

**PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAEL – PALESTINE CONFLICT:  
FRAMES AMONG THE PUBLIC, POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS AND  
MEDIA IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL**

**D I S S E R T A T I O N**

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IN MEMORY OF  
**PROF. WOLFGANG DONSBACH**

HIS WORDS OF INSPIRATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT IN PURSUIT OF  
EXCELLENCE, STILL LINGER ON. . .

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## ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to comprehend how Palestinians and Israelis perceive the conflict and the peace process. It identifies the channels and dynamics related to the shaping of their perceptions on the individual, community, and political levels. The main objectives of this study are to probe the degree of homogeneity between these levels for both Palestinians and Israelis as well as the degree of discord between them on the same levels and to pinpoint intervening factors that contribute to carving out the ultimate perceptions that individuals hold. Unlike previous work, this study employs a multi-method approach to measure and benchmark of the topic at hand. To bridge further gaps, a developed matrix extends the analyses on temporal-spatial dimensions of individuals' cognitions, affections, and behaviors pertaining to the conflict. This study falls within the descriptive research that seeks probing the effect of macro-level factors (the media, and political parties/leaders) on micro-level ones (the audience cognitive processing), and is involved in describing and identifying its elements and components through the collection and analysis of data. Interpretation of data is based on a combination of content analysis for eight major newspapers, two public opinion surveys and a document analysis affiliated to the main four political parties.

The analysis of the Palestinians and Israelis' perspective of the conflict and the peace process revealed that the actual conflict has three main dimensions: *First*, the struggle between individuals, which is full of self-contradictions, as each party describes a conflict in a way different than the other. It is a conflict, in which the past and present of the two sides of the conflict are different - the bitter past itself with different narratives, yet the motives are the same but conducive to different results. Whereas each party is blaming the other on these three levels, the conflict is rooted in different forms, but intertwined with one another. Both nations differ entirely in prioritizing the core issues of the conflict. For example, the study reveals that for Palestinians the issue of Jerusalem ranks first, followed by the issue of releasing of prisoners. The issue of the refugees ranks third, and paradoxically recognizing Israel as a Jewish state ranks last according to Palestinians. As for the Israelis, the issue of security and safety ranks first, the recognition of the Jewishness of their state ranks second, followed by the issue of Jerusalem that comes in the third place, whereas and at loggerheads with the Palestinians' aspirations, the establishing of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders ranks last on their part. The same applies to the proposed solutions of the conflict. The future is fuzzy, and everyone sees the most appropriate solutions that fit their own interest, as a part of the zero-sum game. Both peoples yearn for peace, and both peoples are tired and bored of the conflict, but the majority in both sides, however, are not willing to make concessions towards this end and consequently are not optimistic in reaching peace in the near future. Furthermore, each party does not view the political leadership of the other party as a partner for peace. *Secondly*, a media conflict, where the analysis illustrates a

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similarity in the issues raised in the Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, but there were distinct statistical differences in the extent of coverage and in the display of those issues and their interpretation between the Israeli and Palestinian media, the matter which clearly reflects on the individuals' view on the causes of the conflict, its consequences and solutions. Regarding the third level of the conflict i.e. the conflict between political leaders and parties, a strong statistical relationship has been established between political affiliation to a particular party and the perspective of both, the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, on the most significant issues of the conflict. This is reflected in the homogeneity degree of the priorities of the parties and political leaders in the analysis of documents and media, in the analysis of the content with the order of priorities in the Palestinian and Israeli mindset. The statistical results have particularly shown a strong reciprocal correlation between the angles of this triangle. The relationship boosts wrong inherited notions and beliefs, which necessitates their eradication and adoption of new strategies on the part of political stakeholders. In that case, the media will publish them in a positive way that serves the peace process and bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to an end. Finally, on the basis of the results and conclusions of this dissertation a model was developed that illustrated how these interactions frame realities into new realities that let the peace process sink even more day by day.

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>CBS</b>	Jewish state's Central Bureau of Statistics
<b>DFLP</b>	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
<b>DOP</b>	Declaration of Principles
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>JNF</b>	Jewish National Fund
<b>ICBS</b>	Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
<b>ICC</b>	Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>IDF</b>	Israel Defense Force
<b>IDI</b>	The Israel Democracy Institute
<b>IHCJ</b>	Israeli High Court of Justice
<b>INSS</b>	Institute for National Security Studies
<b>IOF</b>	Israeli Occupation Force
<b>JIPP</b>	Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll
<b>NEC</b>	Near East Consulting
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>oPt</b>	occupied Palestinian territories
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority
<b>PCA</b>	Principle Component Analysis
<b>PCBS</b>	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
<b>PCP</b>	Palestine Communist Party
<b>PCPO</b>	Palestinian Center for Public Opinion
<b>PJ</b>	Peace Journalism
<b>PFLP</b>	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
<b>PI</b>	Peace Index

<b>PLC</b>	. . . . .	Palestinian Legislative Council
<b>PLO</b>	. . . . .	Palestine Liberation Organisation
<b>PNA</b>	. . . . .	Palestine National Authority
<b>PNC</b>	. . . . .	Palestine National Council
<b>PNGO</b>	. . . . .	Palestinian NGO Network
<b>PPP</b>	. . . . .	Palestine People's Party
<b>SPSS</b>	. . . . .	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
<b>TIP</b>	. . . . .	The Israel Project
<b>UN</b>	. . . . .	United Nations
<b>UNCCP</b>	. . . . .	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
<b>UNSCR</b>	. . . . .	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>US</b>	. . . . .	United States
<b>WB</b>	. . . . .	West Bank
<b>WZO</b>	. . . . .	World Zionist Organization

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

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*‘Peace does not lie in charters and covenants alone. It lies in the hearts and minds of the people’.*

– John F. Kennedy (1917 - 1963)

### 1.1 Preface

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most bitter, deeply rooted and protracted conflicts of our century (Kelman, 2005, p. 640; Maoz et al., 2007, p. 81; Shlaim, 2005a, p. 241; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24). It has been so deep-seated that even wars and peace treaties have been unable to bring about an end to it. It is considered one of the major intractable conflicts of our time that according to Coleman (2003) has resisted even the most serious attempts towards a resolution. The fact that both nations have historically claimed the possession of the entire land of Greater Israel or Historic Palestine, and the consecutive failure to find a satisfactory solution for both parties has congealed the peace process (Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999a, p. 3; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007a, p. 1476; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24).

What makes the resolution of the conflict even more difficult is the lack of agreement between official representatives of each side in the negotiations for making

concessions to the other side. A possible lack of public support on each side for solutions that involve such compromises undermines the abilities of policymakers to negotiate and consequently, implement mutually acceptable and compromised solutions to the conflict (Maoz & McCauley, 2005, p. 792; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007a, p. 1478). Not only the political, historic, or economic issues of the conflict impede the achievement of a peaceful solution, but the psychological factors as well, which enfolded “years of hostility, clashes, and wars that have significantly affected the states of mind of both the Palestinians and Israelis” (Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24).

The influence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has extended to the outer world, shaping its economy, relationships between various states and powers, and became a reason behind the emergence of several terrorist organizations (Fan & Weimann, 2003, p. 3). As an active conflict, it is considered a central issue and threat first to the Middle East, because it is the prism through which most Arabs view the world, and secondly to the international community, because of superpowers’ involvement (Telhami, 2008, p. 6; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24). Therefore, in contrast to other conflicts, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by high intensity attempts to diplomatic negotiations (Zussman et al., 2006, p. 85; Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999a, p. 3).

Not surprisingly, the long duration of the conflict made it most intensely researched topic of our time, and much has been written about it (Irwin, 2009, p. 1; Chang, 2008, p. 1; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 7). It is a conflict where religion expresses prominent primordial values. However, the points of contention and dominant discourse continue to be territorially centered. In other words, a more nationalist or statist than religious and theocratic one (Frisch & Sandler, 2004, p. 78). Dowty (2001, p. 2) once noted that it is a clash between two people over the same land, echoed by David Ben-Gurion<sup>(1)</sup> statement: *‘We and they want the same thing. We both want Palestine’*. According to Maoz and Eidelson (2007a, p. 1476), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolves over three broad dimensions; (1) territorial disagreements, (2) values-and identity-based disputes; “that are based in people’s psychology, culture, fundamental values, shared history, and beliefs”, and (3) the ongoing threats to security on both sides.

The nature of the conflict suggests many aspects that according to Donway (1997, p. 589) have national, ethnic, and religious dimensions. Avnery (2010, p. 22) stated that the conflict “is becoming less and less an Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, and more of a Jewish-Arab one”<sup>(2)</sup>. Aziz (2007, p. 2) however, believes that the struggle is between Jewish nationalism and Palestinian nationalism.

*‘We will argue that the dispute over land and borders lies at the heart of the*

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<sup>(1)</sup>Founder of the State of Israel and its first Prime Minister.

<sup>(2)</sup>See also: Avnery, 2004.

*Israeli-Palestinian conflict*', with these words Newman and Yacobi (2004, p. 2) described the conflict. Both parties are motivated by an aspiration to maximize their interests, and unfortunately pro-peace factions and political movements in both territories are rather weak (Donway, 1997, p. 589). The equation is as simple as complicated as it can get, if memories of shady past continue to flourish in Palestinian and Israeli minds, so will the cycle of revenge (Chao, 2011, p. 23). Most Palestinians and Israelis are being fed with hatred from the very beginning of their lives, through family and friends, education, political leaders and parties, propaganda, and media. All these and more serve to strengthen misunderstandings and create intolerance between Israelis and Palestinians.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

One of the main reasons for being unable to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the misdiagnosing of the conflict as only a dispute over materialistic resources, and not addressing the real underlying causes loaded in the minds of both the Palestinians and Israelis. In this context, the first step towards getting closer to achieving an effective solution is through correctly identifying the conflict as an identity one that lies in the cognitive process of people's minds. It is a grave mistake for an individual to think his/her opinion does not matter because every person's opinion plays a significant role and can contribute to the process of change. Individuals are only as powerful as their knowledge, because, without sound knowledge, they might not think correctly. A group of individuals is very influential because together they will have an enormous impact on any future solution and reconciliation.

Overcoming psychological barriers and progressing towards a solution must be sought by a scientific probing of the trends of the public on both sides. This will help stakeholders on both sides to pinpoint major obstacles to reaching a just and last solution to the conflict. Otherwise, a failure to secure a lasting solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict will inflame and escalate violence and aggravate the situation. Had concrete steps not been taken to resolve the conflict, its religious component will exacerbate at the expense of the political one, which will be detrimental to the entire region that is already afflicted with a politicized religion.

Although the desire of the two conflicting parties is to conclude peace, each according to their vision, there is still a set of issues that remain to be addressed. The recognition of those disputed issues will certainly enhance the chances of achieving peace. Those issues should be discussed in any future negotiations between the leaders of both nations. Such negotiations may lead to the narrowing of the gap between the two sides, and broadening the spectrum of issues to be agreed upon.

Despite the extensive research on this topic, the number of researchers that con-



sidered, controlled for, or even estimated the role of media and political leaders and parties in shaping the public perceptions of the conflict is very limited. Many of which overlooked the historical aspect of the conflict, and the accumulation of experience and individuals' quality of life in carving out their ultimate perceptions. Moreover, the growing recognition of the crucial role of the media can make many examine to what extent the media can play a constructive role in resolving the conflict. Therefore, this study includes content analysis of both the Palestinian and Israeli media in an attempt to measure to what degree the media reflect the opinion at the grassroots levels on either side. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in attitudes and perceptions between the political leaders on both sides of the conflict merits a thorough study. An additional competitive advantage of this study goes beyond measuring current factors that influence the process of shaping perceptions to introduce a deeper analysis of the past and the future as well. This study is an attempt to explore and integrate those factors across an individual's cognition, affection and behavior.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of this study are to investigate the dimensions of the public perceptions of the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis and the role of communication processes in the emergence of these perceptions. In particular, the dissertation looked into differences and commonalities in the causes of the conflict, its layers, and possible solutions. It combined historic review with quantitative methods. Comparative surveys, document and content analyses were at the center of data collection. The theoretical foundation of the empirical parts was derived from theories on the framing of public issues, information processing and persuasion, as well as public opinion theories.

Mainly, this study described and analyzed the Palestinians and Israelis' various points of view, beliefs, opinions, notions and attitudes towards the other, the peace process and the conflict. The idea is that people's attitudes towards an object or phenomena influence their actions, interpretations, and notions about it. The research aim is focused on describing and analyzing the variety and diversity of beliefs, opinions and attitudes on the conflict, and on exploring the motives, causes and effects of the variety of attitudes and opinions.

The achievement of a genuine peace should start by recognizing the trends and inclinations of the society in both countries towards a long list of issues, trying thereby to narrow the points of dispute and to enhance the aspects of proper understanding. This dissertation achieved its objective among other scientific studies that might contribute to the laying of the foundations of a genuine and comprehen-

sive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so that all parties can live in peace, security and economic prosperity.

To summarize, the broad objectives of this dissertation are:

- To investigate perceptions' gap of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.
- To reveal what factors sustain this gap, and the role frames infused by respective media and political stakeholders play in shaping these perceptions.

## **1.4 Approach**

Quantitative research was used to describe and interpret the objectives of the dissertation statistically with numbers. This type of analysis uses several kinds of computational and statistical methods that enabled the exploration of causality, comparison, and explanations of phenomena through numeric variables. As mentioned above, this dissertation used as its core multi-methodology design survey, content and document analyses data. This combination was used for the purpose of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration. Thus, a quantitative research analysis was applied to determine the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in Palestine and Israel.

Accordingly, I started with the content analysis for four newspapers in each country as explained below, and then conducted a representative survey in each country using a face-to-face survey on a sample of 1015 Palestinians and a representative web-based survey of 512 Israelis. Finally, I performed a document analysis of press releases of political parties on both sides.

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Undoubtedly, the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion plays a decisive and crucial role towards a just and lasting solution, which would most probably include long-term concessions on both sides. When considering a general compromise to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, considerable weight will be given to the estimates relating to what may be accepted or refused by both the Palestinian and Israeli publics, since only the opinions of political leaders, factions and organizations on both sides are insufficient and indeterminate. Therefore, conducting a mixed-method research will pave the way for a better understanding of the Palestinian and Israeli public opinions as it represents their sound knowledge and opinion that are based on reality. Moreover, this study is expected to provide figures on public opinion, its components and directions that in turn may help to make appropriate decisions that

direct their views and enhance the development of an informed democratic society. In this case, the evolution of views about negotiations with the other side will have a predictable component that can be described by the results of a comparative survey of public opinions.

From a political science perspective, this study specifies the proximity of the responsiveness between the public and the government, to what extent the public's perception goes along with the position of their respective government, and how responsive the government is to these perceptions. From a historic perspective, it monitors how public perceptions mobilized, developed, and evolved in light of certain events - like the 1948 Arab-Israeli war or the first and second uprising of the conflict. From a social science perspective, it studies public opinion "as a force that affects the individual's behavior in the public sphere, as a reflection of our social nature and the motivation to be socially accepted". Finally, from a communication science perspective, this study examines the influence of mass media on public opinion, and how they shape public perceptions of the conflict and the peace process. (Donsbach & Traugott, 2008, p. 2).

The mass media play a considerable role in shaping up beliefs and attitudes concerning the status of a national or ethnic group towards the other, and that by weaving a set of narratives about the origin of the conflict and the heroic roles of the national or ethnic group, and the formulation of narratives about the stages of the conflict that gain a legendary character. On this basis, the national group creates, particularly in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a set of contradicting narratives, which include a bunch of key beliefs and constants in dealing with the national, ethnic, and religious groups that are viewed as perennial foes. Dealing with the media in an objective, balanced manner is elusive because the range of conflict encompasses media terminologies.

Understanding each other's visions through dialogue, research, as well as listening to experts can have beneficial outcomes towards ending the conflict. It is indeed the vehicle needed so that they will have a mutual understanding of each other. Allowing both parties to participate in such a dialogue will allow them to further and better understand each other and will remove the many obstacles that would have been presented had they not taken the time to learn about one another.

To sum up, this study aims to sound the core final status issues that may be consistent or inconsistent with both, the Palestinian and Israeli public opinions. Despite the desire of the two disputing peoples regarding concluding a peace agreement between them, there is still a package of outstanding issues. Also, the realization of such disputed issues and those that will be, or might be, accepted by both parties will certainly enhance the chances of reaching peace by casting light on these issues. If we take into due consideration that the task of the leaderships and media

on both sides must be primary to narrow the differences between the two sides and expand the range of issues that might be accepted by both parties, peace would have then a great opportunity. Any attempt to make a long-term prediction and an evaluation of the public opinion at that time would only serve as a rough estimate, that must be dealt with very carefully, as both public opinions could be influenced by a number of factors and variables, the results of which are precariously predictable. However, dealing now with the basic issues of the peace process is essential to chart the way, or at least get signals about the general situation of those issues or solutions presented at the negotiating table.

## 1.6 Chapter Organization

**Chapter two** discussed the process of my empirical framework that started with a historic review of the conflicts' origins or causes, consequences, and projected solutions, followed by a summary of extracted conflict-related dimensions that could end up in the minds of the Palestinian and Israeli public, political leaders, and media. Therefore, as a first step, I generated a pool of arguments on the conflict based on a thorough review of historic and political science literature on the issue. Then I extracted diverse perceptions (or dimensions) about the conflict and the peace process and employed them as inputs for successive sections and chapters. This section attempted to simplify historic events and highlight discrepancies. It started with a brief overview of the historic land of Palestine, followed by descriptions of early, modern, and current history. Emphatically, it is not only bound to repeat what history had marked, given that the historic review will be the central mode of investigation. It traced the history of the conflict between Israel and Palestine from 4000 B.C. to 2014 A.D.

**Chapter three** started with the variable model of the dissertation, which used a multi-method approach of content, survey and document analyses, based on a historic review of the conflict, to answer the research questions. Now, in order to achieve the goals set by this dissertation a review of media literature and studies about the considerable impact of media on the individual, community, social groups and public opinions is presented. It investigated many approaches and theories that attempted to address the impact, persuasion, mobilization and their scope as well as how public opinion is formed by daily media. Media theories were established and hypotheses were determined for testing. Theories of Media effects and connection with public opinion and political discourse were part and parcel of this process, coupled with previous research with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Mainly, it focused on framing as a theory of media effect, and the role it plays in charging emotions, attitudes, and stirring feelings while reaching the level of psychological

war, brainwash and incitement. It also revealed to what extent media contributed to the escalation of the conflict and its nurture, and the mobilization against the other. Other issues discussed in this chapter included information flow by the public, the relationship between public opinion and the media, the use of conflict-related narratives and the dehumanization of the other, and concluded with the perceptive of the Palestinians vis-à-vis the Israeli media and vice versa. Followed by some highlights of the most prominent research and projects that have been done about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and peace process. This chapter includes a matrix that has been developed based on a thorough review of this literature and previous research, in an attempt to investigate the conflict on an extended temporal-spatial basis namely, cognitions, affections, and behavior.

**Chapter four** investigated the explicit rules and methods or instruments on which this study was based and against which claims of knowledge were evaluated. Survey, content, and document research designs were adopted in this multi-methodological study. They were chosen because the sampled elements and the variables that were studied were simply observed as they were without attempting to control or manipulate them. Data was collected from a sample in each stratum of analyses to determine the relationship between causes, problem dimensions, and possible solutions.

**Chapter five** was divided into five main sections: the first started with a brief overview of terminologies used in Palestinian and Israeli media, followed by tests of reliability and validity. These tests, in addition to hypotheses testing accompanied all methods of analysis. This section included the analysis of media data on both sides; what were the most common topics, the degree of discordance between Palestinian and Israeli media, the style and direction of coverage, and more. The second section comprised of hypotheses testing and survey results, on which comparisons between Palestinians and Israelis' perception frames was based. Further investigations in the third section consisted of a deeper analysis of independent variables contributing to the formation of audience frames through the summary of comprehensive multiple regression models on both sides. On the fourth section, I used validated dimensions of the content analysis and applied them to a document analysis of political parties' secretary announcements, public speeches and press releases, and I compared perception frames in these documents between Palestinians and Israelis. Finally, I integrated all the findings of the analyses and compared the level of accord between public, media, and political stakeholders' frames, as shown in Figure 1.1 below. **Chapter six** started with the dissertation's model of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that introduced a new reading of the status quo on the basis of the analyses, literature and theories, followed by a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.




FIGURE 1.1 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

## Chapter 2

# ELICITATION OF DIMENSIONS

### Contents

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## 2.1 Historic Review

*‘If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development’.*

– Aristotle (384 B.C. - 322 B.C.)

*‘Recovering the past is a necessary part of the route to the future’.*

– Scham et al. (2013)

In order to understand the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is necessary to go back to the very bud of the Jewish question that started in the second half of the nineteenth century when Moses Mendelssohn along with others initiated the Jewish ‘Haskala’ i.e., enlightenment in Europe which helped them get out of ghettos and think of getting back to the ‘Promised Land’ and form a nation. The ‘Haskala’ formed laid the fertile ground for the official birth of the Zionist movement in the first Zionist Congress that was held August 29-31, 1997 in Basle. Since then, the Zionist movement worked diligently to realize Jewish statehood in Palestine. Fifty years after the first Zionist conference, specifically November 29, 1947, the United Nations recognized the influential Jewish presence in Palestine and issued resolution number 181 for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The establishment of the state of Israel on 78.0% of the Historic Palestine in May 1948 was a turning point and a landmark in this conflict. Since then, the Palestinian cause has been outstanding and a just and lasting solution is being sought until this

very moment. The literature review in this research study reveals details that provide a lay person a thorough idea about the roots of the conflict and subsequent repercussions.

In the last seven decades, dozens of books and articles were published discussing the evolvement and development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, political actors, events, and accords. In addition to a full package of scientific research studies, documents, and papers devoted to (1) analyzing the core issues of the conflict and attempting to resolve them (Landman, 2002, p. 136), (2) focusing on the psychological, social, economic, and political aspects of the conflict, and (3) emphasizing the influence it exerts on both nations and on the world. Akasaka (2008) pointed out that the ‘Question of Palestine’ has been the subject of “countless hours of debate, discussion, and negotiations”. Surprisingly, the enormous amounts of writings failed to expedite future research, since most of what has been written did not illustrate a balanced and objective representation of reality. Instead, they intended to justify claims and to neglect others, and “to vilify the enemy and to glorify the own side” (Isseroff, 2009). Nonetheless, the different perceptions that those writings hold are significant and still account for a large proportion of interpretations to subsequent and future occurrences on both sides.

### 2.1.1 A Brief Overview

The historic land of Palestine is located in the Middle East, along the Eastern Coastline of the Mediterranean Sea. Bordered by Lebanon to the north, Syria to the northeast, Jordan to the east, Egypt to the southwest and the Mediterranean Sea to the west (Stobaugh, 2014, p. 31). It lies in the heart of the so-called ‘ancient world’ (Pastor, 2012), namely, at the junction of the three continents i.e. Asia, Africa, and Europe. Its location makes it a land bridge that links Asia with Africa and the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. This geographic location has historically given it religious, cultural and economic importance (Badaruddin & Jafar, 2011, p. 26).

The total area of the land is 27,027  $km^2$ . It is split into two parts: Palestine and Israel. For now, Palestine claims approximately less<sup>(1)</sup> than 21.4% (6,020  $km^2$ ) of total area of which 93.9% is in the West Bank and 6.1% in the Gaza Strip, and Israel claims 78.6% (22,145  $km^2$ ) of it including the Golan Heights area<sup>(2)</sup> (1,176  $km^2$ ) (Chase & Kuhn, 2011, p. 4; Al-Rimmawi, 2003, p. 77; *Palestine Trade Center*, 2011; *Encyclopedia of the Nations*, 2009; *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 2010)

The majority of the Palestinians live in the Diaspora. According to the

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<sup>(1)</sup>Because of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

<sup>(2)</sup>Captured from Syria during the Six-Day War of 1967.



*Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics* (2014), the estimated population of the Palestinian territories for the year 2014 is 4.55 million people, of which 61.3% are in the West Bank, and 38.7% are in the Gaza Strip. Israel's population has been estimated to a total of 8.30 million people in January 2015 (*Jewish states Central Bureau of Statistics*, 2014). This number includes about 341,400 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, 18,900 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (estimations of 2012), and 196,400 people in East Jerusalem (estimations of 2011) (*Israel Demographic Profile*, 2014).

In Palestine, the official language is Arabic, with English being widely spoken. Hebrew is used particularly among freelancers who have business relations with Israelis. Hebrew is the official language in Israel, with Arabic being used officially for Arab minorities, in addition to Russian, and English as the most commonly used foreign languages (*Palestine Trade Center*, 2011; *Israel Demographic Profile*, 2014).

The land of Historic Palestine is considered 'the cradle of civilizations' and the place for the world's three monotheistic religions; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Al-Rimmawi, 2003, p. 77). For Christians, it is the source of Christianity, where Jesus Christ was born, lived, spread his teachings, crucified and resurrected. It is also the place where Muslims believe that Prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven from the Dome of the Rock. Jews believe that the land of Israel rightfully belongs to Jewish people, because of God's promise made to Abraham (Genesis 12: 1-7). Also, that Jerusalem has been the center of their national life for about 3,000 years since its conquest by King David. Therefore, the Holy Land has long been a highly religious destination for Muslim, Christian and Jewish pilgrims from all over the world. The very concept of the 'Holy Land' suggests that religion is implicated in some way (Kibble, 2003, p. 331).

The percentages of Muslims and Christians in Palestine are 98.8% and 1.2% respectively (estimations of 2010) (*Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics*, 2014). In Israel proper, the percentage of Jewish people is 75.1%, Muslims 17.4%, Christians 2.0%, Druze 1.6% and others 3.9% (estimations of 2012) (*Israel Demographic Profile*, 2014).

The illustrious tactical and geographic position of the land at the center of the globe, and as a bridgehead between three continents i.e. Europe, Asia, and Africa together made it a strategic place that a lot of tribes, nations and empires battled to occupy, particularly merchants that came from eastern side heading to the West or vice versa had to pass through it (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 4; *Map of the World*, 2009). Starting from the Assyrian Empire (721 - 587 B.C.), to the Babylonian Empire (587 - 538 B.C.), the Persian Empire (538 - 333 B.C.), the Hellenistic Empire (333 - 63 B.C.), the Roman Empire (63 B.C. - 328 A.D.), the Byzantine Empire (328 -

636 A.D.), the Crusaders (1099 - 1291 A.D.), the Mamluks (1291 - 1516 A.D.), the Ottoman Empire (1516 - 1917 A.D.), and finally, the British Mandate (1917 - 1948 A.D.) after the end of World War I (Wright, 2001, p: 419 - 435; *Israel Science and Technology Homepage*, 2010).

### 2.1.2 Early History

Harry S. Truman (1884 - 1972) once said ‘*No two historians ever agree on what happened, and the damn thing is they both think that they are telling the truth*’. Noticeable differences in citing one own and the other’s connection and belonging to the Holy Land were revealed in literature. Both parties exclusively deny the other originality to the land (Neuberger, 1998; *Israel Science and Technology Homepage*, 2010). For instance, Israeli literature emphasizes the Jews affinity to this land by explicitly referring to it as ‘The Land of Israel’ or ‘The Promised Land of Israel’ (in Hebrew, Eretz Yisrael). Moreover, they dub Palestinians as intruders (Reich, 2008). Palestinian literature on the other side does not mention Israel and keeps insisting that it is their land that was stripped from them by Israeli intruders and their brutal occupation.

Reich (2008) wrote about the dispersion of Jews outside Israel after the defeat of the Kingdom of Israel and Judea. Moreover, how the destruction of the Temple “provides the base for the tenacity of the Jews to the Land of Israel”. He added, Judea was once called Palestina (from which the word Palestine, and the Arabic word Philistines originated). Jews believe that the Roman Empire has decimated the Jewish community and renamed it to stamp out Jewish identification and connection to the Land of Israel.

### Origins of the Palestinians

‘Palestinians’ is a term given to the tribes that settled on the Palestinian shore - Cana’an - from the southwest of Gaza to Jaffa in the north. Historians believe that they originated from different regions in Asia Minor and Greece. The most ancient mention of Palestine was described in the texts of Egyptians and Assyrians as ‘Palastu’ or ‘Pilistu’, which is the same as the Greek terminology ‘Philistia’ that later became ‘Palastina’ (or Palestine). ‘Palestine’ was mentioned in the Torah as ‘Kvetorin’ and stated that their homeland is on the island of Caphtor corresponding to Kvetu in Egyptian sources, which refers to the island of Crete, in nowadays Greece. One of the first waves of immigration to the land was after the Philistines were expelled from Egypt by Ramses III in 1194 B.C. Then, they settled and established an independent state on the southern coast of Palestine where they eventually established a coalition of five-city states namely Ashdod, Ashkelon, Gaza, Gat, and

Akron. The first three cities were right by the sea while the last two cities were a bit inland. Sarcastically, the only town that is now under Palestinian sovereignty is Gaza while the other four cities are inside Israel. Then the Philistines controlled the Cana'anite town of Jerusalem (Zarley, 1990, p. 11; Dabash, 2011, p. 1; Arnaiz-Villena et al., 2001, p. 900). Lerner (2012) believed that the Philistines immigrated to the area in the same period of the Jewish migration to the economic opportunities that such developments brought to the region.

### Origins of the Israelis

According to the Bible, Moses led the Israelites (a confederation of Hebrew tribes, or a portion of them) during the 40-year wander in the Sinai desert out of Egypt, who under Joshua conquered and defeated most of the Cana'anites in 1125 B.C., yet, found the struggle with the Philistines more difficult. King's David conquered Jerusalem about 1000 B.C. and controlled most of the cities of Cana'an (Arnaiz-Villena et al., 2001, p. 900; Isseroff, 2009).

The people of Israel (also called the 'Jewish People') trace their origin to Abraham, whose son is Yitshak (Isaac), and grandson is Jacob (Israel). The name 'Israel' is derived from the name given to Jacob. Jacob's 12 sons (Reuben, Shimon, Levi, Yehuda, Dan, Naphtali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zevulun, Yosef, Binyamin) were the kernels of 12 tribes that later developed into the Jewish nation. One of the Jews was Yehuda (Judah) from which the word 'Jewish' was derived. Therefore, the names Israel, Israeli or Jewish refer to people of the same family (Quesinberry, 2003, p. 149; *Israel Science and Technology Homepage*, 2010).

Ironically, and according to the Torah and the Qur'an, both; Arabs and Jews come from the same father; Abraham. He was a Semitic nomad who followed the caravan trail westwards from the banks of the Twin Rivers (the Tigris and the Euphrates) toward the land of Cana'an (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 42). Abraham believed that he was being directed by God toward a land of promise. According to Genesis (17:8): *'and I will give unto thee' the Scriptures describe God as saying to Abraham, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Cana'an, for an everlasting possession'*. He sired two sons; Isaac, son of Sarah, and Ismael, son of an Egyptian slave woman named Hager. Isaac had two sons; Jacob, who became the root of the Israelis, and Esau. The descendants of Ismael became known as the Arabs (Ibid., p. 42). Some studies have found that Palestinians and Jews came from the same origin. Indeed, archeological and genetic data generated in a research done by Arnaiz-Villena et al. (2001, p. 889) revealed that the origins of Jews and Palestinians stemmed from ancient Cana'anites, who in ancient ages mixed extensively with Egyptians, Mesopotamians, and Anatolians. Thus, in their opinion, the "Palestinian-Jewish rivalry is based on cultural and religious, but not

on genetic, differences”.

## Rise of Zionism

The rise of nationalism and the influence of romanticism, along with the spread of the ideas of enlightenment and the principle of equality before the law, all helped force the process of Jewish emancipation in Russia and Europe. The origins of the new movement began in Russia, and its influence soon extended to Jews in Western Europe and beyond (Laqueur, 2003, p. 3; Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

Jews were unable to assimilate into European societies and lived in separate communities in Europe given their different religious affiliation, laws and methods of worship, dresses and customs, and the fact that they were always a minority (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). These and more had magnified their natural differences and generated widespread antipathy towards Jews and consequently the rise of anti-semitism throughout non-Jewish populations: in Russia and Europe. For this reason, Jews viewed a land of their own as a way to resolve the problem of the Jewish Diaspora and started to call for a pro-active politicized approach to achieving this goal (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 3; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 43 – 44).

Nevertheless, Hamas in their charter described the Jews and the factors that led to the rise of anti-Jewish feelings as follows:

*‘Jews have been scheming for a long time...and have accumulated huge and influential material wealth. With their money, they took control of the world media...With their money, they stirred revolutions in various parts of the globe...They stood behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution and most of the revolutions we hear about...With their money, they formed secret organizations such as the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, and the Lions which are spreading around the world, destroying societies and carry out Zionist interests...They stood behind World War I...and formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains... There is no war going on anywhere without them having their fingerprints’ (Hamas, 1988, Art. 22).*

The official birth of the Zionist movement as a formal organization or political movement is dated back to 1897 in the first Zionist Congress in Basle. The congress was organized by Theodor Herzl; the father of modern Zionism, and the writer of *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). It was a pamphlet where he proposed mass emigration of Jews to a land of their own (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). Herzl convened this congress that “brought the Zionist movement together and created a united Zionist political platform” (Farrell, 2010, p. 20), and formed the World Zionist Organization (WZO), where more than 200 representatives from 24 states and territories

attended (Rist, 1994, p. 90). Cohn-Sherbok & El-Alami (2003) noted that Herzl in a proposal of 65 pages to the Rothschild family has laid the foundations for the creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East.

Zionism; was first coined in early 1890 by Viennese Jewish writer Nathan Birnbaum as 'Zionismus' (derived from Mount Zion; a hill in Jerusalem) for the most part was a secular movement that composed of classical liberals such as Theodor Herzl, Chaim Weizmann and socialists like David Ben-Gurion. It was a movement that always represented religious elements as a secondary matter of a vigorous and vocal minority (Bein, 1990, p. 284; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 45).

As mentioned above, the establishment of this Zionist organization came as a response to the long history of persecution, pogroms, Jewish-ghettos and exile. Jews suffered from anti-semitic acts throughout Europe in a continuum of centuries time and again, which later was labeled as 'the Jewish problem'. They were believed to be a pestilent race and as such must be destroyed. A problem of perennial minority and pogroms, an issue of a homeless community that for them, the only solution was by reviving the idea of returning to what they have all along considered their historic homeland. They believed that it was the historical birthplace of the Jewish people, and the Jewish life elsewhere was a life of exile (Neuberger, 1998). A belief that gradually was cherished by various Jews groups who were forced to banish to foreign lands (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

The motto of the Zionists is '*a state for every nation, and the entire nation in one state*', from which their spirit towards the establishment of a national homeland as the only solution for Jews' problems worldwide has started. It is an ideology "that expresses the yearning of Jews over the world for the historical homeland Zion, the Land of Israel" (Neuberger, 1998). The central argument of the Zionists is to free Jews around the world from hostile and oppressive alien rule, and that liberation and unity should be attained, which cannot be achieved without establishing a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, with a Jewish majority. This is when the history of the waves of immigration 'Aliyah' (Return to the Promised Land) had proven to them to be true (Karesh & Hurvitz, 2006, p. 11; Lesch, 2001).

**Waves of Immigration** - Waves of immigration started at the beginning of the twentieth century (1882 - 1902) with the immigration of a small band of Zionist idealists from Russia called 'Bilu' who settled in Palestine. Followed by the second Aliyah financed by the WZO in the period between 1904 and 1914, leading to a rise in the Jewish population in Palestine to approximately 100,000. However, soon, the Turk policies of deporting Jewish population having a dual citizenship have brought the number to 50,000 Jews (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 50). Later, a third

Aliyah took place in the 1920s followed by a series of immigrations<sup>(3)</sup> to Palestine. These immigrations changed the socio-economic, political and demographic status of Palestine (Karesh & Hurvitz, 2006, p. 11).

The need for attaining a Jewish majority in Palestine and acquiring statehood through a) continued legal and illegal Jewish immigration, and b) purchasing<sup>(4)</sup> Palestinian lands in the period between 1900 - 1903 had resulted over a thirty-year period in the dispossession and the expulsion of the majority of the Palestinians. In 1903, in an attempt to impress the British, Herzl has suggested creating a Jewish colony or settlement in Africa and the Americas, that was before settling in Palestine (*IfAmericansKnew.org*, 2000). The most prominent suggestion was the Uganda Proposal, which entailed the creation of a Jewish homeland in the region of Kenya, East Africa. However, Russian Jews bitterly refused that offer, and responded: '*there can be no Zionism without Zion, and there should be no state anywhere outside of Palestine*' (Eisenstadt, 1992, p. 154; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 46)

### **The British Mandate for Palestine**

The transformation of the political situation continued with the arrival of British troops in Palestine in 1916, more so after the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 1917. This declaration gave the Zionist movement "its long-sought legal statute" to pursue and carry out their plans to establish a Jewish state in Palestine under the protection of the British Mandate (Bloomberg, 2004, p. 166; Lesch, 2001).

**Sykes-Picot Agreement** - The Ottoman Empire that ruled Palestine for 400 hundred years was finally defeated in World War I. Its holdings in the Middle East were then divided between Britain and France in accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, with the assent of Imperial Russia. Briefly, the Sykes-Picot agreement was a secret agreement between France and Britain, represented by two diplomat negotiators; Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Franois Georges-Picot of France, from whom the agreement name was taken. The core agreement discourse involved the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire once World War I had ended. The provisions of Sykes-Picot Agreement were as follows: (1) Syria, Lebanon and Turkish Cilicia to be under the control of the French, (2) Palestine, Jordan and areas around the Persian Gulf and Baghdad to be handed over to the British. Both countries were to control them effectively at a governmental and administrative levels. They did not actually 'own' any of these territories, and (3) Jerusalem was to be placed under international administration (Land, 2008, p. 10; Rowley & Taylor,

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<sup>(3)</sup>Fourth Aliyah between 1924 - 1928, and Fifth Aliyah between 1932 - 1939.

<sup>(4)</sup>Supported and financed by the Jewish National Fund (JNF).

2006, p. 48; Trueman, 2011).

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was held between Allied victors (Britain, France, the United States and the Russian Empire) and defeated powers (the German Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria). The conference involved diplomats from more than twenty-nine countries. The meeting primary product was a series of treaties; the Paris Peace Treaties, which according to MacMillan (2003) has “reshaped the map of Europe and the world”. In this conference, much of the Ottoman Empire was divided into mandated territories assigned to victors of the war. Both, the Arabs represented by Emir Feisal, commander of the Arab forces during World War I, and the Zionists represented by Chaim Weitzmann; leader of the Zionist movement, and Felix Frankfurter; a member of the American Zionist delegation to the Paris peace conference, have met and pleaded their case (Isseroff, 2009). However, due to the double-standard strategy of Britain with the parties, a misunderstanding took place; “Faisal assumed that the Jews would live peacefully under Arab rule whereas Frankfurter understood that the Arabs would live peacefully under Jewish rule” (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 48).

The conference of San Remo that was held in 1920<sup>(5)</sup> and Article 22 in 1922 by the League of Nations awarded the British government “a sacred trust for civilization”, a mandate to officially control Palestine. It was a year when discontent in Palestine became peaked (Ibid., p: 48 - 49), particularly that Palestinians were aware that Britain denied them their national self-determination and prevented them from obtaining their recognition as an independent nation. However, neighboring Arab countries achieved independence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Even though that “some of them were smaller, poorer, and less ready for self-government than was Palestine” (Khalidi, 1992, p. 30; Khalidi, 1997, p. 190).

**Balfour Declaration** - The Husayn-Mcmahon correspondence of 1915-1916 was the basis on which the Arab revolt<sup>(6)</sup> was launched to help the Allies fight the Turks during World War I. The correspondence implied that Palestine would be included in the zone of Arab independence and, therefore, be allowed to govern their independent regions after the disintegration of the Ottoman rule. The British, and through the proclamation of Balfour Declaration encouraged the colonization of Palestine by Jews and ultimately the establishment of a legitimate Jewish country in Palestine. This declaration denied the inclusion of Palestine in the Arab independent zone mentioned in the 1916 correspondence (Rogan, 1999, p. 224; Lesch, 2001).

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<sup>(5)</sup>In that time, Trans-Jordan (later Jordan) was part of Mandated Palestine until the British decision to split off more than two-thirds (77.0%) of the Mandate and calling that area east of the Jordan River ‘Trans-Jordan’. The remainder (33.0%) of Mandate Palestine was divided into Jewish and Arab states by the United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947.

<sup>(6)</sup>Led by Hashemite family of western Arabia.

Arthur James Balfour<sup>(7)</sup> addressed the letter of declaration to Lord Rothschild promising the Jews with the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine and imposing the legal cornerstone of the future State of Israel. This letter represented the first political recognition of Zionist aims by a Great Power, and it was called the 'Balfour declaration' after him:

Foreign Office,  
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country"

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.



#### BALFOUR DECLARATION

**Motives Behind Balfour Declaration** - Arthur Balfour had opposed Jewish immigration to Eastern Europe and Britain. Therefore, he believed that the best for Britain to take advantage of those Jews is by achieving the support of Britain for them outside Europe. According to Bloomberg (2004, p. 166), there were some motives that laid behind this declaration. First, the strong religious affiliation of Lord Balfour and Lloyd George, who were both Christians and considered it an opportunity to help those who had given the Bible to the world, given that they realized the extent of the Bible's contribution to Christianity and the British national charter. Secondly, for political considerations; they wanted to attract the support of Jews in America and Russia, to secure or at least positively influence the public opinion of these superpowers on Britain's side. Finally, the strategic considerations;

<sup>(7)</sup>He was the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1902 - 1905), and at that time was serving as the Foreign Secretary in David Lloyd George's coalition government (1916 - 1919).



controlling Palestine meant controlling a major strategic area that is “close to the Suez Canal and the land and water routes to India”.

Balfour met Weitzmann in 1916, and they became close friends. The former was impressed by the character of the Zionist leader, statesman, and chemist. Especially after he successfully offered his scientific service by developing a process that yielded acetone; a solvent needed for “making cordite; the powder used to make explosives for naval guns” (Weeks, 2012, p. 89), at a time when the British supply of acetone was rapidly dwindling (Isseroff, 2009). Soon after, and in response to Weitzmann’s requests, and the lobbying of the British Zionist movement, he issued the declaration.

**Responses to Balfour Declaration** - The declaration was highly contested by the Arab world and the Palestinians in particular, who felt that “Palestine could not and should not be used to solve the plight of the Jews in Europe and that Jewish national aspiration should not override their rights” (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998, p. 50). These positions underlined the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their fear of the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish People in their country (Kallaway & Bottaro, 1987, p. 270).

The inclusion of Balfour Declaration in the Mandate placed the British government in an extraordinary and difficult position. On one side, “they were pledged to the establishment of a National homeland for the Jews under the auspices of British protection”. On the other side, they had to placate to “the rising frustrations of the Arab populations” after liberation from Turkish rule, as agreed in the Husayn-Mcmahon correspondence (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

Britain implemented the first article of the Balfour declaration that gave the Jews a national state in Palestine but failed to apply the second part of it, which stated: “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Tucker, 2010, p. 1238; Akasaka, 2008, p. 1). It is true that the British policy towards Palestine provided a critically important umbrella for the growth and consolidation of the Jewish community in Palestine despite Palestinian opposition. However, this umbrella was not endorsed by Britain alone, but the United States, though not a member of the League, had a pervasive influence in setting up a Jewish National homeland in Palestine. Other powers endorsed the same, like France and Russia (Rist, 1994, p. 90; Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

In the late 1930s, the support of Britain for the Jewish immigration started to diminish, but in that time, Jews were strong enough and capable of withstanding the Palestinians on their own. Furthermore, the “Zionist movement was able to turn to the emerging superpower, the United States, for diplomatic support and legitimiza-

tion” at the end of World War II in 1945 (Aruri, 2008, p. 53; Lesch, 2001).

The dissemination of the Nazi-inspired racism through Czechoslovakia, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland has led to a continued and rapid growth of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. It reached to 182,839 new entrants between 1930 and 1936. The Palestinians resentment to the Jewish immigration, land purchasing, clashed political demands and British support for Zionist progress in Palestine peaked in the years between 1936 and 1939. With the most remarkable six months strike of 1936 followed by a widespread rural revolt, disturbance, and civil strife for three years period. The civil strife that was launched by Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amin Husseini became known as the ‘Arab Rebellion’ or ‘Great Uprising’. The rebellion faced fierce resistance from the Jews, and soon after was brutally crushed by more than 20,000 British security troops (in an unofficial cooperation with the Haganah; the military arm of the Zionist movement) (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003, p. 110; Tucker, 2010, p. 1238; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 51-54; Lesch, 2001).

**Palestine Royal Commission** - In response to the Arab rebellion, a group of full Royal Commission of Inquiry (or the Peel Commission) was sent by Britain. It was headed by Lord Robert Peel, who came to investigate the roots and causes of the unrest among Palestinian Arabs and Jews, and to propose solutions and recommendations accordingly.

In July 1937, the Peel Commission published its report. The report admitted that the Mandate was infeasible because of the incompatibility between Jewish and Arab objectives in Palestine, and therefore, they recommended abolishing the Mandate, except in a ‘corridor’ surrounding Jerusalem. Moreover, they proposed partitioning the country into two independent states. Palestine was to be divided into three main zones; an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a zone between Jaffa and Jerusalem that would remain under the British Mandate and international supervision because it contains most of the holy places in Palestine. In addition, they recommended that until the establishment of the two states, Jews should be prohibited from purchasing lands in the area allocated to the Arab state (Lewis, 2008, p. 319; Rabinovich & Reinharz, 2008, p. 44).

In the beginning, these proposals were accepted by the British government and endorsed by the Parliament in London. However, the Jews bitter disagreement erupted between supporters and opponents while the Arabs rejected the proposal and refused to regard it as a solution” (Bard & Schwartz, 2005, p. 21). By 1938, the British government recognized that the partitioning plan would be infeasible, and the report was ultimately shelved (Ibid., p. 21).

**White Paper** - In response to the increased rioting of Arabs in 1939 against the continued Jewish immigration to Palestine<sup>(8)</sup>. The British colonial secretary Malcolm MacDonald issued the White Paper that set limitations and constraints on the Jewish immigration to Palestine in order to conform to the “economic absorptive capacity” of the country (Smith, 1993, p. 64; Akasaka, 2008, p. 3; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 50-51; Isseroff, 2002a). However, the White Paper failed to prohibit the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine completely. Especially in light of the rise of Jews persecution across Europe during the period 1939-1945 (Khalidi, 1997, p. 190).

In May 1942, the Zionist leadership headed by David Ben Gurion gathered in Biltmore Hotel in New York and formulated their position in what became known as Biltmore Program<sup>(9)</sup>, where they declared Palestine as ‘a Jewish common wealth’, yet mentioned neither partition nor borders. It was a compromise that explicitly declared the Zionist goal of an independent state in Palestine to ensure the right of free immigration, and intensely opposed the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 (Shindler, 2009, p. 92; Isseroff, 2002b). According to Rabinovich and Reinhartz (2008, p. 544): *‘the program has undoubtedly won the support of the Zionist movement as a whole, mainly because it expressed the policy of Palestinian Jewry which now plays a leading role in the Jewish-Agency’*.

**Failure of the White Paper** - Lord Moyne; the British Minister in Cairo who was in charge of carrying out the terms of the 1939 White Paper was murdered by the Sternists; extremist members of a Zionist organization<sup>(10)</sup> as a means of expressing their opposition to this Paper or any act they considered as an anti-Zionist activity (Aronson, 2004, p. 229; Beckett, 2001, p. 87). Later, in 1944, this assassination led to the ‘Season’ campaign where members of the Stern Gang were rounded up by the Haganah, the Irgun<sup>(11)</sup>, and British troops. The Gang was terminated and turned over to the British in order not to jeopardize cooperation between the Jews and the British after the war (Ibid., p. 87).

Nevertheless, the aftermath of World War II, the Holocaust in Europe in 1945, and the non-compliance of the British Labor party (who came to power then) to their promise of reversing the British White Paper did not leave any venue for the Zionists. Consequently, they started blaming the British ban on Jews immigration to Palestine for the death of thousands of Jews in Europe. This led to the establishment

<sup>(8)</sup>Illegal immigration boosted the Jewish population to 450,000 that year, and comprised about two-thirds of the territory’s population of 2 million in mid-1940s.

<sup>(9)</sup>Later renamed to ‘the Jerusalem Program’.

<sup>(10)</sup>Who broke away from the Zionist organization and began forming their own underground groups.

<sup>(11)</sup>A break away from the Haganah and the main Jewish underground in the pre-state days.

of a United Jewish resistance movement that comprised of various Jewish military forces i.e. Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. It was headed by Ben-Gurion, who in turn launched an active struggle against the British in Palestine to drive them out and speed up the establishment of an independent Israel (Sherbok, 1994, p. 188; Tucker, 2010, p. 649).

The Jewish revolt against the British included blowing up railways, kidnapping, assassinating British employees and soldiers, and more. The political situation raged in Britain and was massively demanding the British government to settle the conflict and stop endangering the lives of British troops in Palestine (Heller, 1999, p. 4). The British government was incapable of settling down this rebellious situation. From one side, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended allowing the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. From the other side, the Arabs' pressures on the British Mandate to block these immigrations (Zarley, 1990, p. 69).

**Partition Plan** - On the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 1946, the League of Nations was terminated by the League Assembly, and its properties and assets were transferred to the United Nations at a simple ceremony in Geneva (Goodrich, 1998, p. 3). At key points in its history, the United Nations has been a major player in the Middle East. However, instead of being committed to granting the right of self-determination<sup>(12)</sup> for the inhabitants of an area to call a country of their own, they decided to revert to the “medieval strategy of allowing an outside power to divide up other people’s land” (AMP, 2009, p. 1).

After a two-month debate, and following the notification of the British Mandate of the withdrawal from Palestine, the U.N. General Assembly decided on adopting Resolution 181 (II). It enacted the termination of the British Mandate through “a progressive withdrawal of British armed forces”, the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem to be an internationalized city. All to take place no later than the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1948. Resolution 181 bestowed “international legitimacy on the nascent, borderless and still-expanding state of Israel, while postulating an abstract Palestinian state and protected international status for Jerusalem” (Bennis, 1997, p. 1; Akasaka, 2008, p. 7; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 73; *BBC news*, 2001).

The partition plan was approved by the majority of the United Nations General Assembly members, with 33 votes in favor (57.9%), 13 against (22.8%), 10 abstentions (17.5%) and one absent (1.8%) (Bennis, 1997, p. 1). The partition plan “ran counter to the wishes of a vast majority of the population in Palestine” (Lesch,

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<sup>(12)</sup>“The right of peoples to self-determination is a particularly well-known collective right, explicitly mentioned in common Article 1 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966” (Butenschøn, 2006, p. 285).

2001). It laid down: the Jewish state covers 56.0% of the land, and the Arab state covers 43.0% of it (with 1.0% for a neutral Jerusalem). At that time, Jewish inhabitants constituted 33.0% of the overall population<sup>(13)</sup>, and Palestinian inhabitants constituted the rest 67.0%<sup>(14)</sup>, as shown in Table 2.1 hereunder. Also, it established “the guarantee of the rights of minorities and religious rights, including free access to and the preservation of Holy Places”. In addition to the constitution of an Economic Union between the two states (Akasaka, 2008, p. 5; *BBC news*, 2001).

**TABLE 2.1** DISTRIBUTION OF ARABS AND JEWS AT THE TIME OF THE PARTITION PLAN

State	Jews	Arabs and others	Total
Jewish state	498000	407000	905000
Arab state	10000	725000	735000
City of Jerusalem	100000	105000	205000
<i>Total</i>	608000	1237000	1845000
<i>%</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>67.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>

*Source: United Nations, 1990, p. 115.*

**Responses to the Plan -** On the one hand, the plan enjoyed the warm support of the Jewish community in Palestine, through the Jewish Agency “tactically because it implied international recognition for their aims” (Ben-Baruch, 2004, p. 2). Despite the opposition of some Jewish leaders, such as David Ben-Gurion; Israel first prime minister, who believed that the Jewish problem “could never be solved within a capitalist environment and that the Jews must return to their socialist, collectivist root”. Moreover, for him, the plan did not conform to the ambitions of a Jewish state on the entire territory of the Mandated Palestine and instead it imposed territorial limits on the proposed Jewish State (Boyle, 1990, p. 333; Akasaka, 2008, p. 9; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 64 - 68; *BBC news*, 2001). All this despite the fact that his attitude towards religion was only based on political interests (Gorny, 2013, p. 41).

On the other hand, the “Arab nations unanimously expressed bitter opposition” (Boyle, 1990, p. 333). The plan was deemed to be a criminal act perpetrated upon them by the United Nations because it “violated the provision of the United Nations charter, which granted the right to decide their destiny”. Furthermore, it unjustifiably gave special and preferential rights and status to the minority and ignored the rights of the majority of the population of Palestine (Akasaka, 2008, p. 9; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 64-68; Isseroff, 2002a). Clashes between Jews and Arabs

<sup>(13)</sup>498,000 in the Jewish state, 10,000 minority in the Arab state and 100,000 in Jerusalem.

<sup>(14)</sup>807,000 in the Arab state, 325,000 in the Jewish state and 105,000 in Jerusalem.

intensified and local fighting turned into a general conflict during the subsequent months of the UN vote on the partition of Palestine into Arab and a Jewish territory (Kamen, 1988, p. 68).

### 2.1.3 Modern History

#### The Independence of Israel and the Catastrophe of Palestine

Eventually, in May 1948, the British government departed from Palestine and returned the Mandate to the United Nations (Isseroff, 2002b; Isseroff, 2009). According to official Israeli statistics, by the end of the British Mandate, 89.6% of all Jewish immigrants came from Europe, America, and Oceania, and 10.4% immigrated from Africa and Asia.

From April onwards, the Zionists started the implementation of Plan Dalet<sup>(15)</sup> against Palestinians. Khalidi (1988, p. 8) described the goals of this operation:

*‘These offensives entailed the destruction of the Palestinian Arab community and the expulsion and pauperization of the bulk of the Palestine Arabs, were calculated to achieve the military fait accompli upon which the state of Israel was to be based’.*

Khalidi (1988, p. 8) and Pappé (2006) agreed that the fundamental objectives of this Plan were to conquer as much as possible of Palestine and to expel Palestinians from their land. However, Hakabi (1972, p. 366) believed that the goals of this plan were to “control over the territory of the Jewish State and to defend its border against any invasion by the Arab armies”.

The Jewish Agency proclaimed the Declaration of Independence that announced the creation of the State of Israel on the territory allotted to it by the partition plan. It took place following the complete relinquishment of the British Mandate over Palestine, and the disengagement of its forces on the 14<sup>th</sup> of May 1948. Unsurprisingly, the Declaration of Independence led to more serious clashes between Arab nations and Jews, and the crossing of borders of the newly proclaimed state by armies of neighboring Arab countries. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, plus a token force from Saudi Arabia entered Palestine “in an attempt to prevent the creation of a Jewish state”. An event that marked the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War known as ‘al-Nakba’ or the catastrophe (Kamen, 1988, p. 68; Akasaka, 2008, p. 2008; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 73).

In the initial stages of the war, notable successes were scored by Arab armies.

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<sup>(15)</sup>An offensive military operation.

However, due to the crucial Arab decision of accepting the truce<sup>(16)</sup> the Arabs failed to keep their successes in later stages of the war. Arabs did not make use of the essence of the cease-fire that aimed to regroup and recruit the troops during the truce. Nevertheless, the Israelis did; they took advantage of the truce in this critical stage of the war, they regrouped, recruited and trained their troops for the fighting (Kamen, 1987, p. 453).

The Israelis established the Israel “Defense Force” (IDF) that comprised of an amalgamation of the underground armies of the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun, and Lehi, and brought large shiploads of arms. According to Isseroff (2009): *‘better organization and intelligence successes, as well as timely clandestine arms shipments, enabled the Jews to gain a decisive victory’*. Add to that, although the Arabs officially were fighting according to one plan, coordination between them was very limited. Gradually, the expulsion of Arabs became “a definite policy of the fighting units. Residents of many Arab villages, who had not fled when their villages were captured, were expelled by the government. Few were permitted to go back to their homes, or to resettle in other localities” (Kamen, 1987, p. 453). The war ended with the devastating defeat of the Arab countries and the Palestinians.

**Outcome of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War -** According to Awad (2011) - the President of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBU): in a matter of seven months, the war yielded significant changes in the composition of the population that lived in that part of the Mandatory Palestine, mainly the transformation of over half of the Palestinians into refugees. Out of 1.4 million people, 750,000 Palestinians were uprooted from 1300 Palestinian towns and villages, from which 531 were devastated. They were displaced to neighboring Arab countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and other countries of the world, as stateless persons (Bell, 2011, p. 6). Also, thousands of Palestinians, almost 20% (186,000 out of 900,000) were internally relocated from their homes but remained within the newly Israeli-controlled territories.

Official data indicate that the underground armies controlled 774 Palestinian towns and villages, destroyed 531 villages and emptied 11 urban neighborhoods. The atrocities of Israeli forces also included more than 70 massacres, rape of women and incarceration of men during the al-Nakba. A total of approximately 15,000 Palestinians were killed and 78% of the land of Mandatory Palestine (including West Jerusalem) was controlled (Awad, 2011; Khalidi, 1992, p. 30; Pappé, 2006, p. 22; Kamen, 1987, p. 453; Smooha, 2002, p. 484; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2012). The remaining territories of Gaza district and the West Bank of the Jordan River (which included East Jerusalem) were controlled by Egypt and Jordan respectively (Akasaka, 2008, p. 10).

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<sup>(16)</sup>Called for by the Security Council from June 11 to July 8 and from July 19 to October 15.

The purpose of all these expulsions and massacres was “to create a purely Jewish state ethnically cleansed of the indigenous inhabitants who had lived there for centuries” (Nabulsi, 2006, p. 13). David Ben Gurion once said: *‘we must do everything to ensure they (the Palestinians) would never return i.e. the old would die, and the young would forget’*. Since then, the war of 1948 was called ‘al-Nakba’ or the catastrophe, which Awad (2011) was described as “a systematic replacement of the population”. ‘al-Nakba’ is “an expression usually used for natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and hurricanes”, yet the Nakba of Palestine is an ethnic cleansing process as well as a “destruction and displacement of an unarmed nation to be replaced systematically by another nation” (Ibid.).

‘Ethnic cleansing’ a term firstly coined by Ilan Pappé in his book ‘The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine’. It implies an accusation and reference to the culprits of/for the events that took place not only in the past but also is happening in the present (Tarachansky, 2009). According to Pappé (2006, p. 21) ‘al-Nakba’ does not directly imply any reference to who is behind the catastrophe and, therefore, the term of ‘Ethnic cleansing’ should be used as a better representation of what had happened in 1948. He defined Ethnic Cleansing as *‘any action by one ethnic group meant to drive out another ethnic group with the purpose of transforming a mixed ethnic region into a pure one. An action can become Ethnic Cleansing regardless of the means employed. Every means, from persuasion and threats to expulsions and mass killings, justifies the attribution of the term to such policies’* (p. 22). Rowley and Taylor (2006, p. 74) summed up the outcome of the 1948 war: *‘what is done is done, and Israel has earned, through bloody battles, the right through might to remain in Palestine’*.

### **Armistice Agreements**

The period between 1948 and 1949 witnessed a series of armistice agreements and resolutions between Israel and neighboring Arab countries. These agreements were arranged by the United Nations to cease all hostile military activities between the signing parties (Shapira, 1971, p. 65). Israel originally was willing to convert these lines into recognized international boundaries. However, the Arabs opposed the idea, and instead, they considered the main aim from signing these armistice agreements to have solely military significance and did not underline any peace treaties (Blum, 2009, p. 29).

### **UN General Assembly Resolution 194**

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 (III) that outlined ways to resolve the Palestinian problem. The resolution called



for “placing all of Jerusalem under permanent international regime” and free access to the holy places in Palestine. Also, it mandated a solution to the problem of Palestinians-made refugees during the 1948 war as referred to in paragraph eleven of the resolution (Khalidi, 1992, p. 33; Akasaka, 2008, p. 11), which stated:

*‘Refugees wishing to return to their homes and to live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible’.*

A conference was convened<sup>(17)</sup> by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) in Lausanne, Switzerland. The conference was an attempt to resolve the three major issues of refugees, the size of territories allotted to Palestine and Israel, and the status of Jerusalem (Chiller-Glaus, 2007, p. 139) and separate talks were held with both parties. Each agreed on the protocol to use the boundaries established in the partition plan of UN Resolution 194 as the basis for negotiations i.e. the same boundaries that were rejected by the Arabs previously. Unfortunately, these delineated attempts have ended inconclusively because of priority differences between the Arabs and the Israelis. The former pressing for the repatriation of refugees as a first step, and the latter, insisting on addressing territorial questions first (Akasaka, 2008, p. 11).

Another attempt among many to lead to a permanent peace was Security Council Resolution 62, which empowered the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Isseroff, 2002a). However, those and later attempts by the Commission to secure the return of the Palestinians and the internationalization of Jerusalem were deemed to fail, mainly, due to Arabs continuing refusal to recognize Israel and its borders, and Israel’s “insufficient cooperation to solve the refugees problem”, and the question of water (Isseroff, 2009).

### **Egypt-Israeli War 1954 and 1956**

Peace talks slightly started to revive between Egypt and Israel in 1954 after the overthrowing<sup>(18)</sup> of King Farouk corrupt government in Egypt. Until Egyptians uncovered an Israeli spy ring “that was plotting to blow up US installations in Egypt”, in order to tension the relation between the US and Egypt and prevent rapprochement. This incident came to be known as ‘the Lavon affair’ or ‘the shameful business’ (Tal, 1996, p. 59).

<sup>(17)</sup>From the 27<sup>th</sup> of April till the 12<sup>th</sup> of September 1949.

<sup>(18)</sup>By a semi-underground organization called ‘the Free Officers’, known in Arabic as ‘El-Dobatt El-Ahrar’, headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Soon, in response to this shameful act by Israelis, Egyptians blocked the straits of Tiran and Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, and later in this year, Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of October 1956 in a plan to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israeli paratroopers landed deep inside the Sinai Desert - joined later by France and the United Kingdom. This plan triggered the second Arab-Israeli war and added another level to the bloody edifice of Israel's relations with its neighbors (Ibid., p. 59). The crisis ended with the eventual withdrawal of the invading forces to the armistice lines in accordance to UN Security Council Resolution 997 (Akasaka, 2008, p. 15).

### **Formation of the PLO**

The first Arab Summit conference of 1964 took place to stop Israel's plans to divert part of the Jordan River had comprised the first steps towards the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In May 1964, the Palestine National Council was summoned in Jerusalem and proclaimed the establishment of the PLO headed by Ahmad Shuqairi. The aim of the PLO was "to ward off the existing Zionist danger in the technical and defense fields. Moreover, to organize the Palestinian people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny" (*British and foreign state papers*, 1971, p. 656). The PLO was defined in the book of the United Nations Special Unit on Palestinian Rights (1980) as '*the general organizational framework within which all Palestinian organizations - commando groups, trade unions, professional associations, as well as prominent national figures meet to work for the achievement of Palestinian national goals*' (p. 374). It regularly came to be internationally recognized as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people (Avnery, 2010, p. 13).

### **1967 Arab-Israeli War**

Tensions between Arabs and Israelis escalated in the late 1960s with the continuous struggle for "the waters of Jordan, Litani, Orontes, Yarmouk and other life-giving Middle East rivers", especially after the establishment of the Israeli National Water Carrier plan that pumped the water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate south and central Israel (Isseroff, 2009). Indeed, this was a principal cause of the 1967 third Arab-Israeli war (Cooley, 1984, p. 3). Coupled with the closing of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, and the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai, which according to Lerner (2012) '*if had not taken place the Six-day war would have never occurred*'.

Although the question of water sharing between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries became more apparent, however, it seemed less attainable because Israel at that time consumed "roughly five times as much water per capita as each of it

less industrialized and less intensively farmed neighbours” (Cooley, 1984, p. 3). In 1964, clashes started between allied Syrian-Lebanon forces and Israel concerning the diversion of Jordan River water, later in 1967, Egypt and Jordan were dragged into the war against Israel (Ibid.).

In the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 1967, Israel launched its first attack against Egypt, followed by a series of clashes with Jordan and Syria. Within six days<sup>(19)</sup> the perceived balance of power in the Middle East was changed, and a new reality was created. The Israelis “had delivered a crushing defeat to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria” (Parker, 1992, p. 180), and became the undisputed master of all Palestine, plus substantial portions of the Sinai desert in Egypt and the Golan Heights of Syria (Ibid.). Israel had acquired extensive territories that were several times larger than the 1948 borders, and a new batch of 500,000 Palestinian refugees was created (Bell, 2011, p. 6).

Not to mention, the destruction of the primary military forces in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and the psychological effects resulting from these military defeats. In comparison to minor losses on the Israeli side coupled with an exaggerated feeling of confidence within and outside Israel in the strength and ability of Israeli military (Alshaer, 2008). The 1967 war was another phase of the struggle between conflicted sides, a phase that “did not change the essence; it only changed the circumstances” (Avnery, 2010, p. 10). The Zionist objectives were furthered to cover more territory, after which the armistice lines were replaced by cease-fire lines (Blum, 2009, p. 30).

### **Fateh Taking Over the PLO**

Two years later, Fateh took over the PLO, which was not an easygoing task but a complicated one that required political and diplomatic skills. First, the PLO in its constitution “harbored ideologically diverse factions”, making it harder to control. Secondly, tensions appeared among the PLO, the conservative Arab regimes and the popular revolutionary forces in the Arab world. Debates included the degree to which violence should be used and the right to repatriation of displaced Palestinians. Furthermore, whether the State of Palestine should be established on the whole area of Historic Palestine or the West Bank and Gaza alone (Araj & Brym, 2010, p. 843).

### **UN Security Council Resolution 242**

The UN Security Council Resolution 242 was one of the most famous and frequently cited resolutions. It became the cornerstone of the Middle East successive diplomatic efforts for peace and the ending of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the

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<sup>(19)</sup>The war lasted from the 5<sup>th</sup> till the 11<sup>th</sup> of June.

coming decades. Examples of other attempts of peace resolutions included “the two Camp David Framework Accords of 1978, the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 and the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles of 1993, commonly known as the ‘Oslo Accord’” (Blum, 2009, p. 28).

The resolution was issued on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 1967 in the wake of the third Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. A war that led to the defeat of Arab armies and the expansion of Israel’s occupation to larger parts of the Arab world. According to Lynk (2007, p. 7), the primary purpose of Resolution 242 in the eyes of its drafters was “to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of the land taken in 1967 and to create the political and legal foundations for an enduring peace in the region”. Blum (2009, p. 28) saw Israel’s obligation to withdraw from territories that were occupied in 1967 as the most important and contentious provision in Resolution 242, yet “security considerations were uppermost in the minds of its drafters”.

The resolution stated that “all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter” (Gold et al., 2009), which “requires UN members to act in ‘good faith’ and seek peaceful means for resolving international disputes”. Moreover, it affirmed that the fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East endorsed by the following principles: (a) “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”, (b) the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied” in the Six-day War, (c) “the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”. Furthermore, the resolution affirmed the necessity “for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones” (Lynk, 2007; Isseroff, 2002a; *PLO documents*, p. 321).

**Failure of UN Security Council Resolution 242** - Despite the legal and practical importance of the resolution that carries between its lines particular territorial and other provisional significance. The resolution lack of specific, constructed language, and legislative history, and failure of emphasizing many core issues of the Arab-Israeli problem had in return raised many distortions and central interpretative differences between disputed parties. Blum (2009, p. 28) summarized the main elements that are not mentioned in Resolution 242. According to his observation, “the resolution does not speak of a Palestinian people or a Palestinian state, nor does it mention Jerusalem”. Additionally, it de-emphasized the centrality of the

Palestinians refugee's problem by referring to it as a "just settlement of the refugee problem".

Likewise, the central argument of the Israelis and their supporters and adversaries that call for 'Land-for-Peace' is not mentioned anywhere in the Resolution. Not to mention, the unsuccessful timing of the resolution, which took place a few months after the well-known 'Khartoum meeting', where Arabs intensively declared: '*no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel*'. These resulted in the absence of any straightforward mention of peace treaties in the resolution (Ibid., p. 28).

The first territorial component of the resolution included "the right of every state in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries". However, the armistice demarcation lines in 1949 "were neither 'secure' and 'recognized', nor were they 'boundaries'" (Ibid.). In line with that, the broad and purposive legal reading of Resolution 242's second territorial component that requires "the total withdrawal of Israel from all (the) territories captured in June 1967 has been frequently challenged" (p. 29).

Legal scholars from Israel "have given the resolution a claustrophobic interpretation over the years" (Blum, 2009, p. 30). They have argued that British sponsors, in consultation with US delegation had deliberately omitted the definite article (the term used is 'withdrawal from territories' rather than 'withdrawal from all the territories') and therefore insisted upon indefinite language (that most probably appear due to the translation of the French written resolution to English) - no use of 'the' or 'all' - in the withdrawal provision. For that reason, they declared that Resolution 242 "does not compel Israel to make more than a partial withdrawal from the captured territories" (Aziz, 2007, p. 6; Lynk, 2007, p. 8; Blum, 2009, p. 30).

Since then, a debate between Israel's and Arab's supporters and adversaries "has raged over whether these provisions call for a complete Israeli withdrawal, a minor revision of borders, or license for Israel to retain sovereignty over some of the conquered lands" (Lynk, 2007, p. 8). Consequently, the resolution faced bitter opposition by the two parties each for their concern, particularly the PLO headed by Yasser Arafat, who strongly criticized Resolution 242 because it reduced the Question of Palestine to a refugee problem (Akasaka, 2008, p. 18).

### **The Fourth Arab-Israeli War**

The October War, Ramadan War (or Yom Kippur War in Hebrew) was the fourth Arab-Israeli war that was launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October 1973 (Long, 2011). It started with a sudden attack by Egyptian and Syrian armies on Israeli forces stationed in the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

The roots of the 'War of Attrition' between Egypt and Israel can be tracked as of July 1967 with the first Egyptian victory against the Israelis at 'Ras Al-'Ish' attack, followed by a series of attacks that took place in the first two years (till 1969). The war took the form of limited artillery duels and small-scale incursions into the Sinai and later was developed through subsequent military stages to a fully prepared Egyptian Army for larger scaled operations in March 1969. Those operations were called by Gamal Abdel Nasser; Egypt second president, 'the War of Attrition' (or Harb al-Istinzf in Arabic). Until the restoration of the cease-fire on the 7<sup>th</sup> of August 1970 (Khalidi, 1997, p. 60; *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 1967). In an interview with Mohamed Tantawi<sup>(20)</sup> stated: *'The War of Attrition was something imperative for the execution of the 1973 October War, even we - including military analysts, consider the October War an extension of the Attrition War'*.

The war officially ended with the signing of the disengagement agreement on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1974. Israel agreed to return the city of Kenitra to Syria and the eastern bank of the Suez Canal to Egypt, in exchange for the removal of Egyptian and Syrian forces from the armistice lines, and the establishment of a special force of the United Nations to monitor the accomplishment of the convention. According to Bard and Schwartz (2005), *'the outcome of the conflict was a territorial gain for Egypt. In Syria, on the other hand, the Arabs could hardly claim victory since Israel had substantially increased its territorial control'*.

**The Aftermath of the October War** - The October war has altered the Israeli thinking about the capabilities of the Arabs and made them reconsider their strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the effect on the Arab world was even greater. By demonstrating "their ability to mount an attack on Israel, Egyptians, and Syrians emerged from the October War with a new sense of pride" (Bonham et al., 1979, p. 5). The most important results of the war were: (1) the recovery of Egyptian sovereignty over all the Suez Canal, and the cities along the canal and most of the Sinai desert, (2) the recovery of Syrian sovereignty over the city of Kenitra of the Golan Heights, and (3) the destruction of what Israeli military leaders used to call 'the invincible army' myth by Egyptians strategic military actions and forces (Ibid.).

Bonham et al. (1979) added: *'the October war, to a much greater degree than previously, resulted in the active involvement of the two superpowers'*; the United States and the Soviet Union, who in the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1973 in a joint proposal (United Nations Security Council Resolution 338) called for ceasefire and adoption of Resolution 242 in all of its parts. Later, they headed to the Geneva Conference of 1973 sponsored by the United Nations "in an attempt to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict as envisioned in United Nations Security Council Resolu-

<sup>(20)</sup> An Egyptian field marshal and statesman.

tion 338". Due to some reservations, the Geneva Conference was not resumed after December 1973 (Quandt, 2008).

**UN Security Council Resolution 338** - The three-line UN Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1973 entailed the following:

1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision.
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The war led to the return of shipping in the Suez Canal in June 1975, and finally, it paved the way for the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. The agreement was held in September 1978 following the historic initiative of Anwar Sadat, the third President of Egypt, to visit Jerusalem in November 1977. Followed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1982 with the so-called 'Reagan plan' that was primarily based on the formula 'Land-for-Peace'. The plan called for a freeze on the establishment of Israeli settlements, urged Israel to return most of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian control, and favored some form of governing association between the Palestinian Territories and Jordan. However, Begin; the Israeli Prime Minister at that time, did not agree on the plan, and therefore, no progress took place (Quandt, 2008, p. 31; Akasaka, 2008, p. 19).

### **First Palestinian Uprising 'Intifada'**

The Intifada, translated into English as the 'uprising' or 'rebellion' is often used as a term for popular resistance to oppression. The first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 was a popular uprising against Israeli military occupation. The uprising is also referred to as 'the war of the stones' due to the iconic images of Palestinian youth throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and their tanks. The Palestinians used civil disobedience, boycotts, protests and to a lesser extent, violence to protest against the Israeli military occupation. The Intifada quickly developed into a well-organized rebellion orchestrated by the PLO from its headquarters in Tunis (Batchoun, 2003b).

The spark started in Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza Strip, and soon a collective Palestinian uprising erupted against Israel in both areas i.e. the West Bank and Gaza. It started when a settler killed a schoolgirl, and an Israeli truck ran over seven Palestinian workers in Beit Hanoun checkpoint in the north of Gaza (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 5; *Palestine Facts*, 2011a; Batchoun, 2003b). These incidents were

the straw that broke the camel's back, but the real reason behind the Intifada was "the culmination of Palestinian discontent and frustration after twenty years of occupation since 1967 Israeli offensive" (Batchoun, 2003b). Israeli repression in the form of "mass detentions, house demolitions, and other violent acts, as well as the economic integration of the Palestinian territories by means of transferring Israeli Jews into the Palestinian territories in clear violation of international law, amounted to what the Palestinians saw as de facto annexation" (Ibid.). The Intifada calmed down in 1991, and finally stopped with the signing of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993.

Over 1200, Palestinians were consequently killed by the Israeli Army during the Intifada (1987-1993), of who 241 were kids, approximately 90,000 were wounded, 15,000 were arrested, and 1228 houses were demolished. On the Israeli side, about 160 Israelis were killed (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 6). Hammami and Tamari (2001, p. 6) described the most significant achievements of 1987 Intifada:

*'Since the PLO had been dispersed in the aftermath of the Israeli's military invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the daily lives of the Palestinians throughout the Palestinian territories were under Israeli colonialism. This status quo that was highly challenged by the Palestinian uprising, who through unarmed civil insurrection have succeeded in convincing Israel that Palestinians could not be governed by colonial rule'.*

In addition, the Intifada led the Palestine National Council to consider the two-state solution based on the 1947 United Nations partition plan. Later, it paved the way to the Oslo accord, to the interim agreements of Wye agreement and Hebron protocol as well (Ibid., p. 6). For Palestinians, the uprising managed to draw international attention to their problem, and Israeli oppression imposed on them (Chao, 2011, p. 9; Avnery, 2010, p. 13).

### **Madrid Peace Conference**

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1991 (eight months following the 1991 Gulf War) the United States, and the Soviet Union jointly sponsored the Madrid Peace Conference. It was the first time after 43 years that the Israelis and the Arabs accepted to enter into direct, face-to-face negotiations with each other. Israel from one side and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and a Palestinian delegation<sup>(21)</sup> on the other side. The aim of convening this international conference was to address the Arab-Israeli dispute following the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The United States taking the lead in the conference has adopted "an even-handed approach and pledged to promote a settlement

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<sup>(21)</sup>That was not independent then but part of the Jordanian delegation.



that would provide security for Israel and justice for the Palestinians” (Pressman, 2003, p. 28; Shlaim, 2005b, p. 242).

The conference through bilateral and multilateral meetings intended to start a peace process by resolving past conflicts, signing peace treaties and for all sides to settle their rival territorial claims. Areas including the Gaza Strip, West Bank (including East Jerusalem) were the main points of contention, in addition to negotiating issues of concern to the entire Middle East, such as water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development (*BBC news*, 2001).

The Madrid conference was considered a success and was open for more talks (*BBC news*, 1991). Later in January 1992, bilateral talks between Israel and Arab countries took place in the American capital - Washington, D.C., under the American auspices. Unfortunately, little progress was made on either track because of the Likud’s “tough and uncompromising posture” – delegated by Shamir; seventh Prime Minister of Israel, who stated that the basic problem of the conflict was not territorial, but the Arab denial of Israel’s very right to exist. However, and later due to the victory of the Labour party headed by Itzhak Rabin over the Likud party in June 1992, Israel adopted a more flexible position toward the Arab track but stayed still regarding the Palestinian issue (Shlaim, 2005b, p. 242).

