action come up?""
Bosnian oHIdjils had raised with Assistant. Secretary Holbrooke and oth^^J.§.>AfficiaIs a
proposal that the United States encourage and support arms shipments by third countries to
Bosnia. Bosnian officials may have been optimistic that the new Assistant Secretary would
" Woolsey Subconunittee Dep. at 68-69.
^' See Chapter One, Section Five for a discussion of covert action.
^ Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at 62.
" Woolsey Subcommittee Dep. at S9.
259
522
entertain their proposal, and accordingly, their optimism and enthusiasm hkely contributed to
exaggerated ard inaccurate reports that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke agreed to the proposal or
was doing much more than he was in fact doing.
Finally, the DCI raised the issue with National Security Adviser Lake in an attempt to
clarify the situation and to separate rumor from fact. Director Woolsey and Mr. Lake discussed,
among other things, the report from thei
tiat the President had approved a covert action at a late August principals meeting
attended by the DCI. The DCI did not in fact attend that meeting, and Mr. Woolsey believcw. iIk
only way to discredit the rumor was to check it out with Mr. Lake. Woolsey testified that if there
was a "covert action that the CIA doesn't know about ... he knew as well as I did ... I had to
report on it to the oversight conunittees."" Mr. Lake confirmed that no covert was action
underway, but the Woolsey- Lake conversation set in motion further investigation of the
activities of U.S. officials with regard to the arms embargo.
Members of the NSC staff reviewed documents made available to them by the CIA.
Based on that revievKaadJb: CIA's ongoing concerns. National Securits^|Xdviser Lakej^^ferred
the matter to the White House where White House Counsel Abner Mikva reviewed the
documents and referred the matter to the lOB.^
The Directorate of Operation 's Concerns.
" Woolsey Subconunittee Dep. at 68.
" See Chapter Two, Section Nine for a discussion of the lOB.
260
523
The Directorate orOperations was preparing a list of its own concerns at the same time
tha|||HHS^^was drawing up his list. On September 13, 1 994,JfpBB|B|^| the
branch chief, wrote a memo to her superiors expressing her concern that a violation of United
States law may have occurred. The basis for her concern was thefJ^MBH^BIiFable
traffic. The branch chief harbored suspicions that wrongdoing might be occurring. The branch
chiefs memo also recommends that the General Counsel's office be asked to render a legal
opinion on the matter.*' There is no evidence to suggest that the General Counsel's office
responded to her concerns, and ihe DCI testified that he did not recall being informed about
either the reporting by th^^^fBH^br about the memo of the branch chief After the
[^^P^^emo was referred to the NSC, the branch chief briefed the NSC on her suspicions.
The reporting by th^iQH|^|^B|was examined and, together with the branch chiefs
suspicions, formed the basis for much of the subsequent lOB and Congressional investigations.
Issues of concern to the branch chief and th^MB^^^Hfe^included:
1 . i^ffiiording to the)pM^BiMy>n or about July 4, 1994, Ambaaudor Galbraitb ^
^^c^^iP^^^nf t>>e CIAHHm^BHMHHMif S2S0 million would be
enough to help the Bosnian Muslims. Ambassador Galbraith also asked if the Iranian arms deal
was w<;n known in Washington. The division chief told the Ambassador he was not aware of
(asjieputy Branch Qiief and subsequently Branch Chief, routinely
reviewed and responded IslhcMj^HHllHH^^c. ^|^9IM^
*' CIA Memorandum to
Anns Shipments, Sept. 13, 1994.
regarding Iranian
524
these issues."
Ambassador Galbraith did indeed discuss the issue of arms shipments to the Bosnian
Muslims withUBIIIBws well as with thaJ^^Ba\kan Task Force.'*' Ambassador
Galbraith testified that the discussion was "an informational inquiry on my part." " Ambassador
Galbraith was not asking the CIA to prepare a program to get arms to the Muslims. He was
simply drawing on the analysts' expertise to better inform himself about the Bosnians' military
situation. ^^^^1^
2. In an August 31, 1994 cable. th^HIBH|freported that General Wesley Clark
asked President Izetbegovic in late August 1994 whether an "Afghan solution" would be
acceptable to the Bosnians.** General Clark did meet with President Izetbegovic and other
Bosnian leaders during a late August orientation trip to Bosnia. The trip occurred in the wake of
Congress' adoption of separate amendments requiring a unilateral lifting of the embargo. Much
of General Clark's discussion focused on hypothetical discussions of lift and of alternatives to
lift.** In response to Bosnian leaders' requests for United States assistance. General Clark
. offered his oiraz opinion that clandestine support might be preferable to lifting lbs aims embargo,
*' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ambassador Peter Galbraith. Aug. 19, 1996, at 83-
84 (hereinafter "Galbraith Subcommittee Dep.").
Id. at 84.
■ijvug.31.
1994
** Select Subcommittee Deposition of General Wesley Clark, Sept. 4, 1996, at 13
(hereinafter "Clark Subcommittee Dep.").
262
525
but stressed that he was "not empowered to make a decision." ''
3. On September 7, 1994, the^^ggtgftjreponed that the Deputy Chief of Mission
told him that Holbrooke is "driving a plan to arm the Bosnian Muslims," and that S50 million
has been set aside for that purpose. Th^JBHBHB^also reported that the DCM informed
him that Holbrooke said that covert anning of the Bosnians would get serious consideration in
Washington, and that the plan would entail either having the United States military look the other
way while third countries provided arms or "doing an Afghanistan."^' ^^^^^
In fact, Holbrooke and other United States Government officials were discussing
hypotheticals on how the Bosnians might be armed. DCM Neitzke testified that the $50 million
referred to in the cable probably was the S50 million provided in the Biden amendment to get
arms to the Bosnians in the event of a lifting of the arms embargo." The DCM denies providing
^^flBHB^H^i^ i^^y reporu for which he is the alleged source, so it is possible that the
remarks attributed to the DCM were not made." C^^J^
4. On September 28, 1994, thq^fll^BHBlreported that Ambassador Galbraith,
preparing for a ineb.!2g with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, asked thtf^MBH^Bilfor
*' Transcript of Meeting, General Clark Trip report, Aug. 26-27, 1994; From
EUCOM/JTF LND, to LTG Wesley Clark and EG Edward Hanlon, USMC.
ept 7, 1994
Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ronald Neitzke, Aug. 7, 1996, at 193 (hereinafter
"Neitzke Subcommittee Dep.").
*• Neitzke Subcommittee Dep., at 174, 175, 177, 178, 181, 184, 185, 192-193.
263
526
information on Middle East funding for Bosnian anns.''
In fact reporting on anns to Bosnia was a "compelling" issue for the CIA.'- Therefore, it
would not be unusual for the Ambassador to ask theJ|HHIBMfor information on a subject
that the CIA had designated to be a priority. The request for information would coincide with
the discussions occurring within the U.S. Goverrmient on the feasibility of supporting the efforts
of third countries to supply arms to Bosnia. The question by the Ambassador and the reaction of
tho|^PipHHHlwillustrates their relationship. Clearly, the Ambassador respected the
expertise of thyBpWWHBfcuand relied on him for information on intelligence matters.^'
Nevertheless, the^lH^^IB^B/filed a report on the request. This reaction suggests an
extraordinary degree of mistrust on the part of theJH^HHH^ and implies that no question,
no matter how iruiocent, by the Ambassador was above the suspicion of th<
5. On September 29, thef^HH^^^^^reported (base
that a U.S. Government official met with Defense Minister Susak and made a $200-300
million offer of arms. The report caused "quite a stir" at headquarters." Ambassador Galbraith
was shown the cabl&that^Cs/flH^HI^Hplanned to send to headquuters on this isss;?. arid
acknowledged meeting with Defense Minister Susak and discussing several hypotheticals, but
Sept. 28, 1994.
" See Select Subconmiinee Deposition of Janet Andres, SepL 30, 1996^t 54-55 opini^ig
that if an ambassador discussed such a closed.s)ibject as covert action with hi^^VlflHBHft it
was indicative of the ambassador's tnist^
I
527
none that involved the United States supplying amis. Ambassador Galbraith objected to the
cable being sent because it did not reflect actual events. When the|IHBBBiy(eplied that
he was sending the cable regardless. Ambassador Galbraith appended a message to the
September 30 cable saying that "at no time was such a deal discussed."" Upon reading the
cable and the appended message, DC! Woolsey took the view that:
when theMHH^Bjsent the report in, he appended the Ambassador's comment,
which irtReproper Way to do it. And on that exchange, as I have said subsequently, I --
at headquarters, we believed the Ambassador, not the [allegation] ... We did not
disseminate this because .we didn't think it was good intelligence based on what Galbraith
said. In this case, we were told by one of the two American participants in thejneeting
that^vert action had not come up and so [the allegation] wasn't true. So th^^l^fl^
4^|Wl think, quite appropriately appended the Ambassador's comment. Befowmy
levcTrthe^ locked at it back at Headquarters and they determined ... it was not in fact
true.''
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also recalls discussing hypotheticals with Defense Minister Susak.
Mr. Holbrooke further testified that he personally supported the idea of third countries supplying
arms, but such a proposal was not ultimately adopted by the U.S. Government. "
6.
** Woolsey Subcommittee Dq>. at 54, 55, 56.
" Harrington InL at 4; Holbrooke Subconunittee Dep.at 42-44.
Sept. 26, 1994
265
528
In fact, Bosnian officials had proposed "a deal" in which the Bosnians would put a
moratorium on their calls for a lifting of the amis embargo in exchange for U.S. support and/or
encouragement of third country efforts to supply amis to the Bosnians. Assistant Secretary
Holbrooke testified that specific numbeis were not discussed and no deal was ever reached.
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said that aiier Prime Minister Silajdzic asked the United States to
support Bosnia's appeal to third countries for arms shipments, "I felt it was worth an affirmative
response, so I began to staff it out with ray Deputy Robert Frasure, and other people. And as
you know, it was decided not to proceed. My job was to staff out this proposal and my
involvement in this was fiilly discussed with my colleagues on the seventh floor."^
7.;
f Oct 7, 1994,
*° SSCI Holbrooke Hearing at 58-59.
266
529
8. In early October. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke approached the DCI asking for
guidance from the CIA's lawyers on what constitutes a covert action. The DCI told Holbrooke
to speak to his own lawyers. State Department lawyers prepared a memo to Secretary
Christopher regarding hypotheticals on covert action. Although the memo considered only
hypotheticals, the conclusions strongly indicated to Assistant Secretary Holbrooke that
requesting that a third country supply arms was not a covert action.
According to the DCI. on October 7. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke called to say that "he
was ready to get together to with my lawyers to discuss the legal issue that he and I had been
talking about, and I said that my general counsel had said that Mr. Ed Cummings in the legal
advisor's office in the State Department knew the area as well as anyone in the U.S. Government.
Ambassador Holbrooke said fine, he would talk to Mr. Cummings.'"^ The DCI further testified
that Mr. Holbrooke had told him that "the Secretary of State was entirely comfortable with, what
they, that is Holbro*^ was doing.*** .. X .. i:
9. In November, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke asked Ambassador Galbraith whether he
*' Harrington Int at 4.
*' Holbrooke Subcommittee Dcp. at 24.
" Hearing on 1J.S. Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments into Rnjmia Rgfow tlw
Senate Select Suhcnmmittee on Intelligmrr. 104th Cong., 16-17 (19%) (statement of James
Woolscy).
Id. at 17.
267
530
n
who reported it by
could "trust hi^jM^i^^'l The DCM reported this to thei
cable to Washington. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told the lOB that he had asked Ambassador
Galbraith this question because he had heard rumors of "active reporting of diplomatic
communications" by theM^BBH^Bi lOB Chairman Harrington thought Assistant Secretary
Holbrooke got this impression fix)m his conversations with the DCI. In response to a question as
to whether he had told a Croatian official that the^|PBi|^H|could not be trusted. Assistant
Secretary Holbrooke responded: "You have got to be kidding...! don't know th^^f^^BI^HIB /
I never would say such a thing to ? foreign official ever in any country.'
10. i
•^
lln fact. President Clinton and President Tudjman did meet on
September 26, 1994. However, the issue of covert arms was not raised. "
11. In the same meeting between General Clark and President Izetbegovic referred to in
/j^B^milHHHmiHV'resident Izetbegovic told General Clark about two thousand
tons of wes^ns destiried-ftr Bosnia were stockpiled in Maribor, SloveaiB»The v/eapca^wtK
held up when fighting broke out between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. President
Izetbegovic requested U.S. intervention with the Slovenes to have the weapons released. General
Claik asked if two thousand tons was enough to sustain the Bosnian Muslims to which President
Izetbegovic replied "no." General Clark took the request back to General Shalikashvili and heard
Holbrooke Subconmiittee Dep. at 24.
Memcon of Sept. 26, 1994 meeting between President Judjman and Uie President
as inaccurate.]
This is one of many examples in which information provided b
268
*ii
I
531
no more about it until Bosnian General Delic renewed the request in November 1994. To this
day, Clark has no idea of the status of the weapons, but does not believe the U.S. facilitated the
release of the weapons.*'
While United States officials - from the staff level to the most senior level - engaged in
hypothetical discussions about lifting the embargo and/or providing arms to the Muslims, no
United States assistance was provided. The Minority finds no evidence that United States
officials engaged in a covert action to provide amis to Bosnia. In addition, no United States
officials knowingly took any a^rion to facilitate the transshipment of arms to Bosnia. Even if
United States officials had taken such action to facilitate the transshipment of arms, it would not
have constituted a covert action.
" Clark Subcommittee Dep. at 29-34.
269
532
Chapter Two
Section Nine
THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
The White House Chief Counsel convened an investigation of the IntelligenceOversight
Board to review the activities of Ambassador Galbraith, Special Envoy Reaman and Assistant
Secretary Holbrooke in the spring of 1994 and again in the fail of 1994. The Intelligence
Oversight Board generally interviewed the same individuals as the Select Subcommittee. The
lOB concluded that no probable cause exists to refer the matters under investigation to the
Department of Justice, and the Minority agrees with the conclusion. The Minority also
concludes that the CIA suspicions were unfoimded, and that better communications between the
CIA, the National Security Council and the Department of State could have obviated the need for
an lOB investigation.
Purpose of the Intelligence Oversight Board.
The Intelligence Oversight Board ("lOB") was created in 1976 and the current Board was
constituted in 1993 under Executive Order 12863. The lOB is charged with preparing reports
specifically for the President "of intelligence activities that the lOB believes may be imlawful or
contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive."' The Board is directed to refer rqwrts to
the Attorney General if it believes that wrongdoing may have occurred. The Board is designed
to help the President to ensure that highly sensitive intelligence activities are conducted in
compliance with the law. Executive order, and Presidential directive, while avoiding the referral
' E.O. 12863. 58 F.R. 48441 (1993).
271
533
of unfounded suspicions of illegality to the Department of Justice.'
The lOB has never released any report prepared for the President to the public. It did
however, prepare a report specifically for release to the public relating to intelligence activities in
Guatemala. No parallel can be drawn between the procedures on the Guatemala investigation
and the Bosnia investigation. Before it began its investigation of the Guatemala case, the lOB
committed to the U.S. citizen whose family was involved in the matter that findings would be
made public, and it so informed those who were being interviewed in the course of the
investigation.
The lOB is designed to provide the President with an independent review of intelligence
activities and concerns.
The lOB's work on behalf of the President is ordinarily conducted in confidence and
shared only with the President and his immediate senior advisors. As a matter of comity,
however, this Administration has sought to accommodate Congressional interest in the
work of the lOB.^
Anthony Harrington, the Chairman of the lOB, briefed staff and offered to brief Members of the
Select Subcommittee on its mandate and fmdings. The lOB also made available to the Select
..■a: ►i.i.
Subcommittee a list of individuals who, with very few exceptions, were the same individuals
interviewed by the Select Subconunittee.
' The Intelligence Oversight Board fact sheet describes in detail what the lOB was
designed to accomplish.
' Letter fi-om White House Counsel Jack Quinn to Rep. Lee H. Hamilton of Aug. 14,
1996. at 2.
272
534
Intelligence Oversight Board Investigation,
At the request of former White House Counsel Abner J. Mikva, the lOB investigated
concerns raised by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") that United States officials may have
been involved in a covert action to send arms shipments to Bosnia without first obtaining the
legally required Presidential finding. The Select Subcommittee has oeen briefed by the lOB on
its investigation and has reviewed the list of persons interviewed by the lOB. In addition, the
Select Subcommittee has reviewed many of the documents that were reviewed by the lOB.
The lOB's mandate was limited. The main purpose of the lOB investigation was to
determine whether reasonable cause existed to refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice
for further investigation. The lOB determined and reported to the President that such cause did
not exist. Since the lOB found no reasonable cause for referral to the Justice Department, there
was no need for public disclosure and the matter was closed. The lOB considered three sets of
events for purposes of determining whether a covert action occurred. First, the lOB examined
whether Ambassador Galbraith was directly involved in facilitating the movement of a particular
convoy suspected of carryjug arms to Bosnia.* Second, the lOB investigated whether ,.i. .
Ambassador Redman had provided direct assistance to the Bosnians through comments he made
to President Tudjman at the April 29, 1994 meeting.' Finally, the lOB was to examine whether
Ambassador Galbraith and/or Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke made an offer of arms to
the Bosnian Government
The lOB found no evidence to suggest that U.S. officials had engaged in covert activities.
* Se& Chapter Two, Section One for a detailed discussion of these events.
' Special Envoy Redman's involvement with the May 1994 convoy is discussed in
Chapter Two, Section Four.
273
535
lOB Chairman Anthony Harrington also reported that the lOB found that U.S. officials did
nothing to request knowingly or otherwise facilitate the shipment of arms to the Bosnian
Muslims during the time that the international arms e.-nbargo was in effect. As discussed in
detail in Section Five of Chapter One, even if such facilitation had occurred, it would not have
constituted a covert action.
The lOB concluded that during the late summer and early fall of 1 994, the Administration
was conducting a review of the options available to arm the Bosnians. Specifically, Assistant
Secretary Richard Holbrooke had advocated a plan in which the United States would ask third
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to supply arms to the Bosnians. He and other
United States Government ofBcials solicited Croatian and Bosnian opinions on "what it would
take" to carry out such a plan. The plan ultimately did not go forward because of objections
from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
Administration lawyers concluded that even if a plan in which the United States requested others
to supply arms did go forward, it would not have constituted covert action if the U.S. was not
directly inVmed in providing th^se arms. jlr_ . ^
The lOB subsequently examined reports that U.S. officials helped to facilitate the transfer
issiles to Bosnia. The lOB concluded that there was no indication that Ambassador
Galbnith pressed the Croatian Government into allowing the missiles into Bosnia.
The Select Subcommittee's mandate covers a much wider set of issues than that of the
lOB. Accordingly, the Select Subcommittee's investigation is more exhaustive. Like the lOB,
however, the Minority finds no reason to recommend further investigation by the Department of
Justice or for that matter, any other body.
274
536
Chapter Three
Section One
IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA 1991-1996
The Minority considers the assertion that the "no instructions" response opened the door
for Iran to march into Bosnia and Croatia to be insupportable. The idea that the Iranian presence
in Bosnia depends on two five minute discussions cannot be sustained under even the most
intense scrutiny. Bosnia is a Muslim country. Iran was vocal in its support of Bosnia.
Regardless of whether Ambassador Galbraith responded that he has no instructions, that tne U.S.
objects to the arms embargo against third countries, or that the U.S. supports third country
shipments, Iran and other Islamic terrorist states would have access to Bosnia. What is
indisputable is that the Iranian presence today is a fraction of what it was in the spring of 1994.
The Select Subcommittee investigated the implications of the Iranian arms transfers for
the safety of United States troops, relations with United States allies and U.S. efforts to isolate
Iran. More specifically, the Select Subcommittee considered whether the United States reply of
"no instructions" to Croatia in April 1994, and Croatia's acceptance of covert arms shipments
from Iran and other Islamic countries for transport to the Bosnian Muslims, gave Iran a
"foothold" in Europe.' Indeed, Iran maintains a diplomatic presence in and has economic ties to
' See James Risen, Administration r)efend.s its OK f>f Rnsnia Arms, Los AngeleS Times,
Apr. 6, 1996, at Al (House International Relations Chairman Benjamin Oilman (R-NY) issued a
statement that the Clinton policy has "given a terrorist regime a foothold in the Balkans"). See
also, James Risen, Gingrich Critici/es Clinton Ovct Bosnia, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 11, 1996,
at A 12, (in which House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) said, "to wink and nod at Iran getting a
foothold in Europe is extraordinarily dangerous.").
275
537
many other counlries in Europe." It strains credulity to suggest this single diplomatic exchange
paved the way for Iran to establish a presence in Europe, especially in light of the fact that
intelligence reports suggest Iran had contact with the Bosnian Muslim community as part of its
general foreign policy since 1979 and, after the war began in 1991, became involved actively in
the region.' Thus, the decision among Iran, Croatia and Bosnia to re-open, in earnest, the arms
pipeline in 1994 was made in the wake of numerous prior decisions that had established Iran's
extensive network of activity and influence in the region. After 1994, observers noted an
increase in the number of Iranians in the region, but there is no evidence that would link the
increased Iranian presence with the arms pipeline.* Since the Dayton Accord was signed in
^/^([Briefing for Select Subcommittee staff, Sept. 1 1, 1996, at 2 (hereinafter^
Briefing'V^ ' ~"
' DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
I The report was transmitted to the Select Subcommittee on September
5, 1996, as follow-up4«rsrbriefing provided to the Select Subcommittee staff on August 21,
1996; See also, James Risen and Doyle McManus, I JS Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms,
Avoid Iran, Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1996, at Al, A6 (hereinafter "US Had Options");
John Pomfret and Dir'id Ottaway, US Allies Fed Pipeline of Covert Arms to Rnsaira, V^hington
Post, May 12, 1996, at Al; U.S. Department of State, Ba.sic Chronology of the Bosnia Arms
Fmhargn - Iran Connection (hereinafter "DOS Basic Chronology"). Many press reports and the
Department of State Chronology trace Iranian involvement in the region to 199J, altfiough little
infoimation on the extent oflran's activities during this year is available.
* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, Sept. 5, 1996, at 43 (hereinafter
"Talbott Subcommittee Dep."). Representative Ha-milton asked Talbott if the no instructions
policy resulted in an Iranian foothold in Bosnia. Talbott replied that "their foot was already in the
door, the Iranians had been active since 1991, had been present in Bosnia since 1991." See also
Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Tamoff, Sept. 13, 1996, at 20. Mr. Tamoff was asked
if the Iranian presence increased after the arms shipments in 1994 began. Mr. Tamoff replied "It
did not significantly increase associated with the shipment There was no evidence that there
was significant increase in Iranians directly linked to the flow of arms." See also US Had
Option.s in which a United States official commented, "The Iranians have done their best to
276
538
December 1995, the number of Iranians in the region has dropped to the lowest level since 1991.
In Bosnia, Iran used a blueprint typical of its operations in other countries with a Muslim
population.' This blueprint included arms shipments and military support, humanitarian relief,
and the establishment of religious and cultural centers. The Iranians also bolstered their presence
in the region through diplomatic and intelligence efforts.
Origins of Iranian Military Involvement.
Iran offered Bosnian President Izetbegovic economic aid as early as 1991. By 1992, the
first press reports of Bosnian Serb attacks on the government's Muslim forces reached Iran. The
Iranian government harshly criticized the Serbs' actions and ceased exporting oil to Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro).' In August 1992, Iran deployed a fact-finding delegation to Bosnia to
investigate the Muslims' condition.' While in Bosnia, the delegation met with senior Bosnian
and Croatian clerics and political leaders, as well as Bosnian Muslim refugees.' The trip was
reported widely in the Iranian press and galvanized strong public sentiment in favor of Iranian
burrow into Bosnia's military and intelligence services. That probably would have happened
anyway, without the arms pipeline. The arms pipeline didn't establish an Iranian beachhead in
Bosnia. The beachhead was already there."
'^'
Briefing, Sept. 11, 19%.
' Defense Intelligence Agency]
16, 1996 (hereinafter^^
277
539
inten'ention and military support for the besieged Muslim population.'
►5^
Iran's Bosnian policy also included eflbrts to gamer support for multilateral intei » million
to aid Muslims among the member-states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference ("OIC").
When support for formal, overt action was not quickly forthcoming, and the European and U.N.
nations confirmed their intent to uphold the embargo, Iran decided to implement its policy
unilaterally. Thus, Iran's intention to become more heavily involved in the region was firmly
fixed more than two years prior to the April 1994 meetings between Ambassador Galbraith and
U.S. Special Envoy Redman, and Croatian President Tudjman.
••* - • - JISL . 2:
Military Arms.
'" Defense Intelligence Report,
Aug. 22. 199S, at 2 (hereinafier^M||
540
Iran began supplying clandestine military assistance to the region in 1991 .'■ Following
the Bosnian declaration of independence in early 1992, amis shipments from several Islamic
sources, including Iran, flowed into Bosnia."/
By September 1992,Iiranian arms shipments were flying into Croatia. In exchange fc
Croatia allowing Iran to use its airfields, Iran provided Croatia with up to thirty percent of every
arms shipment. On September 6, 1992, western and Croatian press reported that United Nations
authorities discovered arms aboard an Iranian Boeing 747 that had landed in Zagreb.' This
report confirmed suspicions that Iran had been delivering arms to Bosnian Muslim forces via
CroatiaJ
w-a:
► 2; i-Ci
" US Had Options at Al, which reporU that Iran sent shipments of arms to the
government of Bosnia beginning in 1991. See_alsQ DOS Basic Chronology (noting that small
arms were smuggled into Croatia beginning September 1 99 1 ).
" DOS Basic Chronology.
" Douglas Jehl, Iranian RfTort to Send Bosnia Anns JLcporlal. Los Angeles Times, Sept.
10. 1992,atAl,A6.
279
541
Despite the publicity generated by the illegal arms shipment, a United States demarche to Croatia
and a United Nations Committee investigation into the matter, Iran was committed to assisting
the Bosnian Muslims.'
In addition to air cargo dejiveries, Iran also attempted to send weapons to Croatia by sea.
In January 1993 in the last days of the Bush Administration, the Egyptian-registered cargo ship
Eco Sherief, was bound for Croatia laden with arms and ammunition." After being challenged
by ships enforcing the UN arms embargo, the Sherief was ordered to unload its cargo in Turkey.
The search of its freight revealed small arms from Iranryi
at 2.
^^■■■■W^ec. 31. 1992.
- Defense Intelligence Digest Weekend Edition, "Iraq: Situation Report," Jan. 17, 1993,
^ Id. Se&alsQ Growing Military Involvement at 2.
280
542
When fighting erupted between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims in May 1993, Croatia
closed the arms pipeline Iran had used to transport weapons through Zagreb to Bosnia
n Some arms did trickle through, but, for the next
year, Iran focused on providing the Muslims with military training rather than delivering military
equipment. At no time, howev<;r, did Iran abandon its objectives in Bosnia.
The March 1994 Federation Agreement between the Croats and Muslims established a
tentative peace between the two parties and opened the way for renewed Iranian efforts to
transport weapons to Bosnia. In April 1994, Iran, Croatia and Bosnia finalized discussions
regarding the reopening of the Croatian arms pipeline, once again allowing Croatia thirty percent
of the arms shipped." Iran's first delivery of weapons occurred in May and continued with
varying frequency until January 1996. During this time, Iran reportedly shippecj
J. i-Jt it
'* Defense Intelligence Report,
Wjan. 21, 1993. at 3.75^^
543
fl^^Bpf anns to Bosnia through the pipeline- two-thirds of Bosnia's military hardware.'*
Although Iran was the largest supplier of weapons, other countries such as Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Malaysia also smuggled weapons to the Bosnian Government.''' '
Military Personnel Deployment
Concurrent with Iran's early weapons and humanitarian shipments, Iran ordered senior
members of its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), the elite military force used to
advance militant Islam, to travel to Bosnia to survey the military needs of the Government. '°/j^HB
^ IRGC trainers taught the Muslims how to use anti-
tank missiles and helped with troop logistics and weapons factories." The IRGC also
-iX.
'* Rupert Comwell, Clinton Faces Flack over Rnsnia Arms Trade, The Independent, May
14. 1996. at 8.
riefing.
" Doyle McManus and James Risen, US Didn't Foresee Iran's Wider Rnle in Ro.snia
Conflict, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al (hereinafter "Iran's Wider KoXtT) .
282
544
incorporated religious indoctrination into the military training. '^^^'^1^
'^"/iran used this leverage to urge tfie Hizballah to send foreign fighters to the region as
members of dtt:Mujahideen. The effort was successful and a force of thous<qada^wn &om
283
545
several pro-Iranian groups and other Islamic Opposition movements assembled in Bosnia.'"' The
Mujahideen operated in small, cohesive units offering both their infantr>' skills and military
training.
Iran's military efforts and contributions to the Bosnian Muslims were notable.
Humanitarian Aid.
Iran provided impressive amounts of humanitarian aid directly to Bosnia beginning in
1992.
•■ S. . !i.
*" Alfred Prados, et al, Rnsnia-Hercegnvina: Foreign Islamic Fighters ("Mujahideen"),
CRS Report 95-1203F, Jan. 29, 1996, at 3 (hereinafter "Prados"). The numbers for membership
of the Mujahideen vary - a UN source estimated 1,000 members in October, 1995, while
December news stories quoting European and UN officials estimated their strength at 2,000-
4,000. Id.
284
546
In addition to the arms pipeline and shipping channels, Iran used private, quasi-legitimate
humanitarian aid organizations to provide cover tor arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims.
The Third World Relief Agency, Merhamet and the Iranian-based humanitarian aid organization
- the Red Crescent Society - were among those Iran utilized to funnel weapons and arms
procurement funds to the Bosnian Muslims/' These organizations had offices throughout
Croatia and Bosnia from which they operated legitimate civilian aid projects including food and
clothing delivery, opening clinics, and rebuilding structures and roads. These organizations also
supplied the Bosnian Anny with funds and weaponSy
" MID Special Report J|
. ^JfJuly 11,1995. SetiilsQ John
Pomfret, How Bosnia's Muslim.s Dodged Arms Fmhargn; Relief Agency Brokered Aid from
Nations. Radical Groups, The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1996 at Al (hereinafter "Pomfret").
The Third World Relief Agency received donations from many Muslim governments and radical
Islamic movements^ sigmficant portion of which was used to purchase weapons illegally foi the
Bosnian Army. Id. ,
285
547
Diplomatic Activities.
Iran has continually spearheaded diplomatic efforts to encourage the United Nations and
the OIC to become more actively involved in providing support to the Bosnian Muslims. On
several occasions, Iran urged the United Nations to exempt Bosnia from the arms embargo, send
troops to the region, enforce more vigorously the no-fly zone and accept Iran's offer to contribute
10,000 troops to UNPROFOR.'" Iran also worked within the OIC urging member states to take
action beyond the confines of those mandated by the United Nations Security Council ai.u lO
work to persuade the United Nations to approve a military force to mtervene in Bosnia.'" In
December 1992, Iran was instrumental in achieving an OIC declaration calling for a lifting of the
arms embargo." In December 1994, the OIC adopted a resolution stating "it is neither legally or
morally permissible" that the embargo be applied to Bosnia and Hercegovina." In June 1995,
Iran campaigned within the OIC for a resolution declaring the UN amis embargo as "illegal" and
pledging to provide additional support. By September 1995, Iran was among the OIC countries
which estab-?*hed the Assistance^Mobilization Group ("AMG"). The AMC'sjCi-ission was to -
supply military, economic, legal and other aid to the Bosnian Government." Additionally, Iran
lobbied officials firom the newly declared territories and the former Yugoslavia to take steps to
" Prados at 3
" Id. at 2.
" DIA Cabled
Feb. 27, 1996.
286
end the Bosnian Serb aggression. 'V
548
Intelligence Activities.
m
287
549
Economic Support Activities.
One of President Izetbegovic's first trips abroad after being elected in 1992 was to Iran.
Izetbegovic went to Iran seeking economic aid and other assistance for Bosnia's failing
economy.*" In November 1992, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei bestowed a S3.3 million
contribution to the Bosnian government," and in 1994, Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar
Valayatia, delivered a check for 'Ii million to Sarajevo with promises of more to come."
Throughout 1994 and 1995, Bosnia and Iran signed a series of economic agreements and
announced plans for expanded economic ties." Iran worked closely with Bosnia to promote
economic cooperation and to examine potential trade and commercial relationships.
Iranian Influence Following the Dayton Agreement
The level of military arms and personnel, humanitarian relief, diplomatic and intelligence
activity and econoi*-.it support provided or promised by Iran to Bosnia prior to Mail, i994.