### **Oslo Accord I of 1993**

Deadlock in official talks led Israel and the PLO to seek a back channel for communicating, away from the glare of publicity and political pressures. In late January 1993, unofficial and secret talks got underway in Oslo. They were led by two Israeli academics; Dr. Hirschfeld and Dr. Pundik, and PLO treasurer Ahmad Qurei. Initially, it dealt with economic cooperation but soon was broadened to negotiate a joint declaration of principles (Shlaim, 1994, p. 33).

Over a period of eight months, talks developed and both parties became more interested and involved in the updated details of those talks. Especially after (1) the failure of the tenth round of the official Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Washington<sup>(22)</sup>, and (2) the need for finding a political solution to the crisis in the relations between Israel and the inhabitants of the occupied territories. In addition to several reports and political changes that urged Rabin “to give the green light to the Israeli team and the secret diplomacy to move into a higher gear” (Ibid.).

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, US President Bill Clinton, and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, later came together to sign a breakthrough agreement. An agreement that would lay a vital groundwork for each side to achieve what they wanted most, namely, a land for the Palestinians they could finally call their own, and secu-

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<sup>(22)</sup>That were running parallel to the secret talks of Oslo.

urity and safety to both nations (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245; Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7).

The Oslo deal was unique in that rather than negotiating major issues; participants chose instead to sidestep them in order to build an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding as a first step. It was completely silent on the thorny issues of the conflict, such as the right of return of the 1948 refugees, the borders of the Palestinians entity, the future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the status of Jerusalem (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7; Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245). Participants did not address these issues because if they did “there would have been no accord” (Ibid.), and therefore, such issues were deferred to the final status agreement (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7).

Oslo was not a final peace deal but the beginning of a peace process and a call for a five-year period in which both sides can take concrete steps that would improve relations and increase goodwill between the two peoples. At the end of this five-year period they would return to the negotiating table to deal with Palestinian and Israeli demands, only this time not as enemies but as partners with a common goal. A sense of trust between the two peoples needed to be built first before proceeding to more critical issues, and the Oslo accord was designed to achieve that (Kopping & Shore, 2003).

**Commitments to the Oslo Accord** - The PLO committed at the Oslo Accord (1) to recognize Israel’s right to exist and live in peace and security, (2) to accept the parts of UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for the amendment of the PLO national charter that calls for the destruction of Israel through violence. Besides, (3) to amend its charters that are inconsistent with these commitments, (4) to confiscate all illegal weapons, (5) to preserve and protect all Jewish holy sites that fall under the PA control in the transfer of lands, and (6) to educate their people for peace (Feith, 1996, p. 6; Kopping & Shore, 2003).

In the light of these commitments Israel agreed (1) to give Palestinians the right to self-govern Gaza and Jericho, (2) to recognize the PLO as a legal governing body that represents the Palestinians everywhere (3) to transfer land over to PA control<sup>(23)</sup>, (4) to educate its public towards peace, and (5) to prepare the Israeli population for the difficult compromises that would need to be made in order to allow for the establishment of the Palestinian entity right next door (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245; Kopping & Shore, 2003; Dunn, 2004). The exchange of letters between Arafat and Rabin was even more profound than this as Yasser Arafat’s letters constituted forfeiting the Palestinians’ “right to violent resistance” (Lerner, 2012).

Moreover, it committed (6) to allow for the creation of a PA police force that

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<sup>(23)</sup>The exact amount to be determined in a series of intimate deals.

consisted of ten thousand pro-Arafat Palestinian fighters to maintain internal security, particularly in Gaza and Jericho, with Israel retaining overall responsibility for external security and foreign affairs, and (7) to transfer power to ‘authorized Palestinians’ in five spheres; education, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245; Kopping & Shore, 2003). Shlaim (2005a, p. 245) stated: *‘the Declaration of Principles promised to set in motion a process that would end Israeli rule over the two million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza’*.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1993, “the Declaration was signed on the Southern Lawn of the White House and sealed with the historic handshake between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat” (Falk & Morgenstern, 2009, p. 242). By accepting the principle of partitioning Palestine and the territorial comprises as an ending solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the two parties have “suspended the ideological dispute as to who is the rightful owner of Palestine and turned to finding a practical solution to the problem of sharing the cramped living space between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea” (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 246). Moreover, Israel by signing this declaration “not only recognized the PLO; it also recognized the existence of the Palestinians as a people” (Scham et al., 2013, p. 7).

Despite the strong and vociferous opposition of hard-liners<sup>(24)</sup> to the Rabin-Arafat deal, both leaders had received the support and approval of the majority for this peace agreement. Another follow-up treaty was held in the 4<sup>th</sup> of May in the same year and yielded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement or the so-called ‘the Cairo agreement’; an agreement concluded for establishing a Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for a maximum transition period of five years (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 246).

## Oslo Accord II

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 1995, the second Oslo accord was signed between Rabin and Arafat; a 300-page accord that “marked the point of no return in the process of ending Israel’s coercive control over the Palestinian people” (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 246). However, the implementation of the agreement was cut short by the assassination of Rabin by a religious-nationalist Jewish fanatic a month after signing the agreement, which led to “a serious blow to the entire peace process” (Ibid.), especially, after the electoral defeat of the Labor party headed by Shimon Peres in May 1996, and the return of power to the Likud under Netanyahu’s leadership. Upon taking office, the latter refused to withdraw troops from areas that were still under Israeli occupation, and vehemently opposed the Labour government’s ‘Land-

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<sup>(24)</sup>Nationalists and militant resistance movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side and the right-wing nationalist parties and the far right-wing Likud party on the Israeli side.

for-Peace' deal with the PLO (Palmowski, 2004; *Palestine Facts*, 2011b).

During his term as a prime minister, Netanyahu relentlessly started demolishing houses, confiscating lands, vigorously expanding Jewish settlements, building an elaborate network of settler's 'bypass' roads, uprooting plantations, imposing curfews and encroaching on Muslim holy places in Jerusalem (Avnery, 2010, p. 15). Soon after an extensive period of economic and political war of attrition against the Palestinians, American pressures compelled Netanyahu to sign two agreements<sup>(25)</sup>, in which the Likud party agreed to concede territories to the Palestinians. These agreements were the reason behind the revolt of ultra-nationalists and religious groups against Netanyahu's actions and a year later to the fall of his government (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7).

Optimists could still believe that "a return of the Labor party would mark a return to the 'original spirit' of the agreement" (Ibid., p. 7). In May 1999, the landslide victory of the Labor party headed by Ehud Barak brought him into office. Unfortunately, Barak dashed the hopes of reviving the moribund peace process with his arrogant and authoritarian policies. Indeed, optimists did not take into consideration that Barak as an interior minister in the Rabin government had actually voted against Oslo at a time when faith in the Oslo agreement was at its peak (Shlaim, 2005a, p: 253-254). As soon as Barak came into power, he proceeded with the rapid expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the confiscation of lands, and he argued that the 'Land-for-Peace' deal does not serve Israel's interests because, in his opinion, Palestinians will always come back for more (Ibid.).

## 2.1.4 Current History

### Camp David

In an attempt to conclude the issues<sup>(26)</sup> that were investigated by the Oslo accord, the final stage of negotiations in the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was set out by the meeting of the Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and United States President Bill Clinton in Maryland in the period from 11<sup>th</sup> till the 25<sup>th</sup> of July (Tucker, 2010, p. 143). Unfortunately, those several meetings have culminated with failure due to many factors, most importantly, "the misjudgments and procedural errors made by all three parties" (Balaban, 2005, p. 11). In addition to other factors, major differences of opinion have reduced the likelihood of a successful deal later in 2000 / 2001.

<sup>(25)</sup>Namely, the Hebron Protocol on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1997, and the Wye River Memorandum on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 1998.

<sup>(26)</sup>Such as the issues of Jerusalem, refugees right of return, borders, Jewish settlements and more.

**Failure of Camp David** - The dominant version of what happened at the Camp David summit was the Israeli one (echoed by the Clinton administration). It claimed and emphasized on the generous offer by the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to the Palestinians and the rejection of Palestinian negotiators to those offers without giving any counterproposal to them (Dajani, 2005, p. 86). According to this version, Barak offered the Palestinians “a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 91% of the West Bank, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, shared control of the Temple Mount / Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem’s Old City, and a commitment to dismantle many Israeli settlements in the West Bank” (Pressman, 2003, p. 5). Also, he proposed “the annexation of Jewish neighborhoods (settlements) in East Jerusalem” (Ibid., p. 8), the establishment of three Israeli warning stations in the West Bank, an Israeli presence at Palestinian borders crossings, and a demilitarized Palestinian State for security concerns, in addition to a conditional return for the Palestinian refugees under family reunification programs (Rydelnik, 2007, p. 215).

The Israeli version claimed that Palestinian negotiators, particularly Arafat have turned down the diplomatic route to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israelis also claimed that the Palestinian pressing need for recognizing the refugees right of return has boosted their unwillingness to accept Israel’s right to exist, their desire to destroy Israel, and were not seeking reconciliation with the Israelis (Pressman, 2003, p. 5).

According to Pressman’s careful assessments of the event, the Palestinian version is “much closer to the evidentiary record of articles, interviews, and documents produced by participants in the negotiations, as well as testimonies of journalists and other analysts” (p. 6). It stated that the Israeli’s offer at Camp David did not entail the removal of many vestiges of the Israeli occupation in terms of land, security, settlements, and Jerusalem (Sheppard, 2009, p. 157). Moreover, the Israeli definition<sup>(27)</sup> of the West Bank differed approximately 5% (5,538 km<sup>2</sup> instead of 5,854 km<sup>2</sup>) from the Palestinian definition, leading to a net of 86.0% of the West Bank, and that Palestinians were offered a noncontiguous state; breaking the West Bank into three separate areas. Besides, Israel offered the Palestinians only a functional autonomy; not a Palestinian sovereignty in core Arab neighborhoods<sup>(28)</sup> of East Jerusalem, and even they demanded some form of sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif (Pressman, 2003, p: 17–18; Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 8).

The Palestinians denied the Israeli-American claim that the PA has preferred violence over peaceful negotiations and emphasized on the real reasons for launching the second Intifada. According to the PA, the aim of the second uprising was not

<sup>(27)</sup>They omitted the area known as ‘No Man’s Land’ (50 km<sup>2</sup> near Latrun), post 1967 East Jerusalem (71 km<sup>2</sup>) and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km<sup>2</sup>) (Pressman, 2003, p. 16).

<sup>(28)</sup>Al-Shaykh Jarrah, al-Suwwanah, al-Tur, Salah-al-Din Street, Bab al-Amud, Ra’s al-Amud, and Silwan (Pressman, 2003, p. 18).

destroying Israel but rather was caused by factors under Israel's control (Ibid., p. 6). Pressman (2003, p. 16) added in his observation that the Israeli offer at Camp David was unprecedented. Barak by proposing to divide sovereignty in Jerusalem went further than any previous Israeli leader. However, "it was neither generous nor complete as Israel has since suggested" (p. 15). Moreover, the Israeli proposal at Camp David, as noticed above "was not forthcoming enough, while they neglected key components" (p. 16).

**The Breakdown of the Camp David** - On one level, the breakdown of the Camp David was the product of the clash between Israeli demands for further concessions on the part of Palestinians on final status issues in return of a greater land area and the Palestinians inability to concede more on these issues after having already conceded a lot during the transitional period. Not to mention the Israeli idea of shared sovereignty<sup>(29)</sup>, that according to Klein (2004) '*was on this point that the summit ended*', plus the annexation of three settlement blocs that would extend Israeli territory along the strip that extends from Jericho westward to Beit-Sahour, "effectively splitting the West Bank into two parts" (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p: 8–9). Agha and Malley (2001, p. 13) stated:

*'The negotiations that took place between July 2000 and February 2001 have created an indelible chapter in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This may be hard to discern today, amid the continuing violence and accumulated mistrust. However, taboos were shattered, the unspoken got spoken, and during that period, Israelis and Palestinians reached an unprecedented level of understanding of what it would take to end the conflict'.*

### **Second Palestinian Uprising 'Intifada'**

The immediate trigger for the second Intifada (or uprising) in September 2000 had been the shooting of demonstrators at the site against the background of the collapse of the Camp David (II) summit in July. It was mainly connected to Ariel Sharon's visit accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers to the Haram al-Sharif on the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2000. Balaban (2005, p. 149) described Sharon's visit at that particular time as '*throwing a lit match into a gasoline can with all the children in the neighborhood standing by*'.

Nevertheless, in both cases, one should look beyond the sparks "to the deeper factors that determined the sudden transition from a seemingly routinized system of control to a widespread violence involving young men and women ready to give their lives for the sake of ending the status quo" (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 5).

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<sup>(29)</sup>Vertically divided sovereignty in which the Palestinians would control the ground level, and the Israelis would control the area below the surface of the Haram (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 9)

The continuation of mass detention, house demolition, expansion of settlements, economic frustration, violation of international law and human rights, the policy of repression against Palestinians, continued the perpetuation of the occupation and Israel's violations at the Haram al-Sharif along with other Muslim and Christian shrines in the occupied Palestinian territories. All those factors were behind triggering the second Intifada (Ibid.; Batchoun, 2003a).

The Israeli government on the other hand claimed that the Palestinian leadership planned and initiated the second Intifada because they wanted to provoke and incur Palestinian casualties as a mean to regain diplomatic initiative (Pressman, 2003, p. 12; *Mitchell Report*, 2001, p. 6), particularly, after the collapse of the Camp David negotiations on the 25<sup>th</sup> of July 2000, and the “widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse” (Asthana & Nirmal, 2009, p. 247). However, according to Agha and Malley (2001) and Balaban (2005, p. 148) the uprising was not a Palestinian initiative but a reaction to the Israeli army excessive use of force.

Counter Israeli stances suggested that there were numerous Palestinian testimonies and documentation of prepared plans and forces ready for the breakout of the second intifada, yet Jamal (2005, p. 155) believed that it is not evident that any Palestinian political force planned it in advance. Rather, the second intifada was “rooted in Israeli policies of settlement, land confiscation, and assassinations since the signing of the Oslo Accord”. Hammami and Tamari (2001, p. 5) briefly described the second Intifada:

*‘The young men armed with stones facing the mightiest army in the Middle East, the grieving mothers, the nationalist symbols unfurled at martyrs’ funerals all seemed to like are staging off the same events twelve years earlier. Even the parades of masked youth carrying guns recall the final days of the first intifada. This time, however, the episodes were more condensed, the killings were more brutal, the reactions swifter, and the media coverage more intense. Within a matter of weeks, the language of the uprising had become the idiom of everyday life’.*

### **Middle East Peace Summit**

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of October 2000, in an attempt “to end the violence, to prevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process”, the government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the United Nations and the European Union have gathered together in the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The summit was proved by the formation and the development of an international investigation commission led by former US Senator George J. Mitchell.

The main goal of the so-called ‘the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Commission’ or the ‘Mitchell Commission’ was to answer the questions of ‘what happened’, ‘why it happened’, and ‘how the recurrence of violence [could] be prevented’. In other words, to “forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future” (*Mitchell Report*, 2001, p. 4). The Israeli side had many reservations<sup>(30)</sup> and expressed their dissatisfaction with the Mitchell Commission Report responding: “it drove a nail into the coffin of any credibility that George Mitchell can ever have as a Middle East envoy” (Bedein, 2009).

### **The Extraordinary Arab League Summit**

Five days later, Arab leaders met in an extraordinary Arab League Summit in Cairo and issued a communiqué. In summary, the communiqué comprised of the following (*The League of Arab States*, 2000):

- First**, it praised the Palestinian Intifada that was the result of the bitterness of disappointment after the longing years of anticipation and waiting to see a political settlement, which has not been achieved because of the Israeli’ intransigence and procrastination in implementing their commitments.
- Second**, it expressed Arab sympathy and prayers for mercy on the souls of the martyrs who paid their lives to establish the State of Palestine and to achieve peace.
- Third**, it condemned Israel’s acts against Palestinians and affirmed the right of the Palestinians for a just compensation from Israel for human losses and material damage.
- Fourth**, it decided in response to the proposal of Saudi Arabia to finance projects designed to preserve the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem, to disengage Palestine from its subordination to the Israeli economy, to allocate payments to families of Palestinian martyrs in the uprising, and to take care of the education of their children.
- Finally**, it called for the formation of an impartial international investigation committee under the auspice of the United Nations that reports to the Security Council and to the Commission on Human Rights on the causes and the responsibility for the serious deterioration in the occupied Palestinian territories and the massacres committed by Israeli occupation forces against Palestinians, the Lebanese and other Arab citizens in the occupied territories. Also, it demanded the Security Council to form an international criminal court to put Israeli war criminals on trial.

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<sup>(30)</sup>See: Bedein (2009).



### **Clinton Bridging Proposal**

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December 2000, Saeb Erekat, PA chief negotiator, and Shlomo Ben-Ami; Israeli Foreign Minister, met in Washington as guests of US President Clinton to conclude an agreement. However, in the four-day meetings, no progress was made despite Clinton's attempts to suggest proposals designed to bridge the gaps between both sides (Katz, 2005, p. 79). Instead, he provoked anti-American sentiments in the Arab world because of his stand in favor of Israel regarding the status of Jerusalem (Donway, 1997, p. 590).

President Clinton in his proposal summarized the differences between the two sides and proposed the resolution of each (Katz, 2005, p. 79). Both sides said yes to the plan but with reservations that vitiated it (Pressman, 2003, p. 20). President Clinton (2001, p. 174) stated: *'both; Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have now accepted these parameters as the basis for further efforts. Both have expressed some reservations'*. It was true, and both sides were committed to the Clinton plan later at the Taba talks and used the ideas of his plan as the framework for the Taba talks with their respective qualifications and reservations (Pressman, 2003, p. 21).

### **The Taba Talks**

Despite Israel's earlier claims not to negotiate as long as violence continued, under European and Egyptian patronage, members of the Israeli delegation had met with their Palestinian counterparts on the 21<sup>st</sup> of January 2001 to negotiate a solution, on the condition that those talks will be informal until all relevant issues had been resolved (Peri, 2006, p. 102). Nevertheless, the escalation of violence in the area and the fact that neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian public opinion were inclined to compromise have made reaching a solution even much more difficult. Ultimately, following the electoral defeat of Barak's government at the hands of the hardline Likud leader Ariel Sharon in February 2000, the prospects for meaningful permanent status negotiations has quickly faded and "time ran out for the Taba negotiations to produce a comprehensive agreement on refugees and other permanent issues, and it ended without a formal agreement" (Chiller-Glaus, 2007, p. 215).

### **From a Jewish and Arab State to Israel and Palestine**

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of March 2002, in response to the request of President Bush, the Security Council passed Resolution 1397, through which, the international community, represented by the United Nations, have reiterated the importance of Resolutions 242 and 338. It demanded the solution that President Clinton could never explicitly

call for during his term of the peace process, which was: ‘*affirming a vision for the region where two states, Israel, and Palestine, live side by side within secured and recognized borders*’ (Security Council Resolution 1397; Golan, 2004, p. 39). Besides, it called for an end to violence, implementation of Tenet and Mitchell plans, and referred to the Saudi initiative (Ibid., p. 39). Months later, the Bush administration unveiled its ‘Roadmap’ outlining the steps for a Palestinian statehood (Khalil, 2007, p. 98).

### Operation “Defensive Shield”

At the end of March 2002, the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Israeli army to launch what so called the ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ (in Hebrew: Mivtza Homat Magen, lit. ‘Operation Defensive Wall’). It was a “large-scale military operation conducted by the Israeli ‘Defense Forces’ in 2002, during the course of the second Intifada” (Surhone et al., 2010, p. 204). It was the largest military operation in the West Bank since the 1967 Six-Day War (Senker, 2005, p. 9).

For Israel, the main aim of this extensive operation was to stop the increasing deaths from “terrorist” attacks, especially in light of the growing number of suicide bombings carried out by Palestinian militants. Therefore, the “IDF” used this operation as a means to fight “terrorism” and destroy its infrastructure (Surhone et al., 2010, p. 204; Senker, 2005, p. 9; Lauterpach & Greenwood, 2008, p. 335). Surhone et al. (2010, p. 204) stated:

*‘The spark that gave rise to the action was the March 27<sup>th</sup> suicide bombing at a hotel in the Israeli resort city of Netanya. A Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up amongst a group of civilians celebrating Passover Seder at the Park Hotel, killing 30 mostly elderly vacationers. The attack became known as the ‘Passover Massacre’.*

Chao (2011, p. 13) added:

*‘Palestinian violence has incited Israeli military retaliation, such as the Gaza War and Operation Defensive Shield, causing international criticism over Israeli brutality’.*

Palestinians on the other hand, condemned the aggressive nature of this “offensive” military strategy. Describing it as the “prelude to Israel’s ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians” (Hamzeh & May, 2003, p. 199), a witness to Israeli war crimes, and the largest military operation against Palestinian civilians since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Ibid.,). During this operation, the Israeli army used the most advanced weaponry at its disposal<sup>(31)</sup> to attack Palestinian cities in the West Bank. Schools,

<sup>(31)</sup>Merkava tanks, Apache attack helicopters and F-15 fighter jets.

offices, and clinics were shelled (Senker, 2005, p. 9), Leading by the end of April 21<sup>st</sup> to the destruction of the Palestinian economic and social infrastructure, leveling large swathes of residential area, killing 220 Palestinians, committing a massacre in Jenin, injuring hundreds more, and arresting 6000 thousands of Palestinians while nearly 17000 had their homes demolished (Hamzeh & May, 2003, p. 199; Ovendal, 2004, p. 315; Senker, 2005, p. 9). Ovendal (2004, p. 315) stated:

*‘On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March an Israeli newspaper quoted Israeli “Defense Force” Intelligence reports to the effect that the American-backed IDF actions in the occupied territories had prevented the Palestinian Authority from taking actions against “terrorists”, and that the “IDF” assassinations and bombings were the reason for the suicide bombings against Israelis and had led senior Palestinian Authority leaders to co-operate with the “terrorist” groups. The Israeli attacks prevented Arafat from cracking down on the Palestinian militants, and Palestinian reprisals provided Sharon with the excuse to delay peace negotiations and mount assaults on centers of Palestinian population’.*

## The Roadmap

Following the negotiations of Mideast Quartet<sup>(32)</sup> on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of April 2003, and in response to the feedback<sup>(33)</sup> of the Palestinians and the Israelis during the process, the Quartet adopted and unveiled the ‘Road Map’ for peace. This major international effort focused on establishing and advancing a new peace process that outlined the steps believed necessary for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Cordesman & Moravitz, 2005, p. 301; Price, 2003, p. 142).

The Road Map consisted of three scheduled phases and several concrete demands; *Phase 1* to be immediately accomplished. *Phase 2* to be accomplished as early as the end of 2003, and finally, *Phase 3* to be accomplished in 2004 and 2005 (Ibid., p. 142). In summary, the Road Map “sought to establish a Palestinian state by 2005 - considering that after the establishment of a Palestinian state a final settlement would soon follow. Also, Israel was required to refrain from constructing settlements, and to disengage from its borders with Gaza and the West Bank. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority was required to take dramatic steps to stop attacks against Israel” (Cordesman & Moravitz, 2005, p. 301).

**Reservations of the Road Map** - Although the Road Map of the US has received an enormous international interest and attention since its inception, and despite the Quartet attempt to push it forward, the level of success of this map to

<sup>(32)</sup>The Mideast Quartet comprises of the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Nations and the European Union.

<sup>(33)</sup>On the 4<sup>th</sup> of June, a summit was held in Aqaba, Jordan, to hear pledges from the represented Israeli and Palestinian leadership to the Road Map (Price, 2003, p. 142).

reinstate the peace process was declining day by day due to several factors; the Palestinians see the main reasons for this decline to be (*Palestine Media Center*, 2004):

**First**, the articles and the three phases of the Road Map have attracted most of the attention to the security of Israel at the expense of other political aspects. Moreover, the benefits were not mutually balanced and equal between the two parties and were skewed in favor of the Israeli side. This has raised suspicion in the plan and mistrust towards the United States' objectives and intentions.

**Secondly**, the Road Map repeated the same mistakes and flaws of the Oslo agreement: (1) it limited most of the actions in the first and second phases to security issues and procedures, and (2) deferred the most important issues of interest to the parties to negotiate a mutual agreement to the final stage. For example, the refugees' right of return - Sharon called for no return for the refugees as a precondition for acceptance of a Palestinian state. In other words, the Road Map would strip the Palestinians off the causes of force (resistance) and then impose the bitter reality of Israeli conditions on Palestinians, which means getting into a vicious circle of negotiations, as what happened in the Oslo agreement and related covenants.

**Thirdly**, the security nature of the Road Map, particularly after the amendments made by the US administration in response to Israel's 14 reservations to it (Butenschøn, 2006, p. 286). These reservations transformed the Road Map into a security agenda and the Palestinian Authority to a security forum to apply this program, which would have to worsen the situation and embarrass Mahmoud Abbas<sup>(34)</sup> in front of the Palestinians.

### **Permanent Status Agreement**

A major step forward was taken when the Geneva Accord was first concluded in December 2003 in Switzerland. This accord was the outcome of official and non-official tracks of talks between key figures in Israel and Palestine. The Geneva Accord was not an alternative for previous official negotiations<sup>(35)</sup> but a complementary one. It was a detailed model of a permanent status agreement that specified possible terms of resolution, to put an end to the conflict and all mutual claims. Moreover, that would be acceptable to mainstream elements in both societies based on previous talks and agreements (Lerner, 2004, p. VII; Klein, 2004, p. 233).

What distinguished the Geneva Accord from previous documents dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is that it was a detailed model. A model that included

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<sup>(34)</sup>The Palestinian Prime Minister at that time.

<sup>(35)</sup>UN Resolutions, the Quartet Roadmap, the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace Initiative.

a precise map of the proposed permanent arrangement; something that was missing before the Geneva Accord, and, “as opposed to earlier documents, the Geneva Accord was a signed agreement” (Ibid., p. 203). In this context Klein (2004, p. 233) wrote: *‘the very fact of the signatures creates a personal commitment that differs from a document published by a host institution’*. Furthermore, the accord was signed by more than twenty people on each side and not only by few individuals, who represented the genuine commitment and agreement to the articles of this accord (Ibid., p. 233). The Geneva Accord offered several steps that its parties believed could resolve some of the most intractable issues, most importantly were the acceptance of the ‘other’ as legitimate, security arrangements, territory, refugees and Jerusalem (Klein, 2004, p: 233–250; Hauser, 2003).

On the one hand, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his government have bitterly criticized and vehemently opposed the accord, and described the Israeli role in it as subversive. Moreover, not only did they not embrace the accord, but as a reaction to the support the accord has gained in Israel and abroad, the Israeli government had taken unilateral steps in an attempt to ease its plight. On the other hand, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has called the accord *‘a brave initiative that opens the door for hope’*, the Palestinian Authority “has refrained from formally endorsing the Geneva Accord because of the Israeli government’s failure to do so and because such a step meant grappling with internal political struggles and making decisions that the Palestinian government feels are premature” (Klein, 2004, p. 251). Besides, Palestinian militant groups have rejected the plan, dubbing its drafters as traitors.

As mentioned above, since 1948, the Geneva Accord was the first detailed forerunner of an agreement that could actually work if there was the political will to implement it, even though it was not the case. It became the term of reference in every political and expert debate on the parameters of a permanent status agreement (Lerner, 2004, p. VII).

### **Israel’s Security Barrier and Palestine’s Apartheid Wall**

In June 2002, following several suicide bombings and attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli targets that “haphazardly killed men, women, and children mostly because they were simply Jewish or Israelis” (Stein, 2002, p. 4), the Israeli Cabinet headed by Ariel Sharon approved the construction of ‘the Separation Barrier’ or ‘Security Fence’ as the Israelis termed it, and the ‘Apartheid Wall’ or ‘the Racial Segregation Wall’ as the Palestinian referred to it (United Nations, 2005, p. 3). Israel claimed that the central idea behind the construction of the wall was to create an obstacle impermeable to suicide bombers attempting to infiltrate into Israel. An automatic consequence was to separate the West Bank from Israel physically to prevent such attacks on Israeli citizens (Shindler, 2008, p. 325).

Nowadays, the total length of the wall is more than 700 km. According to the Committee for the Review of the State Budget in 2007, the estimated cost of the completed barrier till 2007 was between 13 to 15 billion New Israeli Shekel (NIS). The wall consists of a combination of ditches, trenches, razor wire, electronic fences, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, buffer zones and around 45 km length, 8 – 9 meter height concrete wall (*United Nations*, 2005, p. 3; *United Nations*, 2009, p. 8).

The route inside the West Bank severs people's reach to their farms (inside closed areas) to harvest crops and earn living and restricts access to their jobs and services, livelihoods; including access to education and health services. Family and social relations became impaired, particularly for those living in closed areas such as in Jenin, Qalqiliya and Tulkarem districts; it obstructed them from maintaining family connections in the remaining areas of the West Bank, and to access religious shrines and cultural facilities (*United Nations*, 2005, p: 3–5).

74.6% of the Barrier is inside the West Bank territory (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 1), and further encumbered the movement between the northern and southern areas of the West Bank because it blocked current roads used by Palestinians to travel between these areas. Also, Palestinians residing in 'closed areas' between the barrier and the Green Line were required to apply for 'green' permits to remain living in their homes and to continue residing in these 'closed areas'. Neither the future of their personal nor their land statutes have become certain of them (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

Humanitarian consequences of the wall included leaving the Palestinians facing economic hardship, the destruction of their lands and properties that would take many years to recover, and the isolation of fragmented communities and residence from social support networks. About 10.1% of West Bank and East Jerusalem most fertile land; that is the homeland for 49,400 West Bank Palestinians living in 38 villages and towns, lie between the barrier and the Green Line (*Ibid.*, p: 3-6).

On the 9<sup>th</sup> of July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the principal judicial organ of the United Nations issued an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory declaring the Barrier illegal and calling on Israel to dismantle the Barrier (*Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)*, 2009). In that opinion, the ICJ stated:

*'Israel has the right, and indeed the duty to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens. The measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with international law... The Court accordingly finds that the construction of the wall, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law... Israel accordingly has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-*

*tory, including in and around East Jerusalem. . . Cessation of those violations of its international obligations entails in practice the dismantling forthwith of those parts of the structure. . . The Court finds further that Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all natural or legal persons concerned’<sup>(36)</sup>.*

Moreover, in the 20<sup>th</sup> of July 2004, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the ICJ opinion. Israel, however, proclaimed that it would not abide by the ICJ decision, but it did plan amendments in the route of the barrier to satisfy the requirements of the Israeli High Court of Justice (IHCJ).

### Events of 2004

Sharon was suddenly confronted with a financial scandal that seemed to implicate his sons, as well as himself, in a cloud of corruption. The elections were still weeks away, and his victory was far from assured (Eytan, 2006, p. 121). The assassinations of Sheikh Yassin; the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas in March 2004, and the next leader of Hamas; Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi; a month afterwards, symbolizes Israel’s belief that “they could weaken their enemy by targeting its leadership”, the leadership from which the will of Hamas stems (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 108).

The Palestinian-Israeli scenario continued; each with claimed justifications for their acts; whether the Palestinian suicide bombings and resistant or offensive attacks, such as the double suicide attacks on the 31<sup>th</sup> of August 2004, in Beersheba, or the assassinations and massacres committed against the Palestinians, such as in the ‘Rainbow Operation’ on May 2004, and the ‘Operation Days of Repentance’ in October 2004 (Isseroff, 2009).

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2004, Yasser Arafat; the figurehead of the modern Palestinian national movement for forty years “passed away”, and on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2005 Mahmoud Abbas had been elected as his successor to the presidency of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (Honig-Parnass & Haddad, 2007, p. 254). Immediately after being elected, Abbas called for the implementation of the Road Map and starting a discussion of final status issues (*Report of the Council of Europe*, 2005, p. 135). On the 8<sup>th</sup> of February 2005, the Sharm el-Sheikh summit was held between President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon. The main outcome of the summit was the parties commitment to cease all acts of violence and to declare their willingness to work towards the end of the four-year Al-Aqsa Intifada. Nevertheless, following the same pattern of previously held conferences, peace efforts were doomed to failure because of Israel’s violations of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements,

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<sup>(36)</sup>Arts. 141, 142, 151, 153.

and the continued firing of Al-Qassam rockets, and mortar shelling of Israeli targets by Palestinian militants (*United Nations*, 2000, p. 6).

### The Disengagement Plan

Following three years of Israeli-Palestinian violence with no prospects for negotiations, with the Israeli conviction that there is no reliable Palestinian partner with whom they can make progress in a two-sided peace process. Ariel Sharon declared in the Herzliya Speech on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December 2003, what he called the ‘unilaterally disengagement plan’. According to Sharon, if Palestinians would not do their part on their program in a couple of months then Israel would initiate a unilateral security step of disengagement from the Palestinians. This policy would require the relocation of some Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the compensation of those settlers who would be required to move. Upon the completion of this process, there was no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces in Gaza (Rabinovich & Reinharz, 2008, p. 544).

Sharon faced frenzied resistance among his coalition partners and, indeed, within his own party, however, “he was able to pass the resolution in the Israeli cabinet on June 6, 2004, and supporting legislation on October 25, 2004” (Ibid., p. 544). Consequently, Sharon formed a new government with the Labor Party in January 2005. In the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2005, Ariel Sharon initiated the disengagement plan, in which all Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and another three settlements in the West Bank were evacuated. The evacuation of 25 settlements with their 9400 settlers from Gaza Strip and northern West Bank to Israeli territories took place over a period of three weeks. The settlements were officially handed over to the Palestinians on the 12<sup>th</sup> of September (Reinhart, 2006, p. 30; Alpher, 2003). At that time, Sharon declared:

*‘The disengagement plan is the most important plan for Israel in the current time, a plan that aimed at moving settlements from places where they cause us problems to places where we want to remain in a permanent arrangement’.*

Furthermore, it was considered an initial step towards surmounting the demographic problem and the dangers of direct ongoing occupation (Ibid.). In addition to the fact that Sharon recognized the need for close American support, who in turn backed and assured the plan. The plan was approved by a majority of 65 Knesset members, compared to 45 opposed and 7 abstentions. Moreover, it was opposed in a referendum held by Sharon’s own Likud Party, and then, he refused to take it to the public in a referendum (Lerner, 2012; Reinhart, 2006, p. 30).

Israelis varied in their responses to the plan; opponents of the plan claimed that Sharon was diverting attention from the investigations held against him and his sons.



Others described the disengagement's plan as a disgrace and the evacuation of Gaza as a defeat. On the other hand, a prevailing alternative view contended that Sharon had decided to relinquish Gaza to focus his efforts to expand and strengthen Israel's grip on the West Bank and to expand its settlements. From this perspective, "the continued occupation of the densely populated Gaza Strip became too costly, absorbing military and other resources" (Reinhart, 2006, p. 30). Israeli expansionists stated:

*'It is clear that Israel does not benefit from this piece of land, one of the most densely populated areas in the world, and (unlike the West Bank) lacking any natural resources' (Ibid., p: 30-32).*

Khatib (2003) concluded:

*'It is one of the most dangerous Israeli plans to imperil the peace process and the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. This plan proposes to use the wall that Israel has built along the outlines of a 35-year-old settlement expansion project in order to determine by force the final arrangements for the Palestinian territories. In his speech, Sharon talked explicitly about consolidating illegal settlements, rather than removing them, with no regard for Israel's obligation to stop building settlements according to the roadmap'.*

Jarbawi (2003) added, 'basically, Sharon had in mind that part of the West Bank would be incorporated into the state of Israel. The wall was the marker and not a security barrier, but the border'. However, for Palestinian fighters and militant groups the disengagement plan was considered an Israeli retreat, and instead of diminishing attacks against it, could have led "to more threats in more vital areas and eventually undermine Israel's very existence" (Telhami, 2004, p. 8).

### **London Conference**

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2005 a conference hosted by Great Britain in London to promote the Middle East peace process. The conference was attended by representatives of the US, other foreign ministers from more than twenty countries and the newly elected president of the PA; President Mahmoud Abbas. Israel decided to boycott this step. The conference urged the Palestinian leadership to pursue 'reforms' and stressed upon the necessity of ending Palestinian attacks, and the disarmament of Palestinian militant groups. In line with this, the final communiqué condemned the 25<sup>th</sup> of February suicide attack in Tel Aviv and called on the PA to pursue sustained actions against them. It agreed to offer the Palestinian Authority more economic support to help it achieve these goals (Mohsen & Nafi, 2005, p. 159; Kumaraswamy, 2009, p. 159). Following the suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv nightclub in February 2005, Sharon repeatedly demanded: *'there will be no progress until*

*the Palestinians carry out a determined campaign to destroy the “terrorist” groups and their infrastructure’*. In response to that, Abbas vowed to punish those responsible for the attacks and therefore, the Palestinian security forces have arrested six Islamic Jihad militants who were suspected to be involved in the bombing (*Report of the Council of Europe*, 2005, p. 135).

Additionally, Abbas managed after several days of internal talk with Palestinian militant groups in Cairo to reach an agreement to continue what so called the ‘lull’ (calm or Tahdiya in Arabic) of fighting with Israel until the end of the year. This agreement symbolized the willingness of participants “to complete the process of democratization in the Palestinian society” and the recognition of their need for the reform of the PA in every area, which would start by new elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) (Reinhart, 2006, p: 86–87).

### **Palestinian Legislative Elections of 2006**

On January 2006, Sharon suffered a serious stroke and was brought to Jerusalem’s Hadassah Hospital from his ranch in the Negev desert leaving the new Kadima party in the hands of Ehud Olmert, who won the elections two months later, on a dovish platform (Rabinovich, 2011, p. 163).

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of the same month, the Palestinian legislative elections took place. Most of polling and research centers revealed very close results prior to the legislative elections; Fateh’s rate fluctuated between 39.6% and 42.0%, and Hamas between 29.0% and 35.0%. Surprisingly, the results of these legislative elections revealed that Hamas - with its manifesto; the ‘Change and Reform List’ that “focused on the Palestinians’ concerns and daily life issues, as well as on corruption, unemployment and security” had won 76 seats out of 132 and became in control of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Cabinet. But Fateh; the ruling party that dominated Palestinian politics since 1964, did not gain more than 43 seats, with Mahmoud Abbas as the President with a broad power under Palestinian constitution (Thorpe, 2006, p. 387; Zweiri, 2006, p: 675-677; Kukali, 2006).

*‘How did Hamas win the elections?’* Kukali (2006); The founder and the director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) responded to these unexpected results: *‘polling and research centers deal with concrete data and figures and are not in a position to predict the internal feelings of the people. Their outcome is based on the response of the public to definite questions’*. Furthermore, he added that religion was a powerful element in determining the voting trends; a power was successfully used by Hamas for the purpose of social control and was transformed in a way to suit their purpose, and influence the Palestinian voting inclination (Kukali, 2006; Serafimova, 2007, p. 29).

Other reasons that led to the popular disillusionment of Fateh, and thus the victory of Hamas in the election included the death of Yasser Arafat; Fateh's unifying leader and symbol, along with Fateh's divisiveness, widespread disenchantment with corruption, poor governance, and failure to establish a Palestinian state. In addition, the withdrawal of Israelis from Gaza Strip, the well-planned election strategy and well-organized candidates of Hamas, and their use of an open, specific and concentrated language on daily life issues, all helped Hamas win the elections (Addis et al., 2009, p. 22; Zweiri, 2006, p: 675-679).

Hamas's victory resulted in an increased puzzlement within the Palestinian street, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the Palestinian relations with the international community. Thorpe (2006, p. 387) added, '*President Bush was not prepared for this development, he wanted free elections, but not such results*'. Israel "opposed the Palestinian legislative elections from the beginning", and it desperately urged the White House to compel the Palestinians to keep Hamas off the ballot (Ibid.).

### Capture of Gilad Shalit

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of June 2006, Hamas in a cross-border raid on an Israeli army outpost<sup>(37)</sup> had killed two soldiers and abducted the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was held as captive in Gaza by Hamas since then (*Annual Report on Human Rights*, 2009, p. 130). Hamas started to negotiate with Israel to exchange the kidnapped Shalit with Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. However, Israel refused to negotiate with Hamas and instead they launched the 'Summer Rains' operation, which according to Mikaberidze (2011, p. 330) was an attempt to secure the release of the captive soldier alive and to stop the rain of Al-Qassam rockets on Israeli territories. All told, "between 2001 and 2008, the rockets caused seven Israeli deaths" (Graham, 2010, p. 288). Conversely, Effarah (2007, p. 520) once stated:

*'It was a deadly operation, where Israel perpetuated the violence to produce a long, hot, filthy summer of human right violations in the occupied Palestinian territories... it was a summer rain showers to kill innocent Palestinian children, old men, and women of Gaza... to cut off electricity, fuel and water sources... it was set for the Israeli planes to fire bombs and missiles at random just to kill Palestinians... it was an operation that included the bombarding of roads, bridges, universities and private houses, putting in jail ministers and deputies, while killing full families and starving a whole population'.*

According to the *United Nations* (2000, p. 7) report, since the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in September 2005 and until August 2006, 450 Palestinians had been

<sup>(37)</sup>At Karam Abu Slim in Arabic, and Kerem Shalom in Hebrew.

killed. ‘Operation Summer Rains’ was slowed through a truce agreement between Israel and Palestinian militant organizations on the 26<sup>th</sup> of November 2006. The “IDF” failed to return Shalit, and Al-Qassam rockets continued to fly from Gaza to Israel through December (Mikaberidze, 2011, p. 330).

Operation ‘Summer Rains’ began in June 2006 after the abduction of the Israeli soldier ‘Gilad Shalit’ by Hamas during an incursion on the border of Gaza Strip. The military operation escalated by the firing of many rockets of Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades; the armed wing of Hamas, at Israel. The operation continued later under the name of ‘Operation Autumn Clouds’. Initially, Israeli forces entered Khan Younis searching for Shalit in the hope of liberating him. Having failed to do so, they launched a full-scale invasion on the Gaza Strip, raising the number of the dead resulting from this operation at more than 400 Palestinians and seven Israelis. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces and a cease-fire was concluded on November 26, despite the Israeli failure to release Gilad Shalit, who remained under the custody of the Palestinians until the conclusion of Shalit prisoner exchange deal, brokered by Egypt in October 2011, where the release of 1027 male and female Palestinian prisoners (including 500 who were constituted a life sentence), has been effected, and that after more than five years Shalit spent in captivity in a secret location in the Gaza Strip, and after Israel with all its capabilities, intelligence apparatus and agents in the Strip failed to have access to the place of his abduction (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2011, p. 213; Pappé, 2010, p. 1).

### **Fateh-Hamas Conflict**

Hamas’s victory in January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections set in motion a chain of events that contributed to tense Palestinian factional standoff, primarily, the declaration of Hamas as a “terrorist” organization, and the refusal to recognize it as a legitimate winner in the elections, the act by the international community, led by the United States and the European Union to cut off virtually all financial aid to the Palestinians, and therefore plunging them deeper into poverty, above and beyond, their refusal to have direct dealings with Hamas-dominated PA government.

Factional clashes were temporarily eased by the February 2007 Hamas-Fateh ‘Unity Agreement’ brokered by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, later in June, a clash broke out in the Gaza Strip between the forces of Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ismael Haniyeh; one of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin<sup>(38)</sup> early protgs, and led to Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. In response to Hamas’s takeover, the PA President, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led cabinet and declared a state of emergency. He appointed a ‘caretaker’ technocratic PA gov-

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<sup>(38)</sup>Founder of Hamas.

ernment in the West Bank (led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official) (Schanzer, 2008, p. I; Thorpe, 2006, p. 388; Addis et al., 2009, p. 22; *Aljazeera*, 2011), “leading to renewed US and international assistance for the PA in the West Bank that prompted Hamas to further tighten its grip on Gaza” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 20).

In November 2007, the Annapolis Conference was held in Annapolis, MD, with the mediation of the US and the attendance of the Israeli Prime Minister then Ehud Olmert and PA President Mahmud Abbas. The goal of the conference was to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, mainly, “to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (Migdalovitz, 2007, p. 1). However, the conference was doomed to fail because of domestic constraints on both sides as was the case in previous attempts for peace.

### **Tax Money**

Based on previous peace agreements and under an arrangement that dates back to the 1990s, Israel collects taxes and custom duties from Palestinian goods on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, mainly, for goods destined for the Palestinian market but arriving at Israeli ports, as well as those from “indirect taxation on fuel, social benefits, health services and income tax from Palestinians employed in Israel” (Eglash, 2015). The PA uses this money to pay salaries, to provide public services, to meet Palestinian humanitarian needs, and to cover other basic expenses (Myre, 2007). Every month, Israel transfer an average of \$50 million and more of taxes and customs revenues to the Palestinian Finance Ministry. However, Israel began withholding the money it collects from custom and excise duties after Hamas won elections in 2006. Because Israel was frightened that Hamas government will use this money to perpetrate “terror” against it. Hamas bitterly refused this claim and stated that it was a Palestinian money and that they as Palestinians had the right to decide how they would spend it. It is believed that the amount Israel withheld in January 2007 to be more than \$500 million (Myre, 2007). Saeb Erekat<sup>(39)</sup> criticized the Israeli move and stated:

*‘Israel is once again responding to our legal steps with further illegal collective punishments. . . the Palestinians were told unofficially that the tax revenue would not be transferred. This is not an Israeli charity to the Palestinian people they are withholding, but our money, which is rightfully ours’.*

<sup>(39)</sup>A member of the PLO executive committee.

Erekat added: Israel is using tax money to impose political pressures on the Palestinians and the Palestinian government. Moreover, it utilizes it to restrict and delegitimize any Palestinian attempts or ‘unilateral moves’ as described by Netanyahu to attract international sympathy and support to hold the Israelis accountable for war crimes they committed against Palestinians. For instance, Israel decided to freeze at least \$127 million from the PA tax revenues as a response to the Palestinian attempts to join the International Criminal Court in The Hague. These attempts if worked “would give them the ability to request investigations of alleged atrocities by Israel” (Eg lash, 2015). Moshe Maoz<sup>(40)</sup> stated:

*‘Holding back the tax funds could have harsh consequences, including sparking bloodshed or maybe even an intifada, or violent Palestinian uprisings, like those of the late 1980s and early 2000s’.*

The key problem in the view of the Israelis has all along been the non-recognition of the State of Israel by Hamas. For example, as mentioned earlier, Israel has imposed a blockade on Gaza after Hamas’s victory in the legislative elections in 2006 and also tightened the blockade in 2007 after the Hamas takeover of Gaza following a coup against Fateh. The blockade contained a list of materials barred from entering Gaza Strip, including many of the basic food ingredients and construction materials, in addition to weapons of all kinds. Furthermore, Israel has granted permits to exit Gaza for a very limited number of humanitarian and special cases. As such, Gaza Strip became besieged from all its borders by both Israel and Egypt. Egypt is the only Arab country that has with Rafah border crossing a shared border with Gaza. Due to the pressures and the policies pursued by the Republic of Egypt towards Hamas Movement in Gaza and the closure of the border, Hamas was forced to resort to the excavation of tunnels to secure wares barred by Israel and the smuggling of arms (*Aljazeera*, 2015; *Amnesty International*, 2010).

After seizing power in 2012, Mohammed Morsi increased the support for Hamas through the tunnels. This support enhanced Hamas ability to challenge the Israeli enemy. Despite Morsi’s failure to control the Egyptian army, which opposed Hamas support and demolished some tunnels, al-Sisi started - after the coup in Egypt and his seizure of power - to destroy all the tunnels and build a buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt while fighting the Muslim Brotherhood. The siege pressure on Gaza has increased, particularly in the light of Egyptian threats against Hamas, and consequently, Gaza Strip became between the hammer of the Israelis and the anvil of the Arabs (Milton-Edwards, 2013, p. 60).

The year 2013 witnessed the declaration of the Palestinian and Israeli sides of the resumption of negotiations between them after three years of stagnation. The

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<sup>(40)</sup>A professor in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

resumption of negotiations came after several shuttle rounds launched by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to the region. After having held several meetings with the Palestinian and Israeli officials, the Palestinian Authority agreed to return to the negotiation table without preconditions, except a partial freeze on the settlement construction and/or expansion by Israel that did not include all the settlements of Jerusalem (Ravid et al., 2013). In addition, the resumption of negotiations has been conditioned by the release of 104 senior Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, a step characterized by Israeli political sources as a gesture of goodwill towards the Palestinian Authority in exchange of the Palestinian leadership's refraining from joining international institutions and corporations during the period of negotiations. The release of the 104 prisoners, assigned to be in four batches, was made dependent on the progress of negotiations. The release of the three batches of prisoners took place in 2013 while Israel felt uncommitted to the release of the fourth batch if the Palestinian Authority did not agree on the extension of the period of negotiations, which is the same period I chose to analyze the content for reasons mentioned in following chapters (Sherwood, 2013).

Hamas made in February 2014 a step towards the reconciliation with the rest of the Palestinian factions with the aim to form a government of technocrats, in which Hamas would have only five ministries to hold, for a period not exceeding six months, legislative and presidential elections and the election of a new National Council. Indeed, the new government swore the constitutional oath before Abu Mazen, and thus the unity of the Palestinian parties was believed to have been achieved as to ease the siege imposed on the people of Gaza. The immediate reaction thereto came from Israel with the imposition of sanctions on Fateh, with the pretext that it had concluded an agreement with a "terrorist organization". One of the most significant sanctions was the prevention of the arrival of three Hamas ministers to give an oath in Ramallah and the halt of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and, finally, the reduction of fund transfer. For lifting sanctions, Israel stipulated the non-cooperation with Hamas (Ben-Meir, 2014).

In June of the same year three settlers were abducted from settlements adjacent to Gaza Strip. Without any clear evidence, the Israeli army launched a campaign of arrests of Hamas members in the West Bank, which also included detainees released under Gilad Shalit Prisoners Exchange Deal of 2012. After a couple of days, the dead bodies of the three Israeli youths were found in the West Bank. In response to and in retaliation for the killing of the three young people, a group of settlers abducted in July of the same year the child Mohammed Abu Khudair and burned him alive.

## Summary of Operations

The Palestinian-Israeli death loop continued. Each side blamed the other for starting an attack or action, which for the other side is a justification for any 'backlash actions' even if it meant the continuation of death tolls. The loop carries on until massacres and destruction are committed. The international world is aware of what is happening, protests are taking place all over the place asking for a peaceful resolution and for the necessity to stop those war crimes. However, international mediation has always failed to accomplish anything. The acceleration of death tolls slows down, and both sides started recovering to charge for the second loop that awaits a trigger to start rotating.

In the last 7 years, many operations claimed the lives of thousands of people. For instance, *Operation Protective Edge* (July - August 2014) were 2,100 Palestinians were killed, along with 66 Israeli soldiers and 7 civilians. *Operation Pillar of Defense* (November 2012) were 167 Palestinians were killed, along with 6 Israelis. *Operation Cast Lead* (December 2008 - January 2009) were 1,417 Palestinians were killed, including 926 of whom were civilians, along with 10 Israelis (*Middle East Eye*, 2014; *BBC News*, 2014).

### 2.1.5 Conclusion

If the famous statement confirms that history repeats itself, it is crucial to drop this deep meaning on reading the events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or simply accept the opposite of this theory, which is that history does not repeat itself because it is not possible to repeat the same figures at the same place and time once again. However, history offers us a sermon, whilst human beings are themselves who repeat the same error by following the same steps that ancestors approached. From this aspect, we realize that history did not repeat itself, but Palestinians and Israelis failed to take the lesson from it. This theory or the previous one are heading in the same direction, which is the death circle referred to above.

As mentioned earlier, research in and on the past helps understand and reveal the present and also build a bright future. We find our identity in the past. The research on issues of the conflict and its history helps to get rid of the causes of the conflict and to put the standards of peace we want. It also helps us understand things that have not been achieved and to know things, that are desired to be achieved. In my view, understanding the history of the conflict and linking it to what is happening at the present time through our study of the content analysis of the most prominent Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, analysis of documents and the survey of the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion on fundamental issues is a crucial beginning for launching the final status negotiations and reaching a permanent settlement.



## 2.2 An Analytical Framework of Central Dimensions

Avnery (2010, p. 4) once stated: *‘The complete blindness of each of the two nations to the national existence of the other inevitably led to false and distorted perceptions, that took root deep in their collective consciousness. These perceptions continue to affect their attitudes towards each other to the present day’*. In this context, *Perceptions* are the existing valid outcome of views that Palestinians and Israelis hold about the peace process and the conflict. They are the cumulative product of themes that happened in the past, going on in the present, and/or anticipated to happen in the future. Whether in the past, present, or future, different components were developed and had their share of shaping the ultimate perceptions people hold about the conflict and peace process.

As a complement to the historic review, the objective of this section is to investigate and summarize major issues or themes that constitute the perceptions people hold about the peace process and the conflict. The same issues were allocated in subsequent sections of this dissertation to different parts in accordance with their validity, source, and spatial-temporal axes. After all, the main aim of this dissertation is not limited to comparing perceptions. Nevertheless, it is crucial to define and understand the degree to which these perceptions are determined by all kinds of possible aspects or components that fall within the borders of Historic Palestine.

### 2.2.1 Palestinian Refugees

*‘Recognition of the refugees’ rights is critical for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is a core issue that should not be left until final stage negotiations’* (Bell, 2011, p. 10).

Palestinian refugees count more than 5 million, a number which is considered as one of the world’s largest refugee populations of the contemporary history (Bell, 2011, p. 6). According to Dajani (2001, p. 1), the main reasons for the Palestinians displacement throughout the Middle East, and the “creation of the modern world’s most enduring refugee problem” are: (1) the humanitarian crisis resulting from the shattering of Palestinian communities all over Palestine, (2) the denial of their right for a shared national consciousness through the ‘al-Nakba’ of 1948, and (3) the creation of the state of Israel on 78.0% of the territory of the Palestine Mandate of 1922 (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 5). Still, the Israelis refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the creation of the refugees problem, and maintain instead that the displacement of Palestinians was solely a by-product of conflict launched by the Arab world in 1948 rather than a deliberate policy of expulsion (Bell, 2011, p. 8; Chow et al.,

2008, p. 14).

Clearly, both parties' narratives regarding this issue are entirely different and incoherent. The Palestinians claim the right of all refugees and their descendants to return to their homes in Israel proper and are entitled to compensation. This same right sorely contradicts and threatens the very definition of the Israeli state; a state with a Jewish majority. Israel's concern is that the sudden influx of several million refugees would tip the scales in favor of Arab inhabitants in Israel, and eventually threaten the state's Jewish character, and cause Israel's Jewish population to become a minority (Chao, 2011, p. 12; Chow et al., 2008, p. 14). Therefore, for the Israelis, the refugees issue is viewed as a "transparent attempt to quash Jewish self-determination" (Dyszy, 2011, p. 10).

As a first step to resolving this core issue, the notion that it is a robust obstacle to the peace process must be altered. It is not possible to reach a solution, when what is considered a non-negotiable right on the one side, is regarded as a fatal demographic threat on the other side. The right of return does not indicate the right of every refugee (and their descendants) to go back to their exact place of origin. After all, Israel cannot absorb more than 5 million Palestinians and still be a majority Jewish state (Stein, 2002, p. 10; *Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 5). Add thereto, for Israelis, refugees do not have the right to transmit this status to their offsprings, and hence, they do not have any right to come back to their ancestral lands. The Palestinians require the Israelis "to acknowledge and accept responsibility for the plight of the refugees as a critical step, before any forms of restitution, resettlement or compensation can be addressed, and the conflict moves towards resolution" (Bell, 2011, p. 14). On the other hand, the Israeli "security concerns and questions about the right of return are understandable and must be squarely addressed" (Ibid, p. 10).

This dissertation investigated further suggested solutions to the conflict and how Palestinians and Israelis perceived them. Chow et al. (2008, p. 14) outlined some suggestions for a peace settlement that will be gauged in later stages of this dissertation. In Chow et al. (2008) opinion, it is critical to offer the refugees a set of options that might normalize their status, in which compensation is an alternate choice that should accompany each option. These options include the right of Palestinian refugees "to return to a future Palestinian state, return to a swapped territory, limited return to Israel, resettlement in third countries, or rehabilitation in host countries". That is not limited only to Palestinian refugees but to Jewish refugees from Arab states as well. The return should not be on a large scale, and should abide by specific criteria and rules. In other words, they should consider the small size of the land (whether the newly established Palestinian state or Israel), and its economic ability to absorb more people. The feasibility of such suggestions is still to be tested.

Refugees are people that have been "deliberately denied citizenship and kept in

political limbo in their host countries for decades” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 10). Bell (2011, p. 16) described the living standards and the legal, political and socio-economic discrimination refugees are frequently suffering from:

*‘There is no such thing as a typical day in the life of a Palestinian refugee. Their experience depends on factors such as what identity papers and permits they hold and the attitude of the people and government of the host country towards them. But the common bond that they all share is the insecurity of statelessness and the sense of loss and the longing for a homeland that could promote and protect their identity as Palestinians: an identity that continues to be challenged and threatened’.*

For example, Palestinian refugees were considered non-citizens in Syria, were facing numerous employment restrictions and were banned from owning properties in Lebanon, and were always under the threat of deportation or expulsion. In addition to the “lack of mechanisms for the protection of human rights that are usually ensured by the state, is their vulnerability to rights violations either by host countries or hostile entities” (Ibid, p. 13). For Palestinians, the end of the conflict starts with the eradication of discrimination and injustice forcibly applied to displaced refugees; sufferings they experience on a daily basis. For the Israelis, the application of such process should guarantee the persistence of Israel as a secure state for Jewish people. These two positions although hard to maintain combined, but still, a viable solution that complements both sides and secure a “future for both peoples, a future that respects the right of all to live in peace with security, economic prosperity and equity” is possible (Ibid, p. 5). Scham et al. (2013) believed that when ‘*a mutually acceptable statement of shared responsibility for the events of 1948 is proclaimed by the respective Palestinian and Israeli governments, the healing process, a real process of moving forward, can begin’.*

### **2.2.2 Jerusalem and Holy Places**

The status of Jerusalem and the holy places is undoubtedly at the core of any serious attempts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, primarily due to Jerusalem’s historic, political, and religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, specifically due to the status of the Old City and the Holy Basin, including the Wailing Wall or Western Wall, the Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount, and Al-Aqsa Mosque or Dome of the Rock. The issue of Jerusalem is one of the most contentious, intractable issues of the conflict, that is crucial for achieving peace.

On one hand, Israelis consider Jerusalem a red line that should not be crossed and are not ready to territorially negotiate any inch of it (Chow et al., 2008, p. 15). For them, it is the only capital that the Jews ever had for 3000 years. According to

their history records, it has been populated by a Jewish majority since the middle of the nineteenth century (Dowty, 2008, p. 202). Accordingly, Israel tries all its best to change the demographic balance as well as the socio-political and geographic nature of the city to ensure a Jewish majority. Moreover, it declared Jerusalem already few months after the end of the 1967 war as the “entire and unified capital of Israel” (Abuzayyad et al., 2013, p. 8). Palestinians, on the other hand, affirm the Arab identity of Jerusalem since the seventh century. For them, Jerusalem is “the natural linchpin of a Palestinian state, being at its geographic center and dominating its economic and cultural life”, and without it there will be no viable Palestinian state (Dowty, 2008, p. 203). All these and more facts suggest the reasons for rising contention between Arabs and Israelis in the city of Jerusalem, the holiest spot on earth.

### **Arab Citizens of Israel**

The Jewish identity of Israel and the application of democracy mainly to the welfare and benefit of its Jewish population, alienate thereby automatically other ethnic groups from the very essence of the State. This is how Israeli-Arabs view the status of their living in Israel. They are suffering a day-to-day “extreme structural discrimination policies, national oppression...land confiscation policy, allocation of unequal budget and resources, discrimination in rights and threats of being transferred” (Merriman, 2007; Khatib-Natour et al., 2006, p. 5). In particular, problems concerning the issue of land planning and housing, and racial and legal discrimination. Khatib-Natour et al. (2006, p. 17) elaborated that the Israeli planning policy includes:

1. The elimination of the Palestinian historical and geographic features as to prevent the return of the Palestinian refugees.
2. Forcible expropriation of Arab land and the adoption of a central, collective land system.
3. Preventing “state land” of being allocated to the Arab towns and villages in Israel.
4. Adoption of administrative division (areas of local authorities jurisdiction) that guarantees control over Arab land.
5. Marginalizing the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and preventing them from taking part in the decision-making process.
6. Demolition of Arab houses.

East Jerusalem Palestinians, called Jerusalemites, who are living in their city for centuries since the Arab Conquest are now, in fact, stateless; “they hold an Israeli residency permit known as a ‘Blue ID’ and a Jordanian travel document and are not citizens of either” (Abuzayyad et al., 2013, p. 2).

### 2.2.3 Belonging to the Land

As mentioned in the previous section, the UN partition plan of 1947 allotted 55.0% of Historic Palestine to Israel, and then an additional 23.0% was captured by the Israelis in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Following the 1967 war, Israel expanded its territory to include the remaining 22.0%; the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, defined as the territory across the ‘Green Line’ (the pre-1967 armistice line) which is now called ‘the occupied territories’ (Aziz, 2007, p. 5; Avnery, 2010, p. 10). For the Palestinians “it is their land, but in fact they claim less than 21.4% of it. The same territory is being infiltrated by Israeli settlements, projects, and roads for settlers”. On the other hand, for the Israelis, it is the promised land of Israel and should cover the whole area (not only 78.6% of total area). Reich (2008) described Jewish identification with and in connection with the Land of Israel:

*‘The empires tried many ways to eliminate the historical and religious links of Jewish people to the Promised Land, however, clearly, it is not the case, and no one can stamp out the Jewish identification with and in connection with the Land of Israel through history’.*

For Jews, Palestine is considered as their ancestral homeland where most historical events mentioned in the Old Testament took place, making it the focus of their religious practices and rituals (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). These beliefs are fueled by the myth of “the few against the many”, and how 650,000 Jews managed to defeat an entirely fragmented Arab military (Avnery, 2010, p. 8).

Palestinians on the other hand claim that the land is theirs, which they were inhabiting since the Canaanite era, even before the Hebrews guided by Moses left Egypt around 1200 B.C. and invaded their land, Palestine. They believe that the Israeli occupation will come one day to an end (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). That is how many Palestinians think: *‘One day the occupation of Palestine will end... We, Palestinians, generation after generation, went through and survived many brutal wars and occupations... Nevertheless, it is still our land, our ancestors stayed here and so we are. Even if it takes some time, one day the occupation over holy Palestine will come to an end’*. These notions are linked with the religious belief that Palestine is “part and parcel of the Muslims’ identity”. Khatib-Natour et al. (2006, p. 10) once noted:

*‘The Zionist movement used religious and secular terms to convince the Jewish people and the world of its right over Historic Palestine. Terms from the Torah such as the ‘holy land’ and ‘Land of Israel’ were and are still used. These were flavored with secular proverbs ‘such as ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’. These were like a fuel that thrusts the Zionist cart and unites the ‘Jews of the Diaspora’ and link their future to Palestine’.*

Some Muslims believe that the end is near, and in the world-view eventual victory is assured. This means, “they see recent history as a series of victories: the expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the exit of the United States from Lebanon in the mid-1980s and later from Somalia, Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and the resistance to US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, they see Israel’s eventual demise as inevitable” (Dowty, 2001, p. 9). Avnery (2010, p. 4) described the conflict as ‘War of traumas’, where Palestinians view it as “the continuation of the oppression and humiliation by Western colonialists”, and Israelis view it “as just a continuation of anti-semitic persecution”. Arabs reject Israel as a Jewish state and reject its Zionist identity; “the sole instance of Jewish cultural and political autonomy in a region populated with Arab and Muslim regimes” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 13). In this context, Haneen Zoabi<sup>(41)</sup> stated:

*‘Recognition of Israel’s Jewish character would delegitimise the citizenship of Palestinians in Israel, give a legal and ethical justification to discrimination against them, and effectively block the right of return of the Palestinian refugees’, and then concluded ‘Israel should be a democratic state, not an ethnic state’.*

Israel, on the other hand, does not recognize Palestinians as the rightful owners of this homeland.

## 2.2.4 Israeli Settlements

Israeli settlements are the subject of an inevitable issue that is considered one of the largest stumble blocks in the peace process, and a source of tension in negotiations (Chao, 2011, p. 12). Particularly in the West Bank, where more than two hundred Israeli settlements (that brought over 500,000 Jewish settlers), and unrecognized outposts were established since Israel’s occupation in 1967 (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 1). Rania Kutteneh from the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) further explained:

*‘Land and water are particularly significant for both, Israeli and Palestinian viability. The construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and the fragmentation of land by the construction of bypass roads that serve mainly the settlements continue to undermine the prospects for future viability by threatening territorial contiguity. The restrictions imposed by Israel on access to water resources are a significant restriction to Palestinian development, both in terms of agriculture and industrial growth’.*

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has called upon Israel to halt its settlement activity as to resume the peace talks. Nevertheless, Israel continued to expand

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<sup>(41)</sup> An elected member of the Israeli parliament (Knesset).

the construction of settlements despite international condemnation of these actions (Chao, 2011, p. 15). Israel considers the settlements in the West Bank as a “de facto part of its territory and as such eligible for preferential treatment” (Voltolini, 2012, p. 39). The EU and the US have assertively condemned the settlement construction, which contravenes the international law (Ibid, p. 12; Avnery, 2010, p. 12). The Roadmap of 2003 has demanded from Israel to “immediately dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and to freeze all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)” (Chow et al., 2008, p. 13).

The Palestinian side is unwilling to negotiate with Israel unless it stops the settlement program, a program that decreases the amount of land allotted to the newly established Palestinian state, slices up the West Bank and separates Palestinian areas (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 1). Furthermore, the settlement program “imprisons the Palestinians in isolated enclaves, each of which is surrounded by settlements and the occupation forces” (Avnery, 2010, p. 13). Not to mention the negative economic effect it implies. According to Chao (2011, p. 13): *‘Israeli communities are located in the most fertile regions of the West Bank. If Israel were to annex these regions, a new Palestinian state would not be economically sustainable without much international aid’*.

An Israeli point of view suggests that the settlement activity as a cause of the ‘deadlock’ is a false premise. In their argument, there are many instances of proof that the issue of settlements is not the main reason behind the collapse of any previous attempts at reconciliation. For example, the withdrawals that were carried out in Gaza Strip and West Bank in 2005, and the dismantling of settlements in Sinai in 1982.

The Israeli settlement policy of transferring hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) was condemned by the international law and is certainly accountable for creating a hostile setting that jeopardizes the lives of Palestinian and Israeli citizens. Needless to mention, that the legitimization of this policy by the Israeli judicial system and the manipulation of the law to serve its goals. Jabarin (2014) once stated: *‘Despite the consensus of the international community as to its illegality, the lack of political will from many states, especially the United States, has also played a significant role in appeasement, allowing Israel to operate with impunity’*. His work revealed that the driving force behind the settlements is “the exploitation of Palestinian natural resources” (Ibid.).

### **Natural Resources**

As I referred to above, the settlements are strategically located in the occupied territories of the West Bank, the matter which allowed for their control over land, water,

mineral natural resources and marine rights. For instance, the Israeli exploitation and control of the gas reserves offshore the coast of Gaza deprives the Palestinians of gas revenues and makes them dependent on the gas supply from Israel. According to the World Bank report, the Palestinians could derive over an estimated 3 billion US dollars annually from these resources. To put it in another way, the Israeli enterprise of settlements in the oPt is boosting the Israeli economy on the one end, and resulting in more confrontations between Palestinian and Israeli citizens on the other end, thus jeopardizing Israel's national security (Jabarin, 2014).

Studies confirm that the Palestinian economy is deprived of access to 40.0% of the resources in the West Bank, and 82.0% of its groundwater. Israel is currently exploiting more than 90.0% of the Palestinian water resources used exclusively in Israeli settlements, and allocates less than 10.0% for Palestinian use that does not meet the needs of water for the ordinary citizen of Palestine (Abu-Yunis, 2014). Legitimate control of these natural resources without any discrimination<sup>(42)</sup> is very vital for the "sustained development and growth of any society, and should be controlled by a sovereign power for the benefit of the whole population textquoted-bright (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 6). In short, a strong economy and sustainable development in the state of Palestine are unattainable without achieving freedom and sovereignty over natural resources at least in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza.

### 2.2.5 Security

'Security' is essential for a viable solution. It is a legitimate right for all; Palestinians and Israelis alike. The security of one side is inseparable from the security of the other. The roots of the conflict should be eliminated, and violence should stop (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 5). As a first step for peace, security should be achieved. Palestinian suicide bombings ended after the establishment of the wall and fence by the Israelis. However, Palestinians' lives became highly restricted with what they consider a segregation barrier or wall. Chao (2011, p. 21) added:

*'Both Israelis and Palestinians must realize that security for one side must mean security for the other. Israeli security and defense cannot mean the loss of Palestinian security, because that would only cause additional Palestinian violence, creating a threat to Israeli security once more'.*

Palestinians and nearby settlers are having confrontations on a daily basis, kidnappings, and innocent kids are murdered on both sides. These are often referred to in Israeli media as 'residents' in order to label any attack against them as a

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<sup>(42)</sup>"Palestinians receive on average between 57 and 76 liters per person a day, one-quarter of the amount consumed on average by the Israelis. The World Health Organization's recognized minimum domestic consumption for an individual is 100 liters per day" (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 6).



crime against citizens. However, for the Palestinians, settlers are considered “the spearhead of a dangerous enemy who is dispossessing them their land” (Avnery, 2010, p. 19). Israeli armed operations against the Palestinians without any regard of human rights extend from mass detentions, house demolitions, confiscation of lands, encroaching on the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, assassinations and violations of international law. Not to mention the Israeli excessive use of force and responsibility for massacres committed against Gaza, violations against the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). Add thereto the daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem, and the settlers continuous attacks on Palestinians, their lands and properties.

The same applies to the Israelis with the renewed violence in the West Bank, the firing of home-made rockets from Gaza at Israel, and the endangering of Israeli lives. Hamas and Islamic Jihad believe that radical means lead to radical ends. From this perspective, suicide bombings were considered to make an unbearable pain to Israel that other modes of resistance fail to accomplish. They caused a deep feeling of insecurity and undermined the credibility of Israel’s security measures and strategies. Many Palestinians have condemned the horrifying bombings because they made their lives much harder. The destructive and intolerant consequences of these bombings on the Palestinian people, and the way Israel responds to them, simply are making their lives ‘a living hell’ (Telhami, 2004, p. 9). Avnery (2010, p. 20) once noted:

*‘... suicide bombings brought the bloody confrontation at the center of Israeli cities... caused other damage to Israel, paralyzing tourism and stopping foreign investment, deepening the depression, causing the national economy to contract and social services to collapse, thereby widening the social gap and increasing domestic tensions in Israel’.*

‘Hardliners’, ‘spoilers’ or ‘extremist’, are all words describing a group of people who are often called crazy or fanatics, but are very rational on the tactical level. The main aim of this group is to subvert any efforts toward resolution (Dowty, 2001, p. 8). They have a remarkable influence on the peace process that should never be underestimated. Examples of hardliners vary from political movements/parties to religious groups or a mix of them. Dowty (2001) added: *‘the extremists on the two sides are in fact allies, with the same goal: disrupting any move toward reconciliation. They need each other as validation for rejection of compromises’*. An example of extremists is Hamas movement, which fundamentally rejects Israel, and is committed to the destruction of Israel as set out at the start of its founding charter (Dyszy, 2011, p. 5): *‘Israel will exist, and will continue to exist, until Islam abolishes it, as it abolished that which was before it’*. On the Israeli side, it includes those movements, groups, or political parties that follow ideas of Zionism, Reli-

gious Zionism, Kahanism, anti-Islamism, and anti-Arabism. Meir Kahane<sup>(43)</sup> once stated: *'I know that elections must be limited only to those who understand that the Arabs are the deadly enemy of the Jewish state, who would bring on us a slow Auschwitz - not with gas, but with knives and hatchets'*.

### 2.2.6 One-State Solution

A one-state solution in this context means a bi-national state that contains the territory and inhabitants of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Palestinians advocate the belief that a unified state will be able to accommodate all returning refugees, something that a solely Palestinian state will fail to accomplish. Israel, on the other hand, bitterly refuses a one-state solution that contradicts the Jewish identity of the state of Israel. Also, for them, accepting this plan will rapidly, if not immediately, flip the demographic characteristics of the country to an Arab majority and a Jewish minority (Dyszy, 2011, p. 14). Chao (2011, p. 26) believed that although the one-state solution remains less popular than the two-state solution, it is gaining popularity in light of the deterioration of the situation on the grounds, and he pointed out to the numerous advantages of the one-state solution:

*'The one-state solution would be easy to implement... the cessation of violence and hostilities... the establishment of equal rights for all religions and ethnicities... Jerusalem will remain undivided, and there will be free and open access for all the citizens of the new state... there will be no need to deal with the extensive Israeli settlements on the West Bank... the creation of one government in the region decreases the possibility of a radical group takeover in the proposed Palestinian state such as the 2006 Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip'*.

Avnery (2010, p. 26) had an opposite stance on the issue:

*'The idea sometimes voiced that it is possible and desirable to replace the two-state with a one-state solution... is unrealistic. The vast majority of Israelis will not agree to the dismantling of the State of Israel, much as the vast majority of Palestinians will not give up the establishment of a national state of their own. This illusion is also dangerous since it undermines the struggle for the two-state solution, which can be realized in the foreseeable future, in favor of an idea that has no chance of realization in the coming decades. This illusion can also be misused as a pretext for the existence and extension of the settlements. If a joint state were set up, it would become a battlefield, with one side fighting to preserve its majority by the expulsion of the other side'*.

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<sup>(43)</sup> An ultra-Zionist political figure, teacher of Torah 'rabbi', and writer.

### 2.2.7 Two-State Solution

Coined in 1947, the proposal for a two-state solution has become nowadays one of the most popular and internationally accepted viable solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Stein, 2002, p. 10; Chao, 2011, p. 15). It suggested the establishment of a Palestinian state using the occupied territories of the pre-1967 war. The solution foresees “a region where two States, Israel, and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders” (Butenschøn, 2006, p. 290). Nevertheless, this solution fails to solve all the main obstacles of the conflict. Firstly, neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis will agree on dividing Jerusalem to Eastern-Arab part and Western-Israeli part. Secondly, the newly-established Palestinian state will not be able to absorb all Palestinian refugees, and the likelihood of the Israelis to evacuate their settlements in the West Bank is extremely low (Chao, 2011, p. 26). Finally, the establishment of a Palestinian state will give Israel a reason to force their Israeli Arabs citizens to evict into the newly established Arab state (Ibid., p. 27).

Scholars and political actors vary in their opinion regarding the viability of this solution. Some advocate a unity state as a result of “deeply-rooted pessimism” toward the two-state resolution, rather than “any ideological rejection of Israel’s legitimacy” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 17). Others, like Shimon Peres, stated in 2009 that *‘the two-state solution remained the only realistic and moral formula to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’* (Ibid., p. 21). Dov Waxman’s article where he noted *‘a difficult divorce is better than turbulent cohabitation’*. Nevertheless, the failure of reaching peace on the grounds since more than 65 years unearthed another resolution that includes the confederation of the West Bank with Jordan and the Gaza Strip with Egypt, a resolution that neither the Palestinians nor Egypt or Jordan found attractive (Dowty, 2001, p. 16).

### 2.2.8 International Role in the Conflict

The role of the United States in the arena is indispensable, and the power it practices over both parties is unparalleled (Chow et al., 2008, p. 2), particularly that it views Israel as a strategic ally through which it exerts control and influence in the Middle East, which is an important oil production region” (Aguar, 2009, p. 11). Israel’s economy depends heavily on US support, and US military assistance, with which Israel is controlling the oPt (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 4). Donway (1997, p. 591) criticized the influence US military assistance plays on the grounds: *‘US military assistance for Israel encourages it not only to adopt policies that ignite anti-American sentiments among Arabs but also run contrary to Israel’s interest of integrating itself into the Middle East’*. Arabs are convinced that they have to defeat the US in order to control Israel, a notion they established due to the US support of Israel’s

strategy of latching itself to this superpower (Telhami, 2004, p. 10). In line with this, Chao (2011, p. 20) added: *'The US Government must adopt a stricter policy with Israel, not only for peace but also for its image in the Middle East'*.

International financial support played and is still playing a crucial role in the conflict. On the one side it is supporting the poor, empowering people, rebuilding damaged infrastructures, and more, but on the other side, however, it is one of the factors behind the sustainability of the conflict. Donway (1997, p. 591) suggested that Washington should break the wheel of support and cut the Israelis from economic aid<sup>(44)</sup> (*IfAmericansKnew.org*, 2000, p. 1), at least by the amount Israel spends on building settlements and military aid. Moreover, the US should terminate the financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. This would eventually normalize the relationship with the US, and subsequently, boost the Palestinians faith in the US foreign policy. In addition, this will motivate Israel to reform its economy and open a new capital for its political assimilation in the region. The same applies to the European Union and its role in the conflict. The EU always condemned the illegal status of the Israeli settlements, and called for the Palestinian right of self-determination<sup>(45)</sup> (*Christian Aid*, 2007, p. 3). The EU is advocating the "two-state solution and the respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, and international law" (Votolini, 2012, p. 11). Rosemary Hollis<sup>(46)</sup> added:

*'The EU has many stakes in the region and a primary interest in the resolution of the conflict... the EU, the largest donor of the PA, provides the PA with the funds necessary to pay salaries and run basic services like education and health, but it is also politically relevant as a member of the Quartet, the international forum, that comprises of the EU, the UN, the US and Russia, and tries to mediate the peace process. Moreover, the EU bilateral ties with the parties are well-developed, demonstrating the EU's particular interest in the area' (Ibid., p. 13).*

The report of *Christian Aid* (2007, p. 7) pointed out to the importance of ending the impunity for actions committed by any party. Both, the Palestinians and the Israelis should be fully made accountable for their attacks. Observation of the human rights and the rule of law should not be undermined, and a third neutral body should be assigned to intermediate the peace process. Besides, it should for the sake of peace and humanity be able to impose an objective view of reality that both parties should obey and follow. In this context, the report included:

*'The Quartet powers, particularly the European Union, rightly condemn any violence as counterproductive to peace. They correctly call upon the Pales-*

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<sup>(44)</sup>The American economic aid to Israel reaches an average of 7 million US tax dollar per day.

<sup>(45)</sup>For instance, at the Venice Declaration in 1980.

<sup>(46)</sup>A British political scientist.

*tinian Authority to do everything within its power to confront militant groups and bring about an end to attacks on Israel. However, Israel is rarely held to be accountable for its military raids and incursions that cause civilian deaths. Israel continues to expand settlements, impose closure situations and build the separation barrier on Palestinian land with impunity, thus threatening a population already struggling to cope with extreme poverty and unemployment’.*

### **2.2.9 Borders**

The American-Israeli offer of establishing a Palestinian state using the present Green Line as the border of this state is unacceptable for the Palestinians. They consider it “entirely consistent with an apartheid model, where a pacified Palestinian population on both sides of the Green Line is encircled, controlled, and separated by large pockets of Jewish Israeli presence” (Taraki, 2006, p. 450). Add thereto the fractured geography of the West Bank and its lack of contiguity and integrity due to the expansion of the settlement blocs, the establishment of the wall, and the creation of bypass or ethnic roads (Yiftachel & Israel, 2005, p: 126-127). According to the report of *Christian Aid* (2007) “the West Bank is controlled by 540 Israeli checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds and gates, plus an average of 100 ‘flying checkpoints’ on Palestinian roads every week”. Rania Kutteneh<sup>(47)</sup> explained how this threatens the Palestinian future:

*‘Gaza is separated from the West Bank. The West Bank is separated from Jerusalem. Inside the West Bank there are now 75 separate “clusters” where you need to pass through a checkpoint or apply for a permit to get from one cluster to another. All of this, if made permanent, will kill the idea of having one Palestinian society’.*

These and more dimensions of the conflict and peace process were thoroughly investigated in successive sections of this dissertation. Obviously, the formation of perceptions requires not only the present and the future. However, also a whole set of cumulative ideas and beliefs that humans learn from the past, if not as witnesses, then as learners, and then pass them to others.

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<sup>(47)</sup> A member of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO).

## Chapter 3

# THE ROLE OF MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

### Contents

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
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The knowledge gap between the majority of studies and projects about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict regardless of the topic in focus and this study is that they lack the use of multiple approaches to their research. Especially when investigating the crucial issues of the conflict. Added to that, this study highlighted the role of historic facts and their contribution to nowadays conflict through a thorough review of history and its claims, coupled with political stakeholders and media theories and models, and the influential role they play in shaping individuals' perceptions of the conflict and peace process. Besides, this study controlled for many interesting independent factors using sophisticated data analysis tests and methods. Since the shaping of Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions is a broad topic on many aspects and a complex one on others, it incorporated the results and methods of previous research in the process of understanding individuals' perceptions and used them to develop a matrix according to which respondents made their distinct meaning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as they take a stance. The matrix constituted of retrospective, political, attitudinal, cognitive, sentimental, communicational and demographical components that I elaborated on later. The aim was to define the components that constituted, shaped and influenced the basis of these perceptions. One of the main components that could have a critical impact on the situation, particularly in conflicted areas, are the media. Therefore, it is considered a solid start to understand how media work for launching the negotiations for a final solution and for reaching a permanent settlement.

### 3.1 Variable Model

I explained in the Approach section above the combination of survey, content and document analyses this dissertation is using to answer the following questions. Below is the variable model that illustrates this multi-method approach, based on historical review of the conflict. Now, in order to achieve the goals set by this dissertation a review of media and conflict literature is presented hereunder, from which theories were established and hypotheses were determined for testing. Theories of Media effects and connection with public opinion and political discourse were part and parcel of this process, coupled with previous research with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

FIGURE 3.1 VARIABLE MODEL



In respect of the variable model shown above, the main questions to be answered in this dissertation are:

i. *To what degree there is an accord between..*

**RQ1.** media and audience frames on either side of the conflict? (E)

**RQ2.** audience and political parties frames on either side of the conflict? (F)

**RQ3.** media and political parties frames on either side of the conflict? (D)

ii. *To what degree there is a discord..*

**RQ4.** between news frames in Palestinian and Israeli media? And what are the patterns of news reporting? (A)

**RQ5.** between audience frames in Palestine and Israel? (**B**)

**RQ6.** in the frames pertaining to Palestinian and Israeli political parties, press releases, announcements and statements? (**C**)

**RQ7.** what other relevant factors that shape the audience frame perceptions? And to what extent? (**G**)

## Introduction

Psychologists tend to compare humans information acquisition-storage-retrieval processes with computer components of data processing for easier illustration of this complex system; thus, referring to it as ‘Humans information processing’. After all, human beings encode received information (*entering data*), store them temporarily or permanently (*saving data*), and finally, recall this stored information to be used for solving problems or to generate direct responses to the stimuli (*loading data*) (*The Information Processing System*, 1993). Davis and Olson (1985, p. 236) once noted, humans as information processors in their simplest forms “consist of sensory receptors (eyes, ears, nose, etc.) that pick up signals and transmit them to the processing unit (brain with storage). The results of the processing are output responses (physical, spoken, written, etc.)”.

Unfortunately, the capacity of humans processing systems is limited and; therefore, their abilities are restricted to absorb all the inputs the world provides. Hence, humans unconsciously develop a selection process, through which they manage and filter the overload of information, and ease their participation and adaptation to the challenges of social life (Ibid., p: 236-237). This includes a *filtering mechanism* that is based on prior knowledge, experience, background and more, which constitute the “patterns or frames of reference that are collected into use in processing the input” (p. 238). *Experience* in this context is the accumulation of effective use of relevant frames in a specific field over a long period of time. The use of these pattern-directing frames does not only block unwanted inputs but ignores others when defined as being inconsistent with existing frames. However, due to humans limitations as data processors, they tend to ease this process by adopting strategies to deal with. For example, the *concreteness* strategy, where humans “use information that is readily available and only in the form in which it is displayed” (p. 249). In this stage of developing strategies, individuals establish their ‘cognitive style’; a style that blends both, their characteristics and preferred modes or manners when processing information (Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1997).



## Cognitive Style

A 'cognitive style' is "a psychological term used to describe individual differences in the way one habitually tends to perceive, organize, analyze, or recall information and experience" (Hansen & Stansfield, 1980, p. 350). There are two main dimensions of cognitive styles; *the field-independent style* and *the field-dependent style*. The former refers to individuals that are highly independent of processing perceived information while bypassing the surrounding, and building their perception of an issue in accordance with their inner cues. Moreover, they are able to ignore unrelated information and focus on central tasks, and they act on information on highly autonomous fashion with the greater level of perceptual and cognitive restructuring (Hansen & Stansfield, 1980, p. 350; Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1997, p. 200). Witkin et al. (1977, p. 7) stated that dependence field is "when the person experiences items as more or less separate from the surrounding field" and perceives them more analytically. On the other hand, dependence field mode is when "the performance range perception is strongly dominated by the prevailing field" (Ibid., p. 7). It includes people, whose perceptions of information is highly dependent on the environment surrounding them and that are established incoherence with the external context within they occur. Field-dependent individuals are more sensitive to interpersonal cues, social information, and manipulation, and are less cognitive restructuring and tend to accept information from the environment as they appear (Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1997).

The purpose of differentiating between the two dimensions of cognitive styles is to demonstrate the degree to which the environment surrounding the Palestinians and the Israelis matters in establishing their opinion of the conflict and the peace process. Most importantly, how people with different cognitive styles adapt themselves to the context in which events occur - to what degree on the dependence-independence field dimension are influenced by the society and mass media? And to which extent they prevail, resist and analyze the overload of frames sent to them through these information channels? A brief introduction of the role mass media play in shaping public opinion during the conflict will follow as a first step for answering these questions.

Different studies in public opinion research and its quality revealed different results of whether public opinion is a rational, consistent, stable and informed process or it is an irrational, inconsistent, unstable and ill-informed process. One stream of studies found huge variations of quality opinions within the same society; others did not. Questions to be investigated are: what factors drive public opinion? and to what extent do mass media contribute to the process of shaping peoples' perceptions? A vexing phenomenon in public opinion research known as 'framing effects' is a particular phenomenon that will be addressed below as a first step of investigat-

ing these questions. However, before doing so, an explanation of the concept of ‘schemata’ will be introduced.

## Schemata

Plato and Aristotle were the earliest to introduce the concept of schema or schemata in their philosophies, but, Kant (1929) was the first to introduce schema as mental frameworks that organize thoughts around some aspects of the world and control the ability to comprehend these aspects. *Schemata* is a cognitive structure in long-term memory that mediates and guides the process of encoding, processing and understanding a stimulus. For instance, when an individual encounters a stimulus, he or she will interpret that stimulus in accordance with the matching schema in his or her mind (McVee et al., 2005, p. 535; Jörg, 2008). In this context, a schema is a conceptual system for understanding knowledge - how knowledge is represented and how it is used (Diaz, 2008). For Kant (1929) “a schema stood between or mediated the external world and internal mental structures; a schema was a lens that both shaped and was shaped by experience” (McVee et al., 2005, p. 535).

All individuals have a schema that varies from one person to another. They vary in the way of organizing peoples’ thoughts; what they pay attention to, what is important to them and how they make meaning of situations. The reality where they live and the way they make meaning of the world is a response to the schema that individuals have in their mind. For example, some peoples’ behavior may not make sense to you because the schema that they employ to form their meaning of events is very different from the schemas that you have. Simply, schemas drive meaning and change behavior from one person to another. Brain psychologists focused on the relationship between learning ability and schemas, once Medina (2008) noted: ‘*prior knowledge can disturbingly shape how individuals memorize and retain from long-term storage of future knowledge*’. Accordingly, individuals’ schema can be critical to their understanding of events and their behaviour towards these events, because, he or she will inherently rely on existent schemata to understand new information, and the more that information is consistent with the schemata in their minds, the more likely he or she will comprehend that information (*Schema Theory*, 1995; Medina, 2008). Furthermore, “if the schema is triggered near the moment of learning, that learning becomes more permanent”.

As mentioned earlier, individuals unconsciously attempt to process incoming information economically. Therefore, media news automatically becomes subject to ‘schematic filtering’. It is the process when attention is mostly directed towards some aspects of news because of their relevance and consistency with one’s’ self-schemas, and the rest tend to be ignored due to their irrelevance or inconsistency with these schemas. It is true that the more the schemata is organized, the better

the memory is, and the more contingent the event with the schema in the individuals' minds, the more likely to be remembered. Nevertheless, "the more typical an event, the more likely it will be recalled falsely as occurring because it will be 'filled-in' by the schema rather than actual perception" (*Schema Theory*, 1995). From this perspective, Campbell (1989, p. 90) described schemas as being "a sort of bias inherent in the mind". Nevertheless, schemas as organizational units still clearly affect our recall of events, our ability to learn things and help us understand the interaction of key factors influencing the comprehension process.

## 3.2 Objectives of Media Analyses

The media are a reflection of the political environment, a mirror for regional, local and international events, conflicts and interactions at the political level. The political environment is established by the media and the media make us recognize this reality. Accordingly, the media legitimize or socially accept certain concepts and perceptions and exclude other concepts and perceptions from the political controversy or debate, and that by putting in order the list of political issues or concerns in a framework of values, information and views that are compatible with each other and excluding such views and ideas, that are dissonant; this all in a form that displays political issues, information and topics in a coherent form and present them on the basis of accuracy and clarity of the facts, the matter which creates a mental image of the objectivity of these issues. The media play so primarily a persuasive, political function as they (the media) take-over the process of convincing the masses (Swanson, 1992; Stewart, 2000; Eskjaer, 2012; Croteau & Hoynes, 2013)

Therefore, a content analysis of 8 newspapers was done to examine the framing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by newspapers in both countries in accordance with specific criteria mentioned in successive chapters of this dissertation. The general objectives of the content analyzes were as follows:

1. Gauge the amount of news dedicated to the conflict in each media.
2. Estimate the depth of emphasis on particular topics/dimensions related to the conflict and peace process.
3. Capture the density of news coverage in certain areas of the conflict.
4. Observe the direction of media in each country when it comes to covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
5. Compare frames in the Palestinian and Israeli media.
6. See how do pictures frame the conflict.

Accordingly, the following questions about media coverage in both countries were answered:

1. What are the dimensions of emphasis concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
2. How significant the topic of the conflict?
3. The focus was more on promoting peace or fueling up the conflict?
4. To what extent were they similar to their frames?
5. How did they cover core issues of the conflict?

### 3.2.1 Media Function, an Overview

The world is witnessing today a special attention to the media and its mission. We all are also witnessing the development of the media means and the diversity of their methods and updating until they reached the emergence of new communication channels, that know no boundaries or barriers. The emergence of cable TV, the Internet, and satellite communications have turned the world into what looks like a small village and enabled everybody to know what's going on thousands of miles away from him while he is sitting in his closed room in front of the TV or computer screen. In this context comes the term of 'global village' coined by McLuhan in the sixties, who described the media as the nervous system that rapidly integrate the world together, as was the case when human territories were scattered in the shape of small villages. This has led to enabling the media to fulfill its mission over a broader and deeper range, reflecting a general affirmation of the importance of the modern media and its ability to play an active role in various humanitarian issues. The media with their broad philosophy and developed means are considered as the most powerful modern communication means that help the citizen to live his era and interact with it (Stewart, 2000).

Despite their ideological and perceptual differences in their representation of the role of communication in human reality, numerous models of communication as in Shannon and Weaver model of communication (1948), Berlo's (1960) Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR) model, Osgood-Schramm interactive model of communication (1954), DeFleur's (2005) Transactional model, the Action model of Berko et. al. (1992), and more agreed on that the media industry is focusing on three principles main: the *media mission*; that could be an event or news story or theme or idea, the *human element*; that is represented by the sender and receiver, and finally, the *technical means* through which the media message from the sender to the receiver will be transmitted or aired. The information process is aimed to promote the commodity (physical or intellectual) in order to achieve the benefit of the producer and satisfy the desires of the consumer.

The communication process in this context is a deliberate link between two parties; the sender and the receiver, that aims to perform a specific function in the context of human activity. It is a selective, social process, and its purpose is the individual and the community access to information and knowledge and understanding of the experiences of other individuals and groups on the one hand, while at the same time conveying one's opinions and experiences to others, ensuring thereby the creation of a bilateral interactive process in all cases. In the context of the previous determination of this concept, it is physically associated with the formation of the social and political individual and the concepts of freedom and democracy and their application within the community, such as participation and discussion, dialogue

and expression of opinion and its choice, as well as the expression of one's opinion on the political and economic system. This means that the communication, its methods, and operations, are leading the public to the formation of the public opinion at all levels (Croteau & Hoynes, 2013, p. 299).

### **Media in the Context of Political Communication**

The media occupy a significant position among the gauges that indicate the level of civilization and progress in any country of the world and the extent of democracy in this society or that. The media intervene in shaping people's attitudes and perceptions regarding the reality in all aspects of life. There is no doubt that modern societies have become almost entirely dependent on the means of mass communication in the transfer of communication messages to be delivered to the masses and, subsequently, this means the ability of the media to intervene in the formation of the public agenda, especially visual media, as it transmit intended contents that intervene in moving and identifying the trends of the public about a specific issue, such as the mobilization of masses to take a certain decision, as well as formation of convictions and notions that ultimately form a general public opinion in some way towards the intended idea or issue (Eskjaer, 2012, p. 3). The objective and professional media are therefore almost rarely available today one hundred percent, but there is a disparity in the rate of approaching them.


Many recent scientific studies in the field of political communication, as well as within the scope of political science, have shown that the media have an independent power in the society and that they play key roles on the political level through the communication materials they provide. Furthermore, they play an influential role in the political decision-making process, as we play various roles in our contemporary political life. The media intervene in the formation of people's concepts and perceptions regarding the reality in all ways and aspects of life. Furthermore, media provide the people's awareness with political experiences, through which public opinion in the local and international community is formed. There is no doubt that contemporary societies have become totally dependent on mass communication in the transfer of communication messages intended to be delivered to the masses. This role is played by governmental and non-governmental organizations with the assistance of sophisticated and effective systems and devices, on the top of which are the press, radio, television, movies, and others. According to McCombs (2002, p. 2):

*'What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us. More specifically, priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind'.*

It is worthy to note that the governments have discerned the active role, and the impact of the media means, in general, and the newspapers in particular in their ability to create public opinion in the community and move and polarize it for the defense of a certain tendency or a particular concept and even to intervene in moving the course of things and guiding a certain public in the desired direction. In this context, Aguiar (2009, p. 16) stated: *‘a crisis will be global if the media portrays it as such as well as an issue will be newsworthy if it fits in the pre-determiners already established not only by the media but also by the economic and political institutions surrounding them’*. Consequently, this means the ability of the media to interfere with the formation of the public agenda, which is what I wanted to reveal by applying that to the Palestinian and the Israeli daily newspapers, the matter that brings me to clarify the role of the media in shaping the public opinion in these countries. Newspapers, for example, by publishing certain contents reflect the situation and the prevailing conditions of their communities and feed other targeted purposes. They, with these constituents, can intervene in the order of the public’s priorities; consequently to intervene in the formation of public opinion. The persuasion process might be either through information, facts, figures, statistics or others.

### **3.2.2 Political Media**

The individual in contemporary societies is - to a large extent - permanently exposed to ‘paragraphs’, contents, and comments of political nature, that are conveyed to him or her by the various channels of mass communication. Hardly a day passes without these political implications appear in newspapers, magazines, radio and television. In this context, I would like to focus on the term of ‘political media’, which constitutes one of the significant and necessary media branches, an approach and a process aiming at publishing news and facts about individuals with the aim of expression and awareness. The capacity of the awareness circle might even increase aiming at creating a public opinion and a unified humanitarian will that has a certain attitude towards an issue of public interest, whether on a regional or national level. This political awareness might be directed to the public opinion or not. In addition, the political media also form a communication activity conducted by specialized organizations in broadcasting information, concepts, and attitudes about governmental affairs. These are, therefore, genuine efforts to spread the ideas and beliefs in order to anchor the state’s point of view in the hearts of the people. If these information efforts, however, are used in the war with any outside party, they convert to a psychological war against the enemy to influence its members and direct them (Norris, 2004, p. 1).


**FIGURE 3.2** THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Source: Norris, 2004, p. 17.

Figure 3.2 above shows the interactive process and the transmission of information between politicians, the media, and the public. According to Norris (2004), the process “operates downwards from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among political actors, and also upwards from public opinion towards authorities” (p. 1).

Wang (2012, p. 9) in his *Resultant Acceleration Model* (Figure 3.3) emphasized on the interactional process between Media, Public Opinion and Government foreign policies, and how each of them is deepened through such interaction. In its simplest forms: (1) Media report the event, (2) government policy is triggered by this event, (3) and then both of them lead to Public Opinion, which in turn (4) build news agenda and therefore (5) amplify media coverage. Then, (6) Public Opinion and the newly established media coverage trigger a local government policy, which (7) generates bigger public opinion, and conclusively lead to an amplified government policy. On one hand, Public Opinion as a reference plays a vital role in shaping policy agenda’s for political stakeholders and their governments. Moreover, it is reflected and represented by Media outlets, which ultimately contribute to the formation of agendas and frames in the public (Ibid., p. 1).




**FIGURE 3.3** RESULTANT ACCELERATION MODEL

Note: "T"= "traditional media"; "N"= "new media"; "M"="media", "PO"= "public opinion";  
 "GP"= "government policy"; "LGP"= "local government policy"

Source: Wang (2012).

Baum and Potter (2008, p. 41) in Figure 3.4 hereunder outlined a comprehensive review of literature "maintaining that the media influence public opinion, public opinion influences the media, public opinion influences decision makers, decision makers influence public opinion, decision makers influence the media, foreign policy influences public opinion, decision makers influence events, and the media influence foreign policy. This is further complicated by feedback from both foreign actors and the emerging 'facts on the ground'". They added, that every conceivable link between these actors was thoroughly investigated and that any "further investigation into these narrow individual pathways is likely to produce diminishing returns". Baum and Potter (2008) incorporated in their research the strategic actor of mass media, which they believe contribute alongside citizens and elites to the shaping of public's attitudes to foreign policy. Furthermore, they emphasized on the "multifaceted relationships between these actors and foreign policy outcomes" (p. 1).

**FIGURE 3.4** REPRESENTATION OF THE LITERATURE; THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PUBLIC, LEADERS, AND THE MEDIA



Source: Baum and Potter (2008).

### Media Dependency Model

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) developed a theoretical approach toward the influences of mass communications on audiences and the society, and how most are determined through the relationship of the audience-media-society tripartite. They, in their theory of media dependency investigated the degree of audience dependence on media as a “a key variable in understanding when and why media messages alter audience beliefs, feelings, or behaviour” (p. 5). Audience dependency on mass media leads to alteration effect on three main spectrums; cognition, affection and behavioral:

(1) **Cognition alteration effect** is a result of resolution of *ambiguity*, either due to individuals’ insufficient knowledge and adequate information to grasp facts, or the existence of conflicting information about a particular fact. For instance, people first resort to mass media for information when an unexpected event take place. They become aware of that event through the media. That does not mean that the media unclear ambiguity, on the other hand, in the case of conflicting media reports, people tend to search for further media channels to fill knowledge gaps and clear uncertainty. The question here is “the extent to which people are dependent on the media for continuous or ongoing ambiguity resolution” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 9). The more dependent people are on information mediated by media, the

more considerable media effect is in constructing social reality. Nevertheless, it does not mean that audiences with the same 'degree' of dependency on media-mediated information have the same construct of perceptions and ideas. More or less, the media has the power to control 'the range of interpretations' in peoples' minds (Ibid, p. 10). Ambiguity is part and parcel of citizens' lives in Palestine and Israel, where instability is the only stable reality, and thus the power of media is pervasive.

*Attitude formation* is the second cognitive effect investigated by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976). An attitude is a quantifiable hypothetical construct that involves negative or positive evaluation of an object in a specific context. An object can be anything; an idea, a group, a phenomenon and more. Evaluations are the product of many interactive sources toward the object, including *beliefs*, *behaviour*, and *affective reactions*. According to Schiff (1970, p. 7): "an attitude is the collection of feelings (affects) and beliefs (cognitions) which predispose an individual to react in a certain way to the object of these effects and cognition". Pickens (2005, p. 44) defined it as "a mind-set or a tendency to act in a particular way due to both an individual's experience and temperament". In other words, individual's response to a stimulus or any related objects is dynamically driven by their experience with that stimuli. However, the responsiveness of attitudes is susceptible to change to the context in which it was expressed, as well as its magnitude (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008). *Attitudes formation* is a continuum process reinforced by various important figures (e.g., political or religious leaders) and social movements in the society who selectively attract people's attention "to events and influence the content or intensity of the attitude formed" (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 11). It is true that the psychological and social processes have the lion's share of determining what people think and the intensity of their attitudes, but less of influence on shedding the light on what objects or events to be nominated for attitude formation.


There can be no doubt about the fact that there is more news every day than the media can possibly accommodate. Therefore, media have to use news judgment criteria 'pick and choose' in order to constitute the day's news. In this context, *Agenda-setting* as the third cognitive effect is the process whereby the mass media determine what we think and worry about, which McCombs and Shaw pointed out that it is related with gatekeeping (McCombs, 2002). McCombs (2002, p. 2) added: '*What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us. More specifically, priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind*'.

Relating to this, Walter Lipmann; a prominent American journalist and scholar from Harvard University was the first to analyze the impact of the media on people's perceptions, noted in his book (Public Opinion): '*the news media are a primary*

*source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for most citizens are 'out of reach, out of sight, out of mind'* (Lippmann, 1946, p. 29). Lippmann then described the media as a dominator over the creation of pictures in the public heads. He believed that the public reacts not to actual events but to the dominated pictures in their heads. Therefore, the agenda-setting process is used to alter all the events occurring in our environment, into a simpler model before we deal with it (Sanchez, 2002).

According to the agenda-setting theory, first developed by McCombs and Shaw (1968) in their Chapel Hill study, mass media set the agenda for public opinion by highlighting certain issues. Through their studying of the way political campaigns were covered in the media, Shaw and McCombs found that the main effect of news media was agenda-setting; in particular, the correlation between the rate at which media cover a story and the extent to which people think that this story is important. This correlation has been shown to occur repeatedly (McCombs & Shaw, 1972); Bernard Cohen stated: *'The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about'* (Cohen, 1963).

The agenda-setting function is three part-processes (See Figure.3.5): First, 'Media Agenda'; issues discussed in the media, second, 'Public Agenda'; issues discussed and personally relevant to the public and third, 'Policy Agenda'; issues that policy makers consider important. Roger and Dearing (1988) concluded: "(a) The media influence the public agenda; (b) the media agenda seems to have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda; and the media indirectly influence policy as well because (c) the public agenda, once set by, or reflected by, the media agenda, influences the policy agenda" (Reese, 1991, p. 103).

**FIGURE 3.5** THREE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS

Source: McCombs (2009).

‘Agenda setting’ has the power to explain and clear why most people prioritize the same issues as important, moreover, on the one hand, it can help in predicting if people are exposed to the same media, since that they will prioritize the same issues if they do. On the other hand, it can prove that people are not exposed to the same media if they do not. In addition, it is not complex, not costly and it is easy to understand. Also, “its meta-theoretical assumptions are balanced on the scientific side”, and it is considered the springboard for further researches. Finally, it has an organizing power since that it helps organize existing knowledge of media effects (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 176).

Finally are the *‘people’s system of beliefs and values’*, The concept of ‘belief’ or ‘belief system’ has been defined by Converse (1964) as “a configuration of constraint or functional interdependence”, meaning that it is a set of idea-elements that are connected by an interrelated function (p. 207). In this context, he emphasized on the term ‘centrality’, which is the “tendency of new information to necessitate changes in belief” (Ibid.). Simply, the more central the idea-element in the individual’s belief system the more likely he or she will stick to it and not be influenced by the newly gained information, and the less central the idea to the belief system the more likely that the individual will forgone or replace that idea with a new one. In definition, beliefs are those pertaining to one’s “religion, family, politics, and the like reflect the major areas of a person’s social activity” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 13).

Palestinian and Israeli people have a different set of beliefs that do not correspond to each other. In turn, these difference in beliefs are translated into differences in ‘emphasis, interpretation and selection’ of the same events. Bar-Tal (1990) referred to the incompatibility of beliefs between two groups under the same conditions (i.e., in conflicts) as ‘cognitive discrepancy’ (p. 10). According to Bar-Tal (1990b): *‘In a conflict situation, the cognitive discrepancy involves incompatibility of beliefs regarding solutions, incompatibility in the accounts of the background or the course of the conflict, and other contents’*, which enhances the magnitude of that conflict. Two main factors determine the centrality of belief: how frequent is that belief-accessible in the cognitive system and that belief’s degree of relevance to the individual’s evaluations (p. 11). The Palestinian, as well as the Israeli beliefs, were described to be motivated for specific conclusions (or contents). It is the case when undesirable information is rejected, while the desired one is accepted. Accordingly, each nation tend to view their own beliefs as being ‘objective and correct’ and the rival or other group’s beliefs as being ‘distorted and incorrect’. These motivations that constitute the individual’s belief systems are the results of “wishes that individuals try to fulfill and / or fears that they try to avoid” (p. 12).

(2) **Affection effect**: In their opinion, this effect is inevitable, and is inseparable of the cognitive effect. Also, they referred to the lack of studies that pinpoint and examine the influence of media messages on audience’s feelings and emotions. They suggested to research *Fear, anxiety, and trigger-happiness* as illustrations of affective effects, which this dissertation successfully tackles in addition to further illustrations of emotions. In line with this, they referred to the next step of *morale and alienation* where individuals label themselves as ‘we’ *versus* ‘them’, which in conflict-related matters might deepen the conflict and reinforces misperceptions of the self and the other. Finally, (3) **Behavioral effect**, the degree to which past effects influence individual’s behaviors and actions, which he or she would not have done if they were not triggered by media messages.

Further to the explanation of *attitudes formation* above are the elements that constitute attitudes, which were used in line with the Media dependency model to develop the dissertation’s Matrix. Therefore, I am introducing below the *tripartite model of attitudes* or the *ABC model of attitudes*.

### **ABC Model of Attitudes**

According to this model, an attitude is defined by three main elements; affective, behavioral and cognitive components. The *affective component* toward an object develops certain attitudes towards it; people’s reactions, feelings, or emotions against war explain their tendencies to compromise for peace. The *behavioural component* of how people behave toward certain compromises suggested by their government

explains their attitude toward peace. The *cognitive component*; knowledge and beliefs people hold about how harmful a war is will most likely predict their attitudes toward it. It is worth noting that attitudes can sometimes have a kind of reciprocity correlation with some of these components; it is not only the case that attitudes are always the predictive outcome of these components. For instance, a strong attitude toward killing civilians develops certain behavior of how people will act against it and stronger affective reactions to these killings. Or, knowing people's attitudes ease the prediction of their behavior. An attitude filters information that is inconsistent with someone's own attitude and instead accepts only those that conform with it, leading to bias when people perceive new information (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008).

According to McLeod (2009) "the basic idea behind the functional approach is that attitudes help a person to mediate between their own inner needs (expression, defense) and the outside world (adaptive and knowledge)". Measuring attitudes and beliefs should not only be limited to explicit but to implicit attitudes as well. Recent research in the psychology of attitudes developed several methods in an attempt to measure or define the latent side of attitudes, which normally do have an influence on individual's general behavior and cognitions. Also, that are mostly not controlled by the individual, and sometimes they themselves fail to acknowledge (Cunningham et al., 2001). A general mistake might be to assume that "individuals have both the ability and the motivation to report their attitudes and beliefs accurately". We should consider the degree of stability these attitudes and beliefs hold; do they change dramatically over time? and how can we border its influence or at least differentiate between valid and invalid ones?

Since explicit attitudes are the obvious side of attitudes that can be accurately defined by individuals, they are easily measured by typical means of statistical instruments, and that can be directed with 'standard persuasive techniques'. Whereas, implicit attitudes are harder to measure, and they are driven by hidden 'affective reactions' that individuals learn over time in certain circumstances (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008).

Inspired by these models, media literature and theories, and conflict-related studies mentioned below, the matrix at the last section of this chapter highlights these reactions and their connection with the causes, consequences and suggested solutions to the conflict.

### **3.2.3 Theories of Media Effects**

The relationship between the media and the public is one of the most issues that preoccupied scientists and researchers in the public communication field. Where these heed for the impact of these means in individuals through what they publish

or display while focusing on the interpretation of this type of effect and its nature, the matter led to a multiplicity of views and visions and theories that try to give a convincing explanation of the method and the type of leverage of these media.

There is a consensus on the media impact, but to what extent? Under what circumstances? And how? That's what scientists and researchers unanimously didn't agree upon in the field of mass communication. The differences were pushing for a large number of studies and experiments; all crystallized in the form of theories and specimen, mostly tried to explain how the media affect public opinion.

The impact of the media means is of multiple dimensions, but originally it is a psychological phenomenon associated with psychiatric cases of the individual in the communicative information process. Despite the development of research on the subject of media influence, all of them handled the multiple complex relationships associated with some changes in the message future, the terms of the reception and content of the message as well. This is in addition to the social background of the receiver and the sender, as well as the beliefs, and many other variables. In other words, the effect is the result of several overlapping conditions and levels to effect the impact. Due to the multitude of these levels, one must view the effect from different dimensions or aspects: First, from the psychological point of view as a psychological condition upon receipt of the media message, second, from the social aspect considering the impact as the product of social relations of the circles, to which the individual belongs and which plays a major role in the formation of the impact resulting from the exposure of that person to the content of the media. There are also other dimensions that play a role in determining the impact of such educational and cultural level, cultural affiliation, and the standard of living, and as such the effect remains a very complex issue that requires overlapping of several approaches to understanding and attempts to gauge. Studies that were made on the subject, each according to its direction, linked this process to one of the previous dimensions. Taking into consideration that it is a set of processes, surveys were unable to reach a decision limiting access to a single level of these standards. I was keen in this thesis to understand the application of these relations on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a practical perspective to be in the media influence in every country, and the differences between media frames and their role in promoting conflict or peace. I will try here briefly to mention the most important theoretical perspectives, through which scholars sought to interpret the phenomenon of media influence and the way of its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite my cognition that the cultural and historical contexts that helped the emergence of those theories differ in form and content from the contexts in which I want to apply, but handling it in some detail without going into the trends one's intend, is essential to building a background knowledge of the subject of this thesis.



**Most significant theories to explain the impact of the mass media -**

The impact of the media on individuals is not a new subject on the scale of researchers' interests in different fields of knowledge. Accordingly, I will be reviewing the most important theories of media impact, but with further emphasize on Framing theory because it falls at the core of this dissertation's objectives and research questions. Particularly that journalists play a significant role in activating the role of the press in the peace-building process through their ability to frame the media treatment of war and peace news, and this means that the press is not alone at stake, but also the journalists themselves who provide the reality in which we live. The inclination of the journalist towards the conflict and the stance he adopts towards this conflict impact the style he molds for the news story (Kempf, 2007, p. 3). This role falls under what is known '*Framing*'.

**Hypodermic Needle Theory**

The theoretical stream that advocates the strong impact of the communication means emerged in the period between the First and Second World War. This theory received many names. The most important one among them was the theory of the impact of the *Magic Bullet effects*. This means that the media mission is very powerful in its impact and likened to a shot which, if precisely shot, will not miss the target whatever strong its defenses are. It is also called the theory of the *syringe* or the theory of the *Hypodermic Needle*. It likened the message here to the solution, that is injected into a vein and it arrives in moments to all parts of the body through the blood circulation and has such a strong impact that cannot be slipped or avoided. The roots of this belief might revert to the war conditions and the emergence of a new publicity as a way to guide and influence the masses, through the radio stations in particular. This theory means that the individual is automatically and directly impacted by the content of the media outlet, as the advocates of this theory believe that the media have a strong and direct impact on the individual and the community that might reach the extent of domination (E. Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). This impact is strong and as effective as a bullet, and nobody can escape from it. As we perceive, its impact is strong, fast and direct such as the impact of a gun bullet, but it's a short-term impact. Researches, however, have shown later that the impact of media is not absolute and that other variables should be pursued to be included in this framework, such as economic, social and cultural variables that impact the attitudes and choices of individuals (Shaw, 1977, p. 96). The same is applicable to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a conflict that is full of variables that might prevent the absolute impact of the media on the minds of the two peoples. This will be one of the questions that I'm going to answer in this study and which reads as follows:

- Up to what extent might the media affect the minds of the people, or rather,

what is the extent of harmony between media frames available in the minds of peoples with media frameworks in each country, and whether actually the impact / harmony is absolute as this theory assumes?

The opinion of the Palestinian author Zarra' (2013) agrees with this theory, as he said in the light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between Fatah and Hamas supporters:

*'The bullet or the hypodermic needle theory is agreed to be futile and ineffective for more than half a century, and means of local media still try its approval by disparaging the viewer's mind and cutting him from the broad media environment, in which we live today under the satellite TV's and the widespread use of the internet and social media. The Palestinian law defines the powers and freedoms of the press by dead and buried (gone) laws since the demise of colonialism, but restricts other liberties by the supreme powers and interests of the state !! The executive authority usurps these rights from those, who disagree in opinion with them and apply other rights in a manner that commensurate with their authoritarian and political mood '.*


### **Two-Step Flow Theory**

Paul Lazarsfeld is the founder of this theory. He conducted with Berelson and Judy Gaudet a study in 1940 during the US presidential campaign, in which the former President Franklin Roosevelt was engaged and who was at that time sick and unable to assume the presidential responsibilities, especially that the country is on the verge of a world war (Bostian, 1970, p. 109). Therefore, most of the media men called upon the voters not to re-elect him and were hostile to him. Lazarsfeld decided to conduct this study as to ascertain the extent of the impact strength of the mass communication media on the public. If it proves effective, the American voters wouldn't vote for Roosevelt. If not, or to a very small extent effective, then Roosevelt will win. The election results were contrary to all expectations since Roosevelt was re-elected, unlike the media directives. Lazarsfeld concluded that the process of forming the electoral public opinion does not take place on an individual level, but within the framework of groups living similar social conditions and are brought together by common interests and needs: it has been found that interpersonal communication is more effective and influential than the media, and these findings constituted a major shift in the levels of influence of the media from powerful to limited (Mattelart & Mattelart, 1998).

This shift has paved the way in the media research studies to the formulation of the *Two-Step Flow Theory*, which depicted the information transfer movement from the media to the individuals who are even more vulnerable to the media, then the information is transmitted from these individuals to individuals who rely on others

in receiving information and are not exposed to the media, or that they have been indirectly exposed, the matter which led to a theoretical fission in media studies and the emergence of a new phase that conduced to the statement of the limited influence of the media on individuals, and the emergence of the role of reference groups within the community.

**FIGURE 3.6 TWO-STEP FLOW THEORY**



Source: [www.communicationtheory.org](http://www.communicationtheory.org) (2016).

The purpose of this theory is the transmission of information and thoughts in two phases through the people's reception of the information that is broadcast by the media and through the interpretations of the opinion leaders of this information. In the previous theory, one believed that the media have an absolute influence on the receiver, but this theory proved the contrary, as messages are transmitted from the media to opinion leaders, and then to the opinion followers. Direct media might not affect us, or its impact is limited, particularly when the opinion leader accedes the equation, as he enjoys the physical and moral power and interprets the media messages the way he sees it on the basis of his cultural education. This theory received many criticisms and amendments by many researchers: Westley (1971), Rogers (1962), Lin (1971), Troidahli and Van Dam (1965), Robinson (1976) and others. But at the same time, it produced the impact theory in two phases and had undergone fundamental changes, as it has laid a new concept of the individual relationship with the media. It is, however, largely led beyond the impact of social relations in the individual against dwarfing the role of the media and other external factors, the presence of which might be noticed upon impact. Other points opened wide discussion doors wide debate is that whether the opinion leader constitutes alone a link between the media and the rest of the individuals, or whether there is

a series of opinion leaders? It has been observed through the studies carried out in this context that in some cases opinion leaders resort to those who make up an information and impact link. Furthermore, a proposal has been made to extend the hypothesis of the 'two-phase impact' to that of the 'multiple phases impact' as there are several levels of impact between the sender and the receiver (Weimann, 1982, p. 764). This thesis has produced the hypothesis about the impact of the political leaders and the extent of their influence on public opinion, namely:

- The extent to which political leaders influence through their speeches, decisions and evaluations the perceptions of the two peoples, or rather, what is the extent of consistency between the media frameworks available in the minds of the two peoples and the media frameworks promoted by political leaders and their parties?

### **Function of Opinion Leaders**

Opinion leaders are a group of individuals who impact the conduct of others as a result of being distinguished from others in different ways, such as their personality, their skills, or being well-acquainted with matters of public affairs. They often benefit from the most widely used means of communication than others. They are the people who play a double role in conducting the communication in two stages, as they are primarily exposed to the communication sources and then transmit the information they receive from these sources to other citizens, with whom they are bound by positive and strong relationships: They work on converting mass communication via different media sources (radio, television and newspapers) to direct and personal contact depending on their social influence and their personal abilities through transmitting and interpreting the content of the messages, the matter which increases the impact on the preliminary individuals and groups (Page et al., 1987, p. 39). This means that the information does not reach directly to the people, but by means of the opinion leaders who make up the final version of the communication messages. The opinion leaders are the persons, to whom others resort asking for advice or for getting information because the opinion leaders are usually more committed than others to social standards and norms prevailing in the society or in social organization, the matter which grants them leadership recipes and credibility in directing and guidance. Furthermore, communication methods of opinion leaders are innovative and open in terms of accuracy, or quality of information or their sources, as this information are enhanced by multiple external sources, that are not limited to channels of familiar mass communication. In addition, they enjoy widespread attention by the media, and that due to their deep influence on people's minds and their significant leverage on them. To explore the leaders of public opinion, we must find out who are the most influential people, and how to employ them

for this purpose (De Vreese, 2004, p. 45).

Key features and characteristics of influential opinion leaders in the community (Hermann, 1980):

- *Religious character*: a feature that is mentioned in more than one location of researchers studies in the field of the two-phases information transmission theory, which is the most prominent attribute of opinion leaders mentioned in the scientific accumulation of the theory, which might be clearly observed in Palestine and Israel.
- *Confidence and social acceptance*: it is the basic attribute among the opinion leaders attributes. The one who enjoys this attribute will experience the figures of the public opinion heading to him to know his opinions and his views about public issues in the community, and he, consequently, will perform his job trying to shape the public opinion and impact it. Therefore, the opinion leaders who enjoy the trust of the community are considered as influential sources when there is a public inclination to know their views. And those who are pursuing knowledge or advice for certain issues are the public groups that are mostly affected by the opinion leaders, especially if the communication is on the personal or collective level, as established by the results of opinion leaders surveys based on the accumulated knowledge of the theory of information transmission in two phases.
- *Exposure to the means of communication*: In this golden age of media, according to Cohen, in which these means are subject to competition in how to satisfy public needs and reflect the voice of the community rather than being just a political tool for the governments, the responsibility of the opinion leaders seems to be more distinct in encountering these means and restricting their impact on the public opinion. It is therefore, the most significant characteristic of opinion leaders in any society that they are exposed to the media more than others. The researchers describe the opinion leaders in the theory of information transmission in two-stage that they are subjected to various means of communication in order to obtain the necessary information they re-formulate or re-interpret and then transfer to the public intended to be influenced.

### **Objectives of Opinion Leaders Analyses**

Politicians talk to people through the media to impose their authority, and the individuals engage in the political process through the media to express their opinions about national issues. Hence, the flow of information from the media to opinion leaders and vice versa best describe the political process. Accordingly, the primary objective of the document analysis is to measure the level of contingency between

issues discussed by the major political parties/movements and their respective leaders with those presented in the newspapers of each country and perceived by the people.

### **Uses and Gratification Theory**

The uses and gratification theory means that individuals and public use information material to gratify their internal wishes and needs as the individuals and the public are the ones who determine the type of the media content they want and that the role of the media is only to meet the needs and desires. According to the use and gratification theory, the individuals are described as motivated by psychological and social influences to use media in order to obtain special results, dubbed 'Gratifications' (Blumler, 1979, p. 10).

Uses and gratification researchers seek to answer the question: Why does the recipient use the means of communication? Through this question we might realize that these studies consider the receiver as the starting point and not the media message or means of communication. Through this focus action on the receiver, the advocates of this trend perceive that individuals use the media and their contents for many things that may not be related to the objective the 'communicator' wants. The reason is that the individuals, rather than to be receptive to contact messages, they seek to use the means of communication in accordance with their needs, and thus satisfy so many of their needs, and not necessarily to have them satisfied through the media. The individual might resort to alternatives other than the media to satisfy his needs Ruggiero (2000, p. 3). The use and gratification theory is a qualitative shift in media research from the public aspect, is however, an ineffective element, rather than effective so that members of this audience select media means and contents they prefer. They actively participate in the process of mass communication, in other words, the public is (Active) and connects to the needs and the choice of means of communication, so that it uses means that reach the goals intended to meet his expectations. Individuals are thus those who use the means of communication, not the media. The individual is the one who determines what accounts for his interests and what cannot meet his interests. This theory, however, has faced certain criticism, mainly due to the lack of a distinct definition of its most protruding concepts (Blumler, 1979, p. 10).

In terms of the extent of this theory's application to the conflict, if we adopt the most important things written by E. Katz et al. (1973) about the wishes of individuals and arrange them, the study theories at these levels would be branched as follows:


Cognitive Needs and Affective Needs focus on the need and the desire of the

Palestinian and Israeli peoples to obtain clear information about what is happening around them, and to clarify and understand who is responsible for the event and the latest developments. This is in respect of the cognitive field. In the affective field, however, the wishes of the two peoples are concentrated on their need to satisfy their affections towards their beliefs and the narratives, as well as the holy land. I will revert to it in a more detailed form in later chapters of this thesis. In this context, I'm going to test the basic frameworks' directions of the conflict in the Palestinian and Israeli media (negative, positive or neutral frames), and the assumption that the frames in every media will be focused on the oppressed spirit and the other on the oppressor of this spirit, that's to say, the media frames will reflect what the two peoples want to know about each other (by focusing on the negativism in the coverage of the event frameworks) which I reached in the historical overview. Here appears to some extent the public's ability to impact the media. These needs complement the content of other needs mentioned by Katz and his colleagues, which include personal and social integrative needs, which are clearly reflected in the analysis of the wishes of the public in the research form (Ibid.; Noelle-Neumann, 1974, p. 44).

### **Spiral of Silence Theory**

It emphasizes that the media and mass communication are, in general, sometimes biased to the side of one of the issues or personalities, so that leads to the support of the bulk of the audience for the direction adopted by the media in search of the social harmony. Individuals, however, opposed to this issue or that personality are taking the position (of silence) in order to avoid the persecution of the big pro-community, or in fear of social isolation. Consequently, if they believe in opinions contrary to what the media suggest or present, they would withhold their personal views and would be less willing to talk about these views with others. Those, however, who have views consistent with those aired by the media would be more active and aggressive in presenting these views and talking about them to get social acceptance (Scheufele, 2008b, p. 175).

Because a large portion of the public believes that the side supported by the media reflects the trend in the society, the opinion adopted by the media continues to be stronger and possibly effect pressure on those, who oppose the opinion adopted by the media, so they turn to be silent. We therefore, get (a spiral) effect, that is increasingly inclined toward the prevailing side adopted by the media, regardless of the true position of the public (Noelle-Neumann, 1977, p. 144).

**FIGURE 3.7 NOELLE-NEUMANN SPIRAL OF SILENCE THEORY**

Source: Scheufele (2008b, p. 175).

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann suggests a group of approaches or methods in the research, that combines field and survey standards for the public and those in charge of communication in order to realize the power and influence of the media, as well as the use of the approach ‘content analysis’ approach that this survey has pursued.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann has developed her theory on the basis of the pilot researches she has conducted during her work on this theory. She has identified three key variables that contribute to and enhance the power of the media impact, (Ibid.), namely:

1. *The quantitative impact through repetition:* Whereas the media provide similar and frequent media messages about an issue or on a subject or a specific personality so that this cumulative presentation leads to the influence of the recipient in the long run, without actually willing it, so willy–nilly, whatever the strength of the recipient immunity against the media message might be.
2. *Involuntary guidance of the recipient and influencing him totally:* This means: The media controls the human-being and beleaguer him everywhere, in the street, at the workplace, at home, and also dominate the information environment available to him, and the sources of information, resulting in comprehensive impacts on the individual, which he hardly can get rid of, so forming without his will both, the whole of his vision and his view of the world and things.
3. *Media homogeneity and dominance:* This means that those in charge of communication and work in the media centers and provide informational messages in line with stakeholders of media organizations in which they work, and which in turn are in harmony and agreement with beneficiaries of major interests in shaping or directing public opinion to the public, so that it leads to the similarity of attitudes and the similarity of moral logic of the media work



they are doing, which leads by its part to the similarity of media messages reported by various media, the matter which increases the strength of its impact on the recipient.

All of these factors lead – as Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann views them – to the diminution of the receiver’s chance to adopt himself an independent opinion on the issues raised, and thus increasing the opportunity for the media in the formation of ideas and trends influencing public opinion.

- In the context of how far this theory is applicable to the Palestinian and Israeli media, I assume with reference to the historic overview and the results of previous studies that the silent majority in the conflict will be those calling for peace and recognition of the other party.

### **3.2.4 Framing**

#### **Conceptual Definition**

There can be no doubt about the fact that there is more news every day than the media can possibly accommodate. Therefore, news editors and reporters were urged to develop distinctive procedures, values, and work ways to aid them in their challenging task of constituting everyday’s news quickly and regularly (Price et al., 1997, p. 481). Lippmann (1932) was the first to analyze the impact of mass media on shaping peoples’ perceptions. Once he noted: “the news media are a primary source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for most citizens is ‘out of reach, out of sight, out of mind’”. He then described the media as a dominator over the creation of pictures in public heads. Lippmann (1932) believed that the public does not react to actual events but to the dominated pictures in their heads (Ibid., p. 29). The framing concept has been widely applied by scholars in psychology, political science, and communication studies (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 222). It is the process where “meaningless and non-recognizable happenings” are turned into a “discernible event” through their framing representation in the news. According to Gamson (1988), frames are “templates (ideas and principles) embedded in news texts” (Pan, 2008; Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) have defined this representation as “the central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Ibid., p. 119). One of the prominent scholars to write about framing was Entman (1993, p. 52) who stated that “framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.

Cohen (1963, p. 13) pointed out that “the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”. More emphasis was put by Price et al. (1997, p. 482) on the packaging and presentation of news in a certain way by mass media, which systematically can affect how recipients come to understand the news.

*Framing* is “the routine procedure of sizing-magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make some ideas more or less salient” in the text and others entirely invisible, in order to facilitate for the journalists the process of “identifying, classifying, packaging and presenting the information to their audiences” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106; Entman, 1991, p. 7). There is no commonly shared theoretical model underlying framing research or a general statement of framing theory that has a precise explanation of how frames are exactly “embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking” (Entman, 1993, p. 51; Scheufele, 2008a). In other words, there is no consensus among scholars about the conceptual clarity and consistency of what exactly frames are and how they influence public opinion (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 222; Scheufele, 2008a). Indeed, “each political communication scholar provided a definition of this concept with respect to his or her underlining assumptions or hypotheses”, leaving no single commonly accepted definition of framing. Therefore, research on framing is sometimes characterized by theoretical and empirical vagueness, partly because conceptual problems are sometimes translated into operational ones (Scheufele, 1999, p. 103).

### **How Does Framing Work**

On the one hand, the process of framing serves as a mean of making bits of information more salient; “more noticeable, meaningful, and memorable to audience”, through the continuous repetition of specific phrases, putting them in a culturally familiar context and relating them to concepts; stereotype, categories and scripts that guide the individuals’ “processing of information” and that “renders into one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others” (Entman, 1993, p. 53; Entman, 1991, p. 7).

Minor changes or alternative phrasings of the same basic issue significantly alter its meaning to respondents, and the more the frame comports with the receivers’ existing beliefs schemata, the more likely to enhance “the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” (Zaller, 1992b, p. 34; Entman, 1993, p. 53; Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 152). On the other hand, it distracts attention away from other aspects through calling attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring oth-

ers, or through “constraining the available interpretative alternatives for the audience” (Huang, 2010, p. 48; Entman, 1993, p. 54). According to Entman (1993, p. 54), “most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience”.

Accordingly, frames can be meaningful and important determinants in shaping individuals’ perceptions and providing a context for processing information, and therefore making mass media and other institutions of mass political communication as means of profound influence on public opinion, even without any overt attempt at persuasion or manipulation (Hallahan, 2008; Nelson et al., 1997, p: 224-236). To summarize: framing effects occur when minor changes, whether in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and / or visual images, in the presentation of an issue or an event are transferred into (sometimes major) changes in public opinion and therefore evokes different kinds of thoughts, feelings and drives behaviours (Price et al., 1997, p. 483; Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 104; Entman, 1991, p. 7; Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 150).

### **Framing as an Active Process**

Price et al. (1997, p: 485-486) have empirically examined the knowledge activation process, in particular, the influence of news frames on the applicability of ideas and feelings in individuals’ minds. They differentiated between *applicability effect* as a ‘first-order effects of stimuli’ (media messages) that occurs during message processing, and *accessibility effect* as a ‘second-order effect of stimuli’ of messages that is when “ideas and feelings retain some residual activation potential, making them more likely to be activated and used in making subsequent evaluations”. Moreover, they examined how the knowledge that is subject to be processed or activated is highly dependent on the characteristics of the individual established knowledge storage or capacity.

Frames appear to “activate existing beliefs and cognitions, rather than adding something new to the individual’s beliefs about the issue”. Basically, framing effects “result from schema activation or modification, and whether an individual’s internal construct is activated is related to the applicability effect of the attributes of a media message” (Huang, 2010, p. 51; Nelson et al., 1997, p. 236). And through this activation process of some ideas, feelings, and values rather than others, the news can stimulate particular ‘trains of thought’ about political phenomena and lead audience members to arrive at more or less predictable conclusions (Price et al., 1997, p. 483).

Consequently, the output of opinions or interpretations of news that audiences

hold are considered to involve the interaction between the input of news frames and audiences' predispositions (Huang, 2010, p. 47). In view of that, framing can work on all three levels, "by making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible or making beliefs applicable or 'strong' in peoples' evaluations" (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 111). Therefore, researchers decomposed framing into media and audience frames and investigated the linkages between them (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106).

### **Media and Audience Frames**

Kinder and Sanders (1990) referred to *media frames* as "devices embedded in political discourse", and to *individual* or *audience frames* as "internal structures of the mind" (Scheufele, 1999, p. 105). Entman (1991, p. 7) in his turn referred to media frames as attributes of the news itself', and to individual frames as 'information-processing schemata'. Minsky (1975) was from the first to refer to audiences' frames as cognitive frames, which he defined as "mental structures that facilitate organizing and interpreting incoming perceptual information by fitting it into already learned schemas or frames about reality", and that rely on "a version of reality built from personal experience, interactions with peers, and interpreted selections from the mass media" (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 158; Neuman et al., 1992, p. 120).

To sum up, audience framing is a result of "information integration process" that includes both the 'news discourses' and the 'audience's existing predispositions'. In other words, how individuals come to assess and understand news issues is a product of the interaction between individual-level factors and specific frames adapted by the media (Huang, 2010, p. 47). However, "the presence of frames in the text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee their influence in audience thinking". Simply, the frames that guide the receiver's thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator, because "the idea behind framing implies that the frame has a common effect on large portions of the receiving audience, though it is not likely to have a universal effect on all" (Entman, 1993, p: 52-54). Price et al. (1997, p. 481) once stated that "messages can serve to direct in various ways, but not completely control a message recipient's train of thoughts". As individual-level factors can "condition audience frame choice in specific issue contexts, it is expected that these factors can affect the range of views or, the number of frames audience members employ to see public issues" (Huang, 2010, p. 52).

### Limitations of Framing Effect

Druckman and Holmes (2004, p. 112) mentioned in their article the moderator variables that limit framing effects. They started with the most powerful one; individual predispositions such as *values*. Individuals with strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values. In general, strong predispositions reduce framing effects by increasing one's resistance to disconfirming information. *Elite frames* "aim to appeal to the partisan and ideological leanings of the audience", and frames delivered by credible sources are more likely to shift opinions, as are frames that invoke long-standing cultural values. There was no consensus among scholars about the role of the third moderator - *knowledge* - in limiting framing effect, where some scholars found stronger framing effects on less knowledgeable individuals, others report the opposite.

König (2008) pointed out in his writing to the concept of *Framing Viability*, which says that "not all frames have the same chances of catching on". There are several mechanisms that affect the frame viability, such as the *frame's narrative fidelity*; the degree to which a frame is rooted in or depicted from the audiences' personal life experience, and the *frame's empirical credibility*; the fit between a frame and real world events, which for instance can be maintained from mass media discourses (e.g., public opinion about nuclear power).

The results of other scholars' (e.g., Huang (1996); Price et al. (1997); Neumann et al. (1992)) revealed that "media frames not only find their way into audience frames, but that when media and audience frames overlap, the media and the audience accord different weights to those frames". However, in the case of congruent individuals, who like to drive to the heart of the issue or problem in order to construct a rational decision or idea, the media and "the audience focus on different dimensions of those frames", or they had very different priorities in terms of framing issues (Scheufele, 1999, p. 112). In other words, individuals frames do not exclusively depend on media coverage of an event or issue. Rather, "participants demonstrate a capacity to introduce their own thoughts, going beyond the information provided and drawing out some basic implication on their own" (Ibid., p. 113). Audience frames can be influenced by "several social-structural or organizational variables, and by an individual or ideological variables" (Ibid., p. 107). Despite this, reporters and editors "may not be driving the engines of audience decision making, they may nonetheless have some capacity to guide those engines by switching tracks" (Price et al., 1997, p. 504).

### Functions Constituting a Frame

Entman (1993, p. 52) have developed four main functions that a frame may include enabling people to understand how discourse forms common meanings about particular social and political problems. Entman (1993) once noted that frames: “define problems—determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes - identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments - evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies - offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects”.

He then specified, at least, four locations of frames in the communication process. First, the *communicators* (e.g., journalists, editors and more); who consciously or unconsciously use “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation” to organize reality for the audience. The *text*, which contains frames that “are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments”. The *receivers* or *audiences*, who receive that text, and finally, *the culture*; which is a “set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping” (Ibid., p. 52).

### Conventional Expectancy Model – A Psychological Approach

What happens when an individual fails to develop an attitude toward a political topic because he or she is ignorant or holds a blurred idea about that topic? Individuals will probably draw upon few shortcuts or considerations that are available at the top of their heads when for instance responding to survey questions and will be unable to determine the relative importance or develop an overall evaluation or score for these responses. In such cases, “a survey question at best elicits an imperfect representation of a person’s feelings based on the subset of beliefs that are accessible at that moment” (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 105).

Druckman and Holmes (2004, p. 105) referred to what they call ‘the conventional expectancy model’ as “a summary of a definable set of beliefs that an individual holds about a subject”. The expectancy-value model in its simplest form assumes that individuals assign different weights to various considerations about a subject, resulting in viewing some issues as more important than others. Hence, the model is considered a useful abstraction for discussing the psychology of framing.

This conceptualization applies to any object of evaluation, for instance, an individual’s attitude toward a specific policy or issue may depend on several dimensions that are of varying weights of importance (e.g., he or she may view security issues as more important than immigration and economic issues when voting) and therefore,

attitudes will be highly dependent on their evaluation of security issues, or the case might be that all of these issues are important, thus, his or her frame of thought will consist of this mix of considerations. Another case, when attitudes rely on just one dimension, he or she will place all of the weight ( $w_i = 1$ ) when taking their decision. These sets of dimensions that affect individuals' evaluation constitute their "frame in thought" that is likely to have a remarkable impact on their overall opinion or evaluation".

Nelson et al. (1997, p. 225) studied the psychological mechanisms by which framing influences political attitudes. They emphasized on the psychological differences between the framing as a tool that persuaders use to influence opinion and what they referred to as 'standard persuasive argument'. The latter, which is the typical communication process that involves a source who encodes and sends a new message about an attitude object to an audience, at the same time, the audience receives and decodes the new message from their counterparts. If the audience understands and believes the message, and if the message opposes a prior attitude in the audience's thought, then the attitude should change in the direction implied by the message and so the communicator will succeed in changing the audience's belief about that attitude object. In other words, the message was able to influence the audience opinion because it contains either positive or negative information about the attitude object that is not already part of the recipient's knowledge or belief structure.

Nevertheless, what Nelson et al. (1997) argued is "that framing effects are not reducible to the new information that the framed message provides. Instead, frames operate by activating information already at the recipients disposal, stored in long-term memory". They represented the above-mentioned correlation in the equation below which "portrays attitudes as summary evaluations based on a weighted average of a sample of beliefs about the attitude object" (p. 225) in a simple equation form:


$$A = \sum v_i * w_i$$

'A' represents the summary attitude, ' $v_i$ ' is the individual's evaluation or belief of the object on attribute I, and ' $w_i$ ' represents the subjective weight of that belief. We can think of I as a "dimension, a consideration, a value, or a belief" (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 105). With reference to this equation, two possible procedures may change individuals' attitudes: firstly, changing the individual's beliefs or cognitions about the attitude object (traditional persuasion). Secondly, changing the balance of considerations that individuals weigh when assessing political issues or information (framing) (Nelson et al., 1997, p: 226-235)

### A Process Model of Framing Research

Scheufele (1999, p. 114) has developed a process model of framing that conceptualizes framing “as a continuous process where outcomes of certain processes serve as inputs for subsequent processes”. In particular, the model consisted of four main processes: frame building, frame setting, individual-level effects of framing and a link between individual frames and media frames.

**FIGURE 3.8** FRAMING AS A THEORY OF MEDIA EFFECTS



Source: Scheufele (1999, p. 119).

*Frame building* is the process that describes the influence of the creation or changes of frames adopted by journalists and incorporated in their coverage of an issue or event. These influences may be a result of the “journalist-centred influences”; ideology, attitudes and professional norms, “organizational routines”; political orientation of the medium, or external sources of influence (i.e., political actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites (Ibid, p. 115). *Frame setting* is the process that describes the influence of frames on opinions through repetition, placement, reinforcing associations between the words and images on an issue and by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations to that issue (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 569; Scheufele, 1999, p. 116 Entman, 1991, p. 7). *Individual-level effects of framing*, “these individual-level outcomes include attributions of responsibility, support for various policy proposals, or citizen competence” (Scheufele, 2008a, p. 4). *Journalists as audiences*, this process entails the reciprocal relationship between frames in the text and these even schemata or frames in the audiences thinking. It demonstrates the link between Individual-level variables (as a feedback) and media frames. The fact that journalists; like their audiences, can be ‘cognitive misers’ (Entman, 1991, p. 7).



Journalists themselves can be susceptible to frames set by other news media. For instance, when a small number of local media portrays the coverage of an event in a specific frame, other journalists will unconsciously adapt that frame into their coverage. This phenomenon of journalist influenced by other news media was labeled by Fishman as 'news wave' (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117), which, according to Entman (1991, p. 7) in the case of an entirely new breaking events, it is the initial interactions of sources and journalists that set this framing process (or wave) in motion. Entman (1991, p: 11-20) has mentioned in his analyzes of framing differences in the KAL and Iran Air incidents four aspects of the texts that help in creating analyzed frames. This study will adapt these aspects in investigating frames formulation of the conflict in Palestine and Israel. First, the *agency*; an especial common attribute adapted in the headlines that answer the questions of, who did it? And what causal force created the newsworthy act? Second, the *identification*; how were the victims identified. It shows the differences in coverage of, who were the victims? How much attention they were given and the way they were covered. Third, the *categorization*; the choice of labels for the conflict, which tends to place them in categories "that conventionally either elicit or omit moral evaluations". Finally, the *generalization*; the degree to which frames portraying the conflict are generalized to hinder the actual representation of the public in Palestine and Israel, and to convey a different one.

Generally speaking, messages from any source of information may change people's attitudes and perceptions "by adding information to an individual's stockpile of considerations about the issue (belief change), by making particular considerations temporarily more accessible (priming), or by altering the weight of particular considerations (framing)" (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 236). *Framing Theory* and *changes in beliefs* were explained above, thus I will introduce below the *Priming Theory*, and later see to what extent does the increased exposure to certain news goes parallel with frames in people's minds, as suggested by this theory.

### **Priming Theory**

Priming theory argues that the increased exposure to new stories that megastory dominates total media attention enhances the salience of the issue in people's minds (Iyengar et al., 1984, p. 785 ; Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 4). While at the same time crowds out "other news in terms of its impact and visibility" (Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 4). Pan and Kosicki (1997, p. 10) summarized the affects priming can have on audience's cognitive process: Priming can "increase the ease with which the related thought elements are being activated, increase the breadth of the accessible thought elements related to the issue, and increase the closeness in how these thought elements are linked". This in turn, boost the possibility of considering the representa-

tion of the recently-salience issue into the individual's calculus of evaluating events and leaders. Nevertheless, priming affect does not imply that individuals will designate the same proportion the media allocates to that issue into the proportion it will occupy in their evaluation process (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 758). Additionally, priming does not occur equally on all people and is dependent on the circumstances surrounding that issue, the personal importance/relevance attached to it, the news-source credibility, and the characteristics of audiences (e.g., experts or novices), more or less, their political knowledge. Which as well explains why some people may be more vulnerable to manipulations of accessibility than others (Iyengar et al., 1984, p. 779).

### **3.2.5 Role of Media in Conflict Resolution**

As expected from the literature described above, mass media in conflict resolution matters are fundamental parts of the problem and its solution (Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 150). Audiences use the message delivered by the media to comprehend and form opinions on domestic and international events, incidents and issues (Simons, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, the general public is much more dependent on media and experts, as compared with other domestic actors to get up to date information on the negotiations and the actual meaning and implications of news (Shamir, 2007, p. 16). In a way or another, opinions expressed by the press influence the opinion adopted by the public. For example, when individuals read or hear about an issue they tend to adopt their attitude with how the issue was portrayed by the media. Therefore, mass media can be both an opportunity and a threat for the sides engaging in a conflict. An opportunity, "if the power of the mass media can be harnessed to one's advantage and the message relayed". A threat, "if this 'power' is harnessed by an opposing party, who might use it to generate negative sentiment and publicity towards the other party" (Simons, 2008, p. 1).

Mass media in conflict resolution is considered a "fundamental force shaping the lives of individuals and the fate of peoples and nations" (Manoff, 1997). The role of media in conflict takes two opposed and different routes, the first route when the media plays an active part in the conflict and has responsibility for violence escalation, or the second route, that is to stay independent and out of the conflict, and therefore contribute to the resolution of conflict and lessening violence. Zelizer (1997) pointed out that the absence of neutral journalism coverage of conflictual social reality is a correct fact however the present of it is an incorrect one. Moreover, he added: journalistic elite are usually "part and parcel of the political, cultural and intellectual elite in every society", and the active role the journalists and media institutions play in the "power games of society" is overwhelming and should not be underestimated (Jamal, 2007, p. 2).

Nobody questions the significant role of mass media in shaping the configuration of peoples' beliefs, social representations, and opinions, and the remarkable impact it plays in the creation of perceptions and 'relational frames' mediating behaviors and attitudes toward political facts. This composes an inevitable influence on peoples' perceptions that should be considered in solving political conflicts. Not to mention the nowadays increased demand for explanations and clarifications to everything that goes on in political conflicts worldwide, forcing people to turn more to mass media seeking for answers and validations of their points of views, which again, emphasizes the significant contribution mass media provides in the development of political conflicts (Ibid, p. 150). This led to the emergence of the new trend of *peace journalism*, which offers an approach for media professionals enabling them to research into the structural and cultural causes of the conflict and its impact on the lives of citizens and to provide a content that reflects the commonalities between all conflict parties in a particular community and produce proposals and initiatives to mitigate this conflict. In line with this, I will explain below how Galtung defined peace journalism, its goals and the *Hierarchy of Influences Model*.

### **Peace Journalism**

This new trend emerged at the beginning of the nineties of the last century under the name of the alternative press or peace journalism at the hands of John Galtung (Galtung, 2002), in which he identified the role of the press in conflict management and peace-building. It stems from the ability of the media to narrow the differences between the parties of the conflict and try to focus on the commonalities between these parties. Especially that the media in all its forms audiovisual, electronic and written has become the most powerful weapon as viewed by some people. Traditionally viewed, it's no more the fourth power, but it might be considered now as the first power. This assumes the journalist responsible for additional burdens in the commitment to turn and moves the news and picture objectively, balanced and impartial and without misguidance, incitement and sedition or distortion of the facts, and without the use of vocabulary that might fuel conflicts, as well as seditious speeches that encourage violence. In any case, the functions of the peaceful media are to highlight the humanitarian aspects and reject disputes (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 2).

The concept of *peace journalism* emerged as an opposite reaction (backfire) to the concept of the war press that covers issues of violence in a biased manner by focusing on violent incidents and details of their own, such as the number of casualties and the type of the weapons used, but doesn't care about the processes and the reasons that led to the violence and its consequences on human life. It believes that the conflict consequences should end with the victory of one of the parties and the defeat of the other party (it was described by Galtung and Fischer (2013) as the

*the low road*). Peace journalism, however, seeks to leave the interpretation to the reader or viewer or listener on the background of the conflict and its causes without bias, and that through conflict analysis and focusing on the facts broadcast as these are without bias in favor of a party at the expense of the other one, and without manipulation of the emotions of masses through the use of emotional words like ‘tragedy’ or ‘innocent’ in order to achieve a higher rate of follow-up, which is the responsibility of the media parties to highlight conflicts and their causes and how to develop solutions to the causes by experts and specialists (or the *high road*) (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 96).

### **Goals of Peace Journalism**

The concept of *peace journalism* offers an alternative entry point for journalists. The media here focus on the structural and cultural causes of conflicts and their impact on the lives of citizens. They reflect the views of all conflict parties and suggest possible solutions and initiatives to reduce the level of violence (Ibid.). The aim of peace journalism is to provide background on how the conflict began and its dimensions so that the public recognizes these dimensions through transparency. It investigates the causes of conflict and approaches solutions thereto through the presentation of perspectives and vision of all parties about the conflict. The press here takes this relying on the strategy of all parties advantage from conflict resolution (Win-Win Strategy) and focusing on the conflict itself as a problem rather than focusing on a particular party as the reason for this conflict (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 3; Hanitzsch, 2004).


In the case of a lack of trust between the conflict parties, peace journalism comes as a third party that can facilitate communication between these parties and reduce the degree of tension between rivals and prevent the conflict from widening and works as means to build and not to tear down. Although the responsibility for resolving the conflict should be assumed by all groups and institutions of the society, journalists, however, with their ability to have access to information and influence the decision-making process can cover the conflict news in a manner that reduces its effects and provide the principles to overcome it (Shinar, 2007; Mitchell, 2012).

With the development of modern means of communication and the trend towards the so-called globalization, there has been an overlapping between the role the means of communication can carry out at the national and international levels. It has become an imperative for the means of communication to change its media strategy in light of the diminishing role of the national state in the field of media, and thus it has been associated with that role played by modern means of communication to add a new force at the international level to countries that acquire these means. After we had two types of powers that countries enjoy and employ to

achieve their goals, namely the *Hard Power* and the *Soft Power*, developed countries have now a third power, which is called the *Smart Power*, and which has emerged after the events of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September. This power is associated with the use of modern means of communication in the information collection and decision-making process. Despite the claims of Western countries for the inevitability of employing their smart joined powers to fight terrorism, but it has become one of the fundamental powers that are used to impact decision-making at the international and national process level (Chetail, 2009).

### **Hierarchy of Influences Model**

Hackett (2006) in his article ‘Is Peace Journalism Possible?’ investigated the conceptual framework of the ‘*hierarchy of influences*’ model by Shoemaker and Reese, and he highlighted the importance of this micro-to-macro model “to identify specific influences on the news, and to explore relationships between them” (p. 6), moreover, it “helps to assess pressures for and against peace journalism at each of five levels of factors” (Ibid., p. 6). The model comprise of the following levels: (1) *individual*, where media content is driven by newsworker’ attitudes, ideologies and socialization, (2) *routines*; where the content is influenced by organizational structures and constraints, (3) *extramedia (institutional)*; where it is shaped by “economic, political, and cultural forces”, and *ideological (sociocultural)*; where news content go along with the status quo and in support of those in power in the society, as shown in the figure below (Reese, 2007, p. 35). Sujoko (2013) described the process of influence: ‘*Organizational factors play a major role in managing other factors in order to win media business competition. Within the political and economic context, the existence of media (organization) can create “power-making space”*’.


**FIGURE 3.9** HIERARCHY OF INFLUENCES MODEL

Source: Shoemaker and Reese (1996).

### Role of Journalists' Media Framing in Conflict Resolution

Journalists and the neutrality of their reports are becoming targets in modern conflicts. In this context, the absence of pure neutrality in political conflict reports does not mean that journalists are “dishonest or deliberately manipulate the information” (Hackett, 2006, p. 5). On the contrary, it is the status where neutrality is something undesirable to appeal, especially in the situations of violence, injustice and so forth. As has been said, “the worst place in hell is reserved to those who stay neutral in times of crisis” (Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 151). Luhmann (2000) once stated: “*the news that ‘sells’ are those that captures the attention of the audience is spectacular, unforeseen, and dramatic facts*”.

Although scholarly attempts to pinpoint the complexity of the heuristic process of news decisions have failed to have a firm grasp of the pattern used by journalists to include or exclude a story, scholars agreed on the following main factors that apparently seem to have an influence on this process: *news factors*. It was empirically proven that the more personalized, negative, and factual the story, the bigger the chance to be included. At the same time, this type of news factors seems to explain lots of news selection by the audience. *Institutional objectives*; it summarizes the pressure imposed by the employer and the journalist employment status to highlight specific kind of news and disregard others, how to present it, and to follow and frame it in line with the political agenda of the institution or employer (Donsbach, 2004, p. 134). Figure 3.10 hereunder illustrates the elements of journalists' dilemma in news decisions.

**FIGURE 3.10 JOURNALISTS' DILEMMA IN NEWS DECISIONS**

Source: Donsbach, 2004, p. 137.

Tankard (2001) believed that journalists at times circulate frames to skew audiences' attitudes toward an issue, and viewed frames as a mean to manipulate and spin the interpretation of messages by audiences, which can be true. Other scholars believed that frames were being used as tools to reduce the complexity of issues and to convey, identify and classify information in a way that allows audiences to have easy accessibility to and to make sense of that issue even if they were ignorant of it (Scheufele, 2008a). Reese (2001) however moved beyond all this to the conscious side of framing and suggested that "it always implies an active process", and analysts should determine the degree to which framing is prevailing (König, 2008).

A lot of questions are raised on the subject of peace journalism. Can a journalist maintain peaceful coverage or write while his country is under a certain external aggression? Can this concept remain theoretically sound, whilst it's actually difficult to achieve, where the journalist is exposed to pressure from the management of the media institution in which he works as to follow a particular style that serves the interests of the management? It's the duty of the journalist to cover the facts, but instead of fomenting the psychological situation of the public, he can draw attention to the existing peace initiatives. Furthermore, the journalist can highlight the humanitarian demands rather than focusing exclusively on the stances of politicians.

Hackett (2006, p. 11) concluded with three approaches for changing journalistic strategies, one of which focused on reforming journalism from within, meaning, to let journalists take the lead away from an agency restrictions or whatsoever. He added: *'PJ is likely to derive from the victims of war, from activists committed to peace-building processes, and/or from social justice movements marginalized by current patterns of national or global communication'*.

### 3.2.6 Mass Media Propaganda in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The term *propaganda* is a communication pattern that aims at consolidating certain convictions and ideas in the recipient public through ‘the manipulation of significant symbols’, and consequently, ‘the management of collective attitudes’ (Lasswell, 1927, p. 627). In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prevailing vision between the two parties about the media of the counterpart is that it belongs to a media propaganda system that lacks credibility and does not tell the truth and that it’s a media that present non-innocent and tendentious information. It is a key vision with the Arab journalists and researchers, as well as with the ordinary Arabs alike towards the Israeli media. The same applies to the vision of the Israeli party towards the Arab media system. The reason is that it’s the enemy media (Liebes & First, 2003, p. 61).

There are those who believe that this psychological war is one-sided, imposed by the Israeli strongest media side against the most vulnerable Palestinian side. The psychological war, being the control of the information directed to the public in order to create confusion, affect the psychological condition and propagate despair among the ranks of the enemy and their proponents. In this sense, the Israeli media system wages in its totality a psychological war against the Palestinians, and here the assessment of this psychological warfare and media power, as well as the acquisition of the power features and the clarity of the media mission, are different. Each party accuses the other of exercising propaganda and psychological warfare propaganda and incitement against him and his community. The conflict came to be seen not as mere acts of mutual violence and balance of deterrence, but also as a balance in media images and narratives, and that the collective self-portrayal is targeted and that the party concerned is the victim (Shinar, 2003, p. 6).