*° PomfretatAl. Sec-also Kitty McKinsey. Bosnia Ff,ars it will be SlicBd up hy Croatia
and Serbia, The Ottawa Citizen, at 85.
" PomfretatAl.
" Iran's Wider Role.
"Id.
•* DIA Document: Executive Highlights, Dec. 7, 1995.
28S
550
leaves no doubt that Iran had established a foothold in Bosnia soon after the war began.
By the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, Iran had made vast
contributions to the Bosnian Muslims./l
Iran's supply of arms won a praise from Bosnian President Izetbegovic for assisting the Muslims
when other nations refused/ 1^|
Throughout the Bosnian conflict, the United States has been concerned about the Iranian
presence in and relationship with Bosnia. Continued war and instability offered Iran an
opportunity to exert its influence. According to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,
however, the only way to get the Iranians out was through the peace process." Consequently, the
U.S. insisted on the inclusion of a provision in the Dayton Peace Agreement that required the
removal of "foreign forces" from the region before implementation of the U.S. equip and train
program." The promise ofcin equip and train program for Bosnia gaveJa; U.S. leverag^o insist
1996
^^m^
Intelligence Digest,
Vpr. 3,
" Response to House International Relations Committee request for information.
Estimated Number of Iraiijansjn Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. \994rl9D6
*' Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 42.
" Sec Dayton Peace Agreement Article III of the Annex on Military Aspects, paragraph
one that states "All Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this Annex enters into force
289
551
upon the departure of the Iranians.
Had the United States responded negatively to the Tudjman request in April 1994. the
Croatians were unlikely to allow weapons to transit Croatia. The war might have dragged on
even longer, enabling the Iranians to establish themselves more firmly in Bosnia, and depriving
the United States of leverage with which to mitigate the Iranian's influence. Conversely, if the
United States had responded positively to the Croatian request, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims
would likely have perceived a U.S. endorsement of Iran's activities in the region.
Since the spring of 1996, U.S. officials have reported a significant reduction in foreign
forces. Strobe Talbott characterizes their presence today as "minimal in the extreme and
acceptable under the terms of the Dayton accords, which are quite stringent with regard to
obligating the Bosnian Government to get rid of all but a traditional diplomatic presence.""
Although some press reports have described a continuing presence of Iranians in the region and a
lingering Mujahideen influence in Bosnia,™ National Security Advisor Anthony Lake advised the
Select Subcommittee that the Bosnians have a "perfect track record" of expelling Iranians who
which are not local origin, whether or not they are legally and militarily subordinated to the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Republika
Srpska, shall be withdrawn together with their equipment from the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina within thirty days." Paragraph two reads, in part, "all foreign Forces, including
individual advisors, freedom fighters, train... s, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and
other States, shall be withdrawn fix»m the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; see.also Prados at
5.
*• Talbott Subcommittee Dep. at 44.
^ Philip Smucker, Bosnia TerTori7.ed by Foreign Soldiers Who Aided Muslims.
Washington Times, Aug. 8, 1996, at A 13; Majority Report at 182.
290
552
have slipped back into Bosnia in violation of the Dayton Peace Accords.'' Deputy Assistant
Director of the National Security Council Samuel Berger confirmed that a vigorous dialogue
between the United States and Bosnia has been maintained to insure Bosnia's adherence to the
Foreign Forces provision of the Dayton Accords. '■]
Iranian Failure to Achieve its Objectives in Bosnia.
In conclusion, Iran has achieved only limited objectives in Bosnia, including establishing
a small diplomatic and cultural presence. Although Iran remained a friend of Bosnia when many
other countries refused to aid the Bosnian Muslim cause, Iran has realized less than it hoped to
show for its efforts. The arms shipments provided to the Bosnians and Croatians came primarily
from outdated stockpiles and Iran paid for the cargo costs without receiving funds in return. The
majority of the economic deals were concluded with Bosnia and Croatia as a symbol of solidarity
and have littk?a:nancial value. With the recent Administration decisions to fisnsj^e countries
with heavy investments in Iran, it may be even less likely that Croatia and Bosnia will enter into
meaningful economic programs with Iran. Even among the Islamic countries, Iran was not the
'' Select Subcommittee Interview of Anthony Lake, Sept. 26, 1996, at 4 (hereinafter
"Lake Subcommittee Int.").
'^ Select Subcommittee Interview of Samuel Berger, Sept. 25, 1996, at 6.
553
primary source of all aid to the Bosnian Muslims and its calls for more activist approaches to the
conflict went unheeded by the majority of the Islamic states.
Iran had little hope of success within Bosnia for the establishment of a fundamentalist
Islamic state. An October 1994 intelligence report analyzed this concern and found it highly
unlikely that the Bosnians, who are not the same sect as the Iranians, would succumb to
fundamental Islam. The report explained that the term "Muslim" was more of an ethnic rather
than religious denominator in the former Yugoslavia and that most "Muslims" generally were
unaware of their religious heritage because two generations had grown up without any religious
education."
Western journalists, the report noted, were concentrated in Sarajevo where it was most
likely that they would see Muslims practicing their religion and therefore, it was reported that
Islam was spreading throughout the country." The Serbs also were aware of European concerns
about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and they continued to make and exploit fears of
Islam in hopes of diminishing support for the Bosnian Muslims.'* The Iranians were largely
unsuccessful in conMBtting the primarily secular Bosnian Muslims to fundamentaliat practice. It
is also important to note that there was not a single faction within the Bosnian government who
aligned themselves with the Iranians in a desire to prolong the Bosnian conflict in order for Iran
" INR Report to the Assistant Secretary, Oct. 31, 1994 (S).
"Id.
'*Id.
292
554
to spread its influence beyond the region." As former U.S. Special Envoy to the Former
Yugoslavia Reginald Bartholemew stated: "There is no way that the Muslims could create a
fundamentalist state ... in the Balkans.""
" INR Morning Briefing for the Secretary of State, Sept: 23, 1995 (TS U G MF NC
ORCOK)
" Department of State Cable, Apr. 2, 1993 (comments by Reginald Bartholemew).
293
555
Chapter Three
Section Two
THE THREA T OF TERRORISM TO EMBASSY ZAGREB PERSONNEL
The threat of terrorism was a serious concern in Bosnia and Croatia throughout the war.
The Minority does not believe that any attempt should be made to minimize the threat.
However, the terrorist threat was probably no greater than the threat against American civilian,
military and intelligence personnel in Athens, London, or in any capital which has been the target
of internationally known terrorist groups. No additional terrorists entered Bosnia or Croatia as a
result of the "no instructions" response. People with extreme anti- American views already were
in the two countries and will remain so. The Minority believes that the United States must be
vigilant against terrorism — as was the case in Zagreb and in Sarajevo — but the threat of
terrorism cannot prevent the United States from pursuing its interests in Zagreb, Sarajevo or
anywhere else.
The potential consequences of the April 1994 "no instructions" response that caused the
gravest conc^gis to the Administration were the reaction of our allies and the rj^ of the Iranians.
With respect to the latter, each of the principal decision makers in the formulation of the "no
instructions" response was well aware that Iran would be a major supplier of arms if the
Government of Croatia agreed to serve as a transshipment point.'
The involvement of the Iranians in supplying arms could improve their access to
government leaders in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and enhance their importance to such
' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Assistant Secretary of State Peter Tamoff, Sept. 13,
1996, at 19 (hereinafter 'Tamoff Subcommittee Dep.").
294
556
leaders. Clearly, these were significant downsides to the "no instructions" response which had to
be weighed against the critical need of allowing the transshipment of arms for Bosnians in a
manner that minimized the potential for allied objections.
The involvement of the Iranians posed another, and equally important, potential problem.
The presence of Iranians inevitably raised the specter of terrorism. The Administration, like each
previous Administration, considered Iran to be the "single most dangerous [state] in terms of its
support for international terrorism."" Thus, any action such as providing U.S. ground troops as
part of the IFOR force or, in the case of the "no instructions" response, any inaction that might
contribute to an increased Iranian presence in proximity to people and property of the United
States had to be taken with the utmost caution.' As described in the following section, the threat
of Iranian terrorism has declined substantially since 1994. There are other sources of terrorist
threats in the region besides Iran. The Minority believes that all threats of terrorism in the region
must be taken seriously and guarded against vigilantly.
In order to evaluate whether the Administration exercised the requisite degree of care, a
distinction must be drawn between the extent to which the "no instructions" response resulted in
an increase in the flow of Iranian arms to Bosnia and Croatia and'or an increase in the presence
of Iranians in Bosnia and Croatia. The furst issue is a military and political question; Lc, will the
^ Select Subconrmiittee Deposition of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Sept.5,
1996, at 51 (hereinafter 'Talbott Subcommittee Dep.").
' See Chapter Three, Section Three for a discussion of the United States commitment of
troops to the IFOR force and the steps taken by the United States to mitigate any terrorist threat
to the Aimed Forces before they were deployed to Bosnia in December 1995.
295
557
arms help the Bosnian Muslims to survive and will the arms flows cause a serious disruption
with our allies? The second issue is a secunty quescion; i.e., will more Iranians with terrorist
inclinations enter Bosnia and Croatia?/)
Iranian Terrorist Presence in Bosnia.
: table was included in
a memorandum transmitted to the Select Subcommittee by the ClAln response to ar^uQS^for
information on Pakistan's arms sales to Bosnia from June 1993 to December 1996.^
* DCI Interagency Balkan Task For
558
Iranian Terrorist Presence in Croatia.
'ClATable.Aug. 19, 1996.
297
559
298
560
561
300
562
563
1993 Terrorist Incident.
564
1995 Terrorist Threat.
According to Inlelligence Research speciali<;ts wiih the Office of Intelligence and Threat
Analysis at the Department of State, security threats increased at Embassy Zagreb in 1995." The
threats came from many sources, the Iranians in general and HAMAS and Hezbollah in
particular, but also involved surveillance of the Ambassador by the Egyptian organization al-
Gama' at al-lslamiyya." '
Unlike the 1993 incident, the 1995 incidents were not "operational," but the specialists
could not determine if the Iranian activity was either "pre-operational" or simply information
gathering. The incidents were, however, consistent with the evidence of world-wide surveillance
" Select SulcBmmittce Interview of Maria Barton, Intelligence Research Specialist,
Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, United States Department of State ("USDS"), and
Paul Vogel, Senior Desk Officer, Diplomatic Security, Overseas Program EUR, USDS, Oct. 3,
1996 at 2 (hereinafter "Diplomatic Security Briefing").
" Id.; Galbraith Subcommittee Dep. at 1 8 1 .
" The U.S. Department of State specialists did not know if the additional information
about Zagreb was du^Jo greater activity in Zagreb or greater reporting from Embassy Zagreb. In
the deposition of th^|^B|H|H^^|^^|HmOie indicated that U.S. Department of
State worldwide alerts about Iraman terrorist threat?Wre due, in part, to Zagreb reporting which
suggests that more was known about Zagisb^as a result of the quantity of reporting rather than to
a higher degree of terrorist activit
Id.
303
565
being conducted by Hezbollah. Needless to state, the fact that Embassy Zagreb was one of many
United States Embassies throughout Europe and the world subjected to Hezbollah surveillance
does not lessen the risk or the need to respond, but it does suggest strongly that the delivery of
the "no instructions" response twelve months earlier was not related causally to the current
terrorist threat."
Embassy Zagreb Response.
' "' At the affected Embassy, an Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") consisting
of the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission ("DCM"), tho^^^^^^^fand the RSO is
established to monitor the threat
" Herrick Subcommittee Pep, at 78: Select Subcommitti
Aug. 9, 1996, at 142 (hereinafter ^^B^ubcommittee Dep.").
** Henick Subcontimittee Dep. at page 79; Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charlotte
Stottman, Aug. 10, 1996, at 94 (hereinafter **Stottman Subcommittee Dep.^.
304
566
567
306
568
"7
C7
Current Status of Iranian Terrorist Threat.
The Select Subcommittee questioned^^^^^^^^^^^H^HH|^Hin Bosnia,
about the presence of IranianSj-^^HT replied that there are "many less [Iranians] now than there
were at one time."'" AlthouglTB|Mhought the number was small, he cautioned that some of
the few Iranians who remained might be "terrorist trained."'' The presence of the Mujahideen, of
whom only a small percentage are Iranian, is far greater in Bosnia at the current time.'" C^?^l^^
The Select Subcommittee also questioned the current Regional Security Officer of
Embassy Zagreb about the terrorist threat in Croatia. The RSO responded that the last terrorist
action occurred in September 1995 at a Rijeka police station which is located far from the
embassy. The RSO also stated that no further incidents of surveillance of the Ambassador or of
embassy vehicles had been reported since the summer of 1995; nor have any complaints of
surveillance or other suspicious activity been filed or otherwise brought to the attention of the
RSO by Embassy Zagreb personnel. The RSO advised the Select Subcommittee that security
concerns have rha^gfd dramatically, and the threat has dropped very rapidly."
*' Select SubcommJttee Interview of Robert L. Davis, Supervisory Special Agent, U.S.
Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Davis
Subcommittee Int.").
H^ubconunittee Dep. at 42.
II
" Select Subcommittee Interview of William Root, Regional Security Officer at Embassy
Zagreb, Aug. 8, 1996 (hereinafter "Root Subcommittee Int.").
307
569
Chapter Three
Section Three
IFOR DEPLOYMENT AND POTENTIAL RISKS TO UNITED STATES
TROOPS AND PERSONNEL
In December 1995, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1 03 1 authorizing a one-year deployment of an
Implementation Force ("IFOR") to the Balkans to implement the military aspects of the new
peace plan.' The resolution mandated the United Nations peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, to
transfer its operational authority to IFOR, action which occurred December 20, 1995.
Mission of IFOR.
The primary mission of IFOR is to execute the military facets of the Dayton Peace
Accord which would establish the climate for civilian peace measures to take hold and prosper.
To this end, the duties of IFOR included overseeing the withdrawal of Bosnian Federation and
Bosnian Serb Army forces along the zone of separation and the demobilization of their respective
forces.' The ongoing missfbn also includes enforcing the cease-fire agj^-nent, monitoring the
restrictions on airspace, overseeing the release of prisoners of war, and participating in de-mining
' United Nations Security Resolution 1031, passed December 15, 1995. Article II
authorizes the establishment of a multinational implementation force to undertake the military
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord.
' Tmplementation and Future Prospects for the Dayton Accords. 104th Cong., 2nd Sess.
July 24, 1996, at 1 (Testimony of Ll Gen Patrick Hughes, Director, DIA).
308
570
efforts.' These military efforts will pave the way for the implementation of the civilian aspects
of the Dayton Peace Accord including refugee repatriation, establishing complete freedom of
movement, revitalizing the economy and restructuring the government.
The IFOR mission includes over 60,000 intemational troops, many of whom were
transferred from UNPROFOR to IFOR control, and others which were newly deployed. Every
NATO country with armed forces, as well as some non-NATO countries, including Russia,
Egypt, Pakistan and Malaysia, participated.* The United States announced full IFOR
deployment on February 16, 1996 at a level of 20,000 troops.' Of this total, 17,000 were
deployed to Bosnia; 4,400 were posted in Hungary; and 2,100 in Croatia.'
Clinton Administration Support for United States Troops in IFOR.
During the war, the Clinton Administration had been reluctant to commit any United
States ground troops to the UNPROFOR peacekeeping force. The Administration preferred to
work with its NATO allies towards a negotiated settlement because "the United States could not
force peace on Bosnia's warring ethnic groups."^ Once the peace process among the warring
' Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, Rosnia-Fonner Yugoslavia and United States Policy,
CRS Issue Brief IB9 1089, June 4, 19%, at 8 (hereinafler "CRS Report").
* NATO's Rnip in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, No. 1 1 , NATO
Fact Sheets, January 1996, World Wide Web at http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fsl 1. htm.
* CRS Report at 12.
•Id.
^ President William J. Clinton Addressing the Nation on National Interests in Bosnia,
Nov. 27, 1995. at 4 (hereinafler "November 1995 Presidential Address").
309
571
factions was underway. President Clinton said he would consider sending United States troops to
take part in a multilateral peacekeeping mission in the event that all parties reached a negotiated
settlement*
As the parties moved toward the signing of the Dayton Accords, the President remained
in close communication with Congress and the nation about the potential deployment of United
States troops. On November 13, 1995. President Clinton sent a letter to the leadership pf the
House of Representatives outlining the sequence of events that led to the formation of IFOR and
United States interests in participating in such a force.' On November 27, the President delivered
a televised address to the nation outlining national interests in Bosnia, and why United States
participation in IFOR was essential to its success.'" Clinton termed United States participation in
IFOR as America's responsibility to "turn this moment of hope into an enduring reality" and
claimed the United States could help "end the terrible suffering of the people, the warfare, the
mass executions, the ethnic cleansing, the campaigns of rape and terror."" The President
pledged that the IFOR mission would be clearly defined with realistic goals and that United
States should "make the choice for peace."''
In a press conference following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord on December IS,
' Julie Kim, Bosnia and the 104th Congress: the Implementation Force (TFOR) and its
Possible Successor. CRS Report 96-723, Aug. 29,- 1996, at 3 (hereinafter "CRS IFOR Report")-
' CRS IFOR Report at 9.
'"Id.
" November 1995 Presidential Address.
"Id.
310
572
1995, President Clinton pledged United States participation with other countries in implementing
the terms of the peace agreement stating, "we will send you our most precious United States
resource, the men and women of our armed forces."^
Congressional Action on Troop Deployment.
In the Congress, the emerging peace negotiations shifted the focus of debate from the
arms embargo to the United States role in implementing the peace process. Much of the
Congressional debate focused on whether a United States presence in the Balkans was a nat'o-al
security interest significant enough to justify any potential hazard that may befall United States
troops and personnel stationed in Bosnia, and to offset the cost to the United States taxpayer of
United States deployment." Many Members of Congress were skeptical about the deployment
and Congress debated a series of measures in the fall and winter of 1995 - both binding and non-
binding - to impose parameters on United States troop contributions to IFOR.
Even while peace talks were underway in Dayton, the United States Congress was quick
to take action to preclude the involvement of United States troops in any peacekeeping mission
in the region. In the first of several debates on the issue the House of Representatives approved a
resolution (H. Res. 247) on October 30 that stated there should not be "a presumption" by the
parties to the peace talks that United States troops would participate in peace enforcement in
" CRS IFOR Report at 12. S£fi_alsQ Wolf Blitzer. Clinton Urges Warring Sides to
E, CNN, Dec. 15, 1995 (discussing the United States role in IFOR).
'* Congressional Record S15374 (daily ed. October 20, 1995) (statement of Senator John
Warner).
311
573
Bosnia.'' This resolution also aimed to ensure that Congress would be a party to any decision of
United States Armed Forces deployment, and noted ;hat no troops should be deployed in the
absence of a resolution passed by the Congress authorizing such action. The House adopted this
resolution easily by a vote of 315-103. In November, the House considered legislation (H. Res.
2606) to prohibit funds for a United States peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.'^ Again, the
legislation passed by a vote of 243-171."
The Senate also was actively considering troop deployment measures. On December 13.
1995. the day before the fon..al signing in Paris of the Dayton Accord, and immediately prioi :o
the scheduled deployment of United States forces, the Senate considered several measures. First,
the Senate debated and adopted H. R. 2606, legislation the House passed the preceding month to
prohibit funds to be obligated for United States troops in Bosnia, unless such funds were
specifically authorized for that purpose. In an attempt to balance conflicting sentiments about
the deployment, the Senate rejected a resolution (S. Con. Res. 35) that opposed President
Clinton's decision to deploy troops to Bosnia, but also noted that "Congress strongly supports'*
the United States troops ordered there. Finally, the Senate approved a resolution (S J. Res. 44)
by a vote of 69-30 that had been offered by Senators Dole and McCain which stated Congress
**unequivocalIy" supported the United States aimed forces who would be sent to Bosnia to
participate in IFOR, but did not formally authorize their deployment and set conditions and
"CRS IFOR Report at 13.
'•Id.
"Id.
312
574
limitations on their involvement. The resolution included a requirement that the United States
lead an effort to "equip and train" the Bosnian Government forces so that the newly established
Bosnian-Croat Federation would be able to provide its own defense in the future."
The House also was busy on December 13, 1995: three resolutions were debated. The
House rejected H.R. 2770, to prohibit federal funds from being used for the deployment of
United States troops on the ground in Bosnia. Immediately thereafter, the House passed H.Res.
304, which purported to support the United States troops in Bosnia but expressed opposition to
the decision by the President to send them overseas. In effect, H.Res. 304 modified H.R. _ ;70
which would have cut off all funding for the American troops on the ground. After approving
the resolution, the House rejected legislation sponsored by Rep. Hamilton (H. Res. 306) that
"unequivocally" expressed support for the Armed Forces carrying out their mission in Bosnia."
Rep. Hamilton offered his resolution in order to express to the United States troops heading for
Bosnia that regardless of congressional differences over the policy decision. Congress should
"conclude on a unanimous vote [of] support of the troops."^"
Information to Congress on Troop Deployment
In response to Congressional concerns about United States ground forces deployed as part
of the IFOR contingent, Secrctaryof State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry and
" CRS IFOR Report at 14.
"Id.
^'' Cong. Rec. HI 4871 (daily ed. December 13, 1994KsUtement of Rep. Lee Hamilton).
313
575
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili appeared at numerous hearings in
October and November 1995 to assure Members of the House and Senate that United States
participation in IFOR was necessary and that the United States was committed to minimize any
potential threat to the troops."' For instance, when questioned about how the United States
troops would be protected, General Shalikashvili responded that United States commanders have
pursued "all available courses" to mitigate nsks to United States troops."'
The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Staff provided more than ten briefings
regarding IFOR to Congresa ai both classified and unclassified formats." The first briefings held
in early November 1995, provided a thorough review of the IFOR mission, analyzed potential
threats to IFOR and United States troops, discussed the intelligence support that would be
provided to IFOR, and addressed the military equipment to be used to ensure that the risks to
United States personnel were minimized. Although the Administration was attempting to sway
skeptics in Congress, every briefing included a discussion of the threats to IFOR and how those
threats would be minimized.
The threats of indirect fire, land mines, the presence of extremist elements including the
" CRS IFOR Report at 8.
" Notes of testimony of General Shalikashvili, Hearing on United SUtes Policy Towards
Bosnia before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on International
Organization, Nov. 30, 1995.
" Notes of Department of Defense briefings to Congress: DLA, Joint Staff, Office of
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Nov. 2, 1995 - Jan. 25, 1995 (hereinafter 'TKDD Briefings,
Nov. 1995-Jan. 1996").
314
576
Mujahideen'', civil disorder, and hostage taking by independent elements were among those
consistently discussed.'' In classified briefings. Administration officials specifically addressed
the threat posed by foreign Islamic groups - both military and intelligence - including those of
Iran/'
briefings continued throughout January 1996, after United States troops were deployed to IFOR
in order to make sure Congress was informed of the most current information on the progress of
the IFOR mission in Bosnia and the status of United States troop safety and activities.'^
Dayton Agreement Provisions to Protect IFOR.
Consistent with the United States policy of isolating Iran, and in response to specific
concerns about the safety of United States troops, the United States has been particularly diligent
in making sure the Dayton signatories comply with the so-called "foreign forces" provision in the
a:
'* The Mujahideen were loosely organized freedom fighters from a variety of Islamic
countries, most of whom had served in the war in Afghanistan.
" DOD Briefings Nov. 1995-Jan. 1996.
" Notes of DIA Briefmg to the Senate and House of Representatives on Bosnia, Jan. 5,
1995 (hereinafter "Joint Jan. 5, 1995 Briefing").
Id; Joint Jan. 5, 1995 Briefing
315
577
peace agreement."' This provision requires the removal of foreign forces from Bosnia, a catch-
all phrase meant to include the volunteer Mujahideen forces, foreign Islamic fundamentalist
forces, the Iranian military, and other extreme elements who had come to the region during the
conflict to volunteer with the warring factions.
As leverage to ensure compliance with this provision, the United States has linked the
removal of foreign forces, in particular Iranian volunteer forces, with the receipt of United States
aid. This strategy has been successful, and although the Bosnian Government was slow to
pressure the foreign fighters n. 'e..ve their territory after the Dayton Agreement was signed, i. has
made significant strides in the ensuing months. On June 7, 1996, President Clinton provided
certification that the number of foreign forces remaining in Bosnia was low enough to trigger the
United States "equip and train program" to proceed.
<J&.
" Sm Dayton Peace Agreement Article II of the Annex on Military Aspects, paragraph
one, that states "All Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this Annex enters into force
which are not local origin, whether or not they are legally and militarily subordinated to the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Republika
Srpska, shall be withdrawn together with their equipment fiom the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina within thirty days." Paragraph two reads in part, "all foreign Forces, i.^cluding
individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and
other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
316
578
CHAPTER FOUR
RESPONSE TO THE MAJORITY CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
FALSE TESTIMONY. CLASSIFICATION AND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
This Section does not seek to address the numerous factual and analytical errors, false
claims, and inconsistencies in the Mzjority's report. Errors in the Majority's report are noted
throughout the Minority views. This Section addresses three specific charges lodged by the
Majority that the Administration impeded the progress of the Select Subcomminee's inquiry.
The Majority report alleges that i:ertain Executive Branch officials made false statements to the
Subcommittee; it asserts that the Administration has manipulated the classification rules to hide
embarrassing information; and it contends that the Administration improperly invoked executive
privilege. The Minority is of the firm view that the Majority report is wrong on each of these
points.
Referrals to the Department of Justice.
The most inflammatory aspect of the Majority report is its referral of certain matters to
the Justice Department for fiuther inquiry. The Majority asserts that several Executive Bianch
ofiBcials gave inconsistent testimony to the Select Subcommittee and suggests the possibility that
some of these officials might have perjured themselves. This reckless allegation is wholly
unsubstantiated. It casts aspersions on the character of dedicated public servants who performed
their duties in difficult and at times dangerous circumstances for what we can only assume to be
the Majority's short-term political advanUge. With all due respect, the Minority regards these
allegations as shameful.
317
579
Because the testimony giving rise to the Majority's charge is itself classified, the Majority
has denied those it is accusing the ability to defend themselves publicly until such time as the
report is declassified. But it is possible to describe in general terms the Majority's principal
allegation: that various participants have differing recollections of conversations that took place
in the spring of 1994. This allegation does not remotely support a criminal inquiry. The
statements identified by the Majority do not present real inconsistencies. Instead, they involve
slightly varying recollections about nuances in conversations that took place more than two years
ago. Certain participants do not ncal! the use of particular words or facial expressions in the
conversations in question; others do. The Majority's suggestion that a peijury charge could be
supported in such circumstances is absurd.
Making an unwarranted allegation of perjury does more than damage the reputations of
dedicated officials. The Supreme Court has warned that "[o]ae consideration of policy
overshadowed all others during the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law oHense:
that the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from
appearing or testifying."' And in the particular setting of inter-Branch relations, courts have
-•2: - . -11
recognized that aggressive recourse to prosecution "would complicate future relationships
between the two branches and thus could disrupt the orderly functioning of government At a
minimum, it could eventuate that the Executive officials would become more stilted and careful
and less forthcoming than they otherwise might be."' Loose allegations like those made by the
' BiQnslDnv.lInited.Slates.409U.S.352,359(1973).
' United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 26 (D.D.C. 1989).
318
580
Majority, which subject innocent persons to suspicion, loss of reputation, and great expense,
ultimately will damage Congressional fact finding efforts. We trust that the Justice Department
will dispose of this referral in short order.
The Rules of Classified Information.
The Majority asserts that the Administration has manipulated classification rules to hide
damaging material. This is a very peculiar allegation. Much of the material cited in the Majority
report involves foreign government information, intelligence activities, or the foreign relaticns of
the United States, all areas that may be deemed classified.' And perhaps more fundamentally, it
is the Majority that rushed to release its conclusions even before submitting its report to the
Executive Branch for declassification. This tactic has allowed the Majority to make its most
inflammatoiy charges in general and conclusiory terms, while using the classified nature of the
underlying material to shield its allegations from close scrutiny. It therefore is not the
Administration that is using the classified label to hide its diity laundry.
In fact, the CHnton Administration has taken significant steps to rationalize the
classification system and to avoid the rampant over classification that sometimes was undertaken
by its predecessors. * In particular, as the Majority notes, the rules promulgated by the
Administration preclude the classification of data simply to "prevent embarrassment to a person.
' Sm Execurive Order 12958 § 1.5(b). (c). (d) (Apr. 20, 1995).
* See Executive Order No. 12968 (Aug. 2. 1995); Executive Order No. 12958.
319
581
organization, or agency."' The Minority expects that declassiflcation of the report in this case
will proceed expeditiously and with that important principle in mind. For the present, however,
the Majority's accusation that the Administration is hiding behind classification rules is baseless -
- and will remain untested until the Subcommittee's report is declassified by the appropriate
agencies.
The Rules of Executive Privilege.
The Majority is incorrect in contending that the Executive Branch's assertion of executive
privilege to limit the testimony of several senior officials of the National Security Council was
somehow improper. Of course, the Minority agrees wholeheartedly that Congress has the right
to seek information that is relevant to a legitimate legislative inquiry. At the same time, however
— although the Majority seems to suggest otherwise - for at least some purposes the NSC is "an
extension of the White House office" and serves as "the supporting staff to the President in the
conduct of foreign policy." * Matters considered by senior NSC officials and presented to the
President for decision therefore at least presumptively may be shielded bv executive privilege.
As a consequence, the Majority is wrong in asserting that the reluctance of NSC officials
to offer formal, sworn testimony is somehow unprecedented. In fact, the Majority spears to
acknowledge that NSC officials have been summoned to offer formal testimony only with great
infrequency, and then only in the context of inquiries into potentially criminal conduct. And the
'Id. at §1.8(2).
* OLC Opinion 78-50, Erppdom J>f Tnform?<Tio" A*-' - Natinnal Security Council - Agency
■Statm Under FOIA. 2 Op. OLC 197. 1978 OLC LEXIS 50, at *1 n.2.
320
582
Majority is incorrect in contending that the criminal nature of those inquiries was irrelevant to
the willingness of NSC personnel to testify.
The Supreme Court has noted the considerations that bear on the assertion of executive
privilege. The Executive Branch's interest in resisting testimony is at its height where the inquiry
touches on "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets," areas where "the courts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."' The interest in
disclosure, on the other hand, is at its height where criminal conduct is alleged because "[t]he
right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial [itself] has constitutional dimensions.""
That is particularly so because, as the Court has observed, one "cannot conclude that
[presidential] advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent
occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the
context of a criminal prosecution."' In the context of the Select Subcommittee's inquiry, where
very sensitive matters of foreign policy are involved and where the investigation is not directed
at criminal misconduct, those considerations indicate that the Executive Branch's interest in
limiting disclosure is well-founded.
This is not to say that formal testimony by NSC officials may never be required. But it is
plain that those officials may be called only when there is a persuasive showing of compelling
' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706, 710 (1974).
•id. at 711.
* Id. at 712.
321
583
need for the testimony. '° There was no such showing here. The Administration's assertion of
executive privilege had no material effect on the conduct of the Select Subcommittee's inquiry.
Virtually all officials contacted by the Subcommittee either testified or provided information in
less formal settings." All of these officials were forthcoming. While NSC personnel were not
sworn, their accounts were in every case consistent with those of witnesses who testified under
oath.'" The Majority thus is unable to identify any area in which the Subcommittee's inquiry was
hindered by the Executive Branch's limited invocation of executive privilege.
The assertion of privilege by NSC officials therefore was nothing out of the ordinary.
Indeed, it is worth noting that CIA personnel - who are praised by the Majority for their
cooperation with the Subcommittee - on several occasions asserted the executive and
deliberative process privileges to cut off the Subcommittee's lines of inquiry. We do not say this
to criticize the Agency, which is understandably reluctant to disclose its internal deliberations on
very sensitive matters. It is plain, however, that the Majority's complaints in this area turn
entirely on whose ox is being gored.
'" See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-714.
" The only exception is Defense Secretary Perry, who would have had very little of relevance to
say in any event.
" In this regard, the Minority notes that Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and Undersecretary
Tamoff voluntarily testified under oath, even though their prior arrangements with the
Subcommittee called only for unsworn testimony.