#### Narratives

Many Arab and Palestinian experts wrote about the Israeli media’s role and its employment of all printed and audio-visual means and harnessing them as to serve the objectives of the Zionist project which stipulates that Palestine is a liberated Jewish land and not a Palestinian occupied territory, and that the present Israel is a repetition of ancient Israel, and that Palestine’s history begins with the Kingdom of David in the tenth century BC and ends with the new Israel, which represents a resurrection of ancient Israel and a revival of this latter. In the context of these Israeli allegations (Yiftachel, 1999, p. 8), the former Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, addressed the Knesset during the visit of the Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat to Israel in 1977, saying:



*'We did not seize any foreign land. We are back home, and the tie that is between our people and this land is an eternal tie, that has been established since the dawn of history, and was never loose, at any time. In this land, our ancestors established our civilization, and it prophesied the coming of the prophets, and when we were displaced under the bulk of the force used against us and moved away from our country, we have not forgotten this land, even for one single day'.*

This has been referred to by Abdul Qader Abdul Ali (2003) as *the land narratives*, which include legends (narratives) that are consistent with the idea of the promised land Palestine as a poor land, almost empty of dwellers and of any other people, which in his view is a biblical legend that has been developed by the Zionists with the emergence of the Zionist movement and the Zionist romantic literature, allowing the Zionist movement to become a national, secular movement, but on ethnic-religious principles inspired by Jewish religious narratives that are secularized (Bein, 1990, p. 284; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 45). For example, the Torah has been viewed not as a divine book, but as a historic document, and the religious traditions and rites have been seen as national folklore that has preserved the Jewish people from being dissolved. Abdul Ali also added that *the legend of forced exile*, through which the Jewish people in his opinion believe that they have incurred twice a forced exile<sup>(1)</sup> from their country. The historical fact refers to the broad dispersion of Jewish communities across the major cities of the Mediterranean (Alexandria, Athens, Rome, and more) much earlier than this date through migrations and movements dictated by the commercial interests of the Jews in that era. This narrative is for the media of benefit as it encourages migration and proves the legitimacy of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of settlements at the expense of the indigenous population (Gavison, 1999, p. 55).

In response to these Israeli allegations, the Palestinian writer Zakaria Mohammed (2004) commented saying:

*'The Palestinian citizen found himself in the light of these false claims suddenly without history, without a past, and became just a guest of this history. Where Israel ancient history seems to be a moment in the long Palestinian history, this moment has been focused on the Israeli propaganda machine, pretending that it is the core of this history. Everything before it is void. It seems that the moment of Israel's creation in 1948 has swallowed all foregoing moments embodied in the Palestinian history, which is rooted in Palestine since its first era'.*

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<sup>(1)</sup>The first one in the era of the Babylonian Assyrian Empire led by Nebuchadnezzar when the Israelis were exiled to Babylon, and the last exile was in the Roman era, during which the temple has been destroyed in 70 AD.

This led to the formation or promotion of counter-narratives passed by the Palestinian media, which is considered as a model for the Arab media and is dedicated to discourses post-Nakba (catastrophe) and post-setback (1967 war) (Alray, 2010). The Palestinian media have developed a set of narratives in its entirety. These were a response to the Zionist discourse and were coping with it. Among this is the Israeli denial of the identity and the continuous Palestinian history. The reaction is the production of a national discourse that restores the Palestinian folklore and the local traditions and a display of the history of the region before and during the biblical era and during the Islamic period, enabling thereby the Palestinian media to produce a narrative history of a Palestinian nationalism throughout the whole history, which shows that the contemporary Palestinian is a descendant of the people of the 'Giants' and the Canaanites (Dabash, 2011, p. 1; Zarley, 1990, p. 11). Furthermore, Arab analysts view that the Israeli media promote the notion of the *Islamic fundamentalism* as to delude the world that extremism is the origin of Islam and the essence of its teachings. It is noted that the Western media, the American in particular, fell prisoner to this notion until the distance shrunk between the Islamic fundamentals and the political extremism movements that 'abolish' the other, shed his blood, and harm these Islamic fundamentals in the light of the developments that take place in the Arab world, as is the case in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and the spread of ISIS and the radical political thought that distorted the image of Arabs and Muslims (Abu Sway, 2009).

Among the topics that fuel the conflict is the term *anti-Semitism*, which for Jews is a reality and tragedy suffered by the Jewish people in the Diaspora, where the Israelis think that a Jew remains hated outside his homeland. In this context, the phrase 'Siege Mentality' pops up, which according to Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992a, p. 633) "denotes a mental state in which group members hold a central belief that the rest of the world has negative behavioral intentions toward them". Therefore, Jewish people must have, they say, a homeland or a refuge that shelters them and lets them live like other peoples, the matter which promotes immigration and adherence to the Promised Land allocated to the Jews. Most of the Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular, consider this fact as a merely Zionist narrative that reduces the historical reality of the presence of Jewish groups and distorts the facts and shortens the position towards the Jews to a binary, namely either with or against, and omits the third position, which includes indifference to the Jews, and overlooks the historical objective reasons for the hatred of Jews associated with the conditions of the social and economic life of the Jews and their representation of professional groups working in trade and certain special crafts and ally themselves with the supreme authorities in any country they dwell in (Neuberger, 1998). Therefore, many Jewish groups were left vulnerable to persecution whenever the status of power has altered and became the victim of popular uprisings as happened in Russia, Ukraine and

Poland during the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

It's noteworthy to refer also to the legend of the *besieged fortress*, in which the world stands against the people of Israel. This is what Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992b, p. 251) referred to as the 'siege mentality', which he defined as "a belief held by group members stating that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions towards them". This narrative in its various diversities instilled in the psyche of Jewish Israeli individuals and in the Jewish collective memory the notion of being in a permanent and present danger, caused by the hostility of gentiles (non-Jews) to the people of Israel (Laqueur, 2003, p. 3). It reflects, in fact, an accumulated experience of a collective memory of Jewish groups, especially the Jews of Eastern Europe, who have had a long experience with repeated massacres and persecutions. Such a legend is reinforced by a set of historical narratives, for example, the narrative of 'Masada', created by secular Zionism<sup>(2)</sup>, the Jewish fortress that has been besieged by the Romans in 70 A.D. after the fall of Jerusalem, where Jewish fighters, according to the narrative, refused to surrender and committed collective suicide. They preferred to commit suicide rather than to fall prisoners into the hands of the Romans. This narrative, which projects the story of 'Massada' in this form, is intended to foster the national affiliation and the revival of Jewish heroism, which refuses to surrender to pagans. There is also the narrative of the permanent danger delimited by the facts of the Holocaust or the Nazi holocaust as a historical happening, the actual events of which are exaggerated or hyper-dramatized (Ben-Yehuda, 1995, p. 9).

These set of narratives and more contribute to the building of self-awareness and solidarity among members of the group towards the danger and the enemy, who gains legendary dimensions as to create the so-called 'Ethos', which constitutes a set of beliefs or convictions inside the group, including a range of ethical and value constants that determine the orientations of the group towards the enemy and within everyday life.

### **Societal Beliefs and Conflict Ethos**

Societies in intractable conflicts like the case of Palestine and Israel generate and define societal beliefs to cope with such ethnonational conflict, and meet the demands of the conflict. The process of coping with the conflict is not solely limited to military, human, and economic resources, but extend to developing psychological mechanisms or societal beliefs that prepare and reinforce citizens in conflict to bear hardship including physical and mental loss/stress, costs, personal scarifies, and to evoke feelings of solidarity and unity, and much more. Through socialization

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<sup>(2)</sup>"Religious Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists were, to a vast extent, not part in the creation of the myth. Many even objected fiercely to the myth" (Ben-Yehuda, 1995, p. 9).

process beliefs are being imparted into the public shaping the eyes through which they view the conflict, and through which the ethos is formed. Ethos is part and parcel of the group's "language, stereotypes, images, myths, and collective memories", through which they react, take actions and decisions (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 765). Haddad (2004, p. 765) once stated that in definition societal beliefs are "society members' shared cognitions on issues that are of concern to society and that contribute to their sense of uniqueness. Their contents refer to society's characteristics and structure and to processes of its development, and they include beliefs about societal goals, self-images, aspirations, norms and values, images of out-groups, and so forth". This makes the conflict, in the case of ethos being formed around it, approaching the zero solution and remains transmitted from generation to generation so that mobilization on this basis from the media aspect becomes easy. As a result, the mutual hostile perception and the dehumanization of the other party will be enhanced. Accordingly, core beliefs in the conflict ethos are formed from the (a) Negative image of the enemy (b) Positive image of the collective self and legitimacy of its goals (c) Self-portrayal as a victim (d) Positive image of the group and self-determination (e) Self-perceptions of security (f) Own perceptions about the homeland and nationalism (g) Issue of national unity (h) Issue of peace and final settlement (Ibid.).

### **Perceptions of Israeli Media in the Arab World**

Arabs and Palestinians believe that the Israeli media, with their organized and planned propaganda and their distinct, strategic goals seek to silence the Palestinian history and cut off any Arab and Palestinian ties with it. That is the same history that bequeathed the Palestinians a sense that their past and their presence have been usurped in the light of this Zionist propaganda and distortion of history (Abu A'rqoub, 2015). Many Arab sociologists believed that the discourse the Israeli media pass was a deceitful one, in which the numerous speeches end up with so many discrepancies and contradictions as the addressed groups or communities count. The outcome is an inconsistent image to Israel as a state and society. It is a kaleidoscopic discourse that turns to the US and Western European world portraying Israel as a garden or an oasis amid barren desert, as a democratic, liberal and secular state that faces the threat of genocide in the Arab world with its authoritarian countries, that are full of hatred and intolerance against Western democratic values (Abid Elhahmeed, 2014). The same discourse turns to the Asians to portray Israel as an Asian country and a successful pattern in development, and to the Africans with the portray of a state that is suffering from wars and that it is a young country, that has achieved independence and sought development and cooperation with countries of the South.

Edward Sa'id; a Palestinian scholar viewed the Zionist propaganda as the most intimidating propaganda machine in the world that deforms the image of an entire people, as the Israeli media apply the method of the information dumping, reiteration of the media mission, the use of contrasting and binary reductionism style by presenting Israel as the pioneer, developed country in the Middle East, and, in exchange, presenting information, studies, reports and statistics about the backwardness in the Arab world and the rate of illiteracy in it, as well as fanaticism, acts of terrorism, repression by the authorities and ill-treatment of minorities (Said et al., 1998, p. 7). The Israeli media cover truth with falsehood, and portray the victim as executioner and the murdered as a killer; all that to mislead the public opinion, inverse facts or erase them. In this context, Israeli media depict Israel as 'a victim of Palestinian violence'. It is the overall picture of the Israeli, Western and the US-American media that highlights Israel as being surrounded by violent people attacking it with rocks, and that the Israeli missiles and tanks are used to protect Israeli citizens from the Palestinian violence (Hallas, 2014; Abid Elhahmeed, 2014).

On the one hand, the Israeli Media suffers from an inadequate self-censorship. Kasbari (2011, p. 2) added:

*'In times of serious crisis Israeli media coverage adopts an absolute military agenda; the majority of the media gives an exclusive platform to military personnel and to military correspondence, justifying their attitudes and interpretations without offering alternative viewpoints'.*

It reports the event as in war situation without any criticism or different views discussed or shown in public. On the other hand, the majority of Palestinian journalists think that the profession is kind of national patriotic task, which hinders the actual role of the press and media during the Israeli occupation (Ibid.). Khaleel Shaheen of Al Ayyam of Ramallah said in an international seminar on the role of media in the peace process (2005):

*'The Palestinian media reflected a realistic image of what was taking place, the barricades, the destructions, the shootings, the settlers uprooting land and destroying houses and the imprisonment of thousands. There could be no peace with occupation'.*

In the same seminar, Gideon Levy a Journalist and Columnist of Ha'aretz of Israel said:

*'The majority of journalists were telling the truth, but not all the truth. They wrote maybe that a house of a Palestinian had been demolished, maybe, but they would never write about the 12 children that had now become homeless,*

*or who would probably grow up to be suicide bombers. Telling only part of the truth was a betrayal. The Israeli reader's whole political thinking was manipulated towards terrorism and terror. This was a dehumanization of the Palestinians, and it was the biggest crime of the Israeli media'.*

Israeli media achieved a great success in portraying 'the Palestinian struggle' to the American public opinion by attempting to match between the struggle of the Palestinians and that of Taliban, particularly after the horrific events of September 11, 2001, suggesting that the Palestinian struggle is just 'acts of violence', which are not different from the 'terrorism' the US administration is combating to secure the US citizen, trying to describe Palestinian youths, holders of guns, and Palestinian children with explosive belts around their waists, with violence and terrorism. The Israeli justification for the targeted assassinations and the indiscriminate bombing is supported by allegations that the bombing targeted weapons' depots, missiles factories or shelters harboring terrorist stores or that the attacks were to thwart terror acts (Al-Shaer, 2013; Abu Ghneima, 2014; Abu Sa'da, 2010). Al-Qutbi (2015) once added that the Israeli media have been teaching - and continue to teach - the Jewish mind the two complexes: fear of the Arabs and the technical and moral superiority over them as means to achieve their objectives for instilling feelings of resentment, antagonism, and hatred against all that is Arab. There is no doubt that the various media methods pursued by the Zionist media are distinct evidence that the Zionist movement is one of the few movements in this world that has successfully applied the media as a weapon and made the best use of it as to become a powerful and influential tool in their hands. The methods used in the Zionist media are complex, ramified and overlapping one another, but they all meet the wished requirements, be it on the level of extortion, propitiation or as a maneuvering style.

### **Perceptions of Palestinian Media in Israel**

The Israelis view the Arab media as a propaganda media that promote anti-semitism (anti-Jewish) and incite against Jews, against the State of Israel and the people of Israel, and that it's a non-independent media that target brainwashing of helpless citizens. Such media are held responsible for the hostility and incitement against Israel. Rather, the media conflict between Arabs and Israelis reached a stage of psychological warfare, especially in the circumstances of the second Palestinian intifada (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, p. 633). Expressions and remarks about Palestinian incitement are common in Israel, and it might reflect the most common Israeli perception about the Palestinian media according to which, the Palestinian media is another branch of the Palestinian authority / Hamas movement. One of the distinctive speakers about it is the Prime Minister of Israel; Benjamin Netanyahu, who referred to what he calls 'the Palestinian incitement' in some occasions. For ex-

ample, in a special Cabinet meeting in January 2015, the discussion was about the Palestinian Authority incitement and the ‘culture of hatred’ in the Palestinian Authority. According to the Prime Minister Office’s website, “the findings show that incitement against Israel and the Jewish People is continuing on official media channels including *inter alia* by bodies that are very close to the Palestinian Authority Chairman and in educational and religious networks”.

There are more examples of government leaders in Israel blaming the Palestinian Authority and its Prime Minister’s incitement for impeding a peace agreement (Beer, 2014). Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon claimed, “*The Palestinians still educate toward incitement and bigotry based on quotes from Hitler. They claim that there are no Jewish people*”. Minister Steinitz said, “*We must not ignore the fact that the Palestinian educational system and media, under the patronage of Abu-Mazen and during the negotiations, are educating and inciting on a daily basis for the destruction of the State of Israel*”. Justice Minister Tzipi Livni accepts the served-up-as-truth campaign as unassailable: “*The incitement on the Palestinian side is horrible. It’s terrible to educate children to hate*”, she said, despite her conclusion that it is precise because of this that we need a diplomatic solution (B. Ravid, 2015).

Netanyahu also said in a cabinet meeting that “*True peace cannot come into being without a halt in incitement against Israel and without education toward peace. The refusal of the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish People and declare the end of national demands this is the root of the conflict*”. Netanyahu mentioned the Palestinian media also in a statement during a visit of Secretary of State John Kerry on January 2014<sup>(3)</sup>:

*‘I know that I am committed to peace; but, unfortunately, given the actions and words of Palestinian leaders, there’s growing doubt in Israel that the Palestinians are committed to peace. In the six months since the start of peace negotiations, the Palestinian Authority continues its unabated incitement against the State of Israel. This Palestinian government incitement is rampant. You see it in the state-controlled media, the Government-controlled media, in the schools, in textbooks, in kindergartens. You see it in every part of Palestinian society. So instead of preparing Palestinians for peace, Palestinian leaders are teaching them to hate Israel. This is not the way to achieve peace. President Abbas must lead his people away from terror and incitement towards reconciliation and peace’.*

He added in an another speech at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) on 28.01.2014:

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<sup>(3)</sup>Statement by PM Netanyahu and Secretary of State John Kerry, 02.01.2014, Website: <http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/mediacenter/events/pages/eventkerry020114.aspx>.

*‘Now, since you know very well that throughout these 90 years there was and continues to be unceasing incitement against the State of Israel - against the Zionist movement before the establishment of the country and then, without any difference between them, it continued both in the Palestinian Authority and in the Hamas. Actually, there is one difference: Hamas uses terror, and the PA doesn’t, and that is important. But incitement and non-acceptance of the State of Israel, unfortunately, continue in both places. We see it in school books; we see it in schools; we see it in the Palestinian media, which as you know is controlled by the Palestinian government; we see this also in mosques, in sermons, in things that are regrettably said by Palestinian leaders internally’.*

However, according to Ravid (2012), the sources of information on which the prime minister based regarding the Palestinian incitement might be biased. He argued that since the intelligence unit does not cover this topic, the Palestinian Media Watch<sup>(4)</sup> - a right-wing organization, sends updates about it to Prime minister’s office and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The website of the Palestinian Media Watch, an Israeli research institute that was founded in 1996, contains detailed overviews about the Palestinian media. The editors describe their activity as a study of the Palestinian society from a broad range of perspectives by monitoring and analyzing the Palestinian Authority through its media and schoolbooks. The website’s major focus is on the messages that the Palestinian leaders, from the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and Hamas, send to the population through the broad range of institutions and infrastructures they control. The website includes overview about what the editors call: ‘demonization of Jews/Israelis’; ‘PA depicts a world without Israel’, ‘Violence and terror’, ‘Rewriting history’, ‘Holocaust denial and distortion’; ‘Jerusalem under assault’, ‘Views on peace-making’, and more.

Fishman (2011) described the pervasiveness and intensity of Palestinian incitement against Israel. According to his argument, the Palestinian Authority is an oligarchy whose purpose is a war against Israel. Its leaders consider deception and the ‘armed struggle’ as the legitimate means by which they can achieve their goals and have adapted their educational system to fill the younger generation with hatred and the desire to perpetrate terrorist acts. Because of the reality behind it, incitement is the real ‘deal-breaker’. One side wants peace while the other does not.

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<sup>(4)</sup><http://www.palwatch.org>.



### 3.3 Objectives of Public Opinion Analyses

Analyzing public opinion through up-to-date data, public attitudes, as well as their needs and wishes, enable better assessment and understanding of the actual status quo. This provided a real and true relic of data on public opinion, its components and directions, which in turn helped me make appropriate decisions in agreement with available facts that direct public opinion to certain conclusions.

Therefore, a representative sample was conducted in each country that investigate the opinion of each side on fundamental issues, which are considered as an important start for the commencement of the negotiations on the final solution and the reach of a permanent settlement with the other side. Fundamental issues included:

1. Settlements.
2. Prisoners.
3. Jerusalem.
4. The security of both Israel and the Palestinians.
5. Borders and crossing points.
6. The Refugees.
7. Control over natural resources like water.
8. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders.
9. Recognizing the Jewish state.
10. Having control over holy places.
11. One-State solution.
12. Two-State solution.

Moreover, it's pivotal to understand how citizens' perceptions of the peace process and the conflict are shaped, and which factors influence the formation of these perceptions. Below are some factors or extraneous variables that were mentioned in the survey:

- *Individual-level factors* like gender, age, education, income, party identification, concern for and knowledge of the issues.
- *Personal experience*: it dealt with conflict-related experiences as an outcome of direct interaction with citizens. For instance, in the case of casualties or injuries: if someone lost a family member in the conflict, then, an acute perception of the conflict is to be expected. Other examples were the daily humiliation and movement/traveling restrictions imposed by Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, in particular for those working in different cities in the West Bank or inside the green line. In addition to the firing of Al-Qassam rockets at nearby Israeli settlements, especially for those living in these areas or around them. Accordingly, this level (if active) is regarded to have a significant influence on citizens' perception of the conflict, which urges recognizing its effect

and defining the extent to which it skews perceptions on both sides.

- *Various beliefs and emotions*: it incorporated perceived senses of vulnerability (threat/lack of safety and security), freedom, victimization, injustice, distrust, helplessness, and original affinity to the land. The combination of these self-concept emotions and beliefs formed an Index of citizen's quality of life in both societies, which I believe added a significant and direct influence on the structuring of perceptions.
- *Acceptance, grievance and sympathy towards the other*: it addressed the extent to which the Palestinians and the Israelis accept each other, and how deep they allocate senses of grievance against or sympathy towards each other. It focused on exchanged feelings of grievance and sympathy, and the legitimacy each party attaches to the other, which stimulate distinct perceptions, rather than others. The added value of this level was that it produced a clear-cut hint of the citizen's readiness to compromise for peace and to put an end to the conflict. For instance, the more sympathy (or less grievance) feelings a citizen have towards the other, the more he or she is ready to compromise for peace and vice versa.
- *Willingness and hope of reaching a solution*: it looked into the willingness and desire of the Palestinians and the Israelis to reach a solution to the conflict. To what degree each side is ready or willing to compromise for achieving peace, and the hope each party holds to realizing this peace.

These and much more factors and extraneous variables were examined in the survey analysis of this dissertation. The matrix in the upcoming section includes a thorough description of each variable in addition to other interesting factors derived from the matrix, literature review, and desk research. This despite my certain knowledge that any attempt at a long-term prediction and evaluation of the public opinion will be just a rough estimate that should be treated very conservatively. Mainly because both the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion can be easily affected by many events surrounding the conflict, the results of which are very hardly predictable. However, to deal now with the central issues of the peace process could give an indication or, at least, a sign of the general standing of the matters to be settled and the solutions to be reached through the negotiation of the final settlement in the future.

Finally, the results revealed the size of the gap between published opinions and dimensions in the media and the real salient views and dimensions in people's minds. Therefore, it minimized the gap between the "individuals' own opinion and their perceived opinion of what the majority thinks on political issues" (Donsbach, 1997, p. 21). Furthermore, it helped gauge the extent to which mass media shape public's thinking, and, as a result, limit its influence on political decision making of informed politicians (Ibid.).

### 3.3.1 Public Opinion, a Brief Overview

Not to have any opinions is equivalent to not having individuality, personhood, identity, character, self. This is how it was described by Hirschman (1989, p. 76): *‘It is, in fact, the opposite condition that has been widely commended by social scientists, psychologists, and philosophers: to have opinions very much of one’s own’*. Converse (1964, p: 215-216) developed five hierarchically ordered levels of conceptualization that represent different strata of classification: Ideologues, Near-ideologues, Group interest, Nature of the times, and No issue content. Ideologues were those respondents who replied in “some active way on a relatively abstract and far-reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting policy significance over time were evaluated”. According to Converse, Ideologues only constitute “4 percent of the public that has a political belief system and has the ability to think abstractly making them ideologues” (p. 216). Near-ideologues mentioned “such a dimension in a peripheral way but did not appear to place much evaluative dependence upon it or who used such concepts in a fashion that raised doubt about the breadth of their understanding of the meaning of the term”. The Near-Ideologues are approximately 12 percent. They use key terms repeatedly used in the media, such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’; however, they do not know what does these terms represent. Group interest included those respondents who “failed to rely on any such over-arching dimensions yet evaluated parties and candidates in terms of their expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of different social groupings in the population” (p. 216). This level constitutes almost the majority at 45 percent. Nature of the times respondents were those who “invoked some policy considerations in their evaluations yet employed none of the references meriting location in any of the first three levels” (p. 217). “Twenty-two percent of the public fall into this category and based their preferences as to whether times were good or bad”. Lastly, no issue content included “those respondents, whose evaluations of the political scene had no shared of policy significance whatever” (p. 217). Converse believed that 17 percent of the public fall into this category.

Accordingly, Converse verified in his study and Zaller in the early nineties the same fact of the uninformed and ignorant public about governmental and political issues, and that the idea of “high-quality opinions that are usually described as being stable, consistent, informed, and connected to abstract principles and values are rare in the mass public” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 103). In other words, they concluded that most respondents chose their answers based on a flip of a coin, they have no true political ideology, only slight understanding of important debates, and a tendency to change opinions frequently. The vast majority of the public unconsciously avoids understanding issues that are not clearly and directly related to them as individuals.

The development of scientific polling started in the period surrounding World War II. Research during the first two decades after this period yielded a broad agreement; “the ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ on three propositions about public opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies, (2) it lacks coherence or structure, and (3) in the final analysis, it has little, if any, impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992, p. 439). This traditional view that the public react to issues in an emotional and ill-informed way, “creating the positional for public opinion to hinder the pursuit of the national interest” has been vigorously challenged in recent researches (Knopf, 1998, p. 544). One of the first studies to challenge this classical view was Page and Shapiro (1988, 1992) who argued that collective opinion, instead of being volatile and meaningless, are ‘rational’ and develop and change in a reasonable fashion, responding to new information and external events (Bélanger & Pétry, 2005, p. 1). A number of recent studies supported Page’s and Shapiro’s argument of public opinion rationality and consistency, such as Holsti (1992) study on the Vietnam War and its aftermath that challenged the three propositions of Almond-Lippmann consensus mentioned above. In addition to Isernia et al. (2002) study on Americans’ public opinion about foreign policy by using a comprehensive set of quantitative and historical data on foreign policy opinion changes in the United States from the 1930s to the 1980s. They have found that American public opinion is neither volatile nor capricious, and it reacts in a reasonable manner to external changes.

Besides, Bélanger and Pétry (2005) study of the Canadian public opinion in an analyze of 60 years of trends on policy issues, revealed that the Canadian public opinion through these years to be stable, which is, as they concluded “a sign of a rational public opinion”. Accordingly, “evidence based upon analysis have found a certain amount of stability in the preferences revealed by surveys of public opinion, which appears to move rationally and consistently with external events” (Knopf, 1998), and simply, “unstable opinions may just reflect an unstable foreign environment” (Penny & Fielding, 2006, p. 1).

### **3.3.2 Public Opinion in the Democratic Process**

The important role of public opinion in democratic theory has been tough to define, the term ‘public opinion’ is defined by Glynn et al. (2004: 1929) as an aggregation of individual opinions, a reflection of majority beliefs, a clash of group interests and as media and elite opinion. On the individual level, Zaller (1992a, p. 6) has stated: *‘Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it’*. According to Viola (2006), public opinion is a vital component of any democratic system for several reasons: First, the fundamental definition of

democracy is the 'rule by the people'; therefore, policy in democratic states should rest on public opinion. Secondly, public opinion plays a huge role in reflecting how the public view their representatives' actions and policies - Are the opinions and needs of the public well addressed by their representatives, or not? (Ibid., p. 5). Most scholars who studied public opinion and public policy in democratic countries agree that public opinion influences public policy and "are the more salient an issue to the public, the stronger the relationship is likely to be" (Burstein, 2006, p. 29; Monroe, 1998, p. 7).

Indeed, political scientists, scholars of international relations, and public opinion experts emphasized in their researches the complex nature of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, and the multitude of ways and modalities public opinion can impact decision-making (Shamir, 2007, p. 6). In this context, scholars (Naveh, 1998; Yuchtman-Yaar, Herman, & Nadler, 1996) of foreign policy decision making recognize public opinion as a significant factor influencing policy choices. Attitudes and beliefs of citizens are described as "forming part of the societal environment that influences government decisions in democratic states" (Maoz & McCauley, 2005, p. 792). Accordingly, "leaders must be attuned to public sentiment, as public-opinion support becomes critical", because constraining unrealistic popular expectations and lack of popular support can handicap them (Shamir, 2007, p: 1-5).

### **Studies of Public Opinion Amidst the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict**

There are an extensive collection of studies that discussed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from various perspectives and points of views. Due to the generality suggested by the objective of study i.e. to investigate the perception of the peace process and the conflict, and the role of intervening factors in the establishing of these perception frames, I attempted to highlight some of the prominent or on-going studies and projects that touched upon significant aspects of public opinion formation amidst the conflict.

An interesting longitudinal study of sixteen joint polls from July 2000 to June 2006 done by Shamir (2007, p. 17) in a joint project<sup>(5)</sup> used Putnam's classic two-level game metaphor as it focuses on the important role of domestic factors, mainly, the important role of public opinion in determining the conduct of the Israeli-Palestinian two-level games. He compared Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in its most fundamental dimensions (p. 17), his questions stemmed from President Clinton's ideas in December 2000 and Geneva initiative of December 2003, which according to his study comprised of the six most important components of


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<sup>(5)</sup>It was initiated by the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah in 2000.

a permanent-status framework; the end of conflict component, the demilitarized state component, the sovereignty/security component, the borders component, the Jerusalem component, and finally, the refugee component (p. 36).

Adwan et al. (2013); a team of Palestinian and Israeli scholars conducted a comprehensive fact-based textbook analysis<sup>(6)</sup> for Israelis and Palestinian school books over a period of three years, and found that ‘dehumanizing characterizations’ of the other was rarely found in school textbooks of both nations, school books tend to omit important information about the other, which includes information about religions, cultures and so on so forth. A concrete example is textbooks not mentioning the other on the map, as if the people and the land of the other do not exist, which in their opinion denies the legitimate existence of the other and therefore generates a hurdle to the peace process. Moreover, school textbooks portray the other as an enemy aiming to dominate and eliminate the own nation, and any actions to stop this from happening are acts of peace and self-defense. Further results discussed how school textbooks are being very selective in presenting and reinforcing historical events that support the own national narrative. It is worth noting that the majority of Israeli Jews opposed “adopting a school curriculum that recognizes the Palestinian state and to abandoning the aspiration to regain parts of the Jewish homeland that are in the Palestinian state” as shown in Figure 3.11 below:

**FIGURE 3.11** RECOGNIZING PALESTINE IN ISRAELI CURRICULUM



Source: JIPP data - The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, June 2009, in Halperin et al., 2010, p. 34

Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998, p. 761), at some stages of the conflicts, even educational and cultural systems become politicized to serve the interest of “knowing your enemy”, which is evident in the Figure above. Oren et al. (2004) had a different point of view, according to him, the phenomena of the extreme miss presentation of


<sup>(6)</sup>The study was initiated by the Jerusalem-based Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land.

the rival party in schools' text books, in both nations, has considerably changed to have a better representation of reality.

Canetti et al. (2015, p. 264) explored how repeated personal exposure to conflict violence results in psychological distress, which in turn lead to changes in interrelated political attitudes and behavior, and physiological and psychological outcomes. The outcome of the exposure to the different kinds of conflict violence coupled with increased threat perceptions and poor physical status might ultimately foster “extremism, exclusionism, and decrease willingness to compromise for peace in the face of ongoing conflict” (p. 269).

Halperin et al. (2010) among other scholars investigated the role of socio-psychological barriers in preventing peaceful resolution of conflicts, which they defined as “an integrated operation of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes, combined with a pre-existing repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs, world views, and emotions, that result in selective, biased, and distorted information processing” (p. 28). These barriers preserve and reinforce fundamentally biased conflict-supporting beliefs that obstruct any attempt at peace negotiations or suggestions by the adversary or any third-party mediator (p. 29). As shown in Figure 3.12 below. They investigated this framework from the perspective of Israeli Jewish society only.

**FIGURE 3.12** SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION



Source: Halperin et al. (2010, p. 30).

Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) examined the psychological dynamics that con-

tribute to the intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Including (1) *Totality*, where the fulfillment of basic needs such as recognition and security are crucial for survival and persistence, (2) *Protractedness*, describes how generations inherit the conflict, adapt to it, and develop animosity and prejudice, (3) *Centrality*; the awareness, relevance, and accessibility of conflict information to the public, mainly controlled by their salience in the media and political and intellectual elites, (4) *Violence*; how violent is the conflict, including number of casualties, terrorist attacks, and more, which according to Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998, p. 762) can “generate intense animosity that becomes integrated into the socialization processes in each society”. Finally, (5) *Perception of Irreconcilability*, where each society view the other’s positions or solutions as so different that agreement is not possible or zero-sum, and where “each side perceives its own goals as essential for its own survival and, therefore, does not see a place for the concessions regarded by the other side as essential for conflict resolution” (p. 762).

In their opinion, there are many unique characteristics that make the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more resistance to resolution, firstly, the *Perception of exclusive* where each side perceive itself as “the indigenous people on the land”, and which exclusively denies the right of the other to the land. This supports the idea of zero-sum, where if Israelis gave up the land occupied in the West Bank, then they are giving parts of their own right in part of the promised Land of Israel that preserve their Jewish states, and in the case of Palestinians, it is also an ultimate concession where they are giving up the majority of their own land to achieve sovereignty over a small part of the land. This leaves an agreement “almost inevitably accompanied by a profound sense of loss that can overshadow its potential gains” (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 764).

*History of victimization*, which is summarized in the deeply-rooted senses of historical persecutions and destructions that accumulate over time and leave each group absent in its own tragic national experience regardless and in the state of denial of the other group horrific experiences. They also wrote about ‘the Law of Return’ in Israel, and how Israel consider itself the state of the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora on the cost of the minority of mainly Palestinians living within Israel. Moreover, they explored the Palestinian Right of return and how the Palestinians are eager to absorb the refugees back into the newly established Palestinian state at the expense of Israeli settlers in the West bank. Again, this emphasizes the discrepancy between Palestinians and Israelis, and minimizes the potentiality of reaching a permanent resolution to the conflict.

What deteriorate the situation even more is the *Politicization of religion* on both sides, where religious segments invoke “deep religious beliefs to rationalize their political claim”, a rationalization that in turn leads to fanaticism and violence, some-



thing that mass media easily pick up and miss-feed the representation of the conflict in the population minds. For instance, Haddad (2004) investigated the perception of suicide bombings from a data conducted by two Palestinian refugee camps and found that the influence of political Islam is quite evident and plays a crucial role in the formation of perception regarding suicide bombings. The mainstream perceived the conflict as more national than religious, however with current rationalization, the conflict is being dangerously politicized that it became “a clash of religious doctrines in which the possibility of reconciliation becomes unimaginable, and that can, therefore, lead to an unending contest of religiously motivated wills” (Ibid., p. 765).


Oren et al. (2004) in the chapter of ‘Conflict, Identity, and Ethos Societal beliefs’ outlined the influence of the different societal beliefs between the rival sides on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They studied these social beliefs from three related dimensions, which are: (1) the societal beliefs in the justness of one’s own goals that provide the epistemic rationale for the outbreak of the conflict and later continue to maintain it, (2) the societal beliefs about the opponent’s delegitimization, and (3) one’s own victimhood, which “evolve during the conflict and later serve as an inseparable part of the psychological intergroup repertoire that underlies the conflict”. The contents of these two themes are a mirror image, as both sides the Israeli and Palestinian - often use the same labels and justifications. They concluded: *‘Palestinians and Israeli Jews hold an ethos of conflict, which is one of the major foundations for its continuation. Moreover, three themes of the ethos are in direct contradiction between the two groups’*. Simply because the societal beliefs exist to justify the reasons for and importance of the current existing goals for each nation, therefore, failing to achieve these goals may threaten the existence of that group. In addition, the societal beliefs disregard the goals of the other side, describing them as unjustified and unreasonable (Neta et al., 2004: p. 134-154).

Israelis and Palestinians tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence only in response to attacks initiated by the rival enemy. This process of viewing themselves in a purely retaliatory role leads to under-appreciation of the extent to which the violence of the other side is contingent on their own. Therefore, being able to estimate this bias may lead both sides to better understand their own role in perpetuating the conflict, and thus, contribute to its resolution (Haushofer et al., 2010). “Both sides feel they have legitimate historical claims and such a dichotomizing antagonistic strategy only polarizes, stigmatizes, and further entrenches public opinion, rather than having the intended effect of putting an end to abuses” (McLagan, 2006, p. 193). Past researches (as in Arian, 2001; Yuchtman-Yaar & Herman, 1997) have shown that demographic variables, such as a higher degree of religiosity, lower socioeconomic status, and a lower level of formal education are related to more negative and less compromising attitudes toward Palestinians (Maoz & Eidelson,

2007b, p. 1482). The results of Nachtwey and Tessler (1998) cross-sectional survey revealed that general confidence in the government is associated with stronger support for the peace process and that economic satisfaction is positively related to the favor of ending the conflict (Penny & Fielding, 2006, p. 4).

An interesting study done by Cohen-Chen et al. (2014) about the critical role of emotional barriers in forming attitudes and behaviors regarding the conflict and peace-making. They introduced the phrase of ‘cognitive freezing’, which “reduces openness to new information and opportunities to conflict resolution”. A status that they found did not have any correlation with recipient’s gatherings of information, and instead there was an indirect effect of political orientation on the process, as shown in Figure 3.13 below:

**FIGURE 3.13** INDIRECT EFFECT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON PROPORTION OF TIME SPENT ON ARTICLES FAVORING THE PROPOSAL THROUGH HOPE AND FEAR



Source: Cohen-Chen et al. (2014, p. 20).

Nasie et al. (2014) did an experimental study on three groups of participants aiming at investigating the impact of adherence to the own collective narrative of naive realism on the degree of openness to the adversary’s narratives regarding the conflict. The study emphasized on the importance of bridging the gap between both sides openness to the narrative of the adversary as a first step towards peace resolution.

There are many joint projects between Palestinian and Israeli institutions and public opinion centers that aimed to understand the behavior and attitudes of both people regarding vast topics of the conflict. For instance, (1) the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll (JIPP), which is a joint theory-driven survey research that systematically tracks public opinion on both sides since the beginning of the second Intifada, (2) A research that was carried out by OneVoice Israel and OneVoice Palestine. OneVoice “is an international mainstream grassroots movement that aims to amplify the voice of the overwhelming majority of moderates who wish to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (*Peace Polls*, n.d.). Added to that the Peace Index

(PI) research project or 'The War and Peace Index', which "monitors trends in Israeli public opinion regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel and their impact on Israeli society" (*The Israel Democracy Institute*, 2015). Other interesting comparative studies carried out by Saad and Mendes (2013) - Gallup, Irwin (2009), Shibley and Kull (2013), Near East Consulting (NEC), a joint project between the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) and The Israel Project (TIP) in 2011, Ragionieri (n.d.), studies done by David Pollock at the Kaufman Fellow at The Washington Institute investigating the regional political dynamics on the grounds, and much more comparative projects.

There is a reciprocal relationship between media and Public Opinion. Donsbach (1997, p. 20) described how survey research helps the media in fulfilling three important functions; firstly, it creates an objective basis for the media through which to express what people think. Secondly, polls and survey research pave another way for the media to ascertain about public's agenda from the public themselves, in a way, "the people - with the help of the news media - can now push politics to follow up on the issues they wish to be addressed". Thirdly, Donsbach (1997) mentioned the significant role of media beyond the classic borders of communication in utilizing polls to form a community, and to boost citizens integration in their society by feeding the knowledge of one's fellow citizen into its agendas.

### **Public Opinion as a Bridge Between Israel and Palestine**

The phenomenon of the increasing number of the public opinion poll centers has remarkably extended in the last decade in Palestine and Israel. Scarcely a week passes without reading in the local Palestinian and Israeli newspapers about polling results, which are then mostly published by Arab, Israeli and international media as a scale for the development of the Palestinian and Israeli public sentiment in the light of the internal developments, as well as the total regional and international developments resulting therefrom. These polls contributed effectively to the probing of the political power of the Palestinian and Israeli parties and factions, the popularity of each of them and to the publication of academic, vocational, political, economical and informative needs or requirements. They played, and still are playing, an important role in disclosing the point of view of the Palestinian and Israeli citizen on all issues, which are of present and future significance due to the importance of the public opinion polls and their role in democratizing the Palestinian and Israeli societies and the establishment of a sound civil societies (*Al-Naba' Agency*, 2005).

No doubt, the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion is expected to play a decisive and crucial role in any permanent compromise or solution, which would most probably include longterm concessions on both sides, mainly in respect of the territories occupied in 1967. When considering a general compromise to settle the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict, considerable weight will be given to the estimates relating to what may be accepted or refused by the Palestinian and Israeli public, since the opinions of the leadership of political parties, factions and organizations on both sides are alone insufficient and indeterminate. Therefore, giving the public opinion the weight it deserves will most likely reflect then the extent to which Palestinians and Israelis would accept any agreement that will be signed in the future to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Shamir, 2007, p. 6).

The support of the public in any agreement will represent the real power that affects the implementation of the agreement. The opposite would certainly mean that the conflict will continue regardless of the agreements signed or the understandings. The public represents the platform for the success of political agreements, whilst the disregard of the public opinion and the inability to develop and shape positive public opinions can lead to an agreement that is deficient, imperfect and not backed by a broad public base. To ignore the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion under any ideological or political aspects as an essential variable in any deal would negatively influence the public support provided to any agreement that will be signed in future between the two parties (Saad & Crabtree, 2012).

Accordingly, the decisive issue that will determine the extent to which the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas or any other Palestinian president is ready to offer any territorial concessions is the public receptiveness and opinion in terms of the solutions, suggestions, and arrangements related in particular to the final status. Such matters have to receive the support of the majority in the Palestinian territories and even the support of the Palestinian refugees living in the diaspora, in the first line those residing in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The same concept applies to Benjamin Netanyahu or to any other Israeli government that must be backed by a strong majority support in order to be able to carry out 'concessions' about the issues of the final status, such as the borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and others. Attaining the majority's support is actually regarded as an essential determinant. Most important here is that one should initiate the development of positive public opinions on both sides of the Green Line towards issues including permanent and static coexistence between the Palestinians and their neighbors. The fruits of such efforts would be collected in the near future when we are in need of such support, as the old proverb goes: *'Tomorrow's harvest is the fruit of what we sow today'*.

### 3.3.3 Matrix of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in the Light of Cognition, Affection, and Behaviour

*“‘Opinion’ in political theories every so often viewed as a judgment is based on cognition and knowledge, and at others as a result of moral sensitivity, affection or sentiment”.*

– Vincent (2008)

In this section, I used primary dimensions extracted from the historical review and the previously developed pool of arguments, models and theories to organize along an analytical framework differentiating between causes, conflict layers, and possible solutions. *Causes* of the conflict are usually factors, trends, and conditions that can be either underlying causes or immediate causes. *Underlying causes* are those who are more like deeply-hidden or past motivations for a particular event, and *immediate causes* are those that took place during that event. The former explains why an event happened but does not explain why the event happened in that timing. The latter does not explain why the event happened but does explain why then. Moreover, to explain the entire event, both types of causes are needed. In this context, *Dimensions* (conflict layers or beliefs) are the heart of narratives that exist in the minds of the Palestinians and the Israelis, whether about the conflict as causes or consequences or the peace process as possible solutions.

The matrix below (Table 3.1) covers all the issues of the conflict extended on two axes; Firstly, the causes of the conflict, the consequences of these causes, and the suggested solutions to these consequences. Secondly, how they are perceived in the individual's cognitive, affective and behavioral functions toward the conflict and peace process, across different time frames (i.e., past, present, and future). In other words, how do individuals think, feel, and behave or would act on the causes, consequences and solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The matrix goes beyond that to measure what they think are the views of the other side on similar issues to see how these expected views of the other influence their current perceptions of the conflict.

TABLE 3.1 MATRIX OF THE STUDY

	<b>Causes</b>	<b>Consequences</b>	<b>Solutions</b>
<b>Cognitive</b>	<u>Acceptance of causes as given facts</u> Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) Nasie et al. (2014) Halperin et al. (2010) Oren et al. (2004)	<u>Problematic magnitude of outcomes</u> Shamir (2007) Irwin (2009) Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll (JIPP)	<u>Willingness to compromise for peace</u> Peace Index (PI) Ragionieri (n.d.) JMCC Shikaki (2009) Siman-Tov, (n.d.)
<b>Affection</b>	<u>Nature of the conflict and notions of peace process</u> Adwan et al. (2013) McLagan (2006) Bar-On, Dan and Adwan (2006)	<u>Support of conflicts ramifications</u> Canetti et al. (2015) Saad and Mendes (2013) Telhami and Kull (2013)	<u>Readiness for peace</u> Schulz (2010)
<b>Behavioural</b>	<u>Affiliation to history made by ancestors</u> Keynan (2014)	<u>Competency of leaders and efforts of negotiations</u> Penny & Fielding (2006) Claes (2004) Near East Consulting (NEC) Margaret (1980)	<u>Optimism, flexibility, and role of mediation</u>

### **Acceptance of Causes as Given Facts**

#### *Cognitive x Causes*

This cell of the matrix deals with the public's assent about actual causes of the conflict. It speculates the responsibility for the current status quo rest on whose shoulders, and how did it start. Merely, it mirrors their approving of causes behind the conflict as facts. For instance, to what degree do they agree or disagree that the persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia before establishing the state of Israel is a cause of the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict? What about the Jewish immigration to Historic Palestine during the British mandate? Also, regarding the fact that the British granted a national homeland to the Jews in Historic Palestine according to Balfour declaration, followed by their opinion about the 1948 war, the establishment of Israel and the Division of Historic Palestine.

Other causes include the displacement of Palestinians in 1948 from their cities and villages, the Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their agendas at the expense of Palestinian interests. Add thereto the religious conflict of beliefs between Jews and Muslims. Jews believe that the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, where most historical events mentioned in the Old Testament took place, and the Jewish life elsewhere is a life in Diaspora. The Palestinians believe that Palestine is part and parcel of the Muslims' identity, and it is their land they are inhabiting over centuries.

*Acceptance* as a word refers to the act of accepting or the state of being accepted or acceptable. This definition reflects how people suppose the world should take their agreed reasons, and anything that is built on is only an ongoing response to these causes. Therefore, the ability to identify these "given" causes of the conflict in the minds of the Palestinians and Israelis is a major step in understanding the basis from where later opinions can originate. To summarize, in this cell, I answer the question of "*to what extent Palestinians and Israelis accept the causes of the conflict as given fact?*".

### **Nature of the Conflict and Notions of Peace Process**

#### *Affective x Causes*

This cell examines how Palestinians and Israelis perceive the complicated nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; to what degree they agree or disagree about its nature. Is it more of a religious, cultural, national and ethnic, political, economic, historical or existential one, or is it a complicated structure that comprises of all or many of these attributes?

Moreover, this cell touches on important notions regarding the peace process. For example, to what extent they agree or disagree that Palestinians and Israelis should currently stop all forms of incitements to hatred? Should they start with the contribution of curricula in disseminating peace culture and the acceptance of the other? Moreover, whether the media should positively influence both sides towards creating a positive atmosphere between the two people for promoting peace or not.

Other aspects will measure the public' level of agreement regarding peaceful negotiations as the only way to achieve peace between Palestinians and Israelis, and whether any agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis must be accepted and supported by the Arab League? To probe will also be the willingness of both governments to resume genuinely peace negotiations, and how the international community should be ready to assist in the peace building process. Together with how they feel towards the concessions required on their side, and the perspective of reaching a comprehensive and just peace resolution for both parties.

To summarize, this cell answers the questions of *“to what extent Palestinians and Israelis agree on the nature of the conflict?”*. Also, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree about notions pertaining to the peace process?”*.

### **Affiliation to History Made by Ancestors**

#### *Behavioural x Causes*

While the cells above dealt with the cognitive and affective aspects of the causes of the conflict, this cell looks into the public agreement with or without affiliation to the actions (of their ancestors) that established the essence of the present conflict and without which the conflict might not have started. It attempts to grasp Palestinians and Israelis affiliations towards the behavior of their ancestors in the context of claimed causes behind the present conflict.

It suggests a hypothetical status where citizens are asked to express how they would behave if they were to get back to the beginning of the conflict at the beginning of the last century. Would they have kept the history as it is? Would they have sought out more peaceful changes to it? Alternatively, would they have persisted with even more extreme actions. For instance, would they have engaged in the 1948 war or tried to stop it? For an Israeli, would he or she have immigrated from all over the world to Historic Palestine for the same reasons, and for a Palestinian, would he or she have welcomed immigrant Jews? Add thereto, it investigates if they would play an active role in the conflict or the peace process; pro or contra peace.

To summarize, this cell responds to the following question: *“how would Palestinians, and Israelis behave if they were in the position of their ancestors, will they play an active role in the conflict or the peace process?”*, Or *“to what degree Pales-*



*tinians and Israelis are affiliated to the actions of their ancestors?”.*

### **Problematic Magnitude of Outcomes**

#### *Cognitive x Consequences*

This cell probes the general public opinion towards important outcomes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; to what extent they believe that these consequences constitute a problem to the peace process? Alternatively, what role does it play in hindering the wheels of the peace process? It investigates their view concerning all critical matters of the conflict. Firstly, the *political aspect*, which consists of the building and expanding of settlements, refugees, borders and prisoners, and the Israeli full control over natural resources. In addition to the issues of not recognizing Israel’s right to exist, and the lack of communication and contiguity between the West Bank territories themselves and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A conjunction is made here with *security aspects*, which includes security threats imposed by extremist movements and groups on both sides, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s possession of weapons and their construction of tunnels under the borders of Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons and the presence of permanent Israeli control points throughout the Palestinian territories, including the border crossings. Other aspects that this cell investigates are *religious aspects*, which comprise of Israeli moves and attempts to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount, and assaults on worshipers on both sides. This besides the Palestinian refusal of the notion of a Jewish state, the difficulty of having access to places of worship, and the constant refusal on the part of hardliners or spoilers to achieve any peace agreement. Along with many *economic aspects* summarized in the Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products, Israeli economic burden of high military costs for the sake of security, and the deterioration of the Palestinian economy as a result of the conflict. Finally, the lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, and the PA’s addressing influential international organizations including legal bodies that enjoy international jurisdictions.

To summarize, this cell answers the question of “*to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree on the problematic magnitude of outcomes across all aspects?*”.

### **Support of Conflict’s Ramifications**

#### *Affective x Consequences*

This cell explores the Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions of the conflict’s ramifications or consequences that impede signing a peace treaty between the two parties. This includes their perception concerning launching rockets from Gaza Strip at

Israel, raids, and incursions by the Israeli army in Palestinian cities, and the Israeli assassination policy. Add thereto on the part of the Israelis the Jewish settlers' attacks on Palestinians, as well as on their properties, schools, and cars. Further exploration of this cell on the other side focused on Palestinian misdeeds, such as the Palestinians kidnapping of soldiers, stabbing and running over Israelis, in addition to shooting and stone throwing. Add thereto the Palestinian extremists threat of launching indiscriminate attacks by suicide bombers, and their leadership's support of violence against Israel through supporting families of prisoners and detainees in Israeli jails.

Further ramifications extend from Israel's government support of building settlements in the Palestinian territories, building the wall, checkpoints/carriers/import restrictions against the Palestinians. Furthermore, recurrent daily Israeli arrests of Palestinians accused by Israel of security issues, Israeli policy of collective punishment, house demolitions, confiscation of Palestinian properties, and the Israeli absolute control over border crossings. Lastly, economic ramifications including the total dependency of Palestinian economy on the Israeli one as enforced by the Israeli government, and efforts of the Palestinian Authority to isolate Israel internationally.

To summarize, this cell answer the question of *"to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree in their support to ramifications of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?"*.

### **Competency of Leaders and Faith in Negotiations**

#### *Behavioral x Consequences*

Since that the previous two cells dealt with the outcomes and ramifications of the conflict, this cell gauges the Palestinians and Israelis assessment of the performance of some political figures in both countries pertaining to the peace process, such as Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the PA, Khalid Misha'al, the head of Hamas Politburo, Rami Hamdallah, the PA's Prime Minister, and Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, Tzipi Livni, the head of the Hatnuah party in Israel, and Isaac Herzog, the head of Labor Party in Israel. Moreover, it investigates the opinion of Israelis and Palestinians on how likely they think the current leadership in their respective country can make peace with the other side. The idea here is to compare both; their assessment of their leaders and the leaders of the other side of their opinion regarding their ability to make peace.

Additionally, this cell compares Palestinians and Israelis general support to the resumption of peace negotiations between both governments under the current circumstances, with the extent to which they believe negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years. In addition

to 1) their view of resuming peace negotiations as being more important to the Palestinians or to the Israelis, 2) their belief that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or whether they could have gone further to make them a success, and 3) throughout history, who was responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis?

Finally, this cell examines if citizens were given the ability to impose a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, what would they have done: would they impose the same solutions proposed by their government? Impose solutions different from those proposed by their government? Agree on the solutions suggested by the other government? Alternatively, suggest different solutions than both governments?

To summarize, this cell examines the following questions: *“How Palestinians and Israelis assess their political leaders and the political leaders of the other side?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree that their current leadership can make peace with the other side?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis support resumption of peace negotiations between both governments under the current circumstances?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that resuming peace negotiations as being more important to the Palestinians or the Israelis?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that the other party has done all what has been required of it to do to make peace negotiations and treaties a success or it could have gone further to make these a success?”*, *“in their opinion, throughout history, who was responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis?”*, and finally, *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree with solutions imposed by their governments and the government of the other side?”*.

### **Willingness to Compromise for Peace**

#### *Cognitive x Solutions*

Numerous solutions were suggested throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that attempted to reach a permanent resolution of the crucial issues of the conflict. Therefore, this cell deals with Palestinians and Israelis opinions concerning their support or opposition to these suggested solutions that can bring an end to the conflict. The history of the conflict and the current status quo suggested many solutions approved by each side's interest in Historic Palestine. However, this endless number of solutions ended up without implementation due to many reasons mentioned in earlier sections.

This cell suggests an index of the most significant solutions for each decisive issue of the conflict. These issues include the refugees problem, the question of settlements, Jerusalem, prisoners issue, the establishment of a Palestinian State, control over natural resources, economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis, and more. Another interesting aspect of this cell deals with the most appropriate solution to the conflict. Is it a two-state solution that reciprocally recognizes the legitimacy of each other; the State of Israel and an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, a one state, in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations, a binational state, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, or the West Bank to become part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt?

To summarize, this cell investigates the questions: *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree in their support to the proposed suggested solutions of each issue?”* or *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are willing to make compromises for peace?”*, *“what do the Palestinians and Israelis think is the most appropriate solution to the conflict?”*.

### **Readiness for Peace**

#### *Affective x Solutions*

A crucial step towards reaching a permanent solution with the other is to have a prepared set of positive feelings and attitudes towards the other. Feelings and attitudes extend from “tolerance towards the other party, understanding the other party, angry at the other party, fear from the other party, trust in the other party, grudge against the other party, and willingness to make peace with the other” party. An equally interesting set of feelings and attitudes that this cell controls for, is to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that *the other party* holds the same feelings towards them, indexed as “tolerance, understands you, feels angry at you, fears you, trusts you, bears the grudge against you, suspects you, willing to make peace with you”.

Other aspects that this cell examines are 1) to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have nothing to do with politics or the current conflict i.e. music, folklore, general tendencies, literature, religion, social ideas or other 2) How comfortable would they be if many of their neighbors were not from their religion 3) In their opinion, do both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, have the right to live in peace and security? Moreover, to what extent they believe that connection and communication among ordinary people on both sides are useful?

To summarize, this cell responds to the following questions: *“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are ready for peace?”*, *“to what degree Palestinians and*

*Israelis think that the other is ready for peace?”*, “*to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have nothing to do with politics or the current conflict*”, “*how comfortable would they be if many of their neighbors were not from their religion?*”, And “*to what extent they believe that interaction and communication among ordinary people on both sides are useful?*”. Additionally, it tests the following hypothesis:

### **Optimism, Flexibility, and Role of Mediation**

#### *Behavioral x Solutions*

This cell looks into how optimistic or pessimistic Palestinians and Israelis are nowadays, in comparison to the past, and what they think is the likelihood of reaching an agreement over the next five years to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Are they willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace? Alternatively, do they believe that they should not give up any of their demands to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace? Do they believe that the other party is willing to make peace or not? Moreover, to what extent they think that the other is weary and tired of the conflict and its repercussions?

Moreover, this cell explores the views of the Palestinians and Israelis regarding whose opinions matter the most when it comes to addressing the issue of Palestinian-Israeli peace. Are these Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Refugees, Israeli settlers, Israeli extremist parties, Palestinian extremist movements, US government, Arab League, or the American Jewish community? Besides, it addresses the role of mediation and which state or international organization they believe could be the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis? Moreover, how constructive and balanced they think is the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

To summarize, this cell answers the following questions: “*in comparison to the past, to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are optimistic or pessimistic towards the peace process?*”, “*are the Palestinians and Israelis willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace or not?*”, “*to what degree Palestinians and Israelis think that the other party is willing to make peace?*”, “*to what degree Palestinians and Israelis think that the other party is weary and tired of the conflict, and its repercussions?*”, “*in their view, whose opinions matter the most when it comes to addressing the issue of Palestinian-Israeli peace?*”, “*who, they think, is the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis?*”, and “*how balanced and constructive Palestinians and Israeli perceive the role of the US in the conflict?*”

### 3.4 Conclusion

Puddephatt (2006) once noted, *'one of the underestimated complications of the Middle East conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is the inflammatory media on both sides'*. No one can deny that there is a mass impact, where the press sometimes falls under its command, which is the public opinion itself, even if this cannot be seen with the naked eye. The reason is that the press is in writing while the ideas of the masses are perceptible and invisible. It is, however, inevitable that these ideas come to the newspapers and, undoubtedly, that this influence is existing (what is meant here is the impact of the public opinion on the press). The relationship between the press and the public opinion is strong and firm, as both of them derives its strength and impact from the other, and each of them affects and is affected by the other.

Effective peace work is not made easier by the media. Instead of promoting peace, the media focuses on violence and sensation. Consequently, it often hardens the conflict, reinforces the concept of the enemy and robs the people of the feeling that they can act effectively. The lack of joint endeavors or structural cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian mass media - as a mean for affecting public opinion and advocating peace - in both countries limits the potential influence of mass media on reaching the masses, whom the fate of the peace process may ultimately lay upon (Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999b, p. 5). Puddephatt (2006, p. 4) investigated the assumption that "a strong independent media contributes to the retention or creation of peace and stability in conflict-affected and threatened areas". Nevertheless, the role of the media in the conflict is restricted to a complex set of elements that shapes its influence, which includes the relationship between the media and actors in the conflict, the degree of independence media has from power holders in society, the relationship between media and public opinion, and finally, the different use of narratives and media terminologies.

Where the media in general fuel a conflict raging between the various adversaries, whether on the political or international level, they do not make halt, with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, working towards the local, regional and international polarization in favor of one people against the other, or one group against the other, as each one is biased to a party that backs him in the propaganda, as well as politically and ideologically. These means do not stop all the day, paying tribute to the identity of a foe and degrading the value of the other. The media struggle between the Israeli and the Palestinian side through media contents tends to pass a set of narratives on the basis that they are basic facts that justify the prevailing conditions and the status quo, and give legitimacy to the common objectives and issues expressed by the media. These myths are working to mobilize the inside

against the enemy within a concept that exaggerates and is far from the objective facts and distorts them or ignores some of their elements as to be consistent with the self-image of the national group. In conclusion, the perceptions about the media of 'the other' are connected to the way it covers the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its history. Most of the references about "the other's" media are presented as part of the Palestinian or Israeli propaganda, and as another branch of the Palestinian authority or Israeli occupation. Like this, it is also seen as another obstacle to reaching an agreement between Israel and Palestine.

While traditional media show interest in exaggerating the conflict and the violent accruing from it, we find that peace journalism focuses on non-violent alternatives to resolve conflicts. In this context, peace journalism can focus on physical effects of the conflicts to the same degree as it focuses on the psychological effects of these conflicts on individuals and on their way of living. Instead of highlighting the decisions and opinions of political elites only, it can also highlight opinions of ordinary people and reflect their lifestyle and try to present and reflect on the objectives of the various parties to the conflict and focus on common issues and visions. The role of media surpasses that of just transmitting events and issues to the formation of competing speeches that reflect the ideological and political concepts of the conflicting parties and serve their strategies and political interests. Media are in the position of alarm and stimulator for the masses as to take care of and form public points of views on issues and events presented to constitute the public opinion ultimately.

The communication process is considered as an essential process in conflict and post-conflict situations. As I mentioned earlier, there is a consensus among researchers on the role of traditional media in providing information and messages that form public opinion. As these means are used to stimulate and spread violence, they can also be used to prevent violent conflicts and encourage peace and reconciliation. Modern technology has provided new opportunities to communications. The spread of these new technologies such as mobile phones and the means of social media has led to the acceleration of the flow of information and opened new horizons for individuals and communities to play a role in the life cycle of the conflict and conflict resolution, to response to disasters, to monitor the causes of conflicts and predict them, to protect the values, build peace and maintain the stability of the nation.

## Chapter 4

# METHODS AND PROCEDURES

### Contents

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The choice of the adequate methodology to conduct research for or discuss the survey problematic or to achieve the objective from it is one of the most crucial steps that leads either to the success of the survey or to its failure in achieving that objective. The methodology is the method applied by the researcher to respond to the questions raised by the problematic of the research theme. Its observation and discussion might help its description and illustration.

Due to the variety of the methodologies that might assist the researcher in conducting his research works, the nature of the survey objective is the one that determines the methodology to be pursued. The nature of the current study and its objective require the application of the descriptive methodology, which is one of the main approaches used in behavioral and social research, as this is reliable and can be heavily relied upon in discovery, descriptive, and analytical research. As I follow this methodology, I can study the reality or phenomenon in its natural status as it exists in the field without any intervention by any party, and give it a very accurate qualitative description that describes the phenomenon and illustrates its characteristics, or quantitatively gives it a digital description that illustrates the amount of this phenomenon or its size and the extent of its association with the other different phenomena.



## 4.1 Research Planning

This dissertation examined the effect of macro-level factors (the media, and political parties/leaders) on micro-level ones (the audience cognitive processing). Both, the media content and the range of opinion on a public agenda should be assessed to examine the media's function in each country. This dissertation represented such an attempt. It used framing analysis to address the connection between media content and audience cognitions in the conflict and peace process. Especially that framing involves "the construction of views in both news production and consumption processes", and therefore, "the concept appears to be a proper analytical tool to examine the relationship between media content diversity and audience issue cognitions" (Huang, 2010, p. 48). In consequent steps, I applied already validated dimensions from this content analyzes into the document analyzes. It included analyzing press releases/announcements/statements from political parties and leaders to see how they influence the process of shaping media frames and public perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Two progressive trends of methodological approaches that aim for exploring *causality* between variables are a) using a multi-method approach where multiple analysis are being employed, and b) panel or time-series analyzes (Donsbach, 1997, p. 25). Through the application of sophisticated statistical methods on data extracted from the use of the former approach that included coding documents of political leaders and parties, media, surveys, and reviewing history. This dissertation went beyond the spectrum of observing perceptions and their short-term changes to investigating and exploring the dynamics behind these perceptions and changes. Furthermore, the integration of various data collection methodologies allows a more thorough and focused analysis of the topic at hand, and the realization of a more inclusive and brighter picture of reality. Data analyzes were carried out by more conventional techniques such as pies, histograms, crosstabs, and more. Alongside more sophisticated techniques such as multiple regression analyzes, factor analysis, and conjoint analysis.

### 4.1.1 Data Sources

This dissertation used multiple sources for collecting data:

#### Secondary Data

The secondary data of this dissertation was mainly based on the review of the history of the conflict, in which I summarized the timeline of the motivates behind the conflict, beliefs, and notions, claims, consequences, crucial events and agree-

ments, attempts for peace resolution, suggested solutions, and more. Complementary data was used from secondary sources of information emanating from the desk research including published articles, papers, documents, and literature related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The general nature of this dissertation (i.e., to study the perceptions of the conflict as a whole with a focus on the obvious aspects of it, and not to explore the very deep specifications of each main issue of the conflict) restricted the use of specific previous studies for developing the research instruments. At the same time, this allowed for more innovation and added originality to the topic. Nevertheless, previously published work or complementary studies as I referred to above were used to carve out the final questionnaire with an extra spin that undergoes with the goals of this dissertation.

### **Primary Data**

There were several primary tools for data collection: surveys, content analyzes of newspapers, and document analyzes for political parties and leaders. All were explained thoroughly below.

## 4.2 Content Analysis

There is a wide variety of content analysis methods that make undertaking content analysis research a challenging task, and selecting the suitable method for a particular study a more critical one. In definition, content analysis is “a process for systematically analyzing messages in any type of communication” (Kondracki et al., 2002, p. 224). It comprises of coding raw messages from textual material transcripts of interviews, speeches and discussions, newspapers, magazines, visual images, and illustrations. In addition to the narrative and form of films and TV programs and more. All with accordance to a classification theme (Macnamara, 2003, p. 1). The traditional communication model of Lasswell (1948) captured briefly what media content analysis is about: Who (communicator) says what (message) through which channel (medium) to whom (receiver) with what effect (effect).

This dissertation integrated what I would call a condensed qualitative and quantitative content analysis. It is scientifically less reliable to assume that the process of systematic counting and recording (i.e., the size and frequency of media message) as the only and main determinants of media impact. Mainly because this ignores the relationship between the text and its likely audience. Meaning, media impact can vary from reader to reader depending on the “prevailing perceptions of media credibility (e.g. a report in a specialist scientific or medical journal will have greater credibility than a report on the same subject in a popular press); Context (e.g. a health article published or broadcast during a disease outbreak will be read differently than at other times); and Audience characteristics such as age, sex, race, ethnicity, education levels and socio- economic position which will all affect ‘readings’ of media content” (Macnamara, 2003, p. 5).

In other words, I dealt with a manifest content analysis, which is the analysis of what the text says. It investigated the content aspect and summarized the visible, and obvious components. I followed an inductive strategy in developing the content analysis schemes, as follows:

- 1<sup>st</sup> in an interactive process between a careful reading of the text,
- 2<sup>nd</sup> design of preliminary coding categories,
- 3<sup>rd</sup> fitting of texts into these categories,
- 4<sup>th</sup> and refinement of categories till most text can be fitted into the existing set of categories given the specific research needs.

### 4.2.1 Study Framework

The dissertation adopted the Framing Theory of News, through the hypotheses of which one can gauge the contents of the news coverage of various issues in the

media during a certain period of time; where this theory assumes that the events do not contain themselves a particular meaning, but they gain significance or a meaning by putting them within a framework that allocates them and gives them certain consistency by focusing on some aspects of the topic and omitting other aspects; so is the media framework the pivotal concept, which arranges around it events of a particular issue.

### 4.2.2 Investigating Unit

The study was restricted to newspapers published from 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2013 up till 30<sup>th</sup> March 2014. In this period, the United States made vigorous attempts to bring the Palestinians and the Israelis back to the negotiation table after a nearly three-year hiatus, this has been reflected in the numerous visits of John Kerry; US minister of foreign affairs, to the region. The visits paid off, and resulted in a series of negotiation that lasted approximately 9 months. Nevertheless, negotiations collapsed at the end of March 2014 when Israel refused to release the 104 Palestinian prisoners as promised, coupled with their decision to establish 700 housing units in East Jerusalem. Consequently, Abbas declared that the PA is going to apply for membership in 15 United Nations organizations, and later on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April he declared the plan of forming a unity technocratic government with Hamas. Netanyahu was very irritated by the plan breaking off the already collapsed negotiations (Judis, 2014). Thus the choices of investigation were the following months:

**TABLE 4.1** TIME PERIOD FOR CONDUCTING THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

Year	Month
2013	August
	September
	October
	November
	December
2014	January
	February
	March

Here is a summary of events that went off the negotiating track in the specified period, and which did not primarily entail the major issues of the conflict or peace process.

### Summary of Events

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2013, the Israeli authorities released the first batch of prisoners who were arrested before the Oslo accord. On December the same year, they released Samer Al-Issawi after a nine months hunger strike, breaking the record with the longest hunger strike in history. Followed by Mahmoud Abbas's signing of decrees officially naming the adoption of (State of Palestine) in January 2014, the death of Ariel Sharon; the former Israeli Prime Minister in the same month, and the Israeli removal of a tape propagandizing the disappearance of the Dome of the Rock. The signing of the Fateh-Hamas Gaza Agreement in April 2014 calling for new elections to take place, in an attempt to put an end to a seven-year clash between the rival Palestinian factions. Followed by Netanyahu's objection to this unity plan and accusing the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas "of sabotaging peace efforts by seeking rapprochement with Hamas". This resulted in Israel's failure to release the promised last batch of 26 prisoners, the continuation of settlement expansion, and hence, the ending of peace talks by the end of April 2014.

#### 4.2.3 Media Sample

Since I intended to study the influence of media in shaping perceptions of the conflict and the peace process in Palestine and Israel, then the sampling scheme employed was communication sources (in this study, newspapers). The political nature of the subject suggested taking into consideration the political orientations of sampled newspapers in each country.

Political decision-makers stress on the importance of the daily press. They see them with a high degree of importance because they include treatments of the 'quantity and quality' of the news and international events. Moreover, they can cover a broader range of events and approach at the same time the decision-makers on the same day the event takes place. Daily newspapers, provided with a communications network, can fully cover the events that become accessible to readers from the public and to decision-makers, where decision-makers can take the subject of the news and elucidate its aspects better, and, at the same time find out public opinion trends and tracks toward internal and external issues.

Accordingly, media sample included a total number of eight newspapers, four newspapers on each side. The Palestinian newspapers were: Al-Quds newspaper, Al-Ayyam newspaper, Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, and Felesteen. The Israeli newspapers were: Israel Hayom, Yediot Ahronot, Haaretz, and Maariv. The criteria for choosing these newspapers were mainly their high circulation (large readership), and the newspapers representativeness of political orientations in both countries. Additionally, all are published in their respective language (understandable) on a daily basis

(same frequency). Alongside their popularity and political orientation, another major reason to select these eight papers was that most of their websites republish articles from the print newspaper, allowing easier access to them. Below a brief description of each newspaper:

### **Al-Quds newspaper**

**Language:** Arabic

**Established:** 1951

**Website:** <http://www.alquds.com>

**Circulation:** 20,000 (est.)

It is the oldest still running Palestinian daily newspaper that predates the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, and it has the largest circulation in the region. In general, it is politically independent and support a peaceful solution to the conflict (BBC news, 2006).

It was the first Palestinian newspaper to resume publication after the defeat of 1967. General Director is Dr. Marwan Abu Zuluf, and its chief editor Walid Abu Zuluf. The headquarters of Al-Quds newspaper in the city of Jerusalem, and the number of pages, ranging from 16 to 24 pages. Al-Quds newspaper is distributed in all the Palestinian territories. The newspaper covers local, global and regional events, and it has a distinctive touch in terms of output and content. It perhaps has the highest periodical publications and most profitable (Wafa, 2011).

The number of workers in the Al-Quds newspaper is more than 150 employees working in the fields of media, ideas and computing technologies, management, distribution and archive and art direction. Also, it has a network of correspondents, professionals, and distributors to large parts of the country and abroad (Ibid.).

### **Al-Ayyam newspaper**

**Language:** Arabic

**Established:** 1995

**Website:** <http://www.al-ayyam.com>

**Circulation:** 10,000 (est.)

It is a Palestinian daily newspaper that has the second-largest circulation in the territories. It is a Fateh-affiliated newspaper (BBC news, 2006). It is published by the “Al-Ayyam Foundation for Press, Printing, Publishing and Distribution” in Ramallah, and the institution is a joint-stock limited company. The first issue of Al-

Ayyam newspaper was in 25/12/1995.

Al-Ayyam newspaper was launched by the efforts of young and promising scholars, and the competencies of a group of the brightest journalists and writers in the diaspora who returned home following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Editor of Al-Ayyam newspaper is the writer Akram Haniyeh and is chaired by Ghassan Al-Amin. The agency owns a modern and high-efficient press, and the newspaper deals with a range of number from 20 to 40 pages. It classifies distinct and dynamically various threads of political, economic, sporting, cultural; national, regional and international topics. Besides, it is unique in the deployment of selected topics from Hebrew press on a regular basis (WAFA, 2011).

### **Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper**

**Language:** Arabic

**Established:** 1995

**Website:** <http://www.alhayat-j.com>

**Circulation:** 5,000 (est.)

Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda was founded in November 1994, and initially was a weekly political newspaper, and then turned in August 1995 to a daily newspaper. Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper is strongly affiliated to the PNA, and this is evident in the founding statement of the newspaper *'We are with the PNA in support of the achievement of a successful historic opportunity to build a community and independent national entity, and we will not stand to watch any negligence or breaching in opinions and structure, and will address issues relating to the PNA with a high degree of sensitivity and responsibility for the sake of development, not to drag the cart back'*.

The founder of the new Al-Hayat newspaper is Nabil Amr, and was its general manager before transferring ownership and subordination to the Palestinian Investment Fund, and edited by Hafez Barghouti. The newspaper based approach is to benefit from the efficiencies of creative outsiders other than newspaper owners; to enrich the content of the newspaper articles and topics and the various comments. The number of pages per issue is 28 pages, and the number of staffs is 60 employees officially distributed among reporters and editors and administrators (WAFA, 2011).

### **Felesteen newspaper**

**Language:** Arabic

**Established:** 2006

**Website:** <http://www.felesteen.ps>

Felesteen newspaper is a Hamas-affiliated newspaper that was founded in September 2006 in Gaza. The first issue of the newspaper was in 03/05/2007. It is a daily political and comprehensive newspaper that seeks to raise public awareness of the Palestinian cause in particular. It aspires to be a bridge between the different views and attitudes from the Palestinian national approach and the moderate Palestinian democratic editorial policy. It employs media staff and technical and administrative specialist, and the issue consists of 32 pages a day. The newspaper holds specialized courses in all art media and with the participation of senior coaches (FelesteenOnline, 2010).

### **Israel Hayom**

**Language:** Hebrew and English

**Established:** 2007

**Website:** <http://www.israelhayom.com>

**Circulation:** 350,000 (est.)

Israel Hayom is a free daily leading newspaper published throughout Israel to homes, workplaces and on a range of public locations. The first issue of Israel Hayom appeared on 30.07.2007, and nowadays it has the highest circulation with 39.3%<sup>(1)</sup> of readership compared with Yediot. The owner of Israel Hayom is the US-based billionaire Sheldon Adelson, who is a supporter of Benjamin Netanyahu and against the two-states solution, which defines its right-leaning political orientation. The main goals of the newspaper stem from the belief that Israeli public “deserves better, more balanced and more accurate journalism. Journalism that speaks, not shouts. Journalism of a different kind” (*Israel Hayom*, 2007; Greenslade, 2010).

The vision of Israel Hayom is summarized in the following headlines: (1) To tell the truth straight and to the point, (2) to support the rule of law, (3) to be fair and balanced, (4) to examine the facts and, if we make a mistake, to correct it, and (5) to remember that we are Israelis.

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<sup>(1)</sup>A poll conducted by TGI market research company.



**Yediot Ahronot****Language:** Hebrew**Established:** 1939**Website:** <http://www.ynetnews.com>**Circulation:** 250,000

Yedioth Ahronoth (or “Latest News” in English) is nowadays second largest and widely-read daily newspaper in Israel. It had the largest circulation for six decades until recently, was surpassed by the establishment of other competitive newspaper such as Israel Hayom. It has an online version written in Hebrew and English called “Ynetnews” published since 2005. Yedioth Ahronoth tackles the local and international arenas, with a special focus on Israel, the Jewish World, and the Middle East. All designed and drafted by Israel’s most high-profile writers coupled with an unmatched level of proficiency and journalistic ethics. Concerning its political leaning, Yedioth Ahronoth is by large centre-right (*Ynetnews*, 2005; Johnson, 2014).

**Haaretz****Language:** Hebrew**Established:** 1919**Website:** <http://www.haaretz.com>**Circulation:** 85,000 (est.)

Haaretz (in English “The Land”) is a leading liberal Israeli newspaper and oldest daily newspaper founded in 1919. It has a broad impact and is considered the most powerful for its reporting and commentary by the country’s leading commentators and analysts. Moreover, Haaretz plays a significant role in shaping public opinion and is widely reflected in “government and decision-making circles”. Haaretz also tackles both domestic and international spheres, and its journalistic team comprises of an estimated 330 reporter, writers, and editors (Haaretz, 2001; CRL, 2001). Haaretz is considered the “flagship broadsheet of Israel’s left-wing intelligentsia”, and most critical of Netanyahu (Jeffay, 2012).

## Maariv

**Language:** Hebrew

**Established:** 1948

**Website:** <http://www.nrg.co.il>

**Circulation:** 200,000 (est.)

Maariv (in English ‘Evening’) is a mainstream daily newspaper that had a fierce six decades competition with Yediot Aharonot, until its financial crisis particularly in 2012. It is a widely read newspaper, especially that it was established with the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, making it the second oldest newspaper in Israel. Nevertheless, according to Rafi Mann, Maariv failed to cope with the social map of the country, and therefore, did not manage to sustain its status as the “most connected newspaper with the political, economic and social elite”. The newspaper used to be published in the evening from where its name was derived, however nowadays it is being published in the morning. The political orientation of Maariv is center aiming for secular audience (Jeffay, 2012; Kershner, 2012).

### 4.2.4 Sampling Units

I used the method of ‘industrial week’ in collecting the data for the content analysis. In this method, I chose a different day every week for each issue. For instance, If I coded the issue of Saturday on the first week, for the same newspaper, I coded the issue of Sunday on the second week, Monday on the third week, and Tuesday on the fourth week, and so on so forth. This method ensured the representation of all days of the week and took into consideration all themes, issues and events. Besides, this method reduced any possible bias in the sample and minimized the effect of events, or “any shortsightedness that can result from looking at society through the lens of events” (Patterson, 2008, p. 37). In line with this, Patterson (2008, p. 37) added: *‘Events are like anecdotes; they are examples, not systematic observations’*. Furthermore, event-based stories are occasionally framed thematically and instead are mostly framed in an episodic frame that “focuses on a particular event without placing it in a larger context” (Ibid., 38).

As mentioned above, the sampling units included 8 daily newspapers; 4 in Palestine and 4 in Israel, for the period between August 2013 and March 2014. From each newspaper 4 issues were coded every month using the method of ‘industrial week’, which sums up to 16 issues per county per month, and to a total of 32 issues per month, as shown in Table 4.2 below:

**TABLE 4.2** NUMBER OF INVESTIGATED ISSUES PER NEWSPAPER PER MONTH

<b>Palestine</b>					
<b>Newspaper</b>	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda	Felesteen newspaper	Sub-total
<b>No. of issues / month</b>	4	4	4	4	16
<b>Israel</b>					
<b>Newspaper</b>	Israeli Hayom	Yediot Ahronot	Haaretz	Maariv	Sub-total
<b>No. of issues / month</b>	4	4	4	4	16
<b>Total</b>					<b>32</b>

### 4.2.5 Coding the Sample

The coding of the sample was determined in two steps (see Figure 4.1 below). In the first step, all articles during the investigation period were selected from the media research units and sections where the heading title or sub-title contained keywords \*Palestine, Israel or conflict\*. It did not matter whether the keyword was typed in a big or small font, or if it was preceded by a prefix as in ‘anti-terrorist’, followed by a suffix as in ‘terrorism’, mentioned alone as in ‘terrorist’, or was in a context as in ‘a terrorist attack’.

In the second step, selected article was read completely and then over-checked if it addressed the main issues of the conflict (e.g., casualties, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements, Palestinian prisoners, security of Israel, the status of Jerusalem, Natural Resources, borders, beliefs, feelings and principles, and Gaza). If not then, the article was not coded.

### Access Criteria

Coded units were all articles in the news and commentary sections of the newspaper that discussed, mentioned or portrayed suggestions/ideas/points of views regarding the main issues of the conflict, history, accords, peace agreements, resolutions, political actors and speeches, events, day-to-day reports of confrontations, attacks and casualties, ideologies, and public opinion. Posts that did not address the conflict directly was not investigated.

### Exclusion Criteria

Articles from the following sections were excluded: sport, travel, housing, culture, motor/auto, fashion or entertainment were not coded, because they included very

few articles related to the conflict. The same applies to any magazines/brochures attached to the newspaper.


### Context Unit

Context unit for this analyzes is the whole article. Encoders had to code the articles mentioned as in the codebook, whether as causes, consequences, or solutions.

## 4.2.6 Developing Dimensions

Public strata vary significantly when their political knowledge is being questioned, and so the quality of their opinions. As summarized by Neijens (2008, p. 27) “people who discuss public affairs are better educated, more attentive to media messages, more knowledgeable about politics, and more politically involved”. Therefore, I considered Price and Neijens (1997) collective ‘decision-quality’ concerns when validating and listing the dimensions. He accounted for (1) the degree to which dimensions addressed appear responsive to popular concerns, (2) their magnitude to popular discussion, mass media, and debate, (3) the linkage between political actors and their representation of their respective public, (4) the various available options/solution/viewpoints at hand, and finally (5) the legitimacy and fairness of suggested dimensions (Vincent, 2008, p. 22).

**FIGURE 4.1** STRATEGY OF SAMPLE ENTRY



### 4.2.7 Reliability

After a thorough reading and revision of the codebook, I met with the Palestinian coders in the headquarters of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) in Beit-Sahour, Palestine. In this meeting, I gave them a training session that included an explanation of terms, expressions, terminologies, abbreviations used, general concepts, scrutinizing data in the field, and how to decide which articles to code. The same training took place for the Israeli coder but on Skype due to mobility restrictions imposed by the political status quo, and inability to travel to Israel.

The coding rules of the codebook were simple, clear, and required only coding the availability of pre-determined dimensions with “mentioned” or “not mentioned”. This ensured higher *stability* when coding newspapers, and smaller chances of being skewed in their coding due to personal views. In line with this, *Cognitive change* is another issue that can influence the stability of coding text. Nevertheless, the fact that coders belonged to two purely different groups - Palestinians or Israelis and were dealing with issues that were directly connected to them determine higher cognitive stability and lower chances of any significant change in their position. On the other hand, it could have the opposite influence, were coders automatically filtered information that did not support their view. Therefore, a pilot sample was conducted in contemplation of testing the *Reproducibility* or *intercoder reliability*, which refers to “the extent to which content classification produces the same results when the same text is coded by more than one coder” (Weber, 1990, p. 17), and the Intra-coded reliability as well.

### 4.2.8 Validity

I used multiple validity methods in asserting the validity of research results based on content analysis. *Face validity*, which is the degree to which categories appear to measure the construct it is designed to measure. This kind of validity test depends on the correspondence between the researcher’s definitions or theories and construction of categories that measures them. The categories or dimensions were extracted from a thorough review of history, a closer observation to previous studies and questionnaires in the field, and finally, they were reviewed and assessed by experts on both sides; Dr. Nabil Kukali<sup>(2)</sup> on the Palestinian side, and Dr. Aaron Lerner<sup>(3)</sup> on the Israeli side. Even though content analysts relied heavily on face validity, however, according to Weber (1990, p. 18) “some social scientists have viewed their results sceptically”, and that “stronger forms of validity involve more than one variable”,

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<sup>(2)</sup>President of the PCPO (Palestinian Center for Public Opinion).

<sup>(3)</sup>Director of IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis).

which can be used more effectively to assess the validity of results from the content analysis.

Consequently, I checked the *Construct validity* of categories. “A measure has a construct validity to the extent that is correlated with some other measure of the same construct. Other scholars differentiated *convergent* from *discriminate* validity” (Ibid., p. 19). Accordingly, I categorized the items in terms of positive, negative, and neutral tendencies for each country, and compared polarized evaluations within each country’s newspapers. For example, an item that had a high construct validity had a high correlation with other items of the same construct (convergent) and at the same time was uncorrelated with measures of dissimilar constructs (discriminant). Finally, I used *Hypothesis validity* to test if items behave as it is projected to (Ibid. p 19).

### **Testing Coding**

A small sample of 50 articles across all newspapers was coded to test the clarity of category definitions, and to offer suggestions and insights regarding any amendments or classification scheme.

## 4.3 Survey

This descriptive methodology is a general study of a phenomenon found in a group, and in a particular place. At present it's a method of analysis and interpretation in a scientifically organized form to reach specific purposes of a social status, or a social problem or a specific population. The research steps in this methodology included the allocation of the survey problematic and the scientific considerations of the survey objectives. It furthermore determined the scope of research regarding sample, time and place required for its implementation, as well as the selection of the research tools that were used to obtain information or data in accordance with the nature of the research problematic and its hypotheses, then codified these tools and assessed the extent of their reliability and contrast.

### 4.3.1 Data Collection

Representative samples were selected through the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO)<sup>(4)</sup> in Palestine and Maagar Mochot Ltd.<sup>(5)</sup> in Israel<sup>(6)</sup>.

It was critical to ascertaining how thoughts are structured in the questionnaire in order to understand the general framework people use in organizing their thinking about the peace process and the conflict. Therefore, I used a closed-ended question format to facilitate to the respondents the establishment of their frame of reference. They were particularly well-suited for this purpose. The general goals of the survey were to determine the methods applicable to the following:

1. Descriptive design and quantitative research as two supplementary systems in conducting the surveys.
2. Application of a definite pattern of the descriptive design in the public opinion studies.
3. Sources of the secondary data resulting from the Bureau research.
4. The field survey, on the distribution of 1500 questionnaires among a representative and random samples of the Palestinian and Israeli societies. Besides,

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<sup>(4)</sup>PCPO, one of Palestinian's leading research institutions, was established back in 1994 as a private institution. It has over 21 years of experience in working with clients in the media, government and NGOs on opinion research projects of all descriptions (PCPO's official website, <http://www.pcpo.org>).

<sup>(5)</sup>Maagar Mochot - The Israel's leading research institution, was established back in 1992 as a private corporation. The institution specializes in supporting major decision-makers in the public, private and third sector organizations, with vital information through the collection and analysis of data, based on surveys and other quantitative and qualitative research methods (Maagar Mochot official website, <http://www.maagar-mochot.co.il>).

<sup>(6)</sup>PCPO and Maagar Mochot Ltd. has been commissioned to do the data collection for this dissertation in Palestine and Israel.

processing and analyzing the data.

### 4.3.2 Operational Definitions

The following terms were defined as used in this study:

- Affiliation to historic events – On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree, respondent were asked to evaluate the following historic events: (a) Persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia. (b) Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. (c) The British granting the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine -Balfour Declaration. (d) The 1948 Arab-Israeli war. (e) Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 - Six Days War. (f) Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their own agendas. (g) The Palestinian belief that they have lived on this land over centuries and are entitled to own it. (h) The Jewish belief that the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people.
- Affiliation to the past – Respondent's affiliation to the past was measured by asking them about which statement they feel is closer to their opinion, if they were to get back to the beginning of the conflict in the beginning of last century: (1) Would have kept the history as it is. (2) Would have sought out more peaceful changes to the history. (3) Would have persisted with even more extreme actions. (4) Do not know.
- Actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – Respondents were asked if the following actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were almost always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified: (a) Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel. (b) Military actions by Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories. (c) Palestinian actions against Israelis. (d) Jewish settlers' actions against Palestinians. (e) Movement restrictions imposed by Israel. (f) The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prison. (g) Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally. (h) Building the wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
- What the conflict is about – Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree, respondents were asked to answer what they thought the between the Palestinians and Israelis is about? (a) Religion (b) Culture (c) Nationalism (d) Politics (e) Economics (f) History (g) Existence (h) Ethnicity.
- Most appropriate solution – Respondents were asked about the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict: (1) Two states that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, the first is Israeli and the second is Palestinian. (2) One state in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations. (3) A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. (4)



The West Bank becomes part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt. (5).  
None.

- Prioritizing major issues of the conflict – Respondents were asked about the issues that they that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties. The scale was from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and 10 represents the least important issue these days, issues included: (a) Settlements. (b) Prisoners. (c) Jerusalem. (d) The security of both Israel and the Palestinians. (e) Borders and crossing points. (f) The Refugees. (g) Control over natural resources like water. (h) Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders. (i) Recognizing the Jewish state. (j) Having control over holy places.
- Plans of economic cooperation – Respondents were presented with plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis, and then were asked to specify the extent to which they accept the following plans using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to them, and 5 meaning very acceptable: (a) Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, etc. (b) Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel. (c) Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two states. (d) Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and Israelis. (e) Building a Palestinian airport. (f) Building a Palestinian seaport. (g) Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip.
- Establishing a Palestinian state – Respondents were asked to evaluate their support of the following elements as a part of establishing a Palestinian state using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning they are completely opposed, and 5 meaning that they are in full support: (a) Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of land swap. (b) A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces. (c) International presence on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state and Israel. (d) A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings. (e) The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority. (f) Building a “Safe Passage” between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (g) Demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established Palestinian state. (h) Security coordination between Israel and Palestine.
- Evaluation of political figures – Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of some political figures on both sides pertaining to the peace process. They were asked to evaluate them with highly positive, somewhat posi-

tive, somewhat negative or highly negative.

- Actions hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process – Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious respondents were asked how do they evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process: (a) Building settlements. (b) Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. (c) Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. (d) Hamas and Islamic Jihad's possession of weapons. (e) Israeli settlers' possession of weapons. (f) Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. (g) Detained Palestinians prisoners' by Israel. (h) The Israeli full control over natural resources. (i) Palestinian refugees' right of return. (j) The difficulty of having access to places of worship. (k) Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. (l) Not recognizing Israel's right to exist. (m) Hardliners constant refusal to any peace agreement. (n) The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products. (o) Deterioration of the Palestinian economy. (p) Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine. (q) The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. (r) Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. (s) Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy. (t) Israel's absolute control over border crossings. (u) The freezing of the funds' transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.
- Feelings and attitudes towards the other side – Respondent were presented with a list of words and phrases that describe how would they express their feelings and attitudes towards the other side. They were asked for each word or phrase, if they you don't share this feeling, they share it to a low degree, they share it to a moderate degree, or they share it to a very high degree: (a) Tolerance towards the other side. (b) Understanding the other side. (c) Angry at the other side. (d) Fear from the other side. (e) Trust in the other side. (f) Grudge against the other side.
- Feelings and attitudes of the other side towards you – This battery of questions asked the respondents to what degree they believe that the other side holds the following feelings towards them: (a) Tolerance. (b) Understands you. (c) Feels angry at you. (d) Fears you. (e) The other side trusts you. (f) Bears the grudge against you.
- Newspaper – Respondents were asked about the local daily, weekly, or monthly newspaper they you usually read the most? *In Palestine*: (1) Al-Quds newspaper. (2) Al-Hayat newspaper. (3) Al-Ayyam newspaper. (4) Filistin newspaper. (5) Other. *In Israel*: (1) Israel Hayom. (2) Yediot Ahronot. (3) Haaretz. (4) Maariv. (5) Other.
- Political identification – Respondents were asked if new elections, agreed to by all factions, were held today and this list were presented, for which would

they vote? If they were not sure, the question asked to which would they lean?*In Palestine*: (1) Fateh. (2) Hamas. (3) Third Road. (4) Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). (5) Palestine National Initiative. (6) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). (7) Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement. (8) Independent Islamists. (9) Independent Nationalists. (10) Other. (11) No comment/Refused to answer. (12) Do not know. *In Israel*: (1) Likud. (2) Zionist Union. (3) Jewish Home. (4) Yesh Atid. (5) United Arab List. (6) Kulanu. (7) United Tora Judaism. (8) Israel Beitenu. (9) Shas. (10) Meretz.

- Degree of religiosity – Respondents were asked how do they introduce themselves from the religious point of view: (1) Very religious (religious activist). (2) Somewhat religious. (3) Religious to a mediocre degree. (4) Somewhat irreligious. (5) Irreligious at all.
- Quality of life – Respondents were asked if the following battery of items apply to them, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree: (a) Poverty (b) Low wages/pensions (c) Unemployment/lack of job opportunities/ (d) Shortage of health care and education (e) Lack of security and safety/crime/violence. (f) Restrictions imposed on freedom of movement/blockade. (g) high cost of living/Inflation/high prices (h) Energy or fuel shortages (i) Electricity shortages (j) Water shortages (k) Housing problems

### 4.3.3 Instrumentation

There should be no separation between the research methodology and the methods that were used in data collection. The research methodology and its tools are inter-related, integrated stages, thus forming a unity that is influenced by the nature of the study and the sample type. The survey topic and objective determined together the type of the data required to be collected and the nature of the methodology used in the survey determined the sample type and the methods of the data collection required. Relying thereon, the nature of the target of this survey and the nature of the method used required the collection of as much data as possible. Among the most powerful methods of data collection that might help to implement this survey was the Questionnaire.

The questionnaire form has been chosen as a research tool for many reasons; the most crucial one is that it secures the frank and free answers where respondents were not obliged to give their names or any connotation referring to them. They were not obliged to fill in the questionnaire form if they were not willing to, or when they might even be not prepared, psychologically and intellectually, to answer the questionnaire. The respondents were therefore very distant from any accountability or

blame. This aspect was important in the questionnaire because it secured scientific openness and objectivity in the results.

As the questions for all respondents were standardized and the formulation of the questions did not vary with the change of the interviewer, it was thus easier to collect data in masses and, subsequently to interpret them and have access to appropriate conclusions. Also, the questionnaire made it easier for the researcher to collect much information from several people at a specific time. Finally, the nature of the research that I have carried out was a comparative study between the Palestinian and Israeli public, and thus it served and facilitated the use of the questionnaire as a tool for the survey to achieve the goals of the research at a high level of effectiveness and accuracy. Youngs (1969, p. 291) contended that:

*‘Many investigators believe that through a questionnaire they are able to eliminate personal influence upon the subject and thereby achieve a greater degree of objectivity. The questionnaire also provides the possibility of covering large areas and diverse groups with minimum time and effort’.*

#### 4.3.4 Data Analysis

The required statistical processing of the data has been carried out by extracting the figures and the Percentages. The hypotheses of the survey were examined at the rate of  $\alpha = 0.05$  through the following statistical tests:

- Stepwise multiple regression
- Pearson correlation coefficient ( $r$ )
- Effect size of Rosnow and Rosenthal
- Cronbach-Alpha stability coefficient ( $\alpha$ )
- Chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) - goodness-of-fit test
- Independent-samples  $t$ -test
- One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
- Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test
- Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
- Bartlett’s test of sphericity - Measure of Appropriateness of Factor Analysis
- Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS test) and Shapiro-Wilk - Testing for Normality of Residuals
- tolerance and VIF - Testing for Collinearity
- bpktest test<sup>(7)</sup>
- Breusch-Pagan and Koenker’s tests - Testing for Heteroskedasticity
- Durbin-Watson coefficient ( $d$ .) - Testing for Independence

By using Excel and SPSS 22.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).

<sup>(7)</sup>A macro that was developed for SPSS to test for Heteroskedasticity with numbers.

However, *Backward stepwise multiple regression analysis* was the main test statistics used in this research because it determines the correlation between a criterion variable and some combination of two or more predictor variables. This study incorporated thirty-three independent variables for each model (Table 4.4), from which, only significant predictors remained in the models. The dependent variables for my models were about the prioritization of major conflicting issues that respondents thought both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties. They were ten major issues that respondents rated from 1 to 10, where 1 represented the most important issue and 10 represented the least important issue to be addressed. This suggested ten multiple regression models for each side, however, due to the use of a split-ballot method when collecting the data, I ended up with 20 regression models for each side split to A and B as shown in Table 4.3 hereunder.

**TABLE 4.3** DISTRIBUTION OF MODELS

<i>Country</i>	<b>Palestine</b>		<b>Israel</b>	
<i>Split</i>	A	B	A	B
<i># of models</i>	10	10	10	10

Dummy variables were used to measure gender, social status, refugee or not, and more. Dummy variables were used to insert a nominal scale variable into a regression equation. Since the numbers assigned to categories of a nominal scale are not assumed to have an order and unit of measurement, they cannot be treated as ‘scores’ as they would be in conventional regression analysis.

### 4.3.5 Method

To achieve the targets that are pursued by this dissertation and to be able to respond to the study questions in a satisfactory manner, I with the assistance and support of PCPO in Palestine and Maagar Mochot Ltd. in Israel agreed upon the following modes of administration:

#### In Palestine

With regards to the method of data collection in Palestine, I used face-to-face interviews instead of phone interviews for many reasons confirmed by the team in the PCPO. Some of the benefits of conducting face-to-face interviews in Palestine were:

TABLE 4.4 DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<i>Dependent variables</i>	(1) Settlements, (2) Prisoners, (3) Jerusalem,
	(4) The security of both Israel and the Palestinians,
	(5) Borders and crossing points, (6) The Refugees,
	(7) Control over natural resources like water,
	(8) Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders,
	(9) Recognizing the Jewish state, (10) Control over holy places.
	(a) <b>Demographics:</b> Gender, Age, Social status, Education, Degree of religiosity, Refugee or not, Affiliation to Political Party.
	(b) <b>Indexes:</b> Influence of historical events, Actions pertaining the conflict, Actions hindering peace, Quality of life, Positive feelings and attitudes towards the other, Negative feelings and attitudes towards the other, Positive feelings and attitudes of the other towards you, Negative feelings and attitudes of the other towards you.
	(c) <b>Other variables:</b> Optimism, Interest in the conflict, What the conflict is about, Affiliation to the past, Economic cooperation, Items for establishing Borders, Best solution for the conflict, Evaluation of Abbas, Evaluation of Mishaal, Evaluation of Netanyahu, Faith in political leaders to make peace with the other, Resumption of negotiations, Faith in negotiations, Readiness to compromise for peace, Confidence that peace will take place in near future, Willingness to emigrate, Inclination to integrate, Casualties as a result of the conflict.
<i>Independent variables</i>	

1. The respondent felt safer meeting the interviewer at his/her home rather than on the phone, which keeps the interviewer more anonymous.
2. The face-to-face interview gave the respondent more time to think and elaborate on his/her answer as there is sometimes a sense of urgency on the phone.
3. A face-to-face interview secured the right environment for the respondent because, during a phone interview, the respondent could likely be at work at times or the timing of the call could be inconvenient for him/her.
4. A land line is less common these days with the affordability of mobile phones; roughly 60 percent of the Palestinian population has land lines in comparison to 92 percent who own mobile phones. The use of this method might not allow us to have a representative sample.
5. Facial and physical expressions, body language, are vital when conducting a face-to-face interview, but are unfounded during a phone interview.
6. Due to the difficult and non-transparent political situation and the manifold parties and factions in the country, people were scared to answer survey questions on the phone as they do not know the identity of the caller.

Therefore, I concluded, for the best results for this dissertation a face-to-face interview would be the most recommendable, safer, and convenient option to be conducted in Palestine, hopefully bringing about the quality of results I seek to obtain.

### **In Israel**

After meeting with a group of specialists on the Israeli side, I decided that despite the accuracy and objectivity of the questions in portraying the reality of the conflict that it may still face some practical and technical problems with the Israeli people. Thus, might scoreless accurate results, as the topic in its nature addressed issues that are sensitive to the two peoples. However, as I mentioned earlier, I have used the face-to-face method for data collection on the Palestinian side, which significantly reduces the proportion of those respondents, who refused to cooperate or even to fill in the questionnaire form.

On the Israeli side, however, the face-to-face method is less commonly used and is very high in cost. Surveys are usually conducted in Israel by phone or electronically. But for the same reasons mentioned above, the phone as a mean to collect data for this dissertation has been excluded and was agreed to carry out the survey online on a sample, which is scientifically representative of the Israeli people. The survey was conducted using a Web Panel (by 'Midgam Project'). Today, the panel includes over 50,000 'panelists' that participate in different studies for a fee. This panel has proven itself in hundreds of studies conducted since 2008.

### 4.3.6 Sample - in Palestine

#### Technical Details

The Central Elections Committee has selected about 998 polling centers in the West Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem. The PCPO ascertains that the centers are selected according to precise scientific standards. It is also taken into due consideration, that the distribution of these centers in each town, village or camp has been carried out in a way as to cover all the areas so that these centers become easily accessible to the residents.

In each selected refugee camp, village/town or city (after stratification), the PCPO chose at random a number of polling centers. A total of 180 were selected. The selection is subject to certain considerations, such as the number of the election centers in each of the 16 governorates and the geographic distribution of the voters in towns, villages, and camps. The polling centers are distributed among the constituencies by the density of the voters and the number of the poll centers in each district (governorate).

Having selected from every district (governorate) the polling centers, their numbers and names were given to the field supervisors, who distributed them by their turn among the researchers. The following duties then followed:

1. A list was made of all streets located in the vicinity of each polling center, which were considered as the starting point for each residential quarter. Streets that had no names were given certain numbers by the researchers.
2. A certain street was randomly selected in each area by using the simple random sample method.
3. Either side of that particular street was selected. Then every other house i.e. those with odd or even numbers were interviewed.
4. In the case of a multi-apartment building, each apartment were considered as a separate household.

Other streets mentioned on the list were taken as an alternative in the following cases:

5. If work is completed on the first street before all necessary data were gathered.
6. If for a reason or another, the first street was not found.
7. If the first street was found to be deserted or slightly inhabited.
8. If the first street was found to be commercial or industrial.

If a certain house or apartment was found to be uninhabited or the inhabitants refrained from receiving the interviewers, work would continue as normal, i.e., every other house. Only one member of any one household was interviewed. For the selection of the respondent, all 18+ residents in a household were listed by name and



dates of birth according to their ID cards. After listing the household members, the designated respondent was the person (male or female) who had ‘The Last Birthday’ among all listed individuals before the date of the interview. In cases where the designated respondent was not at home after three visits to the same household at different times of the same day or different days of the field period, or in cases of definite refusals, or when the interview could not be completed with the designated respondent, the interviewer continued going ahead to the next household on the route from the same sampling point.

### **Sampling Plan**

A representative sample of 1015 Palestinian adults per survey, 18 years and older, were selected for this research from Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). This sample was based on the 16 districts, called “governorates”, in which a random 180 of primary sampling units (PSUs) were chosen, as presented in Table 4.5 below:

**TABLE 4.5** PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE IN PALESTINE

District	Age groups (%)					Total (%)
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55-64	65+	
Jenin	2.5	2.2	1.3	0.4	0.3	6.7
Tubas	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	1.4
Tulkarem	1.5	1.3	0.8	0.2	0.2	4.0
Qalqilya	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.1	2.4
Salfit	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	1.5
Nablus	3.1	2.7	1.6	0.5	0.4	8.3
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	2.8	2.5	1.4	0.5	0.4	7.4
Jerusalem	3.4	3.1	1.8	0.5	0.5	9.2
Jericho	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	1.1
Bethlehem	1.7	1.5	0.9	0.3	0.2	4.6
Hebron	5.5	4.9	2.8	0.9	0.8	14.9
<i>West Bank</i>	<i>22.9</i>	<i>20.4</i>	<i>11.9</i>	<i>3.7</i>	<i>3.2</i>	<i>61.5</i>
North Gaza	2.8	2.5	1.4	0.4	0.4	7.5
Gaza City	4.9	4.4	2.5	0.8	0.7	13.3
Dier Al-Balah	2.1	1.8	1.2	0.3	0.3	5.6
Khan Yunis	2.7	2.4	1.4	0.4	0.4	7.2
Rafah	1.8	1.6	0.9	0.3	0.2	4.7
<i>Gaza Strip</i>	<i>14.3</i>	<i>12.7</i>	<i>7.4</i>	<i>2.2</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>38.3</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>37.2</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>19.3</i>	<i>5.9</i>	<i>5.2</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Palestinian Center for Public Opinion.

## Sampling Design

To obtain the most representative sample of the districts mentioned above, the following methods of sampling were used in collecting the data:

1. *Stratified random sampling*: a random stratified cluster sample of 1030 individuals 18 years or older was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. This involved selecting 156 clusters “out of 998 polling centres” with populations of 1,000 or more individuals (after stratification by district and type of community- urban, rural, and refugee camp) with probabilities proportional to size.
2. *Simple random sampling*: choosing the street (starting from the polling center).

3. *Systematic random sampling*: this stage involved randomly selecting households in each of the chosen clusters (Left-side houses in even order).
4. *Last Birthday Method*: this is the last stage, which involved selecting one individual in each household using the Last Birthday Method. Face-to-face interviews were then conducted with the selected individuals.

### 4.3.7 Sample - in Israel

#### Sampling Plan

A representative sample of (520) adult Israeli population (aged 18 and above) means a sample representing all segments of the population, including both the Jewish and Arab sectors. The Jewish sector consisted of a number of segments, including new immigrants, orthodox Jews and the general Jewish segment. All of these segments were represented in the national sample in proportion to their relative size in the population, as shown in Table 4.6:

**TABLE 4.6** PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE IN ISRAEL

Sector	Age groups (%)				Total (%)
	18-34	35-44	45-64	+65	
Jewish Sector	21.6	11.0	19.0	10.4	62.0
New Immigrants	5.6	3.6	5.2	3.6	18.0
Arab Sector	8.6	4.6	5.0	1.8	20.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>19.2</i>	<i>29.2</i>	<i>15.8</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Maagar Mochot Ltd.

To be qualified as a representative sample as I defined it, a representative sample of the adult Israeli population must meet some basic objective parameters relating to sex, age, segment and geographic location that can be validated based on the data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS).

#### Sampling Design

People signed up to the panel by references to search engines (especially Google). Also, there are some sites that referred visitors to the panel, and finally, the participants themselves referred others and receive compensation through their affiliate program. Respondents were paid for participation, and the reward was determined

in dialogue with the clients. In most cases, as a rule of thumb, about 10 Agorot per question are maintained.

**To Ensure No Duplicate Registrations to the Panel** - During registration, registrants submitted identifying information that included an e-mail address, phone number, and ID number. That does not completely rule out duplicate registrations, but it certainly makes it more difficult. In any case, the reward was such that the trouble of creating false registrations is too big.

**Maintaining the Security and Confidentiality of Participant** - Registry, in which they gave the identifying information, is done using a secure communication protocol (SSL). The actual data is stored in an encrypted form in the database. The panelists login is made by using a username and password. Password recovery required answering correctly on the verification question. Finally - the data submitted to the customer never included identifying information.

**Quality of Data** - After most of the surveys, the system automatically marks about 20% of the participants on 'suspicion' of invalid participation. If a participant is marked, again and again, he/she will stop receiving invitations to participate. This method is good for the participants, whose "participation history" we have, but it does not cover new subscribers. Therefore, we recommend to include reading test questions when it is relevant.

**Sampling Participants** - The method of stratified sampling was used, based on data published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. Then quotas were made by gender and age groups following the research requirements.

### 4.3.8 Questionnaire

#### Questionnaire Completion

In the beginning, I allocated the goals anticipated from making the questionnaire in the light of the research topic and its problematic, and then determined the data and the information to be collected, and after that compiled and converted these objectives into a set of questions and inquiries. After having completed the design and selection of the questionnaire, I conducted a pilot test on a limited group of respondents identified in the research sample as to give me a feedback about their opinion on the quality of the questionnaire in terms of their understanding, inclusiveness and significance, as well as their quantity and adequacy to collect the required information on the topic of the research and its problematic. In the light of the observations and comments obtained, I modified the questions and compiled the questionnaire in its final form as to obtain the required outputs.

## Pre-test

The pre-test main objectives were to:

- Test the translation into the local language;
- Check the questions wording if they are fully understood by the interviewee, and if there are any “local expressions” that could fit better into the translation;
- Verify the total length of each section and the complete questionnaire;
- Identify the questions that are particularly difficult to understand, check the survey’s flow, and more;
- Verify the skip patterns.

The pre-test report provided complete information on:

- Comments and suggestions for improving the questionnaire. For example, on the general comprehension, the understanding of the questions, the sections flow, and more.
- Comments on particular questions
- The length of the questionnaire, per section and in total.

## Questionnaire Design

I made sure when designing the questionnaire to write in an understandable and clear manner that did not bear multiple interpretations to avoid any confusion or ambiguities by the respondents, or obtain inaccurate answers from them. Furthermore, I have taken into account the time available to the respondents and, therefore, was keen not to have as much as possible long questions, which might lead to the rejection of the interviewees to respond to the questionnaire or give fast and inaccurate answers.

Due to the nature of the research, length of the questionnaire, and to minimize context effect among items I decided to use a split ballot design, as shown in Table 5.10 in the next chapter. Moreover, after having reviewed the objectives of the study, I was keen to give a sufficient number of options enabling the respondents to express their different opinions in a precise way. As I mentioned earlier, the questionnaire has been designed according to the study matrix and the review of the history of the conflict. Add thereto the different previous studies that investigated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I, therefore, made sure of the correlation between the various questions in the different sections of the questionnaire, as well as of the correlation between these and the research topic and its problematic.

Emphasis should be given here to the sensitivity of the research topic to both peoples. I therefore tried as much as possible to stay away from any embarrassing

questions that might discourage the respondents to respond to the filling-in of the questionnaire, or even the use of any complex questions that might include more than one notion of the subject required to be examined, as that could cause confusion or embarrassment to the respondents. Finally, and after a thorough review of history and literature I managed to carve out four final questionnaires (Palestine - Split A and B, Israel - Split A and B) that investigated peoples' perspectives regarding almost every single and important aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The questionnaire comprised of many indexes of items regarding different aspects of the conflict and peace process and asked the respondents about their perceptions of these items. Questionnaires A and B in each country investigated the same indexes but with different items that complement each other.

I was cautious when developing the questionnaire especially that attitudes are highly dependent on the context in which they are depicted (Tourangeau & Galesic, 2008, p.145). Therefore, the wording of the questionnaire was characterized by simplicity, clearness and consistency across questions. Moreover, the sequence of questions was carefully studied to avoid dependency of responses on previous relevant answers. Afterward, the questionnaires were proofread and revised thoroughly.

### **Translation**

The master copy of the questionnaire was developed in English and then was translated into Arabic and Hebrew. The translation was done by an experienced and qualified team of translators, who already translated books from various languages, particularly from English into Arabic and Hebrew and vice versa. The translation was subject to possible modifications, since some expressions, terms and ideas were culturally grounded. Experience shows that the Hebrew questionnaire can also be used to interview respondents from both the Arab sector and the new-immigrant segment in Israel. The interviews for a particular sector were carried out in its language by interviewers who speak the language (Arabic speakers in the Arab sector and Hebrew speakers in the Jewish sector).

## 4.4 Document Analysis

Political leaders, elites, and parties are a well-informed politically active stratum of every society that exercises influential power in the decision-making process, which implies unique value orientations and political attitudes that differ from those of non-elites or the broader public. Therefore, a complementary document analysis of both societies main political parties/movements and leaders is a core stone determinant of public opinion and media frames that should not be overlooked, but instead be incorporated hand in hand with public opinion surveys and content analysis for further and clearer understanding of the formation of public opinion and media frames (Hoffmann-Lange, 2008, p. 54). Also, there is a close relationship that should be considered between political media and the political process, where the media is the link between the public and the regime. These media contribute through their political activities and functions significantly to the success or failure of the political system. Once Swanson (1992, p. 397) noted: *‘Politicians, officials, and interest advocates try to manipulate reporters and editors to manage rather than inform public opinion’*.

### 4.4.1 Unit of Analysis

Units of analysis are documents that include political parties’ activities, actions, decisions, secretary announcements, public speeches and press releases. The goal of this analysis was to observe how political parties and leaders influenced the media and people’s perceptions of the peace process and the conflict, and vice versa. Principally, it included exploring documents that wrote about the conflict and coded them using the same comprehensive pre-defined and already validated dimensions in the codebook of the content analysis.

### 4.4.2 Documents Sample

#### In Palestine

The major neck-to-neck political movements in Palestine are Fateh and Hamas. Statistically, these movements won a majority of 86.3%<sup>(8)</sup> of Palestinian votes in the 2006 legislative elections. These political movements are familiar with their distinct ideologies (*Islamism*; a type of religious-nationalism vs. *Secularism*; a type of secular nationalism that is not based so much on the repression or restriction of religion). Although Fateh forms the government, Hamas supporters constitute a

<sup>(8)</sup>Hamas (43.9%) and Fateh (42.4%).

very high percentage of the society, particularly in Gaza, and play a very influential role on the grounds that should not be ignored. Therefore, I used the archives in Fateh's official website for analysis, and I contacted the office of Hamas in Gaza who provided me with all official documents needed for my analysis.

**Fateh** - literally means 'Victory' or 'Conquest'. It is a reverse acronym of 'Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini' (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), the dominant faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Lybarger, 2007, p. 4). Fateh was founded by Yasser Arafat and a small group of Palestinian nationalists in the late 1950s in Kuwait (Bullock, 2007). As mentioned earlier, Fateh lost its majority in the Palestinian parliament to Hamas. However, Fateh still holds the presidency, the highest elected position in the Palestinian Authority, as well as roughly 70,000 police and security forces throughout the West Bank (Ibid.)

The main principles of Fateh's ideology advocated the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. It embraced the idea of solo Palestinian resistance with the policy of noninterference in the affairs of the Arab states, and one of its major concerns was "to get rid of the patronage of the Arab brethren over Palestinian problems" (Flapan, 1979, p. 53). It aimed to liberate Palestine without waiting for the Arab states to do so and to establish an identity and a sense of empowerment for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian cause for Fateh cadres could not wait any longer for Arab unity; they stressed its independence from pan-Arab unity and instead defined it as 'Palestine first' (Dunn, 2004). *'The ideology we adopted was unique in the Arab world'*, Arafat said. He elaborated, *'We were not Baathists, not Muslim Brothers, not Communists and not pan-Arab nationalists. We were not part of any existing parties'*. Fateh's ideology, he said, was Palestinian nationalism (Viorst, 1995, p. 215).

In 1967, Fateh became the dominant body in the PLO coalition, and the PLO became virtually synonymous with Fateh. Two decades later, the PLO, headed by Arafat, decided to move on the negotiation track. Therefore, many amendments on their core principles and the national constitution had to be taken; starting with the PLO's acceptance of three American conditions for opening a dialogue with the USA. Arafat "denounced terrorism, recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted the UN Security Council resolution no. 242 calling for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 war borders" (Araj & Brym, 2011, p. 843). Furthermore, Fateh amended and eliminated articles calling for the destruction of Israel and those articles that were incompatible with Oslo's agreement.

**Hamas** - literally means 'zeal'. It is an acronym for 'Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya' (the Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas was formally established and took part in the Palestinian national struggle after the outbreak of the first In-



tifada in 1987 (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 5; Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 90). It is a “Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Palestine, itself a part of the Muslim Brotherhood; an Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928, by Hassan al-Banna” (Aaron, 2005, p. 5). The origins of Hamas can be traced to late 1970s in the Gaza Strip by its founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was engaged in efforts to spread the movement’s extreme fundamentalist ideology among the Palestinian population (Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 90).

In 1988, Hamas published its charter which was a combination of Palestinian patriotism and radical Islamic ideology. The charter emphasized absolute subordination to the law of Islam, the non-recognition of Israel, and the commitment to be engaged in activities that aim to establish the institution of an Islamic Palestinian state. (Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 91). Hamas appeals to the religious sentiments of the public, and it uses the mosques as venues for interaction with the people to win their trust (Zayyad, 2005, p. 108). Hamas’ main political leaders are Ismail Haneyya - the premier of the deposed Hamas government, Khaled Misha’l - Head of Hamas politburo’ and Mahmoud Zahar (Aaron, 2005, p. 2).

The Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas ‘*consists of Muslims, who are devoted to Allah and worship Him verily*’ and who ‘*have raised the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the country and the people from the [oppressors] desecration, filth and evil*’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 3). The movement “draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpretations and views about existence, life, and humanity; refers to it for its conduct, and is inspired by it in whatever step it takes” (Article 1). The slogan of Hamas is ‘*Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution, Jihad its path and death for the cause of Allah its most sublime belief*’ (Article 8).

## In Israel

The document analysis was based on archives of two of the most senior and influential parties in Israel. The first is the Israeli right-wing party *Likud*, which is the one that rules in Israel in the last six years, and the party which scored the highest number of Knesset seats in the recent elections of March 2015. The second party for the document analysis was the Israeli Labour party *Ha’avoda*, which scored the highest number of Knesset seats among the parties in the opposition in the last two elections.

**Likud** - The ideological and intellectual roots of the party date back before its establishment, which was inspired by the Liberal National Movement ‘Beitar’ led by the revisionist Zionist leader ‘Ze’ev Jabotinsky’. It was established by the merger of two parties; ‘Herut,’ founded by ‘Menachem Begin’ in 1948 and the Liberal

Party to form together in 1973 this right-of-center secular-nationalist political party. Therefore, the Likud party is defined as a Zionist party of liberal right that believes in the ideas of new conservatives. Likud came into power for the first time since its foundation in 1977 (the victory of Menachem Begin over the Labor Party leader Shimon Peres), which was the first defeat of the Labor Party since the establishment of the State of Israel (Toler, 2011, p. 245). For decades afterward, the Likud party alternated in government with Labour. It became the ruling party in Israel in the years between 1977 - 1984, 1986 - 1992, and 1996 - 1999. The party came to power between 2001 and 2005 under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, before it split to form a new centrist party 'Kadima', taking from the mother party prominent moderate politicians with it. Finally, Likud came to power under the leadership of Netanyahu in 2015. The party still adopts the stance of firm opposition to a Palestinian state, to the Palestinian right of return, and to the dismantling of Jewish settlements. Likud leaders also assert Israel's sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem and rule out the withdrawal from the Golan Heights (Shlaim, 2005b, p. 253).

Traditionally, the Likud party opposed the withdrawal from any land occupied by Israel during its wars with neighboring Arab states. Furthermore, it supported the establishment of settlements in the "occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank", which were and still are "a constant source of tension between the Obama administration and the European allies". Nevertheless, modern history witnessed Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories under Likud's governments as happened in the Sinai after the Camp David Accords with the Egyptian government, as well as Gaza disengagement plan after Oslo Accord. This resulted in an ideological clash that ended with the split of Sharon and others from the Likud to form the 'Kadima' political party (*BBC News*, 2013).

Likud's most important principles are Israel's right to exist on the entire historical land of Palestine and Eastern Jordan, to eventually conclude peace with Arabs through direct negotiations, the continuation of large-scale settlement operations in 'all the territories of the liberated Eretz Israel (Greater Israel)', the emphasis on free market economy and the reduction of state intervention. Likud's platform neither endorsed nor ruled out "a two-state solution, but simply condemns any further unilateral withdrawals on the model of Lebanon in 2000 or Gaza in 2005" (Dowty, 2001, p. 15).

**Ha'avoda** - 'Mifleget Ha'avoda Hayisra'elit' was a merger between Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avoda Po'alei Zion, and Rafi. In the beginning, this confederation of factions was headed by PM Levy Eshkol. Golda Meir stated at the unification convention in Jerusalem:

*'Though we come together today to restore our unity, we are not about to create a large party with a single point of view, but one of freedom of opinion*

*and discussion... We have united not against, but for so that we can call upon the Jewish people: 'Come to Israel: we are waiting, the land and the country await you'... We have united to serve the nation with greater strength to educate the youth and the workers, to create a just society' (Dishon, 1973, p. 541).*

It is a center-left party that went through many transformations and upheavals since it sat out. However, it always derived its strength from being a Zionist, social democratic, centralized and a party of pragmatic position. The Labour party was leading every government from 1948 until the Likud first came to power in 1977 led by Menachem Begin. Lately, the popularity of the party among voters was steadily waning over (Haaretz, 2014), particularly after the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, established the centrist 'Kadima' party, Shimon Peres and several other members of the Labour Party left the party and joined Sharon in 2005. Furthermore, Sharon managed to attract some of its voters, who felt comfortable with Sharon's policy of ending Israel's presence in the Gaza Strip as described earlier in this dissertation. The era of the Labor Party witnessed the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 between the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the leader of the Labor Party, late Yitzhak Rabin, who was later assassinated (Ibid.; Dowty, 2001, p. 8).

The most important principles of the Labour party are: to improve the social and economic life of the Israeli people, to strengthen the Israeli economy based on free market principles, and to achieve comprehensive peace and security in the Middle East. It always wished an egalitarian society, and the deep responsibility of the State of Israel and its citizens, regardless of race, religion or gender, as well as peace with the neighbors. Military power was always accompanied by a realistic vision of reality, and the ability to turn a dream into fact. Fair economy and a just society are the condition for a strong and prosperous nation, and are also derivatives of the IDF's military strength, on the one hand, and the ability to strive courageously for peace on the other (Ha'voda official website).

The Zionist Union; a centre-left political alliance between the Labor Party (headed by Isaac Herzog) and the liberal political party 'Hatnua' (formed and led by Tzipi Livni), was established in December 2014 in an attempt to win the 2015 Israeli elections and take over the governance from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Haaretz, 2015).

### 4.4.3 Investigating Units

The strategy of sample entry and access criteria is similar to the one of the content analysis as shown in Figure 4.1 above.

The study was limited to documents published from 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2013 up till

30<sup>th</sup> March 2014, which is the same period of the content analysis, and for the same reasons mentioned before.

#### **4.4.4 Sources of Data**

The online archives of the Palestinian and Israeli political parties were easy to access, arranged by dates and included information on the parties' activity, part of speeches, political vies, press releases, announcements, statements, decisions, legislations and attitudes toward 'the other' political leaders and the peace process. The analysis referred to the relevant issues of the peace process. Finally, the nature of documents reported in the Palestinian websites was similar to those reported by the Israeli websites, making them very useful and unique sources of data.

## 4.5 Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the research were:

1. It was limited to Israelis in Israel, and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and Gaza Strip.
2. The surveys were limited to the period between 15.04.2015 - 15.05.2015, and the content and document analysis were limited to the period between 01.08.2013 - 30.03.2014.
3. A different research instrument was used for the survey in each country; a face-to-face survey in Palestine, and a web-based survey in Israel.
4. The content analysis was confined to newspapers only.
5. The document analysis was limited only to the major political parties/movements in each country.

## Chapter 5

# ANALYSIS OF DATA

### Contents

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## 5.1 Content Analysis

### 5.1.1 A Brief Overview of Terminologies

Israeli newspapers used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ because they consider the principle of Islamic jihad as ‘terrorism’. They, in general, connected the essence of Islam with extremism and showed that Israel and America are partners in being targeted by terrorism on the one hand and partners in the fight against terrorism on the other hand. That is in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims a fallacy that offends the Islam because Jihad in Islam is only legitimized for self-defense, for defending the religion and one’s country, and no way for aggression against the others as emphasized by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Tayeb. What Israel considered as Islamic terrorism is considered by the Palestinians as Jihad for the sake of God and the homeland. In both cases, the blood of unarmed, helpless citizens is shed. Other topics that were abundant in the Israeli media is the term ‘martyrdom operations’ or ‘suicide operations’, which the Palestinians and their media considered as operations of ‘Palestinian resistance’ against the Israeli occupation, which Palestinian militants view as “terrorist” occupation and are entitled to resist the occupiers, who kill, assassinate, demolish their houses, arrest their people and besiege their towns and villages.


What Israel views as self-defense, is regarded by Palestinians as acts of resistance and the cycle of conflict continues at the media level and on the ground. And where the Israeli media are keen to frequently use the term 'Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) instead of the term 'Israeli army' as to give the world the impression that Israel is always in the state of self-defense against a vast hostile Arab environment that seeks to eliminate it, are the media on the Palestinian side keen to use the term 'Israeli army', which should tell the world that Israel's occupation applies military repression and attacks against the occupied Palestinian citizens. It is in this regard worth mentioning that the Israeli media focus on the use of the term 'Arab-Israeli conflict' which in turn, suggests that there are two conflicting parties, who are Arabs and Israelis, and each of them has a right in Palestine, and that their conflict revolves around this right, while the means of the Palestinian media use the term 'Palestinian issue' which clearly indicates that there is one issue to one titular / claimant, who is the Palestinian people, and puts Israel in the position of a one that basically has no rights since the whole issue is the issue of people, whose homeland has been usurped, who have been displaced from their land, whose rights are violated and whose sanctuaries have been desecrated. The term 'Arab-Israeli conflict', however, used by the Israeli media, imposes a conflict between two parties that deals in the first place with the settlement of the border, and not with the right to exist. Furthermore, Israel uses through its media the term 'Land of Israel' as to suggest to the world that it is an Israeli land and belongs to the Jews, and the Palestinians have no right to it. The Palestinians, on the other hand, name the land 'Palestine' as to suggest to the world that Palestine is a Palestinian land, and the Jews have no right to it.

Other examples include the use of the Israeli media of the term 'Judea and Samaria' as substitute for the use of the term 'West Bank'. The Israeli term refers intentionally to two kingdoms in the West Bank after the death of Solomon, one in the South, which is the 'Kingdom of Judea', and the other in the north, that is called the 'Kingdom of Israel', the matter which Palestinians find as unjust and illogical as these two kingdoms lasted only eighty years, which in the age of nations is considered a very short period. The Arab Muslims stayed in Andalusia (Spain) almost eight hundred years, but, however, did not claim any historic right to it. The term frequently used in the Israeli and Western media is 'Middle East' instead of the term 'the Arab world' which confirms the Arab identity of this land from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. For the Arabs, Israel is only a foreign body in the Arab world. This term has developed to 'Greater Middle East' which includes beside the Arab countries, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. This underlines the role Israel plays as guardian of the Americans' interests and their leadership of this region. This term is also based on the suggestion that Israel is an integral part of its geography, and that its presence is natural, and Arabs have to accept it.

### General description

In earlier chapters, I elaborated the sampling units of observation that included eight daily newspapers; 4 in Palestine and 4 in Israel, for the period extending between August 2013 and March 2014. The investigating units of analysis were chosen using the method of 'industrial week'. In this method, issues were chosen in different days every subsequent week. For instance, the first issue of Al-Quds newspaper was the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2013 (that is Thursday), for the second issue of the same newspaper it was Friday the next week (9<sup>th</sup> of August 2013), and the third issue was the one on Saturday in the third week (17<sup>th</sup> of August 2013). Keeping in mind that Israeli newspapers are not published on Saturdays, I excluded Saturdays from the sample in Israel and applied the same sampling method to Israeli newspapers. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the total number of coded articles in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers per month.

**FIGURE 5.1** NUMBER OF CODED ARTICLES PER MONTH



As described in earlier chapters, any articles within the specified time-frame that mentioned or investigated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was coded. A total number of 2519 articles were coded in both countries. 77.7% (a total of 1957 articles) were coded in the Palestinian newspapers and 22.3% (a total of 562 articles) were coded in the Israeli newspapers, as shown in Table 5.1 below:



**TABLE 5.1** NUMBER OF CODED ARTICLES PER NEWSPAPER

Country	Newspaper	Frequency	%
<b>Palestine</b>	Al-Quds newspaper	555	28.4
	Al-Ayyam newspaper	486	24.8
	Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper	611	31.2
	Felesteen newspaper	305	15.6
	<i>Total</i>	<i>1957</i>	<i>100.0</i>
<b>Israel</b>	Israel Hayom	154	27.4
	Yediot Ahronot	91	16.2
	Haaretz	204	36.3
	Maariv	113	20.1
	<i>Total</i>	<i>562</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Also, results revealed that 78.2% and 66.5% of news related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were reported in the first ten pages of the Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively. 21.5% of conflict-related news were mentioned on the main page of Palestinian newspapers, and 13.3% were referred to on the main page of Israeli newspapers. The majority of conflict-related articles: 85.8% in Palestinian newspapers and 70.3% in Israeli newspapers - were mentioned in the sections of political news and localities, 12.9% of Palestinian news and 26.9% of Israeli news were mentioned in the editorial section (i.e., as opinions, comments, and/or dialogs) and only 1.3% and 2.8% of conflict-related news were mentioned in other sections of the Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively, including business and variety sections.

### 5.1.2 Reliability

Reliability test for content analysis is paramount, particularly because the main goal of this kind of analysis is “to identify and record relatively objective (or, at least, intersubjective) characteristics of messages”, which, if not correctly done, will lead to invalid and useless results. Lombard et al. (2010) emphasized on the importance researchers should allocate to inter- and intra-coder reliability tests because it carves out a more efficient coding, without which data collection and results would likely be misleading and, therefore, be rejected by reviewers and critics.

I used both inter- and intra-coder reliability to be certain that the content-coding is reliable. *Intercoder reliability*, or in more specific terms *interrater agreement* between or across coders reliability is “the extent to which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same conclu-

sion” (Lombard et al., 2010). *Intracoder reliability* within single coder, refer to the level consistency by which coders code.

### Intercoder reliability test

Since there were three independent coders coding the four newspapers in Palestine, and only one coder in the Israeli side, I used inter-coder and intra-coder reliability tests to test for the level of agreement among Palestinian coders and within the coders themselves, and I used intra-coder reliability test for the Israeli coder at the beginning of data collection, in order to secure a better research quality.

I used Krippendorff’s alpha (KALPHA) to test for inter-coder reliability for many reasons determined by Krippendorff and Hayes (2007, p. 1), mainly because “sample size, multiple (more than 2) coders or missing data are not problematic for calculating KALPHA, and all measurement levels can be tested”. Furthermore, Krippendorff’s alpha “is well regarded and very flexible (it can be used with multiple coders, accounts for different sample sizes and missing data, and can be used for ordinal, interval and ratio level variables)” (Ibid.). However, at that time, automated softwares were not widely available, the matter which explains why researchers tended to use different inter-reliability tests. Fortunately, this is not anymore the case thanks to the macro-developed by Swert (2012).

I applied the KALPHA test for content analysis using SPSS on a previously developed macro<sup>(1)</sup> by Swert (2012). A subsample that consisted of the main page of 15 randomly chosen newspapers across three months were coded independently by all coders. One problematic issue of using this test is that KALPHA provides information on the reliability of variables, not coders. Therefore, I applied the macro for the items of *Causes*, *Consequences*, and *Solutions* separately.

### Causes

The Kalpha test for the *causes* was very good, the value of Alpha was .86, which is quite high. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is only 0.01 percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .80 if the whole population would be tested.

### Consequences

The Kalpha test for the *consequences* was excellent, the value of Alpha was .98, which is optimal. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is only 0.001 percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .90 if the whole population would be tested.

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<sup>(1)</sup>See Appendix G.

## Solutions

The Kalpha test for the *solutions* was excellent as the value of Alpha was .90, which is high. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is only 0.001 percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .90 if the whole population would be tested.

The results above suggested a high level of agreement among Palestinian coders, a good and clear operational definition, categories, items, and well-trained coders.

## Intracoder reliability test

To test for intercoder reliability or the level consistency by which coders code, 120 random articles were chosen and analyzed for content, twice at different times, T1 and T2 (approximately after 3 to 4 weeks) in order to see how consistent their coding methods were based on the content codebook. Reliability statistics were then computed using the two sets of data.

I used the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) as a measure of the intercoder reliability. The ICC is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 where 1 stands for perfect reliability with no measurement error, and 0 represents no reliability. Table 5.2 below shows that all the ICC values were very high for all the three coders on the Palestinian side (ICC = 0.92, 0.93, and 0.96), and for the coder on the Israeli side (ICC = 0.91) as well, for the same amount of articles. Accordingly, this confirms the repeatability of measurements between both periods, and all of the ICC values are above the required reliability needed to conduct a reliable analysis of content.

**TABLE 5.2** INTRACLASST CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

Country	Coder	Intraclass Correlation	95% Confidence Interval
Palestine	Ahlam	0.92	0.87, 0.95
	Ehsan	0.93	0.90, 0.96
	Salwa	0.96	0.92, 0.98
Israel	Dana	0.91	0.85, 0.94


Accordingly, I can safely state that my data was conducted reliably by different coders, and that the same coders maintained consistent results over time (From T1 to T2).

### 5.1.3 Findings

#### Distribution of news

Figure 5.2 hereunder shows the distribution of news across causes, consequences, and solutions. The results show evidently that Palestinian newspapers slightly more focus on the consequences of the conflict, whilst Israeli newspapers focus to a greater extent on the solutions of the conflict.

**FIGURE 5.2** DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS ACROSS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS




This can be a consequence of the extremely skewed balance of power on the grounds, which leaves the Palestinians with a fragile immunity to pressures and actions imposed by this imbalance. Moreover, it makes the Israelis more inclined to discuss solutions related to “control” any “backlashes” resulting from the fragility of the Palestinian grounds by imposing actions that serve Israel’s own interests. Furthermore, this imbalance is evident in the style of articles on both sides, where 86.8% of Palestinian newspapers and 65.5% of Israel newspapers reported factual news, reports, documentaries about the conflict, and only 13.2% of news in Palestinian newspapers were mainly opinions (i.e., comments, reader letters, or reviews) in comparison to 34.5% on the Israeli side. This reflects a higher interactivity level between Israeli newspapers and their readers that highlights more or fewer solutions and national interests.

#### Tendency of articles

Figure 5.3 hereunder shows that the tendency of articles, when describing the peace process, is symmetrical in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers. The results revealed that most of the articles describing the peace process were neutral (50.5% in Palestine, and 61.0% in Israel), and quite high percentages of 45.4% in Palestine, and

32.9% in Israel were negative. These raise the questions, whether ‘authors are adopting a negative tone when covering the peace process’, or ‘is it the case that targeted issues were already negative, and the authors only reported them?’ For Example, reporting the number of casualties on either side will not carry within its lines a positive vibe. Finally, as shown in the figure hereunder, only 4.1% of Palestinian newspapers and 6.0% of Israeli newspapers inclined to be positive when covering the peace process. Again, is it the case that authors on both sides are seldom positive when conveying the news, or simply a consequence of the scarcity of positive issues to write about when dealing with Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

**FIGURE 5.3** TENDENCY OF ARTICLES TOWARDS PEACE



Coming back to my questions, 1) are authors negative towards peace or 2) are they reporting items that are already characterized by negativity? After converting the variable of ‘tendency of article’ into a dummy variable (where negative = 1, and the rest = 0), and crosstabbing it with all dimensions, I found that 90.0%<sup>(2)</sup> of the main dimensions with high frequencies<sup>(3)</sup> already imply negativity and can’t be reported otherwise, as shown in Table 5.3 hereunder. Consequently, referring to them already suggest negativity, unless the author decided to take a different route than usual and present his or her ideas in bizarre and uncommon way, for instance, if he or she presented Israeli actions against Palestinians as a good thing to protect the Palestinians themselves from radical movements and groups, or if Palestinians frame resistance actions against Israelis as the only way to peace!

The same applies to Israeli newspapers but with lower intensity since that the

<sup>(2)</sup>Sum of negative items (i.e., 9) divided by total number of items (i.e., 10).

<sup>(3)</sup>In sum, they accounted for 61.1% of negative tendencies across the whole sample in Palestinian newspapers.

dimensions with high frequencies<sup>(4)</sup> did not explicitly suggest negativity, and only 30.0% did so, the rest of the dimensions were either positive or neutral. Accordingly, I can conclude that the high level of negativity referred to above in Figure 5.3 might be overestimated, particularly for Palestinian newspapers, due to the implication of negativity within items that, if not directly, still account for significant amount of negativity of what was written.

## 5.1.4 Testing Hypotheses

### Episodic vs Thematic Frames

In order to pinpoint the emotional angles of episodic versus thematic content, the target of photos appearing in connection with frames were analysed for the presence of episodic or thematic nature. Iyengar and Simon (1993) distinguished between these two types of frames: Episodic frames are “references to isolated news events without providing broader context” and that tend to attribute responsibility on specific groups or individuals. Thematic frames, on the other hand, “provide broader societal context to issues and events and thus present more complete pictures and collective evidence” and that attach responsibility to societal/political forces (Muralidharan et al., 2011, p. 26). Kamhawi (2002) in their analyzes of media frames in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict found that the dominant frame was the conflict frame, which is categorized as episodic, followed by the blame frame that is considered a thematic frame (Ibid.). Accordingly, I hypothesize below that photos appearing in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers in the context of the conflict will be more episodic than thematic in nature.

*H<sub>0</sub>*: The presence of episodic nature will be more dominant than thematic one in photos appearing in connection with frames in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results in Table F.1 show that there is a significant difference between the target of photo in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers  $X^2 (1) = 60.2, p < .001$ , where 90.4% of photos attached in Palestinian newspapers adopted an episodic frame, in comparison to 64.7% in Israeli newspapers. Moreover, 9.6% of Palestinian newspapers and 35.3% of Israeli newspapers adopted a thematic frame. Cramer’s V value is .31,  $p < .001$  which means that there is a difference between the target of photos in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, and the difference is moderate.


<sup>(4)</sup>In sum, they accounted for 53.5% of negative tendencies across the whole sample in Israeli newspapers.

TABLE 5.3 CROSSTABULATION BETWEEN DIMENSIONS AND TENDENCY OF ARTICLE

Tendency	Palestine	No.	%	Tendency	Israel	No.	%
Negative	Israeli actions against Palestinians	423	15.1%	Neutral	Lack of Trust between Palestinians and Israelis	66	7.5%
Negative	Violations of International law and Human rights	211	7.5%	Negative	Palestinians actions against Israelis	58	6.6%
Negative	Acts against Palestinian prisoners	198	7.1%	Neutral	Settlement expansion	53	6.0%
Negative	Israeli positions	161	5.8%	Negative	Palestinian positions	52	5.9%
Negative	Settlement expansion	143	5.1%	Neutral	Third-party mediation	52	5.9%
Neutral	Lack of Trust between Palestinians and Israelis	136	4.9%	Neutral	Israeli positions	50	5.7%
Negative	Judaization of Jerusalem	135	4.8%	Positive	Israeli measures against Palestinians	45	5.1%
Negative	Settlers actions against Palestinians	118	4.2%	Negative	The State of Palestine will become a “terrorist” state	35	4.0%
Negative	Restrictions on the Palestinians freedom of movement	116	4.1%	Neutral	US and EU strict measures against the conflict	31	3.5%
Negative	Israel Procedures against Gaza	69	2.5%	Positive	The Israeli-American backed-strategy	27	3.1%
	<i>Total</i>	<i>1710</i>	<i>61.1%</i>		<i>Total</i>	<i>469</i>	<i>53.5%</i>


Interestingly, Figure 5.4 illustrates that 50.9% of photos in Palestinian newspapers portray an aggressive act/action, in contrast to 6.2% in Israeli newspapers. Moreover, 90.2% of photos in Israeli newspapers adopted a neutral position, and only 21.3% of Palestinian newspapers adopted this position. Finally, the results show that 27.8% of Palestinians newspapers and only 3.6% of Israeli newspapers advocated peace or a positive vibe in their photos about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

**FIGURE 5.4** TENDENCY OF COVERAGE



Crosstabs of photos tendency across episodic and thematic frames show that episodic frames account for 48.8% of negative tendencies in Palestinian newspapers, and 2.5% of neutral tendencies in Israeli newspapers, as presented in Figure 5.5 hereunder:

**FIGURE 5.5** TENDENCIES OF PHOTOS ACROSS EPISODIC AND THEMATIC FRAMES




Episodic frames in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are higher on both sides because they simply represent the day-to-day status quo, a status quo full of casualties,



destruction, detentions, and so on. Newspapers in both countries report all these acts as part of their duty to “convey” what is happening on the ground, regardless of how it is framed. Numerous statistical data describe the fragile grounds, on which peace lies. For instance, this lively infographic below based on data<sup>(5)</sup> “publicly available from credible international, national, and local human rights and civil society organization” illustrates the ‘reigniting cycle of killing’ in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since September 2000 (VisualizingPalestine, 2012).

**FIGURE 5.6** TIMELINE OF VIOLENCE SINCE SEPTEMBER 2000



Source: VISUALIZINGPALESTINE (2012)<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>a</sup>Data was updated in 2014.

Almost no single month passes without casualties. Figure 5.6 above shows that in the last 14 years<sup>(6)</sup> more than 7000 Palestinians were killed by Israelis, and more than 1100 Israelis were killed by Palestinians. The figure also shows that the period between August 2013 and March 2014, during which the data of this content analysis was collected, was quite a calm period casualty-wise. However, it was after the ‘Operation Pillar of Cloud’ and before the ‘Operation Protective Edge’. Consequently, most probably, episodic frames portrayed more or less post-war destruction of the first operation, and the events leading to the commencement of the second op-

<sup>(5)</sup>[A] B’ Tselem, 2012. Statistics (accessed on November 2012). [B] Huffington Post, 2009. Reigniting Violence: How Do Ceasefires End? (accessed on November 2012) (VisualizingPalestine, 2012).

<sup>(6)</sup>Excluding the last war/operation on Gaza that resulted in the death of more than 2100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis.

eration in April 2015.

### News Dedicated to the Conflict

I referred previously to Priming theory and how the increased exposure to specific news enhances the salience of the issue in people's minds. Moreover, the persistent nature of the conflict (as discussed before) and the situation in the Middle East in general suggest that the topic of the conflict is inevitable and that both media would allocate a high percentage of their news to cover it. After all, it is critical to draw the line of how much news is dedicated to the conflict in each media, which in sense explains the gap of perceptions that exists in the minds of both people as will be proved in later stage of this dissertation. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:


**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between the percentage of articles dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per issue in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results unveil that there is a significant difference  $t(250) = 12.3$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $r = .61$  between the percentage of articles dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per issue in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, and the difference was in favor of Palestinian newspapers ( $M = 23.8\%$ ,  $SE = .01$ ) in comparison to Israeli newspapers ( $M = 10.2\%$ ,  $SE = .01$ ). The effect size was very large ( $r = .61$ )<sup>(7)</sup>. Figure 5.7 hereunder illustrates the average percentage of articles dealing with the conflict across the 8 newspapers:

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<sup>(7)</sup> =  $\text{SQRT}((12.3 * 12.3) / (12.3 * 12.3 + 250))$ .

**FIGURE 5.7** AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DISCUSSING THE CONFLICT ACROSS NEWSPAPERS



### Resemblance of News Coverage

The percentage of news dedicated to each dimension of the conflict is an interesting issue to investigate. It aims to see the level of congruence between the focus of media in Palestine and Israel toward the aspects of the conflict. The literature suggests that Palestinian and Israeli media are similar in their dedication to certain news topics, but are different in their direction of coverage to those topics.

$H_0$ : There is no significant correlation between the percentage of news dedicated to each dimension in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the percentage of news dedicated to each topic in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers,  $r = .45$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , and the effect size is quiet large. As shown in the figure below:



The results show that there is a significant difference  $t(1606) = -4.57, p < 0.001, r = .11$  between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, where on average Israeli newspapers cover the causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article ( $M = 1.60, SE = .04$ ) than Palestinian newspapers ( $M = 1.40, SE = .02$ ). Although the difference is highly significant, its effect size - using the equation of Rosnow and Rosenthal (2003, p. 224) - is small. ( $r = .11$ )<sup>(8)</sup>.

### Density of coverage to *Consequences*

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there is a significant difference  $t(1849) = -2.90, p < 0.01, r = .07$  between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, where on average Israeli newspapers cover the consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article ( $M = 2.00, SE = .05$ ) than Palestinian newspapers ( $M = 1.81, SE = .03$ ). Again, although the difference is highly significant, the effect size is very small. ( $r = .07$ )<sup>(9)</sup>.

### Density of Coverage to *Solutions*

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to proposed solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there is a significant difference  $t(1012) = -4.45, p < 0.001, r = .14$  between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, whilst on average Israeli newspapers cover suggested solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article ( $M = 2.54, SE = .09$ ) than Palestinian newspapers ( $M = 2.04, SE = .06$ ). Although the difference is highly significant, the effect size is small ( $r = .14$ )<sup>(10)</sup>.

<sup>(8)</sup> =  $\text{SQRT}((-4.57 * -4.57) / (-4.57 * -4.57 + 1606))$ .

<sup>(9)</sup> =  $\text{SQRT}((-2.90 * -2.90) / (-2.90 * -2.90 + 1849))$ .

<sup>(10)</sup> =  $\text{SQRT}((-4.45 * -4.45) / (-4.45 * -4.45 + 1012))$ .

### Density of coverage to *all dimensions*

Accordingly, we will expect a significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, which proved to be the case when testing the following hypothesis:

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there is a significant difference  $t(2503) = -10.97, p < 0.001, r = .21$  between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, whilst on average Israeli newspapers cover conflict-related issues more densely per article ( $M = 4.20, SE = .11$ ) than Palestinian newspapers ( $M = 2.91, SE = .05$ ). The effect size is moderate.  $(r = .21)^{(11)}$ .

These differences suggest the following directional hypotheses that:

**$H_0$ :** Articles in Palestinian newspapers tend to expand in covering news across the three aspects of causes, consequences, and solutions.

Table 5.4 below shows that there is a significant and positive correlation  $r = .30, p < 0.01$ , between reporting causes and consequences in Palestinian newspapers, which means that newspapers pick up and report topics that are not exclusively about causes or consequences but more or less a combination of both, and this correlation is moderate. Also, results revealed significant and positive correlations  $r = .22, p < 0.01$  and  $r = .34, p < 0.01$  between reporting causes and solutions, and reporting consequences and solutions respectively. Both correlations are also moderate. Accordingly, we accept our null hypothesis that Palestinian newspapers tend to expand in covering news across the three aspects of causes, consequences, and solutions, instead of focusing on one aspect.

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<sup>(11)</sup> =  $\text{SQRT}((-10.97 * -10.97) / (-10.97 * -10.97 + 2503))$ .

**TABLE 5.4** CORRELATIONS BETWEEN  
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS

Newspapers	Comparisons	Causes	Consequences	Solutions
<i>Palestinian</i>	Causes	1	<b>.30**</b>	<b>.22**</b>
	Consequences	784	1	<b>.34**</b>
	Solutions	324	521	1
<i>Israeli</i>	Causes	1	.06	-.12
	Consequences	293	1	<b>.27**</b>
	Solutions	226	270	1

\*p <.05, \*\*p <.01, \*\*\*p <.001

**$H_0$ :** Articles in Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-oriented and focused more on reporting only causes, consequences or solutions, instead of expanding across the three aspects.

The table above demonstrates that there were no significant correlations between reporting causes and consequences  $r = .06$ ,  $p > .05$ , and between reporting causes and solutions  $r = -.12$ ,  $p > .05$ . Nevertheless, there is a significant and positive correlation between reporting consequences and solutions  $r = .27$ ,  $p < 0.01$ , which means that newspapers tend to report topics that are not exclusively about consequences or solutions, but more or less a combination of both, and this correlation is moderate. As a result, I can conclude that Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-oriented when it comes to writing about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, the inclusion of causes in most articles of both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers shows how they keep tracing back to the causes of the conflict on their issues and the connection of these causes whether as history, religious beliefs or belonging with the current status quo and consequences. The question to be asked here is ‘to what extent this inclusion of causes in newspapers is represented in the minds of the public?’ This question and more will be investigated in further sections of the dissertation.

### 5.1.5 Comparisons

This section is divided into three main parts: the first part is discussing and comparing the most important common dimensions that were highly covered by both newspapers; A total of 8 dimensions in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers. The second part is discussing those dimensions (a total of 7 dimensions) that were mainly covered in Palestinian newspapers only with less attention in Israeli newspapers,

and the third part is discussing the dimensions (a total of 8 dimensions) that were mainly covered in Israeli newspapers with less attention in their Palestinian counterpart.

As stated above, the codebook consisted of 65 dimensions distributed across causes, consequences, and solutions. Now, the 23 (8 + 7 + 8) dimensions I am discussing below accounted for 80.1% of total news in Palestinian newspapers, and 77.2% of news in Israeli newspapers, as shown in Table 5.5 hereunder:

**TABLE 5.5** DISTRIBUTION OF MAIN DIMENSIONS  
IN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS

<b>Importance of dimensions</b>	<b>Distribution in:</b>	
	<b>A) Palestinian newspapers</b>	<b>B) Israeli newspapers</b>
In both newspapers	<b>39.7%</b>	<b>42.5%</b>
More in Palestinian newspapers	<b>31.3%</b>	7.6%
More in Israeli newspapers	9.1%	<b>27.2%</b>
<i>Total</i>	<i>80.1%</i>	<i>77.2%</i>


As shown in Table 5.1 above, the total number of coded articles that investigated or referred to the conflict and peace process were 1957 in Palestinian newspapers and 562 articles in Israeli newspapers. These 2519 coded articles comprised of 5671 and 2347 conflict-related dimensions in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively. Accordingly, the comparisons of percentages below were always drawn from the frequency of each dimension divided by the total number of dimensions (i.e., 5671 and 2347) in each respective country.



## Common dimensions

Figure 5.9 below demonstrates the percentages of common dimensions between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers:

**FIGURE 5.9 COMMON DIMENSIONS**



### Israeli military actions against Palestinians

Undoubtedly, Israeli measures against Palestinians were intensively covered by Palestinian newspapers where 14.8% (853 out of 5671) of total dimensions focused on Israeli measures against Palestinians. For Palestinians, these measures include actions of demolishing houses, expropriating lands, confiscation of privately owned land in the West Bank, uprooting of plantations, mass detentions, military presence, excessive use of force by the Israeli army, incursions of the army into Palestinian towns, targeted liquidations, and extra-judicial assassinations. The same issue got a fair share of coverage in Israeli newspapers, specifically 4.3% (101 out of 2348) of total dimensions. These were, however, from different perspectives, where Israeli actions are mainly defensive against Palestinian acts, or a backlash of their actions, and how Israel is unwilling to remove security measures for fear of fundamentalist terrorism, and that the strategic goal of the wall is to guarantee the security of Israel.

### Israeli intransigence

Israeli position and unwillingness to negotiate directly with Hamas, and the opposition of both sides to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans, particularly in the case of right-wing hardliners and Islamist groups, constituted almost an equal amount of coverage (5.8% and 5.6%) in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers respectively.

### **Third-party mediation**

Another common issue that was focused on in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers is the issue of third-party mediation, for example an International Observer on the borders of a future established Palestinian state and Israel, and how any process towards viability must be guided by international law and resolutions, be impartial, hold both sides to account, and bring an end to impunity. After all, a viable process must hold both sides to account for any breaches of human rights and international law, to build the necessary trust that enables both parties to engage and reach a settlement. Moreover, it focused on the role the international community should play in exerting pressure on both sides to commit to a negotiated peace in the region, and how each government must show their respective dedications and commitments to the peace process, or there will only be broken promises. The results in Figure 5.9 above revealed that 6.9% (162 out of 2348) of total dimensions in Israeli newspaper referred to this issue, in comparison with 3.3% (187 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.

### **Lack of trust between Palestinians and Israelis**

The results revealed that 5.9% (139 out of 2348) of the total number of dimensions in Israeli newspapers and 4.3% (244 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers mentioned the lack of trust between both sides, and emphasized on the belief that there is no reliable and trustworthy partner to make progress in a two-sided peace process, and how negotiations are not advancing and will likely collapse, as was the case in the failure of past agreements.

### **Palestinian actions against Israelis**

The results above revealed that 6.6% (155 out of 2348) of the total number of dimensions in Israeli newspapers were dedicated to discussing Palestinians actions against Israelis. For Israelis, actions include acts of vandalism/terrorism, a constant threat of indiscriminate attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli citizens, Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli targets, kidnapping, hijackings, stabbings, shootings, and stone-throwing, in addition to Palestinian political violence and fundamentalist terrorism against Israel. On the other hand, 2.5% (142 out of 5671) of a total number of dimensions in Palestinian newspapers referred to these actions as retaliation for Israel's armed operations and actions against the Palestinians, administrative detentions, and occupation.

### **US and EU strict measures against the conflict**

Both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, 2.3% and 4.2% respectively, emphasized the active role of the US and EU in the peace process, because they have the leverage to influence greatly and impose pressures on Israelis and Palestinians. Also, how they must, for the sake of peace, utilize a more aggressive form of diplomacy if

Israelis and Palestinians do not respond to the peace process. As mentioned above, they and the international community must continue to place pressure on Israel and the Palestinians to commit to the peace process and to take the necessary steps to promote a lasting peace.


### Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides

The results revealed the importance both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers allocate to building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides by prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred and educating for peace. Furthermore, they point out to the positive role media should play in promoting peace and pro-peace ideologies and programs. Figure 5.9 shows that 4.1% (96 out of 2348) of the total dimensions related to the conflict in Israeli newspaper referred to the importance of building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides, in comparison with 2.4% (136 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.

### Exclusive dimensions in Palestinian newspapers

Figure 5.10 below demonstrates the percentages of dimensions that were exclusively important in Palestinian newspapers with minimum attention in Israeli newspapers:

**FIGURE 5.10** PRIMARY DIMENSIONS IN PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS ONLY



**TABLE 5.6** EXCLUSIVE DIMENSIONS IN PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS

<b>Dimensions</b>	<b>%</b>
a. Violations of International law and Human rights	25.9
b. Acts against Palestinian prisoners	21.6
c. Judaization of Jerusalem	13.1
d. Settlers acts of vandalism	12.8
e. Restrictions on freedom of movement	12.2
f. Israel Procedures against Gaza	8.1
g. United Nations as an active side	6.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>

*Note:* The percentages mentioned in this table are calculated only from 31.3%<sup>a</sup> of total dimensions.

<sup>a</sup>It is equal to the sum of percentages in Figure 5.10.

### **Violation of international law and human right**

One of the most important issues that were mainly referred to in Palestinian newspapers was the violation of international law and human rights by Israeli defense force or Israeli occupation force as referred to by Palestinians. The results revealed that 8.1% (459 out of 5671) of the total issues reported in Palestinian newspapers mentioned this issue, which extends from preventing women in delivery condition from reaching hospitals, to blocking food and medicine from entering Gaza, to the bombardment of hospitals and schools, and the killing of children and women. In comparison, only 1.0% (24 out of 2348) of all issues mentioned in Israeli newspapers referred to this issue. Table 5.6 shows that 25.9% from the issues that were exclusively mentioned in Palestinian newspapers were dedicated to Israeli violations of international law and human rights against the Palestinians.

### **Acts against Palestinian prisoners**

The second most important dimension that was exclusively covered in Palestinian newspapers dealt with Israeli's actions and acted against Palestinian prisoners. This includes the frequent physical abuse and torture of Palestinian prisoners and the deteriorating situation of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Results revealed that 6.8% (386 out of 5671) of all dimensions in Palestinian newspapers referred to these acts. The same issue constituted only 0.4% (9 out of 2348) of the issues mentioned in Israeli newspapers. Its evident that the issue of prisoners makes up 21.6% of the news that was primarily mentioned in Palestinian newspapers, as shown in Table 5.6 above.

### **Restrictions on Palestinians freedom of movement**

The result revealed that 3.8% (215 out of 5671) of the news in Palestinian newspapers raised the issue of checkpoints and the segregation wall and their effect on the freedom of movement, as well as the lack of contiguity and integrity in the West Bank. In addition, to the siege of Gaza, the indignities and restrictions imposed by the occupation, the building of an elaborate network of settlers-only “bypass roads”, and Israel’s absolute control over border crossings. On the other hand, 1.7% (40 out of 2348) of the dimensions in Israeli newspapers highlighted this issue. Table 5.6 above shows that the issue of restrictions on Palestinians freedom of movement constituted 12.2% of the dimensions that were exclusively mentioned in Palestinian newspapers.

### **Settlers actions against Palestinians**

Another issue that received almost the same attention to coverage (12.8%) in Palestinian newspapers is the issue of settlers’ actions against Palestinians and their lands/schools/cars. For Palestinians, settlers are considered dangerous enemies who are usurping Palestinians’ lands and daily lives, and whose activities are expanding in many cities, such as in Hebron and East Jerusalem, where their actions went beyond the Jewish Quarter. In total, this issue constituted 4.0% and 1.5% of total issues covered in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively.