322
Appendix A
584
KEYSAMES
Christopher. Warren
Cengic, Hasan
Delic, Hazim
Deutch, John
Granic. Mate
Hurd, Douglas
Izetbegovic, Ahja
Juppe, Alain
Karuizic, Radovan
Khamenei, Ayatollah
Milosevic, Slobodan
Mladic, Ratko
Omerbasic, Imam Sveko
Owen, Lord Da\-id
Penry, William
Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rose, Sir Michael
Slajdzic, Hans
Susak, Gojko
Susak, Djurdja
Tudjman, Franjo
Turkovic, Biserka
Vance, Cynis
Velayati. Ali Akbar
U.S. Secretar>- of Slate
Bosnian Deputy Minister of Defense; Kjiown Arms Dealer
Commander of the Bosnian Government Army
Director. Central Intelligence
Croatian Foreign Minister
Fonner British Foreign Secretary
President of Bosnia Herzegovina
Former French Foreign Minister, Current French Prime Minister
Bosnian Serb leader
Supreme Leader of Iran
President of Serbia
Cotnmander of the Bosnian Serb Army
Leader of the .Muslim Community in Croatia
Former EC Mediator and Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia
U.S. Secretary of Defense
President of Iran
Commander of UNPROFOR 1 994- 1 995
Former Prime Minister of Bosnia Herzegovina
Croatian Defense Minister
Senior Official in the Croatian Intelligence Ministry
Croatian Intelligence Chief
President of Croatia
Bosnian Ambassador to Croatia
Former UN Envoy and Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia
Iranian Foreign Minister
Appendix B
585
ACROSYMS
BSA
LTF
Bosnian Serb Anny
Balkan Task Force, CIA
CIA
COM
COS
CRS
DATT
DCI
DCM
DDCI
DDI
DDO
DIA
DOD
EAC
EU
FRY
FY
HVO
ICO
ICR
IFOR
lOB
JNA
MID
NATO
MID
NSA
NSC
OCSE
OGC
PAO
RSO
TDY
UN
UNHCR
UNPROFOR
UNSC
USDS
Central Intelligence Agency
Chief of Mission
Chief of Station
Congressional Research Service
Defense Attache
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Mission
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
U.S. Department of Defense
Emergency Action Committee
European Union (formerly the European Community or EC)
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
Fiscal Year
Croatian Defense Army
Islamic Conference Organization
Intelligence Community Representative
Implementation Force
Intelligence Oversight Board
Yugoslav People's Aimy
Military Intelligence Daily
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Intelligence Daily
National Security Agency
National Security Council
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE)
Office of the General Counsel, CIA
Public Affairs OfTicer
Regional Security Officer
Temporary Duty Assigiunent
United Nations
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
United Nations Protection Force
United Nations Security Council
U.S. Department of State
"^
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593
Appendix E
DA TE5 OF ARTICLES APPEARISG IS THE SA TIOSAL ISTELLIGESCE DAIL Y
REFERRI.XG TO ACTLAL OR PROPOSED ARMS SHIPMESTS l\ I lOLA TIOS OF THE
IMTED \AlTO.\S ARMS EMBARGO
1994
January ::. 1994
FcbniarN 7. 1994
March 16. 1994
April 4. 1994
Apnl27. 1994
Apnl 30. 1994
May 3. 1994
May 5. 1994
May 14. 1994
May 19. 1994
May 21. 1994
June 11. 1994
June 15. 1994
Julv 19. 1994
July 23. 1994
August l"^. 1994
September 3. 1994
September 13. 1994
Sq)tember20. 1994
September 27. 1994
November 3. 1994
November 15. 1994
1995
Fcbniary 25. 1995
May 5. 'l 995
June 2. 1995
June 10. 1995
June 23. 1995
July". 1995
July 24. 1995
July 31. 1995
.\ugust 11. 1995
September 1. 1995
October 3. 1995
November 1". 1995
December 11. 1995
December 2S. 1995
594
Appendix- F
SELECTED LIST OF MAJOR PRESS ARTICLES RECARDISC LEAKS
IS THE IS ARMS EMBARGO
Dai«f
Source
.\nicle
8 :3 92
.NVu York Times
9 10 92
Los Angeles Times
9 10 92
\e^^ York Times
9 10 92
fCashingion Post
9 11 92
Washington Times
1 1 3 92
Christian Sci Mon,
12 1 92
Los Angeles Times
4 U94
Washington Post
4 15 94
.\V>« YorH Times
5 13 94
If'abiiingtdn Post
5 13 94
AP
5 14 94
Reuters
5 14 94
S'e\\ York Times
5 15 94
Washington Post
5 16 94
li'ashingion Post
6 2 94
Washington Times
6 24 94
Washington Times
"2 94
Reuters
S2 94
Washington Times
9 4 94
Washington Times
11 5 94
Sew York Times
^•».
11 11 94
Sew York Times
4 15 95
Sew York Times
Degree Vanes as .Vabs Assist Bosnia's Muslims
Iranian Effon to Send Bosnia .Vms Reported
Iran Said to Send .Vms to Bosnians
Iran Supplies Arms to Croatia. LS S-'vs
Croatia Seizes .Arms on Iranian Plane on a Tip from
US
Islamic Stales Concern for Bosnia
Islamic National to Press tor Militar>' Aid to Bosnia
L'.S. IS .Mlovking Iran '.o .Arm Bosnian Muslims
L'.S Looks .Away as tan Arms Bosnia
Iran Ships Explosives to Bosnian Muslims
Bosnian .Army OtTicia! Confirrr.s Receiving .Arms
Shipments from Iran
Iran Ships Matenal For .Arms to Bosnians Report
Iran Said to Violate Embargo
Iran's Coup in Europe
Greece. .Macedonia Said to Sk;n Sanctions: L'N
Obseners Report Barjied Goods Flowing in lo
Yugoslavia
Iranians Move into Bosnia to Terronze Serbs
Iranian Weapons Sen: Via Croatia
.\nr.i are Reaching Bosnia Via Croatia. Paper Says
Iran Uses Russian Planes to Supply Bosnian
Muslim. Croatian Troops
Bosnians Sought Help from Iran
.Arms TratTicking to Bosnia Goes on Despite
Embargo ,^
Getting Senous on Bosnian .Arms ""
U.S. Looks Awav as L^in Aims Bosnia
595
Iran Reported
Trying to Send
Arms to Bosnia
*• ." •« -».*-: « >» '-*e^<r#
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IRAN: Bosnia Arms Shipment
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596
kKU^u-nakiiMk
• Kmu.
e
ington fOBi
IIIhTm
Vl}«
nuDO.Mti ii.i«M
Iran Ships Explosives
To Bosnian Muslims
Embargo-Busting Cargo Also Aids Croatia
G>nflictu^
Directives
In Senate
\bles Oppose
Arms Embargo
B« Htkfi Ot«ir
luH ocr.Andcw> «imu««*
«i Bi^M ^ *'"'•■ tntorfo
•fitfut imnu 4t«-*«ii«m|
•««*tcri •ttt 4«^o«nci«ig
tfw artr^jHnum lot 't^.f
*» panu* • nltcrrit yekri
bi %KK-t>totk vein tf SO
••4f. CM Seuif firv te«n-
•4 PmatN C^::f. -j h«c
»Ib*tf m:?acr. ^ t i^Um-
•r* *--| i* ;?• I Vrt N*-
taraan fcmftfau »kiitril
Both *vrt ff)ctwd«4— widt
that tt-ktert !>it Bigitt
••IM« ltd MBl to IkC
»t r««*lur ff«4Mi.'
•*«M(t Ikt S«fkMt VM
Tkt fcattt »t*a tnm-
ffi «i a.-* of lStm I J!«n«
• torj-' Hi< Sr^ >g»]t W.
SAUJIVO. ftoiM. M«v 12-ta
InaiM tir torn Uantfort fteiM.
htdkj vnh M ktm «0 tOM ilt9l»
■w tnt mtm n« nitoM lor
VU9VM praAAMA, knM » l**
frtft bss wMk ■ pin of • tel b*>
iwtw Craw Mri Bavw i» rm«
fnititirr ceepcnitofi i|aiMi IM
Scfta. Wcurra «td Soma nrai
The Mir 4 trmi gt iM Bau^
747 T ^pUnTff Crau'tapOil
fUffcod ■ CV39KJ0M fwboa» rf
I'X imamtf Cawed on Twwtofa
wtf o fanner npybha « Si^c»
tor Ifll. Cdrtft« tM «iyt Wkn •
«wt tB Botfua andCniUi by lnm«
rorac^ Mmub At Akte VttoHCi.
■ vm a KraR( acTMl it b«> •»
4«fNig commtlacRi u feteil't
Vctavto pr«M9Wd tfaman ?!«»
*ni a:)* Ur^tofoov *Nk • dMck
far II aalbni »rf • dM far 10.000
Un d *iwi fati brtb»tB>v f*>
fponikd v^ «tei ■««>««< fate I
dfa* VVM lUWlMM «f diMto !■
Irw't aAury NWorL
'V>:J> «* asMi Its tl tMt *- I
uib n^r.' ^t aM nportn. *n <
nsn wAtnsjnd :lHi av Sfht inr
Iwrtan ■ ■ ■ w^m im\tmi\\\m I
W vtOon Im ari a Ml'
IBAMB wd BeivMa Mwhn
r«« cf *«tpec*-ftUit4 tmtfcn
Vwuncf-
fetft*«a tewa mO CntOa feM
MclMS*M tn«Ma Cntdi aatf
Bom. i*««y MHT Wm« *
'tt» «*« kcM ftnfag ■» fa iMk *
"^^ aaft «ttpm wB It Ilk
I OH am if tti-w »
■ntn*^ far «.'?«;«Bt
kMB «BnM a • UM atea OrtiU -
tmharfo tsn bM* wfanflid to* » )
EnuuK aa ftnciao ttt i^
•MtOrVKMlCAl I
597
598
tie tQastiinQtan |lo$t
IITtcTm
Vll«
nUD4>.H>« I) IMI
Iran Ships Explosives
To Bosnian Muslims
Embargo-BmHng Cargo Also Aids Croatia
ConfUctiHg'
Diiectives
In Senate
! Vtlea Oppose
: Arms Embargo
i tf Hcin Omr
ITW SrMit fWfUf •■
■■< iMfMcurT timvm
M <*• Chua ■*w«i;>tai
I " •«*•• !»• •«"• •»>;■•
•PWM ■mw *i>u: j:ii|
I ai ^m MtAMiJVfvt «««• M
! Z
vy Jvii ^v^Wl
iAMIVO. Ion*. MiT li-A*
hi<H nk ailMa M Ma rf t«b-
«upa« piiliw. toiM • b-
rvft ta« ««*% a pMi il • *■! kt-
uiui G«ut arf Bosit «i fcwv
mihtirr eaopcnliM •(tiut IIM
•nr.
*i1 ariD itaM A CnMa'i apul
•n4 o hTMr npuMa ■ S9ic»
kB ini.Cswtil*«*r>MBRa
vart !• kvu M^Cnala ^ fervMA
rin«9 MiMla M Attn Vikna.
4iiruig mwiiatM I* BaMd*
Matoa art B tan > hOaaa
«niiual>>i»yfc
Vtarw I
• Aclftltina
!»■■»« i«>nt .WW < 10
••«* OaSKmCnilnn.
ata* imtr. ioi ( fi^ur.
•nl Mia* 3l M I. VIM >»
"—»■■»»■■» trntirti ra
toai ai KnMau awum
to II ^ka art • «i ki le.OOO
uni 4 *atl IkL tetbtfam l»
lta» ilM BMOKM rf UMMB fer
Ifw'l tAutt avpan.
^Tiit •• oam uld itaO-
Uib «•- M bM n*snet. ■*•
•aa la aiiK Uai «> 6|«i to
fllHH ... -' ■
M MM )»•■«•• aA-
IW awaaK. atok to«»> av
Mail tf da •uMu aai IW ili«ni. a<
to* W aa VmH StKn to<att aM lim n
•*ai" Wtof-a W|:>Uta.
Iktl MUtOfI ;<IC • |>t
»4U*4 ••< K>l l> IM
I to
^■^•«*aaa«^>
*i taMiMr aatM
ift <te Vuia aii
■rf «■ aMMtfH » da Ini a I a>
nt« •! atipMi ttUlH Inufcn
OUM»
tot|* a laaa m4 CmM tw
Ittam Cratk tai
a>«aWB«
■*a«paiaat>^
•aaanttfdK-awi*'
1W Inni
r a-
■ »to».* lal In. >r. » . j
T>a knxa 4ifc«fT tf at ita
■attrak to aaawMoi fR^mai
« M Ma KSTC axin a ei lit'
kis ana ■■ • m aton *itaa
^«* lAi l*.& aajiet ai ca am
rrAarfs tet km ntoitfad tv ta
*v'* tsrr^ Soitt aaiivf' n* •
awjc^anfc aa 4aKUi| Ca ■*-
l~MC<UMXUI I
599
Senate Backs Contradictory Proposals on Bosnia Polio
«Di»t frapoM^t -3 «^-v r«*r^ Ti» tCfv^-'k-*^ • •» •K'f T.* *u r-f'M'1 ' ••«* •• is irKtafwrf «•-•» r **
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«mi irniit Sc-^ Orrw C HMrti ll- ;
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ncATvtt lh« 3cr\ •*»»» <u "^f* s
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Dole (R-IUr. u^ UK •«< iitt*r£
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Irptlttm la ^ the cxterfo vwdf 1
•nra «2ic« luRcr. br t pr: i^.^
«(««>'.*« nrr ^w« to 9vrr •tto
"*>*'. '%M •col M* » c*: Tt
•ctei; wC sfl *J«« % t^iif^ar*. «:- -
Sic:"
Dm* «.td Scr. .'iwgfc 1 L«ternK tO- i
«r •,"c-M=^ ja: 9K c« ae «kO
tkwi dteu biM. Cmm vMii ^-
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«>t>e>.i K9«or af nktc^e >AT3
Sea OMMf rka«*M«nJw) >
Crca* Suia «-3 m* mIi h _ m-
600
Sl^a^^ington Stime^
WASHINGTON. DC. THURSDAY. JUNE 2. 1994 „
Iranians move
into Bosnia to
terrorize Serbs
Guards aim lo radicalize Muslims
• o«-i
I erganac t«rT«rt: r'Supt tmonf
I Muilims ift :ht rcf.on. accordtf\|
I to V-S intctUicrtci icurccs
I Most of L^< Cua.-fs am^d in
' early May a'.er^ *-.;?. »>ipm«n:»of
• ar-ia.*<fi?'.£»-.-.^i
TSt CwJrtfs ha-« ^«|un or|aft-
a>r.g groups ot B>injAA Muslima
: kr>-al » fra't and i:» ^rand of fun-
I darna^iulii; talan. accordmg lo
■ ifltct:i|cnce pass«d iram a Weal-
tr-t Europ*ai ir.lt:".:|«r*.;f acmct
: o C S spy a|cr:c«
TV.4 Gtjir£i'acr.vr*.:ci art bting
organucd m of th« Iriftrfa trp-
bajty A Zagrvb. Cnatii. ' *~
Tht BotRUD Muslim iirTe-<n
groupa »a>ld un<vKl e^radons
I agautit S«rbi. TW)- also i^wM b«
I u$«d aa • fccna of rjbwniOA ip
j cUxr paru e( brop*. Ktsf^n*
t B 0A« inuTttftnct report baatd on
; efT:cul Irva^fl irjrcM. '
According B ir.t rcpon. Irsn^
rjin goal m Bor: j i» so ergajuii
■ group! l;ro:'jr»;tirjmtfrrwMt
' ni:T«ga». HcSc'IaS (Parry e( •
Crod\ »^c'» hai ca-r.fd out nw- ^
frcr^t a'.tacU ir. U^arwn and
cUiri«drcipoM:ti::ryforllt«J992
1 tv^'.cuon t^at bir« up t>i« Itrocli
I Crr.^iiy m Bu«r.o« AiroJ-
; -rs«i™-Laiii«lJui»»a»ay-
; logttaT t^t uftu-itrbcUy of Cu*
: iop«.**aidc^VS ofTiciaL
1T>.a olT;cA liking on Ox
eer-.^tion of anonrr.it^ aaid a m«'
jor proMon kr U!t Iniuon Is ikii
ir^dtl •osr.^aa Muilusufo not Itr-
<trtt btlicvtrs ts^AiiM W diRf
cull to oria»arl£idtr tho bonrcf
of miliuntuT. _
Y>>t XathniourT Guards. Hit
itK'.atyU aed ez'-Ciry sundwd-
in«nulisrr.. »iU a:*«-f. t^ :!■:
cahlt Ida Eoinj^ M.i;ti :-•
oTicial aa:d
A stcordar> os.«rv.>« •:• 5« ~
act up n«:*«fti8 cf pr>Irar..a-
graipt m Boinia a-J ot^cr ;ar
of the forrrcr YigcaUnj :!ia- as
tut ■fthra? a> treiiung •'j: ■■
IrarMsn g:N»mr.cr.: vicrt at
f i unpcicd cmrargoof :ra-
Ti« prcK-cc ef •..-* Ret.- —
»ry Cur^ ^a» -c:gWc-ci --
ccms oriong Wciarii gn^r-
mcnta abcu: grs»rag I-a:-.:a-
Allucnc* *?» tJ« •ariorfl ferr-.c
YVignlavtt.
T>»tpr»-Ir»ria?t|-oup»»-; .pr>
vide t «ier*:d IT. E.rspc ya- ci
be used by Ttfsvi a a;;. -
IhrOugh »oirj a.-J Croat:* gjoc
-. has b«c:> ic-ab-c a jurc-'atc j.
rtctly from Wcian E«r»pe. e
report toyv
•cnncn MO er^ WO ncr^e■
•r the Iranah Pcvoluiisr.a:
Guard Corp* are «»• m Bear..
•ccocdAg Dan in»nigcncc :cpc-
artslattd reccnOy. among »cr.::
Pmafon oiTicala. The ecrrt
apeoiti lhi!Jsry uti.l hai !ra.-t
atlier Mosin aii'_-jr::j n ;>c v. -
41« Cast ar.d Nors Afnea
ti wte^dcr.ec agctK;ci at
have d<!tc-.ed t.-Tta3 nu.T.beri
tigMera frrr. Err-. Sa--' A^'
- and Syria ;a Bo«r.:a
'Tka Saadi gowrr-T.cr.: ^al ».
tlMd acvtrtl hundred irJirt «
irj- awJi rflrru » I^■c Bcr- _
Mutlims. VS. on>:a!i ta^d
Tba actnties ol l!>« Inr.
ftcvtAiltionary Coardt vn hci-
could cortpUcata ef!or.i to rca:-
paaca aarJanan bcr^tr. E
mail SctSs a.-id Msiirta
Isalcve! rlg^ttng A Bn-. J
'cofUmKrg. and US etc'.'.;gt-
enuials a4id i!i« prtipcct
tttTkAS.pctiAII
601
602
®fie Pa$()ington Sit
WASHINGTON. DC. FTUOAY. HJSt 2*. I9W . «.
Iranian
weapons
sent via
Croatia
Aid 10 Muslims
gets U.S. Vink'
CnMiia Nil Mcom« « m«.ot
trtfittt aotni (o- eo*«r !f»r-«^
•■mi thipmt^'i -o ftosti* •!!• •*«
mintiimmi *r.ich publicly **
in( •# the m'trruttenal inii
embargo •(*'"» ^tw tncntrts
B«lk«n aum Mcor^iftg • tfiiC'.i-
t«nc« Muren
DivctotMrt or IraniaB •r^i
tft^OMMi dirou|h Craiii* caat««
■• nrpnacnutivvt of tout NATO
•n Arms mlMrf4 tgaint: Bofr^
umlavriUir vouM >■«« 4ir« cc
A wTuer t'S ;r!ic;a Mi) ■»*'
Kighi The LS iv^mmc^t sppsMi
the Innun ima ritopmcrji ^
CAUM they uMtrsMi L'N W-£
rton* *T*ier» ■• -m I.' S •upperr !c"
»tMi trmn ■« 3oinc-~ ^*** 3ff<v>
OM C S t^er^nBi. wiMch Cam
tr mmimn Inn h4 l» tt« pa*
tea lalMg • M»iMM eT anM •
BowMA In Septambtc hat mi pf»
mm< Irrnn*! traiit«lup<n«*i af
arvu » ItaWia thnwgtt Craatia
that ka«« wcTMted 4nmaticARy
•ioce March.
T>M lack af promii cat.M4 t!Ic
^ra^ana to afnune The arfirja;*-
tntA hat *v>lwd* ai die anna
poets cvmladnf » wamt pe!KT-
m«kcn ui tha admukatraiMn. Cf*'
iMa to Irm tMm^fa^ 9m t
Aa pan af the frswu^ tkcfl. Cr»>
aba li ■■« a oaadi be bani i
ama tMpmanis • •otnian Maa-
hma. teniae Sef*s A a btootfr. ^C*
ir.«ntfi'«U ovd var TSt arr-t
t^ipncnu «:c;a:c :h« ra— •
'■or«: embarto
A frfitagon af?K«l 'ar^tlMr
with tfta rvpor aaitf aia OA k-4
^vntaga* MtcUitcncc agt'c-ei
h«^ 4rma»4 tww*\mr •h(rircr::t
•f naO armi vt4 aapiatiwa ^
wkfl n^mm turn Za|r«h. tha Craaiia-i
capnaL frwn Iran aa •aM<« '4*
irvfupefU.
Other liupmenu h*i« haei H-
>*ci«d arrmnf at the pen af V^a.
•n Cnanal A4natK cmm Tte •
■vapovu tre th«fi m0«i«d by a'^ck
flrrCftOATU *•«* 41*
CROATIA
ff^m^aft At
» •oaman Mmlim farcci
Inn alae Nai •wpplirtf ter*«e-
1304n4 400Ke^Wuiionar\ C\^ri%
Oai Ikfinn Hai ar««rad m st-p
hem Mn«nft fnwp< ■imitar «
(he trnvriM fwp H«ibeiUh ^
LabanaA Inn) |9vt^m«nT t^t
Jcfbe4 MMint rh« parafn.li-.ary
!brca*
^n!a|»fi afTiciala art csr-
canwd the Irvuaii artns. vhi;*
hetpiAf Mtnbmt 4tftr^ them
aeh««. oamplKatt peace effari
*h«ti itpea- B be f*«nitn^ 4bC
T»w4«tpr«a4 • olationi af a Jur^
lOrruct afreer-r^:
Acoerding «, rite :nic:i>te?cc
■mrrcet -^e Craa-4nfr%«r-^e*-
'<?a»e. *-^» X -r^ Boi-.a^ v..
•iflta Terarg^ ^i>r,isf\ »ff^j *
art tfisiniUfMl 9l the fi-s^ t^g ? tt
* tran -^It rst ?r-m« Ni.mi-v-
arl «eVr.ae mu-urry o/T>c«ls 'a
^r c^oat* rratfe :*#« >iTn Tk-*:ra*
Craa--»t fer«>(:i rijunar be-
ha<«a tAe Irwtan ««apons lii^t-
K«M« hai* :he lact •wppa-. at ;»e
Circn aC-tiinia— a-rcn. .-^ft •*!
M4 :T 'a*^*! .if-.-rg -re •— » •-
barfo •' 'Aettt-: a. :« i-s tor^
•csori.'^ » -?!• ■ojrcei
CnmfT. Jcf»r-.M af* c* « t^?
par the :ra-tar a-^« »•'«-€— i ■
3e£a-.;sc a ar^ sr- — :' m:*
a?— » 1- r-e-- tt— - - -.-
r-s-erei ;* ■:- ..* ;. •» .-.
a:;as^.. :ar%
r*--A" «•■ te«« -< ; "a- ■ e*. ■ •
Tr«!- ••« -*« -ea- r-T- r a* a *•.
•9>i- S ^ Cn»- a « arr*e« 't'ja'
a«< 7t£^a • *-»je aef*:- « :•
IfM er:r-a:t«l a- r-.tn -na^ l>X
K«3i»ats Kaa-Tjar* a n*:^' i:
"trB?»w.*^'*a C=«fre»»<** l*e
•aarsr* S«r. ca M:d Ifa-* "ai :'
!fcae » aertf :3 mc :racp» » B«-
•»• « Pa.r 9f a I' N larte bi.t vt
■nrti betfk j»* nc: •af!* "V-
ihaf*
"Tbe* jir • .a— x M« •- jT
thew.~ Mr Ka3-ian u< ^ a«i -
MAP Iraiuan !>r:t ax^ ^
na«e ar af ««*<^J•:«afy Cvarct
lh« n«(cal Mmj« farca* tAa-
■«<ai grawpt M am M«Mla btt
•M 9««nh A/nea. Mr Kaama-^
OaCa;.BlH:i: 6efrueaf?i«iat
f<we Sniam. Tra-'^ca S^aa a*;
Dtwaarii ^atrf wd bt.'ara r>e Se-
asa Arrratf $er\-.ce« Ccr--.r»«
^aaaria-. Tha* a jri:a*»-». •• -e
cftf^a— rte^rar|3ap».-r B-*
- a ^- -r* Vrj^ad S'jut »««.ltf in-
•e*|i'» -Ae aDn.r^
Wi be.c^ ;sat ;<«« tifuni of
"»e •— J eT.aia.i9 aow'^ ha«a :ht
e"ec 9f pak.-r4 ^aeli-w an fire
a- • -«• a- til-owr •!: ' m<« 0*rt-
»' •.-rfT*«-rj-, 'or Orre^M
•-;t-i>-. .•beri
V- >: Acff arpured aJeng
• ■r^.■o- Ca.«« MaP^i. director
;.* r^ er- x-xv a: tbc r^*nc^
rt*t-:« V r.i-> Cen Jua-i
^•»- *«: U^-u 3e;i^|y «*.tfer
•e;rej- a" J^ !;a- ».' Oefeffic
•■ -. r- a-J Vj Cen Rapen
5- - ; Ti.-:-:'r-«-fr;pe..c\
• ■ "e J-- I" r«'r-H U^notry
T»;e K:.»e racr;::- «e»d tn fa-
-r* t* a --.ju-a, jftifn af the
a-?t» traarfQ a-j :?te Sena» la
ci;«c-«e t uut • liAiiar rrta-
i-rt ••,! «*e*
TW: r'er rur^rrt pasted m
••t Sc-j:t :at: TarrJi One sf
;e.-ac v.- Csi . » Lf t IM trr-
^•n ---*•.#•*:> tni the «fcM4
:-Se-»i -.la' ^e teek a:^^!*!**
VN a(-t«-e^:b«!irr««ouif to
$e-Jt Vsiarry Ua4cr B«b
r*r.e Ka'-uj Rf;vbl:can. plana tt
-.-aC^iu V. arv^'ceni m the
' stti m* ttiwT>M aytheniAtion
T ...xw br.-f 4flte!a«.that««uM
J rar :?.a Vx^ttf S>:n » bTt the
e-.6a?T9 erulatafmar
Oppanr-u af ^ ^aaMTt cDwId
a(an anr.tar t!it acjoa ^tti a
•r;«ns rcaMin aai «ouM ra^
s.;rt ::-A.---t a^ad n.Tpo<t bc-
n-e -frj"! -.U ba.-.
*:_»; rt'r-»a :r e jH laitf Uf:-
-rg :>t arr-j ba.** "Tva terce the
- -*■£•»»« :f L'N rxn m Bet-
- * a :.-:• rf ^.-.a-.^:anan aid.
i-r r •: -?• re» artf T-ert •igrca-
■■^ attacks by ftetn^an Serbt
lf:heVn.a4Siainfrja'«-ff *
ur;fttiher^baria.f>l cflarti^
r^AUjn trvpi to the odw.:^
•««'d be -difTicjft rf not urpe-
L?'t' and *«utd wndcrrr-nc :.*
rt". paact tfTvtt. Can Sff.-*.
wd
Mr Man*:. t?-.e rrancb dcfe^.ic
cfT cut. atid the Uaitrd Su-«*
•rt : J be pUc-t <:ieirabc*e -ru-
•j-^-a; >• a« aviUd ecf.irb-.'f
5 ■j-'er-j:.rr*j diaofdcf n -jt
Xi'-Ca^Vbar world.'
TVj tvt..i pr^bablv — .«a* — e
e-d :.'Skeja=>eaf the;VS :Ser.
r> CaacI Ml iha auerr.Aric-A:
ccee^' Mr MaOr aa«d -1^ f j-
'--t aC C^npean aac^riy ii r
ra-^«ay« at Kafee'
!u« Ocpat^ttent ipoketr^a-
MJ« McCvrrr wid dw adaur.i-
?r»T:e-» >ha.-«« -he eanccru af -re
fciir .lanens. »he hanc tnopi r*
*>e tmMJ n Iopma.
Mtanvbila. leaders af :t»
Vni9d Suaes. Kwaaia and Cvrepa
pU^ «(vid9tt Bf Boama at an aco- .
nesic ivTsmti ■ecimf aeii
n>«nt!i.aMrjarad«uMSTTBaflB9f- ,
ftCAlMld.
TU plan aOa te fi*ii« Hj»-
b^i and Craau SI parcm ar Baa-
htan arTOory «bda Ba«Ma» Sam '
««wU t<t 4f percnt TIm Sertt
CTanilT eDMivl about 73 perca-.:
l>-a Boti^afi tP»<ftuae.M' fcat
reared nasativtly • the r:an ard
•■-: rvcnntaJ^T raaon « suli*^r>
acT::*. ttetiaia mare irmowy ty
f:r:e ra:^.«f i.*-aii thrvug!) nef:*--
ar.r-i. VS 3?iciali aaid
603
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sf&&;s§ sit
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605
606
srv* voHH riMcs INTERNATIONAL Tin»sn*\ ^f.^frMiuu .« .»•.■
AlO
IRAN SAID TO SEND
i ARMS TO BOSNIANS
jPtane Intercepted m Croatia
- Is Reported to Hold War
Materiel and Men
•vMICM^ClR COKOO^
I WASHINGTON Wd« t- Iftihclirti
•«oc\jmf«i«^ fviOTACt •! mihury
uivpon bw kQ lutmfc ooktfttry t* (he
'Muslifn^emMaif^ C«»*ntfncM •!
•maia and M«rwt»<nnA. CraaiMn afli-
CiAli ha*« MicrrcpiM * pUneioad of
• ftnttn armi and 3erMrwi*i *«tirni
The offKuls ui4 i^ai •cco'dit to
■rcpont fi"(wn tfw irf^n. an Iranian
! tertixc '4' rVw la Lagrv*. tht Cvanaii
:cap<iai ort Fr%4aT iii aawntifrtc mtt-
•««n vat ;o oruvf r«h*« tu«o>>«« '•^
e««riand ^ii«c<^ .o (otiMa aM Henc-
|av,na gyi «hm v^« >LaiM •»» *- •
>9vct««. Cnaanaa efr<tAl3 diMO*«rt«
< OOO fvtnt mofT 'Jv«n a stilinn reunds -
of «in^uP>i«n 4nd !0 ;• «0 !rtnans
1>r C^TMi^anauiVf- i«i w«rv u<d'o
Ajvf tcilM ih« ^ar mairr^l and vnt
:hc Irimartfteme TV Cr«au •u*« 'wt
»<oiiciv acK!<w»«CK(< 'Jie t^tiadc. bbi
>Aa to ol'cai :• *«»il* tf« '.n«ed Na-
■••ant uon Anwncan an«ais uid
• *ln* -..Vrt iia*T M««t «wanfirm«d
fraom '^a: l>a^<c rvuninn ^a*e
Seen pnr^MSiAf «t>i;arv a« :o iM tot-
Riat MuU>mt !Ac tc;Afn ol tM
Iranian Vi.pn^-. -rsfntvus um f.r«
ijon olTiCdii u.'
««atlm Na'tana «.«hapn
T>« (Ovf rM^H*i.:| -; Mu^ii.T* pot-'*
'•' « "«*» et;r»uec J**^ aArj30<ncti
4aowt IS* r»a3«ti« j< An:c-i t^root
a!%d :?*• . r iM i^ e> ^ >f »A lA -t>: ; ■
i^ »A.-ka« ' t' ^i_ -: ••<» ^ ^*.
i»'*«n Iorc«
Alt^aw•^ i!tr Lf •.«%! Nat^nft Has .m-
pDsrd 4- a'*u r*rMtK3 •«« :fir ftai
fcan* *-»e't<*it e«:v— » m* «>I ?ac
:«n» :."WT "^.^ ar'wft»« *nm a»*»
tm«.«j^a t^ ifir i^.«,tf t.nt 3l w*a^
•"-» ••I: Twwf t^;wf.A«i for lAr Mu*.