### **Judaization of Jerusalem**

The Judaization of Jerusalem has received a fair share of coverage; namely, 13.1% of the total dimensions pointed out mainly to this issue by Palestinian newspapers (4.1% of total issues) with only a quarter of this attention by Israeli newspapers (1.1% of total issues). For Palestinians, the Judaization of Jerusalem stands for the daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem by Israel’s violations of and encroaching on the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in Jerusalem; not to mention their intentions to have a vertically divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount or Noble Sanctuary, and to open a new gate for Jews to enter Al-Aqsa Mosque to pray.

### **Israel’s procedures against Gaza**

The period of investigation is bordered by two operations/wars on Gaza. Consequently, Israeli’s procedures and wars on Gaza constituted 2.5% (142 out of 5671) of the total issues covered in Palestinian newspapers and 1.3% (30 out of 2348) in Israeli newspapers. These actions include imposing restrictions on bringing building materials to prevent Gaza from rebuilding its infrastructure, the naval blockade, the Israeli army counter of any rearmament or tunnel construction along the Eastern borders between Israel and Gaza, and their staging ground incursion into the Gaza Strip. All these wars or so-called “operations” on Gaza left nothing but destruction

as mentioned previously in the historical review. Table 5.6 above shows that this issue scored 8.1% of the news that was mainly covered by Palestinian newspapers.


### The United Nations as an active party

Finally, the role of the United Nations as an active party. In total, this issue constituted 2.0% (113 out of 5671) and 0.6% (15 out of 2348) of the total dimensions covered by Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively. It focused on how the UN should play a more active and progressive role on the ground, and how it should be detached from the influence of the US and its domination. This dimension constituted 6.3% of the news that were exclusively covered by Palestinian newspapers and was referred to only 15 times in 562 coded articles in Israeli newspapers.

### Exclusive dimensions in Israeli newspapers

Figure 5.11 below demonstrates the percentages of dimensions that were exclusively important in Israeli newspapers with minimum attention in Palestinian newspapers:

**FIGURE 5.11** PRIMARY DIMENSIONS IN ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS ONLY



**TABLE 5.7** EXCLUSIVE DIMENSIONS IN ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS

<b>Dimensions</b>	<b>%</b>
Palestinian intransigence	17.6
Israeli-American backed-strategy	16.8
Release under certain conditions	12.9
Economic burden	10.5
1967 Borders	12.1
Hamas threats	9.9
Israels right to exist	10.4
Palestine will become a “terrorist” state	9.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>

*Note:* The percentages mentioned in this table are calculated only from 27.2%<sup>a</sup> of the total dimensions.

<sup>a</sup>It is equal to the sum of percentages in Figure 5.11.

### **Palestinian intransigence**

Not surprisingly, results revealed that the main topic of focus in Israeli newspapers with less attention in Palestinians newspapers was the issue of Palestinian intransigence (4.8% and 1.9% of total dimensions respectively). Mainly, this issue investigates Hamas’s denial of the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state, the negotiations with Hamas, the continuous objection of Palestinian Hardliners, the Palestinian intransigence and their objection to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans. This issue constituted the highest percentage of 17.6% of Israeli news that was mainly covered by Israeli newspaper in comparison to its counterpart on the Palestinian side, as shown in Table 5.7 above.

### **Israeli-American backed-strategy**

The second issue that gained high attention in Israeli newspapers with much less of attention in Palestinian newspapers is the issue of Israeli-American backed-strategy, and how Israel is highly dependent on US support, and US military assistant, with which Israel is controlling the occupied Palestinian territories. The results in Figure 5.11 below revealed that 4.6% (108 out of 2348) and 1.3% (74 out of 5671) of the news in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers respectively were dedicated to the issue of American-Israeli backed strategy. This issue made up the second highest percentage (16.8%) of Israeli news that were mainly covered in Israeli newspapers.

### **Release of Palestinian prisoners under certain conditions or circumstances**

One of the most important issues that were mainly referred to in Israeli newspapers was the issue of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails under certain conditions or circumstances (12.9% of exclusive dimensions). This issue discussed whether the Israeli government should release Palestinian prisoners A) who stayed in Israeli jails for a long time, B) who are suffering from illness, C) who were imprisoned in the pre-Oslo-era, and finally, women and children. The results revealed that 3.5% (82 out of 2348) of total issues mentioned in Israeli newspapers referred to this issue, in comparison to 1.6% (91 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.

### **An end to the Israeli occupation of 1967 territories**

The results revealed that 2.9% (68 out of 2348) of the issues that were exclusively covered by Israeli newspapers investigated the Palestinian demands for Israel's withdrawal from territories captured in the 1967 War, the disengagement from its borders with Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, the consideration of the Green Line as a border between the two states, or the demarcation of the borders of the Palestinians entity. On the other hand, 1.6% (91 out of 5671) of the total issues discussing the conflict in Palestinian newspapers emphasized on this issue. In total, 10.6% of the coverage that was primarily mentioned in Israeli newspapers were dedicated to the issue of the 1967 borders (as mentioned in Table 5.7 above).

### **Economic burden and Boycotting Israeli products**

Results revealed that 3.3% of news related to the conflict in Israeli newspapers were dedicated to discussing how Israel's economy is being hampered by the high costs of settlement construction and incentives to settlers. Coupled with military costs of securing them, the pressure applied by the International community boycotting Israeli products manufactured in Jewish settlements, and the added burden of Palestinians boycotting Israeli products. The results in Figure 5.11 show that only 0.7% of Palestinian newspapers mentioned this issue when speaking about the conflict. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that boycotting Israeli products, mainly in Palestine, played a vital and influential role in later stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. No doubt that the percentage of the news dedicated to this issue has increased in both countries.

### **Not recognizing Israel's right to exist**

Not surprisingly, the issue of not recognizing Israel's right to exist, the Palestinian notion that the struggle (Al-Jihad) against Israel is an Islamic obligation, the necessity to destroy Israel, Palestine as an Islamic trust, resistance is still the force that unifies Palestine as one nation, and that Palestinians are the original inhabitants of the land; all this accounted for almost 10.0% of Israeli news that was mainly con-



sidered to be crucial in Israeli newspapers. Figure 5.11 shows that 2.7% (63 out of 2348) of news covered by Israeli newspapers raised this issue, in comparison to 1.0% (57 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.

### **Hamas' threats**

Another issue that received almost the same attention of coverage (10.3%) in Israeli newspapers is the issue of threats imposed by Hamas and their pledges to free all fighters/militants in Israeli prisons by using force and kidnapping Israeli soldiers. Results revealed that 2.8% of the total issues that were covered by Israeli newspapers raised this issue, in comparison to 0.7% in Palestinian newspapers.

### **Palestine will become a "terrorist" state**

The results in Figure 5.11 above show that 2.7% of the total issues covered in Israeli newspapers described how Palestinians had never intended to make peace and that their true objective is to throw the Jews into the sea. Add thereto the PA's incitement against Israel, Hamas's incitement to launch a third intifada against Israel, and that pursuing negotiations with the PA from a position of weakness would only result in more terror.

### **Harmony between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers**

Table 5.8 hereunder shows the level of harmony or similarity between the percentage of news dedicated to dimensions of the conflict or peace process between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers. It is clear that among the 23 items (which constitute 81.0% of total Palestinian news, and 77.0% of total Israeli news) 20.4% of the items are somewhat highly contingent, 56.5% are moderately contingent, and only 13.0% are contingent to a low degree. Figure 5.12 below shows a detailed illustration of the level of contingency or agreement between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers across the 23 items (See also Table F.2).

**TABLE 5.8** LEVEL OF HARMONY BETWEEN DIMENSIONS

<b>Harmony</b>	<b><i>n</i> of items</b>	<b>%</b>
Very high	3	13.0
High	4	17.4
Moderate	13	56.5
Low	3	13.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>100.0</i>


However, it is worth-mentioning that being contingent does not mean that the dimensions have the same direction or tendency (i.e., positive or negative, pro or

contra peace). It means that the issue or topic had quite the same attention or coverage by both media. For instance, as we saw before the dimension of *Israeli military actions against Palestinians* was covered by Palestinian media, where Palestinians were the *victims* and Israelis were the *perpetrators*. On the other hand, the same issue was covered differently in Israeli newspapers, where Israelis were in the position of *defending* themselves by any means from the Palestinians *perpetrators*, even if they had to attack first to crush these perpetrators.

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers harmony level in covering issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there is no significant difference  $t(44) = 0.16, p > .05$  between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers contingency level in covering issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance. Therefore, I accept the null hypothesis, which proves the conclusion confirmed in Figure 5.8 to be correct, namely that Palestinian and Israeli newspapers tend to be contingent in covering major issues of the conflict.

FIGURE 5.12 LEVEL OF HARMONY BETWEEN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS



## 5.2 Survey Analysis

### 5.2.1 Reliability and Validity

As I mentioned earlier, I conducted two representative surveys for Palestinians and Israelis, aged 18 years and older, to capture their perceptions of the conflict and peace process. Verification of the accuracy, validity<sup>(12)</sup>, and reliability<sup>(13)</sup> of the questionnaire were carried out by conducting a pilot test on a random sample of 50 interviews that were not included in the final sample as to ensure that the questions were relevant, unambiguous, smooth and efficient. This helped to verify and improve the wording of each question and mechanism in order to give the field interviewers the opportunity to practice data collection as if they were in a real setting. After revising and making the necessary amendments, the final form of the questionnaire was presented to the advisor for approval. In addition, the correctness of the questionnaire has been ascertained by the judgment of the validity trustees. The remarks and evaluation of the experts and consultants about the first draft were of great value and benefit.

Furthermore, the questionnaire's validity was verified by the determination of the internal arrangement of the standard paragraphs that reached the rate of (0.92) according to Cronbach-Alpha, which is a very good rate. This rate is an evidence for the survey's reliability and its instrument. Additionally, the results in subsequent stages of this study revealed values of standardized coefficients for different items of the same battery (across the Splits of A and B) in the same direction in all regression models, which emphasize on the accuracy of questions, and thus, the validity of used instrument. The survey standard was applied on samples consisting of 1019 Palestinians and 520 Israelis.

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<sup>(12)</sup>Validity: the extent to which used measurement reflects the concept that I am trying to measure.

<sup>(13)</sup>Reliability: the extent to which the questionnaire is measuring real rather than random values.

## 5.2.2 Findings

### Sample Distribution

The distribution of data in accordance with the area in each country was as follows:

**TABLE 5.9** DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLES

Country	Area / City	<i>n</i>
<b>Palestine</b>	Jenin	68
	Tubas	14
	Tulkarem	41
	Qalqilya	24
	Salfit	16
	Nablus	84
	Ramallah & Al-Bireh	75
	East Jerusalem	93
	Jericho	12
	Bethlehem	47
	Hebron	151
	North Gaza	76
	Gaza City	135
	Dier Al-Balah	57
	Khan Yunis	73
	Rafah	48
	<i>Total</i>	<i>1015</i>
<b>Israel</b>	West Jerusalem	42
	North	84
	Haifa	71
	Center	129
	Tel-Aviv	107
	South	52
	Judea and Samaria	35
	<i>Total</i>	<i>520</i>

*Source:* Dissertation survey data.

And the distribution of the split ballot was as follows:

**TABLE 5.10** SPLIT-BALLOT DISTRIBUTION


Country	Splits		Total
	A	B	
Palestine	501	518	1019
Israel	267	253	520
<i>Total</i>	768	771	1539

*Source:* Dissertation survey data.

### Sources of Information

Not surprisingly, the large majority of Palestinians (96.8%) and Israelis (93.2%) do follow news related to the conflict. Furthermore, a cumulative of 78.5%<sup>(14)</sup> of Palestinians and 90.0%<sup>(15)</sup> of Israelis were to some extent interested in news related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the sources of their news were distributed as follows:

**FIGURE 5.13** SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE CONFLICT



*Note:* What are your sources of information regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

As we can see in Figure 5.13 above, there was a big difference between newspaper readership in Palestine and Israel, where 29.0% of the Palestinians read newspapers printed or online in comparison with 67.7% of Israelis who read newspapers. The result also shows that 89.0% of news read by Palestinians and 86.6% read by Israelis were from the same newspapers that I used in the content analyses of this

<sup>(14)</sup> 19.6% extremely interested, 33.1% very interested, 25.8% somewhat interested.

<sup>(15)</sup> 2.6% extremely interested, 43.6% very interested, 43.8% somewhat interested.

dissertation, which is an evidence of the high level of readership of these newspapers, as shown in Table 5.11 hereunder:

**TABLE 5.11** READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS

Country	Newspaper	Frequency	%	Cumulative %
<b>Palestine</b>	Al-Quds newspaper	138	37.1	37.1
	Al-Hayat newspaper	59	15.9	53.0
	Al-Ayyam newspaper	84	22.6	75.5
	Filistin newspaper	50	13.4	89.0
	Other, please specify	41	11.0	100.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>372</i>	<i>100</i>	
<b>Israel</b>	Israel Hayom	122	33.2	33.2
	Yediot Ahronot	170	46.3	79.6
	Haaretz	21	5.7	85.3
	Maariv	5	1.4	86.6
	Other	49	13.4	100.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>367</i>	<i>100</i>	

Figure 5.13 above shows that 40.7% of the Palestinians and more than double of this percentage (82.3%) of Israelis used the Internet as a source of information regarding the conflict. Moreover, when asked about how frequent do they read the news on Internet, 55.4%<sup>(16)</sup> of the Palestinians replied that they read news on the Internet at least once a day, in comparison with 78.1%<sup>(17)</sup> of Israelis. Moreover, the results revealed that 15.5%<sup>(18)</sup> of the Palestinians read news on the internet at least once a week, and 17.3%<sup>(19)</sup> of Israelis do the same.

### What the Conflict is About?

A crucial index is measuring to what degree the Palestinians and Israelis think that their conflict is about Religion, Culture, Nationalism, Politics, Economics, History, Existence, or Ethnicity, has shown interesting results. Figure 5.15 hereunder presents the responses in an ascending order, where the brighter the color the lower degree, and the darker the color, the higher degree they thought the conflict was

<sup>(16)</sup>28.9% several times a day, 26.6% once a day.

<sup>(17)</sup>55.8% several times a day, 22.3% once a day.


<sup>(18)</sup>4.4% 2-3 days a week, 6.1% 4-6 days a week, 5.0% once a week.

<sup>(19)</sup>6.9% 2-3 days a week, 6.3% 4-6 days a week, 4.1% once a week.


about that item. The results revealed that all the items mentioned above were very critical for the Palestinians and Israelis (Figure 5.14 below).

**FIGURE 5.14 THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT**

(A) Palestinians



(B) Israelis




*Note:* Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 means a very low degree and 5 means a very high degree, please tell me what the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is about?

Nevertheless, differences still exist, where the matter of *Existence* was ranked first, *Politics* second, *History* third, *Nationalism* fourth, *Economics* fifth, *Religion* sixth, *Ethnicity* seventh, and finally *Culture* ranked eighth at the bottom. These results if put in another way describe the current status quo, one that is all about



self-existence; an existence that is being manipulated by politics, driven by history, fueled by nationalism, with less emphasis on economy and religion. The influence of economy and religion is there, but not anymore at the very core of the conflict. Maybe we should stop for a second and rethink the theory of the conflict as a religious one, or the recent uprising theory of the conflict as an economic one. Recent confrontations during the third quarter of 2015 showed how governments and leaders politicized religion to serve their agendas, and how they effortlessly managed to unleash religious beliefs and escalate these confrontations to further bloodshed.

**FIGURE 5.15** WHAT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT?



*Note:* I recoded the values of “Don’t know” to missing, and I summed up all the responses for each item. Sensibly, the higher the sum, the higher the degree of importance allocated to that particular item, and vice versa. Afterward, I calculated the total sum of all values, and then the percentages of these values across all items.

### 5.2.3 Testing Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated with respect to the developed matrix of the dissertation, which covered the issues of the conflict extended on two axes; Firstly, the causes of the conflict, the consequences of these causes, and the suggested solutions to these consequences. Secondly, how they are perceived in the individual's cognitive, affective and behavioral functions toward the conflict and peace process, across different time frames (i.e., past, present, and future); The past was represented by hypotheses stemming from Historical events, the present included hypotheses about actions appertaining to the conflict and realities hindering the peace process, and finally, the future summarized by hypotheses of solutions to core issues of the conflict. Other hypotheses driven by logic and literature of the conflict tested differences in perceiving the most critical issues of the conflict, the most appropriate solution to the conflict and finally the prioritization of these issues.

#### Historical Events

The respondents were asked *'To which extent you might find the following historical events as a cause of nowadays conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means a very low degree and 5 means a very high degree'*. The battery of questions included 8 main historical events and beliefs that took place before and during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

#### For the Palestinians

As shown in Table 5.12 below, Palestinians still referred to the 1967 war and the Jewish beliefs that the holy land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people; a belief that many Palestinians bitterly deny as the main causes of the nowadays conflict. Followed by the 1948 war and the importance Palestinians allocate to their belief of belonging to this land, and how the British Mandate did not have any right to grant the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine (through Balfour Declaration). Add thereto, the results revealed the Palestinian view of the crucial role of the Jewish immigration to Historical Palestine and the Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their agendas in nowadays conflict. Finally, the table below illustrates the Palestinian view of the persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia in the past as having a moderate impact on nowadays conflict. The scaled average ( $\bar{X}$ ) for this index was 3.9 (on a scale from 1 to 5) which means that, in general, Palestinians assigned quite a high degree of importance to historical events as a player in the nowadays conflict.

#### For the Israelis

Table 5.12 hereunder shows how the Israelis view the Palestinian belief that they

have lived on this land for centuries and are entitled to own it as the main cause of nowadays conflict; a belief that the Israeli consider illegitimate and clearly contradicts their belonging to the promised land of Israel, followed by the Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their agendas at the expense of the Palestinians, the Six Days War, and the Jewish belonging to the land. Moreover, the results revealed that Israelis to a high degree believed that the 1948 War was as a cause of nowadays conflict, maybe due to the creation of the refugees problem that, as mentioned before, is considered a milestone issue in the past, present, and in any future negotiations with the Palestinians regarding the peace process. Finally, the table below shows how Israelis had moderately emphasized the role of the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish immigration to historic Palestine in nowadays conflict, and even allocated a lower emphasis on the persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia as a player in the current status quo. The scaled average ( $\bar{X}$ ) for this index was 3.7 (on a scale from 1 to 5) which means that, in general, Israelis assigned a bit higher than a moderate degree of importance to historical events as a player in the nowadays conflict.

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results show that there was a significant difference  $t(1529) = 4.37$ ,  $p < .05$  between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of the role of historical events in the nowadays conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis, and the results revealed that the difference was in favor of the Palestinians with a  $\bar{X}$  value of 3.9, in comparison with a  $\bar{X}$  value of 3.7 on the Israeli side, which also was apparent in the question of '*Which statement do you feel closest to your opinion, if you were to get back to the beginning of the conflict at the beginning of last century*'. The answers revealed that both, Palestinians and Israelis (44.8% and 48.3% respectively) would have sought out more peaceful changes to the history, 17.9% of the Palestinians and 22.7% of the Israelis would have persisted with even more extreme actions (without specifying the direction of these actions), and only 15.2% of them and 16.5% of the Palestinians would have kept the history as it is. These answers demonstrate that more people on both sides were not affiliated with the history and were ready to seek out different approaches with the other, and although a significant difference of evaluation of the historical events existed, however, the difference was small (3.7 to 3.9). Furthermore, the effect size using the equation of Rosnow and Rosenthal (2003) was very diminutive ( $r = .11$ )<sup>(20)</sup>.

<sup>(20)</sup>  $= \text{SQRT}((4.37 * 4.37) / (4.37 * 4.37 + 1529))$ .

TABLE 5.12 HISTORICAL EVENTS AS CAUSES OF NOWADAYS CONFLICT

Descriptive Statistics				
Country	Historical event	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
<b>Palestine</b>	e. Israels occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 - Six Days War	491	4.2	1.0
	h. The Jewish belief that the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people.	492	4.2	1.2
	d. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war.	494	4.1	1.1
	c. The British granting the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine -Balfour Declaration	495	4.0	1.2
	g. The Palestinian belief that they have lived on this land over centuries and are entitled to own it	486	4.0	1.3
	b. Jewish immigration to historic Palestine.	494	3.9	1.4
	f. Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their own agendas.	486	3.7	1.2
	a. Persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia	486	3.2	1.5
	<i>Sample mean</i>	3924	3.9	1.3
<b>Israel</b>	g. The Palestinian belief that they have lived on this land over centuries and are entitled to own it	271	4.3	1.1
	f. Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their own agendas.	252	4.0	1.1
	e. Israels occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 - Six Days War	268	4.0	1.3
	h. The Jewish belief that the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people.	250	4.0	1.3
	d. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war.	253	3.9	1.3
	c. The British granting the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine -Balfour Declaration	271	3.5	1.3
	b. Jewish immigration to historic Palestine.	246	3.5	1.4
	a. Persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia	269	2.4	1.4
	<i>Sample mean</i>	2080	3.7	1.4

*Note:* How much you find the following historical events as a cause of nowadays conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 means to a very low degree and 5 means to a very high degree.

### Actions appertaining to the Conflict

This part aimed to investigate how Palestinians and Israelis perceive actions about the conflict, and, therefore, I tested the following hypothesis:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of actions pertaining to the conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:



There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of:

- Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel?
- Military actions by the Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories?
- Palestinian actions against Israelis?
- Jewish settlers' actions against Palestinians?
- Movement restrictions imposed by Israel?
- The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prisons?
- Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally?
- Building the segregation wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis?

Fairly enough the results revealed that there was a highly significant difference ( $p < .001$ ) between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of actions pertaining to the conflict<sup>(21)</sup>, and the differences were in favor of the one's people, which means, Palestinians significantly justified the actions of Palestinians, and Israelis significantly justified the actions of Israelis, as shown in Figure 5.16 below.

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<sup>(21)</sup>See Table F.3.

**FIGURE 5.16** ACTIONS PERTAINING TO THE CONFLICT**(A) Actions by Israelis****(B) Actions by Palestinians**

*Note:* Using a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 means never justified and 4 means almost always justified. Do you feel that the following actions appertaining to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are almost always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

## Realities hindering the Peace Process

A battery of questions was asked to see how Palestinians and Israelis evaluate the role of ongoing realities in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and therefore, I tested the following hypothesis:


$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of the role of the following in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of the role of the following ongoing realities in hindering the peace process:

- Building settlements.
- Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount.
- Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state.
- Hamas and Islamic Jihad's possession of weapons.
- Israeli settlers' possession of weapons.
- Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip.
- Detained Palestinian prisoners' by Israel.
- The Israeli full control over natural resources.
- Palestinian refugees' right of return.
- The difficulty of having access to places of worship.
- Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine.
- Not recognizing Israel's right to exist.
- Hardliners constant refusal to any peace agreement.
- The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products.
- Deterioration of the Palestinian economy.
- Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine.
- The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides.
- Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.
- Dependency of Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy.
- Israel's absolute control over border crossings.
- The freezing of the funds' transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and customs duties collected by Israel.

The results in Table F.7 revealed that there was a highly significant difference ( $p < .001$ ) between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of facts in hindering the peace process, and the differences were in favor of the Palestinians who evaluated these facts as being *serious* ( $\bar{X} = 3.88$ ) in comparison with the Israelis, who evaluated them as being *somewhat serious* ( $\bar{X} = 3.56$ ) (See Figure 5.17 below):

**FIGURE 5.17** EVALUATIONS OF REALITIES IN HINDERING THE PEACE PROCESS



*Note:* Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 standing for not serious at all and 5 for very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process ?.

As I mentioned earlier, there were significant differences ( $p < .05$ ) between Palestinians and Israelis across all items (see Table F.7) except for the refugees' right of return, where there was no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis in their evaluation of this issue,  $t(767) = 1.8$ ,  $p > .05$ , which means that both people equally recognized this issue as a serious obstacle and is hindering the peace process.

The results in Table F.5 show that for Palestinians, detained prisoners by Israel was ranked in the first position ( $\bar{X} = 4.21$ ) as most serious in hindering the peace process, coupled with Israel's absolute control over border crossings ( $\bar{X} = 4.17$ ), and the freezing of funds' transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and customs duties collected by Israel ( $\bar{X} = 4.12$ ). Moreover, the issues of refugees' right of return, Israeli settlers' possession of weapons, and the continued building of settlements were all ranked in the fourth position with  $\bar{X} = 4.07$ . As noticed in Table F.5, 42.9%<sup>(22)</sup> of these realities were ranked by the Palestinians as somewhat very serious (between 4.00 and 5.00), another 42.9%<sup>(23)</sup> as somewhat important (between 3.50 and 3.99), and the rest 14.2%<sup>(24)</sup> were ranked as somewhat neutral (between 3.39 and 3.49). On the other hand, Palestinians evaluated Hamas and Islamic Jihad's possession of weapons, the tunnels underneath the borders of the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products as the least serious problems to hinder the peace process with  $\bar{X} = 3.40$ .

Not surprisingly, most of the issues that were ranked by the Palestinians as least serious when it comes to hindering the peace process were ranked by the Israelis as very serious problems, such as Palestinians having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip ranked first ( $\bar{X} = 4.70$ ), and Hamas and Islamic Jihad's possession of weapons ( $\bar{X} = 4.66$ ), followed by not recognizing Israel's right to exist ( $\bar{X} = 4.48$ )

<sup>(22)</sup>9 items out of 21.

<sup>(23)</sup>9 items out of 21.

<sup>(24)</sup>3 items out of 21.



and not acknowledging the notion of the Jewish state ( $\bar{X} = 4.37$ ). Other realities were evaluated as somewhat very serious by the Israelis: the lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis ( $\bar{X} = 4.19$ ), hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement ( $\bar{X} = 4.18$ ), and the security threat imposed by extremists on both sides ( $\bar{X} = 4.16$ ). The Palestinians also evaluated these issues as quite serious but with less emphasis ( $\bar{X}_s = 3.80, 3.96, 3.86$  respectively). Again, most of the issues that were considered by the Palestinians to play a very critical role in hindering the peace process, were for the Israelis at the bottom of concern, for example the Israeli settlers' possession of weapons ( $\bar{X} = 2.78$ ), detained Palestinian prisoners' ( $\bar{X} = 2.62$ ), Israel's absolute control over border crossings ( $\bar{X} = 2.56$ ), and the Israeli full control over natural resources ( $\bar{X} = 2.42$ ). As shown in Table F.6, 33.3%<sup>(25)</sup> of these realities were ranked by the Israelis as somewhat very serious (between 4.00 and 5.00), 14.3%<sup>(26)</sup> as somewhat serious (between 3.50 and 3.99), 28.6%<sup>(27)</sup> as somewhat neutral (between 3.00 and 3.49) and the rest 23.8%<sup>(28)</sup> as somewhat not serious (between 2.50 and 2.99).

### Solutions to Core Issues of the Conflict

The respondents were asked by one primary set of questions about the most and next acceptable solutions to the core issues of the conflict, specifically, these issues that mainly constitute the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and on which the consequences of what is happening on the grounds stem. The concept behind these questions was to control for expected suggestions people have in their minds about what should be done to each issue. It will be noticed below how the majority of both people responded with very idealistic self-centered answers (Win-lose solution) as the most acceptable choice for each issue, and how they dramatically switched to a more reasonable one when asked about the next acceptable solution to these issues. A solution where making compromises is not a choice but a painful reality that should be considered.

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of the most and second acceptable solution to the core issues of the conflict  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of the most/second

<sup>(25)</sup> 7 items out of 21.

<sup>(26)</sup> 3 items out of 21.

<sup>(27)</sup> 6 items out of 21.

<sup>(28)</sup> 5 items out of 21.

acceptable solution to the issue of:

- Palestinian refugees?
- Israeli settlements?
- Jerusalem?
- Prisoners?
- Natural resources?

Table 5.13 hereunder reveals that there were significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of the most and next acceptable solutions to all investigated issues ( $p < .001$ ), and the differences were as follows:

**TABLE 5.13** MOST ACCEPTABLE AND NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS

Questions 11 - 15		Pearson Chi-Square	df	Asmp. Sig. (2-sided)
Palestinian refugees	Most acceptable	1040 <sup>a</sup>	6	.000
	Next acceptable	368 <sup>a</sup>	6	.000
Israeli settlements	Most acceptable	846 <sup>a</sup>	9	.000
	Next acceptable	414 <sup>a</sup>	9	.000
Jerusalem	Most acceptable	586 <sup>a</sup>	6	.000
	Next acceptable	221 <sup>a</sup>	6	.000
Prisoners	Most acceptable	831 <sup>a</sup>	5	.000
	Next acceptable	394 <sup>a</sup>	5	.000
Natural resources	Most acceptable	517 <sup>a</sup>	4	.000
	Next acceptable	50 <sup>a</sup>	4	.000


*Note:* With regard to the issue of..., which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?

## Palestinian Refugees

### Most Acceptable Solution

As expected, for the majority of the Palestinians (77.6%) the right of refugees to return to their homes within Israel proper is the most acceptable solution that can be implemented to solve the issue of Palestinian refugees, followed by a conditional return of refugees (11.4%), absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian state (5.4%), and the refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries (3.0%). The Israelis' positions on this issue were more distributed and less skewed toward a particular solution as was the case for the Palestinians. The majority (30.5%) answered with "none of the above", mainly because for Israelis the right of return means a demographic threat to the existence of Israel and its Jewish majority. This is followed by the solutions that refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries (20.1%), absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian state (19.5%), and finally relinquishing the right of return and replacing it by financial compensation (17.4%), as shown in Figure 5.18 below.

**FIGURE 5.18** MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEES ISSUE




*Note:* With regard to the issue of Palestinian refugees, which of the following you consider being the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?

### Next Acceptable Solution

Away from the most acceptable solution, that might be a solution in a perfect world, is the question of 'what you consider the next most acceptable solution?' A question, where rationality and the urgency to compromise for a solution, play a more decisive role in solving the issue. The results revealed that 27.5% of the Palestinians considered absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian state as the next most acceptable solution to the issue, 25.9% preferred them to be assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries, 20.4% decided for conditional return of Palestinian refugees as the next most acceptable solution, and finally, 7.7% chose the right of refugees to return to their homes within Israel

proper. As mentioned above, almost one-third of the Israelis believe that none of the suggested solutions is considered an actual solution to the conflict but a demographic threat to Israelis existence, 22.1% voted for relinquishing the right of return and replacing it by financial compensation, 17.9% preferred the option of the refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship right in their host countries, and finally, 12.5% decided for absorbing the refugees in the newly established Palestinian state, as shown in Figure 5.19 hereunder.

**FIGURE 5.19** NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEES ISSUE




*Note:* And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?

## Israeli Settlements

### Most Acceptable Solution


The results in Figure 5.20 revealed that more than half of the Palestinians considered evacuating all Israeli settlers from the settlements built on 1967 borders as the most acceptable solution to the issue, 23.7% preferred dismantling all settlements built within the 1967 borders, and 8.7% thought of freezing settlement activities in the West Bank and Jerusalem as the most acceptable solution to the issue. Finally, 4.3% believed in compensation packages, including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders, and only 2.7% agreed on keeping all settlements intact. On the other side, 27.6% of Israelis thought that settlements should be kept intact, 13.1% believed that relinquishing parts of Israeli lands that would commensurate in an area with that occupied by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as the most acceptable solution to the issue of settlement. Another 13.0% found that all settlements built on the Israeli side of the wall should become part of Israel, and 12.6% considered the compensation packages, including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders as the most acceptable solution to the settlements issue. Finally, 9.5% answered with “none of the above”.

**FIGURE 5.20 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT**

*Note:* With regard to the issue of Israeli settlements, which of the following do you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?

### Next Acceptable Solution

Results in Figure 5.21 below unveiled how Palestinians positions did not change much, where 27.1% of them thought of dismantling all settlements built within the 1967 borders as the second best acceptable solution to the issue of settlements, 22.5% answered with freezing settlement activities in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 16.1% believed that all Israeli settlers should evacuate the settlements built on the 1967 borders. Only 7.0% of the Palestinians raised the solution of allowing settlers to stay in the West Bank under the Palestinian sovereignty at their discretion as the next most acceptable solution for this issue. The results also revealed that 17.9% of the Israelis decided to adhere to one main acceptable solution, i.e., their refusal to consider any of the other suggested solutions as an alternative, 14.0% believed that all settlements built on the Israeli side of the wall to become part of Israel as the next most acceptable solution to the issue, and 13.0% decided that all settlements should be kept intact. Interestingly, 12.8% are for relinquishing parts of Israeli lands that would commensurate in the area with that occupied by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, in addition to 12.2% who agreed upon compensation packages including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders.


**FIGURE 5.21** NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

*Note:* And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?

## Jerusalem

### Most Acceptable Solution

Undoubtedly, the majority (45.9%) of Palestinians thought that the most acceptable solution for the issue of Jerusalem is to divide the City in East Jerusalem for the Palestinians and West Jerusalem for the Israelis as was the case before the 1967 War, 22.0% preferred an international control over Jerusalem and its holy sites, 8.6% believed that Jerusalem should be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters, 5.4% favored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control, with allowing access to Jerusalem holy sites for both nations. Only 2.6% preferred the joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city, 10.3% answered with none of the above, and finally, 5.2% did not know. On the other hand, more than half of the Israelis (57.0%) favored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control with allowing access to Jerusalem proper holy sites for both nations, and 14.1% were ready to accept dividing Jerusalem; the eastern part for the Palestinians and the western part for the Israelis as was the case before 1967. A smaller percentage of 7.8% thought of the international control over Jerusalem and its holy places as the most acceptable solution. Moreover, 6.3% of the Israelis believed that the old city should be placed under joint control, and 5.5% agreed that Jerusalem should be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters. Finally, 9.3% answered with none of the above, as shown in Figure 5.22 below.

**FIGURE 5.22 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM**


*Note:* With regard to Jerusalem, which of the following do you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?

### Next Acceptable Solution

Results in Figure 5.23 revealed that the Palestinian positions did not change significantly, as 22.4% of them preferred international control over Jerusalem and its sanctuaries as the next acceptable solution to issue of Jerusalem, 16.3% favored the division of Jerusalem to East for Palestinians and West for Israelis, and 11.2% thought of a joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city as the next acceptable solution to this issue. Finally, an eye-opening percentage of Palestinians (10.4%) fa-

vored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control with allowing access to Jerusalem sanctuaries for both nations, and 8.6% believed that Jerusalem should be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters.

**FIGURE 5.23** NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM



*Note:* And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?

The same applies for the Israelis whose views did not change much when asked about the next acceptable solution to the issue of Jerusalem. 22.5% of the Israelis believed that Jerusalem should be united and under Israeli sovereignty with allowing access to Jerusalem sanctuaries for both nations, a quiet impressive percentage




of 18.5% preferred a joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city, 15.8% favored an international control, 8.2% believed that Jerusalem should be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters, and only 6.9% said that things should be as it was before the Six days war of 1967 where East Jerusalem belonged to the Palestinians and West Jerusalem to the Israelis. Finally, 28.2% decided to stick to one main acceptable solution, i.e., their refusal to consider any of the other suggested solutions as an alternative.

## Prisoners

### Most Acceptable Solution

55.8% of the Palestinians are for the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons when asked about the most acceptable solution that can be implemented to reach a solution to the issue of prisoners, 30.9% thought at least to release prisoners for humanitarian reasons only as in the case of illness, long-term prisoners, women and children, and 6.1% answered to keep only those who killed or were accomplices in the killing of Israelis, as shown in Figure 5.24 below.

**FIGURE 5.24** MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRISONERS ISSUE



*Note:* With regard to the issue of the Palestinian prisoners, which of the following do you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?


In addition, the results revealed that 40.4% of the Israelis were of the opinion that the most acceptable solution is to keep all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons, a quiet high percentage of 30.5% answered with keeping only those who killed or were accomplices in the killing of Israelis, 10.7% thought at least to release prisoners for humanitarian reasons, and 8.8% considered none of the above-suggested solutions enough to solve the issue.

### Next Acceptable Solution

Results in Figure 5.25 show that a Palestinian majority of 41.6% asked for the release of prisoners for humanitarian reasons as the next acceptable solution to end this issue, 25.7% thought that all prisoners should be released, 14.5% replied I dont

know, and 9.0% answered none of the above. On the other hand, 25.1% of the Israelis decided on keeping in prisoners who killed or were accomplices in the killing of Israelis. 18.5% further insisted on keeping all prisoners, 17.3% were for the release of prisoners for humanitarian reasons only, and only 4.4% agreed on releasing all Palestinian prisoners as the next acceptable solution.

**FIGURE 5.25** NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRISONERS ISSUE




*Note:* And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?

## Natural Resources

### Most Acceptable Solution

Fairly enough, 66.8% of the Palestinians when asked about the most acceptable solution to the issue of natural resources replied that the natural resources should be under Palestinian control in the newly established Palestinian state, 16.3% preferred the solution of joint control over the natural resources for the sake of economic prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis, and only 8.3% thought that natural resources should remain under Israeli control as it is the case today, but equal rights (price, consumption, and distribution) must be maintained for the Palestinians and Israelis alike, as shown in Figure 5.26 below.

**FIGURE 5.26** MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF NATURAL RESOURCES


*Note:* With regard to the issue of natural resources, which of the following do you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?

On the other hand, the results in Figure 5.26 above revealed that 44.4% of the Israelis are of the opinion that that the natural resources should remain under Israeli control as it is the case today, but equal rights must be maintained for the Palestinians and Israelis, 21.3% preferred a joint control, and only 10.9% thought that the natural resources should be under Palestinian control in the newly established Palestinian state.

### Next Acceptable Solution

Figure 5.27 revealed that 30.3% of the Palestinians believed that the next acceptable solution for the issue of natural resources is that these remain under Israeli control, as it is the case today but with equal rights, 23.2% preferred that natural resources to be under joint control, and 12.3% that they should be under Palestinian control in the newly established Palestinian state. On the other hand, a majority of 30.7% of the Israelis believed that the next acceptable solution to the issue is that natural resources be under joint control, 25.3% thought that they should remain under Israeli control with equal rights, and the rest answered with none of the above (26.5%) or did not know (11.0%).

**FIGURE 5.27** NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF NATURAL RESOURCES



*Note:* And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?

## Economic Cooperation

Plans for economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis were introduced to the respondents, and these were asked to rate them on a scale from 1 (very unacceptable to you) to 5 (very acceptable to you). The main goal of this battery of items was to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approving economic cooperation plans between both parties on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:

There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approving:

- Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors, i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, etc.?
- Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel?
- Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two states?
- Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and Israelis?
- Building a Palestinian airport?
- Building a Palestinian seaport?
- Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip?

The results of the t-tests revealed that there were significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis in some items of the battery and not across all items, as

shown in Table 5.14 hereunder:

**TABLE 5.14** HYPOTHESES TESTING - BATTERY OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Null hypotheses	Accepted	Rejected
Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, and more		✓
Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel.	✓	
Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two states.		✓
Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and Israelis.		✓
Building a Palestinian airport.	✓	
Building a Palestinian seaport.	✓	
Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip.	✓	

*Note:* I want to propose to you plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 means very unable to you, and 5 means very acceptable, to what extent do you accept the following ?:

The results above revealed that there was a significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions in allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel as a plan to enhance economic cooperation between both parties, and the difference was in favor of the Palestinians, where they found it highly acceptable to them ( $M = 4.00$ ,  $SE = .05$ ) to work inside Israel, in comparison with less than a neutral level of acceptance regarding this plan on the Israeli side ( $M = 2.89$ ,  $SE = .09$ ). Another significant difference existed between their level of acceptance to building a Palestinian airport, and the difference again was in favor of the Palestinians ( $M = 4.07$ ,  $SE = .06$ ) who highly accepted the plan of building a Palestinian airport, in comparison with ( $M = 2.32$ ,  $SE = .06$ ) on the Israeli side who found this plan somewhat unacceptable. The same applied to the plan of building a Palestinian seaport, where Palestinians ( $M = 4.32$ ,  $SE = .05$ ) found the plan highly acceptable for them, unlike the Israelis who found it somewhat unacceptable ( $M = 2.33$ ,  $SE = .09$ ). Furthermore, a significant difference existed between both sides regarding the plan of extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip, and this was also in favor of the Palestinians who found this plan very acceptable ( $M = 4.15$ ,  $SE = .06$ ), whilst the Israelis found it somewhat unacceptable ( $M = 2.63$ ,  $SE = .06$ ). The effect sizes for all these differences using the equation of Rosnow and Rosenthal (2003) was somewhat large, as shown in Table 5.15 below:

**TABLE 5.15** EFFECT SIZES FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES

Hypothesis	Effect size (r.)
Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel.	38.2%
Building a Palestinian airport.	53.6%
Building a Palestinian seaport.	60.4%
Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip.	48.6%

The rest of suggested plans that did not have any significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis, and which both (on average) found somewhat acceptable comprised of those plans that were solely focused on the trade and economic prosperity for both nations without any direct access to people (e.g., workers) through the borders of the other, or as shown in the table above, does not involve the economic prosperity of one side excluding the other (See Table F.8).

### Establishing a Palestinian State

The respondents were introduced with elements as parameters of establishing a Palestinian state and were asked to rate how much they support or oppose each, using a scale from 1 (completely opposed) to 5 (in full support). The main goal of this battery of elements was to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approving of elements as parameters of establishing a Palestinian state on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:

There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis level of support to:

- Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of a land swap?
- A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces?
- International presence on the borders of the newly established Palestinian state?
- A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings?
- The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority?
- Building a 'Safe Passage' between the West Bank and Gaza Strip?

- Demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established Palestinian state?
- Security coordination between Israel and Palestine?

The results of the t-test revealed that there were significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis across all elements except one element that was about demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established Palestinian state ( $p > .05$ ). Both, Palestinians and Israelis, somewhat opposed this element ( $M = 2.75$ ,  $SE = .06$ ) and ( $M = 2.66$ ,  $SE = .09$ ) respectively. Further results (see Table F.9) revealed that Palestinians somewhat supported ( $\bar{X} = 3.49$ ) the Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of the land swap, unlike the Israelis who somewhat opposed this element ( $\bar{X} = 2.25$ ). Moreover, the Israelis somewhat supported ( $\bar{X} = 3.19$ ) the element of a demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces, something that the Palestinians somehow opposed ( $\bar{X} = 2.42$ ).


As noticed, all the results showed that the Palestinians struggle for freedom and statehood, and the Israelis aim to keep their country safe and secured from the Palestinian counterpart. For instance, the presence of Israeli permanent control points at Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority is to some extent supported by Israelis ( $\bar{X} = 3.43$ ) who want to secure their borders in case the Palestinians failed to do so. On the other hand, the Palestinians somewhat opposed this idea ( $\bar{X} = 2.70$ ) because lacking the ability to fully control ones borders contradicts the very concept of sovereignty over the newly established state, which was also fostered by the strong support of Palestinians ( $\bar{X} = 3.73$ ) to a Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings, in comparison with a neutral position towards this element on the Israeli side ( $\bar{X} = 3.16$ ). Furthermore, Palestinians to quite a high degree supported building a 'safe passage' between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, something that the Israeli counterpart opposed ( $\bar{X} = 2.76$ ). Security coordination between both nations received more support from the Israelis ( $\bar{X} = 3.72$ ) in comparison with the Palestinians, who had somehow a neutral position toward this element ( $\bar{X} = 3.15$ ). The same view has been established towards an international presence on the borders of the newly established Palestinian state ( $\bar{X} = 3.18$ ), unlike the Israelis who, to a some extent, opposed an international presence on the borders ( $\bar{X} = 2.92$ ).

### Most Appropriate Solution

A very crucial question probed respondents about their opinion of the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the results in Figure 5.28 below show that the majority of Palestinians (37.3%) and Israelis (46.3%) thought that

the most important appropriate solution to the conflict is that of the two states, Israel, and Palestine, that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, which according to Halperin et al. (2010, p. 33) “indicated the removal of a significant barrier to conflict resolution with the Palestinians”. 19.2% of the Palestinians and 8.8% of the Israelis preferred a one-state solution in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations. Moreover, 15.9% of the Israelis and 7.9% of the Palestinians favored the solution of the West Bank as part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part as a part of Egypt. Only 5.2% of the Israelis and 10.3% of the Palestinians thought of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and finally, almost a quarter of the people on both sides believed that none of the above-mentioned solutions were good enough to solve the conflict. These might be the stratum of the society that are driven by their eagerness to have the whole land controlled by their respective government, or simply they have no trust in the other as a partner for peace and, therefore, are lacking the hope of reaching a peaceful solution.

**FIGURE 5.28** MOST APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT



*Note:* In your opinion, what is the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

### Prioritization of Issues

The respondents were asked to prioritize milestone issues of the conflict on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for “the most important issue”, and 10 for “the least important issue” these days, which both, Palestinians and Israelis, think they should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties. The main objective of this question was to see how they prioritize these crucial issues, and to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:



$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' prioritization of crucial issues on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis prioritization of:

- Israeli settlements?
- Palestinian prisoners?
- Jerusalem?
- The security of both Israelis and the Palestinians?
- Borders and crossing points?
- Palestinian refugees?
- Control over natural resources?
- Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders?
- Recognizing the Jewish state?
- Having control over holy sites?


The results of the t-test in Table F.10 revealed that there were significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis across all issues ( $p < .05$ ) except for the issue of control over natural resources ( $p > .05$ ). Both people did not give this issue a high priority ( $M = 6.48$ ,  $SE = .07$ ) and ( $M = 6.28$ ,  $SE = .09$ ) respectively. Different perceptions of what should be addressed first are expected, but the results revealed even a wider gap between perceptions on both sides concerning how peace should be processed. As if Palestinians and Israelis agreed to disagree concerning these milestone issues, for instance:

- Recognizing the Jewish state was ranked second by the Israelis and tenth by the Palestinians.
- The prisoners issue was ranked second by Palestinians and ninth by Israelis.
- The refugees issue was ranked third by Palestinians and seventh by Israelis.
- Establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders was ranked tenth by Israelis and fifth by Palestinians.
- Security was ranked first by Israelis and ninth by Palestinians.

Figure 5.29 hereunder illustrates the prioritization of issues by Palestinians and Israelis.


**FIGURE 5.29** PRIORITIZATION OF ISSUES

(A) Palestinians



Mean values are in brackets.

(B) Israelis





Mean values are in brackets.

*Note:* In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties? Please put them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and 10 represents the least important issue these days.

### Performance of Political Figures

The respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of some political figures on both sides pertaining to the peace process; rating whether such a performance is highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative. The results of the t-test in Table F.11 revealed that there were significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of political leaders on both sides, where each side evaluated the performance of political parties in their respective country in a more spread and less skewed manner, and the political parties of the other in a more negative and skewed pattern, as illustrated in the red dashed circles in Figure 5.30 below:

**FIGURE 5.30** EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL FIGURES PERFORMANCE**(A) Palestinians****(B) Israelis**

*Note:* I'm going to ask you about the performance of some political figures pertaining to the peace process. Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative?

The results above showed that 60.4% of the Palestinians evaluated the performance of Mahmoud Abbas, head of the PA, positively. 40.0% of them also expressed a positive rating for Khalid Misha'al, head of Hamas Politburo, and 47.8% for Rami Hamdallah, the PA's Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Palestinians

evaluations of the performance of Israeli political figures regarding the peace process were very negative as shown in the figure above. On the Israeli side, 41.7% of the Israelis evaluated the performance of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, positively. The same applies to Tzipi Livni, head of the Hatnuah party in Israel, and 42.9% for Isaac Herzog, head of Labor Party in Israel. On the other hand, their evaluations of the performance of Palestinian political figures pertaining to the peace process were somewhat negative, particularly towards Misha'al, head of Hamas Politburo.

### Hope to Make Peace with the Other Side

The respondents were asked how likely they think that the current leadership in their respective country can make peace with the other side. Is it most likely (coded 1), somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or absolute unlikely (coded 5)?

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis trust in their respective political leaders to make peace with the other side on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.


The result of the t-test revealed that there was a significant difference  $t(1460) = -4.6$ ,  $p < 0.01$  between Palestinians and Israelis trust in their respective political leader to make peace with the other side, and the difference was in favor of the Palestinians ( $M = 2.68$ ,  $SE = .03$ ) in comparison with the Israeli side ( $M = 2.92$ ,  $SE = .04$ ), which means that Palestinians have a bit more trust in their political leaders than Israelis to make peace with the other side. The mean values here are translated to 'slight likely'. It is highly dependent on how the results are being interpreted, for instance, the distribution in Table F.12 shows that 27.2% of the Palestinians and 24.0% of the Israelis thought that it was absolute unlikely for their current leadership to make peace with the other side. Add thereto, 19.1% and 44.8% of Palestinians and Israelis respectively thought it was somewhat unlikely. On the other hand, 48.5% of the Palestinians and 31.9% of the Israelis thought it was likely to a certain degree that they can make peace with the other side. The results of this part showed that both people were somewhat skeptical about the ability of their political leaders to make an actual change. A further question was presented to the respondents with scenarios regarding proposed solutions by their respective leadership. It reads: '*If you had the ability to impose a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, what would you do?*' Almost one-third of the Palestinians and Israelis would impose the same solutions proposed by their government, 27.0% of the Palestinians and 15.2% of the Israelis would impose solutions different from those proposed by their government, and only 7.6% and 3.5% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively would agree on the solutions proposed by the government of the other side. Finally,

a majority of 52.0% of Israelis and 19.8% of Palestinians would suggest different solutions than their governments, and the rest responded with “I don’t know”.

### Peace Negotiations

The majority of the Palestinians (61.9%)<sup>(29)</sup> and the Israelis (51.4%)<sup>(30)</sup> supported to some degree the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis under the current circumstances, and 27.7% of the Palestinians and 41.4% of the Israelis opposed to some degree the resumption of peace negotiations, as shown in Figure 5.31 below.

**FIGURE 5.31** RESUMPTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS



*Note:* Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis under the current circumstances?

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ support of the resumption of peace negotiations under the current circumstances on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The result of the t-test unveiled that there was no significant difference  $t(1535) = -1.4$ ,  $p > .05$  between Palestinians and Israelis support of the resumption of peace negotiations under the current circumstances. This means that both people realized to some extent the importance of peace negotiations and the role they play on the grounds.

<sup>(29)</sup> 9.5% ‘Strongly support’ + 52.4% ‘Somewhat support’.

<sup>(30)</sup> 13.5% ‘Strongly support’ + 38.0% ‘Somewhat support’.

### Belief in Peace Negotiations

Further to previous results, respondents were asked if they believed or not negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years. Interestingly, only 6.2% of the Palestinians and 4.3% of the Israelis strongly believed that negotiations will lead to peace in the coming years, in addition to 34.1% on the Palestinian side and 20.3% on the Israeli side who thought to a certain degree that negotiations will lead to peace. On the other hand, 39.7% of the Israelis and 24.3% of the Palestinians did not believe at all that negotiations can achieve peace, as well as more than one-third of the Israelis and quarter of the Palestinians who did not believe to a certain degree in the ability of negotiations to make a change.

Another interesting observation was to test for a significant correlation between support and trust in negotiations, as follows:

$H_0$ : There is no significant correlation between support for the resumption of peace negotiations and trust in those negotiations to achieve peace on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Table 5.16 below demonstrates that there were significant and positive correlations ( $r = .46$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and ( $r = .37$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) in Palestine and Israel respectively between the support of resumption of peace negotiations and trust in these negotiations to achieve peace. The correlation was slightly stronger among the Palestinians than the Israelis, and the positive direction means that an increase in one variable is correlated with the increase in the other variable. Similarly, the decrease in one variable is correlated with the decrease in the other variable.

**TABLE 5.16** CORRELATION BETWEEN SUPPORT OF RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TRUST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS


Correlations			
Group	Comparisons	Support of resumption	Trust in negotiations
<i>Palestinians</i>	Support of resumption <sup>(a)</sup>	1	912
	Faith in negotiations <sup>(b)</sup>	<b>.37***</b>	1
<i>Israelis</i>	Support of resumption	1	519
	Trust in negotiations	<b>.46***</b>	1

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

*Note:* (a) Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis under the current circumstances? (b) Do you believe, or not, that negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years?

Further results in Figure 5.32 below showed that 38.4% of the Palestinians and only 14.3% of the Israelis thought that resuming peace negotiations is *more important to the other*. This put the Palestinians in either a more self-confident, but fragile and offensive position, where Palestinians think they have the edge or the superiority to influence otherwise, or in a sympathetic and advisory position where they believe making peace with the Israelis is a foot step into making peace and integration with the rest of the Arab world. On the other hand, results revealed that 15.8% of the Palestinians and almost quarter of the Israelis thought it is *more important to ones self* (own people) to resume negotiations. This can be translated into the desperate need to live without fear for their own safety and security. Most importantly, 28.1% of the Palestinians and 43.7% of the Israelis realized that resuming negotiations was equally important to both parties, leaving only a minority of 6.0% and 9.9% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively, who believed that it was not important to either party, which, if translated referred to this stubborn stratum of both societies that either benefit from the conflict, or were eager to have the land by force or by any other means except resorting to the negotiations in order to accomplish their goal.

**FIGURE 5.32** RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF WHOM ?



*Note:* In your view, to which party resuming peace negotiations is more important, to the Palestinians or to the Israelis?

### Concessions and Efforts in Negotiations

The respondents were asked if they believed that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success or they could have gone further to make them a success. Results in Table 5.17 revealed that the vast majority of both, the Palestinians (59.3%) and the Israelis (79.5%), believed that the other party could have gone further, in comparison with only 4.4% of the Israelis and 8.9% of the Palestinians, who admitted that the other party has done all what has been required of them to do.

**TABLE 5.17** CONCESSIONS AND EFFORTS IN NEGOTIATIONS

<b>Perception</b>	<b>Groups</b>	<b>They have done all what has been required of them to do</b>	<b>They could have gone further</b>
a. Of the other	Palestinians	8.9%	59.3%
	Israelis	4.4%	79.5%
*Actual difference as perceived by	Palestinians	-38.3%	-25.4%
	Israelis	-31.1%	-34.6%
b. Of the self	Palestinians	42.7%	33.9%
	Israelis	40.0%	44.9%


\*The difference between the perception of “the oneself” and the perception of “the other”.

*Note:* Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or you believe they could have gone further to make them a success?

The results disclosed that each party perceived the concessions made by his or her own people (or oneself) as quite high, where 42.7% and 40.0% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively believed that they have done all what has been required of them to do. Additionally, 33.9% of the Palestinians and 44.9% of the Israelis believed that his or her own people could have gone further, which was quite promising and in some sense referred to this stratum in each society that believed more efforts should be invested in future negotiations, and were more open to concessions.

Further to these results, I calculated what I called “Actual perceived difference”, which is the actual difference between the perception of “oneself” and the perception of “the other”. This difference shows to what extent both parties were deeply anchored in their miss-perception of reality - what has been done, and what should have been done, and who is responsible for the failure of past negotiations, as illustrated by the dashed circle in Figure 5.33 hereunder.



**FIGURE 5.33 CONCESSIONS AND EFFORTS IN NEGOTIATIONS**

*Note:* Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or you believe they could have gone further to make them a success?

### Responsibility for the Failure of Past Agreements

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of shouldering the responsibility for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results in Table F.13 revealed significantly different answers between Palestinians and Israelis when asked about whom they thought, is/are responsible for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis. Except for the item of Israeli extremist parties where  $p > .001$ . This means that both Palestinians and Israelis think they have their share of responsibility for the failure of past agreements. Other than that, Figure 5.34 shows that for the Palestinians, the majority of answers placed the Israeli government and leaders as the main responsible actors for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis, followed by Israeli extremists and the United States. Interestingly, Arab leaders were highly ranked as one of the main actors to be responsible for the failure of negotiations and treaties; they were highly ranked by the Palestinians as having a bigger share of responsibility than Israeli people, who were ranked in the fifth position. On the other hand, Israelis ranked Palestinian extremist movements as the main actors responsible for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties

between Palestinians and Israelis, followed by the Palestinian government and leaders, and Arab leaders. Again, Arab leaders were ranked higher as having a bigger share of responsibility than Palestinian people, who were ranked in the fourth position. Its worth mentioning that quite moderate percentages of 11.4% and 10.7% believed that Israeli extremists, government, and leaders were responsible for the failure of past agreements.

**FIGURE 5.34** RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES

(A) Who is responsible from the Palestinian point of view



(B) Who is responsible from the Israeli point of view




*Note:* In your view, historically seen, who is responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis?

## Intermediation

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of how balanced is the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results in Figure 5.35 below showed significantly different results ( $\chi^2(3)=568$ ,  $p<.001$ ) between Palestinians and Israelis regarding how balanced they thought is the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

**FIGURE 5.35** ROLE OF THE US IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT



*Note:* In your opinion, does the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict play towards both parties a balanced role, a biased role towards the Israeli stance, or a biased role towards the Palestinian stance?


Clearly, a very high percentage (81.6%) of the Palestinians answered that the United States role in the conflict is biased in favor of the Israeli, and more than one-third of the Israelis thought that it plays a biased role in favor of the Palestinians. This in comparison with 7.5% of the Palestinians and 27.7% of the Israelis who believed that the US plays a balanced role towards both parties, and only 3.9% of the Palestinians and quite a moderate percentage of 21.1% of the Israelis thought it plays a biased role towards the Palestinian and Israel side respectively.

### Best Mediator

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of which state or international organization could be the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results in Figure 5.36 hereunder show that both Palestinians and Israelis agreed on their recommendation of The Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia) and Egypt as the best mediators between them. Surprisingly, the highest percentage of one-third of the Israelis thought that none of the suggested states and international organizations was the best mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which might stem from their belief that the conflict should be resolved between the Palestinians and Israelis themselves without international intervention. Nonetheless, the majority of the Israelis thought that the US is the best mediator, followed by The Quartet and Egypt. On the Palestinian side, the order was The Quartet ranked as the best mediator, followed by Turkey, UN, EU, and Egypt. Finally, the results were significantly different  $\chi^2(12)=390, p<.001$ .

**FIGURE 5.36** BEST MEDIATOR BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS



*Note:* As you see it, which state or international organization could be the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis?

### Readiness for Peace

The results of asking the respondents ‘*To what degree are you bored and tired of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?*’ revealed that both people were really fed up from the conflict. In this question I tested the following hypothesis:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis boredom from the conflict on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results were significantly different between Palestinians and Israelis  $\chi^2(4)=39$ ,  $p<.001$ , where 44.0% of the Palestinians and 47.8% of the Israelis were to a high degree bored and tired of the conflict, 35.0% and 33.5% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively were to a moderate degree, and 7.5% of the Palestinians and 13.2% of the Israelis were to a low degree fed up from the conflict. On the other hand, only 9.9% of the Palestinians and 5.6% of the Israelis declined this status of mind.

### Willingness to Make Peace with the Other

‘*To what degree are you willing to make peace with the other?*’ was one of my main dependent variables that I used to see how other independent variables that I already investigated above influenced the willingness of individuals to make peace with the other. In this question I tested the following hypothesis:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ willingness towards peace on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results revealed very interesting outcomes; first of all, there was a significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis  $\chi^2(4)=73$ ,  $p<.001$  willingness towards peace, where 46.6% of the Israelis and 26.6% of the Palestinians were to a high degree willing to make peace with the other side, and 39.0% of the Palestinians and 26.1% of the Israelis were to a moderate degree willing to do so. It is noticed here that both people were willing to make peace to a certain degree; the intensity, however, was higher among Israelis than Palestinians. Further results revealed that 16.9% and 18.0% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively were willing to a low degree to make peace with each other, 10.8% of the Palestinians and 6.0% of the Israelis did not care about making peace with the other.

### Taking Risks and Making Sacrifices for Peace

26.2% of the Palestinians believed that they should be willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace, in comparison with 51.1% of the Israelis who were willing to do so in order to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace.


The low percentage on the Palestinian side compared with the Israeli side can be a result of the Palestinian belief that they already gave up a lot through negotiations and suggested solutions to the current status quo and that they can't compromise anymore to resolve the conflict. Additionally, 73.8% of the Palestinians and 48.9% of the Israelis believed that they should not have to give up any of their demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, most probably for the same reason explained above.

### Confidence in Peace

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' confidence in peace on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results revealed significant differences ( $p < .001$ ) between Palestinians and Israeli confidence in peace in the near future. The differences as shown in Figure 5.37 below were in favor of the Israelis  $M = 3.42$ ,  $SE = .03$ . Results indicated that Israelis were to a great extent not confident of peace taking place with the Palestinians in the near future. In comparison with the Palestinians  $M = 2.76$ ,  $SE = .03$  who to a lesser extent but still not confident that peace will take place in the near future. These results simply illustrate how suspicious both people were to peace to occur soon. Percentagewise, only 2.7% of the Palestinians and 1.7% of the Israelis were very confident, 37.4% and 11.6% respectively were somewhat confident, and almost one-third of both people were somewhat not confident that peace will take place in the near future, and a majority of 55.3% of the Israelis were not confident at all that peace will take place soon, in comparison with 21.0% on the Palestinian side.

**FIGURE 5.37 CONFIDENCE IN PEACE**



*Note:* How confident are you that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians will be solved in the near future?

### Quality of Life

The respondents were asked to what degree do the following battery of items apply to them, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 stands for a very low degree and 5 for a very high degree. The respondents answered with 0 when the item did not apply at all to them. Items comprised of issues related to every-day life, including poverty, low

wages/pensions, unemployment/lack of job opportunities, shortage of health care and education, lack of security and safety/crime/violence, restrictions imposed on freedom of movement/blockade, high cost of living/inflation/high prices, energy or fuel shortages, electricity and water shortages, and housing problems. After all, an index of all the items was generated that I called 'Quality of life', and concluded that there were significant differences ( $p < .001$ ) between the quality of lives of Palestinians and Israelis, and the differences were in favor of the Israelis with an average of 3.09, which means a modest quality of life, in comparison with the Palestinian average of 3.46 indicating a lower quality of life. In-depth sub-hypotheses revealed significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis among all items except one that was about low wages and pensions where both people equally felt that they to a some degree suffered from it, as shown in Table 5.18 below.



**TABLE 5.18** QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX

<b>Group Statistics</b>				
<b>Index of items</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
a. Poverty	Palestine	997	3.02	1.68
	Israel	508	3.31	1.55
b. Low wages/pensions	Palestine	1006	3.64	1.47
	Israel	509	3.71	1.48
c. Unemployment/lack of job opportunities	Palestine	1007	3.86	1.39
	Israel	510	3.27	1.64
d. Shortage of health care and education	Palestine	1004	3.45	1.43
	Israel	511	3.07	1.62
e. Lack of security and safety/crime/violence.	Palestine	1007	3.64	1.45
	Israel	511	3.20	1.56
f. Restrictions imposed on freedom of movement/blockade.	Palestine	1008	3.94	1.31
	Israel	510	2.27	1.57
g. High cost of living/Inflation/high prices	Palestine	1011	3.96	1.31
	Israel	510	4.30	1.17
h. Energy or fuel shortages	Palestine	1000	3.63	1.49
	Israel	507	2.74	1.62
i. Electricity shortages	Palestine	1008	3.48	1.63
	Israel	507	2.39	1.60
j. Water shortages	Palestine	1003	3.09	1.63
	Israel	506	2.53	1.66
k. Housing problems	Palestine	999	2.98	1.78
	Israel	507	3.56	1.60

*Note:* To what degree do the following items apply to you, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree.

### Feelings and Attitudes

The main goals of these consecutive questions were to see how do Palestinians and Israelis feel towards each other, and how do they think the other feel towards them. Moreover, to test the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' feelings and attitudes towards each other on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

$H_0$ : There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of how they feel towards each other on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

These null hypotheses include the following sub-hypotheses:

There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis:

- tolerance towards the other side?
- understanding of the other side?
- anger on the other side?
- fear from the other side?
- trust in the other side?
- grudge against the other side?

Moreover, is there a significant difference between their perceptions of how the other side:

- is tolerant towards them?
- understands them?
- feels angry at them?
- fears them?
- trusts them?
- bears a grudge against them?

The results revealed significant differences ( $p < .05$ ) across all items except for “fear from the other side” and “trust in the other side” where  $p > .05$ , and where both; the Palestinians and the Israelis expressed a low degree of trust ( $M=2.07$ ,  $SE=.03$ ) and ( $M=2.04$ ,  $SE=.04$ ) respectively. Similarly, both of them; the Palestinians ( $M=2.61$ ,  $SE=.03$ ) and the Israelis ( $M=2.70$ ,  $SE=.05$ ) fear to a moderate degree each other. To sum up, Palestinians and Israelis shared the same low level of trustworthiness in the other, and a similar moderate feeling of fear from the other. The rest of the differences are summarized in Table 5.19 below.

**TABLE 5.19** UNDERLYING AND EXPECTED FEELINGS AND ATTITUDES

<b>Group Statistics</b>				
<b>A) Feelings and attitudes towards the other side</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
a. Tolerance towards the other side	Palestine	931	2.00	1.04
	Israel	505	2.69	1.09
b. Understanding the other side	Palestine	933	2.29	1.07
	Israel	508	2.64	1.07
c. Angry at the other side	Palestine	948	2.91	1.00
	Israel	509	3.09	0.98
d. Fear from the other side	Palestine	951	2.61	1.03
	Israel	507	2.70	1.05
e. Trust in the other side	Palestine	941	2.07	1.05
	Israel	503	2.04	0.98
f. Grudge against the other side	Palestine	932	2.93	1.08
	Israel	503	2.56	1.01
<b>B) Feelings and attitudes of the other side</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
a. Tolerance	Palestine	974	1.85	1.05
	Israel	503	1.69	0.88
b. Understands you	Palestine	957	2.07	1.04
	Israel	505	1.65	0.85
c. Feels angry at you	Palestine	962	2.91	0.98
	Israel	501	3.30	1.04
d. Fears you	Palestine	954	2.89	0.97
	Israel	502	2.69	1.14
e. The other side trusts you	Palestine	944	2.08	1.08
	Israel	502	1.69	0.89
f. Bears grudge against you	Palestine	940	3.10	1.11
	Israel	502	3.31	1.02

*Note:* Now I am going to read you a list of words and phrases that describe how would you express your feelings and attitudes towards the other side. For each word or phrase, **A)** please tell me whether you don't share this feeling, you share it to a low degree, you share it to a moderate degree, or you share it to a very high degree. **B)** In this context, to what degree do you believe that the other side holds the same feelings towards you:

Finally, it is interesting to see if there was a significant correlation between shared and expected feelings and attitudes. Therefore, I tested the following hypothesis:

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant correlation between Palestinians and Israelis shared and expected feelings and attitudes on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

The results in Table 5.20 hereunder show that indeed, there were significant correlations ( $p < .05$ ) between most of shared and expected feelings and attitudes, and by most I mean 91.6% (33 out of 36 correlations were significant) on the Palestinian side, and 77.7% (28 out of 35 correlations were significant) on the Israeli side. Interestingly, the direction and strength of the correlation between shared and expected feelings and attitudes were as follows:

### **Tolerance**

On the Palestinian side, there was a significant and strong positive correlation ( $r = .558$ ,  $p < .05$ ) between how tolerant Palestinians feel the Israelis were towards them and how tolerant they were towards the Israelis and vice versa, the same applied to the Israelis with ( $r = .488$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

### **Understanding**

Results unveiled that there was a significant and strong positive correlation ( $r = .405$ ,  $p < .05$ ) between how Israelis understood the Palestinians and how the Israelis believed the Palestinians understood them and vice versa; the same applied to the Palestinians with ( $r = .520$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

### **Anger**

Another interesting example was a moderate and positive correlation ( $r = .389$ ,  $p < .05$ ) between how angry Palestinians were with how angry they thought the Israelis were angry from them, the same applied to the Israelis ( $r = .232$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

### **Fear**

Further results revealed that feelings of fear were quite weak on the Palestinian side where  $r = .199$ ,  $p < .05$ , and not even significant on the Israeli side. This means, either other variables controlled the degree of fear each side have from the other, and/or it does not matter how fearful Israelis thought the Palestinians were. It does not influence their own feelings of fear.

### **Trust**

Results revealed that there was a significant and moderate positive correlation ( $r = .321$ ,  $p < .05$ ) between how Israelis trusted the Palestinians and how the Israelis thought the Palestinians trusted them and vice versa. The same applied to the Palestinians with a stronger and positive relationship ( $r = .493$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

**Grudge**

The more one side thought the other bears grudge against them, the more they were likely to bear the same feeling and vice versa. The results revealed that there was a moderate and positive correlation between the feelings of grudge on the Israeli side ( $r=.285$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and quite a very strong correlation on the Palestinian side ( $r=.504$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

**Optimism**

The results disclosed that the majority of the Palestinians (63.7%) and the Israelis (52.8%) believed that things in their respective country were heading to the wrong direction while only 26.5% of the Palestinians and 32.5% of the Israelis believed that things were going in the right direction. The rest responded with 'Don't know'.

TABLE 5.20 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN UNDERLYING AND EXPECTED EMOTIONS

		Correlations					
Comparisons		Feelings and attitudes towards the other side					
Group	Feelings and attitudes of the other side towards you	Tolerance towards the other side	Understanding the other side	Angry at the other side	Fear from the other side	Trust in the other side	Grudge against the other side
Palestinians	Tolerance	.558***	.521***		.094***	.422***	-.128***
	Understands you	.465***	.520***		.144***	.465***	-.180***
	Feels angry at you	-.087***	-.071**	.389***	.164***	-.079**	.327***
	Fears you	-.136***	-.124***	.284***	.199***	-.090***	.297***
	The other side trusts you	.449***	.466***	-.079**		.493***	-.182***
	Bears the grudge against you	-.139**	-.144**	.209**	.111**	-.109**	.504**
		Correlations					
Comparisons		Feelings and attitudes towards the other side					
Group	Feelings and attitudes of the other side towards you	Tolerance towards the other side	Understanding the other side	Angry at the other side	Fear from the other side	Trust in the other side	Grudge against the other side
Israelis	Tolerance	.488***	.436***	-.287***	-.094**	.393***	-.177***
	Understands you	.434***	.405***	-.230***		.364***	-.138***
	Feels angry at you			.232***		-.115**	.243***
	Fears you	.255***	.261***			.091**	
	The other side trusts you	.268***	.220***	-.121***	.135***	.321***	
	Bears the grudge against you	-.101**		.270***	.155***	-.187***	.285***

\*p&lt;.05, \*\*p&lt;.01, \*\*\*p&lt;.001

## Summary

1. It is noteworthy that upon asking both Palestinians and Israelis about their assessment of whether the conflict is of religious, cultural, national, political, economic, historical, existential or ethnic character, both peoples referred to all these options with high assessments, which means that, regardless of the slight difference in the assessment of each option, the two peoples have suggested that the conflict is a mixture of all these options. The conflict is rooted in different and interrelated forms, although the conflict, according to their assessment, has been mainly existential, political, historical and national, followed by being economical and religious, and lastly labeled as ethnical and cultural.
2. Scrutiny of the hypotheses has demonstrated the existence of significant statistical differences between the assessment of the views of the two peoples about obstacles to the peace process. Their views have differed in 20 items out of 21 items talking about the obstacles, the matter which shows extent of the difference and depth of the gap between the Palestinians and Israelis and their outlook on the reality of the present, and this might be attributed to the media and their particular framework for the peace process and the conflict in a way that serves the interests of the state to which they belong. The same applies to the proposed solutions to the conflict that reinforce the findings I previously established, since the results indicated the presence of significant differences between their view of the most intractable issues and in addition to the differences in points of view even on the second-best solution to the conflict.
3. Both Israelis and Palestinians have different views regarding the economic cooperation between the two peoples. As to the results, there were clear differences when it comes to economic activities that include or require interference or rather the presence of individuals in the other region (for example, the work of Palestinian laborers inside Israel) or activities that are aimed at the development of the economy of one of the parties only (e.g. construction of an airport or seaport for the Palestinians). But the two peoples agreed on economic activities in general, which include economic cooperation between companies or institutions without any explicit mention of individuals' inclusion and their professional involvement directly in the economic process. These differences might be attributed in a particular to the Israelis mistrust of the Palestinians and their fear for their personal security on the one hand, and the weakness of the Palestinian economy and its direct dependence on the Israeli economy on the other hand.
4. The majority of the Palestinians and Israelis agreed that the two-state solution is the most appropriate one, followed by the one-state solution, and then

other solutions which scored only small rates of support. It is worth mentioning here that the rate of those who have opposed all the already mentioned solutions was very high, reaching a percentage almost close to a quarter of the respondents in both parties, which might be due to lack of trust in the other party to reach a peaceful and radical solution to the issue, or due to their faith and belief in their rights to claim the entire land for themselves, and that the other party has no right to share with them this land. However, this has been mentioned in previous chapters of this study.

5. In addition, the Palestinians and the Israelis are divided on the extent of their trust in their current governments and the ability of such governments to make peace with the other party, as well as the dissatisfaction of both parties with the solutions proposed by the other party's government. The majority supports the decisions of their government, or are ready to propose solutions other than those already introduced by their own governments and the other party's government. In this context, the results revealed that more than half of the respondents on the two sides are in favor of resuming negotiations under the current circumstances, while more than a third of the sample refused to return to negotiations. This calls for understanding this contradiction from a different perspective, namely that the parties want peace, but want different solutions. They do not want to make concessions themselves, but want the other party to make such concessions. They are inclined towards negotiations, but are not willing to compromise. That's with regard to the "*optimistic segment in the society*". As for that segment that does not want any of the proposed solutions, and does not want to waive, and does not accept any solution proposed by their own government and the government of the other party as well, we must focus on radical changes as to change this unfortunate reality.
6. Both peoples are aware of the fact that negotiations are in the interest of both parties, especially the Israelis, and that a high rate of the Palestinians believe that a return to the negotiations table would be in the interest of the Israelis in exchange for a lower rate on the Israeli side who believed that it is in their own interest to return to the negotiations table. There is also a proportion within the two publics that recognizes the importance of a return to the negotiations for their own people (27.7% on the Israeli side and 15.8% on the Palestinian side) and another proportion (9.9% on the Israeli side and 6.0% on the Palestinian side) that do not see in the negotiations any benefit for any party. Nevertheless, the analyses and the results indicated that the confidence of the two peoples in the ability of the negotiations to reach a peaceful solution is somehow affected, as an insignificant minority of 6.2% on the Palestinian side and 4.2% on the Israeli side strongly believe that the negotiations will bring peace in the near future.



7. Each party blames the other for the previous failure of the negotiations, and both parties have actually agreed to disagree in their views and opinions. However, it is not surprising that the two parties entirely agree to the effective role of the Arab leaders in case the negotiations between the two parties fail. Beyond that, each people blame the government and the people of the other party as well as the radical groups for the failure of the negotiations in the past. Even the Palestinians and Israelis perspectives differed clearly about the extent of the impartiality of the US in the peace process, as the majority believes that the United States plays a biased role towards the other party, in particular in the case of the Palestinians, of who more than 80.0% believe that the role of the United States is biased towards the Israeli side .
8. More than a third of the Israelis does not believe in the necessity for a mediator to resolve the dispute, followed by almost a quarter of the respondents, who considers the United States as the best broker. On the Palestinian side, however, opinions were divided among the Quartet, the United Nations, Turkey and Egypt.
9. Results demonstrated that both peoples are bored and tired of the conflict, as almost 80.0% of both parties acknowledged this feeling, which makes us stand for a moment and probe the reasons and motives behind this feeling; perhaps it's the boredom effected by the other party and the certainty that the other party is not serious in the peace process, and subsequently lack of faith on both sides that peace will be achieved in the region, a situation that is prevailing these days; or it might be simply the fact that people are tired of the conflict and longing for peace. Moreover, 72.0% of the Israelis and 76.0% of Palestinians wish to varying degrees making peace with the other party and only 10.8% and 6.0% of the Palestinians and the Israelis respectively are not interested in making peace with the other side.
10. Both parties are deeply anchored in their miss-perception of reality what has been done, and what should have been done, and who is responsible for the failure of past negotiations.
11. Both peoples to some extent do not believe that peace will take place in the near future.
12. The study revealed that there were significant correlations ( $p < .05$ ) between the shared and expected feelings and attitudes of both sides i.e. 91.6% and 77.7% for Palestinians and Israeli respectively. Thus, political leaders and influential stakeholders can play a significant role in uprooting superseding miss-perceptions embedded with hatred by tolerance, coexistence and acceptance of the other.

## 5.3 Formation of Audience Frames

This section answers the research question of ‘*What are the factors that influence the formation of audience frames or perceptions in people’s minds?*’. I applied a principle component analysis (PCA)<sup>(31)(32)</sup> for the 10 dependent variables: 1) Settlements, 2) Prisoners, 3) Jerusalem, 4) The security of both Israel and the Palestinians, 5) Borders and crossing points, 6) The Refugees, 7) Control over natural resources like water, 8) Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, 9) Recognizing the Jewish state, and 10) Control over holy places, in order to ease the analyses by reducing the number of dependent variables and, therefore, fewer number of generated models. However, after applying the PCA, I ended up losing the momentum of data, and, therefore, decided to study the 40 regression models, and summarize them as seen below. The idea behind these analyzes is that the ten dependent variables represent to a high degree what the conflict is about. As a result, summing up the independent variables that significantly predict the variation in these dependent variables help us understand the intervening factors that constituted the perceptions individuals hold about the major issues of the conflict and the extent to which each factor contributed to the shaping of these perceptions. Before investigating the regression models, I ran some tests to diagnose them for any possible problems that may occur and have an impact on the analyses (See: Appendix A). The results of the diagnosing showed that I can comfortably rely on the results, and the models did not suffer from any serious errors. After applying the multiple regression models, I found the following:

1. The values of the  $R^2$  in Table F.15 show that, on the Israeli side, the highest variations explained by the independent variables were in the issues of *rec-*

<sup>(31)</sup>**PCA for the Palestinian side:** Bartlett’s test of sphericity  $X^2(45) = 4995$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The Sig. value for this analysis leads us to conclude that there were correlations in the data set that are appropriate for factor analysis. An initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Three elements had eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 55.4% of the variance (as we can say in the table below). Given the large sample size of 1015, and the convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion on three components, these were the components that were retained in the final analysis. These components represented the perceptions Palestinians hold for the most important issues that both people should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement.

<sup>(32)</sup>**PCA for the Israeli side:** Bartlett’s test of sphericity  $X^2(20) = 2742$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The Sig. value for this analysis leads us to conclude that there were correlations in the data set that are appropriate for factor analysis. An initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four components had eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 61.5% of the variance (as we can say in the table below). Given the large sample size of 550, and the convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion on four components, these were the components that were retained in the final analysis. These components represented the perceptions Israelis hold for the most important issues that both people should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement.

*ognizing Israel as a Jewish state and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders*, and were the issues of *Jerusalem* and also *recognizing Israel as a Jewish state* on the Palestinian side. These results reflect a clearer and a more oriented picture that exists in the minds of the Israelis and Palestinians regarding these issues in comparison to the rest of the issues. However, still, the Israelis had more driven perceptions regarding these issues because they got the same results on both splits, A and B. Moreover, the results revealed that for the Palestinians, the issues of *settlements*, *the establishment of Palestine on the 1967 borders*, and to some extent the issue of *prisoners* were among the highest issues to be explained by the independent variables, in comparison with the issues of *Jerusalem*, *security*, and *prisoners* on the Israeli side.

2. Surprisingly, the variation in the issues of *borders*, *natural resources*, and *crossing points* were slightly explained by the independent variables on both side, which reflect less focused views regarding these issues, or to put it in another way, a more scattered basis, on which they rely their evaluations of these issues.
3. The variation on the issue of refugees was barely predicted by the independent variables on the Palestinian side, which might be a result of the absence of a clear-cut foundation on which they view this issue, or simply, they perceive it through their sentiments and beliefs, something that individuals themselves can't capture.

That was one aspect of the analyzes, another one dealt with the frequencies and direction of independent variables that were significant after applying the backward stepwise regression tests. Important variables and their level of significance across all models were as follow:

### 5.3.1 Most Influential Variables Predicting Palestinians' Perceptions

The evaluation of Benjamin Netanyahu was significant ( $p < .05$ ) in 45.0% of the 20 multiple regression models predicting the variation in the dependent variables, which means that Palestinians perception frames were highly driven by their evaluation of the Israeli Prime Minister and his role pertaining to the peace process. Further results of the standardized coefficient values as seen in Table F.4 hereunder show that there was a positive correlation between Palestinians' evaluation of the Israeli Prime Minister and their prioritizing of the issues of *settlements*, *Jerusalem*, and *prisoners*, which means that Palestinians were dissatisfied with Netanyahu's policies regarding these issues, and so the same toward his role pertaining to the peace process. Another crucial confounding variable that was significant ( $p < .05$ ) in

45.0% of the models was the dummy variable<sup>(33)</sup> of not having a clear stand regarding the past. The results revealed that those who had an unclear stand of affiliation to the past emphasized more on dealing with the issues of *settlements*, *security*, and *recognizing the Jewish state*, and less on the issues of *control over natural resources*, *1967 borders*, *Jerusalem*, and *prisoners*.

### 5.3.2 Second Most Influential Variables Predicting Palestinians' Perceptions

The following independent variables were significant in 30% to 40% of the multiple regression models, as shown in Tables F.16 and F.17.

1. The results unveiled that there was a positive relationship between the evaluation of Khalid Misha'al, head of Hamas Politburo, and views of *control over holy place* and *recognizing the Jewish state*, meaning, the more satisfied Palestinians were with Misha'al's role pertaining to the peace process, the less<sup>(34)</sup> importance they allocated to these issues.
2. Palestinians who thought that things are heading in the right direction in Palestine put less emphasize on issues I think they consider non-negotiable (i.e., *Jerusalem* and *the establishing of Palestine on the 1967 borders*), or a painful reality that they are ready to bear (i.e., *Security issues*). On the other hand, there was a negative relationship with the issues of *settlement* and *therecognition of the Jewish state*, which reflects that although they believe things are heading in the right direction, they might be influenced by settlements, and are bitterly against the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.
3. Palestinians who were ready to compromise for peace were less inclined to compromise on the issues of *refugees*, *control over Holy places*, and the *1967 borders*. Further results show that they were more flexible to negotiate the issues of *settlement* and *natural resources*.
4. Surprisingly, Palestinians with relatives or friends that have been killed or injured over the past years as a result of the conflict put less emphasize on *security*, which can be explained as a backlash of not being secured.
5. Results revealed that Palestinians who were willing to emigrate, if they had the opportunity, cared less about the core stone issues of the conflict (i.e., *Jerusalem*, *refugees*, *prisoners*, and *settlements*). Apparently, this represents the stratum of the society that is ready to leave everything behind, and travel abroad seeking for a better life.

<sup>(33)</sup>In comparison with 'would sought out more peaceful changes to the history'.

<sup>(34)</sup>The issues were arranged from 1 to 10, thus, the larger the number is, the less is the importance they allocated to that issue.

6. Feelings and attitudes also proved to have an influence on Palestinians' perceptions of the peace process and the conflict, where having positive feelings and attitudes towards the Israeli side mattered. The same applies to the expected negative feelings and attitudes of the Israelis towards themselves.
7. Sensibly, being refugee made, Palestinians care more about the refugees issue, and there was a positive correlation between the two. Added thereto, the more religious the person is, the more s/he emphasized on the issue of *control over natural resources*. Other interesting results were the difference between Males and Females perception frames of *Jerusalem*, *security*, *recognizing the Jewish state*, and *control over natural resources*. Not to mention the quality of life of the Palestinians, where the worst it was, the more importance they allocated to the issue of security, and vice versa, as shown in Table F.18.

### 5.3.3 Most Influential Variables Predicting Israelis' Perceptions

Results in Table F.19 reveal that, on the Israeli side, being affiliated to the Israeli-Arab political party of United Arab List - in comparison with those affiliated to the Likud party - had very influential role in predicting Israelis' perceptions of the conflict, where it was significant in 55.0% of the regression models. This variable prioritized the issues of *settlements*, *refugees*, *prisoners*, *1967 borders* (a negative correlation) over the issues of *recognizing the Jewish state*, *Jerusalem*, and *Security* (a positive correlation). In addition, the degree of religiosity - an influential variable that unsurprisingly prioritized the issues of *control over holy places*, *Jerusalem*, and *settlements*, over *security* and *borders*. Another interesting variable that was significant in 45.0% of the models predicting the perceptions of the conflict's most critical parts is the variable of readiness to compromise for peace, a variable that was also important on the Palestinian side according to the results in Table F.19. Those who were ready to compromise for peace were less inclined to compromise on the issues of *recognizing the Jewish state*, *prisoners*, *Jerusalem*, and *natural resources*, and more to do so with the issues of *settlements* and *1967 borders*.

### 5.3.4 Second Most Influential Variables Predicting Israelis' Perceptions

The following independent variables were significant in 25.0% to 35.0% of the multiple regression models, as shown in Table F.20. The results were as follows:

1. Education was an important factor that was significant in 30.0% of the models. According to Table F.20, those who are more educated among the Israelis

emphasized more on addressing the issues of *establishing Palestine on the 1967 borders* and *Palestinian refugees*, and stressed less on present issues, like *crossing points*, *prisoners*, *holy places*, and *natural resource*; most likely, because they understand that former issues, if achieved, will end later ones, something that less educated Israelis do not realize or view differently.

2. Again, the evaluation of Khalid Misha'al role pertaining to the peace process was significant in predicting many crucial issues of the conflict. The more Israelis disagreed with his role in building peace, the more they emphasized on the issues of borders, crossing points, and the building of settlements, mainly, for security measures. On the other hand, the more they agreed with his role pertaining to the conflict and peace process, the more they highlighted the importance of recognizing the Jewish state as if his evaluation is highly connected to how secure they feel, and therefore, the prioritization of issues. Nevertheless, Table F.20 shows that the evaluation of Misha'al was not significant when predicting the issue of *security*, which contradicts earlier conclusions. The only valid explanation is that the majority of Israelis do not trust Misha'al as a partner for peace, and for them, he will always be coming with more claims. Accordingly, maintaining a safe and a secure life is not an option that Hamas or Misha'al offers, but a reality that Israel controls.
3. Being affiliated with the ultra-Orthodox party of United Torah Judaism compared to the Likud was significant in around 30.0% of the models. Results revealed that being affiliated with this party increases the potential for addressing the issues of security and crossing points rather than emphasizing on the issues of settlements and Jerusalem as expected. That is because, for them, the latter issues are non-negotiable, and, therefore, are not ready to investigate by any means.
4. In addition to the previous affiliations to political parties, the social-democratic left-wing party of Meretz has been reviewed, where results show how being affiliated to this particular party decreases the emphasize on the issues of *Jerusalem* and *recognizing the Jewish state*, and on the other hand, more focus was put on the issues of 1967 borders and the settlements. These contingent results support the ideologies of this secular party.
5. Other interesting factors that were crucial in 20.0% of the models included: (1) Age; the older the respondents, the less emphasis they put on the issues of *refugees* and *security*, (2) Gender; males referred to the importance of addressing the issues of *natural resources*, *borders*, and *recognizing the Jewish state* more than females, and on the issue of *settlement* less than females, (3) Israelis who lost friends or relatives because of the conflict assigned more priority to the issues of *refugees* and *recognizing the Jewish state*, and less weight was given to the issue of *Jerusalem*, as if losing a beloved

person unleashed nationalistic-historic feelings that dominated religious beliefs. Finally, (4) having negative feelings and attitudes towards Palestinians and/or being affiliated with the center-left political party of Zionist Union contributed to perceptions Israelis hold about the conflict and peace process.

Table F.22 summarizes all models' independent variables that were significant when applying the backward stepwise regression tests.

## 5.4 Document Analyses

### 5.4.1 Summary

The total number of documents in the specified period from August 2013 to March 2014 was as follows: 42 documents out of 102 (41.1%) for Likud, discussed or mentioned the conflict, 25 documents out of 96 for the Labour Party (26.0%), 53 out of 87 (60.9%) for Hamas, and 38 documents for Fateh<sup>(35)</sup>.

In total, 295 items<sup>(36)</sup> were distributed across 25 dimensions on the Palestinian side, and a total of 238 items were distributed across 22 dimensions on the Israeli side. At the beginning of the analyzes, I found that the Palestinian political documents included 66 dimensions and the Israeli ones comprised of 42 dimensions. Therefore, I condensed the answers to 25 and 22 dimensions on the Palestinian and Israeli side respectively as to ease the analysis and comparisons. All similar dimensions were condensed into one unique dimension that summarized all of them. For instance, the division of Jerusalem to Eastern and Western Jerusalem as well as the dimension of Judaization of Jerusalem were recoded to “Jerusalem”. The same applies to the rest of the dimensions. A brief description of the most prominent dimensions on each side was mentioned below.

### 5.4.2 Testing Hypothesis

The function of politicians and opinion leaders was thoroughly described above. They represent the stratum of the society that talk to people through the media to impose their authority, and the individuals engage in the political process through the media to express their opinions about national issues. Accordingly, the primary objective of the document analysis is to measure the level of congruence between issues discussed by the major political parties/movements and their respective leaders with those presented in the newspapers of each country and perceived by the people.

**$H_0$ :** There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli political parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes, consequences, and solutions on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance.

Results revealed that there was a significant difference between Palestinian and

<sup>(35)</sup>The total number of documents was not counted, because it included international issues and was not limited to domestic ones.

<sup>(36)</sup>Items were issues about the conflict.



Israeli political parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes, consequences, and solutions  $X^2(2) = 38.1, p < .001$ , where 32.5% of the Palestinian political parties focused on causes in comparison to 30.7% on the Israeli side. The difference was bigger between their focuses on consequences and solutions: The Palestinians mentioned in their documents more about the consequences of the conflict, while Israeli documents investigated more the solutions thereof. Nevertheless, I should clarify here that each side considered its perspective across each portrayed causes, consequences, and solutions. This means it might be the case that Israeli political parties investigated the solutions for the refugees problem, but that did not imply that they discussed the solutions that matter for the Palestinian side, but the Israeli ones. The same applies to the Palestinians; each side viewed the right solution to be the solution that fits more their interest in the country.

### 5.4.3 Comparisons


#### Palestinian Political Parties

The results disclosed different focuses of topics when discussing the conflict, as shown in Tables F.23 and F.24. Figure 5.38 below showed the distribution of the most significant dimensions or topics investigated by the political movements of Fateh and Hamas. The following items summed up to 89.8%<sup>(37)</sup> of total dimensions. The results revealed that the dimension of *security* was mentioned the most by these leading political movements. The security of the Palestinians comprises of a broad range of actions committed against the Palestinians and their lands. For instance, the Israeli war against Gaza, and their measures of demolishing houses expropriating lands, mass detentions, military presence and attacks, excessive use of force by the Israeli army, incursions of the military into Palestinian towns and targeted liquidations, assassinations, and massacres.

The next most significant issue that was mentioned in their document was the issue of *Jerusalem* (13.6% of total dimensions), which comprised of (a) the Judaization of Jerusalem: daily attempts of obliterating the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem, encroachment on the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in Jerusalem, (b) Settlement activities extending into an infiltration of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, encircling them with Jewish population, (c) Division of Jerusalem, (d) International control over Jerusalem, and agreement on managing the Holy sites.

<sup>(37)</sup>After I condensed the answers from 66 to 25.

**FIGURE 5.38** MAIN DIMENSIONS INVESTIGATED BY THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES



The third major topic mentioned in their documents was the issue of *prisoners*; 11.9% of the total dimensions discussed this issue. It included the acts against Palestinian prisoners extending from the frequent physical abuse and torture of detainees to the deteriorating situation of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Add thereto the evacuation of prisoners from jails or their release under certain conditions or circumstances. Other topics falling under this category is Hamas's readiness to continue their resistance until all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails are freed. This is followed by *Hamas's condemnation of the PA's security cooperation with the Israelis* (6.8%), the *lack of trust* between Palestinians and Israelis (5.4%), and the importance of *Third-party mediation* (4.7%). Surprisingly, only 4.4% of the focusing was dedicated to the issue of *settlements*, 3.7% of them stuck in the past commemorating wars and massacres, and the same percentage encouraged the *continuation of the resistance* (mainly in the case of Hamas), as shown in the figure above.


### Israeli Political Parties

The following items summed up to 88.7%<sup>(38)</sup> of total dimensions. Interestingly, results in Figure 5.39 below revealed that 21.1% of the total dimensions discussed the security of Israel, which included Palestinians constant threat of indiscriminate attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli citizens, Qas-sam rocket and mortar shelling on Israeli targets, kidnapping, hijackings, stabbings, shootings, and stone-throwing. Add thereto Hamas's incitement to launch a third

<sup>(38)</sup>After I condensed the answers from 42 to 22.

intifada against Israel, and the belief that the State of Palestine will become a 'terrorist' state.

**FIGURE 5.39** MAIN DIMENSIONS INVESTIGATED BY THE ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES



The second most investigated issues (with a total of 7.1%) were (a) the issue of building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides by prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred, by the education for peace, and how the media should play a positive role in promoting peace and pro-peace ideologies and programs. (b) Israeli intransigence, which comprised of Israel's unwillingness to negotiate directly with Hamas, and (c) Third-party mediation. Another emphasis on the Israeli-American 'strategic alliance', which constituted 6.7% of the total dimensions, followed by recognizing the Jewish state (6.3%), and the two-state solution (6.3%), as shown in the figure above.

## 5.5 Integration of Findings

The main objectives of this dissertation are to compare the degree of harmony of conflict topics and the peace process in the minds of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples with what the Palestinian and Israeli media, as well as the political parties and their leaders, disseminate. After the collection of items and the standardization of their denominators in every data form and their comparison with each other (as shown in Table 5.21 hereunder), I established a somewhat high similarity between the coverage extent of the frameworks that talk about the conflict in these segments of society. Despite the different results between some individuals, the media, and the leaders sometimes, I noticed from the subsequent results that there was a positive correlation between the inclination of the segments in covering most of the topics or frameworks. In certain cases, the compatibility was very high between the order of priorities given to a specific topic in the media and the minds of individuals and what has been focused on by the leaders and political parties. In few cases, however, there was a slight difference in the tendencies, and that due to political reasons I have explained and interpreted in detail, or due to other reasons that explain my reduction of the comparison items and my commitment to certain topics I defined in the basic frameworks of the conflict.

**FIGURE 5.40** ORDER OF ISSUES ACROSS ALL LEVELS




Figure 5.40 above shows how similar the order of frames were across the three levels of audience, media and political stakeholders. The results regardless of the direction illustrates a high average of similarity between frames in every interaction. Relying on my comparison data and linking the results of content, survey and documents analyzes of leaders and political parties, I came to the following conclu-

sions:

1. Israeli and Palestinian media ascribe utmost importance to the issue of safety and security. I mean the safety and security which enables the ordinary Israeli Jew, be it a child, a woman or an old man, to go confident and at ease to school, or to his office or store, or to the park, where he plays with his grandchildren, not looking cautiously and terrified to his right or his left, to someone encountering him, or walking behind him. As for the Palestinians, the topic security and safety is defined. It will not be achieved unless the Israeli occupation comes to an end and the State of Palestine is established with Jerusalem as its capital within the borders of the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1967 and in accordance with the international resolutions. Hence, as the results reveal, Palestinians do not impute the issue of security and safety a great importance as explicit as the case is in the Palestinian media, which have placed the issue of security and safety at the top of their priorities order towards the conflict. The reason is that this item has included victims, arrests, demolition of houses, hospitals and the confiscation of land and many actions, from which the Palestinian people are suffering on a daily basis as a result of the Israeli hegemony. As for the parties and political leaders, the analysis results of the political documents of this category did not differ at all from that of the public. The issue of security and safety stood for the same reasons on the top of both parties' priorities, as political leaders realize that ensuring the security of their people is an integral part of the citizen's fundamental rights that cannot be waived or ignored for a sound functioning of the political and social process and the success and prosperity of the state.
2. The prisoners' issue was one of the topics that were highlighted by each of the Palestinian media, the leaders, and the Palestinian political parties, and that is clearly and firmly embedded in the minds of the Palestinians. The prisoners' issue occupies a significant place in the framework of the Palestinian cause, as it involved a large number of Palestinian people, mainly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was necessary to give this issue a legal and humanitarian dimension due to Israel's lack of commitment to abide by the Charter of the United Nations and its decisions and to the provisions and regulations of the international humanitarian law in their dealings with the Palestinian prisoners. Add to it the certainty of the concerned authorities of the necessity to speed up programmed diplomatic, political and legal actions in order to internationalize it and to benefit as much as possible from the relevant international laws and resolutions.  
As for the Israeli party, the prisoners' issue has been covered by the Israeli media somehow extensively, including raising the issue of prisoners release under certain circumstances, such as political, humanitarian or health reasons.

This coverage, however, did not reflect on the Israeli people, who placed the prisoners' issue among the less important issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. An analogous result has been established by the political parties and leaders, who found in other issues of the conflict greater importance, such as the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, or as the state of the Jewish people, which is an expression of the self-determination right of people, that is related to this land in a 'historical right' relationship. I have further found upon my analysis of the perspective of this issue in the minds of the Israelis that this issue occupies the second priorities or conditions for attaining peace between the two sides. Nevertheless, the Israeli media did not allocate the same intensity of media coverage to talk about this topic and contented itself with referring to this topic in a somehow moderate form. As to the Palestinians, it is expected that the media, the Palestinian public, and their leaders put this issue at the bottom of their priorities scale. This reflects their unwillingness to accept or grant this recognition due to the political, legal, ideological and national dimensions that would result from that. The recognition of the Jewish character of the state means a precedent waiver of the right of return and admittance of the Palestinians that all Palestinian demands known as final status issues have been resolved, especially the refugees, the borders, and Jerusalem.

3. Not surprisingly, the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places with their religious, political and historical dimensions have met with interest of the Israeli and Palestinian parties, in particular the Palestinian people, who put the solution of the issue of Jerusalem at the core of their priorities to make peace with the Israelis, the matter which is reiterated in the content of Palestinian media and speeches of Palestinian leaders and political parties. On the Israeli side, the intensity of the media coverage of the issue of Jerusalem is less emphasized than that on the Palestinian side, it is however ranked in the fifth position on the priorities scale in respect of the conflict, and in the third position for the Israeli people. As for the issue of controlling the natural resources, despite its significance, it received from the Israeli and Palestinian sides little attention at all the political and media levels and at the level of individuals, who found on other issues a much more crucial importance.
4. As I mentioned in previous chapters of this study, the settlements issue lies in the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The resolution of this issue requires resolutions to other intractable issues. The topic of the settlers and the expansion of settlements at the cost of the Palestinian terrain have occupied the headlines of the Palestinian media, especially in the light of confiscating Palestinian lands in violation of the international law, as well as the daily settler attacks against the Palestinians and neighboring towns. The resonance

of this media revolution about the settlements did not meet with the same resonance in the minds of the Palestinian public, who perceived that the settlements issue, which lies at the center of priorities, is preceded by other more important issues. The same applies to the Palestinian leaders and parties. As to the Israeli side, the settlements issue has met with extensive media coverage, which is fairly reflected on the Israeli people, who in turn found the issue of the settlements expansion and protection of the settlers somewhat crucial, and that is mentioned in the policies of the leaders with almost the same intensity.

5. It remains to say that the issue of Palestinian refugees, which is considered as one of the most critical final-status issues, because it affects the largest proportion of the Palestinian people, as well as the rate of 78% of historic Palestine, have met with moderate partisan condemnation and a Palestinian media involvement less than expected, but with a very high interest among the Palestinians, who ranked the refugee issue in the third position preceded by the issues of Jerusalem and the prisoners. For the Palestinians, the refugees issue is the heart of the Palestinian cause. It's the complex of the Zionist settlement and religious project, the matter which requires the finding of political equations, which ensure maintaining it alive until the appropriate factors are available to empower the refugees to realize their dreams and acquire their right of return. This equation is inverted in the Israeli street, the public and media of which did not care about the refugees issue compared with its leaders and political parties, who emphasized their principle refusal of the right of return under the pretext that their recognition of this right entails the acknowledgment of Israel's responsibility for the rise of the problem, and subsequently bearing the consequences thereof. Israel, for its part, does not consider itself responsible for the 1948 war, but it is worth mentioning, however, that notwithstanding this fact, the Israeli governments, especially governments headed by the Labor Party, are willing to enter some Palestinian refugees to Israel proper within the criteria of family reunification and without any commitment towards these refugees to the right of return.

TABLE 5.21 INTEGRATION OF FINDINGS

Palestine			
Media	Survey		Documents
Security (1905) <sup>a</sup>	Jerusalem (3.43) <sup>b</sup>	Security (29.2%) <sup>c</sup>	
Prisoners (570)	Prisoners (3.48)	Jerusalem (22.5%)	
Settlements (523)	Palestinian Refugees (4.49)	Prisoners (19.7%)	
Jerusalem (329)	Borders and Crossing Points (5.09)	Settlements (8.4%)	
Borders and Crossing Points (298)	Establishment of a Palestinian State (5.25)	The Refugees (6.2%)	
Establishment of a Palestinian State (175)	Settlements (6.28)	Establishment of a Palestinian State (5.1%)	
The Refugees (83)	Control over Natural Resources (6.48)	Recognizing The Jewish State (3.9%)	
Recognizing The Jewish State (71)	Security (6.81)	Borders and Crossing Points (2.8%)	
Control over Natural Resources (66)	Recognizing The Jewish State (7.90)	Control over Natural Resources (2.2%)	
Israel			
Media	Survey		Documents
Security (492)	Security (3.07)	Security (48.1%)	
Settlements (223)	Recognizing The Jewish State (3.42)	Recognizing The Jewish State (20.8%)	
Prisoners (126)	Jerusalem (4.24)	The Refugees (9.4%)	
Establishment of a Palestinian State (112)	Borders and Crossing Points (4.54)	Settlements (8.5%)	
Jerusalem (111)	Settlements (5.27)	Jerusalem (6.6%)	
Recognizing The Jewish State (73)	Control over Natural Resources (6.28)	Establishment of a Palestinian State (2.8%)	
The Refugees (57)	Palestinians Refugees (7.08)	Borders and Crossing Points (1.9%)	
Borders and Crossing Points (56)	Prisoners (7.40)	Prisoners (0.9%)	
Natural Resources (40)	Establishment of a Palestinian State (7.58)	Control over Natural Resources (0.9%)	

<sup>a</sup>Number of times this dimension was mentioned in newspapers.<sup>b</sup> Average value; issues were prioritized from 1 to 10, where 1 represented the most important issue and 10 represented the least important issue.<sup>c</sup>Percentage of documents dedicated to this issue by political stakeholders.



## Chapter 6

# MODEL, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

### Contents

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## 6.1 Dissertation's Model

In addition to its a) unique multi-methodological approach, b) representative data on each level of analyses, c) vital scientific descriptions and interpretations in the context of comparing the perceptions or frames of the peace process and the conflict among Palestinian and Israeli individuals, media and political stakeholders, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the reading of the conflict from different angles. A process is defined as a “sequence of interdependent and linked procedures in which inputs are converted outputs then serve as inputs for the next stage until a known goal or result is reached”. However, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this process is hindered by the very first stage of it, where results revealed very different and contradictory perceptions on the individual level, which keeps the wheels of peace tangled. In light of the theory, literature and hypotheses of this dissertation, I developed the model hereunder in an attempt to answer why in my view the conflict still persists, and how the perception gap between both people stretch over time. As I mentioned before, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most bitter, deeply rooted and protracted conflicts of our century. It has been so deep-seated that even wars and peace treaties have been unable to bring about

an end to it. It is considered one of the major intractable conflicts of our time that has resisted even the most serious attempts towards a resolution. Therefore, I am not in a position to find a solution to this body of complex, but instead, I am trying in the model below to offer some explanations of what is happening, on the macro level, summarized by the interaction between audience, media and political stakeholders. Notably, that I thoroughly analyzed and compared different perceptions on each micro-level in previous chapters.

The results of the analyses revealed very opposite opinions between Palestinians and Israelis on most of the aspects within each level in the developed matrix. I illustrated these opinion with stripes of opposing directions in each triangle, which has three sides; affective, cognitive and behavioral. Bordered by a thick layer referring to the socio-demographic and more factors that influence the formation of audience frames. The second stage (in successive period of T2) shows how core issues are formed, which appear when the two triangles of perceptions intersect, leading to the third stage (T3). A stage where the '*core*' issues become the conflict and the rest fades, regardless of how relevant the rest of information is significant to the persistence of the conflict and its resolution. I referred to the rest of information at this stage as '*postponed reality*' which each side; the Palestinians and the Israelis solely find important, a reality that is less critical at this juncture but can be a huge obstacle in later stages of conflict resolution. I referred to information that was neglected in the first stage because of media and leaders' framing of reality an '*Ignored or marginalized reality*', which is inevitable and was thoroughly explained in previous chapters of this dissertation.

*From reality into a framed reality:* at this stage, the model shows the gap (G1) between perceptions of the Palestinians and Israelis due to the framing of news in each country by its' respective media and political stakeholders. Now, at the second stage, this gap is widened by the amount of G2+G3, due to the focus of the media on the core issues of the conflict leaving a wider gap between perceptions of both people. Finally, the third stage (T3), where the gap is even broader and equal to the previous gaps plus the focus of each media on "the others" perceptions of the core issues of the conflict, which the results revealed were negatively/inversely portrayed, I referred to it as '*counter reality*'. At this stage, the media becomes more vulnerable and responsive to the audience frames due to the urgency of the situation and topics in hand, and therefore, an interaction between the three sides of the triangle (media, audience, and political stakeholders) become more prominent. To summarize, by the end of the process, the newly-established reality is not only very inconsistent with what actually happened but also, it fuels up the conflict by representing the others' stubborn and contradictory perceptions of the same '*core*' issues of the conflict. Also, the model shows the interaction between the newly-established reality (i.e., the core issues that we believe in versus the others' perceptions of the

same key issues) with media and political stakeholders' frames. The directions of influence (or causalities) between these levels of analyses were not determined in this dissertation and therefore, it is highly recommended to be investigated by applying a time-series analyses of the same factors across time ( $T_1$ ,  $T_2$ ,  $T_n \dots$ ) to pinpoint causalities between them. Nevertheless, the results in Figure 5.40 revealed that the order of frames were very close across all levels of analyses particularly between media and political stakeholders' frames. That's why the model below referred to them as one entity portraying the same reality.




FIGURE 6.1 A NEW READING OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

(1) T – TIME PERIOD

(2) G – GAP BETWEEN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS

## 6.2 Findings

The following hypotheses were tested using different statistical analyses. Significance was determined at the .05 level of significance and yielded the following findings:

1. The hypothesis that the presence of episodic nature will be more dominant than thematic one in photos appearing in connection with frames in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers on  $\alpha = .05$  level of significance was accepted ( $V = .31$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
2. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the percentage of articles dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per issue in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers was rejected ( $r = .61$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
3. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between the percentage of news dedicated to each topic in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers was rejected ( $r = .45$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
4. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article was rejected ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
5. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article was rejected ( $r = .07$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
6. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to proposed solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article was rejected ( $r = .14$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
7. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article was rejected ( $r = .21$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
8. The hypothesis that articles in Palestinian newspapers tend to expand in covering news across the three aspects of causes, consequences, and solutions was accepted.
9. The hypothesis that articles in Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-oriented and focused more on reporting only causes, consequences or solutions, instead of expanding across the three aspects was accepted.
10. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers harmony in covering issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was accepted ( $r = .02$ ,  $p > .05$ ).
11. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli evaluations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict was rejected ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < .05$ ).
12. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and

- Israelis' perceptions of actions pertaining to the conflict was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
13. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' evaluations of the role of conflict-related actions in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  14. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of the most and second acceptable solutions to the core issues of the conflict was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  15. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' approving economic cooperation plans between both parties was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  16. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' approving elements as parameters of establishing a Palestinian state was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  17. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' prioritization of crucial issues was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  18. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' trust in their respective political leaders to make peace with the other side was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  19. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' support of the resumption of peace negotiations under the current circumstances was accepted ( $p > .05$ ).
  20. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between support for the resumption of peace negotiations and trust in those negotiations to achieve peace was rejected ( $r = .37, p < .05$ ).
  21. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of shouldering the responsibility for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
  22. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of how balanced is the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was rejected ( $r = .12, p < .05$ ).
  23. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of which state or international organization could be the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis was rejected ( $r = .52, p < .05$ ).
  24. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' boredom of the conflict was rejected ( $r = .54, p < .05$ ).
  25. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' willingness towards peace was rejected ( $r = .42, p < .05$ ).
  26. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis' confidence in peace was rejected ( $r = .35, p < .05$ ).
  27. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and

Israelis' feelings and attitudes towards each other was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).

28. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between Palestinians and Israelis' perceptions of how they feel towards each other was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
29. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between Palestinians and Israelis' shared and expected feelings and attitudes was rejected ( $p < .05$ ).
30. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli political parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes, consequences, and solutions was rejected ( $r = .32, p < .05$ ).

## 6.3 Conclusions

On the basis of the evidence resulted from the research, the following conclusions appeared warranted in generalizability to the target populations of Palestine and Israel:

1. There is quite a high level of accord between (A) media and audience frames, (B) audience and political parties frames, and (C) between media and political parties frames on both side of the conflict. Results on each level of analyses revealed that indeed how the media frame the conflict goes in harmony with how the people on each side perceive it. The direction of influence or causality as to say is not specified here, however, this dissertation supposes that it is an interactive process where the direction of influence and the transmission of information between politicians, the media, and the public operates downwards from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among political actors, and also upwards from public opinion towards authorities, as stated in Norris (2004) *interactive model of political communication*.
2. The answer to the first research question of ‘*to what degree there is an accord between media and audience frames on either side of the conflict?*’ is that the impact of media is not absolute as the *Hypodermic Needle Theory* suggests, however, the relationship between the media and the public opinion on the Palestinian and Israeli sides is strong and firm, as both of them derives its strength and impact from the other, and each of them affects and is affected by the other. The media on both sides are inflammatory, mobilize the inside against the enemy within a concept that exaggerates and is far from the objective facts and distorts them or ignores some of their elements as to be consistent with the self-image of the national group. Additionally, I found that the majority of the Palestinians and Israelis are field-dependent in their habitual tends of perceiving, organizing, analyzing, or recalling information and experience. Meaning, their perceptions of information is highly dependent on the environment surrounding them and are more sensitive to interpersonal cues, social information, and manipulation, and are less cognitive restructuring and tend to accept information from the environment as they appear. This goes in line with Riding & Sadler-Smiths, (1997) definition of this cognitive style. Or simply, because the large portion of the public believes that the side supported by the media reflects the trend in the society, the opinion adopted by the media continues to be stronger and possibly put pressure on those, who oppose the opinion adopted by the media, so they turn to be silent. This is what Noelle-Neumann (1977) referred to as the spiral effect in her theory of *Spiral of Silence*. Clearly, this effect amplifies in the context of war to avoid persecution of the big pro-community, or in fear of social isolation.



Later, the different set of beliefs Palestinians and Israelis hold are translated into differences in emphasis, interpretation and selection of same events. This is deepened by the amplification process of public opinion as stated in the *Resultant Acceleration Model* discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation. Nevertheless, the hope for peace is still there, symbolized by a small minority of individuals that are highly independent in processing perceived information, and who bypass the surrounding and build their perception of an issue in accordance with their inner cues. It is this stratum of individuals that act on information on highly autonomous fashion with a greater level of perceptual and cognitive restructuring.

3. The answer to the research question regarding '*the degree of accord between media and audience frames with political parties frames on either side of the conflict*' is simply, very strong. Political parties and leaders on both sides of the conflict influence through their speeches, decisions and evaluations the perceptions of the two peoples, and there is a high degree of consistency between the media frameworks available in the minds of the two peoples and the media frameworks promoted by political leaders and their parties. This transmission of information and thoughts in two phases through the people's reception of the information that is broadcasted by the media and through the interpretations of the opinion leaders of this information was depicted in the *Two-Step Flow Theory*. The political game in Palestine and Israel is based on a certain marketing success. The players of this political game resort to political marketing through media propaganda and all the means to gain access to power and promote their 'goals'. They understand the impact of political marketing to the public, and utilize it to serve their own interests. From here we have to understand that it is very unlikely for Palestinians and Israelis outside the political circle to have access to political events without mass media tools; the political environment embraced by the media. Obviously, it is not easy for both peoples to evade the effect of structural political process broadcasted by the media.
4. '*To what degree there is a discord between audience frames in Palestine and Israel?*' Analyses of survey data revealed significantly high level of discord between perceptions of the conflict in the minds of the Palestinians and Israelis. As I mentioned before, results revealed as if Palestinians and Israelis *agreed to disagree* in their understanding of the conflict. Most of their prioritization of milestone issues are incoherent with one another and are driven by 1) their need for recognition and security as key factors for survival and persistence, 2) the awareness, relevance, and accessibility of conflict information to the public, mainly controlled by their salience in the media and political and intellectual elites, and 3) their view of the other's positions or

suggested solutions as so different that agreement is not possible, and does not serve the peace process or their own interests. These and more were proven to be critical in Rouhana and Bar-Tals' (1998) analyses of psychological dynamics in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The conflict is being inherited from generation to a generation, the only difference is the intensity of developed animosity and prejudice. Added to that the perception of exclusiveness and the refusal of each side to recognize the other. Not to mention the history of victimization, which is summarized in the deeply-rooted senses of historical persecutions and destructions that accumulate over time and leave each group absent in its own tragic national experience regardless and in the state of denial of the other group horrific experiences. All these and more emphasize the discrepancy between Palestinians and Israelis, and minimizes the potentiality of reaching a permanent resolution to the conflict.

5. *'To what degree there is a discord between news frames in Palestinian and Israeli media? And what are the patterns of news reporting?'* The analyses revealed paradoxical results, on one side, there is a somehow strong positive relationship among the topics covered by the Israeli and Palestinian media across 65 items of causes, consequences and solutions. On the other side, although a similar percentage of attention was given to these issues, however, the direction and intensity (i.e. number of articles) of coverage were very different on the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. This to a large extent defines how the conflict is being deepened by media and political stakeholders' frames and propaganda, which is evident in audience's contrasting perceptions of the conflict as shown above. Regarding the patterns of news reporting, the majority of Palestinian and Israeli media talked about the causes of the conflict, or, in particular, history of the conflict, as a conflict of beliefs, notions and perceptions, and in which the present is rooted, and the future is leaning. While almost half of the number of articles in the Palestinian media and a one-third in the Israeli media have focused on the results of the conflict (or on the present, in particular), the rest however, has included the proposed solutions, despite the fact that most of the solutions would serve the region to which they belong, as each side suggests the solutions that fit their interests, the matter which is reflected on the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion, where results revealed that both peoples refer to the history somehow a great importance. Finally, a very marginalized percentage of articles in the Israeli and Palestinian media have written about the peace process or about the conflict in a positive way. Even if we consider that the conflict's issues implicitly reflect negativism, or in the best case neutrality, this painful reality aggravates the conflict. These results and more reinforce the notion that the Israeli and Palestinian media lack constructive self-criticism, and instead they focus on

‘the other’ presented as the persecuting intruder, or simply revert to the past of the conflict and its painful memories and thereby boost these inflammatory notions.

6. *‘What other relevant factors that shape the audience frame perceptions? And to what extent?’* After summing up the results of all models and reducing them to a fewer number of representative factors, I found that 1) the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a dispute that is to a large extent perceived by individuals through their affiliations with political parties, 2) the perception of the conflict is connected to the notion individual’s hold about the most appropriate solution to the conflict, whether a two-state that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, an Israeli and a Palestinian state, or a one state, in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, or the West Bank becomes part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt. Moreover, 3) the willingness to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace is another factor that plays a significant role in predicting individuals’ perception frames of the conflict. Equally important factors were actions hindering the peace process. And 4) as expected, the degree of religiosity does have its share of influence when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 5) Feelings and attitudes, whether positive or negative, contributed to the shaping of individuals’ perceptions of the conflict. Other feelings-related factors comprised of having a relative or friends been killed or injured over the past years as a result of the conflict, being skeptic about the past, willingness to immigrate, confidence in the peace process, and being optimist regarding economic cooperation between both sides. Finally, 6) demographic factors that had a moderate relationship with perception frames were the quality of life index, gender, age, and formal education.

## 6.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and the conclusions of this study, it was recommended that:

1. The media on both sides must focus on the peace culture rather than instigate more hatred, fear and belligerency between the two peoples. Media have great responsibilities ahead such as correcting of misleading images for the public opinion on both sides and focusing on the peace powers and possibilities rather than to pour oil on the flames and protract violence. Media on both sides must help to build trust between the public opinions and boost the peace process.
2. Media must play a decisive role because it’s one of the most effective tools

for building consensus and achieving cultural diversity. It must focus on the peace culture and rectify misleading judgments and distorted images between the peoples. Media should help boost cultural diversity.

3. If a historic reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians is sought, there must be a genuine peace, for the military confrontation will not deliver, and the conviction to live in peaceful coexistence is gaining every day more weight. The horizons of future are open, and the culture of peace and coexistence has found a ground on the Israeli–Palestinian reality, a matter that will have positive effects on the formation of the next generation. All this is a positive shift in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict but could however collapse momentarily if it finds no support and sustenance. Nothing can help more than a genuine settlement of the conflict, after which all parties can live in peace, security and economic prosperity.
4. Palestinian and Israeli peace activists should exert hard efforts all over the world to correct the distorted images of both nations by focusing on the positive points and the common wish for peace. They can help to reflect credibility on the voices that call for actions against violence, and by spreading the culture of peace, enabling the two peoples to deal with each other in a civilized and humanitarian way and to listen to the needs and aspirations of the other. Communicating with each other and coming together must replace hatred and grudge, for today, in the era of globalization and internet, one can not prevent people from communicating with each other. So how it would like for Palestinians and Israelis, who live on a tiny piece of land? They still find difficulties in debating and communicating with each other.
5. In seeking a settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we have to bestow a great importance to the estimates of what Palestinians and Israelis may accept and refuse. It's not sufficient to probe only the opinion of the leadership of the political parties and organizations because ignoring the Palestinian public opinion will have an adverse impact on the public consent of any accord that may be signed in future. The support of the public opinion for such accords gives them the real strength. Otherwise, the conflict will continue whatever the accords or agreements may be, and whoever may sign them. The public is the basis for the success of those accords. Ignoring the public opinion on such issues, or not building a positive public opinion to back them, simply means that such agreements will remain incomplete and will be lacking the popular base.
6. Both publics, must work together worldwide to correct their distorted image, and that by focusing on the common positive aspects and their mutual desire to make peace.
7. Mutual understanding will build trust between both countries. Education is

one aspect that should not be underestimated; it should be free from biased information about the other's religion, culture and history. Maybe at later stages, to set up school where Palestinians and Israelis can attend, and taught by teachers from both sides. Chao (2011, p. 23) once noted: *'By educating Israelis and Palestinians on each other, each will begin to see similarities, which will bring mutual understanding'*.

To be acquainted today with the results of the public opinions on both sides, is a necessary and valuable attribute to the long-term viability of the whole peace process. When both public opinions, Israeli and the Palestinian, perceive that both nations are in need for security, peace, stability, economic prosperity and full sovereignty especially for Palestinians, peace will have a better chance. In order to bring the peace process to a successful end, the public opinion should be encouraged to see the reality in both societies. The two conflict parties are viewing each other at present in a wrong manner. As noticed above, fear, skepticism and prejudices are so far dominating the relations between both sides, and this entails the mistrust and the feeling of insecurity towards each other. The negative public opinion on both sides, being influenced by such misleading judgments, is then translated into violence and counter-violence at all public and official levels.

If peace prevails, people in the Middle East will be envied for building a multicultural and multi-religious societies rather being pitied for the belligerency and volatile political situation as it is the case now. I want to conclude with a quote by Lerner (2004) answering the question *"does the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has an end"*?

*The conflict between Israel and Palestine can end. It is not a reflection of some eternal struggle that can never be solved. It is not the product of hatred that is so intractable that they will always defeat good intentions. And when it is solved, people will look back and wonder why the obvious steps to a solution were not taken at a much earlier stage and in a more decisive manner.*

## Chapter A

### REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS

Before explaining the regression tests, I checked some problems that may occur when running a regression model, which included the following:

#### A.1 Testing for Normality of Residuals

In short, the rationale behind hypothesis testing relies on having something that is normally distributed (in some cases it's the sample distribution, in others the error in the model) and, if this assumption is not met, the logic behind hypothesis testing is flawed (Field, 2009, p. 133). One of the assumptions of linear regression analysis is that the residuals are normally distributed. Therefore, I predicted the dependent variables from the independent variables. Then, I used the *save* command to generate residuals.

As shown above, I used the *examine* command to look at the normality of these residuals. The results revealed that the residuals were relatively normally distributed: for the 40 models the values of skewness and kurtosis were somewhat close to zero. Added to that, generated histograms looked to some extent normally distributed. The results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk were in many cases insignificant ( $p > .05$ ) suggesting that those models are not significantly different from a normal distribution (i.e. they are normally distributed), and in other cases, it was significant ( $p < .05$ ). The main objective of running these models was to determine the most influential predictors of the major issues of the conflict, and if the test of normality or other tests did not meet the requirements in some of the models that did not mean that I will be constrained by the results since I have plenty of models.

#### A.2 Testing for Collinearity

I tested for collinearity to check if any of the models' predictors have a perfect linear relationship among each other. Since, if that was the case, the estimates of

the regression models' coefficients become unstable and might inflate dramatically. Additionally, it makes some variables statistically insignificant while they should be otherwise significant.

One efficient way to test for multicollinearity is by using the 'tolerance'<sup>(1)</sup> and 'VIF'<sup>(2)</sup> values for each predictor. The number of predictors multiplied with the number of models i.e. 40 have generated very large tables, which according to them the values of 'tolerance' and 'VIF' were very acceptable, and as a results, the models did not suffer from any multicollinearity problems.

## A.3 Testing for Heteroskedasticity

Another assumption of ordinary least squares regression is that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous across levels of the predicted values, also known as 'homoscedasticity'. If the model is well-fitted, there should be no pattern to the residuals plotted against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals is nonconstant, then the residual variance is said to be 'heteroscedastic'. Hence, it was advisable to check the model for robustness. Basically, I aimed to check if the results have robust standard errors in order to control also for heteroskedasticity.

The results of the scatter plots showed that the standard errors in most models had trivial changes, which means that the models were unlikely to have the problems of heteroskedasticity. However, scatter plots can be misleading; therefore, I applied an advanced test in order to check with numbers if the model suffered from heteroskedasticity. As a first step, I introduced the SPSS program with a new test called 'bptest test'. A test that required an already developed sophisticated Macro and can be downloaded from the Internet.

Many of the results revealed significant values ( $p < .05$ ) which according to 'Breusch-Pagan and Koenker' tests mean that the distributions were significantly different from homoscedastic distributions (i.e. they have no homoscedastic distributions). Accordingly, the majority of the models might suffer from heteroscedasticity. The interpretation of these results might be due to the different sample sizes in Palestine and Israel, in addition to the usage of a split-ballot technique when collecting the data for the study.

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<sup>(1)</sup>The 'tolerance' is the percentage of variance that cannot be predicted or accounted for by other independent variables.

<sup>(2)</sup>The VIF, which stands for variance inflation factor, is  $(1 / \text{tolerance})$  and as a rule of thumb, a variable whose 'VIF' values is greater than 10 may merit further investigation.

## Chapter B

# GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

## B.1 Objectives of the Content Analysis

*'What is said?'* – Subjects / Dimensions

*'Who said it?'* – Which newspaper?

*'Who is affected'* – Palestinians or Israelis

And *'how?'* – Who is responsible?

The study intends to examine the effect of the macro-level factor (the media), on the micro-level factor (the audience cognitive processing). Both the media content and the range of opinion on a public agenda should be assessed to examine the media's function in Palestine and Israel.

The study methodology consists of newspapers survey of all articles written on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It tends to investigate how the most prominent newspapers in Palestine and Israel frame the conflict and the peace process.

## B.2 General Coding Instructions

The coding of each article will be made strictly according to the following steps:

1. First, the entire article is read once.
2. Then, the sequence number is entered on the coding sheet.
3. Then all other formal categories (issue no., date, etc.) to be encoded.
4. The post will be completely re-read to the content categories.
5. Encoding should be done only to what is in the article, and as not what the coders think of him/herself.
6. Does not matter whether the details mentioned in the article are speculations or facts.
7. For the coding of content, headlines and leading text are to be used.
8. The codes should be processed in the predefined excel sheet.



### B.2.1 General Processing Instructions

Coders should keep in mind the following steps when processing codes:

1. The code number should be processed under the right item in the coding sheet.
2. A cell is specified for each item in the coding sheet.
3. The respective code number must always be fully recorded.
4. For every article an entire row is provided. This means that the number of coded articles must match the number of filled rows!

## B.3 System of Categories

The codebook consists of two levels of analysis: **(1)** Article level or Information source, and **(2)** Evidence level or Dimensions of the conflict.

### B.3.1 Article Level

The Article level or Information source comprises of the formal categories, which are: the encoder, name of newspaper, issue number and date, section, page number, type of article, source, style of the article, support by a photo, target of the photo, tendency, link, occasion behind writing the article, and the size/length of the article.

#### IS1: Encoder

**Definition** - The encoder is who analyzed the source of information (i.e., the newspaper). It must be entered on the coding sheet, as follows:

Encoder	Code
Ehsan	01
Salwa	02
Ahlam	03
Dana	04

**IS2: Name of Newspaper**

Afterwards, the newspaper in which the article was published will be encoded:

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Code</b>
<b>Palestinian newspapers</b>	
Al-Quds newspaper	01
Al-Ayyam newspaper	02
Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper	03
Felesteen newspaper	04
<b>Israeli newspapers</b>	
Israeli Hayom	05
Yediot Ahronot	06
Haaretz	07
Maariv	08

**IS3: Issue Number**

Here, the issue number of the newspaper is encoded.

Encoder Note: The Issue number is printed on the front page of the newspapers.

- For example: 7854

**IS4: Date**

The date the newspaper was published will be encoded in this format DD-MM-YYYY.

- For example: 21-08-2013

**IS5: Section**

Here the encoder will note the section where the article was published, whether in political/news, editorial (including opinion/comment), and business (of economy). As follows:

Section	Code
Political/news	01
Editorial (Opinion/Comment)	02
Business	03

**IS6: Page Number**

Here the encoder should code the page number where the article was published.

- For example: Page 4

**IS7: Type of Article**

In this section, the encoder will specify the type of the article; news story, column/commentary, reportage/background story, editorial, portrait, interview, bulletin, headline only, documentation, public opinion article, letter to the editor, question to the newspaper. As follows:

Type of article	Code
News	01
Column/commentary	02
Reportage/background story	03
Editorial	04
Portrait	05
Interview	06
Bullet	07
Headline only	08
Documentation	09
Public opinion article	10
Letter to the editor	11
Question to the newspaper	12
Other, please specify:	13

**IS8: Source**

Here, the encoder should refer to the source of the article, is it the newspaper, the newsagent, copy of editor, journalist, a reader, or a politician?

<b>Author/Source</b>	<b>Code</b>
Newspaper	01
Newsagent	02
Copy editor by name	03
Journalist	04
Reader	05
Politician	06
Not recognizable	07
Other, please specify:	08

**IS9: Style of the Article**

Here, the encoder will refer to the style of the article; a fact or an opinion?

<b>Style</b>	<b>Code</b>
Factual (news, reports, documentary etc.)	01
Opinion (comment, reader letters, review etc.)	02
Not recognizable/Unknown/Both	03

**IS10: Tendency of the Article**

Here the encoder will determine the general tendency of the article towards the peace process, is it positive, negative, or neutral, as follows:

<b>Article tendency</b>	<b>Code</b>
Negative	01
Positive	02
Neutral	03

**IS11: Accompanied by a Photo**

The encoder will indicate here if the article was accompanied by a photo or not, as follows:

Accompanied by a photo	Code
Yes	01
No	02

### IS12: Target of the Photo

The target of the photo should be determined here, whether an episodic or thematic one.

Target	Code
Episodic	01
Thematic	02

### IS13: Tonality of the Photo

Here, the encoder will describe the toner of the photo, does it hold an aggressive (negative), a peaceful (positive), or a neutral toner, as follows:

Toner	Code
Aggressive	01
Peaceful	02
Neutral	03

### IS14: Link to the Article Content

The encoder here will determine if the photo supports the tonality of the article or not.

Link	Code
Yes	01
No	02
Not recognizable	03

**IS15: Occasion**

This section deals with the occasion behind writing the article; what motivated the author to write the article. The encoders here will code the occasion as follows:

Occasion	Code	Example
A political event	01	Political conference/convention/speeches by political figures
A religious event	02	(e.g., In Israel - Yom Kippur, Passover, Chanukah, in Palestine - Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Mawlid al-Nabi)
A patriotic/nationalistic event	03	Independence or national day / Commemoration of events (e.g., Al-Nakba, Yom Kippur War)
A comment on an article	04	A letter written to an author, editor, or the newspaper/Commentary on an article
An attack	05	Acts of vandalism (e.g., mass detentions, attacks by settlers, militants, IDF force)
Problem dimension	06	This category includes one of the following: continues expansion of Jewish settlements, Palestinian prisoners, security of Israel
Other	07	Please specify:_____.

**IS16: Article Size/Length**

The size/length of the article will be determined with accordance to the space it occupies in the page. The encoder will estimate the space as follows:

Size/Length	Code
Up to ¼ of the page	01
Up to ½ of the page	02
Up to ¾ of the page	03
More than ¾ of the page	04
More than one page	05

### B.3.2 Evidence Level

The evidence level covers the most important aspects of the conflict such as casualties of war and responsibilities towards these casualties, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements, Palestinian prisoners, Security of Israel, The status of Jerusalem, Natural resources, Borders, Beliefs, feelings and principles, and Gaza. At the very end, the encoder is asked to specify the total number of articles that did not mention the conflict.

#### CL: Casualties

This dimension will include any mention of casualties on either side as a results of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The encoder here will code if casualties were reported or not:

Items	Code
Yes ( <i>Continue to RS</i> )	01
No ( <i>Skip to CSS</i> )	02

**Definitions:** *Casualties* are defined as any individuals that were injured, killed, murdered, captured, or missing in action whether as combatants or non-combatants. *Combatants* refers to those who are directly/voluntary involved in the war as soldiers/resistant movements/militants/settlers. *Non-combatants* on the other hand refers to citizens, who were not directly engaged but were forced into action.

**RS: Responsibility**

The encoders here will code who was responsible for these casualties, as follows:

Responsibility	Code
Israeli forces	01
Palestinian militants	02
Israeli settlers	03
Palestinian citizens	04
Israelis citizens	05
Unknown	06
Not mentioned	07
Other, please specify: _____ .	08

**Note:** *Unknown*, is when the responsible individual/s were unknown, and still under investigation. However, *Not mentioned*, is when the responsible for the act is known but was not mentioned by the author of the article.

- **Example 1:** *'In its most recent count, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 2,104 Palestinians were killed in Gaza, including 1,462 civilians, among them 495 children and 253 women'*<sup>(1)</sup>.

Question	Code
CL	01
RS	01

- **Example 2:** *'Avraham Walz, 29, killed when terrorist runs him over with a bulldozer. Bulldozer driver proceeds to slam into a city bus, turning it on its side and injuring six additional Israelis. Israeli soldier, 20, seriously hurt in separate shooting attack'*<sup>(2)</sup>.

Question	Code
CL	01
RS	07

<sup>(1)</sup>Booth, William (August 29, 2014). The Washington post, The U.N. says 7 in 10 Palestinians killed in Gaza were civilians, Israel disagrees.

<sup>(2)</sup>Saban, I., Yalon, Y., and Daniel Siryoti (August 5, 2014). Israel Hayom: Israeli killed, another seriously hurt in 2 Jerusalem terror attacks.



The following includes the main issues/dimensions/topics of the conflict categorized as *Causes* of the conflict, *Consequences*, and suggested *Solutions*. Several items are outlined in each category describing the conflict and the peace process from the Palestinian and Israeli points of view. Each encoder will code the tendency (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral) of each particular dimension mentioned in the article, as follows:

Question	Code
Positive	01
Negative	02
Neutral/Ambivalent	03

There is a total number of 63 items; 13 items referring to *Causes* of the conflict, 18 items summarizing the *Consequences* or *problem dimensions* of the conflict, and 32 items discussing suggested *Solutions* to these consequences. Most of the items are entitled with a bold description to facilitate the coding process. Under each title there are several points that refer to the same issue in hand.

### B.3.3 Causes

**CSS1:** 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars.

**CSS2: Jewish immigration and its aftermath:** Jewish immigration from Russia, Europe and other countries./ Rise of Zionism. / Balfour declaration of 1917. / Buying lands and the illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine after World War I.

**CSS3: Jewish connection and affiliation:** Cultural, religious, historical, and biological connection to the ancient Israelites, over millennia. / It is the Jews ancestral homeland where most historical events mentioned in the Old Testament took place, and therefore is the focus of their religious practices and customs. / The presence in the land continues well after the period covered in the Old Testament. / Jewish Identity of Israel.

**CSS4: The Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif in Arabic); a site of two Temples:** It is prohibited for Jew to pray in Al-Aqasa, and the Dome of The Rock is the location of the 'Holy of Holies' so off limits to Jews for prayer. / The allocation of some area on the Temple Mount for Jewish prayer that is not either Al-Aqsa or Dome of the Rock. / Historically there was a period when there was a synagogue located there while on the other hand, the holiness of Haram al-Sharif has been extended by others so that it is not permissible for

Jews to be near the Western Wall. For that matter there are some who consider a Jewish presence in the Waqf of Palestine altogether to be an unacceptable defilement of the area.

**CSS5: The Israeli-American (alliance) or American-Israeli backed strategy:** Israel is highly dependent on U.S. support, and U.S. military assistance, with which Israel is controlling the occupied Palestinian territories.

**CSS6: Israeli measures against Palestinians:** Demolishing houses, expropriating lands, confiscation of privately owned land in the West Bank, and uprooting of plantations. / Mass detentions, military presence and attacks, excessive use of force by Israeli army, incursions of the army into Palestinian towns and targeted liquidations. / Israeli forces/settlers invade almost daily, injuring, kidnapping, and sometimes killing Palestinian civilians. / Extra-judicial assassinations. / Massacres. / Israel's unwillingness to remove security measures for fear of fundamentalist terrorism. / The strategic goal of the security fence is to guarantee the security of Israel.

**CSS7: Palestinians acts of vandalism/terrorism:** Constant threat of indiscriminate attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli citizens, Qassam rocket and mortar shelling on Israeli targets / kidnapping, hijackings, stabbings, shootings, and stone-throwing / The Palestinian political violence and fundamentalist terrorism against Israel. / Lethal Palestinian attacks inside Israel. / Armed operations against the Palestinians. / Administrative detention. / Detentions without any legitimate trial.

**CSS8: Not recognizing Israel's right to exist:** Al Jihad against Israel and Judaization is an Islamic duty. / Palestine is an Islamic trust. / Palestinians are the original inhabitants of the land. / The necessity to destroy Israel. / Resistance is still the force that unifies Palestine as one nation.

**CSS9: The State of Palestine will become a "terrorist" state:** The Palestinians had never intended to make peace and that their true objective is to throw the Jews into the sea. / PA's incitement against Israel. / Hamas's incitement to launch a third intifada against Israel. / Pursuing negotiations with the PA from a position of weakness only results in more terror.

**CSS10: Not granting the Palestinians their right to establish their own state - right of self-determination:** The questionable borders of the Palestinians entity. / The necessity to kill all the Arabs. / Not recognizing the Palestinians as the owners of this homeland.

**CSS11: Israel Procedures against Gaza:** IDF wars on Gaza. / Restriction on bringing building materials prevents Gaza from fixing its infrastructure. / The Is-

raeli exploitation and control of gas reserves off shore the Gaza Strip. / The naval blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza. / IDF counter of any rearmament or tunnel construction along the western borders between Israel and Gaza. / The absence of Israeli technology to discover underground tunnels. / Israel “Defense” Forces staging ground incursion into the Gaza Strip.

- CSS12: Settlers acts of vandalism:** Settlers continues attacks on Palestinians and Palestinian lands/schools/cars. / Settlers are dangerous enemies who are usurping Palestinians’ land. / Settlers are Jewish extremists. / Fear of violence from extremists among Jewish settlers is a factor in both Israeli government decisions and in the daily lives of Palestinians. / Settlers activities in Jerusalem’s Old City have expanded beyond the Jewish Quarter.
- CSS13: Israel’s military superiority:** Palestinians can’t do anything if Israel decides to impose a certain solution.

### **B.3.4 Consequences**

- QSC1: Demographic threat to Israel:** The Palestinians demanded right of return is a demographic threat to Israel. / The Palestinians do not have any right to immigrate to the land of Israel. / The definition of a ‘refugee’ should be in accordance with the definition applied to other groups (namely, a refugee is someone who actually lived someplace and left it. The status is not handed down for generations).
- QSC2: Violations of International law and Human rights:** Women in delivery condition are prevented from reaching hospitals (at time resulting in death). / Food and medicine are blocked from entering Gaza. / Bombardment of hospitals and schools.
- QSC3: Restrictions on the Palestinians freedom of movement:** Checkpoints and siege over Gaza. / Lack of contiguity and integrity. / The Separation Barrier or Security Fence. / Restriction on freedom of movement to East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, and within the West Bank. / Indignities imposed by Israeli occupation. / Israel’s restriction /limitations on issuing Palestinians work permits. / Building an elaborate network of settlers-only ‘bypass roads’. / Israel absolute control over border-crossings.
- QSC4: Palestinian Refugees:** Dreadful conditions of Palestinian refugees in refugee camps in neighbouring Arab countries such as in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and more. / Denial by Arab nations of basic human rights (citizenship, unrestricted rights to work, etc.) to Palestinians in their countries.

- QSC5: The influence of settlements on Palestine's natural resources and statehood:** Strategical allocation of settlements in the West Bank (Area C) in order to allow for control over water, land and mineral resources. / Settlements threaten territorial contiguity. / Settlements chop the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into pieces and imprison the Palestinians in isolated enclaves, each of which is surrounded by settlements and the occupation forces. / Settlements continue to occupy some of the most fertile regions of the West Bank.
- QSC6: Control of natural resources:** Israel controls all the water and natural resources of the land. / Lack of drinking water. / The oPt dependency on Israel for fuel (gas, petrol) supplies, thus bolstering the Israeli economy.
- QSC7: Settlement expansion:** The expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. / The Housing and Construction Ministry issuing hundreds of tenders for the construction of new housing units in East Jerusalem and the large settlement blocs. / Settlement activities extending into an infiltration of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, encircling them with Jewish population. / The movement or transfer of hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians into occupied territory.
- QSC8: Economic burden and Boycotting Israeli products:** The Israelis economy is hampered by the high costs of settlement construction and incentives to settlers combined with military costs of securing them. / International community Boycotting Israeli products manufactured in Jewish settlements. / Palestinians Boycotting Israeli products.
- QSC9: Judaization of Jerusalem:** Daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem. / Israel's violations of and encroaching on the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in Jerusalem. / The Israeli intentions to have a vertically divided sovereignty of the Temple Mount or Noble Sanctuary. / The intentions to open a new gate for Jews to enter Al-Aqsa Mosque to pray.
- QSC10:** Jews arrested for praying on Temple Mount. / Palestinians' violations of Jewish sanctities in Jerusalem.
- QSC11:** A new wave of takeovers of Palestinian homes by false measures, forged documents or as absentee properties, turning them into Jewish property.
- QSC12: Life hardship:** Unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment. / Barriers to health care and education. / Unprecedented low levels of internal lawlessness and instability.

- QSC13: Hamas threats:** There will not be an agreement with Israel as long as there are Palestinians in prison. / Hamas will free all fighters/militants in the Israeli prisons by using force. / Kidnapping Israeli soldiers.
- QSC14: Acts against Palestinian prisoners:** Frequent Physical abuse and torture of prisoners. / Deteriorating situation for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli Jails.
- QSC15: Israeli Intransigence:** The unwillingness of Israel to negotiate directly with Hamas. / Israeli intransigence and their disobedience to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans. / The Zionist-Israeli movement directs to take over the entire country and to drive out non-Jewish populations. / The constant objection of Israel right wing Hardliners.
- QSC16: Palestinian Intransigence:** Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel's right to exist. / Denying the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state. / The unwillingness of Hamas to negotiate with Israel. / The continues objection of Palestinian Hardliners. / Palestinian intransigence and their disobedience to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans. / The Palestinian national movement directs to establish a Palestinian State in the entire country.
- QSC17: Lack of Trust between Palestinians and Israelis:** Failure of past agreements. / Negotiations are not advancing and will likely collapse. / The belief that there is no reliable and trustworthy partner to make progress in a two-sided peace process.
- QSC18: Israeli violation of Palestinians lands:** Palestinians would not accept an agreement under which Israel would maintain any military presence on lands that become part of a Palestinian state.

### B.3.5 Solutions

- SLN1:** The right of return of Palestinian refugees to their lands.
- SLN2: Conditional return or compensation:** A conditional return for the refugees of Palestine under family reunification programs. / The right of return to a Palestinian state within agreed borders with compensation. / A compensation to be paid for the refugees who do not want to return. / The right of return to a Palestinian state within agreed borders without compensation, and in some 'humanitarian' cases, they are allowed to return to their homes within the 1948 borders.
- SLN3: Evacuation/demolishment and/or compensation of settlements:** All Israeli settlers will be evacuated from the West Bank, and the settlements will be

turned over to returning refugees. / The demolishment of all settlements in the oPt/West Bank. / Settlers will accept compensation packages for their withdrawal. / Settlers who stay are obliged to live under Palestinian sovereignty.

**SLN4: Refraining the construction of settlements:** Israeli government to call a halt to the settlement program. / The international community, and particularly the United States, must put pressure on Israel to halt its settlement program. / In order to mitigate the difficulties Israel may face in evacuating its settlers from the West Bank, the transfer of territories to the Palestinian control can be implemented in phases to allow time for Israel to sensitize its public.

**SLN5: No change to be made to settlements:** All settlements on the Israeli side of the security wall should be part of Israel. / All settlements should remain as they are.

**SLN6:** To evacuate prisoners from Israeli jails.

**SLN7: Release under certain conditions or circumstances:** Release of Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli jails. / Release of Palestinian Prisoners who stayed in Israeli jails for a long time. / Release prisoners who are suffering from illness. / Release of pre-Oslo-era Palestinians from Israeli jails.

**SLN8: To keep all Palestinian prisoners for the security and safety of Israel:** Those who killed should stay in jail - to stop releasing “terrorists” who have blood on their hands. / Israeli belief that releasing “terrorists” only adds fuel to the terrorists’ fire. / Irresponsible release of “terrorists” will jeopardize the security of Israelis.

**SLN9:** PA to stop rewarding “terrorists” with salaries payment to their families while they are in prison.

**SLN10: To abstain resorting to international institutions:** Not to resort to influential, international institutions and corporations, including the legal corporations that enjoy international competences, in case Israel approves of the release of Palestinian prisoners.

**SLN11: Israeli military presence in Palestine:** An Israeli presence at Palestinian border crossings / the existence of permanent Israeli observation posts in the Palestinian state / the Israeli “Defense” Force should remain in the Occupied Territories/West Bank.

**SLN12: A demilitarized Palestinian state:** To confiscate all illegal weapons, and the disarmament of Palestinian militant groups / incarceration and trial for all those associated with “terrorist” attacks / Disarming Hamas and Islamic Jihad. / The Israeli condition of a demilitarized Palestinian state with no army.

- SLN13: The demilitarization of Gaza:** Israeli demand to disarm Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip. / Destroy all missile , mortars, etc. / To destroy all tunnels under Gaza border.
- SLN14: The cease of militants acts against Israel:** The P.A. should take dramatic steps to stop Palestinian attacks against Israel. / Israel's pressing concern of the security threat posed by radical Islamist regimes.
- SLN15: Third-party mediation:** International observer on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state and Israel. / Any process towards viability must be guided by international law and resolutions, be impartial, hold both sides to account, bring an end to impunity. / The international community must exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League to commit to a negotiated peace in the region. Before negotiations can begin, each government must show their respective dedications and commitments to the peace process, or there will only be broken promises. / A viable process must hold both sides to account for any breaches in human rights law and international law, to build the necessary trust that enables both parties to engage and reach a settlement.
- SLN16: The recruitment of a stronger Palestinian police force:** Israel cannot be secure until a Palestinian state is established that will be strong enough to control Palestinian attacks. / Palestine should have a strong police force. / Palestinian police and special forces will continue to operate against all those endangering Palestinian national security.
- SLN17:** Security coordination between the Israel "Defense" Forces and Palestinian security forces.
- SLN18: Division of Jerusalem:** East Jerusalem to the Palestinians and West Jerusalem to the Israelis. / Division of the city according to Palestinian and Israeli Neighborhoods. / The Old City should be divided into two parts; a Jewish one under Israeli control and a Muslim and Christian one under Palestinian control. / Israel will be 'guardian' of the Wailing Wall and the Palestinian State 'guardian' of the Islamic Holy site. The status quo of Christian Holy sites will remain.
- SLN19: International control over Jerusalem:** Jerusalem to be an international city under the authority of the United Nations. / Jerusalem to be an international city under the authority of Multi-faith Municipal Covenant. / Neutral body, (e.g., the United Nations) will be the guardian of all the holy sites.
- SLN20: Agreement on managing the Holy sites:** The Old City should be under joint control. / Free access for everyone to the Holy sites. / No side will have

sovereignty on the Holy sites.

- SLN21: Jerusalem under Israeli control:** Jerusalem will remain united and under Israeli sovereignty. / All the holy places, including East Jerusalem holy sites to be under Israeli control. / The annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel.
- SLN22: To bring an end to the Israeli occupation of territories captured in the 1967 War:** Israel withdrawal to the 1967 boarder. / To disengage from its borders with Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. / The Green Line as a border between the two states. / To determine the borders of the Palestinians entity.
- SLN23: Conditional withdrawal and land swap:** Israel withdrawal to the 1967 boarder with adjustment through agreement of equivalent exchange of land. / Israel would annex 3-4% of the West Bank that includes major settlement blocks with comparable land swaps to be negotiated. / The land taken by the settlements could simply be ceded to Palestine from other regions of Israel.
- SLN24:** Borders established by the security wall.
- SLN25: Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides:** Prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred. / To educate for peace. / The media to play a positive role in promoting peace and pro-peace ideologies and programs.
- SLN26: U.S. and European union strict measures against the conflict:** They must take an active role in the peace process because they have the ability to greatly influence both the Israelis and the Palestinians. / If Israelis and Palestinians do not respond to the peace process, they must, for the sake of peace, utilize a more aggressive form of diplomacy. / They and the international community must continue to place pressure on Israel and the Palestinians to commit to the peace process and take the necessary steps to promote a lasting peace.
- SLN27: The United Nations as an active side:** The UN should play a more active and progressive role on the ground. / The UN should be detached from the influence of the U.S. and its domination.
- SLN28: To stop IDF acts against Palestinians:** The IDF to stop armed operations against Palestinians. / The IDF to stop the policy of targeted assassinations. / The IDF to abandon the policy of collective punishment, the demolishment of houses, and confiscation of Palestinian lands for alleged security reasons .
- SLN29: Lifting of the blockade over Gaza:** to be able to visit relatives outside Gaza, to be able to rebuild the own house, freedom of trade, and to lift the restrictions on the Gaza fishing range.



- SLN30: Freedom of movement:** The creation of an airport. / The reopening of Gaza airport. / The creation of a 'safe passage' between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. / Seaport, the borders-crossings and wages' funding. / Palestinians consider the taking of serious and real measures by the Israeli government for lifting up the siege and the security belt will mitigate violence. / Putting an end to the construction of the segregation wall.
- SLN31: Economic Cooperation:** Raising of joint projects in all economical sectors and a serious cooperation between all the parties and groups in the region for creating a new reality of peace and prosperity in severals fields like water, health, environment, tourism and others, even before reaching a final peace deal between Israel and its Arab neighbors. / To give the Palestinian laborers the possibility to work inside Israel. / The improvement of the economical and living conditions will have considerable positive effects on the support of any future peace negotiations. / To permit the free transportation of goods to/from Palestine.
- SLN32: Shared control over natural resources:** Control over natural resources: land, water, minerals, sea - for the benefit of the whole population's economic growth and prosperity. / To ensure legitimate control over natural resources that comprise of land, water, mineral and marine rights. / Natural resources are vital for the sustained development and growth of any society, and should be controlled for the benefit of the whole population, without discrimination.

**NA: Total number of articles**

Here the encoder will refer to the total number of articles in each newspaper.

Total number of articles in each newspaper (excluding unrelated sections):\_\_\_\_\_.

**Steps of the codification process**

1. Read the article to see if it is relevant.
2. If relevant, code it on the 1<sup>st</sup> level; the article level, to gather general info.
3. Afterwards code the second level; the evidence level.
4. Start a new codification when you find a new evidence in the same article.

**Formal Categories****IS1: Encoder**

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**IS2: Name of newspaper**

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**IS3: Issue number**

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**IS4: Date**

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**D D M M Y Y Y Y****IS5: Section**

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**IS6: Page number**

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**IS7: Type of article**

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**IS8: Source**

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**IS9: Style of the article**

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**IS10: Tendency of the article**

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**IS11:** Photo

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**IS12:** Target of the Photo

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**IS13:** Tonality of the Photo **IS14:** Link to the article content

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**IS15:** Occasion

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**IS16:** Article size/length

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## Content

QUESTION	YES	NO
CL		
RS		

CAUSES			
ITEM	-	+/-	+
QCSS1			
QCSS2			
QCSS3			
QCSS4			
QCSS5			
QCSS6			
QCSS7			
QCSS8			
QCSS9			
QCSS10			
QCSS11			
QCSS12			
QCSS13			

CONSEQUENCES			
ITEM	-	+/-	+
QSC1			
QSC2			
QSC3			
QSC4			
QSC5			
QSC6			
QSC7			
QSC8			
QSC9			
QSC10			
QSC11			
QSC12			
QSC13			
QSC14			
QSC15			
QSC16			
QSC17			
QSC18			

SOLUTIONS			
ITEM	-	+/-	+
SLN1			
SLN2			
SLN3			
SLN4			
SLN5			
SLN6			
SLN7			
SLN8			
SLN9			
SLN10			
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SLN25			
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SLN29			
SLN30			
SLN31			
SLN32			

Number of articles:

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## Chapter C

# CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK - ARABIC TRANSLATION

### الملحق "ج"

#### الإطار العام لتحليل المحتوى

#### C.0.1. هدف الدراسة

"ماذا قيل" ؟ - مواضيع / أبعاد

"من قاله" ؟ - أية صحيفة ؟

"من هو المعني" ؟ - الفلسطينيون أم الإسرائيليون ؟

و "كيف" ؟ - من هو المسؤول ؟

الغرض من الدراسة هو فحص تأثير عامل المستوى الكلي (الإعلام) على عامل المستوى الجزئي (المعالجة المعرفية للجمهور). وهنا ينبغي تقييم محتويات الإعلام ومدى الرأي على المستوى العام من أجل فحص وظيفة الإعلام في فلسطين وإسرائيل.

تتكون منهجية الدراسة من دراسة جميع المقالات المنشورة في الصحف حول الصراع الإسرائيلي - الفلسطيني، وتهدف إلى فحص مدى قيام أشهر الصحف في فلسطين وإسرائيل بوضع إطار للصراع والعملية السلمية.

#### C.1. وحدة الفحص

تتضمن عملية اختيار وحدة الفحص (1) فترة الفحص، (2) عينة الإعلام، (3) أخذ عينات من العناوين في جميع الصحف و (4) تشفير العينة.

#### C.1.1. فترة الفحص

لقد تم فحص عينات الإعلام المطبوعة خلال الفترة من 1 أغسطس (آب) 2013 لغاية 30 مارس (آذار) 2014 على النحو التالي:

السنة	الشهر
2013	أغسطس (آب)
	سبتمبر (أيلول)
	أكتوبر (تشرين أول)
	نوفمبر (تشرين ثاني)
	ديسمبر (كانون أول)
2014	يناير (كانون ثاني)
	فبراير (شباط)
	مارس (آذار)

الجدول C.1: الفترة الزمنية

### C.1.2. عينة الإعلام

تشمل عينة الإعلام أو وحدة البحث ما مجموعه ثمانية صحف، أربع صحف في كل من الجانبين، وهي على النحو التالي:  
**في فلسطين:** صحيفة القدس، صحيفة الأيام، الحياة الجديدة و فلسطين.  
**وفي إسرائيل:** إسرائيل هيوم، يديعوت أحرونوت، هآریتس و معاريف.

### C.1.3. تشفير العينة

تقرّر أن يكون تشفير العينة في خطوتين (أنظر الشكل C1 أدناه). في الخطوة الأولى يتم اختيار جميع المقالات أثناء فترة الفحص من الوحدات والأقسام الإعلامية المخصصة للبحث التي يحتوي فيها العنوان الرئيسي أو الفرعي كلمات رئيسية مثل: فلسطين، إسرائيل أو صراع. وليس من المهم إن كانت الكلمة الرئيسية مطبوعة بأحرف كبيرة أم صغيرة، أو إذا كانت مسبقة ببادئة "مثلاً" في مكافحة الإرهابيين"، أم تلتها لاحقة "مثل في الإرهاب" أو ذكرت لوحدها "إرهابي أو إرهابية" أو في سياق "هجوم إرهابي".

في الخطوة الثانية تُقرأ المقالة المُختارة بشكل كامل وثم تُفحص بدقّة عمّا إذا كانت تعالج القضايا الرئيسية للصراع (مثلاً: الخسائر البشرية، اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، المستوطنات اليهودية، الأسرى الفلسطينيين، أمن إسرائيل، وضع مدينة القدس، الموارد الطبيعية، الحدود، الإعتقادات، المشاعر والمبادئ و غزّة). وإن لم تعالج المقالة أي من هذه القضايا، لا تشفّر.