Uma -A Kovt:a "Vam n r«lA.- ;jv fhov.^M
*ic-t#* *•« Sa»» N^-^ ^rrtf-yi wp©;-*«d
'|r«m :hr arw>«a>t ■• ar V^cvtu^
iarm«o !orcr%
I A»fo-<-^t <«c'«t«.r«^ *»*'--*#» •
SoAAia <u>r VB u'N«« «^ :fir friwtiaJi
. MMaiimt w ; T>* W'^t..** to«r»\
''*•* SB j'f*wf«»; yp<^r.^r' ra*****
tmrcr% -*.T idB -.. ^K •-: i*** y^*«
urt\
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1
607
Appendix G
FBIS REPORTS OF ISCREASISG TIES BETHEES THE ORGASIZA TIOS OF THE
ISLAMIC COSFERESCE A.\D BOSSIA
8 May 1991
Izetbegovic concluded a visit to Iran where he strengthened economic ties between the W\o
countries.
14 Mar. 1992
Izetbegovic praised Iran for its recognition of Bosnia-Herzegonna's independence. Iran also
recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.
16 June 1992
Muhamed Cengic. Bosnia's deputy prime minister, called on Islamic nations to help save Bosnia.
Speaking from Istanbul, Ceneic appealed to members of the OIC to make more effectiv- efforts
to stop the war. The OIC was scheduled to meet in Istanbul the following day.
5-6 Aug. 1992
Silajdzic meets with Iranian officials during his tour of Islamic countries. He pleaded with the
Islamic conference to put a stop to the Serbian aggression in Bosnia.
10 Aug. 1992
Silajdzic praised the recommendation that an Islamic force led by Iran intervene in the war in
Bosnia. While visiting Pakistan, Silajdzic also requested that the OIC attempt to deliver
weapons for aerial defense and protection against Serb forces.
11 Sept 1992
Silajdzic denied today that Islamic countries, especially Iran, were sending arms to his country.
He reported that Bosnia was having all military aid channeled through the Security Council.
Silajdzic noted that Bosnia was accepting financial aid and had so far received S13 million from
Pakistan, an^i^Tdisclosed amount from Saudi Arabia was to be delivered and aii^gements were
being made with Kuwat. Negotiations also being held about Iranian oil shipments
5 Nov. 1992
Izetbegovic granted an Iranian interview during the proclaimed "week in support of the
oppressed people of Bosnia-Herzegovina" in Iran. Izetbegovic thanked Iran for its support and
hoped that it would continue.
14 Nov. 1992
Hojjat ol-EsIam Mahmud Mohammadi Eraqi \isited several Bosnian cities and implored Iranians
to send aid. Several instances are cited of people demonstrating theirlranian heritage and
devotion to Iran and its principles. Eraqi reports that although there are food and water
shortages, the Bosnian Muslims "only demand weapons and military assistance from the Islamic
countries."
1
608
28 Dec. 1992
Izetbcgovic held an interview with a group of journalists from the Persian daily JOMHURIYE
ESLAMI. The group traveled to Sarajevo. During the interv iew. !zetbego\ ic declared Iran to be
Bosnia's "greatest friend in the world." OIC ministers are quoted as threatening to lift the
embargo by l.'15'93 if the Serbs did not agree to a cease fire. (The meeting was held in Jeddah
earlier in the month.)
3 May 1993
IRNA
In a meeting with Iran's ambassador to Greece. Qasem Moheb'Ali, Izetbegovic thanked Iran for
its support. The two met after signing the U.N. peace plan in the Astir Palace Hotel. Izetbegovic
expressed his hope that at the end of hostilities, Iran and Bosnia could enter into prosperous
economic relations. During an OIC meeting in Karachi earlier in the week. Iran pledged $20
million in aid to the Bosnian Muslims.
28 Dec. 1993
Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Izetbegovic conducted an interview with an Iranian journalist. He thanked Iran for its leadership
role in supporting the Bosnian Muslims and noted that because of such support, the Bosnian
Muslims were able to find the strength to fight the Serbs.
17 April 1994
Bosnian President Izetbegovic sent a communique to Iran's president regarding the siege of
Gorazde. In the communique, Izetbegovic implored the Iranians to "make every effort to defend
the inhabitants of Gorazde and to prevent their destruction."
23Aprai994
Tehran IRNA
During an aside to the Cans-Montana meetings in Bucharest, Velayati pledged Iran's full support
to the Bosnian Muslims to Silajdzic. In turn, Silajdzic spoke pessimistically about the role of
''international circles" and thanked Iran for its support.
29 April 1994
Tehi^ Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran
Deputy Prime Minister Edib Bukvic arrived in Tehran today. According to Tehran, Bukvic
thanked Iran for its support calling it Bosnia's 1>est friend and supporter in today's sorrowfiil
crisis." Bukvic asked for the lifting of the arms embargo and noted that Bosnia will continue to
rely on the aid and assistance fhim Iran.
30 April 1994
Tehran IRIB Television
Habibi met today with Croatian prime minister Valentic and Bosnian deputy prime minister
Bukvic. Valentic criticized recent Serb aggression and "conveyed his country's willingness to
engage in trilateral cooperation in various fields between Iran, Bosnia, and Croatia.
609
Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran
This account detailed Bukvic's visit in Iran and described the fact that despite the atrocities
occurring in Bosnia, the country had few friends and among those, "there are not many who are
ready to extend active support for the territorial integrity, independence, and sur\ival of the
oppressed Bosnian nation." "Iran reiterated i:s willingness to dispatch military assistance in
order to prewnt the Serbs from continuing their crimes of aggression." The piece concludes \n ith
a pledge for continued relations based on ideological Islamic tenet.
lAfayl994
Beijing Xinhua News Agency
According to Xinhua, Bosnia, Croatia and Iran signed a trilateral agreement to cooperate in the
resolution of the Bosnia crisis. In a communique dispatched after the agreements were signed in
Tehran, Nikica Valentic said that the trilateral negotiations concerned "resolving the Bosnian
crisis and humanitarian aid."
7 May 1994
Sarajevo Radio
"For the first time since the beginning of the aggression against our country, a delegation of the
Islamic Republic of Iran visited Sarajevo." Velayati's delegation was received by Izetbegovic.
In a speech to reporters after the meeting. Izetbegovic said that the meeting would have occurred
sooner had UNPROFOR permitted it and that the struggle for freedom would have been different
and less successftil without Iran's aid. Izetbegovic reported that a Bosnian delegation, including
the defense minister, had recently \isited Iran "and they made certain deals there."
8 May 1994
Tehran Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran
In an interview following his return from Sarajevo, Velayati said that "[e]xpansion of ties
between Iran and Croatia will play a positive role to reduce the suffering of the Bosnian people"
and he commended the federation agreement reached between Croatia and Bosnia.
23 May 1994
Ebrahim Rahimpur, Iran'<!^oreign Ministry special envoy called on Hri?^SilajdzJc. Iran's
ambassador to Bosnia, Muhammad Asayesh-Zarebi accompanied him. Rahimpur expressed
Iran's willingness to continue providing humanitarian and political aid to the Bosnians.
Rahimpur stressed that such aid was being provided out of friendship and not religion. Silajdzic
said there is no need for concern as Bosnia was a sovereign nation and could chose with whom to
deal on its own.
June 10. 1994
Ljubljanic arrived in Tehran today and met with Velayati. The two discussed the cunent
situation in Bosnia and bilateral relations. Ljubljanic said his country was still encouraging the
UN to allow Iranian and other Muslim troops into UNPROFOR.
June 11, 1994
Hashemi-Rafsanjani received Ljubljanic today in Tehran. Hashemi-Rafsanjani praised the
610
Bosnian Muslims and Ljubljanic thanked the Republic of Iran for its humanitarian aid.
4 Aug. 1994
Tehran IRNA
Silajdzic met with Velayati at the OIC meeting in Geneva asking for more Islamic counir>-
involvement in the Balkan crisis. The meeting was an aside to the OIC contact group meeting.
The situation in Bosnia was discussed and coordination among the contact group members. Also
in attendance was FM Ljubljankic and Taherian.
// Aug. 1994
Silajdzic received Iranian ambassador today and discussed the OIC plans developed at the
Geneva meeting. Issues of joint importance, including humanitarian were also discussed.
25 Aug. 1994
A delegation of Bosnians arrived in Iran. The delegation included Ljubijankic, Dr. Mirko
Pejanovic. Dr. Enes Karic, Ibrahim Jusufvranic, and Mayor Tarik Kuposovic. Pejanovic met
with the Deputy foreign Minister emphasizing the need to include Iranian diplomacy in the talks
with Russian and Greek diplomacies who are responsible for forcing the Serbs to accept the
Contact Group plan; Karic met with Iranian Culture Minister Mirsalim and agreed to integration
of each others countries cultural days into the calendar and curriculum.
28 Sept 1994
Sarajevo Radio BH Network
Taherian w as received by Ljubijankic today. They discussed economic development and the
situation in BH, particularly in Sarajevo.
29 Sept. 1994
Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Velayati met with Izctbegovic and the president of Azerbaijan today. Velayati reconfirmed
Iran's willingness to place troops under the UN flag in BH.
3 00.1994"^ =-'^
Sarajevo Radio BH %'etwoik
Member of Presidency Stjepan Kljuic received Ibrahim Taherian, ambassador of Iran to BH.
They discussed the role of UNPROFOR, the implementation of the federation on the ground, and
the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced people. Kljuic suted that BH
believed it would be in the best interests of the country if Islamic and Latin American troops
participated in UNPROFOR. Iran reiterated its willingness to conunit troops to UNPROFOR,
despite the possibility that British and French may pull out. Housing construction issues also
were discussed and Iran stressed that it already procured buses and financial ftuiding for the
return of refijgees.
30 Oct 1994
21agreb Radio Croatia Network
Croatian and BH Prime Ministers Nikica Valentic and Haris Silajdzic returned to Zagreb after a
611
six day visit to Malaysia. Pakistan, and Iran. Croatian PM characterized the trip as favorable
because it strengthened bilateral relations between C and BH and also with the visited countries.
Concrete results reached included the participation of Croatian and Bosnian companies in
Malaysia. Pakistani businesses held bnef talks with the two and entrance into the market looked
favorable. "One of the most important results of the tnp was certainly our visit to Iran, where we
held very comprehensive top-level talks." (Valentic) During this tnp Croatia concluded a deal
with Iran to build four ships worth SI 10 million in exchange for the same in crude oil. An
additional four ships were in agreement stage. Valentic stated that "This first deal -- 1 have to
say this openly -- has been concluded for the sake of good political relations between Croatia and
Iran. Future deals must have greater commercial value."
16 Nov. 1994
According to Tehran IRNA. Bosnian FM Ljubljankic cabled Velayati on 1 1/16/94 calling for the
"removal of all hurdles for dispatch of peacekeeping forces from Muslim countries, especially
from Iran, to BH." He also called for Muslim countries to present a strong presence and take
actions to solve the Balka-. crisis."
29.\ov. 1994
Tehran IRIB Television
Because of the attacks on Bihac. Izetbegovic cabled Hashemi-Rafsanjani requesting that Iran
increase international efforts to put an end to the violent aggression of Serb forces in BH.
Hashemi-Rafsanjani then cabled the heads of state of France and Germany asking them to take
new steps to thwart the Serb aggression.
J Dec 1994
A meeting in Geneva of the QIC is scheduled. Bosnian President Izetbegovic is scheduled to
attend. Bosnia's ambassador to Geneva, Musufa Bijedic, said that he would be accompanied by
FM Lubjankic. PM Silajdzic also was to try to attend if he could leave Bosnia. The meeting was
to be attended by the OIC contact group on Bosnia as well ministers from Morocco. According
to FBIS (12/1/94), Turkey and Iran had been appealing "over the last several days to the five
nation Contact Group on Bosnia (US, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) to take action to aid
the Bihac enf ISVc. - ""r
NOTE: After this meeting, the OIC declared the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims illegal
and immoral.
6 Dec 1994
According to FBIS (12/6 94). Croatian FM Mate Granic also attended the OIC meeting.
Bangladesh, Jordan, and Tunisia also were represented at the meeting. At the meeting the OIC
called for a breaking of all economic ties with rump Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and
rejected the European suggestions of easing sanctions against Belgrade.
NOTE: In the September 1994, the OIC met in Islamabad and called for the lifting of the arms
embargo. Failing that, the OIC members said they "could provide the [Bosnian Muslims] with
the necessary 'means of self-defense."'
612
7 Dec. 1994
According to a FBIS transcript of the Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Foreign Affairs Minister 'Aii Akbar Velayati said "the situation in Bosnia and ways of
preventing the Serb's aggression were studied." With regard to putting an end to Serb
aggression, "We had positive discussions . . anc" practical measures were taken, the effects of
which will appear gradually." Velayati also commented that Iran proposed at the session that
"Islamic countries should dispatch more peacekeeping forces to BH. These forces can replace
those of the countries that have threatened to withdraw from Bosnia."
Velayati also held private talks with Izetbegovic in which "bilateral relations and ways of
cooperation between the Xs.o countries were studied."
IV
104th congress
2d Session
House Calendar No. 214
H. RES. 416
[Report No. 104-551]
Establishing a select subcommittee of the Committee on International Rela-
tions to in\-estigate the United States Role in Iranian arms transfers
to Croatia and Bosnia.
IX THE HOUSE OF REPRESEXTATRTIS
April 29, 1996
Mr. GiLMAX submitted the following resolution: which was referred to the
Committee on Rules
>L\Y 2. 1996
Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
RESOLUTION
Establishing a select subcommittee of the Committee on
International Relations to investigate the United States
Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia.
1 Resolved, That (a) there is established a Select Sub-
2 committee on the United States Role in Iranian Arms
3 Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (hereinafter referred to
4 as the "select subcommittee") of the Committee on Inter-
5 national Relations. The select subcommittee is authorized
(613)
614
1 to sit and act (luriiit; this Cungi'css at such times and
2 places uithin the United States, uieluding any conunoii-
3 wealth or possession thereof, or in any other countri*.
4 whether the House is in session or has adjourned.
5 (b) The select subcommittee shall be composed of 8
6 members of the Conmiittee on International Relations ap-
7 pointed by the chairman of the Conmiittee on Inter-
8 national Relations, 5 of whom shall be members of the
9 majoritj' party and 3 of whom shall be appointed upon
10 the recommendation of the ranking minority' partA* raem-
11 ber of that conmiittee. The chairman of the Committee
12 on International Relations shall designate one of the ma-
13 joritj' partj* members as chairman. Any vacancy occurring
14 in the membership of the select subcommittee shall be
15 filled in the same manner in which the original appolnt-
16 ment was made.
17 (c) The select subcommittee is authorized and di-
18 rected to conduct a full and complete investigation, and
19 to make such findings and recommendations to the Com-
20 mittee on International Relations as the select subcommit-
21 tee deems appropriate relating to the following matters:
22 (1) The polic}' of the United States Government
23 \rith respect to the transfer of arms and other as-
24 sistance from Iran or anv other countrv to countries
25 or entities T^ithin the territorv of the former Federal
•HRE8 41« RH
615
3
1 Republic of Yugosla\ia during any periml tliat an
2 international arms embargo of the former Yugo-
3 sla\ia was in effect.
4 (2) The nature and extent of the transfer of
5 arms or other assistance from Iran or any other
6 countiy to countries or entities within the territor>*
7 of the former Federal Republic of Yugosla\ia during
8 the period that an international arms embargo of
9 the former Yugoslavia was in effect.
10 (3) Any actions taken by the United States
11 Government to fJaciUtate or to impede transfers de-
12 scribed in paragraphs (1) and (2).
13 (4) Any communications or representations
14 made to the Congress of the United States or the
15 American people with respect to the matters de-
16 scribed in paragraph (1), (2), or (3), with respect to
17 the international arms embargo of the former Yugo-
18 slavia, or with respect to efforts to modify or termi-
19 nate United States participation in that embargo.
20 (3) Any implication of the matters described in
21 paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) for the safeU' of United
22 States Armed Forces deployed in and around
23 Bosnia, for the prompt withdrawal of United States
24 Armed Forces firom Bosnia, for relations between
•HRBS 41« BH
616
4
1 the United States and its allies, and for I'nited
2 States efforts to isolate Iran.
3 (6) Any actions taken to re\ie\v. analyze, or in-
4 vestigate any of the matters described in paragraph
5 (1), (2), (3), (4). or (5), or to keep such matters
6 from being re\'ealed.
7 (7) All deliberations, discussions, or eommu-
8 nications ^^ithin the United States Government re-
9 lating to the matters described in paragraph (1),
10 (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6), and all communications be-
1 1 t^-een the United States Government (or anv of its
12 officers or employees) and other governments, orga-
13 ni2ations, or indi\iduals relating to such matters.
14 (d) The select subconunittee shall be deemed to be
15 a subcommittee of a standing committee of the House of
16 Representati\'es for all purposes of law and for all pur-
17 poses of the Rules of the House, including clause 2(m)
18 of rule XI, but not for purposes of clause 6(d) of rule X.
19 The select subcommittee may sit while the House is read-
20 Jng a measure for amendment under the five-minute rule.
21 (e)(1) The chairman of the select subcommittee, for
22 purposes of its investigation, may, upon consultation with
23 the ranking minorit\' partj' member of the select sub-
24 committee, authorize the taking of affida\its and deposi-
25 tions pursuant to notice or subpoena, by a member of the
•HRES 41« RH
617
o
1 select subeomniittec or of the staff of the Committee on
2 International Relations designated by the chairman of the
3 select subconmiittee. or require the furnishing of informa-
4 tion by interrogator>\ under oath administered by a person
5 otherwise authorized by law to administer oaths.
6 (2) The select subcommittee shall pro\ide other com-
7 mittees and Members of the House with access to informa-
8 tion and proceedings, under procedures adopted by the se-
9 lect subconmiittee consistent with clause 7(c) of rule
10 XLXTII of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
1 1 However, the select subcommittee may direct that particu-
12 lar matters or classes of matter shall not be made available
13 to any person by its members, staff, or others, or may
14 imp)ose any other restriction. The select subcommittee
15 shall, as appropriate, provide access to information and
16 proceedings to the Speaker, the mjgoritj'^ leader, the mi-
17 nority leader, and their appropriately cleared and des-
18 ignated staff.
19 (3) Authorized subpoenas may be signed by the chair-
20 man of the select subcommittee.
21 (f) The select subcommittee shall transmit a report
22 to the Committee on International Relations not later than
23 6 months after the date on which this resolution is agreed
24 to. The report shall contain a detailed statement of the
•HRES 41« RB
618
6
1 findings of the select subcommittee, together \nth its rec-
2 ommendations.
3 (g) The select subcommittee shall cease to exist 6
4 months after the date on wliich this resolution is agreed
5 to.
•HRES 41« RH
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►o> >> n-'ttqut: ^!^e -n Congiess anc
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) — HOISE
September ;J6, /SSe
•SPETt.*.:. ORncR?
Tkr .SPEAKER ?io lenipure iMr.
Fou.vi Vnaer ;h» Sp^-AKfr's an-
nouiiced p.->licy of M.vy 12. 199S. and
und*r a pretiou* .<ri:<r ot tho Hous« ih*
follo«ria« Membf.-!' will It r-cuKQUod
fur a mtnutr^i each
The SPEAKER pro temptTa Under a
pretioiu ord.»r of the Houfe. the sen-
Utman from Colorado {Mr. Skaoo.s] I*
rccocnUcd for i minutes.
[Mr. SKACGS addrauc<l the House.
His rsnuxks will appear hereafter In
the Extensions of Remarks.]
The Sl'EAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the Rouse, the gen-
tlsman from Indiana (Mr. MctNTOSH) Is
reeocnlud for S mioutes.
(Mr. Mcintosh addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter In
the Extensions of Remarks.]
SEQUENCE OF SPECIAL ORDER
Mr. HYDE Mr. Speaker. I ask unani-
mous consent to proceed out of order
with mj Vminote special order.
T*e SPEAKER pro tempore Is there
oblectloD to the rwiuest of the gen-
Uemaa from nilools?
There was no objection.
UNfTEO STATES ROLE IN IRANIAN
ARMS TRANSFERS TO CROATU
AND BOSNIA
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Qltnois (Mr. Hvst] Is rcc-
ocolxcd for $ minutes.
Mr. HYBE. Mr. Speaker. I rise to tn-
forin the House of the serious problem
that has come to ray atteotico as
chairman of the select subcommittee
of the House Committee 00 Inter-
national ReUtlons esiabllahed to look
Into the Clinton admlnUtratlon's pol-
icy of giving Irmn a green light In set-
Ung up military assistance ttrograms
In Croatia and Bosnia.
We are well along In our Investiga-
tion and hope to have a report ready to
share with the House and the public
next month. I can guarantee you that
If we can manage ;o get the admlnli-
tratlon to cooperate concerning the
riles of classincation. chat report will
make very interes-.mg reading It will
document an Incredibly Ill-advised pol-
icy that was conceived and executed In
an Incredibly inept manner
Moreover, and r-.ore ImporiAncly. It
will lay out for ai: -.0 see the tragedy In
the making that ii iu legacy, a well-
entrenched and hostile Iranian foot-
hold In Europe. The Iranian presence
.nd Influence, per.aslve In some of the
•!;«he»rclrcles of tn<- bosnian Muslin-.
koMicnl leadership. Is nor pUyini
h.voc with jur policymak»r» trying tr
:.T.plcm«nt the Dayion Accords a.id our
nii'.itary trvlog te keep the lid on vio-
lence in the region. This cloud of Ira-
man influence and the terrorist infra-
structure it has fostered in this part of
Europe nn. and will remain, very re.%:
threau to the West for years to come
The problem I wish to bring to your
aitentiun loocerns the difficulty our
subcommittee' has had In trying to pr>
loose information that must be shared
with the American people If they are to
understand our findings. Tae adminit-
tratlon is doing this by hiding behind
the rules of classification. That is. they
are Insisting that importaal Informa-
tion Is classined and cannot be shared
with the American people due to con-
eena of Its compromising national se-
curity.
What sort of Information am I talk-
ing abontT The names of Intelligence
sgeouT No. Information on our mili-
tary's capabilities? No. What we are
talking about are embarrassing little
conunenU and facts.
We art talking ahout lecreu tha:
..3k like this.
C IMS
This la one of three documeou we
asked the administration several
months ago to declassify for oar re-
port. After over a month of dellbera-
tloo. the Sute Department refused to
declassl.> two of them. sad. for this
one. they selecUvefy declassified SO
percent of the text. What then is In the
10 percent they deleted?
Well. I cannot UU you exactly, be-
cause the administration says It is
classined. I can 1st you know In the
meet general terms It Includes such
things as an embarrassing comment by
a senior Department of State offldal
on his department's performance Ic
formulating the policy that gave Iran a
green light Into coming Into the Bai-
ksns. It contains an embarrassing
statement about the administration s
ability or inability to reach a decision
on policy guidance te Issue an ambas-
sador. It contains an stetement wheth-
er or not to Interpose Itself between a
foreign government and the Iranians.
It also contains an embarrassing state-
ment about whether or not the admin-
istration would advlss our allies who
have troops on the ground la Bosnia cf
a decision that could affect the aafet t
of those troops.
I ask then. Is this classification t:
protect the national security, or is ::
to avoid embarrasameot and avoid ad-
mitting mistakes?
This administrmtlon has made a gres'.
hullabaloo about declasslfyiag infor-
mation. Openness has been iu byword
When It comes to sensitive military in-
formation, the motto has been when :r.
docbt. declassify.
Well, unfortunately, that is not hew
It works In practice. I Invite the ad-
ministration to live up to IU One rhet-
oric. In Its public pronounoemeou of
npennrjs. :he admlnistra'if.r. •rent v,
far as to issue a new executive order
tpeviflcally stAttng it shall be illeeai to
uoe the rules of classlOcation 10 "con-
ceal violations of law. Inefnclency or
administrative error." or "te jrtvent
embarrassment to a person. orKsniia-
tlon or agency "
That Is from Section 1.8 of tiit Clin-
ton Administration s Executive Order
129SS. Accordingly. I have referred this
matter today to the Information Secu-
rity Oversight Office and the Inter-
agency Security Claasineatlon Appeals
Panel for Investigation antf appropriate
action.
Ploally. I wish to sssurt the House
that we will continue to Investigate
the administration's efToru at provid-
ing the Iranians a unique opportunity,
that amoanted to. a franchise for la-
Blnaatiag and entrenching themselves
into a very vulnerable and volatile part
of Europe.
UPCOMING BIPAR-nSAN RETREAT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman fVora Ohio (Mr. Sawtsr] U rec-
ognized for i minutes.
Mr SAWYER. Mr. Speaker. I rise
today In company with our colleague
from New York. Mr. RoucirrON. to re-
port to the Bouse on the work that a
number of us have been doing and
many Members are aware of te put to-
gether a bipartisan retreat on the
weekend of February B through March
i In Rershey. Penasylviuila.
This work has come about as a result
of the efTortt o( many Member*, but I
particularly want to mention the >ork.
in addition to Amo and myself, of Oavi
Skacos and Rat LaBooo. who. to-
gether, have worked to develop this ef-
fort to bring together not only Mem-
bers, but our tkmilics and our chlldr*n.
in a period of time when we can over-
come some of the barriers that we have
ercouctered In recent years Co getting
to know one another 00 a human level,
on a personal baais. to understand the
kinds of things that motivate us. W
rccogoixe the honesty of eves differing
opinions. In a way that can help te
build the etvUlty of this Chamber and
elivate tlie quality of public discourse.
The ri«"»«n«g group tor this sffort In-
cludes other Members. It Includes Mr.
STKOiaus. Ma. Clatton, Mr. LaHood.
Mr. Iiouon<OH. Mr. Skaoos. Mr.
Drcsr. and Mis. FowLCX. in an effort
te use these last several weeks of this
session to pot together the logistics,
including ths site and the travel plans
for this weekend at the end of Feb-
ruao'-
I believe that there Is an enormoos
Appe-.'.te for this kind of effort. People
across not only this Chair.ber. but
throughout the country, have com-
mented on the wide variation In the
level of discourse that we have encoun-
tered In recent yeara. and many of us
believe that some of that can be over-
come, not solved, but overcome, by
simply getting to know one another
629
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURfTY sE^F
JK205U-6035
ONi HUM>KO FOUMTM CONOICSS
FUno a SKNCC S(Xm4 CAMXMA. CmmiM
April IS. 1996
Tha Honorable Nilliaa J. P«rry
S«cr«c«ry of DaCans*
Hashington, O.C.
Dear Secretary Perry:
Recent report* allege that the Adminiatration, beglnlng in
1994 and continuing through January 199£, undermined the
International arm* embargo against Bosnia by acquiescing in
Iran's transfer of arms to Bosnia. These allegations raise
questions that such a policy may have served to prolong the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, aaff facilitated increased
political and military influence oy Iran, on the Ejaropean i^m-* M^
continentj^»/_ Jca^<^tUir^LjfcJ~:SL C3^rii>^^..ii^^<l>i^fJJttY cLiOt tw. /jAlc> «***»'
The coamittee needs to ascertain whether and to what extent
the Oapartaent of Defense had any knowledge of Iranian arms
shipoeats to Bosnia during the period of the embargo.
Accordingly, I request that you provide the coomittee the
materials requested below and answers to the questions that
follow by May 13, 1996:
1. Please provide any imagery, photographic analysis, SIGINT,
or other intelligence reports available to the Department of
Defense indicating arms or munitions transfers from Iran to
Bosnia during the period of the arms embargo.
2. Please provide any internal Department of Defense
memorandum discussing tha existence or possibility of Iranian
arms or munitions transfers to Bosnia during the period of the
arms embargo.
3. To what extent were senior Department of Defense officials
aware of the alleged decision to acquiesce in arms transfers from
Iran?
4. Here any of the Department of Defense officials who briefed
this committee and the Congress during the period of the arms
amtoargo aware of tha alleged decision to acquiesce in arms
transfers from Iran?
630
S. xe Departneac ot iMt«nae officiala were aware of any auch
decision to aequieace in ax«a tranafera from Iran, what afforta
were made. If any, by the Department to notify tbia eooaalttee or
Congrcaa?
S. To your knowledge, did the U.S. provide arms or nunitions
to Bosnia directly or to a third party for transfer to Bosnia
during the period of the ania anbargo?
7. To your knowledge, did the U.S. facilitate the transport of
arms and munitions, aupplied by a third party, to Bosnia during
the period of the arms embargo?
S. To your knowledge, did the U.S. in any way modify or alter
cad9«X90 enforcwaeat operations to facilitate the third party
flhipmcnt of arms or Munitions to Bosnia during the period of the
anas embargo?
9. To what extent were members of the Joint Staff, EOCOH staff
or other military organixatlons involved in direct execution of
the Administration's Bosnia policy aware of the alleged decision
to acquiesce in arms transfers from Iran?
The point of contact on the committee professional staff will
b« Peter Pry who can be reached at (^03y22C-0531. Your assistance
and proo^t action on this io^ortant matter is appreciated.
with regards, I am^^
Sincerely,
Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
li^M-Fr
631
COMMOTIE OM rCWElOM MELATK3NS
WajMMTiM. OC 201IO-422S
April 16. 1996
The PicsMkal
The White Hoiae
WMhiagieii. O.C. 20Sno
Dear Kir. President:
I confess deq> coawau about medU rcpoitj that you dKided in 1904 to
becoming the principal supplier of annaments to the Bosnian military. The fi
bcaa a nvptier of weapons to the Boaaiaa govenunent has been public knowlc
time.
ppro' «
that
;e fo
IranVi
Iran has
some
inetnba' of your Administratioa inform the Committee of this recently-disciose I
presian^ly covert) Iran policy'
What has flol been public knowledge are the aUegations that your Admlunratlon
saactlooed - indeed, bctlitated • tfie intervention of that tenorist nation into theJBallutn
confUcL
Mr. Pmldant. the Bosnians did indeed i>eed weapons and training to rcdel Sepia's
illegal aggression. I wis ariMng those who argued strenuously at the lime that t was the
responsibility of Que United States to provide such tssistance. I am therefore st inned by the
credible reports diat, at the very sane time you were actively opposing leglslati >n in Congresi
to lift the embargo and provide the Bosnian Government with arms and trainin) . you
Administration was subcontracting U.S. responsibilities lu iIk pariah regime in ran. 'As a
direct result of that policy. Iran — a radicai. fimdamentalist, letTorist nation -- ijpw h4s a
strategic foothold in Europe.
I am fiDther dismayed that despite the numerous public hearings and brkfing!
conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee on the Bosnian conflict, aet ti s
di^ iax
(and
tn prepaiaUon for • comprehensive review of tfau matter by the Foreigi Relajionx
Committee. I rcspcctfiiOy reqtiest that you instruct roemben of your Administr tion to submii
no later dun April 26. 1996. any and all documents related to the role that yotir
Administration may have played in proposing, organizing, assisting, consulting arrailging. or
agreeing to die transfer of arnu by any govermnenl or private organisation inti the I srmer
Yugoslavia during the period in vvfaich the United Nations arms embargo was i efFKt.
In addttKm. I wlU appreciate your iiistructiof someone authorized to sp «k fo^ you to
reload to the followiitg questions posed formally by the Foreign Relations C^ mmittee
no/zooc
iiv:s «:•: :va mi KiZi:i 95-}:->o
632
s.
10
II.
Did th« CovtnuBcnt of Cruti« tn)uesi the views of the Oovemiflent oT the
United States in regard to the transfer of Iraniu arms through CaMtiai territory
to BosaiB? I
DM uy offlcial of the Oovcnuncnt uf the Uiiiled Suies respond to »w h a
request? If to, what was the icsponse?
Did the efToit to tnnsfa Iruiaa una to Bosoit through Croatia terri cry also
facilitate the entiy of Iranian government operatives into Bosoial
Did any official of the Goventment of the United States at any tj ite pi opose
any ofndal of the Oovcmmeat of Cnixia any initiative to facilii
of atnu to Bosnia?
le th<
Did any ofScial of the Govtnusent of the United States meet at {pny tihie with
any official of the Oovcmment of Iran to discuss the transfer of
Bosnia? If so. when and where did such meetings take place, arjll whkt exactly
was discussed?
Did the Government of the United Sutes provide to any ofIiciaJ| of tht
GovcmiDcnt of Itiui any infbnnation -- classified or otherwise — on aii
ground ioteidiction efforts to enforce the United Nations snns ei ibarg<i against!
Bosnia for die purpose of assisting in the evasion of such mcasuj|es? ^ so.
what information was provided?
Was any such infonrution provided to the Uovenunent of Croat:
information was provided?
Was the transfer of Iranian weapons to Bosnia consistent with t> : United
Nations urns embargo?
Did the United States have an obligation to inform the United Mktiotis
Council of any evidettce that the arms embargo was being systea latica
violated?
I? ir
so. what
maner.
Did the transfer of Iranian arms to Bosnia pose any danger or c^ nue ahy
additioaal risk to th« paacakccping troops paiticipatiag in the Ud ited Tfatinns
Protection Force in Bosnia?
What is the distinction between the Government of the United ^tes
acquiescing to the delivery of Iranian weapons to Bosnia versus | the
Government of the United States directly delWering weapons to posnl^?
Mr. President. I wui very much appreciate your cooperation and assistarjfcc m his
^
Respectfully.
JESSE HELMS
to
deliver;
Security!
ly i
633
April 21, 1994
Fr«sident Bill Clinton
The Whice House
Waal-i-g^cn, D.C. 205C0
Sfiar Mr. President:
With each passing day. the situation ir. Bosnia •Kerccgovina
deteriorates further as the legitlcate internationally recsgr.ixad
goverr.-er.t of that country struggles to defend itself fror. Bosnia.-.
Serb aggressors assisted by their allies in Belgrade. In response
to this tragic situation, the iTnited States should irrr.ediately lift
the arr\s ecJsargo imposed on the Bosnian govcrrr-ent and f irrly taxe
the lead in urging others and the CM to do likewise. It is a
course of action that should be pursued before any nore Xnericans
are asked to risk their lives in pursuit of a vague policy that
do4S not distinguish between the aggressors and the vic.i.rs.
Sooe 63,000 men, tramen, and children of Corazda are now at the
rercy of a vicious Serb army that has targeted a hospital and
huTnanitari&n relief organizations for intensive shelling, killing
scores of iaDoc«nt civilians and reducing much of the city to
rubbl«. In response to limited and largely ineffective NATO air
strikes by US aircraft operating under Byzantine rules of
engagement And tangled ON/KATO chains of command, Serb forces
pronptly gathered up OH personnel as hostages, blocked humanitarian
relief convoys, and forcefully vrested control of heavy arms from
US peacekeepers in the so-called Sarajevo exclusion zone. In so
doing, they hAve demonstrated a capability and determination
against w'aleh the current UN/KXTO military posture is simply
inadequate.
In response to yet another in a series of failures to halt
Serbian aggression, your Mminlstration seems intent on adhering to
an intellectually uneven and ineffectual policy. He relinquish
both authority and responsibility to a UN that institutionally is
incapable of ta)cing decisive action. We repeatedly pledge our
neutrality in the Bosnian conflict while reportedly rushing into
Ooraxde a small contingent of ON observers in early April to act as
a crip wire to justify our ultimately unsuccessful bombing of Serb
attackers. The Xdainistration refuses to lift the arms embargo
against the Bomian government, but you publicly stats on numerous
occasions the desirability of so doing.
634
.- .— - ic.teA;«c :.:.T- a-d tixe again. Ke
a?D«ar wavering, indectilve and irresol-ze. y- ?rejider.c. -r.e
iiT.e is long overdue tha; c^e Ur.lstd State* icc ir. tiir natxc-al
incers3C and not rely on the UN co deterr.ir.t our policy, without
furcr.«r deliberition. you ihould lift tht anr.! «itbargo cr. t.-.e
•csr.ian sovtrr.mtnt and upon r«c«i?t from that 5cvemr.e.-.t ot a
r«q-j«sc for *f«istar.c«, provide appropriate r.ilitary assistance.
You should also taX« th« lead in urcing other gcverr. ne.-.cs to so
likewise .
0-r .-.ational interest lies ir. returning stability to t.-.a
regior. *r.d securing the eovereignty of ir.cerr.aticr.ally recogr.ized
governrents there. If thi« conflict is pemittad to continue or.
itc preser.c co'irse, it will inevitaSly deitaollize neighboring
countries and a dangerou* broadening of the conflict could result.
Our interests and thoae of the peoples of the region are ser-/sc by
leveling the battlefield and aimultaneously encouraging peace
negotiations. lifting the embargo is one of the few steps' that
could proTpt Serbians Co seriously consider a negotiated settle.r.cnt
to end* this conflict. Nothing getf the attention of an aggresscr
like a formidable foe. Aa long as Serbians believe chey can win on
the battlefield, they won't retire until their genocide is
complete.
The Kouse>Scamte Conference on the State Depar.T.ent
authorization bill thia wce)< endorsed a provision expressing the
Sense of the Congress that you should terr.inate the US arr.s erbargo
on Bosnia and urging you to provide apprspriatc nilitary
assistance. We are enclosing a copy of this language which you
should soon be in a position to sign into law.
Mr. President, we urge you to take the action urged upon you
by Congress and provide the esbattled Bosnian govemfflent with the
means to defend itself, to fight its own war and to win its own
peace. We should atop creating the Boi&ian government like a ward
of Che OK that ia Incapeble of atanding up for itself. Xll the
Boaniana want from the world ia a chance to protect themselves, a
baaic right guaranteed by Xrtiele Si of the UN Charter. Lifting
the arms embargo -- an action that ia clearly within your grasp ••
will give thea that chance and it is no longer norally defensible
CO deny ic . ^-^ .
^■y^^^
Sncloeure
635
Congress of the fUnted States
CnBaUnc n l«ni»tional Kdationi
Miy2.1996
Ite Hoooabk Wanca QBtaophci
SecRUiy of Soie
UDked StUH DcpunBeat of !
2201 *C* Stiwt. N.W.
WtshiagtoB, D.C. 30520
Dear Mr. Secrettiy:
I write wUb rc^eo to my tencx to yoa of April 23. 1996, ttgn^iat the Caomiisee'i
requea to okc vudtaoof bom Anbasadon Galbiiiih and Kadmaa on U.S. polky towani
Botnia.
I was ift-n""-*"* to kan ibat te SMe DcpaniDaa bad made available Aoibasaadon
Galbraith aid Hedmaa to toadiy betoe Ike Scaw PcnaaeA Seka Coniniaee oo InttlUgcocc
Ihil week dea|ritt mf wiiitca nqaes to yoa at April 23rd and ny 00*1 tailia onl icqaeatt
for Mch a bearias at iooB aa I
This if even more frumaiing given die pkdge of Under Seocaiy TamofT in recea
testimosy before ibe fill * ■■ '"«* to oakB avaUable ibeae gfinkmrji to our oomminee.
My saff bat been infoaned by your legitlative afbin saff ibat Anbaitadon Gaibraith
■«H B»«im«ii would be made available to die ""««''"** but only under certain coodiiiont:
aamely, my caunianeot ibat Ibey would noc be called back by ibe Selea Sttbcoamiltee on
Inn/Botnia aikd odter u yet nnstatBd owrtirinnt. I am nae you can ifpreciaie my rehKUnce
to agree to any f«n^itin«« given dat te new tefea ■ibcoomiQee bu not yet been ccostiaited.
I would not in aay way want to conaiTiin ibai nbconmittee'i ability to fOffill its mandate witb
regard to diis imponaot fanign policy i
Acconlii^. I OBoe again mpwat ibat Ambwaadon Galbraiih tad Redman be made
available to testify in public teoian before die faO r^nrmninrr at dte earlien poctibU time.
SbouM the committee ooc receive a taiitfartnry antwer in thit regard, I believe 1 have no choice
but to consider eoavcali« iIk foil """"""" oext week to consider the iscuaace of lubpoenat
to coBTCl the preseuce of Ambanadon Oalbtaith and Redman before dc foil committee.
636
I also wia to lalK Ihu opponunity to coovey ny franitioo with icgaid to loodier upea
of U.S. poUcy in Bonk. A> yoa know, ihe '•~"-'»«'~ wu hx pleased to rtad in the
Bcwipapmabm te AteiDtabiilaa't faeaa poUcy Gte^e oo dK IcBfih of the deployment of
U.S. foicM la BoBoia wtakh ocaintil hardy a day after diica Kstiiiioay id Oh cattmy by
Under Secmaiy Tamoff and DoD official Tom Lo^oicth.
Today die WMiimpnn iv^ icponed that the Pncideat bai (kcided to keep U.S. foicei
at fiillKrei^iiadl after die elections pUaned for SqNcmber. In additkn, die ankle mea widi
regard to a poasibie foOow-on pencekeepinc operuion m Bosnia diat would take over fron IFOR
on Deceaiber 2(tt th« *Tte While Hoose has not rated out U.S. paiticipaiioo in anch an
"P""*" ■Bd there even have been planning sessions at die Penag on aid Sate p*fif V" •<• to
discuss the shape of such a fom. sources said.*
TUs tcpon direct^ cootrsdiets ds swora testimoiv of Uider Secretary Tanioff at our
hearing last week. At diit hearing, ihe Rankii« Demoaitk: Moaber of our CoamiiiEe. Kfr.
Hamihnn. askxd Mr. Taractf There is no cnnsirirrition being given to aay kind of follow-on
military force after December 20di?* and was toU by Mr. Tamoff 'That is concct.*
In my AprQ 26ih leiier hi you I stated: *I can only suimiie that '■'"Yn my colleagues
wmmisled last Tuecday. or die Director of Seaetaiy Peny's Bosnia Task Fwce snd the UiMler
Secretary of StaB for Political AfCiin aic not fliOy infonned about die pUnotiv w>f> Rgard to
the withdrawal of U.S. fbioes from Bosnia. In either eveat, die AdministiatioalMsjaapardixed
iu credibility widi ds Congieaa on a vial foreign policy maaer.* Today's w«»h;^yt«« Vna
story merdy uadetSGores the nocoracy of diat staiemeat.
I urga you to fully infocm our committee just what Administradon policy is widi tcspect
to die wididrawaloru.S. farces in Bosnia. In additioo, I would Uka to iclinite my laquasi diat
you ask your HaCf to review the nantcript of our Aptil 23id Ixaitag in order to clarify die
Adminiaration's '■"'itfuy with legatd to ilus maitter.
Thank yon for your ""—j"^ to diese maaers.
Widi best wishes,
IAMINA.~
Chairman ■
BAO/Jwr/pbb
637
Congress of the Bnited States
Commiotc on Sntonanonal Ktlations
tionsc or KcprcstnQdou
ICDaBhington, B£ :oii5
May 13. 1996
OOMIiOM •**•« *••*•»••
MOOT** Mt<4«tttt «<>«*w
C«a> » S'M*
The Honorable LxMiis J. Freeh
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Room 7176
Washington. DC. 20535
RE Request for Detailed Agents
Dear Diref/a^Ttcch:
Recently, I spoke with your Chief of Suff. Bob Bucknam. about the issue of detailing
FBI agents to assist the new House International Relations Select Subcommittee to investigate
the United Sutes' role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. As you know. 1 have
been designated to chair and conduct the Select Subcommittee's inquiry. Critical to a fair and
thorough examination of this serious matter will be the Bureau's assistance and skilled
investigative support.
The investigation will be challenging and wide-ranging. It is very important that the
Congress have the benefit of the Bureau's best and most experienced agents. The agents to be
deuiled should have considerable experience in both the criminal and foreign counter intelligence
(FCI) fields.
In order that we thoroughly explore all of the facts surrounding the question of Iranian
arms into Bosnia, I specifically request that three experienced senior agents be detailed to the
Select Subcommittee: two with criminal investigative backgrounds, and one with specific FCI
experience. Fluency in Serbo-Croatian by one or more of the agents would be extremely useful,
as would an understanding or familiarity with Farsi.
It is my hope that these agents can be selected soon, and made available to the Select
Subcommittee for the duration of its mandate in the 104th Congress.
638
Page Two
Lener to Director Freeh
Again. I thank you for your willingness to accommodaie this request. As soon as your
selection of these agents is made, my staff will be in touch with your office to discuss all of the
necessary ammgements, including compensatory information, for detailing these agents to the
Select Subcomminee.
With best wishes. I remain.
Very truly yours.
HENRYSJWfDE
Chairman
Select Subcommittee to Investigate
the U.S. Role in Iranian Arms Transfers
to Croatia and Bosnia
HJHXpbm
639
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Regarding the Use of Executive Branch Law Enforcement
Investigators Detailed to the Select Subcommittee by DOJ and FBI
The Majority and Minority staff of the Select Subcommittee on the United States
Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia have reached the following
understanding regarding certain terms and procedures relating to the use of Executive
Branch lav«^ enforcement investigators ("Select Subcommittee agents') detailed to the
Select Subcommittee by the Department of Justice ('DOJ') and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ('FBI').
(1 ) Professional law enforcement investigators assigned by the Department of
Justice and the FBI shall be a joint resource to both the Majority and Minority of the Task
Force.
(2) All assignments to the Select Subcommittee agents by the Chief Counsel,
and/or the Minority Chief Counsel, shall, for administrative purposes be made either by or
through the Chief Counsel. The Chief Counsel shall provide timely notice to the Minority
Chief Counsel of all assignments to the investigators. ^
640
(3) Unless directed omerwise Dy tne unief Counsel, or the Minority Chief
Counsel, the Select Sut>connmittee agents may conduct interviews personally or by
telephone. Such interviews shall osf be under oath unless directed by the Chief Counsel,
upon consultation with the Minority Chief Counsel.
(4) The Select Subcommittee agents shall provide the Chief Counsel, except in
extraordinary circumstances, who shall in tum notify the Minority Chisf Counsel, sufficient
advance notice of any pending appointments for interviews, so that either Chief Counsel
can determine whether to assign an attorney to join the interview.
Furthermore, with regard to all personal interviews. Select Subcommittee agents
shall:
(a) inquire whether the witness is represented by counsel, and if so, inform the
Chief Counsel and Minority Chief Counsel accordingly, prior to scheduling the interview;
(b) take notes during all interviews and keep the originals of the same as a
record of the Select Subcommittee;
(c) reduce to writing, in niennorandum form, the substance of all personal
interviews within five working days, unless drcumstances prevent that schedule and the
Chief Counsel approves the delay;
2
641
(d) provide both the Chief Counsel and the Minority Chief Counsel a copy of the
interview merrwrandum; and
(e) insure that any documents, records, exhibits, or other evidence obtained from
the interviewed witness are turned over immediately to the Select Subcommittee security
officer pursuant to the procedures relating to the same.
Richard J.
Chief Counsel
Richard Meltzer
Minority Chief Counsel
Date
P:>0AT*\raM\MfMO»MOur» ooc
642
WmOBMroPM OF rnDBRSTAMDIBG
wHiwt xmrxxD sraksxs bcxisb of vxpsasanKTiwEs
wjxcrp aPBuamriiE ov ihb umitku staxes sois n
IBANIAll ABKS tKAKSFBBS TO CSOATIA AHD BOSHIA
AVD
IBB FKDBRAL BDSEAIJ OF IHVSSTIGATiail
I. This document is a Menorandxiin of Understanding between
the United States House of Representatives Select Subcomaittee on
the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia ("Select Subcommittee") and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") regarding certain terms and procedures
relating to the detail assignment of Special Agents of the FBI to
the Select Subcommittee.
II. puttes and Responsibilities of the Chief Counsel and
Minority- Chief Counsel to the Select Subcommittee
(A) Federal law enforcement investigators assigned to
the Select Subcommittee by the FBI shall be a joint resource to
both the Majority and Minority staffs of the Select Subcommittee.
(B) The Select Subcommittee shall reimburse the FBI
for all costs associated with the detail assignment of FBI
Special Agents to the Subcommittee, including official travel
expenses .
(C) The Chief Counsel and/or the Minority Chief
Counsel shall furnish written or oral responses, if requested by
the FBI, regarding the performance appraisal of FBI Special
Agents detailed to the Select Subcommittee.
(D) All assignments to the Select Subcommittee agents
by the Chief counsel and/or the Minority Chief Counsel shall, for
administrative purposes, be made either by or through the Chief
Counsel. The Chief Counsel shall provide timely notice to the
Minority Chief Counsel of all assignments to the agents.
(E) Unless directed otherwise by the Chief Counsel, or
the Minority Chief Counsel, the Select Subcommittee agents may
conduct interviews personally or by telephone. Such interviews
shall not be under oath unless directed by the Chief Counsel,
upon consultation with the Minority Chief Coxinsel.
OS 0* 06 TW 13:04 (T\ RX VO St61 I
643
III. Duties anj p^taponslbilities of the Select
Subcommitf e Aqent»
(A) The Select Subcoaaittec agents shall assist the
Subcommittee in all tasks related to the objective of the
Sxibcommittee, as directed by the Chief Counsel.
(B) The Select Subcommittee agents will remain subject
to the personnel rules, regulations, laws and policies applicable
to FBI employees and will adhere to Subcommittee rules and
regulations which are applicable to the performance of their
assigned duties at the Subcommittee, so long as those rules do
not conflict with PBI rules and regulations.
(C) The Select Subcommittee agents shall provide the
Chief Counsel, except in extraordinary circumstances, who shall
in turn notify the Minority Chief Counsel, sufficient advance
notice of any pending appointments for interviews, so that either
Chief Counsel can determine whether to assign an attorney to join
the interview.
(D) With regard to all witness interviews, Selecc
Subcommittee agents:
(1) shall inquire whether the witness is represented
by counsel, and if so, inform the Chief Counsel and
Minority Chief Counsel accordingly, prior to scheduling
the interview;
(2) shall identify themselves as staff investigators
of the Select Subcommittee, and not as federal law
enforcement agents;
(3) shall not possess a firearm nor display FBI
credentials or badge during the conduct of any personal
interviews;
(4) shall take notes during all interviews and keep
the originals of the same as a record of the Select
Subcommittee ;
(5) shall reduce to writing, in memorandum form, the
substance of all witness interviews within five working
days, unless circumstances prevent that schedule and
the Chief Counsel approves the delay;
(6) shall provide both the Chief Counsel and the
Minority Chief Counsel a copy of the interview
memorandum ;
OS/09'96 THl' 15:04 (TX/R.X NO 51611
644
(7) shall insure that any docuatents, records,
exhibits, or other evidence obtained fron the
interviewed witness are turned over imaediately to the
Select Subcomittee security officer pursuant to the
procedures relating to the same.
(E) The Select Subconunittee agents shall not exercise
any law enforcement authority granted then by lav while executing
the duties and responsibilities for which they have been detailed
to the Select Subconmittee.
(F) The Select Subcommittee agents shall not provide
any oral or written account of information obtained as a result
of the agents' assignment to the Select Subcommittee either to
the FBI or to ths personnel of any other Executive Branch agency
without the express approval of the chief Counsel.
(G) This agreement may be terminated by either party
upon written notice to the other party.
RICHARD ^^POCKER ^ DATE ^ >
Chief Counsel
RICHARD KELTZER DATE^ i
Minority Chief Counsel
HOWARD M. SHAPIRO O DATE O^^ '
General Counsel, FBI
08 09 96 TBI- 15:04 (TX/fU SO 5161 I
645
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May IS, 1996
Dear Mr. Chairnan:
I am writing in response to your letter regarding arms supplies
to Bosnia in 1994. I have asked the relevant agencies to address
the specific questions tr.at you raised in your letter a.nd to wor>:
with you to ensure that the Committee obtains the information it
needs on this matter. I would lilce to take this ODPortluniCV.
however, to review the context of events in Bosnia at that time
and the policy this Administration has pursued in order to end
the conflict there.
From the day we took office, this Administration opposed the
United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia because it gave the
Serbian aggressors an unfair advantage over, their Bosnian
victims. At the same time, we opposed a unilateral lifting of
the embargo because of the damage it would have done to relaticrs
with our NATO allies and the potentially disastrous, short-ter-
effects it could have had on the ground in Bosnia. Unilateral
lift would have put us in direct violation of a binding UN
Security Council resolution. It would have triggered a ma^or
escalation in the war and caused the immediate withdrawal of
UNPROFOR, presenting us with the tough choice of deploying grour.c
troops to Bosnia to help our Allies extract their troops in a
hostile environment or doing nothing and precipitating the
biggest crisis in NATO since its founding.
In the spring of 1994, we faced another difficult decision when
we were approached by Croatia on the question of allowing third-
country weapons — from Iran and other sources — to pass through
Croatia to Bosnian Government forces. If we had objected to
potential arms shipments and the Croatians had complied, the
Muslim-Croat Federation might have been destroyed in its infancy,
making a bad situation for the Bosnians even worse. Under the
circumstances, we chose to uphold our own obligation under the UN
Security Council Resolution 713 not to provide arms to Bosnia,
thus avoiding the harmful consequences that would have resulted
from unilateral lift. But we chose not to take a position with
respect to Croatia's permitting aims shipments to Bosnia across
its territory. I believe that my Administration made the correct
decision at the time, and I believe subsequent events havs 'sorr.s
that out.
646
It is important To' remember that the Iranian presence m Bosnia
predates this decision. In fact, Iranian efforts to gain
influence in Bosnia date back to the 198Cs, and they gained
■omentum in 1991-92, in the early stages cf the war. when the
international community proved unable to confront Serb
aggression. During this period, despite the UN arms embargo,
Iran established itself as Bosnia's principal arms supplier and
dispatched hundreds of personnel to assist ir. training Bosnian
Governnent forces. Iranian military aid was part of a .T.ulti-
pronged campaign of support that also mcludec intelligence
cooperation along with economic and humanitarian assistance. We
have no evidence that the Iranian presence increased
significantly after April 1994.
By contrast, the policy we pursued helped set the stage for
changes in the military balance in Bosnia that led to the
successful negotiation of the Dayton Accords. We insisted that
those accords contain strict provisions on the withdrawal of
foreign forces . Moreover, we made clear to the Bosnians that our
readiness to lead an international effort to train and equip
Federation forces was contingent on their ending all military an:
operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. As a result, the
Iranian presence has been reduced to its lowest level since the
start of the war, and we are working with the Bosnian government
to reduce Iranian influence even further.
Our decision in April 1994 not to obnect to third-party anas
shipments to Bosnia through Croatia was extremely sensitive: if
it had become public, it could have led to serious tensions
between us and our allies and further aggravated an already
difficult situation in Bosnia. He did not discuss with Iran the
issue of arms supplies for Bosnia, and we did not ourselves
provide or transport arms to Bosnia. No U.S. covert action was
undertaken.
In October 1994, Congress in effect codified this policy when it
passed legislation that cut off funds for the purpose of U.S.
enforcement of the embargo, while declining to lift the embargo
against Bosnia unilaterally. Throughout this period, members of
Congress were aware — through intelligence shared with the
Congress and press reports — that arms shipments were entering
Bosnia from third countries and that Iran was playing a role
there. Consistent with our approach during the spring, the
legislation did not make an exception for arms coming from any
country, including Iran, nor was such an exception proposed
during the Congressional debate.
647
I welcome this opportunity to present the policy my
Administration has pursued to help bring peace to Bosnia. Let me
assure you that my Administration will cooperate fully with the
Committee and with other Congressional bodies in their
examination of this matter.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
648
0K iundnd Standi Cangmi
CongreBB of the Bnited $tateB
Committtc on dntonationai TUIatioiu
fuott of Kqirumtanou
OuhingaHi. 9C 20511
May 21. 1996
The Honorable Tony Lake
Aasiscant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington. O.C. 20S00
Dear Mr. Lake:
As you know, we have reached agreement with the Department
of State that Ambassadors Charles Redman and Peter Galbraith will
testify before the Committee on International Relations next
Wednesday. May 29th. Among other things, this agreement avoids
the necessity of serving the subpoenas that were authorized by
our Committee on May 8th for the testimony of these two
individuals.
In order for our Coonittee to prepare to receive the
testimony of Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith, we need access to
*11 relevant Executive branch documents. I realize that there is
not sufficient time before the May 29th hearing for the Executive
branch to process a new document request regarding the
Iran/Bosnia matter. Accordingly, I ask only that you make
available to this Committee all documents within the custody of
the White House that have been made available to other
congressional committees with respect to this matter.
I would appreciate your delivering all such documents to the
Committee no later than Friday, May 24th. so that we will have
adequate time to review them.
Please have your staff contact my Chief Counsel, Stephen
Rademaker. at 22S-7376 if you have any questions about this
request .
With best wishes,
SincAely.
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN
Chairman
649
MOV AAO L HIkMAN.
Congress of the UNfiTED States ^^^i
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Selea Subcommittee oa tbe UmUed Sutet Role in
IrauUu Ama Tramfen M Om(u tniBoinia
Washington, D.C. 20515
"*"•"" COPY
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United Sutes Department of State
2201 -C- Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary^
As you are aware, the House of Represenuiives chanered a "Selea Subcommittee to
Investigate the United States' Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia.* H.Res. 416
(May 8, 1996). During the course of the Subcomminee's preliminary inquiries, it has been
brought to our attention that the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, through various
"administrative' measures, has recently brought extremely important official government
activities to a virtual halt.
Upon the Ambassador's return to Croatia, following his testimony before Congress, the
Ambassador sought to impose-and did impose-a number of intolerable conditions on specific
conduct of certain personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Zagreb. It is our
understanding that the Ambassador's actions have worked to reduce morale, and have also
disrupted important professional relationships between officials working at the mission.
We are aware of the important role each member of an Embassy staff plays in the
achievement of American foreign policy. Furthermore, we are cognizant of the important
national security information that has been developed over the past several years that impacts
upon the United States' vital interesu in that particular region of the globe. Such information
has, in fact, saved American lives. Therefore, it u highly distressing to learn that our ambassador
has apparendy allowed his personal prejudice to interfere with our national security concerns, not
the least of which is the need to protea the lives of the tens of thousands of U.S. troops currendy
deployed in the highly volatile environment of the former Yugoslavia.
650
The Honorable Wairen M. Christopher ODDV
July 3. 1996 WWl" f .
Page 2
We would welcome your inquiry into dm nuncr and your providing our Comminee
with a repon on the Sute Department's actions to rectify this untenable situation. We ask that
the appropriate State Department Bureau brief senior staff of our Comminee on this maner at
your earliest opportunity.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Very truly yours.
tNJAMIN A. OILMAN HBMKV J. HYDE '
Chairman Sdea Sufacommioee Chairman .
cc The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
The Honorable John M Deutch
Direaor of Central Intelligence
The Honorable Larry Combest
Chairman
Houac Permanent Sdect Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Lee H. Hamiltott
Ranking Democranc Member
Select Subcommittee
BAG:HJH/pbm
651
OOUC KJLELTIA.
E!Z!L Congress of the United States tcuiH,..^.
^is;;mj^ House of REPRESE^^■A•^VES
"*~" ^^ Committee on International Relations
-tm^SItSU'*^ Mta Sitbeommittt* on the United Stala Role in
Iranian Armi Transfen to Croatia and Botnia
Washington, DC 20515
July 26, 1996
Mr. John M. Quinn
Counsel to the President
West Wing
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. NW
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Quinn:
We are writing to request that you provide any of the documents that satisfy the
Subcommiitee's requesu found in the anached letters, and any other information relating to
the transfer of arms from Iran to Croatia and Bosnia which are in the possession of your
office, or under the control of the White House.
This information wiU facilitate the Subcomminee's investigation of the issues relatine
to the government's decision regarding the Iranian arms transfers. Due to the Umited time
grantrf to the Subcommittee by its Congressional chaner. we ask that these documents be
provided to us by close of business August 2, 1996.
Should you have any questions regarding thb request, please do not hesitate to contaa
me or my staff at (202) 225-2264. Thank you for your prompt anention to this maner.
Sincerely, >^
^^^^^ ^^
H^ffRY J. HYDE LEE H. R\MILTON
^*'""»° Ranking Democratic Member
l-'J>ATA\ttBMtUISS.rtO
652
oouc umzima. hovahsliimuk
^>«*< Congress of the United States iE-'^-*^^
House op Representatives
COMMTTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
i^»!l!!» aS^T*^ ^''^ SuhtommilUe oa the Uniud Suta RoU in
Inmum Amu Trsmtfen to Cnatu and Bomia
Washington, D.C. 20515
July 26, 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary.
We are writing to request an interview with the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright. United
States Ambassador to the United Nations, relative to the issues, facts and evenu under
bvestigation by this Select Subcommittee. We are requesting tha our staff counsel be permined
to interview Ambassador Albright between August 7 and August 15, and wotild appreciate
learning when, during that time frame, the Ambassador will be available.
Should you have any questions regarding this request, please do not hesitate to contact us
or our staff at (202) 225-2264. Thank you for your assistance and prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
HENRTn. HYDE ^ LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
^«^'
KNOATAVn^CVAUMCHrilm
653
DOCC UAELTU. Hq v UD L tfJlMAN.
»««TON. Congress of the United States ^^i^-^n^^
ZSissHaAOL. House of Representatives
' — Committee on International Relations
..Slt^E tSi!**-"*- **«* S«*coi«iiii«n« on ibt Umiled Stata Role in
Irsmuu Armi Tranifm to CnatU and Bomia
Washington, DC 20515
July 26, 1996
The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Depanmenc of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington. D.C. 20301
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We are writing to make an initial request for copies of all Department of Defense
documents, records and/or briefing papers relating to the transfer of arms from Iran, or any
other country, to Croatia and Bosnia during the period of time the UN Security Council
Resoluuon prohibiting such activity was in effect. In particular, please provide copies of all
DOD cables to, and/or from, the American Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia, relating to this issue.
In addiuon, we request informadon on DOD aaivities undertaken to facilitate the provision
of arms through Croatia, or through any other country, to Bosnia and any memoranda of
conversations and/or meetings between you and any other agency official relating to this
maner, or issues surrounding this maner.
Due to the limited rime granted to the Subcomminee by its Congressional chaner, we
ask that these documents be provided to us by August 2, 1996.
Should you have any quesdons regarding this request, please do not hesitate to contaa
us or our staff at (202) 223-2264. Thank you for your prompt attention to this nuner.
Sincerely,
^-^Z-
HENRY J(^«rt>E {/ LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
c-SATA\ccMeiosMi\,-oiinTmiim«ro
654
Er™^ Congress of the United States ^~>.'^^^
^^^iZ^ House OF Representatives
• — Committee on International Relations
"T!?S»2!r^ SeUaSihcommitteeoalhtUuUedSuieiRoUiM
Irtnian Anrn Trtnsftn l« CnttU and Bcsnia
Washington, DC 20515
July 26. 1996
Mr. Anthony Harrington
Hogan & Haruoo L.LP.
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, D.C 20004
Dear Mr. Harrington:
The Selea Subcommittee request's a copy of the Intelligeoce Oversight Board's report on
its investigation of the transfer of arms from Iran to Croatia and Bosnia during the time of the
United Nations' Security Council arms embargo on the Former Yugoslavia. In addition, please
provide a list of all individuals interviewed as pan of the lOB's investigation and copies of the
memoranda of those individuals' interviews and any records received by the lOB as part of its
investigation.
This information will faciliute the Subcommittee's investigation. Due to the limited time
granted to the Subcomminee by in Congressional chaner, we ask that these documents be
provided to us by August 2, 1996.
Should you have any questions regarding this re<{uest, please do not hesiuie to contaa me
or my staff at (202) 225-2264. Thank you for your prompt anention to this matter.
Sincerely,
HENKY'jrKYDE ^
Chairman
cc: Lm H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
ft>OAT*>co»o«5N>ii«)o«nirM»iue«Twn)
655
MMMa MMMUnm, HOVAAD L iOMAN.
^~"H CONGRESST5F THE UNITED STATES ^tHAn^cv
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
!t^t^!!^ Sdea SibcommitUt em the UniteJ Suut ReU in
Iranian Armi Traniftn (o GrodtM andBomia
Washington, DC 20515
July 26. 1996
Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
National Security Councfl
Old Executive Office Building
Washington. D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. Lake:
We are writing to make an initial request for access to documents relating to the
transfer of arms from Iran to Croatia and Bosnia during the time of the United Nations'
Seomty Council arms embargo on the Former Yugoslavia. In particular, we ask that you
provide copies of all documenu that have previously been made available to all other
Congressional Committees.
Due to the limited time granted to the Subcomminee by its Congressional charter, we
ask that these documents be provided to us by August 2, 1996.
Should ywx have any questions regarding this request, please do not hesiute to contaa
us or our staff at (202) 225-2264. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
KiC^'
^\. HYDE LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
et\DATANcotMaN\iM|aitnT\L«u.«n>
656
OOVC UMLTUI.
DAN ICIITON.
HHtmh-GUMItH.
Congress of the united States
House of Representatives
COHMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SeUa Subcommitter on tbe United SiMn Relt in
Iranian Arm Tranifm le Croatia and Bosnia
Washington, DC 20515
July 26, 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United States Department of State
2201 -C- Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In reviewing documents made available by the Department of State to this
Subcommittee, we have determined the following three documents will be of
critical importance for the preparation of the Subcommittee's report:
- "Zagreb 1683," dated April 27, 1994, classified 'Secret;"
• "Zagreb 1721." dated April 29. 1994, classified 'Confidential;' and
- Memorandum for the File by Ambassador Peter Galbraith and witnessed by
Ronald Neitzke, dated May 6, 1994, classified 'Secret.'
The matters discussed therein - the transmittal and implementation of the
"green light" policy • are not at this point diplomatically sensitive and have been the
subject of repeated and extensive unclassified testimony by Deputy Secretary
Strobe Talbott, Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff, and Ambassadors Peter Galbraith and
Charles Redman, among others. The documents are essential, however, in
contemporaneously documenting the events to which they have testified.
Accordingly, we ask that you declassify the documents for us to be able to cite and
include as exhibits to our report.
Due to the extremely tight schedule on which the Subcommittee is operating,
we ask that you notify us of the declassification no later than August 2, 1 996.
657
We thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely.
HENRr J. HYDE^
Chairman
Select Subcommittee on
Iranian Arms Transfers
SERJAMIN A. OILMAN
Chairman
International Relations
Committee
Ml^h^L^
LEE H. HAMILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
Select Subcommittee on
Iranian Arms Transfers
658
House of Represent attves
*— Committee on IhOEiwATiONAL IUlations
IStrSlSJSr*^ ^*'*f Smb€wmmittet »m the VnHtd Sum Mt la
Irsmism Armi Tnntftn (o CnMia and Boihu
Vashincton. D.C. 2051$
July 26. 1996
The Honorable Varren M. Chrinopher
Secretary of Sutc
United States Departmcot of Sute
2201 -C" Street. N.W.
Washinpon. D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In order to faciliutc the Select Subconunitlee's investigation of the Administration': "no
instructions'* policy regarding Iranian arms deliveries into Bosnia through Croatia, we would request
that the Department of Sute make the following original items, documents, and records, from the
U.S. Embassy Zagreb available to the Select Subcomminee staff no later than close of business
August 2. 1996:
- the accounting of recollections, impressions, and refleaions prepared by
Ambassador Peter Galbraith regarding various issues or events that arose is hu
capacity as U.S. Ambassador to Croatia. (Ambassador Galbraith dictated this
accounting to his secretary for transcription, which she then typed on the office
computer system. It u believed to be contained and maintained on a computer
disk at the Embassy. Staff counsel has been advised that Ambassador Galbraith
began creating this document shortly after his arrival at the embassy in the
summer of 1993.) We are requesting that this accounting be provided to the Selca
Subcomminee in hard copy form. We also ask that the disk on which the original
is maintained also be provided;
— the Ambassador's appointment calendar from the date of his arrival through
November 30. 1994;
~ any existing phone logs of calls made to or from Ambassador Galbraith during that
same time frame;
~ all requests for travel and/or travel vouchers submitted by Ambassador Galbraith
659
from the time orius anival at Mission in Zagreb through November 30. 1994.
records of briefings or hearings al which DeparanenI of Suie personnel spoke or
testified to Members and/staff regarding violations of the anns embargo including
the dates of such briefings or bearings; questions and answers provided at the
briefing or hearing or, subsequently for the record; lists of anendees artd briefers; and
any materials diat were distributed at such hearing or briefing;
- telephone billing records maintained by the Department of Siite for those telephone
lines, including STU-IIls, used or assigned to Ambassador Galbraith's office or
rcsideace; and/or
— any memoranda indicating briefings given by Ambassador Galbraith to Members of
Congressor staff regarding weapons flows into Croatia and Bosnia or the issue of the
terrorist threat to US Embassy personnel or US military personnel in the former
Yugoslavia from the time of his arrival at Mission through the current date.
On May 23. 1996. the Department of State provided documents to the House International
Relations Conunittee, pursuant to a request submitled by Chairman Oilman by letter dated May 71,
1996. We would, at this time, renew that same request, asking for any documents subsequently
provided to any other Congressional Committee from May 23, 1996 through the present date.
We understand that some, if not most, of the requested items may be maintained at our
Embassy in Zagreb. Please do not hesitate to contact our respective staff at 22S-2264 (Majority) and
225-2274 (Minority), if compliance with this request cannot be accomplished by the date indicated
herein, so that other acconunodations for compliaiKe with this request can be arranged. The
requested materials should otberuise be delivered to the Subcomminee offices at H2-I75D Ford
House Office Building.
Thank you for your prompt response to this request
Sincerely,
HENRYj/im)E LEE H.HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic
r-NBkTAvmruTiijiivvwoa^i.n
660
l nihil .^luli- 1/1 |iul IliK III i>t .^4.iii
JUL 30 696
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Secretary has asked that i respond to the July
17, 1996 letter in which you and Representative
Hamilton set forth some of the procedural
understandings th.'tt have been reached by the Select
Subcommittee on th« United States Role in Iranlon Arms
Transfers to Bosnia.
Allow me to reiterate at th
Department .remains committed to
the Select Subcommittee, with a
this inquiry promptly.. The Dep
decision to conduct depositions
appreciate that vou will make e
staff interviews on a joir.t t">«
your decision to proceed in thi
by an understanding cf t-he subs
resource burdens associated wit
responding to — an investigati
e outset that the
cooperating fully with
view toward concluding
aitment welcomes your
iointly, and we further
very effort to conduct
is as well. No doubt
s fashion was motivate'1
tant ial costs and
h motinting -- and
on of this character.
Your letter also addressed another important
issue: the ability of De(.ortment attorneys to attend
depositions and interviews conuvscted by the Select
Subcommittee. We are firmly of the view that
Department attorneys should be present during the
interviews and deposition of Department employees when
the subject of questioning is official government
business and such employees approve of a. Departmental
legal presence.
i he uepaitrieut is conuiiitted to ensuring that the
presence of its attorneys during both informal and
formal questioning will be consistent with the
Subcommittee's fact-finding mission. We would be
pleased to consult with you and your staff on
Th*" Honorable
Henry J. Hyde, •"hairman.
Select SubcoMnittee on the United
States l''>le in Iranian Arms Transfers
to Cic-ati'i and Bosnia.
House of Representatives.
661
- 2
this and other procedural matters to ensure that future
proceedings are characterized by an atmosphere of full
cooperation.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
662
04N M.«rON.
CAU »Ain'«r.t»
■C^MON *. COMAN.
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Stlta Siibcomniiatt on tbt Uniled States Role in
Iramum Armi Tramfen to Croatia and Bomia
Washington, DC 20515
o - •• •
UCU L H/UTOCV
July 31, 1996
Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20S06
E)ear Mr. Lake:
Pursuant to this Select Subcommittee's continuing inquiry, u-e are writing to request that
Mr. Sandy Vershbow of the National Security Council be made available for a staff deposition
during the afternoon of August 8, 1996 at our Select Subcommittee offices. It is anticipated that
Mr. Vershbow's deposition will last no longer than two (2) hours.
Please notif}- us immediately if our request cannot be honored, so that we may make
alternative arrangemenu. As Deputy Chief Counsel Pat Murray stated to Mr. James Baker of
your office, the testimony sought from Mr. Vershbow will concern bis aaivities while serving
at the Depanment of State, not the National Security Council.
/^^
Richard
Chief Counsel
Sincerely,
Richard Meltzer
Chief Minority Counsel
CVDATA COUMOVMAJOOmjUUrVTO
663
DAM MATON.
Congress of the United States *^'^'^«'~'
House of Representatives
Committee on IraEKNATiONAL Relations
•««waa *. CBMAN. Stka Smbnmmaut om the UuittJ Stain Reit im
IrtmUa Aim% Trtntftn to Cnttia tni BoinU
Washington, DC 2051S
August 1, 1996
The Honorable Wancn M. Ctaiistopber
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Depaitment of Sute
Washington. DC. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary.
Pursuant to this Selea Subcomminee's continuing inquiry into issues surrounding the
transfer of Iranian arms to Croatia and Bosnia, we are writing to request that Undersecretary
Peter Tamoff be made available for a staff deposition on August 29, 1996 beginning at 1:30 p.m.
at our Select Subcomminee offices. It is anticipated that Mr. Tamoffs deposition will take
approximately two (2) hours.
Please notify us immediately if our request cannot be honored, so that we may make
alternative arrangements.
Sincerely,
^'Ji(i^/)Mfy^
Richard Meltzer
Chief Counsel ' Chief Minority Counsel
c\D*TA<coMMOs*M«jcwTro«a' vro
664
0AMW.1>TaM.
Congress of the United States
House of Represent attves
Committee on Ii^ternational Relations
StUa St^ammitttt en 1^ United Sum RoU in
Iranian Ann Traniftn to Croatia jhJ Bosnia
Washington, DC 2C515
Hi « OiJi. kL>.*IAS
August 1, 1996
The Honorable Wanen M. Christopher
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Department of Sute
Washington. D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Pursuant to this Selea Subcomminee's continuing inquiry into issues surrouoding the
transfer of Iranian arnu to Croatia and Bosnia, we are writing to request that Deputy Secretary
of State Nelson Strowbridge Talbon DI be made available for a staff deposition on August 29,
1996 beginning at 10:00 a.m. at our Select Subcomminee offices. It is anticipated that Mr.
Talbott's deposition will take approximately two (2) hours.
Please notify us itiunediately if our request cannot be honored, so that we may make
alternative arrangements.
Sincerely,
RichardJ. Pocker
Chief Counsel
*\.
Richard Meltzer
Chief Minority Counsel
C:\DAT ANCOtO«ON-34AJOWTYVOa3> Xn
665
OOUC tUKUTUt.
DAM KUTON.
CASi IKIIINTJH
J4*ME« A. COMAN.
One (S^^nJreJ ^S^rii ^cm^ftu
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Sele<^ Subcommiaee on the United Sutet Role in
Iranian Arms Trantfen to Croatia andBmnia
Washington, DC 20515
August 2, 1996
HOVAIIX) L U.
AlCU U HASnM.S.
Mr. John M. Quinn, Esq.
Counsel to the President
West Wing
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Quinn:
Pursuant to this Sele« Subconuninee's continuing inquiry, we are writing to request that
Mr. Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice-President (or National Security Affairs, be made available
for a staff deposition on Monday, August 26, 1996 at 1:30 p.m. h is anticipated that Mr. Fuerth's
deposition will last no longer than two (2) hours.
Please notify us immediately if our request cannot be honored, so that we may make
alternative arrangements.
Sincerely,
.i-^^chard I. Wcker ^ Richard Meltzer
Richard J. PtScker * —
Chief Counsel
Richard Meltzer
Chief Minority Counsel
C:>0ATAVCOMM0N^MA|OlinT\QUIN>O«rD
Ron Klaln
Chief of Staff to the Vice President
666
THE WHITE House
WASHI NCTON
'••r»IOCNT S
*9V SO*v SOAMO
August S. 1996
Dev Chkinoan Hyde:
Thank you for your letter of July 26, received on July 3 1 . requesting a copy of the
Board's report and deliberative matenals related to the transfer of anos to Bosnia.
As you probably know, pursuant to my offer in early May to brief you or the
Subcommittee. 1 met with the Subcommittee's staff on July 2S. I gave a short introduction.
described the report in detail, responded lu questions, and offered to try to address any fuitber
inquiries. I would be happy to provide a similar briefing to you or the members of the
Subcommittee.
1 cannot, however, provide the records you requested — the report, a list of all persons
interviewed, memoranda of those interviews, and any records received by the lOB as par of its
review. To do so would seriously and unnecessarily damage the effectiveness of Frcsideraial
inleliigertce uversigbL Just as 1 trust that you consider the confidentiality of communications
from your irtaff essential to Congressional oversighi, I believe you would agree that the goal of
eCfoctivc Presidential oversight is best served when senior advisers to the President are able to
provide frank and forthright advice and information lo the President, v^tbout restraint. Without a
reliable expecution of confidentiality. Board members might not he os free in their comments to
the President; witnesses would also no doubt he more hesitant to speak openly to the Board; and
Administration officials wnuld probably be less willing to turn to the Board vi'hen needed to
address matters of concern.
Fortunately, in this case it is quite unnecessary to do violcrtce to the Presidential oversight
process or to the line of separation between the Congre<is and the President. I would assume that
the same docimients and witnesses that the Board examined are also available to your
Subcommittee, so that you can direct any requests to the pertinent agencies and officials. The
practice of providing a briefing and responding lo questioiu has been followed in inquiries by
both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence concerning Bosnia and Uuatemala. This practice represents a new, constructive
cooperation between the Board and the Congressional oversight committees. However, I do not
beUeve that, in the 20 years since the Boanl wa.t Hrst eailablished by President Ford, the Board's
reports and dehbcrative materials have been, or should have been, provided to the Cungre.\s.
In any event, the President and White House CouumsI, rather than the Board, control the
disposition of the report and the other requested materials. 1 have, therefore, forwarded your
request to the White House Counsel.
Ot'OS'M VON 10:41 ITX'RX NO SISI)
667
We look forwaid to wonciuit wtut y^u and Uic Subcommittee to the ertcnt that we con be
hclpfiil.
SinccTcly. f
Aothony S. Hamni;toii
Chainnaa. Intelligence Oversight Board
Tbc Honorable Ilemy J. Hyde
United Stales House of Represeotaiivcs
Wa^ngton. D.C. 305 IS
cc: The Honorable I.ee H. Hamilton
ot
/0S/»6 »0N 10; II tTX'RX NO 51S1I
668
BOIC HJUITI*.
D*NH.«TON.
Congress of the United States
House of REPRESEivrrAiTVES
Committee on International Relations
Mki Subcommittrt on the Unittd Stain Rolt ta
Iranian Am» Transfm le Croatia and Boinij
Washington, DC 20515
HO<\M>LaiJIM*V
UCU L H»T1NCV
August 6, 1996
Mr. Michael Klosscn
Office of Legislative Affairs
U.S. Deparanent of State
Washington. DC. 20520
Dear Mr. Klossen:
This lener will recap the issues discussed and memorialize the understanding reached at
our meeting of Friday, August 2, 1996.
It is our position that Ambassador Galbraith must tender the entire document described
and identified pre%-iously in our document request lener of July 26 to Secretary Christopher.
This document was described by you as a series of 'memcons' (memorandum of conversations)
of the Ambassador during his service in Zagreb. As discussed, it is cur understanding that it is
maintained as a single document, which is kept in a binder together with the original computer
disk in the Ambassador's safe behind his desk in his office.
As mentioned, we would agree to make the entire document available only to a single
person from both the Majority and Minority staffs for their initial review. That staff member
could then share with the Subcomminee share those portions of the Ambassador's record he or
she found to be relevant. As you indicated during our meeting, the Department of State prefers
to withhold the entire document from the Subcommittee's review, and wishes to only tender
excerpts of the document, which excerpts thus far have been selened by Ambassador Galbraith,
himself.
Ve find the State Department's position unacceptable and, as suggested, counterintuitive
to the Department's interest in resolving all questions surrounding this maner favorably.
Without a thorough re\-iew of all pertinent documents, the perception that the State Department
and Ambassador Galbraith have something to hide about this maner will be impossible to
overcome.
669
Page 2 u
We look forward to your full compliance with the document request made iointly by Mr.
Hyde and Mr. Hamilton in their lener of July 26. 1996.
As for the procedural maners we discussed on Friday, I believe we are in agreement. You
understand that we hold open the option of refusing to allow Department anorneys to be present
during any deposition where the witness objects or where Chief Counsel of either the Majority
or Minority staff objecu. We understand the Department's equities in this regard, as well as the
Department's view that iu anorneys should always be allowed to sit in on depositions of
Department employees. We agreed that we would proceed with this understanding, and treat the
issue more concretely when or if it arises. Additionally, we agreed to make the deposition
transcripts available for Department review. Likewise, deposition transcripts will be available to
each witness for the purpose of creating any necessary errata sheets.
You raised an issue as to whether the principles - understood to mean Secretary
Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Undersecretary Tarnoff - would sit for staff conducted
depositions. Quite frankly, I do not understand the issue. H.Res. 416 authorizes Select
Subcomminee staff designated by the Chairman to conduct depositions and that is the manner
by which all deposition will be taken. Requests for production of the principals for such
depositions have already been jointly made by the Majority and Minority Chief Counsels. If the
Depanment is disinclined to honor that request, please let us know, so we can then condua our
inquiry pursuant to other procedural options, i.e. subpoena.
Finally, we appreciate the Department's offer to support the Select Subcommittee's staff
during its necessary foreign travel. Moreover, the Department's prompt cooperation will be
extremely vital to our being able to complete this inquiry within the time frame established by
H.Res. 416. As discussed, the FBI detailed agents will likewise be conducting inter\-iews of
various State Department employees domestically and abroad. The Department's assistance in
contacting these individuals and coordinating such interviews will expedite our inquiry and
alleviate more burdensome methods of investigation.
I thought our meeting on Friday was beneficial and productive. W: hope the State
Department's offer of cooperation is understood at all levels of the Department.
Very truly yours,
'^^tjbujj^noi^
PATRICK B. WURlUY /
Deputy Chief Counsel / /
cc: Richard Meltzer
Minority Chief Counsel
670
- . rtOUSE OF KEPR£SENT ATTVES
•— • Committee on International Relations
(mAaaM*.caM*N. Stitct Subnmmititt on the Umittd Sum Rolt im
tranUn Armi Trtrntfrn to Crostia tnd Bttmit
Washington, DC 2051$
August 6. 1996
The Honorable John M. Deutch
Direaor of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D.C. 20505
Dear Director Deutch,
As pan of the Subcomminee's researching the transit of arms into the former
Yugoslavia in contravention of the United Nations Security* Council embargo, we would
appreciate receiving any information available at your Agency regarding the Pakistani
government's involvement and interest in circumventing the arms embargo during the period
from June 1, 1993 through December 1, 1995. We have particular interest in:
- any discussions of this by Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto during her visits to the
former Yugoslavia and the United States; and
- the level of cooperation and consultation that may have existed bem-een Iran and
Pakinan in breaking the embargo.
Also, to assist our analysis of the level of Iranian influence in the former Yugoslavia,
we would appreciate your Agency's best analytic judgement of the number of Iranians present
in Croatia and Bosnia (as separate categories) on a monthly basis from January 1, 1994
through the present. Any break-out of the numbers by affiliation (such as IRGC, diplomatic,
intelligence, etc.) would be useful as well, if available.
Finally, we would appreciate an analysis of the financial value to Iran of the
commercial and bilateral trade agreements reached between Croatia and Iran as well as Bosnia
and Iran during the period from April 1994 to December 1995. For each of the above issues
we would appreciate your making Directorate of Intelligence analysts available who can brief
and answer our follow up questions.
671
Doe to the short tim«-fr»me in which we mun complete our work, we request your
compliance with the ibove by August 15. We sincerely appreciate your Agency's
responsiveness and assistance.
-2/ J\U^JC!^ P
HhtRYJ.HVlt' UEh
HlU^
LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
672
OOCC UJIIt.1U. ' HOltlUU UJW«N
^viiTo>. Congress OF THE United States -^ul «*,«>..
^^^x. House of Representatives
••— Committee on International Relations
c<«MOi<LcaM.\N. Select Smbcommittet OK Ibe UnUeJ Stain Role im
Iranian Armi Tramfen to Croatia and Bosnia
Washington, DC 20515
August 9, 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am writing to follow up on the Subcomminee's initiil document request of July 26,
1996, which documents were to be delivered by August 2, 1996.
Although it was understood that a few days might be needed to comply - it now is one
week beyond the compliance date. If the documents requested are not produced by close of
business, Tuesday, August 13, 1996, we will be compelled to issue a subpoena for the
produaion on those documents.
I anticipate your prompt response.
Stnc|rely,
henrythIwe //
cc: Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
Gc-oata cototovMMOwrrcMiatvrD
673
House of Repjcesentattves
wMMovt^ca. Committee on iNrrERNATioNAL Relations
ao^uat KCOMim. Selttt Smbcemmitttt an ibt Uiiitd Slam Rolt m
'*' Irtmiam Ami Tftufen to Cnttia and BoimU
Washington, DC 20515
August 12, 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Department of Sute
Washington. DC. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
To (adliute this Subcomminee's efforts at defining the policy implications of the decision
in April 1994 to issue the "no instruaions* response to President Tudjman's request for guidance
on cooperating in the transshipment of weapons to Bosnia, we would appreciate your providing
responses and any available documentation to the following:
1) What demarches and unofBcial comments from foreign ofBcials did the US receive based
on the knowledge or suspicion that the US was turning a blind eye to the transshipments through
Croatia?
2) What countries were infoimed of the "no instructions'* policy and in what
circumstances?
3) What demarches or foreign comments have been reported back to the Department
since the "no instnictioiu" policy has become public knowledge?
4) The dates of travel and all Department records of state visits by Prime Minister Benazir
Bhuno of Pakistan to Washington, D.C. and to Zagreb, Croatia from June, 199} thtv the present
day. Itineraries and scheduled meetings with U.S. officials during such visits and copies of all
DOS cables relating to those visits.
5) The Zagreb Embassy message ^agreb 1567) which describes a meeting between Charles
Redman and Mate Granic on April 18, 1994.
6) The Secretary's Morning Summary for April 29, 1994.
7) An outgoing cable (number 1421 19Z) from the Depanment dated April, 1995.
674
t) The quanerly security repons from Embusy Zagreb covering the period of January,
1994 through June. 1996.
9) Lastly, we request staff interviews with Chru Liebengood, Maria Banon and/or Paul
Vogel, all of Diplomatic Security, to further our understanding of the security arrangements for
Embassy Zagreb during the period of January, 1994 through June, 1996. The interview would
be coaduaed by FBI agents detailed to the Select Subconuninee. Although the FBI would
conduct the interview, this is not a criminal investigation, and whatever information provided
by these individuals would be for background purposes only.
Due to the limited time granted to the Subcommittee by its Congressional charter, we ask
that these documents be provided to us by August 26, 1996.
Should you have any questions regarding this request, please do not hesitate to contaa us
or our staff at (202) 22S-2264. Thank you for your prompt anention to this matter.
Sincerely, Xj
FrfNRYJ.HYDF-^ LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairnoan Ranking Democratic Member
C>D*TANCOtatON\MAiOIUTT>aaUU «*o
675
House of Representatives
Committee on IhoiRNATiONAL lUiATiom
tuvat A.caMAM. Sflta Subcommiatr •■ ibt Umutd Sum RbU u
Irsaiam Armu Tramfm ta CnstU tmd Motmu
Washington, D.C 20515
August 12. 1996
The Honorable Varreo M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United States Depanment of State
2201 "C" Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary:
During the depositiop held earlier today of former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Canadian and European AfTai/s, Alexander R. Venhbow, the Select Subcommittee was advised 'Jiat
Mr. Vershbow maintained a series of handwritten notes on various meetings and conversations held
during his tenure in that position. Mr. Vcrshbow played a central role in the Clinton
Administration's decision-making process that ultimately resulted in the U.S. govenunent signaling
to the Croatian government that it was unopposed to Iranian shipments of arms to Bosnia
transshipped through Croatia. Those notes were maintained in a series of approximately 30 spiral
notebooks, which he currently still possesses.
The Select Subcommittee has had an opportunity to review only portions of those notes,
which portions were chosen for our review by Mr. Vershbow.
We request that the State Department make the original notebooks available to the Select
Subcommittee in their entirety, for review by the Select Subcomrainee staff. This will ensure that
all relevant notations made by Mr. Vershbow have been tendered to the Select Subconunittee for
purposes of conducting its investigation. Based on our discussions with Mr. Vetshbow, this question
remains to be seen, given that Mr. Vershbow was truly uncertain as to the dates on which these
iwtations were actually made.
676
Page 2
Please provide those notebooks to the Select Subcomininee no later than close of business
August 14. 1996. Thank you Tor your prompt response to this request.
Sincerely.
HENRY J. HYDE 11
Chairman ^
cc: Lee H. Hamiltoa
Ranking Democratic Member
F\DATA\m<UXTTUS.
677
^^ ^ HOVAADLiUMAV
^««n-. Congress of the United States -^-^h-™*'
House of Representatives
Committee on Internationm. Relations
VittBtKcauui. Sdtcl Smbcemaiatt en tht UmiitJ Statn RoU in
^* *" ' Iramian Armi Tramifen to Croatia and Botmia
Washington, D.C. 20515
August 12. 1996
The Honorable Warrer. M. Christopher
Secretar>- of State
United States Department of State
2201 "C" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Pursuant to the letter dated August 12, 1996, sent to you by Chairman Gibnan, as well as
Ihe Select Subconuninee letter dated August 7, 1 would ask that the following logistical support and
accommodations be extended during the Select Subcommittee's staff \isit to Croatia. Slovenia, and
the Czech Republic.
Please advise Embassy Zagreb to arrange hotel acconunodations, ground transportation,
interpreter services, meeting facihties, and access to classified areas for this visit
Additionally, please confirm the availability of Ambassador Peter Galbraith, for deposition
to be conducted on August 19; Ambassador Victor Jackovich on August 20; and Ambassador
Jenonne Walker in Prague, on August 21 . Depending upon Ambassadors Jackovich and Walker's
availability, suffwill require Embassy Zagreb's support in facilitating travel to and from Zagreb,
Prague, and Ljubljana.
Contingent upon the infoimation leaned during the course of the staffs visit to Croatia,
Slovenia, and the Czech Repubhc, staff may also request and/or require Embassy Zagreb support
and travel arrangements into and out of Sarajevo. Bosnia-Hei^egovina.
Embassy Zagrd> should determine the availabiUty and schedule appointroenU for depositions
of the following Embassy employees: Ambassador Galbraith, UNTAES (detailee) Richard
Holtzapple, Terri Lee Baker, the current RSO. and Protocol Assistant Duska Duiic, a foreign service
Croatian national in the employ of the United States Department of State.
Embassy Zagreb should also inquire, on behalf of the Select Subcomraittee, whether Croatian
Government officials, including Presideni Fianjo Tudjman. Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Defense
678
Page 2
Ministci Gojko Susak, Phme Minister Valentic. the Chief of the Croatian Intelligence Service, and
Madame Djcrdja Susak. would receive Select Subcommittee staff and grant them appointments for
interviews in relation to our investigation.
Embassy Zagreb should also anange interviews with specified cotnmunity leaders, including
Muslim clerics Cenc and Omerbasic, director of Merhamet.
Embassy Zagreb should also arrange Select Subcomminee staff interviews with the British.
French, Russian, and German Ambassadors to Croatia, if such Ambassadors were serving at that post
during 1994.
Embassy Prague should determine the availability and schedule appointments for depositions
of the following Embassy employees: Ambassador Walker, and the former Consul General of U.S.
Consulate/Zagreb, (FNXJ) (LNU), whose tour occurred prior to the raising of that mission to
Embassy status.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Very truly yours.
cc: Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
r DATA f«rum*»«i<ai: tn
679
(3nt Q^VaH</f*</ K,^ivurti "^/utar^it
DOVCHMIIU. ' HO»««OLM«.«»V
s;^*To. Congress of the United States »^^^^^
House of Representatives
Committee on IfOERNATioNAL Relations
4*MiN ^caMAH Sdta Subcommiart o« ibt Uuittd Siaiet Kelt I'a
Iranian Armi Tranifm to Craatu and Bosnia
Washington, D.C. 2C515
August 13, 1996
Mr. Anthony S. Harrington, Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington. D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Harrington:
It was with interest that I read your responsive letter of August S. declining our request for
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board to letider specific items :o the Select Subconunittee-the
lOB's report, a list of all persons interviewed, memoranda of those interviews, and any other records
received by the lOB as pan of its review. There is some confusion as to the rationale underlying the
lOB's refiisal to tender those documents to the Select Subcommittee. As you know, we have been
charged by the House of Representatives with conducting a Congressional oversight investigation
of the U.S. role in Iraruan arms shipments to Croatia and Bosnia, the implications of the
Administration's decision to agree to such shipments, as well as the consequences of that policy
change.
During your briefing of the Select Subcommittee staff, which certainly was appreciated, you
gave an oral presentation oi the facts considered by the lOB and the conclusions reached based upon
those facts. There is concern on the Select Subcommittee's part that the lOB was not provided with
all doctmtents and information relative to the Administiaiion's change in its arms poUcy in Croatia
and Bosnia. We are seeking a written account of the £Kts and cotKhtsions found by the lOB,
together with a list of the names of individuals interviewed and the memoranda of those interviews,
so that a thorough review of the Executive Branch's activities in this regard can be undertaken. It
is widiin the Legislature's purview to determine if the moneys appropriated to the Executive branch
are being spent appropriately.
Part and parcel of the Select Subcommittee's investigation is the determination as to
whether the Administration has been honest with Congress regarding this issue. In order to complete
that task, we must review all prior statements of the Administration ofBcials who were responsible
for the creation of the new policy, and its execution. Review of the sutements made to the lOB as
\
680
August 13. 1996
Page 2
part of its investigation is necessary to determine whether Administration oiTicials were consistent
and tnithfiil in their account to the lOB, and to the Congress.
As indicated in our discussions, we are concerned that the lOB, in reaching its Tindings and
conclusions, failed to interview Deput>' Secretary Strobe Talbon. who was integral to the
establishment of the so-called "Lights Out" or "Wink and Nod" policy to let Iran ship arms to the
Bosnian Muslims through Croatia. Furthermore, it was explained to us that, although the lOB
requested all documents relating to this matter, neither the State Department nor Ambassador
Galbraith ever disclosed the existeiKC of the Ambassador's contemporaneous documenution of
events. That documentation was maintained on a government computer disk at the Embassy, was
compiled almost daily, and was typed by the Ambassador's secretary on government equipment and
time. Additioiully, the lOB was iwver made privy to Alexander R. Vershbow's handwritten
notations, which were kept contemporaneously with events as they unfolded during the
determifution and execution of U.S. policy. It also appears that the White House Counsel at the
time. Judge Mikva, reached his legal conclusions as to this maner based on an incomplete factual
basis.
The asserted purpose for withholding the requested documentation from the Select
Subcommittee's review is that releasing it would "do violence" to the President's future ability to
have his executive officers provide full and honest testimony during any such review. Arguably,
that hoped-for result did not manifest itself already in this case, given the documents and testimony
withheld from the lOB's own review. As an additional matter, failure to disclose these documents
only compounds the failure of the lOB to leam the complete truth.
As the process thus far has shown, these officers can withhold documents and information
without fear of reprisal, because the lOB's assertion of "privilege" otherwise shields non-disclosure.
Furthermore, as you iwted, a material false statement to the lOB is prosecutable as a felony under
Title 18, United Stales Code, Section 1001. Nevertheless, if all documents and interview sutements
are not disclosed to any oversight body, the threat of such prosecution is an empty one at best.
As an aside, I would note that the lOB's c<aim of Presidential privacy as to the report iuelf
is meritless, especially inso&r as the lOB publicly released a similar report on the CIA's activities
in Guatemala. As explained, (hat report was released because of the confused stale of the record of
that matter (in addition to the fact that individuals were engaged in hunger-strikes). The same
confiision reigns in this matter as well, exacerbated by the differing versions of events thus far
provided to the Select Subcommittee.
As Senator J. Robert Kerrey has so wisel/and adeptly noted, without disclosure to Congress
of the lOB's report, the people we represent will never be satisfied that the conclusions reached by
the lOB are accurate and not simply politically self-serving.
681
August 13.19^6
Page 3
For all of the above reasons. I would reiterate the Select Subcommittee's position that the
lOB should make the requested documents available to the Select Subcommittee sufTby close of
business August 14. 19%. Failure to do so will require the employment of another procedural
mechaiusm, i.e. subpoena, to gain access to such documents. I await your prompt response.
Very truly yours.
ChiHinan \^
cc: Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
r\a*TAWfumuiowi:in
682
OOUC ■mVTUk MO«*»DLUIU«A.S.
Sr-n*. Congress of the United States ^««n^v
OB MuiNcu. House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
vfMtM^eoMAK SeUct Subnmmitut em the Umiltd Suta Rote i»
Iranian Armt Tranifert to Croatia and Bomia
Washington, D.C. 20515
August 14. 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United Sutes Department of State
2201 •€• Sueet, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary:
As you are certainly aware, the Select Subconunittee staff (with Majority and Minority staff
representation) will be traveling to Embassy Zagreb, Embassy Prague, and Embassy Ljubljana from
August 17 through August 22, 19%. Their purpose is to collect information and to conduct various
interviews and depositions of State Department personnel.
While the staff is present at the American Mission in Zagreb, it would be most helpful to our
investigation if appropriately cleared staff personnel were given access to, for purposes of review
and collection of facts:
Ambassador Galbraith's chronological cable file;
Ambassador Galbraith's cables kept in an EXDIS. NODIS, or LIMDIS file; and
Former FSO Rick Holtzapple's handwrinen notes that were kept during his tenure at the
Embassy, and which are believed to be maintained in the Ambassador's safe in his office.
Additionally, in order to alleviate costs and the burdens of production upon the State
Department, Select Subcommittee staff would agree to review the previously requested phone
records and travel voucher information that are kept at the Embassy (July 26th document request
letter), and to simply make copies of portions of those documents the Select Subconunittee staff
determines to be relevant to its inquiry. This would save the Department from making photocopies
of all of the requested documents, and shipping those same items to the offices of the Select
Subcommittee. This offer of accommodation was previously articulated to State Department staff
during the course of their meeting with Select Subcomminee staff on August 2, 1996.
683
August 14. I wo
Page 2
It would also be helpful to review Embassy Zagreb access documents for the years 1993.
1994, I99S. and 1996. These documents would be in the nature of entry and exit logs mainiaiaed
by the Marine sentry station.
The Selea Subcommittee staff may be conducting depositions of Ambassadors Walker
(Czech Republic) and Jackovich (Slovenia) while in the Balkans. Ve would request that those
rwo diplomau provide the Selea Subcomminee staff access to and/or copies of any
contemporaneous notes and/or other records in their possession relating to the issues under
investigation by the Selea Subcommittee.
Ve appreciate your prompt response to this request. Should you have any questions,
please do not hesiute to contaa the Selea Subcommittee staff at (202) 22S-2264.
Very truly yours,
HENR^J.H^^ \J LEE H. HAMILTON
ChairmA ^ Ranking Democratic Member
LtfH^U.
f^\OATA>nt<NrmM\«McnM.n
684
V*."' N- ^t« /to ^^ w N_— n^<4 't^T »^ I ty ^ j^»
u^ H,.ov Congress of the United States •'."• - " •-
SiiS^;«c^ House of Representtattvis
'■~ Committee on International Relations
"'?I?£t.^"*'^ 5flf SiAcemiaittet on tht United Sum Role in
Iranian Armi Tramfen to Croatia and Botnia
Washington, DC 2C515
August 14. 1996
William Sheehan, Esq.
Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel)
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 203CM6CO
Dear Mr. Sheehan:
Thank you for your telephone message of last night regarding the availability of
General Wesley Clark for staff deposition on September 4, 1996. At this point in time, I
believe that September 4 u-ill be an acceptable date for all concerned, and I'll discuss details
with you further in the ne.\t few days.
I also appreciate your cooperation and willingness to facilitate iaierviews by our staff
of various military members currently on site in Croatia. If the current Defense Attache in
Zagreb is Lieutenant Colonel John Sadler, then I and my staff investigator will definitely wish
to speak with him. If a different officer now serves in that post, we will still need to conduct
an interview, but it will be much shoner.
Previous investigation has indicated that members of tbe Embassy Marine detail, most
notable the Gunnery Sergeant at post during 1994, may have information relative to facts
bearing upon our inquiry. I would appreciate your assistance in determining who that
Gunnery Sergeant is and whether he is still stationed in Zagreb. If he is not, I am requesting
that I be advised of his current duty assignment and where our investigators might interview
him.
My final request relates to the whereabouts of General Don Kerrick, formally detailed
to the National Securit>- Council as Jennone Walker's depuri-. It is our intention to interview
General Kerrick relative to his ser^-ice on the National Security Council in 1994, during the
next ten (IC) days. (I will be sending a copy of this lener to James Baker of the National
685
Security Council Legal Staff, as per our earlier discussions regarding Major Lesley.) Please
advise me as to General Kerrick's current duty assignment, as well as details on his availability
for inteniew on Auguu 22 or August 23, or earlier in the week of August 19.
Thank you again for your consistently effective assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Richard .pi'ocker
Chief Counsel
cc: James Baker, Esq.
Counsel, NSC
cc: Richard Meltzer
Minoritv Chief Counsel
C'OaTA CC%0riOVAU'OIUTY\SHEXH.\N«T7
686
THE^WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1996
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter responds to your letters of July 26, 1996, to
Mr. Lake, Mr. Harrington and me. I am also responding to a
letter from members of the Select Committee Staff to me dated
August 2, 1996 requesting the deposition of Mr. Leon Fuerth, and
in part to letters to Secretary Perry dated August 2 and to
Secretary Christopher dated August 7. Matters raised in your
letter of August 13 to Mr. Harrington will be addressed in a
separate letter.
First, let me underscore that we ire committed tc ensuring that
Congress obtains the facts it needs in order tc fcrm a complete
understanding of U.S. policy in Bosnia as it relates tc ycur
inquiry. To this end, since March, numerous Administration
officials have been made available to testify or brief five
committees of Congress. In addition, relevant gcvernr.ent
agencies have undertaken extraordinary efforts tz collect,
review, and provide Congress materials responsive tc r.umercus
requests. The NSC alone has spent well ever IZC staff days
collecting and reviewing docur.ents. We will, of course, also
work with your committee in a good faith effort tc provide you
with the same information.
I am sure you agree that this should continue tc ce dcr.e in a
manner that does not undermine the President's ability to
formulate and execute foreign policy. At stake is the principle,
understood well by previous Republican and Democratic
Administrations, that a President must be able tc protect the
confidentiality of certain types of communications if he is tc
carry out his constitutional role in this regard. If acceding to
requests for disclosure would either impair the President' s
ability to perform his role or result in the inappropriate
entanglement of other branches in the President's constituticr.al
function, then the President must be afforded the latitude to
protect the prerogatives of the Presidency. These are not new
precepts; Presidents and Members of Congress frc~ both parties
have recognized these constitutional principles, as have the
courts, for generations.
687
As a result, the Administration has sought to accommodate
Congress's interest in the underlying facts in a manner
consistent with the interests and constitutional roles of both
branches -- in an effort to avoid invocation of privilege and a
wholly unnecessary constitutional confrontation. We have thus
worked successfully with other committees of the Congress to
provide them the informaticr. they need for a complete under-
standing of U.S. policy in a manner that accommodates the
legitimate institutional interests of both the legislative and
executive branches of government. I am confident we can do the
same here.
1. NSC Documents
With respect to your requests for access to documents identified
in your letters to Mr. Lake and me, the Administration is
prepared to provide your subcommittee access to the same
documents, on the same basis, as were previously made available
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In fact, your
staff has already begun this process by reviewing materials at
the NSC on August 5. We would be prepared to brief on, or shew
to, the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member additional
documents at your convenience.
2. lOB Report and Staff Depositions
In a separate letter addressed to Mr. Harrington, Chairman Hyde
also requested a copy of the Intelligence Oversight Board's
report on Bosnia. Mr. Hamilton is not a signarcry of this
letter. As you know, consistent with long-standing practice, the
lOB' s report for the President was not made available publicly or
to the Congress. Indeed, we are aware of no precedent in this or
any other .=idministration for providing to the Congress ICB
reports to the President. As indicated in Mr. Harrington's letter
of August 5 to you, the Board's report to the President on its
Guatemala review has been handled in a like manner, although ir.
this one instance, a public version was also prepared and
released. Nor is the report being relied upon as justification
for policy options selected at the time. The lOB undertook a
factual review in its Presidential oversight rcle, not a policy
review.
Rather, the lOB' s work on behalf of the President is ordinarily
conducted in confidence and shared only with the President and
his immediate senior advisers. As a matter of comity, however,
this Administration has sought to accommodate Congressional
interest in the work of the lOB. In the case of Bosnia, for
example, the Board was authorized to brief the Congress
extensively on its factual review and conclusions.
688
Mr. Harrington offered to brief you or the Subcommittee staff m
early May, an offer which was ultimately accepted on July 25.
Notwithstanding these accommodations, the Board remains a
Presidential oversight mechanism. I am sure you would agree that
the goal of effective Presidential oversight is best served when
the President's senior advisers, such as the Chairman of the lOB,
are able to provide frank and forthright advice and information
to the President. Without a reliable expectation of confiden-
tiality. Board members might not be as candid in their comments
to the President; employees would also no doubt be less willing
to talk to the Board freely; and Administration officials likely
would be less willing to turn to the Board to address matters of
concern. It is vital that we preserve the effectiveness of this
Presidential oversight mechanism. This is a goal clearly
consistent with our shared interest in effective intelligence
oversight .
For the same reasons, and in light of the cere constitutional and
presidential nature of the lOB's work, the Administration is not
prepared to make Major David Wesley, previously Counsel to the
lOB, available for a staff deposition. I submit that no
legitimate countervailing legislative interest exists that would
justify the damage to the lOB that would result from such an
invasive proceeding. This is particularly true given that your
Subcommittee can draw its own conclusions cr. the basis of the
investigation undertaken by the House. However, as was the case
with the Senate and House Intelligence Conunittees, and as Mr.
Harringtor. offered at the time of his brief ir.g, we are prepared
to make Maior Wesley available for an inforr.ai briefing in the
same way we made Mr. Harrington available.
With respect to the Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security .^if fairs, Mr. Leon Fuerth, while we are not prepared to
make him available for a staff deposition, he will be made
available to brief the Chairman and the Ranking Democratic Member
on issues not touching upon the deliberative process.
3. NSC Staff Depositions
Along the same lines, staff requests to interview current and
former NSC staff with respect to their NSC duties, specifically
Mr. Vershbcw and Ambassador Walker, raise serious separation of
powers concerns. As noted above. Presidents musj: be free to seek
and receive confidential advice and assistar.ee, of a policy or
legal nature, from members of their staff. This concern is
heightened in the area of national security. This is a point
about process and not about the particular content of any written
or oral communication. As you know, based cr. this constitutional
principle, throughout this and prior administrations, NSC staff
689
have not been available to testiiy or b^ deposed by the Congress.
Exceptions have been granted only in the most unusual cases when
credible allegations of wrongdoing by individual staff members
exist. That is not the case here.
Moreover, given the serious constitutional concerns raised by
these requests as they relate to the President's national
security decision making process, it is our view that such
requests should come directly from the Chairman and Ranking
Democratic Member of the Select Subcommittee and not from the
staff. This is a view consistent with your letter dated July 1~
stating that "all requests for documents that have not already
been made available and depositions will be in writing and signed
by both of us."
Based on these considerations, we are not in a position to make
either Mr. Vershbow or Ambassador Walker available for staff
depositions with respect to their NSC duties. We are, however,
prepared to have NSC staff brief members of ycur staff on the
policy issues and factual matters relating to Bosnia policy, on
the condition that a White House lawyer (or White House designee)
be present to identify those questions and answers that go
directly to the President's deliberative processes, such as
matters pertaining to confidential communications to ana from the
President, Presidential meetings with foreign heads of state, and
the content and deliberations of Principals and Deputies
Committee meetings. Where such core constitutional functions are
implicated, we are prepared to brief the Chairman and Ranking
Democratic Member of ycur Committee directly. In this way the
legislative need of Members of Congress will be addressed while
at the same time preserving the interest of the executive branch
in an effective foreign policy process.
4 . Legal Briefing
Finally, while you have not made such a request, the
Administration is prepared to provide to your committee a
briefing by a panel of legal experts from the government who can
give you an overview of U.S. law and international law relating
to the events under review. The panel would, of course, be
available to address any questions regarding intelligence law or
international law that say relate to your review, but not, of
course, on any particular deliberations they may have had with
policy makers. Further, the Administration would not object to
preparation of a transcript of such a briefing, although we would
insist upon receiving a copy of any such transcript. The process
would be well served by such a discussion of the law.
690
In closing, the Administration is committed to ensuring that the
Congress obtains the information needed for a complete
understanding of U.S. policy. I am confident this can be done in
a manner which accommodates the legitimate institutional
interests of both branches of government.
We believe this process has worked with the Senate and are
confident it will work here. We look forward tc working with ycv
to this end.
A
^Sincerely,
lack Quinn
Icunsel to the President
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in
Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
691
sr.."""^ Congress OF THE United States icuLH.im..v
Cam gmninffn p> • •.
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
•t!!!^ »S^*'*" W«» SM^mminw on (k l/«tf^ Statu Rolt in
baniam Armi Traitifm to CnuitU and Bosnia
Washington, DC 20515
August 15. 1996
The Honorable Wuren M. Christopher
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Department of Sute
Washington. D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Pursuant to this Select Subcommittee's continuing inquiry into issues surroundin* the
transfer of Iranian arms to Croatia and Bosnia, I am writing to renew my Subcomminee staffs
request that Ambassador Jennone Walker, United States Ambassador to the Czech Republic, be
made available for a staff deposition on August 21, 1996 at United States Embassy, Prague. It is
anticipated that Ms. Walker's deposition will take approximately ruo (2) hours.
Please notify the Subcomminee Chief Counsel, Richard Pocker, by Noon on Friday,
August 16, 1996 with regard to this request.
Sincerely,
cc: Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
c 'iOATA<otn<ON'>M«|c«rrrc>93-..> rro
692
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POLC •LMLTUI.
OAS KVTOV
fe- ...
MMtftO«N»ACft.
MAMC^iA-COMAV
t M A. »*. . I
*■ ~ . 'I y >• ,M
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Meet Sibcommittrt on ihr L'nilrJ Sum Role in
Iranian Armi Trjnifen (a Croatia i-.J Bomia
Washington. DC 2:515
August 15. 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretar\- of Slate
U.S. Department of State
Washington. DC. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretarv:
Pursuant to this Select Si'bcomminee's continuing i=quir>' into issues surroundi-g x'.e
transfer of Iranian arms to Croatia and Bosnia, ^e are writir.g to request production of the
notes taken by Ambassador Philip Wilcox during your Mav 3, 1994 meeting with the
Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey. We also :; quest that any other documents
prepared from these notes be tendered to the Select Subcorr.minee.
Please provide these items to the Selen Subcomminee no later than August 23, 1996.
Thank you for your prompt response to this request.
Sincerely,
^^, ^ ^^ sincere
Chairman I J
LEE H. H.\MILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
c -Dsix cc\»:c V v.voicn cvo«;i xro
693
AUG ?2 -
UNCLASSIFTFD WHEN CLAfiSTFIED ATTACHMENTS REMOVED
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This responds to your July 26, 1996 letter to the
Secretary requesting that the Department make available to
your House Select Subcommittee all documents provided to any
other Congressional Committee between the dates of May 23,
1996 and July 26, 1996, regarding Iranian arms shipments to
Bosnia. This documentation had originally been requested
by Chairman Gilman in his May 21, 1996 letter to the
Secretary.
Our review of Department files is ongoing, and we will
con':.inue to provide responsive materials as they become
available. Enclosed for review by members of your
Subcommittee and cleared staff with a need to know, is a
group of responsive documentation which we are naking
available to: the House International Relations Committee;
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; the Se.-:ate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select
COiTinittee on Intelligence.
Additionally, we have made available another group of
documents for review in the Department by appropriately
cleared staff. These documents contain sensitive foreign
policy information or internal deliberations. Appropriately
cleared staff may review the documents, take written notes
and identify any which Committee members should see.
Verbatim copying of the documents by any .T.ethoc (e.g.,
handwritten copying, photocopying, voice recording, etc.)
may not be done. Department officers would subsequently
take any documents identified by staff to the Congress where
Me.-abers could review them. The documents would remain under
The Honorable
Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Select Subcommittee on the United States
Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia
and Bosnia,
House of Representatives.
"lassified by: Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, H
Reason: 1.5 (C) , (D) , (E)
DECL: XI, .X6
UNCIASSTFIED WHEN CLAggTTT^^TACHMENT.S REMOVED
OOOC03
694
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS REMOVED
-2-
the Department's control, and Department officers would
return them to the Department when the .yeirJsers' review was
completed.
Except for newspaper articles and unclassified United
Nations documents, the documents we are .-rtaking available
were originated by the Department. In accordance with the
Department's normal practice, we have redacted the names of
drafting, clearing and approving officers.
Most of the enclosed documents we are making available
contain classified material. Under Executive Order 12958,
as you know, the Department may not disseminate classified
information outside the Executive Branch except under
conditions that ensure that it be given protection
equivalent to that afforded such information within the
E;:ecutive Branch. We are providing access to these
■documents on the condition that you and your staff protect
the classified information to which you have access by
applying standards at least as stringent as E.O. 12958 on
the handling of classified information. Only those with the
need to know this information and with appropriate security
clearances may be permitted to examine these documents.
Because of the unique circumstances invol%*ed, we are
providing the Committee with access to very sensitive
foreign policy and deliberative information. Our ability to
carry out diplomatic activities and to receive candid advice
would be very seriously harmed if these .materials were tc
become public. Please have your office contact Leslie
Bassett at 647-8722 to arrange a convenient ti.me for the
review of this material.
Included in the documents available for review in the
Department are several of the memoranda of conversation
prepared by Ambassador Galbraith which have been requested
by the Select Subcommittee, as well as r.ites taken by Amb.
Wilcox. We continue to review materials in response to your
July 26, 1996 document request.
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS REMOVED
000004
695
UNriA<;SIFIED WHEN CrggSTFIED ATTACHMKNTS REMOVED
-3-
Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of
further assistance as you continue your inquiry.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
i^nclosures:
As stated.
aNCIASSIFTED WHEW ATTACHMENTS REMOVED
000003
696
0Hf (^Vuntlrrd <S^rik ^finatv-u
save •Ull.'lllt. HOTUOLHJUUS.
K}L«oH Congress of the United States ^K«mc.
^^2!^ House of Representatives
•— Committee on International Relations
jc«w» "LCOMAX Stltcl SiJfnmmittet en tbt United Stain Kelt in
iw»fwa<i>iiMi ,
Iranian Armi Trantfm to Croatia ana Bosnia
Washington, D.C. 20515
August 26. 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of Stale
United Sutes Depanment of State
2201 -C* Street, N.W.
Washing:ton, D.C. 2C520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
As you are undoubtedly aware, the Select Subcomminee has, for some time, been in the
process of conducting its investigation of the United States' role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia
and Bosnia during the period that the UN arms embargo was in effect for the entire region of the
former Yugoslavia.
On August I. 1996. the Majority and Minority Chief Counsels, acting on behalf of the
Majority and Minorit>° membership of the Select Subcommittee sent letters to you requesting that
the State Department make Deput>' Secretary Talbott and Undersecretary for Political Affairs
Tamoff available for staff depositions, scheduled for .August 29. 1996. In those letters, it was
specifically requested that the State Department notify the Select Subcomminee "immediately" if
the request could not be honored. (Letters of August 1, 1996 are anached hereto).
On August 2. 1996, staff was advised by Mr. Klosson of the OfRce of Legislative Affairs for
the Department of State that the Department's legal section was reviewing the resolution creating
the Select Subcommittee to determine if the Select Subcomminee has the authority to take staff
depositions of "priiKipals." (li was assened at that time that the "principals" at issue were yourself,
and Messrs. Talbott and Tamoff) Moreover, it was also asserted at that meeting that the issue of
whether the State Department would even allow 'principals" to sit for staff depositions was at the
same time separate from w hethcr the Select Subcomminee enjoyed the authority to conduct such
proceedings. The staff was assured that these two issues would be resolved in the short term. No
answer has yet been provided, despite the Majority staffs repeated request for the State
Department's detetmination of these issues. Earlier today. Majority Chief Counsel Rick Pocker and
Deputy Chief Counsel Panick Murray inquired of the State Department's Legislative Affairs
personnel, Ms. Leslie Bassen, as to Messrs. Talbon and TamofTs availability for deposition on
Thursday. Ms. Bassett could only provide that there was, as of yet, no resolution of these issues
within the Department of State. Ms. Bassett is certainly not the source for the delay.
697
August 26. 1996
Page 2
That the Stale Depanment may reruse the Select Subcommittee's request to have Messrs.
Tatbott and TamofT sit for the requested depositions cannot be based upon any legal principle.
Additionally, the Department's "emerging" or "developing" policy of whether "principals" *ill
submit to staff depositions is also twt determinative of whether such depositions will be conducted.
House Resolution 416 unambiguously authorizes such depositions. Furthermore, the
resolution authorizes the Chairman (with merely a consultative role for the ranking Minority
member) to issue a subpoena compelling the appearance of any individual for such depositions.
If it is the State DepaiUneitt's policy deterrrunation that a subpoena must issue before Messrs.
Talbott and TamofT will appear as desired for deposition by the Select Subcommittee staff on
Thursday. August 29th, please advise my staff no later that 6:00 p.m. on August 28, 1996. Upon
either the Department's failure to provide a response by that time, or its provision of a negative
response, I will then, as required, advise Mr. Hamilton of the Sute Department's unwillingness to
voluntarily produce the Deputy Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State for lawfully
constituted proceedings before a Subconnminee of the United States House of Representatives. And,
a subpoena compelling their appeararKe, as directed, will be issued and served.
It cannot be more plainly stated. Regardless of the State Department's "policy"
determination of whether "priiKipals" will submit to staff depositions, such depositions will occur-
as previously requested-on August 29th. The depositions will take place either by virtue of the
State Department's acknowledgment of the legitimate role of the Select Subconunittee to conduct
meaningful oversight, or through compulsot>- process necessitated by the Department's glaring lack
of cooperation.
I appreciate your personal anention to this maner. Should you have any questions, please
do not hesiute to contact the Select Subcomminee staff at (202) 225-2264.
Very truly yours,
Chairman ^^
cc: BenjainiD A. Gilman
Chairman, Comminee oi International Relations
Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
c.'OATA<o>o<os'>M«jo*m\*MC>:u.n
698
DkHC HAtlTUl.
^^_^^ Htt% Ulia U|IM«V
DAN MUTON.
»•■ ...
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
■fc^t^I^ i!^*"" ^f Smbtommitter on tbt United Sum Role in
Iranian Arms Tranifen to Croatia and Bmnia
Washington, DC 20515
August 28, 1996
TTic Honorable Warren M. Chhstopher
Secretary of Sute
U.S. Departi.ient of State
Washington. D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I wish to bring to your anention that we are still awaiting the declassification of the three
documents identified in our lener of July 26 from Chairman Oilman, the Rankin^ Minorirv
Member of this Subconuninee, Mr. Hamilton, and myself. Considering the brevit>- of the
documents and the fact that their subjea matter has been extensively discussed in open hearings,
we were confident you would meet the August 2 deadline. In response to staffs numerous efforts
to follow up on this by telephone, the Office of Legislative Affairs has advised that the
declassification action is pending but that it cannot provide an estimate of when it will be
accomplished. Frankly, the Depanmeot's unwillingness to respond to our request is
unacceptable. I would appreciate your personally looking into this and making sure that the
materials requested are declassified for our use.
In reviewing other State Department documenu made available to the Subcomminee, we
have also identified Departmental telegram "State C38237," dated Februari- 27, 1996, as another
document we would like to have declassified for use in our report. In particular, we would like
to have paragraph 3 declassified. In that paragraph, the Depanment provided sanitized talking
points on the Iranian and foreign mujahadin presence in Bosnia. Since more than fifn- posts
worldwide were authorized to use these points at their discretion in talking with foreign
governments, it would appear the assessments they contain do not compromise sensitive national
security or intelligence information or techniques. I would appreciate your notifying us of the
declassification aaion no later than September 3, 1996.
Sincerely,
^ HENRY
Chairman
bcc: Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman, Comminee on International Relations
699
mNRT} MVTlt.hit«-"* LU M IIV4UTOS.*.
C»» — »« • • u. ■■ «...
OIX« MMl-n*. H»«UllLUJM«V
'TsVi.Tov Congress of the United States ucuLH«nM.v
x^-Vi^y^ House OF Representativis
»■■- Committee on International Relations
U.N1AMIN A COM vv Sglto Sibtomminet on tbt L'ntltd Sum Role m
Iranian Armi Traiufm to Croatia jna Botnia
Washington, DC 2C515
August 29, 1996
The Honorable William J. Perry
Secreiar\' of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington. D.C. 203C1
Dear Mr. Secretary:
According to a front-page article by James Risen and Doyle McManus in the May 2,
1996 edition of the Lot .^ngflp< Timw, "administration otticials* indicated the Defense
Department was 'conducting a detailed review of congressional testimony given by senior
officials to determine what was said to lawmakers at the time.' This was, according to the
article prepared in the context of what an administration official charanerized as a "growing
understanding in the administration that in terms of Congress this [the "green light" issue]
could have been handled bener."
Please advise if the Depanment of Defense has prepared or participated in the
preparation of any such report and, if so, please provide the Comminee with a copy and the
materials gathered in its preparation. House Resolution 416, establishing this Subcomminee,
has specified this as an area of investigation.
We would appreciate your response not later than September 3, 1996.
Sincerely,
MaTO>P^
LEE H. HAMILTO
Ranking Democratic Member
c OAT.» co>euON-MA:c«.-rr3nMr»«?3
700
NLSftVI HVW.k . . LU M K^^lllctx i
Cw. >».« »••• ■ !■. .. «...
"XKC MAiiTU. - Mt««OU»LMAM*V
NK«o> Congress of the United States «f»LK*.nvc^
vi-^-oVi.^^ HOUSE OF Representattves
*-™ Committee on International Relations
^^?!»?°^'*^ ^'«' SibcommitUt on t** t'mf«y Sf4«« Ro/* in
Iranian Armi Trantftn to Croatia and fiotnu
Washington. DC 20515
August 29. 1996
The Honorable Wanen M. Christopher
Secretary of Stale
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
According to a front-page article by James Risen and Doyle McManus in the May 2,
1996 edition of the I m Angplr< Tim« "admininration otticials* indicated the State
Department was 'conducting a detailed review of congressional testimony given by senior
officials to determine what was said to lawmakers « the time." This was, according to the
article prepared in the context of what an administration official charaaerized as a "growing
understanding in the administration that in terms of Congress this [the 'green light* issue]
could have been handled bener.*
Please advise if the Department of State has prepared or panicipated in the preparation
of any such report and. if so. please provide the Comminee with a copy and the materials
gathered in its preparation. House Resolution 416, establishing this Subcomnunee, has
specified this as an area of investigation.
We would appreciate your response not later than September 5, 1996.
Sincerely.
eu.
crtZ^T^
HENRYl. HYDV/ LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
c 3.»T.» cc»»iovma;o«.ttstc».-t?3
701
^
•«X« HMI.-IIII.
• MtTON.
CAlt (UUNCUL
t*M WO«M«CL
■C4IUIE« * COMtV
Ui H IIAMUIOVI-
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Sr/rcl SAcommintt on tht Vnittd Stain RoU in
Iranian Aran Trjmfen to Croatia and Bointa
Washington, DC 20515
!•>'>« ^UI I UJUIAN.
UCU L IWMINCV
August 29. 1996
Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
VTashington, D.C. 2C5C6
Dear Mr. Lake:
According to a front-page article by James Risen and Doyle McManus in the May 2. 1996
edition of the 1 «« Ang<'li»<Tiin»<, 'administration officials' indicated ihat the National Security'
Council was conduaing a review of VThite House public statements and correspondence
concerning the 'green light' polic>- towards the Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia. According to
the article, this reviev was prepared in the context of what an administration official
characterized as a 'growing understanding in the administration that in terms of Congress this
could have been handled bener.'
Please advise if the National Security- Council has prepared or participated in the
preparation of any such report and, if so, please provide the Comminee with a copy and the
materials gathered in its preparation. House Resolution 416, establishing this Subcomminee, has
specified this as an area of investigation.
Ve would appreciate your response not later than September 3, 1996.
Sincerely,
HENRY-J. HYDE
Chairman
LEE H: HAMILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
e a*T* coie<ovMiMOKTr=iui:» «n
702
V.W/
II ■I'h/iii.-riin. /Ar. Mutf
AUG 29(996
Dear Mr. Chaiman:
The purpose of thia lattar is to fellow up tha
undarstanding reached between you and Deputy Secretary Talbott
during your August 28 telephone discussion regarding your
letter of August 26 and earlier staff requests for depositions
of Department principals.
A3 the Deputy Secretary indicated, the State Department is
cooimitted to cooperating with the Subconunittee' s efforts to
pursue its inquiry. In the Interest of both time and getting
to heart of issues of concern to your inquiry, there was
agreement that the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary Tarnoff
would go up next week to meet with you. Rep. Hamilton and other
interested members for an hour or so. This would be an
informal interview in which the Chief and Deputy Counsels on
both sides would also participate.
The Deputy Secretary has testified extensively on this
issue before two other Congressional committees, and we
understand from your staff that the Subcommittee has access to
those transcripts. He is prepared to clarify any questions you
might have concerning the policy the Administration pursued
regarding arms transfers to Bosnia.
He suggest that the interview occur on Thursday, September
5 from 10:30-11:30 a.m., if that is convenient for you and
other Members. An alternative time would be Friday, September
6 from 3:30-4:30 p.m.
He loolc forward to working together to make the necessary
arrangements for these meetings with Cepartment principals. He
have conveyed a similar letter to Representative Hamilton.
Sincerely,
Barbara larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
The Honorable
Henry J. Hyde, Chaiman
Select Subcommittee on the
United States Role in Iranian Arms,
Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives
703
srt„o. Congress of the United States £.;■•.♦"-
5:^:2:^^;^''^ House of Representatints
uatmamstu ». COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
H^woN * rjiM«x StUa Stibcvmmintr om iht I'mitrd StJin Roir in
"** ' IrtuUu Amu Traiufin 10 Crottia Jind Botnia
Washington. D.C. 2CS1S
September?. 19%
The Honorable Wairen M. Christopher
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington. D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am writing to request that the State Depanment release documents to the Select
Subcomminee it received from the LS Mission to the United Nations pursuant to my stafTs mid-
July 1996 request to that ofTice relating to the Subcommittee's inquir> into the role of the United
States in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia.
At the request of Majority Senior Staff Associate Janine E. Doherty. these materials were
prepared by Mr. David Shapiro in the Yugoslavian Sanctions Division at the US MissionUN. The
documents requested include the minutes of all LT< Security Council Committee meetings and L'N
Sanctions Committee meetings, and copies of coirespondence received from the governments of
Bosnia. Croatia, and Iran referenced in the May 25. 1994 L'N Securitv Council Committee meeting
transcript, which we currently have. It is my understanding that these documents are not classified,
although the UN restricts their release to Security Council nations
I am advised that these documents were forwarded to the State Depanment. simply as a
matter of protocol, and have been in the State Departments control since shortly after August 16.
1996. (Mr. Shapiro reported that he sent the documents to the State Department via diplomatic
pouch on or about August 16. 1996).
I appreciate your prompt attention to this maner. Should you have any questions or
comments regarding this request please do not hesitate to my staff at (202) 225-2264.
Sincerelv
HENRY J
Chairnun
704
out ft%LU>dlL ab
S;;ii.v;«c^ house of Representatives
••— Committee on International Relations
■f,"*^. ^^»^ Srlttl Subcomminee on tbe Vnittd St Jin Rolt i«
lra»iam Armi Trantftn le Croatia and Beiiua
Washington, DC 20515
September 3, 1996
Honorable Warren M- Christopher
Secretary of State
US Department of State
2201 C Street. NW
Washington. DC 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We are writing to request that the FBI / Diplomatic Security file and investigation
reports of foreign service nationals serving in the US Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia and
conducted in 1994, be released to the Select Subcomminee.
During a recent trip to Croatia to depose and inieniew individuals at the US Embassy
relative to the issues and events under investigation by this Select Subcommittee, it was
brought to the staffs attention that the FBI, together with Diplomatic Security, conducted a
thorough background investigation all foreign service nationals, due to concerns of security
and counterintelligence. We believe the release of this file to tbe Selen Subcomminee would
be helpful to our investigation.
We appreciate your assistance in this maner. Should you have any questions regarding
this request, please do not hesitate to contact one of us at (232) 225-2274.
Sincerely, /^ I
Htnrfli^ j LeeH.
ChairmA ^ Rankir
Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
cc: Peter E. Bergin
Director, Office for Investigations and
Counterintelligence
Bureau of Diplonutic Security
705
^iim«». Congress of the United States i^'f'^»»'"«'^
House OF Represent ATTVES
Committee on International Relations
k. coMAN. SeUa Suktommittet oa tbt L'niled Statn Role in
IranUn Amt Tramftn to Croatia and Botnia
Washington. D.C. 20515
September 5. 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United States Depanment of State
2201 -C" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
As you are aware by letter dated August 12, 1996. the Select Subcommittee requested ihat
its stafTbe granted an opportunity to meet *ith Croatian Government officials, including President
Franjo Tudjman, Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Defense Minister Gojko Susak. Prime Mimster
Valentic, the Chief of the Croatian Intelligence Service, and Madame Djerdja Susak. to discuss with
Ihem their knowledge of facts and e\ents relating to the U.S. role in Iranian aims transfers to Croatia
and Bosnia.
The Select Subcomminee would ask the State Department to renew that request at this time.
The Select Subcomminee staff is available to meet with those officials, at their convenience, either
in Croatia or anywhere the Croatian government deems appropriate.
Please forward this request on our behalf to the Croatian govemmeni officials using all
appropriate diplomatic channels. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this matta
do not hesitate to contact us, or Chief Counsel Rick Pocker at (202) 225-2264.
Your prompt anention to this maner is greatly appreciated.
Very truly yours.
U^
HENRY J. HYDE LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
6M>ATA cotMON- MMOMrrCMiasno
706
OOUC KUCTO. .' MO«*III>Ltl«M>N
^ji,TOK Congress of the United States icu.:K«n.c..
Cam T*iif-^T*
Z::is;;m»a. house of Representatives
'^'~ Committee on International Relations
^^tHIfS; tS^T*" S**"* Subcommittrt en tht Uuittd Statn Rolt in
Iranian Arm Traniftn le Croatia and Boinia
Washington, D.C. 20515
September 5, 1996
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
United States Department of State
2201 "C" Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
As pan of the Select Subcommittee's investigation, we ask that the State Deparoncm advance
a request from the Select Subcomminee seeicing meetings and interviews by Subcommittee staff
with Bosnian Government officials, including President Alija Izetbegovic, former Prime Minister
Maris Silajdzic, aixl Vice President Ejup Ganic, to discuss their knowledge of facts and
circumstances surrounding the United States Goverruneni's decision to convey a message to
Croatian Govenwnent ofiicials, which resulted in the transshipment of weapons from Iran through
Croatia into Bosnia despite a United Nations arms embargo on the region.
Please make it clear to the Bosnian Government that the Select Subcomminee staff is
available to meet with their government officials, at their convenience, either in Bosnia or anv-where
the Bosnian Government deems appropriate.
Please forward this request on our behalf to the Bosnian goverrunent ofRcials using all
appropriate diplomatic channels to do so. Should you have any questions or commenu regarding
this maner do not hesiute to conuct us. or Chief Counsel Rick Pocker at (202) 225-2264.
Your prompt anention to this maner is greatly appreciated.
HENRY J. HYDE LEE H. HAMILTON
Chairman Ranking Democratic Member
c vDATAicoMtoNvuMOnnr^MiBa no
707
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SepteirJDer 13, 1996
Dear Chairman Hyde:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss by telephone the steps
we are taking to help ensure that your Subcommittee obtains the
facts it needs concerning the Bosnian arms matter. I am pleased
that you are also prepared to work together to find ways to mest
the Subcommittee's legitimate needs without engendering an
unnecessary confrontation as to the appropriate line of
separation between the Presidency and the Congress.
In this spirit, I -A.uld like tc suggest that Intelligence
Oversight Board Chairman Tony Harrington meet personally with
you. Representative Hamilton and any other merrjsers of the
Subcommittee you consider appropriate, either separately or
together. Among other things I know Mr. Harrington would like
to address are the nature and role of the lOB and certain
misimpressions reflected in ycur letter of August 13 to him. .-.s
you know from my letter of August 14 and Mr. Harrington's letter
of August 5, he has briefed members of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees, as well as your Subccrrjnittee staff, cr.
the lOB' s inquiry, and we are making great effort otherwise tc
provide the information you seek for your own inquiry. I thin>
we can further this progress with such a meeting at your earliest
convenience.
Sincerely,
4'
ack Quinn
'Counsel to the President
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
cc: The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
708
o««„.,x Congress of the United States ^^a^mcv
rSr;rw«. House of Representatives
^ Committee on International Relations
.Sti?^ JiSi'*^ Select Subcommittee on the VmUtd Stain Role i»
haniam Armi Tramifert to Croatia and Botmia
Washington, D.C. 20515
September 16, 1996
Mr. John M. Quinn, Esq.
Counsel to the President
West Wing
The White House
1600 Penns>-Ivania Avenue, NW
Washington. D.C. 2C500
Dear Mr. Quinn:
Thank you for your lener of Friday, September 13. 1996, which recounted the substance
of our August 15th conversation. E>uring that discussion, you expressed a desire to accommodate
the Select Subcommittee's need for information in the possession of the Intelligence Oversight
Board (lOB), the White House, and the National Security Council (NSC) relating to our
investigation, as well as making NSC staff and the National Securit>- Advisor available to the
Subcommittee for the taking of testimony. Based on my understanding of vour wish to cooperate
with this investigation. I direaed my staff to contact you and seek an avenue for a resolution of
these issues.
Since that time, my Chief Counsel. Rick Pocker. and Mr. Baker of your staff, have had
a series of conversations to this end. The last of these occurred early last week. During that
disctissiun. Mr. Pocker was told by Mr. Baker that the lOB documents at issue would not be
turned over to the Selea Subcommittee as requested. I would say that some progress has been
made on the issue of NSC staff being made available for taking their statements. However, there
remain questions of whether the statements will be tnade under oath and whether a verbatim
transcript will be made of the statement. It is my strong preference that such be the procedure
for the gathering of this infornution.
Notably, your lener only reiterates a desire for cooperation without specific mention of
any of these particulars. Thus, there is a need once again to discuss the service of subpoenas to
guarantee produaion of individuals and documents.
As to your offer to have Mr. Harrington meet with me, I am open to the proposition.
Although, it is my understanding that Mr. Harrington has already briefed the Selea
Subcommittee staff. Futthermore, it is my understanding, as well, that that briefing took place
only after the Selea Subcomminee requested Mr. Harrington's appearance at a deposition under
oath. Mr. Harrington rejeaed that option. The briefing proceeded as it did only as a maner of
accommodation on the Subcomminee's pan. and because of the need to gather »% much
information as possible in the shon life span of the Subcomminee.
709
Page 2
Lei me idd that the scheduling of that meeting does not negate the lOB's obligation to
provide the information sought by the Select Subcommittee since July 26, 1996.
It is trulv unfortunate that the limited information sought by the Select Subcommittee
from the lOB and the NSC cannot be released, free of compulsor>- process. But, the Selea
Subcomminee can complete its work only if it has access to all information it determines to be
relevant to its investigation.
I appreciate your personal anention to this matter, and look forward to completing our
inquiry, which can only be accomplished with your cooperation.
Very truly yours.
HENRy^FYDE Q
ChJbman
cc: Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Comminee on International Relations
Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
e 3ATACOiaios''M\-owrrQ(.iNv>«T0
710
OOCt^ •UtlLIUL H«^««llflLUJLSI«N
CAM lAlUNCUI.
^;««-. Congress OF THE United States «cuL„.»mcv
House of Representatives
Committee on Ii^ernational Relations
~*?fcl?2»SM'*^ *'''•' Sibcommitut «■ iht UmUfd Sutn RoU in
IrsuUm Armi Tranifen M Cnttu and Bcinit
VCashincton.DC 20S1S
September 16, 1996
Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary-
Legislative Affairs
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Madame Assistant Secretary:
Thank you for your letter of September 6, 1996, regarding your proposed arrangement for
assuring that the Selea Subcommittee have access to all relevant ponions of Ambassador Galbraith's
documented 'recollections* currently in the possession of the State Department. I have considered
your proposal, but I am instead proposing that Chief Counsel and Chief Minority Counsel be
permined to review the entire text, not simply those portions the State Depanment chooses to
make available, or to designate one person on each of their respeaive staffs to make such a review.
The question of relevance is best addressed by individuals intimately familiar with the details
and progress of the investigation thus far, as well as theories of inquiry contemplated. Limiting the
access to one member of each staff will sufficiently accommodate your Department's concerns about
the sensitivity of the contents of the recollections and guard gainst unnecessary dissemination of the
irrelevant ponions.
As you are aware, time is of the essence with respea to the Select Subcomminee's
investigation. I am requesting that you respond to my counterproposal by close of business on
Wednesday, September 18, 1996. Thank you for your prompt anention to this maner.
Sincerely,
cc: Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
711
HO«AIIDLMJUt*.V
o«_..mn». Congress of the United States "i^"-^'"^^
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
.<4*MM*.aut*N. UUet S^tcommixttr oa iht Vnittd Stain RoU im
Ik. t^ •.»- w Irtmum Anrn Transfm to Croatia and Bmnia
Washington. DC 2051S
Sepumber 17. 1996
William Sheehan, Esq.
Deputy General Couiuel ^.cgal Counsel)
U.S. Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1600
Dear Mr. Sheehan:
I am writing to follow up on our earlier discussions regarding the willingness of Secretar>-
William Perry to appear for a staff deposition to facilitate this Selea Subcomminee's investigation.
On a prior occasion, you indicated that such a request made the Pentagon "nervous" and that you
would have to get back to me with the Depanment's position.
Please respond at your earliest convenience if you have had an opportunity to determine the
Depanment's position as to our request. As the time available for this investigation is dwindling, I
need a response so that the Select Subcomminee can explore and consider its options for dispensing
with, compelling or otherwise obtaining Secretary Perry's testimony.
Sincerely.
Richard jTPocker i>
Chief Counsel
cc: Richard Meltzer
- Minority Chief Counsel
bcc: Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairnun, Conmiinee on International Relatioiu
712
U inhiiuton. I) ( . MiJU
SEP I 7 1996
D*ar Mr. Chairman:
In our continuing effort to facilitate the Select
Subconunittee on the U.S. Government's role in Iranian Arms
Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia, I am pleased to inform you
that we are able to make available an additional r.urOser of the
documents requested in several letters dating from July 16 to
September 3. Material requested but not yet provided will ce
addressed in subsequent correspondence.
Our review of Department files is ongoing, an? we will
continue to provide responsive materials as they are identified
and processed. However, at this time we believe rcft
responsive documents have been collected and are ceir.c
reviewed. This additional tranche of documents i.-clude?
information on concerns of foreign governments relating tc arms
transfers and deliberations of the United Nations Sanction-
Committee. A review of Department files fou.nd .-.o iccureents
regarding PH Bhutto's travel to the United States vhich -ver-i
directly relevant to the Subcommittee's inq\:iry; a few puclit
documents en her visit are being provided ir. case they may -5
of interest .
Your "uly 26 letter requests informatic.-. on "criefir.rv .■-'•:.
Galbraith gave to Congressional members and staff. /-s
understand the Subccminittee already has access to trar.«:r-;t-
of briefings 5n this matter which took place in 'A'ajhir ;t:r. . .-.
complete list of congressional travellers, roth r.erce-s ?--
staff, to Zagreb in 1994 and 1995 is attached for ytui
reference. Xe have been informed by Ambassador Galirait." tr.-.t
it was routine for him to brief both congressional an: s~»ff
delegations d-jring their stay in Zagreb, if he hirself -'s ir.
town. It is his recollection that he met with most of ths
delegations on the attached list. During the course of tht
briefing. Ambassador Galbraith generally gave an cvervie*-'
The Honorable
Henry *. Hyde, Chairman,
Select Svibcosunittee on the United Stat.es
?.cle in Iranian Arms Transfers tt Crtatia
and Bosnia,
House of Representatives.
000001
713
of U.S. policy lowjras LlUJLla as well «» the situation on the
9round, then took questions from delegation merabers. Embassy
staff often attended the briefings and would occasionally
respond to specific questions.
According to Ambassador Galbraith during the course of the
briefings he and his staff would discuss the arms embargo along
with other tools of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
These discussions generally included perceptions of the
effectiveness of the embargo. The level of information shared
would depend on whether a classified briefing was being
provided; however in all situations the Ambassador and his
country team endeavored to provide its best assessment and to
respond fully to questions.
In a separate letter on August 12, 1996, ysu requested
access to notebooks maintained by State Department officer
Alexander R. Vershbow while he was working at the State
Department and subsequently detailed to the NSC. The State
Department and the NSC have offered to make available, or have
already made available, relevant portions of these materials to
the Select Subcommittee (either by briefing or showing you and
Ranking Hember Hamilton their content, or, where appropriate,
by showing portions directly to staff) .
On August 14, 1996, the Subcommittee requested access to
documents during staff travel to Embassy Zagreb. The
Department has provided access in Washington to relevant
n>«terials from Embassy Zagreb files. Finally, on August 28.
you requested the declassification of talking points contained
in State 38237. A redacted version of this document is also
attached; those oortions withheld remain properly classified
under E.O. 12958.
In addition to responsive documents attached, we have made
available another group of documents for review in the
Department by appropriately cleared staff. These documents
contain sensitive foreign policy inforroation or internal
deliberations, ^propriately cleared staff may review the
documents, take written notes and identify any which Committee
members should see. Verbatim copying of the documents by any
method (e.g., handwritten copying, photocopying, voice
recording, etc) may not be done. Department officers would
subsequently take any documents identified by staff to the
Congress where Members could review them. The documents would
remain under the Department's control, and Department officers
would return thea to the Department when the Members' review
was completed.
000002
714
In accordance with tb« Dcpartacnt's nonnal practice, in
documents oriainated by the Dcpartaent we have redacted the
names of drafting, clearing and approving officers.
Most of the enclosed documents we are making available
contain classified material. Onder Executive Order 12958, as
you know, the Department may not disseminate classified
information outside the Executive Branch except under
conditions that ensure that it be given protection equivalent
to that afforded such information within the Executive Branch.
Ne are providing access to these documents on the condition
that you and your staff protect the classified information to
which you have access by applying standards at least as
stringent as E.O. 12958 on the handling of classified
information. Only those with the need to know this information
and with appropriate security clearances may be permitted to
examine these documents.
Because cf the unique circumstances involved, we are
providing the Committee with access to very sensitive foreign
policy and deliberative information. Our ability to carry ■:iZ
diplomatic activities and to receive candid advice wou^** be
very seriously harmed if these materials were to become
public. Please have your office contact Leslie Bassett at
647-6722 to arrange a convenient time for the review of this
material.
In the course of our document collection we identifies
three documents which were referred to the NSC for
coordination; the NSC's response is also enclosed.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of
further assistance as you continue your inquiry.
Sincerely,
^^^Ct^^^'^^p^
Or^A^^"-^
Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
Enclosures:
As stated.
000003
715
M .nhl/UTi'll. I> < JihJI/
SEP 18 B86
0«ar Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter dated September 16, responding to
our letter of September 6, regarding access to Ambassador
Galbraith's typed recollections of events during
August-September 1994 and from November 1994 through November
199S.
We are disappointed that you are not prepared to accept
the proposal set forth in our letter, under which both you as
Chairman, and Mr. Hamilton as the ranking minority Member,
would have been provided access to the entire recollections.
In our view, this would have been the most appropriate way to
satisfy the desire of the Subconmittee to ensure the portions
of the recollections that have not been released are not in
fact relevant.
Nevertheless, in the hopes of avoiding a confrontation on
this issue, wc are prepared to move forward on the basis of
your September 16 letter by providing access to Mr. Pocker and
Mr. Meltzer, in lieu of you and Mr. Har.iltcn, to the entire
recollections in order to allow them tc satisfy themselves that
the remaining portions are in fact not relevant to the
Subcommittee's inquiry. To help address our concerns regarding
dissemination, part of the understanding would be that any
notes taken by either Mr. Pocker or Mr. Meltzer would not be
removed physically from the Department and they would agree not
to discuss the recollections with persons other than you and
Mr. Hamilton.
We believe it is appropriate to underscore that the
Department, as a matter of principle, is deeply concerned about
prospect of providing access to sensitive documents such as
these that ar« not relevant tu the Subcommittee's inquiry. We
have attempted to meet your concerns as best we can while
trying to protect the legitimate interests of the Department
The Honorable
Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Select SubcoauBittee on the
Onited States Role in Iranian Arms
Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia,
Committee on I.nternational Relations,
House of Representatives.
716
•nd the Executive branch. Indeed, following expresaiona of
concern by your staff that they should not be required to rely
upon assessments of what should be provided to the Subcommittee
by persons who may have a specific interest in the outcome of
inquiry, the Departaent conducted an additional review of the
recollections and has aade available to the Subcommittee access
to all segments that we in qood faith believe are relevant to
its inquiry. Indeed, virtually all of the recollections are
dated well after the period on which the Subcommittee's inquiry
is focused.
He hope that you can appreciate our concern about granting
access to sensitive doctiaents in order for a congressional
committee to "verify" that those documents are not relevant.
Left unchecked, such a principle could be used to justify
requests for access to virtually any dooiaent that the
Department might hold. Accordingly, if we proceed in the
manner proposed above, it would need to be understood that this
accommodation is being adopted on an exceptional basis, in the
interests of bringing this inquiry to an expeditious close.
This procedure would not serve as a basis for providing access
to other congressional coenittees in this or future cases.
Ne hope that yo-c will accept this approach in the spirit of
accommodation in trtiich it is offered.
Barbara iarkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
cct The Honorable Lee B. Bamilton
717
••t» if sr i
September 20. 1996
Dear Chairman Hyde:
Thank you for meeting with Jack Quinn and me concerning your comminee's review of
matters related to the provision of arms to Bosnia. I trust that you found it as helpful as I did to
discuss the background of this matter and u-ays in which we could help you satisfy your
responsibilities in this review without unnecessarily breaching the constitutional line of
separation between the Presideixry and the Congress and impairing the President's own
intelligence oversight
Pursuant to our understanding, we are providing herewith a list of the names of those
persons the Board found necessary to interview in order to gather the facts relevant to the its
review. Please note that some of the identities in our list are coiuidered classified.
If your committee should find that any other person had significant information with
regard to the events the Board reviewed, we would likewise appreciate your identifying them to
us. In this regard, though, it should be noted that your inquiry is presumably broader, as our
Board does not exercise oversight over policy-making but rather over the intelligeiKe community
and intelligence-related laws and Presidential directives.
In the same spirit of mutual cooperation we have enjoyed with the House and Senate
intelligeiKe conunittees, please let me know if you have questions about this list or about the
Board.
Sincerely.
-)
. /-,..
Anthony S. Harrington
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
The Honorable Heno' i- Hyde
United Sutes House of Represenutives
Washing:ton, DC. 20515
cc: The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Jack Quinn
This page is unclassified
when separated from attachment
CLBY: CH.\1RMAN, PFIAB
REASON: 1.5(c) DECL:X 1.3.4
000002
718
DObC>UU.-IU. *' <-
s=i««-* Congress of the United States i^'***^"
House of Representatives
Committee on Inteknational Relations
"nUTiS^J'*^ StttttSmhammitttttulhtUuittdSuttiReltin
Irtniau Armt Tranifm te Cnatis and Betnia
Washington, DC 20515
September 24. 1996
Tlie Honorable Wairen M. Christopher
Secretary of Stale
U.S. Department of Sute
Washington. DC. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
On August 2, and periodically since that date. Select Subcommittee staff have raised with
your Legislative Affairs staff the issue of your availabilit> to provide the Subcomminee with
information on the US role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia ani Bosnia during the period the UN
Security Council resolution imposing an embargo upon the former Yugoslavia was in effect.
Initially, the State Department raised issues relating to format and procedure, without
addressing dates of availability. Now that the issues of how to proceed seem to have been resolved,
we would ask that you advise us of dates and times that you would be available to provide a
statement that could assist the Subcomminee conclude its investigation.
It is our understanding that you wish not to provide your sutements under oath, but that a
verbatim transcript can be made of our meeting. If this is not the case, please advise promptly. Also,
please conuct the Select Subcomminee Staff at (202) 225-2264 with time and dates of your
availability. Time constraints require that a response be made to this request no later than the close
of business September 27. 1996. We would ask that the interview he conducted no later than
October 1. 1996.
Unfortunately, the delay in responding to the Select Subcommittee's August 2 and
subsequent inquiries, as well as working to resolve the other procedural issues, force the shortness
of lime within which this request must be accommodated.
Thank you for your prompt and personal anention to this maner.
Very Truly Yours,
&
LEE H. HAMILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
719
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Klil^tS^*^ ^'«' Siil>commiOtt on ibt UmUtJ Stala Role im
Iramism Armi Trtutfm (o CnatU and BotnU
Washington, DC 20515
Septemb«r25, 1996
The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Depanment of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 2C)C1
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We are writing to request that you make available to the Selea Subcomminee
materials used by Depanment of Defense officials in briefing Members of Congress and their
suffs prior to the commitment of U.S. troops to the IFOR mission in December, 1994.
In particular, we are requesting information that the Defense Department provided to
Congress regarding the potential terrorist threats faced by IFOR troops.
Given the tight deadline under which the Subcommittee is operating, we would greatly
appreciate your providing this material to us by Wednesday. October 2, 1996.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
LEE H.HAMILTON
Ranking Democrat
720
sr;;i,«^ Congress of the United States y-uLK^vm,^
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
^*^ L**"*^ S**"* S«i*comiiiiff*f on ibt Vmitti Sum Role in
Iramitn Armt Trjiufen le CnatU and BoimU
Washington, DC 20515
Sept. 26. 1996
Mr. Steven Garfmkel
Director
Inrormation Security 0\ersight OfTice
National Archives and Records Administration
700 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.. Room 5-W
Washington. DC. 20408
Dear Mr. Garfinkel:
We appreciate the .Xdministration's efTort to enhance the regularit>- and oversight of the
classification and declassitication process for docuinents of the Executive Branch, as evidenced
by the issuance of Executive Order 1 2958. dated .\pril 17, 1995. At the same time, I am sure
you would agree with us that this Order will have no eHect if agencies within the Executive
Branch fail to comply with its terms.
In that regard. I want to call to your anention and request action on a request made by our
Select Subcommittee on Iranian Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Serbs in regard to our
investigation of the Administration's role in this matter. The document about which we are
most immediately concerned is a Memorandum to the Files, dated May 6, 1994, in possession of
the Department of State. The Department of State has now provided this Subcomminee with a
redacted version of that Memorandum that has raised grave concerns about that agency's fidelity
to Executive Order 12958.
In particular, it is absolutely clear to us that some important pans of the Memorandum
have been redacted solely for the purpose of '*pre\'ent[ing] embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency...." (Executive Order 12958, Section 1 .8(2)) Other parts have been
redacted in what appear to be clear violations of Paragraphs ( 1 ) and (4) of Section 1 .8, as well.
In some of these cases, moreover. PriiKipals from the Department of Slate have already testified
under oath in open session regarding matters contained in this memorandum, and yet the
Department appears determined to refuse declassification of information in this document that
was prepared contemporaneously with the events in question and can verify (or not) the accuracy
of the recollection of those testifying. Ultatever purposes the classification process can have, it
surely caimot be a cover for concealing from the American public infomiation that would allow
verification of the accuracy of information given by Admiitistration officials before Congress
while under oath.
721
Of course, ih« redacted ponions of this Memorandum, and the Department's apparently
cavalier violations of Execuive Order 12958. have also raised broader concerns about the
Administration's provision of all the information requested by our Subcommittee. If the
Department has so flagrantly disregarded the Administration's o«-n declassification standards in
this instance, it naturally reduces considerably our confidence that ihey have complied stnctly
with the letter and spirit of that Order in other regards.
In short, the Department's behavior in regard to this panicular memorandum has raised
concerns about its fidelity to the Order and to the Administration's other representations
regarding openness with respect to all our other requests. Obviously, we are not in a position to
independently verify whether it and other relevant ageiKies have indeed released all the
information requested, but I think you can understand the current source cf our concerns in this
regard.
I am sure you share try concern that all agencies within the Executive Branch comply
strictly with the terms of Executive Order 12958 and more generally with the Administration's
stated policy of openness to the American public. Accordingly, I respectfully request that you
examine in particular the Department of Sute's compliance with the terms of Executive Order
12958 in regard to the memorandum cited above, as well as more generally the compliance of all
agencies of the U.S. Government with respect to our request for documents relevant to the above
captioned investigation.
Our Subcommittee's staff remaitts available at any time to elaborate fiirther the precise
nature of our concerns with respect both to the above-mentioned memorandum and to our
general requests for documents rele\-ant to this investigation.
Sincerely.
722
»«>»«- Congress of the United States «cut«,m«
ii^iiifiia^cK House of Representatives
*"" Committee on International Relations
'^TIT^tt.'^*'^ StUaSmbtemmitteramtbeVmtfdUatnRoleiu
Iranisn Armi Tramftn le Croatia tnd Bmmu
Washington. DC 20515
September 26. 1996
Roslyn Mazer, Esq.
Chair
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
Deputy .Assistant Attorney General
Deparaneni of Justice
9S0 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.. Room 4234
Washington. DC. 20530-0001
Dear Ms. Mazer:
We appreciate the Administration's efTon to enhance the regularity and oversight of the
classification and declassification process for documents of the Executive Branch, as exidenced
by the issuance of Executive Order 12958. dated April 17, 1995. At the same time, I am sure
you would agree with us that this Orda «ill have no effect if agencies within the Executive
Branch fail to comply with its teims.
In that regard, I want to call to your anention and request action on a request made by our
Select Subcommittee on Iranian Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Serbs in regard to our
investigation of the Administration's role in this matter. The document about which we are
most immediately concerned is a .Memorandum to the Files, dated May 6, 1994, in possession of
the Department of State. The Department of State has now provided this Subcommittee with a
redacted version of that Memorandum that has raised grave concerns about that agency's fidelity
to Executive Order 12958.
In particular, it is absolutely clear to us that some imponant parts of the Memorandum
have been redacted solely for the purpose of '^revent[ing] embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency...." (E.xecutive Order 1 2958. Section 1 .8(2)) Other pam have been
redacted in what appear to be clear violations of Paragraphs ( I ) and (4) of Section 1 .8, as w ell.
In some of these cases, moreover. Principals from the Department of Suie have already testified
under oath in open session regarding matters conuined in this memorandum, and yet the
Department appears determined to refuse declassification of information in this document that
was prepared contemporaneously with the events in question and can verify (or not) the accuracy
of the recollection of those testifying. Vrliatever purposes the classification process can have, it
723
surely cannot be a cover for concealing from the American public mfomiation that would allow
venficaiion of the accuracy of infonnation given by Administration ofTicials before Congress
while under oath.
Of course, the redacted portions of this Memorandum, and the Depanmeni's apparently
cavalier violations of Executive Order I29S8, have also raised broader concerns about the
Administration's provision of all the infonnation requested by our Subcommittee. If the
Department has so flagrantly disregarded the Administration's own declassification standards in
this instance, it naturally reduces considerably our confidence that they have complied strictly
with the letter and spirit of that Order in other regards.
In short, the Department's behavior in regard to this particular memorandum has raised
concerns about its fidelity to the Order and to the Administration's other representations
regarding openness with respect to all our other requests. Obviously, we are not in a position to
independently verify whether it and other relevant agencies have indeed released all the
information requested, but i think you can understand the cunent source of our concerns in this
regard.
I am sure you share tny concern that ail agencies within the Executive Branch comply
strictly w ith the terms of Executive Order 1 2958 and more generally with the Administration's
stated policy of openness to the .American public. Accordingly. I respectfully request that you
examine in particular the Department of State's compliance with the temis of Executive Order
129S8 in regard to the memorandum cited above, as well as more generally the compliance of all
agencies of the U.S. Govenunent with respect to our request for documents relevant to the above
captioned investigation.
Our Subcommittee's suff remaiiu available at any time to elaborate fiinher the precise
nature of our concerns with respect both to the above-mentioned memorandum and to our
general requests for documents relevant to this investigation.
Sincerelv,
724
Umhin^lon. lU:. Jtl'tjO
■jcr 25 996
D«ar Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter dated September 24, regarding the
availability of Secretary Christopher for an interview with
Members no later than October 1.
As Deputy Assistant Secretary Klosson discussed with Chief
Counsel Mr. Pocker September 26, the Secretary is committed t?
full cooperation with the Subcommittee's inquiry and the
Department has responded accordingly. However, this late
request for an interview poses practical problems. The
Secretary is in New York all this week in connection with the
United Nations General Assembly, during which he is holding an
extensive series of bilateral meetings. Given this constraint,
the Committee's proposed time frame thus leaves just one day
next week for the interview. Unfortunately, the Secretary
already has commitments for that period.
I hope you will appreciate the difficulties in scheduling
the Secretary for an interview on such short notice. Deputy
Secretary Talbott, Under Secretary Tarnoff and Chief of Staff
Donilon have all addressed the Secretary's limited
participation in the process which lead to the "no
instructions'* decision since he was travelling abroad at the
time.
Sincerely yours,
Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
The Honorable
Henry J. Hyde, Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the
United States Role in Iranian Arms
Transfers tc Croatia and Bosnia,
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
725
mjonnatWH Scairity Ovfrsiglit Offici' /"S^i'\
TiMI I'.Hii vh-.uii.i .InMii.. .VU' l\ i'hii.ir.-t. IH i'lHOS ^«
October 1. 1996
The Honorable
Hervy J. Hyde
Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the
United States Role in Iranian
Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington. DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter of September 26, 1996. in which you question the
legitimacy of continued classification of portions of a Memorandum to the Files, dated
May 6. 1 994. The Department of State has provided the Subcommittee a redacted
copy of this memorandum.
As Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). I have initiated
an inquiry into this matter with the Department of State Please find enclosed a copy of
my letter of this date to the HorKxable Patrick F. Kennedy. Acting Under Secretary of
State for Management. vA\o serves as the Department's Senior Agency Official for its
security classification program. I will respond to you with the results of my ir>quiry
immediately upon its completion.
Your letter also requests that ISOO examine the broader question of whether all
agencies properly and completely responded to the Subcommittee's calls for
information. Such an inquiry would be outside the purview of ISOO's authorities under
Executive Order 12958. "Classified Natiorial Security Information." We suggest that
the Inspector General of each responsive department or agency would be the
appropriate official to contact on this issue.
Sir>cerely,
StAuan tiarftnlcttl *
Steven Garfinkel
Director
Enclosure
cc: The HorxKable John W. Carlin
Archivist of the UnKed States
726
I, i^My :] Siitu'iuii .\nliivf\ ,111,1 Rrivril\ .\iliiiiiii-tr,iliim
BY FAX; ORIGINAL MAILED
October 1,1996
0©lp>y
The Honorable
Patrick F. Kennedy
Acting Under Secretary for Management
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Mr. Kerviedy:
The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has received a letter, copy
erKlosed. from the Hor>orable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Select Subcommittee on the
United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations. In this letter. Chairman Hyde
questions the legitimacy of continued classification of portions of a Memorandum to the
Files, dated May 6, 1994. The Department of State has provided the Subcommittee a
redacted copy of this memorandum. The Chairman suggests that the continued
classification of this memorandum may violate one or more of three prohibitions against
classification contained in Section 1.8(a) of Executive Order 12958, "Classified
National Security Information" (the 'Order").
UrKJer Section 5.3(b) of the Order, the President requires the Director of ISOO to
'consider an6 take action on complaints . . . from persons within or outside the govern-
ment with respect to the administration of the [security classification] program . . . .'
In order that I may fulfill this responsibility. I respectfully request that you designate an
individual within the Department of State through whom I can pursue my inquiry.
Specifically, I request an opportunity to examine the memorandum in question, as well
as two other documents that I urvjerstand the Department has provided to the
Subcommittee in redacted form. I also request an opportunity to examine other
documentation related to this issue and to discuss the continued classification of these
documents with an irnlividual or individuals who are responsible for or cognizant of the
Department's position.
Thank you for your cooperation on this matter. I would very much appreciate an
initial response no later than October 8, 1996. I can be reached at (202) 219-5250.
(aigned) ^-Cefen Wf iokel
Steven GarTinkel
Director
Enclosure
727
HCnUlDLUJlMAV
OOIC H««.-Il». ' t »»■'■
Hr*"^ Congress of the United States js'^'^'^^
CAM tuuNcn. House of Representatives
COHMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
f*^^c«*«w«. SeUa SmbtommUtet an tbe United Sutti Kelt in
IrtnUu Aim$ Trantfat M Cnstia and BotmU
Washington, D.C. 20515
October 1, 1996
The Honorable Wairen M. Chhstopher
Secretary of State
U.S. D^anment of State
Washington. D.C. 20S20
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In reviewing documents made available by the Department of State to this Subcommittee,
we have determined that tbe handwritten notes made by Alexander R. Vershbow, former Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, will be of critical
importance for the preparation of the Subcommittee's report
The matters contained therein relate to the transmittal and implementation of the "green
light" policy, and are not diplomatically sensitive. Mainly, the notes describe and detail
communications between US Govenunoit ofBciak. The notes provide a naming contemporaneous
account of the intetnal State Department and NSC discussions about how to handle the Iranian Green
Light situation. Accordingly, we ask that you declassify these notes, as well as Mr. Vershbow's
deposition transcript, for the Subcommittee to be able to cite and include as exhibits to our public
report
Due to the extremely tight schedule on which the Subcommittee is operating, 1 would ask
that you notify us of the E>epartment's declassification decision no later than Noon on October 4,
1996. If the Subcomminee is not so advised, it will assume that the Department has agreed to
declassify tbe entirety of these documents. Please contact John Miltis, Majotity Staff Director, or
Rick Pocker, Majority Chief Counsel, at (202) 225-2264. if you have any questions or commentt
regarding this matter.
Very truly yours.
HENRY J
Chairman
cc: Benjamin A. Oilman. Chairman
Committee on International Relations
Lee H. Hamihon
Ranking Democratic Member
O OltTaCOWaOVMAlOWTrOCLASSIVin
o
3 9999 05903 548 3
ISBN 0-16-054070-4
9 780
60"540707
90000
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