### معايير الدخول

جميع وحدات إعادة التشفير مقالات في الأخبار وأبواب التعليق في الصحيفة التي تناقش، تذكر أو تعرض آراء / أفكار / وجهات نظر بخصوص القضايا الرئيسية للصراع، تاريخ، معاهدات، اتفاقيات سلام، حلول، شخصيات سياسية وخطابات، أحداث، تقارير حول المواجهات اليومية، هجمات وخسائر بشرية، إيديولوجيات ورأي عام. الأعمدة أو المواقع التي لا تعالج الصراع بشكل مباشر لن يتم فحصها.

### معايير الاستبعاد

تستبعد المقالات من الأقسام التالية: الرياضة، السفر، الإسكان، الثقافة، السيارات، الموضة والتسلية ولن يتم تشفيرها لأنها تحتوي على مقالات قليلة جداً تتعلق بالصراع. ويطبق هذا أيضاً على أية مجلات أو نشرات مرفقة بالصحيفة.

### C.1.4 وحدة السياق

وحدة السياق لهذا التحليل هي كلّ المقالة. وعلى المشفرين أن يشفروا المقالات المذكورة على النحو الوارد في سجلّ التشفير، إمّا كأسباب، أو نتائج أو حلول.



## C.2 إرشادات التشفير العامة

يكون تشفير أية مقالة مطابقاً تماماً للخطوات التالية:

1. تقرأ المقالة مرّة واحدة.
2. يتم بعد ذلك إدخال رقم التسلسل على ورقة التشفير.
3. يتم بعد ذلك تشفير جميع الفئات الإسميّة أو الشكليّة الأخرى (رقم العدد، التاريخ... الخ)
4. يتم قراءة المقالة أو الموقع مرّة أخرى بالكامل لفئات المحتوى.
5. يجرى التشفير فقط لما هو موجود في المقالة وليس لما يفكر به المشفّر أو المشفرة.
6. لا يهم إن كانت التفاصيل الواردة في المقالة تخمينات أو حقائق.
7. لتشفير المحتوى، ينبغي استخدام العناوين والنصّ الرائد.
8. تُعالج الشيفرات في ورقة الإكسل المعرّفة مسبقاً.

### C.2.1 إرشادات المعالجة العامة

يجب أن يتذكر المشفّرون الخطوات التالية عند معالجة الشيفرات:

1. ينبغي أن يُعالج الرقم الشيفري تحت البند الصحيح في ورقة التشفير.
2. تمّ تحديد خلية لكلّ بند في ورقة التشفير.
3. يجب دائماً تسجيل رقم التشفير المعني بالكامل.
4. يتوقّر لكلّ مقالة صفّ بأكمله. هذا يعني بأن عدد المقالات المشفرة يجب أن يعادل عدد الصفوف المعبّأة !

## C.3 نظام الفئات

يتكوّن سجل التشفير من مستويين من التحليل: (1) مستوى المقال أو مصدر المعلومة و (2) مستوى الأدلّة أو أبعاد الصّراع.

### C.3.1 مستوى المقال

يتألّف مستوى المقال أو مصدر المعلومة من الفئات الشكليّة وهي: المشفّر، إسم الصحيفة، عدد وتاريخ الإصدار، القسم، رقم الصفحة، نوع المقال، المصدر، أسلوب المقال، مدعوم بصورة، هدف الصّورة، الميل أو الإتجاه، الصلة، المناسبة ما وراء كتابة المقال وحجم/طول المقال.

### IS1: المشفّر

**التعريف:** المشفّر هو الشخص الذي قام بتحليل مصدر المعلومة (مثلاً: الصحيفة). ويجب إدخالها في صحيفة التشفير، وذلك على النحو التالي:

المشفر	الشفرة
إحسان	01
سلوى	02
أحلام	03

## IS2: إسم الصحيفة

يتم بعد ذلك تشفير الصحيفة التي تُنشر فيها المقال:

الشفرة	الصحيفة
الصحف الفلسطينية	
01	صحيفة القدس
02	صحيفة الأيام
03	صحيفة الحياة الجديدة
04	صحيفة فلسطين
الصحف الإسرائيلية	
05	إسرائيل هيوم
06	يديعوت أحرونوت
07	هآريتز
08	معاريف

## IS3: رقم الإصدار (رقم العدد)

هنا يتم تشفير رقم إصدار الصحيفة (أي رقم العدد).

ملاحظة المشفر: رقم الإصدار (رقم العدد) يكون عادةً مطبوعاً في الصفحة الأمامية من الصحف.

• مثال: 7854

## IS4: التاريخ

يتم تشفير التاريخ الذي نشرت فيه الصحيفة بهذا الشكل: اليوم - الشهر - السنة

ي ي - ش ش - س س س س

• مثال: 2013 - 08 - 21

#### IS5: القسم (الباب)

هنا يسجل المشفر القسم أو الباب الذي نُشر فيه المقال، أكان مثلاً في قسم الشؤون السياسيّة / الأخبار، أو في الافتتاحيّة (شاملة رأي / تعليق) و في قسم مال وأعمال (الإقتصاد)، وذلك على النحو التالي:

الشيفرة	القسم/الباب
01	شؤون سياسيّة / أخبار / فلسطينية
02	افتتاحيّة (رأي / تعليق / تقارير)
03	مال وأعمال / فلسطينية دولية
04	المحليات
05	شؤون إسرائيلية / بانوراما الصحافة
06	مقالات
07	حوارات
08	منوعات

#### IS6: رقم الصفحة

هنا ينبغي على المشفر تسجيل رقم الصفحة التي نشرت فيها المقالة.

• مثال: صفحة 4

#### IS7: نوع المقال

يبين المشفر في هذا الباب نوع المقال، مثلاً إن كان قصّة إخبارية، عمود / تعليق، ريبورتاج (تحقيق صحفي) / قصّة خلفية حدث، افتتاحيّة، صورة، مقابلة، نشرة، عنوان فقط، بيّنة موثقة، مقال رأي عام، رسالة للمحرّر، سؤال موجه للصحيفة، وذلك على النحو التالي:

الشيفرة	نوع المقال
01	أخبار
02	عمود / تعليق / تقرير
03	ريبورتاج (تحقيق صحفي) / قصّة خلفية حدث / تحليل / سيناريو
04	افتتاحيّة
05	صورة
06	مقابلة
07	نشرة
08	عنوان فقط

09	بيّنة موثقة
10	مقال رأي عام
11	رسالة للمحرّر
12	سؤال موجّه للصحيفة
13	غير ذلك، الرّجاء حدّد: _____.

#### IS8: المصدر

ينبغي أن يشير المشقّر هنا إلى مصدر المقال. هل هو صحيفة، وكيل أخبار، نسخة من المحرّر، صحفي، قارئ أو شخصيّة سياسيّة ؟

الشيفرة	الكاتب / المصدر
01	الصحيفة
02	وكيل أخبار
03	نسخة من المحرّر بالإسم
04	صحافي
05	قارئ / قارئة
06	شخصيّة سياسيّة
07	ليس بالإمكان التعرّف عليه
08	غير ذلك، الرّجاء حدّد: _____.
09	مركز استطلاع للرأي
10	قناة
11	كاريكاتير
12	مكتب الأمم المتحدة
13	منظمة بتسليم
14	مركز حقوقي

#### IS9: أسلوب المقال

ينبغي على المشقّر هنا أن يشير إلى أسلوب أو نمط المقال. هل هو حقيقة أو رأي ؟

الشيفرة	الأسلوب / النمط
01	واقعي (أخبار، تقارير، وثائق..الخ)
02	رأي (تعليق، رسائل قراء، مراجعة..الخ)

**IS10: ميل أو اتجاه المقال**

على المشفّر هنا أن يحدّد الميل أو الإتجاه العام للمقال. هل هو إيجابي، سلبي أو حيادي، وذلك على النحو التالي:

الميل أو اتجاه المقال	الشفرة
سلبي	01
إيجابي	02
حيادي	03

**IS11: الصورة**

ينبغي على المشفّر هنا أن يبيّن إذا كان المقال مصحوباً بصورة أم لا، وذلك على النحو التالي:

الصورة	الشفرة
نعم	01
لا	02

**IS12: هدف الصورة**

ينبغي هنا تحديد هدف الصورة، فهل هو عرضي (مرتبط بحدث) أم موضوعي (مرتبط بموضوع معيّن) ؟

الهدف	الشفرة
عرضي	01
موضوعي	02

**IS13: النسق اللوني بالصورة**

على المشفّر هنا أن يصف النسق أو الصبغة اللونية للصورة. هل تحمل لون عدواني (سلبي) أم سلمية (إيجابي) أم لون حيادي، وذلك على النحو التالي:

النسق اللوني	الشفرة
عدواني	01
سلمية	02
حيادي	03

#### IS14: العلاقة بمحتوى المقال

على المشفّر هنا أن يحدّد عمّا إذا كانت الصورة تدعم نسق المقال أم لا.

العلاقة	الشفرة
نعم	01
لا	02
ليس بالإمكان التعرّف عليها.	03

#### IS15: المناسبة

يتناول هذا القسم المناسبة الكامنة وراء كتابة المقال. ما الذي دفع الكاتب لكتابة المقال ؟ ويقوم المشفّرون هنا بتشفير المناسبة على النحو التالي:

المناسبة	الشفرة	مثال
مناسبة سياسيّة	01	مؤتمر سياسي / اتفاقية / خطابات لشخصيّات سياسيّة
مناسبة دينيّة	02	مثلاً: في إسرائيل (يوم الغفران، الفصح، حانوكاه) وفي فلسطين (عيد الفطر، عيد الأضحى، عيد المولد النبوي الشريف)
مناسبة وطنيّة	03	عيد الإستقلال أو اليوم الوطني / إحياء ذكرى أحداث (مثلاً: النكبة، حرب يوم الغفران، ذكرى وعد بلفور...)
تعليق على مقال	04	رسالة كتبت لمحرّر أو كاتب أو للصحيفة / تعليق على مقال / تقارير.
هجوم	05	أعمال تخريب (مثلاً: اعتقالات جماعيّة، هجمات يقوم بها مستوطنون، رجال مقاومة أو قوّة من جيش الدفاع الإسرائيلي، الإبعاد والنفي، المقدسات والأماكن الأثرية).
بُعد المشكلة	06	تحتوي هذه الفئة على أحد البنود التالية: الإستمرار في توسيع المستوطنات اليهوديّة، الأسرى الفلسطينيين، أمن إسرائيل.. (الخ).
غير ذلك	07	الرّجاء حدّد: _____

### IS16: حجم / طول المقال

يُحدّد حجم / طول المقال حسب الحيز الذي يشغله في الصفحة. ويقدر المشقّر الحيز على النحو التالي:

الشيفرة	الحجم / الطول
01	لغاية 1/4 الصفحة
02	لغاية 1/2 الصفحة
03	لغاية 3/4 الصفحة
04	أكثر من 3/4 الصفحة

### C.3.2: مستوى الأدلة

يغطي مستوى الأدلة أهم نواحي الصراع مثل الخسائر البشرية في الحرب والمسؤوليات تجاه هذه الخسائر، والأجنيين الفلسطينيين، والمستوطنات اليهودية، والأسرى الفلسطينيين، وأمن إسرائيل، ووضع مدينة القدس، والموارد الطبيعية، والحدود، والمعتقدات، والمشاعر والمبادئ وقطاع غزة. ويطلب من المشقّر في النهاية تحديد العدد الإجمالي للمقالات التي لم تنطرق للصراع.

### CL: الخسائر البشرية

يشمل هذا البعد ذكر أية خسائر بشرية على كلّ من الجانبين نتيجة الصراع ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين. وينبغي على المشقّر أن يدوّن عما إذا ورد ذكر الخسائر البشرية أم لا.

البند	الشيفرة
نعم (استمر ل RS )	01
لا (انتقل ل CSS)	02

### تعريفات:

الخسائر البشرية تعني أية أفراد جرحوا أو قتلوا أو خُطفوا أو فُقدوا في عملية أكانوا بصفة مقاتلين أم غير مقاتلين. المقاتلون هم أولئك المشتركون بشكل مباشر أم تطوعي في الحرب كجنود أو حركات مقاومة أو فصائل مسلحة أو مستوطنون.

الغير مقاتلون هم على الناحية الأخرى المدنيون الغير مشتركون بشكل مباشر في عملية بل كانوا مجبرين على ذلك.

## RS: المسؤولية

يدون المشفرون هنا الجهة التي كانت مسؤولة عن هذه الخسائر البشرية على النحو التالي:

المسؤولية	الشفرة
القوات الإسرائيلية	01
المقاتلون الفلسطينيون	02
المستوطنون الإسرائيليون	03
المدنيون الفلسطينيون	04
المدنيون الإسرائيليون	05
جهة مجهولة	06
غير مذكورة	07
جهة أو جهات أخرى	08
غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: _____	09

**ملاحظة:** جهة مجهولة هي في حالة أن الفرد أو الأفراد المسؤولين كانوا غير معروفين (مجهولين) ولكن ما زالوا قيد البحث. ولكن غير مذكورة تعني أن الجهة المسؤولة عن الفعل أو العملية معروفة ولكن لم تُذكر من قبل كاتب المقال.

- **مثال 1:** "في آخر إحصائية ذكر مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية بأن 2.104 فلسطيني قُتلوا في غزة، شاملاً 1.462 مدنيًا من بينهم 495 طفلًا و 253 امرأة"<sup>1</sup>.

السؤال	الشفرة
خسائر بشرية (CL)	01
المسؤولية (RS)	01

- **مثال 2:** "أفراهم فالتس، 29 عامًا، قُتل عندما دهسه إرهابي بجرافة. ووجه سائق الجرافة بعد ذلك ضربة عنيفة لحافلة مدينة فقلبها على جنبها وجرح ستة إسرائيليون آخرين. وفي هجوم منفصل بإطلاق النار أصيب جندي إسرائيلي، 20 عامًا، إصابة بالغة"<sup>2</sup>.

(1) بوث، وليام (أغسطس 29، 2014). واشنطن بوست، "تقول الأمم المتحدة بأن 7 من 10 فلسطينيين قتلوا في غزة كانوا مدنيين، غير أن إسرائيل تنكر ذلك".

(2) سابان ي، يالون. واي و دانيال سيبروتي (أغسطس 5، 2014). إسرائيل هيوم: "قُتل إسرائيلي وجرح آخر بصورة خطيرة في هجومين إرهابيين بالقدس".



السؤال	الشفرة
خسائر بشرية (CL)	01
المسؤولية (RS)	07

فيما يلي القضايا الرئيسية / الأبعاد / ومواضيع الصراع مصنفة كـ **أسباب الصراع والنتائج والحلول** المقترحة. ترد عدة بنود في كل فئة واصفة الصراع والعملية السلمية من وجهات النظر الفلسطينية والإسرائيلية. وعلى كل مشفر أن يسجل الإتجاه أو الميول (مثلاً: إيجابي، سلبي أو حيادي) لكل بعدٍ على حدة مذكور في المقال، وذلك على النحو التالي:

السؤال	الشفرة
إيجابي	01
سلبي	02
حيادي/متردد	03

هناك ما مجموعه (63) بند، (13) بند منها تشير إلى **أسباب الصراع**، (18) بند تلخص **النتائج** أو **أبعاد المشاكل** المتعلقة بالصراع، و (32) بنداً تناقش **الحلول** المقترحة لهذه النتائج. معظم البنود معنونة بأحرف ثخينة واضحة وذلك لتسهيل عملية التفسير. وتحت كل عنوان عدة نقاط تشير إلى نفس المسألة موضوع البحث.

**الأسباب: (يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشفرة CSS1) إلى (CSS13).**

**CSS1: الحروب العربية – الإسرائيلية عام 1948 و 1967**

**CSS2: الهجرة اليهودية وتداعياتها: الهجرة اليهودية من روسيا، أوروبا وبلدان أخرى / صعود الصهيونية / وعد بلفور عام 1917 / شراء الأراضي والهجرة الغير شرعية لليهود إلى فلسطين في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الأولى.**

**CSS3: الارتباط والانتماء اليهودي: الارتباط الحضاري والديني والتاريخي والبيولوجي للإسرائيليين القدماء عبر ألوف السنين. / إنها أرض آباء وأجداد اليهود التي وقعت فيها معظم الأحداث التاريخية المذكورة في العهد القديم، وهي بذلك بؤرة ممارساتهم الدينية وعاداتهم. / ويستمر الوجود في الأرض بعد الفترة الزمنية المغطاة في العهد القديم. / هوية إسرائيل اليهودية.**

**CSS4: جبل الهيكل (الحرم الشريف بالعربية) – موقع هيكليين: يحظر على اليهود من الناحية الدينية الصلاة في ساحة المسجد الأقصى وقبة الصخرة المشرفة لأنها موقع "قدس الأقداس". / تخصيص جزء من مساحة جبل الهيكل للصلاة اليهودية وتكون هذه ليست من ضمن المسجد الأقصى أو قبة الصخرة المشرفة. / من الناحية التاريخية كان هناك في فترة من الزمن كنيس في الموقع، هذا في حين تم توسيع قدسية الحرم الشريف من قبل جهات أخرى بحيث لا يُسمح الآن لليهود لأن يكونوا**

بالقرب من الحائط الغربي (حائط البراق). ولهذا السبب يعتبر البعض الوجود اليهودي في الوقف الفلسطيني تدنيًا للمنطقة لا يُقبل به.

**CSS5: التحالف الإسرائيلي - الأمريكي أو الإستراتيجية الأمريكية - الإسرائيلية المدعومة:** تعتمد إسرائيل إلى حد كبير على الدعم الأمريكي وعلى المساعدة العسكرية الأمريكية التي تتحكم من خلالها إسرائيل بالأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة.

**CSS6: الإجراءات الإسرائيلية ضد الفلسطينيين:** هدم البيوت، نزع ملكية أراضي، مصادرة أراضي ذات ملكية خاصة في الضفة الغربية وقمع المظاهرات. / الإعتقالات الجماعية، وجود عسكري وهجمات عسكرية، الإفراط في استخدام القوة من طرف الجيش الإسرائيلي، غارات الجيش الإسرائيلي داخل المدن الفلسطينية والإغتيالات. / القوات العسكرية الإسرائيلية أو المستوطنون يغيرون شبه يومي، يجرحون أو يخطفون وأحياناً يقتلون مدنيين فلسطينيين. / الإغتيالات الخارجة عن نطاق القضاء. / المذابح. / عدم رغبة إسرائيل في رفع الإجراءات الأمنية خوفاً من الإرهاب الأصولي. / الهدف الإستراتيجي من السياج الأمني هو لضمان أمن إسرائيل. / الإبعاد والنفي. / المواجهات والتهديدات. / العنصرية.

**CSS7: أعمال التخريب / الإرهاب الفلسطينية:** استمرار التهديد بالهجمات بدون تمييز من طرف الانتحاريين، هجمات على مستوطنات ومدنيين إسرائيليين، قصف أهداف إسرائيلية بصواريخ القسام وقذائف الهاون. / أعمال خطف أشخاص وطائرات، طعن، إطلاق نار والقذف بالحجارة. / العنف السياسي الفلسطيني والإرهاب الأصولي ضد إسرائيل. / هجمات فلسطينية قاتلة داخل إسرائيل. / عمليات مسلحة ضد الفلسطينيين. / الإعتقال الإداري. / إعتقالات بدون أي محاكمة مشروعة. / مواجهات بالأيدي مع الشرطة الإسرائيلية.

**CSS8: عدم الاعتراف بحق إسرائيل في الوجود:** الجهاد ضد إسرائيل والتهويد هو واجب إسلامي. / فلسطين أمانة إسلامية. / الأرض للفلسطينيين الذين يقطنون فيها منذ زمن طويل؟ / ضرورة تدمير إسرائيل. / المقاومة ما زالت القوة التي توحد الفلسطينيين كشعب.

**CSS9: دولة فلسطين ستصبح دولة إرهابية:** لم يكن للفلسطينيين أية نية في صنع سلام وبأن هدفهم الحقيقي هو القذف باليهود في البحر. / تحريض السلطة الفلسطينية ضد إسرائيل. / تحريض حماس لإطلاق انتفاضة ثالثة ضد إسرائيل. / استمرار المفاوضات مع السلطة الفلسطينية من موقف ضعف يؤدي فقط لمزيد من الإرهاب.

**CSS10: عدم منح الفلسطينيين حقهم في إقامة دولتهم المستقلة - حق تقرير المصير:** حدود الكيان الفلسطيني موضوع الخلاف. / ضرورة قتل كل العرب. / عدم الاعتراف بالفلسطينيين كأصحاب هذه الأرض.

**CSS11: إجراءات إسرائيل ضد غزة:** حروب الجيش الإسرائيلي على غزة. / القيود المفروضة على إدخال مواد البناء يمنع قطاع غزة من إصلاح بنيته التحتية. / استغلال إسرائيل وسيطرتها على موارد الغاز الطبيعي قبالة شواطئ قطاع غزة. / الحصار البحري الذي تفرضه إسرائيل على قطاع غزة. / مكافحة جيش الدفاع الإسرائيلي ضد أي إعادة تسليح أو بناء أنفاق

على طول الحدود الغربية ما بين إسرائيل وقطاع غزة. / غياب التكنولوجيا الإسرائيلية لاكتشاف الأنفاق تحت أرضية. / توغل الجيش الإسرائيلي في عمليات برية داخل قطاع غزة.

**CSS12: أعمال المستوطنين التخريبية:** استمرار هجمات المستوطنين على الفلسطينيين وعلى أراضٍ ومدارس وسيارات فلسطينية. / المستوطنون عدو خطير يسلب الفلسطينيين أراضيهم. / الخوف من عنف المتطرفين من بين المستوطنين اليهود يشكل عاملاً مهماً في قرارات الحكومة الإسرائيلية وفي حياة الفلسطينيين اليومية. / نشاطات المستوطنين في القدس القديمة قد امتدت لما وراء الحي اليهودي.

**CSS13: تفوق إسرائيل العسكري:** لا يستطيع الفلسطينيون فعل أي شيء إذا ما قررت إسرائيل فرض حلّ معين.

**النتائج: (يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشفرة (QSC1) إلى (QSC18)).**

**QSC1: التهديد الديمغرافي لإسرائيل:** حق العودة الذي يطالب به الفلسطينيون هو تهديد ديمغرافي لإسرائيل. / ليس للفلسطينيين أي حق بالهجرة إلى أرض إسرائيل. / تعريف مصطلح "لاجيء" ينبغي أن يكون مطابقاً للتعريف المطبق على مجموعات أخرى (أي بالتحديد: اللاجئ هو شخص عاش في مكان ما وتركه. ولا ينتقل هذا الوضع إلى أجيال).

**QSC2: انتهاكات القانون الدولي وحقوق الإنسان:** منع النساء في وضع الولادة من وصول المستشفيات، (مما يتسبب أحياناً في موت الأم والطفل). / منع الغذاء والنساء من دخول قطاع غزة. / قصف المستشفيات والمدارس. / مقابر الأرقام.

**QSC3: قيود على حرية حركة الفلسطينيين:** نقاط التفتيش والحصار على غزة. / الافتقار للتواصل والتماس بين مناطق الضفة الغربية، وبين الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة. / جدار فصل أم سياج أمن ؟ / قيود على حرية الحركة في التوجه للقدس، لقطاع غزة وضمن مناطق الضفة الغربية. / معاملات الإذلال التي يفرضها الاحتلال الإسرائيلي. / القيود التي تفرضها إسرائيل على إصدار تصاريح عمل للعمال الفلسطينيين. / بناء شبكة معقدة من "الطرق الالتفافية" للمستوطنين فقط. / سيطرة إسرائيل المطلقة على المعابر الحدودية.

**QSC4: اللاجئين الفلسطينيين:** الظروف المروعة للاجئين الفلسطينيين في مخيمات اللاجئين في الدول العربية المجاورة مثل الأردن، العراق، لبنان، سوريا، مصر وغيرها. / إنكار حقوق اللاجئين الإنسانية الأساسية من قبل الدول المضيفة (مثلاً: حقّ المواطنة، حقوق العمل بدون قيود.. وغيرها).

**QSC5: تأثير المستوطنات الإسرائيلية على موارد فلسطين الطبيعية وعلى قيام الدولة:** مواقع لمستوطنات الإستراتيجية في الضفة الغربية (منطقة ج) للسيطرة على المياه والأرض والموارد الطبيعية. / المستوطنات تهدد التواصل الجغرافي. / المستوطنات تقطع أوصال الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة وتسجن الفلسطينيين في جيوب (كنتونات) معزولة، كلّ منها محاط بالمستوطنات وقوات الاحتلال. / المستوطنات تستمر في احتلال بعض أخصب المناطق في الضفة الغربية.

**QSC6: السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعية:** تسيطر إسرائيل على جميع موارد البلد المائية والطبيعية. / نقص مياه الشرب. / اعتماد الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة على إسرائيل بالنسبة لإمدادات الوقود، الأمر الذي يعزز الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي.

**QSC7: توسيع المستوطنات:** توسيع المستوطنات اليهودية في الضفة الغربية. / إصدار وزارة الإسكان والإنشاء الإسرائيلية مئات من العطاءات لإنشاء وحدات سكنية جديدة في القدس الشرقية وفي البلوكات الإستيطانية الرئيسية. / توسع النشاطات الإستيطانية إلى عمليات تسلل في الأحياء الفلسطينية في القدس الشرقية، محيطة هذه بتجمعات سكنية يهودية. / حركة أو انتقال مئات الآلاف من المدنيين الإسرائيليين لداخل المناطق المحتلة. / توسيع المعابر.

**QSC8: العبء الاقتصادي ومقاطعة المنتجات الإسرائيلية:** إعاقة الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي بسبب التكاليف العالية لإنشاء المستوطنات والحوافز الممنوحة للمستوطنين، مقرونةً هذه بالتكاليف العسكرية لضمان أمنهم. / مقاطعة المجتمع الدولي المنتجات الإسرائيلية المصنعة في المستوطنات اليهودية. / مقاطعة الفلسطينيين المنتجات الإسرائيلية.

**QSC9: تهويد القدس:** المحاولات اليومية لطمس الهوية العربية والإسلامية لمدينة القدس. / إنتهاكات إسرائيل في الزحف على الحرم الشريف والمقدسات الإسلامية الأخرى والمسيحية في القدس. / نوايا إسرائيل في تقسيم عمودي لسيادة جبل الهيكل أو الحرم الشريف. / نوايا فتح باب جديد لدخول اليهود ساحة المسجد الأقصى للصلاة. / الانتهاكات للمقدسات والمعالم الأثرية في الضفة الغربية.

**QSC10:** اعتقال اليهود لتأديبهم الصلاة على جبل الهيكل. / انتهاكات الفلسطينيين للمقدسات اليهودية في القدس.

**QSC11:** موجة جديدة من الإنقضااض على بيوت الفلسطينيين بإجراءات غير شرعية أو مستندات مزيفة أو كونها أملاك غائبين، محولين إياها لممتلكات يهودية. / تسليم إخطارات هدم البيوت.

**QSC12:** مشقة الحياة: مستويات غير مسبقة من الفقر والبطالة. / قيود على الرعاية الصحية والتعليم. / مستويات منخفضة لا مثيل لها من الفلتان الأمني الداخلي وعدم الاستقرار.

**QSC13:** تهديدات حماس: لن يكون هناك أي اتفاق مع إسرائيل ما دام هناك فلسطينيين في السجون والمعتقلات الإسرائيلية. / حماس ستحرر كلّ المقاتلين في السجون الإسرائيلية باستخدام القوة. / اختطاف جنود إسرائيليين. / التهديد بإطلاق قذائف الهاون.

**QSC14:** انتهاكات حقوق الأسرى الفلسطينيين: إعتداءات جسدية متكررة وتعذيب السجناء الفلسطينيين. / تردّي حالة الأسرى الفلسطينيين في السجون الإسرائيلية. / أسر النساء والأطفال. / الاعتقال الإداري.

**QSC15:** العناد الإسرائيلي: عدم رغبة إسرائيل في التفاوض مباشرةً مع حماس. / عناد الإسرائيليين وعصيانهم تجاه أي اجتماع أو حلّ أو قرار لا يتماشى مع مخططاتهم. / تتجه الحركة الصهيونية الإسرائيلية للإستيلاء على كلّ الأرض وطرد السكان الغير يهود منها. / الرّفص المستمرّ من طرف المتشدّدين من الجناح اليميني في إسرائيل.

**QSC16: العناد الفلسطيني:** عدم الاعتراف بحق إسرائيل في الوجود. / رفض شرعية إسرائيل كدولة يهودية. / رفض حماس للتفاوض مع إسرائيل. / الرفض المستمر من طرف المتشددين الفلسطينيين. / عناد الفلسطينيين وعصيانهم تجاه أي اجتماع أو حلّ أو قرار لا يتماشى مع مخططاتهم. / تتجه الحركة الوطنية الفلسطينية لإقامة دولة فلسطينية على كل الأرض.

**QSC17: انعدام الثقة ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين:** فشل الاتفاقيات السابقة. / المفاوضات لا تتقدّم ومن المحتمل أن تنهار. / الإعتقاد بأنه لا يوجد شريك أهل للثقة ويعتمد عليه لإحراز تقدّم في عملية سلمية من طرفين.

**QSC18: الانتهاكات الإسرائيلية ضدّ أراضي الفلسطينيين:** لن يقبل الفلسطينيون بأية اتفاقية تحتفظ بموجبها إسرائيل بأي تواجد عسكري على أراضٍ ستصبح جزءاً من دولة فلسطينية.

**الحلول: (يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشفرة (SLN1) إلى (SLN32)).**

**SLN1:** حق اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم.

**SLN2:** عودة مشروطة أو تعويض: عودة مشروطة للاجئين الفلسطينيين بموجب برامج لم تشمل العائلات. / حقّ العودة لدولة فلسطينية ضمن حدود متفق عليها مع تعويضات. / دفع تعويض لأولئك اللاجئين الذين لا يريدون العودة. / حقّ عودة اللاجئين لدولة فلسطينية ضمن حدود متفق عليها بدون تعويضات، ويسمح في حالات "إنسانية" بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام 1948.

**SLN3:** إخلاء / هدم المستوطنات و/أو التعويض عنها: إخلاء جميع المستوطنين الإسرائيليين من الضفة الغربية ويتم تسليم المستوطنات للاجئين العائدين. / هدم جميع المستوطنات المشيدة في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة / الضفة الغربية. / يقبل المستوطنون تعويضات لانسحابهم. / يلتزم من يبقى من المستوطنين بالعيش تحت السيادة الفلسطينية.

**SLN4:** الإمتناع عن إنشاء مستوطنات: تدعو الحكومة الإسرائيلية إلى وقف برنامج الإستيطان. / على المجتمع الدولي، وبشكل خاص الولايات المتحدة، أن تمارس ضغطاً على إسرائيل لوقف برنامجها الإستيطاني. / ولتخفيف الصعوبات التي قد تواجهها إسرائيل في إخلاء مستوطناتها من الضفة الغربية، يمكن نقل الأراضي للسيادة الفلسطينية على مراحل لإعطاء وقت كافٍ لإسرائيل تقوم فيه بتوعية شعبها.

**SLN5:** عدم إجراء أيّ تغيير على المستوطنات: تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب الإسرائيلي من الجدار الفاصل جزءاً من إسرائيل. / ينبغي بقاء جميع المستوطنات بدون تغيير.

**SLN6:** إخلاء الأسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون الإسرائيلية.

**SLN7:** إطلاق سراح الأسرى تحت شروط أو ظروف معينة: إطلاق سراح السجناء السياسيين الفلسطينيين من السجون الإسرائيلية. / إطلاق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين الذين قضوا في السجون الإسرائيلية فترة طويلة من الزمن. / إطلاق سراح

السجناء الذين يعانون من أمراض. / إطلاق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين من السجون الإسرائيلية الذين حكم عليهم قبل اتفاقية أوسلو.

**SLN8: الإبقاء على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين من أجل أمن وسلامة إسرائيل:** الإبقاء في السجون على من قتل – وقف إطلاق سراح الإرهابيين الملتأمة أيديهم بالدماء. / الاعتقاد الإسرائيلي بأن إطلاق سراح الإرهابيين يصبّ فقط الزيت على نار الإرهابيين. / إطلاق سراح الإرهابيين الغير مسؤول سيعرّض أمن الإسرائيليين للخطر.

**SLN9: على السلطة الفلسطينية إيقاف مكافأة الإرهابيين بصرف رواتب لذويهم أثناء فترة سجنهم.**

**SLN10: الكفّ عن الإلتجاء للمؤسسات الدولية:** عدم الإلتجاء للمؤسسات والهيئات الدولية المؤثرة، بما فيها الهيئات القانونية التي تتمتع بصلاحيات دولية، في حالة موافقة إسرائيل على إطلاق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين.

**SLN11: الوجود العسكري الإسرائيلي في فلسطين:** وجود إسرائيلي على المعابر الفلسطينية. / وجود مراكز رقابة إسرائيلية دائمة في الدولة الفلسطينية. / ينبغي على قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلي أن تبقى في المناطق المحتلة / الضفة الغربية.

**SLN12: دولة فلسطينية منزوعة السلاح:** مصادرة جميع الأسلحة الغير مرخصة ونزع سلاح الفصائل الفلسطينية المسلحة. / سجن ومحاكمة جميع من لهم علاقة بهجمات إرهابية. / نزع سلاح حماس والجهاد الإسلامي. / الشرط الإسرائيلي: دولة فلسطينية منزوعة السلاح بدون جيش.

**SLN13: نزع سلاح قطاع غزة:** المطالبة الإسرائيلية بنزع سلاح المجموعات الفلسطينية في قطاع غزة. / تدمير جميع مخزون الصواريخ وقذائف الهاون وغيرها. / تدمير جميع الأنفاق المتواجدة تحت حدود قطاع غزة.

**SLN14: توقف عمليات المقاتلين ضد إسرائيل:** ينبغي على السلطة الفلسطينية اتخاذ خطوات صارمة لوقف الهجمات الفلسطينية ضد إسرائيل. / تتمثل مخاوف إسرائيل الشديدة بالتهديد الأمني الذي تشكّله الأنظمة الإسلامية المتطرفة.

**SLN15: وساطة أطراف ثالثة:** مراقب دولي على الحدود ما بين الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً وإسرائيل. / يجب أن تكون أية عملية نحو الجدوى منقادةً بالقانون والقرارات الدولية، وأن تكون حيادية وتحاسب كلا الطرفين وتضع نهايةاً للتصرفات بدون عقاب. / على المجتمع الدولي أن يمارس ضغطاً على السلطة الفلسطينية وجامعة الدول العربية لكي تتعهد بسلام يتمّ التفاوض حوله في المنطقة. قبل بدء المفاوضات، على كلّ حكومة أن تبيّن التزاماتها وتقيداً بالعملية السلمية، وإلا سيكون هناك فقط وعوداً منكوبة. / يجب على عملية سلمية قابلة للحياة أن تحاسب كلا الطرفين عن أية انتهاكات في قانون حقوق الإنسان والقانون الدولي، وبناء الثقة اللازمة التي ستمكن كلا الطرفين من التواصل مع بعضهما البعض والتوصل لتسوية.

**SLN16: دولة فلسطينية قوية:** لن تكون إسرائيل آمنة حتّى قيام دولة فلسطينية تكون قويّة بما يكفي للسيطرة على الهجمات الفلسطينية. / ينبغي أن يكون لفلسطين قوة قويّة من الشرطة. / ينبغي أن تستمرّ الشرطة الفلسطينية والقوات الخاصة في العمل ضد أولئك الذين يعرّضون الأمن الوطني الفلسطيني للخطر.

**SLN17:** التنسيق الأمني ما بين قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية وقوات الأمن الفلسطينية.

**SLN18:** تقسيم القدس: القدس الشرقية للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربية للإسرائيليين. / تقسيم المدينة حسب الأحياء الفلسطينية واليهودية. / ينبغي تقسيم المدينة إلى جزئين، جزء يهودي يكون تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية وجزء إسلامي – مسيحي يكون تحت السيطرة الفلسطينية. / تكون إسرائيل "حارسة" حائط المبكى والدولة الفلسطينية "حارسة" المواقع الإسلامية المقدسة. والوضع الراهن للأماكن المسيحية المقدسة يبقى بدون تغيير.

**SLN19:** رقابة دولية على القدس: ينبغي أن تكون القدس مدينة عالمية تحت سلطة الأمم المتحدة. / ينبغي أن تكون القدس مدينة عالمية تحت سلطة عهد أو ميثاق بلدي متعدد الأديان. / تتولى هيئة محايدة (مثلاً الأمم المتحدة) حراسة جميع الأماكن المقدسة.

**SLN20:** اتفاقية حول إدارة الأماكن المقدسة: ينبغي أن تكون المدينة القديمة تحت سلطة مشتركة. / حرية الدخول للأماكن المقدسة لكل شخص. / لن يكون لأي جانب سيادة على الأماكن المقدسة.

**SLN21:** القدس تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية: تبقى القدس موحدة وتحت السيادة الإسرائيلية. / تكون جميع الأماكن المقدسة، شاملة الأماكن المقدسة في القدس الشرقية، تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية. / ضم القدس الشرقية لإسرائيل.

**SLN22:** إنهاء الاحتلال الإسرائيلي للأراضي التي احتلت في نكسة عام 1967 : انسحاب إسرائيل لحدود عام 1967. / فك الارتباط من حدودها مع قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية. / الخط الأخضر هو الحدود ما بين الدولتين. / رسم حدود الكيان الفلسطيني.

**SLN23:** انسحاب مشروط ومبادلة أراضي: انسحاب إسرائيل لحدود عام 1967 مع تعديلات من خلال الإتفاق على مبادلة أراضي بشكل متكافئ. / ستضم إسرائيل في مثل هذه الحال 3 – 4 % من مساحة الضفة الغربية التي تشمل التجمعات الإستيطانية الرئيسية مع التفاوض على ما يعادلها من أراض على الجانب الفلسطيني. / يمكن التخلي عن أجزاء من أراضي إسرائيل مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات من أراض فلسطينية.

**SLN24:** الحدود التي أقامها جدار الفصل.

**SLN25:** بناء جوف من الثقة المتبادلة والتفاهم بين الجانبين: منع جميع أشكال التحريض على الكراهية. / ثقافة السلام. / ضرورة أن تلعب وسائل الإعلام دوراً إيجابياً في تعزيز السلام والإيديولوجيات والبرامج الداعمة للسلام.

**SLN26:** إجراءات الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي الصارمة ضد الصراع: يجب على هذه الدول أن تتخذ دوراً فعالاً في العملية السلمية لأن لديها القدرة على التأثير بشكل كبير على كلا الجانبين، الإسرائيلي والفلسطيني. / إذا لم يتجاوب الإسرائيليون والفلسطينيون مع العملية السلمية، يجب على هذه الدول – من أجل السلام – استخدام شكلاً من أشكال الدبلوماسية أكثر "هجوماً"

/ يجب عليها مع المجتمع الدولي الإستمرار في ممارسة ضغطٍ على إسرائيل والفلسطينيين لإلزامهم بالعملية السلمية واتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة لتعزيز سلامٍ دائم.

**SLN27: الأمم المتحدة كجانب فعال:** ينبغي على الأمم المتحدة أن تلعب دوراً أكثر فعاليةً وتقدماً على الأرض. ينبغي أن تتحرر الأمم المتحدة من نفوذ وهيمنة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

**SLN28: وقف عمليات قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية ضد الفلسطينيين:** ينبغي على قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية إيقاف عملياتها العسكرية المسلحة ضد الفلسطينيين. / ينبغي عليها وقف سياسة الإغتيالات. / وينبغي عليها التخلي عن سياسة العقوبات الجماعية وهدم البيوت ومصادرة الأراضي الفلسطينية لأسباب أمنية مزعومة.

**SLN29: رفع الحصار عن قطاع غزة:** للتمكن من زيارة الأقارب خارج قطاع غزة، للتمكن من إعادة بناء البيوت المهتمة، من أجل حرية التجارة، ورفع القيود المفروضة على مجال الصيد البحري في القطاع.

**SLN30: حرية الحركة:** إنشاء مطار. / إعادة فتح مطار غزة. / خلق "ممر آمن" ما بين الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة. / الميناء، المعابر و تمويل الأجور/ يعتبر الفلسطينيون بأن اتخاذ الحكومة الإسرائيلية إجراءات جادة وفعالية لرفع الحصار والتخفيف من الحزام الأمني سيخفف من العنف. / وضع نهاية لبناء الجدار الفاصل.

**SLN31: التعاون الإقتصادي:** القيام بمشاريع مشتركة في جميع القطاعات الإقتصادية وتعاون جاد مع جميع الأطراف والمجموعات في المنطقة من أجل خلق واقعٍ جديد للسلام والإزدهار في مجالات متعددة مثل المياه، الصحة، البيئة، السياحة وغيرها حتى قبل التوصل لاتفاقية سلام نهائي ما بين إسرائيل وجيرانها العرب. / منح العمال الفلسطينيين إمكانية العمل داخل إسرائيل. / تحسين الأوضاع الإقتصادية والمعيشية سيكون له تأثيرات إيجابية هامة على دعم أية مفاوضات سلام مستقبلية. / السماح بحرية نقل البضائع من وإلى فلسطين.

**SLN32: السيطرة المشتركة على الموارد الطبيعية:** السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعية: الأراضي، المياه، المعادن، البحر وذلك لفائدة النمو الإقتصادي وازدهار الشعبين الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي. / ضمان السيطرة المشروعة على الموارد الطبيعية التي تشمل الأراضي والمياه والمعادن والحقوق البحرية./ الموارد الطبيعية حيوية للتنمية المستدامة ونمو أي مجتمع، ولذا ينبغي مراقبتها لفائدة جميع السكان بدون تمييز.

**SLN33: حلّ الدولتين.**

**SLN34: دولة واحدة ثنائية القومية.**

**العدد الإجمالي للمقالات:** يشير المشقّر هنا إلى العدد الإجمالي للمقالات في كلّ صحيفة.



#### C.4 ورقة التشفير

##### خطوات عملية التشفير:

1. اقرأ المقال لترى إن كان ذا صلة بالموضوع أم لا.
2. إن كان ذا صلة بالموضوع، شفره على المستوى الأول، ثم على مستوى المقال من أجل جمع معلومات عامة.
3. بعد ذلك شفر المستوى الثاني، مستوى الأدلة.
4. ابدأ عملية تشفير جديدة إن وجدت دليلاً جديداً في نفس المقال.

##### الفئات الإسمية أو الشكلية

IS2: إسم الصحيفة

IS1: المشفر

IS4: التاريخ

IS3: رقم العدد

IS6: رقم الصفحة

IS5: القسم / الباب

IS8: المصدر

IS7: نوع المقال

IS10: ميل أو اتجاه المقال

IS9: أسلوب المقال

IS12: هدف الصورة

IS11: الصورة

IS14: العلاقة بمحتوى المقال

IS13: النسق اللوني للصورة

IS16: حجم / طول المقال

IS15: المناسبة

##### المحتويات

السؤال	نعم	لا
خسائر بشرية (CL)		
المسؤولية (RS)		

الأسباب			
+	-/+	-	البند
			QCSS1
			QCSS2
			QCSS3
			QCSS4
			QCSS5
			QCSS6
			QCSS7
			QCSS8
			QCSS9
			QCSS10
			QCSS11
			QCSS12
			QCSS13

النتائج			
+	-/+	-	البند
			QSC1
			QSC2
			QSC3
			QSC4
			QSC5
			QSC6
			QSC7
			QSC8
			QSC9
			QSC10
			QSC11
			QSC12

			<b>QSC13</b>
			<b>QSC14</b>
			<b>QSC15</b>
			<b>QSC16</b>
			<b>QSC17</b>
			<b>QSC18</b>

الحلول			
+	-/+	-	البند
			<b>SLN1</b>
			<b>SLN2</b>
			<b>SLN3</b>
			<b>SLN4</b>
			<b>SLN5</b>
			<b>SLN6</b>
			<b>SLN7</b>
			<b>SLN8</b>
			<b>SLN9</b>
			<b>SLN10</b>
			<b>SLN11</b>
			<b>SLN12</b>
			<b>SLN13</b>
			<b>SLN14</b>
			<b>SLN15</b>
			<b>SLN16</b>
			<b>SLN17</b>
			<b>SLN18</b>
			<b>SLN19</b>
			<b>SLN20</b>

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			<b>SLN21</b>
			<b>SLN22</b>
			<b>SLN23</b>
			<b>SLN24</b>
			<b>SLN25</b>
			<b>SLN26</b>
			<b>SLN27</b>
			<b>SLN28</b>
			<b>SLN29</b>
			<b>SLN30</b>
			<b>SLN31</b>
			<b>SLN32</b>

عدد المقالات:

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## C.1 Additions to the Palestinian Codebook

Section	Additions	Code
<b>IS5:</b> Section	Reports	02
	International Palestinian	03
	Localities	04
	Israeli affairs/Panorama Press	05
	Articles	06
	Dialogues	07
	Varieties	08
<b>IS7:</b> Type of articles	Report	02
	Analysis/scenario	03
	Israeli Public Opinion Poll	14
	Public Opinion Poll	15
<b>IS8:</b> Source	Public Opinion Center	09
	Channel	10
	Caricature	11
	UN Office	12
	Btselem	13
	Human Rights Center	14
<b>CSS6:</b> Israeli measures against Palestinians	Deportation and exile./Confrontations and threats./Racism.	
<b>CSS7:</b> Palestinians acts of vandalism/terrorism	Fights with the Israeli police.	
<b>QSC2:</b> Violations of International law and Human rights	Cemetery of Numbers.	
<b>QSC7:</b> Settlement expansion	Expansion of the crossings.	
<b>QSC9:</b> Judaization of Jerusalem	Violations of holy places and monuments in the West Bank.	
<b>QSC11</b>	Delivery notifications of house demolitions.	

*Continued on next page*

*Continued from previous page*

Section	Additions	Code
<b>QS13:</b> Hamas threats	Threat of firing mortars.	
<b>QSC14:</b> Acts against Palestinian prisoners	Imprisoned Women and children./ Administrative detentions.	
<b>NEW _ SLN33</b>	Two states solution.	
<b>NEW _ SLN34</b>	A binational state.	

## Chapter D

# CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK - HEBREW TRANSLATION

### נספח C

## מסגרת עבודה כללית לניתוח התוכן

### C.0.1 מטרת המחקר

- 'מה נאמר?' – נושאים / ממדים
- 'מי אמר את זה?' – איזה עיתון
- 'מי מושפע?' – פלסטינים או ישראלים
- 'ואיך?' – מי אחראי?

המחקר מתעתד לבחון את השפעת הגורם ברמת במקרו (המדיה), על הגורם ברמת המיקרו (תהליך העיבוד של הקהל). הן תוכן המדיה והן טווח הדעות שעל סדר היום הציבורי צריכים להיות מוערכים כדי לבחון את תפקוד המדיה בפלסטין ובישראל.

המתודולוגיה של המחקר מורכבת ממדגם של כל הכתבות שנכתבו על הקונפליקט הפלסטיני-ישראלי. הוא נוטה לחקור כיצד רוב העיתונים החשובים בפלסטין ובישראל ממסגרים את הקונפליקט ואת תהליך השלום.

### C.1 יחידת ניתוח

התהליך בו נבחרה יחידת הניתוח מערבת את (1) תקופת הניתוח, (2) דגימת המדיה, (3) דגימת הכותרות לאורך כל העיתונים ו-(4) קידוד המדגם.

### C.1.1 תקופת הניתוח

מדגם המדיה המודפסת הבאה נבדק בתקופה שבין 1 באוגוסט 2013 ועד 30 לאפריל 2014, באופן הבא:

שנה	חודש
2013	אוגוסט
	ספטמבר
	אוקטובר
	נובמבר
	דצמבר
2014	ינואר
	פברואר
	מארס
	אפריל

### C.1.2 מדגם המדיה

מדגם המדיה או יחידת הניתוח כוללים מספר כולל של שמונה עיתונים, ארבעה בכל צד:

**בפלסטין:** אל קודס, אל-אהיים, אל-חייאב, אל-ג'ידה ופלסטין.


**בישראל:** ישראל היום, ידיעות אחרונות, הארץ ומעריב.

### C.1.3 קידוד המדגם

קידוד המדגם נקבע בשני שלבים (ראה תרשים C.1 למטה). בשלב הראשון כל הכתבות במהלך תקופת הניתוח ייבחרו ביחידות ובחלקים של מחקר המדיה, היכן שהכתורת הראשית או המשנית תכלול מילים הקשורות ל"פלסטין, ישראל או הקונפליקט". לא משנה האם מילת המפתח מודפסת בפונט קטן או גדול, או האם קודמת לה תחילית כמו "אנטי-טרוריסט", עוקבת אחריה סיומת כמו "טרורזם", מוזכרת לבד "טרוריסט", או בהקשר "פיגוע/התקפת טרור".

בשלב השני, המאמר הנבחר ייקרא כולו ותיעשה לגביו בדיקה האם הוא מתייחס לנושאים המרכזיים של הקונפליקט (למשל נפגעים, פליטים פלסטינים, התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, בטחון ישראל, מעמד ירושלים, משאבים טבעיים, גבולות, אמונות, רגשות ועקרונות ועזה). אם לא, אז המאמר לא יקודד.

תרשים C.1: אסטרטגיה לגבי איזה כתבות נכנסות למדגם:



### קריטריונים לגבי מה נכלל בקידוד

יחידות הרישום מהוות מאמרים בחדשות ובמאמרי הדעה בעיתון, שדנים, מזכירים או מתארים הצעות / רעיונות/ נקודות מבט לגבי הנושאים המרכזיים של הקונפליקט, היסטוריה, הסכמים, הסכמי שלום, החלטות/פתרונות (resolutions), שחקנים פוליטיים ונאומים, אירועים, דיווחים יום-יומיים של עימות, התקפות ונפגעים, אידיאולוגיות ודעת קהל. רשומות שלא מתייחסים לקונפליקט באופן ישיר, לא ייחקרו.

### קריטריונים לגבי מה לא נכלל בקידוד

מאמרים מהמדורים הבאים לא ייכללו: ספורט, נסיעות/תיירות, בית, תרבות, רכב, אופנה או בידור לא יקודדו וזאת משום שהם כוללים מעט מאוד כתבות המתייחסות לקונפליקט. כך גם לגבי מגזינים/ברשורים המצורפים לעיתון.



#### C.1.4 יחידת הקשר

יחידת הקשר לניתוח זה היא הכתבה כולה. המקודדים יקודדו את הכתבות המצוינות בספר הקידוד, בין אם סיבות, השלכות או פתרונות.

#### C.2 הוראות קידוד כלליות

הקידוד לכל אחת מהכתבות ייעשה בדיוק לפי השלבים הבאים:

1. ראשית, יש לקרוא את הכתבה כולה פעם אחת.
2. יש להזין את מספר הסדרה לתוך גיליון הקידוד.
3. לאחר מכן, יקודדו כל הקטגוריות הפורמאליות האחרות (מספר גיליון, תאריך וכו').
4. יש לקרוא את הרשומה כולה שוב לפי קטגוריות התוכן.
5. על הקידוד להתבצע רק לפי מה שבכתבה, ולא לפי מה שהמקודדים חושבים בינם ובין עצמם.
6. אין זה משנה האם הפרטים המוזכרים בכתבה הם השערות או עובדות.
7. עבור קידוד התוכן, ייעשה שימוש בכותרות ובטקסט המוביל
8. על המקודדים להמשיך לפי גיליון האקסל שהוגדר מראש

##### C.2.1 הוראות עיבוד כלליות

על המקודד לזכור את השלבים הבאים כאשר מעבדים את הקודים:

1. מספר הקוד צריך להיות תחת האייטם הנכון בגיליון הקידוד
2. לכל איטם יש תא מוגדר בגיליון הקידוד
3. מספר הקוד המתאים חייב להיות תמיד רשום במלואו
4. עבור כל כתבה יש שורה שלמה. כלומר, מספר הכתבות המקודדות חייב להיות תואם למספר השורות.

#### C.3 שיטת הקטגוריות

ספר הקידוד מורכב משתי רמות של ניתוח: (1) רמת הכתבה או מקור מידע ו-(2) ממדים של הקונפליקט.

##### C.3.1 רמת הכתבה

רמת הכתבה או מקור המידע מורכבים מהקטגוריות הרשמיות, שהן: שם המקודד, שם העיתון ומספר הגיליון והתאריך, מדור, מספר העמוד, סוג הכתבה, מקור, סוג הכתבה, תמיכה על ידי תמונה, מטרת התמונה, מגמה, קישור, סיבה מאחורי כתיבת הכתבה, ואורך / היקף הכתבה.

### IS1: מקודד

**הגדרה** – המקודד הוא מי שמנתח את מקור המידע (למשל, העיתון). זה צריך להיכנס בדף הקידוד באופן הבא:

מקודד	קוד
אליאס קוקלי	01
דנה גיא	02

### IS2: שם העיתון

אחרי כן, העיתון בו הכתבה פורסמה יקודד באופן הבא:

קוד	עיתון
<b>עיתונים פלסטינים</b>	
01	אל קודס
02	אל אהיים
03	אל חייאת אל ג'דידה
04	פלסטין
<b>עיתונים ישראלים</b>	
05	ישראל היום
06	ידיעות אחרונות
07	הארץ
08	מעריב

### IS3: מספר גיליון

כאן יופיע מספר הגיליון של העיתון המקודד.

הערה למקודד: מספר הגיליון מודפס על העמוד הראשי של העיתון.

- למשל: 7854.

### IS4: תאריך

התאריך שבו פורסם העיתון יקודד בפורמט DD-MM-YYYY.

- למשל 21-08-2013.

#### IS5: מדור

כאן המקודד יציין את שם המדור בו מופיעה הכתבה, בין אם מדובר בחלק הפוליטי/חדשות, מאמרי מערכת (כולל מאמרי דעה ותגובה) ועסקים (כלכלה), באופן הבא:

קוד	מדור
01	פוליטי / חדשות
02	מאמרי מערכת (דעה / תגובה)
03	עסקים

#### IS6: מספר עמוד

כאן המקודד יקודד את מספר העמוד בו מופיעה הכתבה.

- למשל: עמוד 4

#### IS7: סוג הכתבה

בחלק זה, המקודד יציין את סוג הכתבה: סיפור חדשותי, טור דעה / פרשנות, רפורטז' / ספור רקע, מאמר מערכת, פורטרט, ריאיון, תבליט, כותרת בלבד, תיעוד, סקר דעת קהל, מכתב לעורך, שאלה לעיתון, באופן הבא:

קוד	סוג הכתבה
01	חדשות
02	טור / פרשנות
03	רפורטז' / סיפור רקע
04	מאמר מערכת
05	כתבת פורטרט
06	ריאיון
07	תבליט
08	כותרת בלבד
09	תיעוד
10	סקר דעת קהל
11	מכתב לעורך
12	שאלה לעיתון
13	אחר, פרט

**IS8: מקור**

כאן, המקודד יתייחס למקור הכתבה, האם זה העיתון, סוכנות חדשות, עורכ/ת, עיתונאי/ת, קורא/ת או פוליטיקאי/ת?

מחבר/מקור	קוד
עיתון	01
סוכנות חדשות	02
עורך	03
עיתונאי	04
פוליטיקאי	06
לא מזוהה	07
אחר, פירוט	08

**IS9: סגנון הכתבה**

כאן המקודד יתייחס לסגנון הכתבה; עובדה או דעה?

סגנון	קוד
עובדתי (חדשות, דיווח, תיעוד וכו')	01
דעה (מאמר מערכת, מכתבי קוראים, ביקורת)	02
לא ניתן לדעת	03

**IS10: מגמת הכתבה**

כאן, המקודד יקבע את המגמה הכללית של הכתבה, האם חיובית, שלילית או נייטרלית, באופן הבא:

מגמת הכתבה	קוד
שלילית	01
חיובית	02
נייטרלית	03

**IS11: תמונה**

המקודד יציין כאן האם הכתבה מלווה בתמונה או לא, באופן הבא:

תמונה	קוד
כן	01
לא	02

**IS12: מטרת התמונה**

מטרת התמונה תיקבע כאן, האם אפיזודית (מקרית) או תמטית (נושאת):

מטרה	קוד
אפיזודית (מקרית)	01
תמטית (נושאת)	02

### IS13: טונאליות של התמונה

כאן, המקודד יתאר את הטון של התמונה, האם יש בה גוון תוקפני - aggressive (שלילי), רגוע – peaceful (חיובי) או נייטרלי, באופן הבא:

קוד	טון
01	תוקפני
02	רגוע
03	נייטרלי

### IS14: קשר לתוכן הכתבה:

המקודד יקבע כאן האם התמונה תומכת בטון של הכתבה או לא

קוד	קשר
01	כן
01	לא
02	לא ניתן לדעת

### IS15: סיבה

חלק זה מתמודד עם הסיבה שמאחורי כתיבת הכתבה; מה הניע את המחבר לכתוב את הכתבה. המקודד יקודד כאן את הסיבה באופן הבא:

סיבה	קוד	דוגמה
אירוע פוליטי	01	ועידה / כנס / נאומים על ידי דמויות פוליטיות
אירוע דתי	02	למשל בישראל – יום כיפור, פסח, חנוכה, בפלסטין – איד אל פיטר, איד אל אדחה, מאווליד אל נאבי
אירוע פטריסטי / לאומי	03	יום העצמאות או יום לאומי / זיכרון של אירועים, למשל הנכבה, מלחמת יום כיפור
תגובה לכתבה	04	מכתב שנכתב למחבר, עורך או לעיתון / תגובה לכתבה
תקיפה / התקפה	05	מעשה ונדליזם (למשל מעצר המוני, תקיפות של מתנחלים, לוחמים, כוח צה"ל)
ממד בעייתי	06	הקטגוריה כוללת את אחד מהבאים: התרחבות מתמשכת של התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, בטחון ישראל
אחר	07	יש לפרט

### IS16: אורך / היקף הכתבה

היקף הכתבה ייקבע בהתאמה לשטח שהוא תופס בעמוד. המקודד יעריך את השטח באופן הבא:

שטח	קוד
עד $\frac{1}{4}$ עמוד	01
עד $\frac{1}{2}$ עמוד	02
עד $\frac{3}{4}$ עמוד	03
יותר מ $\frac{3}{4}$ עמוד	04

## C.3.2 רמת ראיות

רמת הראיות מכסה את רוב ההיבטים החשובים של הקונפליקט, כמו נפגעי המלחמה ואחריות כלפי נפגעים אלו, פליטים פלסטינים, התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, בטחון ישראל, מעמד ירושלים, משאבי טבע, גבולות, אמונות, רגשות ועקרונות, ועזה. בסופו של דבר, המקודד מתבקש לציין את המספר הכולל של הכתבות.

### CL: נפגעים

ממד זה יכלול כל אזכור של נפגעים בכל אחד מהצדדים, כתוצאה מהקונפליקט בין פלסטינים וישראלים. המקודד יקודד נפגעים אם דווחו או לא:

קוד	אייטם
01	כן (המשך ל-RS)
02	לא (דלג ל-CSS)

**הגדרות:** נפגעים מוגדרים כאינדיבידואלים שנפצעו, נהרגו, נרצחו, נתפסו או נעדרים בפעולה ישירה או עקיפה עם האויב. פעולה ישירה מתייחס לכאלה שהיו מעורבות ישירות מרצונם במלחמה כלוחמים/ מתנגדים. פעולה עקיפה מתייחס לאזרחים שלא היו מעורבים באופן ישיר אלא שהפעולה נכפתה עליהם.

### RS: אחריות

המקודד יקודד את מי שהיה אחראי לנפגעים באופן הבא:

קוד	אחריות
01	צבא ההגנה לישראל (צה"ל)
02	לוחמים פלסטינים
03	מתנחלים ישראלים
05	אזרחים ישראלים
06	לא ידוע
07	לא הוזכר
08	אחרים
09	אחר, נא לפרט

**יש לשים לב:** 'לא ידוע' יקודד כאשר האינדיבידואלים האחראים לא ידועים, או עדיין תחת חקירה. 'לא הוזכר' יקודד כאשר האחריות על הפעולה ידועה אבל לא צוינה על ידי המחבר או הכתבה.

- דוגמה 1:** "בספירה האחרונה, קצין האו"ם לתיאום עניינים הומניטאריים מדווח ש-2104 פלסטינים נהרגו בעזה, כולל 1462 אזרחים, ביניהם 495 ילדים ו-253 נשים."<sup>1</sup>

קוד	שאלה
01	CL
02	RS

<sup>1</sup> Booth, William (August 29, 2014). The Washington Post, "The U.N. says 7 in 10 Palestinians killed in Gaza were civilians, Israel disagrees."

- **דוגמה 2:** "אברהם וולס, 29, נהרג כאשר טרוריסט דרס אותו עם בולדוזר. נהג הבולדוזר המשיך להתנגש אל תוך אוטובוס עירוני, הופך אותו על צידו ופוצע שישה ישראלים נוספים. חייל ישראלי, 20, נפצע קשה בהתקפת ירי נפרדת."<sup>2</sup>

שאלה	קוד
CL	01
RS	01

ההמשך יכלול סוגיות/ ממדים/ נושאים של הקונפליקט, המקוטלגים כגורמים של הקונפליקט, השלכות, ופתרונות מוצעים. פריטים אחדים המפורטים בכל קטגוריה מתארים את הקונפליקט ואת תהליך השלום מנקודות המבט של הפלסטינים ושל הישראלים. כל מקודד יקודד את המגמה (למשל, חיובי, שלילי או נייטרלי) לכל אחד מהממדים המוזכרים בכתבה, באופן הבא:

שאלה	קוד
חיובי	01
שלילי	02
נייטרלי / אמביוולנטי	03

המספר הכולל של הפריטים הוא 63: 13 פריטים מתייחסים לסיבות של הקונפליקט, 18 מסכמים את ההשלכות או היבטים בעייתיים של הקונפליקט, ו-32 פריטים דנים בפתרונות מוצעים להשלכות אלה. לרוב הפריטים תהיה כותרת עם תיאור מודגש כדי להקל על תהליך הקידוד. מתחת לכל כותרת יש כמה נקודות שמתייחסות לאותה הבעיה:

## גורמים

### CSS1: מלחמות ערבי-ישראל 1948 ו-1967

**CSS2: הגירה יהודית והתקופה שאחריה:** הגירה יהודית מרוסיה, אירופה ומדינות נוספות / עליית הציונות / הצערת בלפור בשנת 1917 / רכישת אדמות והגירה לא חוקית של יהודים לפלסטין אחרי מלחמת העולם הראשונה.

**CSS3: קשר יהודי ושייכות:** קשר תרבותי, דתי, היסטורי, וביולוגי לעברים הקדמונים במשך אלפי שנים / זוהי מולדתם של אבות היהודים, היכן שרוב האירועים ההיסטוריים מוזכרים בברית הישנה התרחשו, ולכן המוקד של המנהגים וההלכות הדתיות / הנוכחות בארץ ממשיכה טוב אחרי התקופה שמכוסה בברית החדשה / זהות יהודית של ישראל.

**CSS4: הר הבית (Haram al sharif בערבית) אתר של שני מקדשים:** אף יהודי לא רוצה להתפלל באל-אקצה וכיפת הסלע היא המקום של קודש הקודשים ולכן מחוץ לתחום של היהודים להתפלל. / ההקצאה של חלק מהאזור של הר הבית למתפללים יהודים שאינו אל אקצה או כיפת הסלע / מבחינה היסטורית היתה תקופה שבה לא היה בית כנסת ממוקם שם בעוד שהקדושה של חארם אל שאריף הורחבה על ידי אחרים כך שהיא

<sup>2</sup> Saban, I., Yalon, Y., and Daniel Siryoti (August 5, 2014). Israel Hayom: "Israeli killed, another seriously hurt in 2 Jerusalem terror attacks."

לא מורשת ליהודים להיות ליד הכותל המערבי. לעניין זה יש כמה ששוקלים נוכחות יהודית בוואקף הפלסטיני ביחד כחילול האזור שאינו מתקבל על הדעת.

**CSS5: הברית הישראלית-אמריקאית או אסטרטגיית הגיבוי האמריקאית-ישראלית:** ישראל תלויה מאוד בתמיכה של ארה"ב, בתמיכה הצבאית של ארה"ב שבאמצעותם ישראל שולטת בשטחים הפלסטינים הכבושים.

**CSS6: האמצעים בהם נוקטת ישראל נגד הפלסטינים:** הרס בתים, הפקעת אדמות, החרמת אדמות בבעלות פרטית בגדה המערבית, ועקירת מטעים / מעצרים המוניים, נוכחות צבאית והתקפות, שימוש מופרז של הצבא הישראלי בכוח, פשיטות של הצבא לערים פלסטיניות וחיסולים ממוקדים / כוחות ישראלים / מתנחלים פולשים כמעט בכל יום, פוצעים, חוטפים ולפעמים הורגים אזרחים פלסטינים / חיסולים ללא משפט / טבח / חוסר נכונות ישראלית להסיר אמצעי אבטחה מפחד מטרוריסט / פונדמנטליסטי / המטרה האסטרטגית של גדר בטחון היא להבטיח את הערבות של ישראל.

**CSS7: מעשי ונדליזם על ידי הפלסטינים:** איום מתמיד של התקפות פיצוצי התאבדות, תקיפות על התנחלויות ואזרחים ישראלים, טילי קסאם והפגזות מרגמה על מטרות ישראליות / חטיפות, דקירות, אירועי ירי ויידוי אבנים / האלימות הפוליטית הפלסטינית וטרור פונדמנטליסטי נגד ישראל / תקיפות פלסטיניות קטלניות בתוך ישראל / פעולות מזוינות נגד פלסטינים / מעצרים מנהליים / מעצרים ללא משפט לגיטימי.

**CSS8: אי הכרה בזכות הקיום של ישראל:** ג'יהאד נגד ישראל וייחודה זוהי חובה אסלאמית / פלסטיין היא הבטחה אסלאמית / האדמה היא לפלסטינים, בה הם גרים מאז המאה השביעית / הצורך להרוס את ישראל / התנגדות היא עדיין הכוח שמאחד את פלסטיין כאומה אחת.

**CSS9: מדינת פלסטיין תהפוך למדינת טרור:** הפלסטינים מעולם לא התכוונו לעשות שלום והכוונה האמיתית שלהם היא לזרוק את היהודים לים / הסתה של הרשות הפלסטינית נגד ישראל / הסתה של חמאס להתחיל אינתיפאדה שלישית נגד ישראל / רדיפה של משא ומתן עם הרשות הפלסטינית מעמדה של חולשה רק תגרום ליותר טרור.

**CSS10: אי מתן הזכות לפלסטינים לייסד את המדינה שלהם – זכות להגדרה עצמית:** הגבולות הנתונים בסימן שאלה של הישות הפלסטינית / הצורך להרוג את כל הערבים / אי הכרה בפלסטינים כבעלים של מולדתם.

**CSS11: האמצעים בהם נוקטת ישראל נגד עזה:** צה"ל נלחם בעזה / הגבלה על הבאת חומרי בניה מונע מעזה לתקן את התשתיות / הניצול והשליטה הישראלים על מקורות הגז בחוף של רצועת עזה / המצור הימי של ישראל על עזה / טענות צה"ל על חימוש מחדש או בניית מנהרה במזרח גבולות ישראל-רצועת עזה / היעדר טכנולוגיות ישראליות לגלות מנהרות תת קרקעיות / צה"ל פולש קרקעית לתוך רצועת עזה.

**CSS12: מעשי ונדליזם של מתנחלים:** מתנחלים ממשיכים בתקיפות על פלסטינים ואדמותיהם / בתי ספר / מכוניות / מתנחלים הם אויב מסוכן שמנשל את הפלסטינים מאדמותיהם. / פחד מאלימות מקיצונים בין מתנחלים יהודים הוא גורם בהחלטות הממשל הישראלי ובחיי היום יום של הפלסטינים / פעילויות המתנחלים בעיר העתיקה התרחבו מעבר לרובע היהודי.

**CSS13: עליונות צבאית של ישראל:** פלסטינים יכולים להיות ללא תשובה אם ישראל מחליטה לכפות פתרון.



## השלכות

**QSC1: איום דמוגרפי לישראל:** הפלסטינים דורשים זכות שיבה הוא איום דמוגרפי לישראל / הפלסטינים אינם בעלי זכות להגר לאדמת ישראל / ההגדרה של "פליט" צריכה להיות בהתאמה להגדרה שמישומת לקבוצות אחרות (כלומר, פליט הוא מישהו שלמעשה חי במקום כלשהו ועזב אותו, הוא סטטוס שלא מועבר בדורות).

**QSC2: הפרה של החוק הבינלאומי וזכויות אדם:** נשים יולדות נמנעות מלהגיע לבתי חולים (לעיתים תוך גרימת מוות) / משלוחי מזון ותרופות נחסמים מלהיכנס לעזה / הפצצה של בתי חולים ובתי ספר.

**QSC3: הגבלות מעשיות של חופש התנועה של הפלסטינים:** מחסומים ומצור על עזה / חוסר סמיכות ואחדות / גדר ההפרדה או גדר הביטחון / הגבלה על חופש התנועה למזרח ירושלים, רצועת עזה ובתוך הגדה המערבית / השפלה על ידי הכיבוש הישראלי / ישראל לא מוציאה היתרי עבודה לפלסטינים / בניית רשת מתוכננת מתנחלים בלבד של 'מעברי דרכים' / שליטה מלאה של ישראל במעברים.

**QSC4: פליטים פלסטינים:** תנאים מחפירים של פליטים פלסטינים במחנות פליטים בשכונות למדינות ערביות כמו ירדן, עיראק, לבנון, סוריה, מצרים ועוד. / הכחשה על ידי אומות ערביות של זכויות אדם בסיסיות (אזרחות, זכויות לא מוגבלות לעבודה וכו') לפלסטינים במדינותיהם.

**QSC5: השפעה של ההתנחלויות על המשאבים הטבעיים של פלסטין ומעמדה כמדינה:** הקצאה אסטרטגית של ההתנחלויות בגדה המערבית (אזור C) במטרה להרשות שליטה על מים, אדמה ומשאבים מינרליים. / ההתנחלויות מאיימות על רצף טריטוריאלי. / ההתנחלויות קוטעות את הגדה המערבית ואת רצועת עזה לחתיכות וכולאות את הפלסטינים במובלעות מבודדות, שכל אחד ממנו מוקף בהתנחלויות ובכוחות של כיבוש / ההתנחלויות ממשיכות לכבוש כמה מהאזורים הכי פוריים בגדה המערבית.

**QSC6: שליטה במשאבים הטבעיים:** ישראל שולטת בכל מקורות המים והמשאבים הטבעיים במדינה / מחסור במי שתייה / תלות השטחים הכבושים במשאבי הגז של ישראל, ובכך מחזקת את הכלכלה הישראלית.

**QSC7: התרחבות ההתנחלויות:** ההתרחבות של ההתנחלויות היהודיות בגדה המערבית / משרד הבינוי והשיכון מפרסם מכרזים לבניה של יחידות דיור חדשות במזרח ירושלים ובגושי התנחלויות גדולות. / פעילויות התחלות מתרחבות לחדירה לשכונות פלסטיניות במזרח ירושלים, מכתרות אותן עם אוכלוסייה יהודית / התנועה או מעבר של מאות או אלפי אזרחים ישראלים לתוך הטריטוריה הכבושה.

**QSC8: נטל כלכלי והחרמת מוצרים ישראלים:** הכלכלה הישראלית נעצרת על ידי מחירים גבוהים של בנייה בהתנחלויות ותמריצים למתנחלים, בשילוב עם עלויות צבאיות של אבטחתם / חרם בין לאומי עולמי על מוצרים ישראלים המיוצרים בהתנחלויות היהודיות. / פלסטינים מחרימים מוצרים ישראלים.

**QSC9: ייחוד ירושלים:** ניסיונות יומיים לדכא את הזהות הערבית והאסלאמית של ירושלים / הפרות של ישראל והסגת גבול/חדירה ל-Haram al Sharif ומקומות אחרים הקדושים לאסלאם ולנצרות בירושלים. / כוונות ישראליות להיות בעלת ריבונות המחולקת אנכית של הר הבית או של מקום קדוש / הכוונות לפתוח דלת חדשה ליהודים להיכנס למסגד אל אקצה להתפלל.

**QSC10:** יהודים נעצרים על תפילה בהר הבית / הפרות של פלסטינים של מקומות קדושים ליהדות בירושלים.

**QSC11:** גל חדש של השתלטות על בתים של פלסטינים על ידי אמצעים שקריים, מסמכים מזויפים או היעדר בעלות, הפיכתם לרכוש יהודי.

**QSC12: קשיי/מצוקת מחייה – רמות חסרות תקדים של עוני ושל אבטלה / חסמים לבריאות ולחינוך / רמות נמוכות באופן חסר תקדים של חוסר חוק פנימי ושל חוסר יציבות**

**QSC13: איומי חמאס:** לא יהיה הסכם עם ישראל כל עוד ישנם פלסטינים בכלא / חמאס ישחרר את כל הלוחמים בכלא הישראלי על ידי שימוש בכוח / חטיפת חיילים ישראלים.

**QSC14: פעולות נגד אסירים פלסטינים:** התעללות פיזית תכופה ועינוי של שבויים / החמרת המצב של אסירים פלסטינים בכלא הישראלי.

**QSC15: עקשנות / אי פשרנות ישראלית:** חוסר נכונות של ישראל לשאת ולתת ישירות עם חמאס / עקשנות וחוסר פשרנות וחוסר ציות לכל פגישה, פתרון / החלטה שלא מסתדרת עם התכניות שלהם / התנועה הישראלית ציונית מכוונת להשתלט על כל המדינה ולגרש אוכלוסיות לא יהודיות / ההתנגדות המתמשכת של בעלי הקו הנוקשה ולא מתפשר של הצד הימני בישראל.

**QSC16: עקשנות / אי פשרנות פלסטינית:** אי הכרה בזכותה של ישראל להתקיים / שלילת הלגיטימיות של ישראל כמדינה יהודית / חוסר נכונות של חמאס לשאת ולתת עם ישראל / ההתנגדות המתמשכת של פלסטינים בעלי עמדות נוקשות ולא מתפשרות / עקשנות פלסטינית וחוסר ציות שלהם לאף פגישה / פתרון / החלטה שלא מסתדרת עם התכניות שלהם / התנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית מכוונת לייסד מדינה פלסטינית בכל המדינה.

**QSC17: חוסר אמון בין פלסטינים וישראלים:** כשלון של הסכמי עבר / משא ומתן לא מתקדם וסביר שייכשל / האמונה שאין פרטנר אמין ומהימן כדי לעשות התקדמות בתהליך שלום דו צדדי.

**QSC18: הפרה ישראלית של אדמות פלסטינים:** פלסטינים לא יקבלו הסכם שתחתיו ישראלים ישמרו נוכחות צבאית כלשהי על אדמות שהפכו להיות חלק מאדמת פלסטין.

## פתרונות

**SLN1:** זכות השיבה של פליטים פלסטינים לאדמותיהם

**SLN2: חזרה על תנאי או פיצוי:** חזרה מותנית לפליטים פלסטינים תחת תכניות איחוד משפחות / זכות השיבה למדינה פלסטינית תחת גבולות מוסכמים ופיצוי / פיצוי ישולם לפליטים שלא רוצים לחזור / זכות השיבה למדינה פלסטינית במסגרת גבולות מוגדרים ללא פיצוי ובכמה מקרים 'הומניטאריים', הם מורשים לחזור לגבולות 1948.

**SLN3: פינוי / הרס ו/או פיצוי של ההתנחלויות:** כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפוננו מהגדה המערבית, וההתנחלויות יהיו לפליטים חוזרים / הרס כל ההתנחלויות בשטחים הכבושים בגדה המערבית / מתנחלים יקבלו חבילות פיצוי עבור נסיגתם / מתנחלים שיישארו מחויבים לגור תחת ריבונות פלסטינית.

**SLN4: הימנעות מבנייה בהתנחלויות:** הממשלה הישראלית תקרא לעצור את תכנית ההתנחלויות / הקהילה הבין לאומי ובייחוד ארה"ב צריכים לשים לחץ על ישראל לעצור את תכנית ההתנחלויות / במטרה למתן את הקשיים שישראל מתמודדת עם פינוי ההתנחלויות מהגדה המערבית, העברת הטריטוריות צריכה להיות מיושמת בשלבים כדי לאפשר לישראל זמן להיות רגישה עם הציבור שלה.

**SLN5: לא ייעשה שינוי מבחינת ההתנחלויות:** כל ההתנחלויות בצד הישראלי של גדר הביטחון צריכות להיות חלק מישראל / כל ההתנחלויות צריכות להישאר כמו שהן.

**SLN6:** לפנות אסירים מבתי הכלא הישראליים.

**SLN7: שחרור תנאים מסוימים או נסיבות מסוימות:** שחרור של אסירים פלסטינים פוליטיים בבתי הכלא הישראלי/ שחרור של אסירים פלסטינים שנשארו בבתי הכלא הישראליים לתקופה ארוכה / שחרור של אסירים שסובלים ממחלה / שחרור של פלסטינים מהתקופה שלפני הסכם אוסלו מבתי הכלא הישראליים.

**SLN8: להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים למען בטחון ישראל:** אלה שהרגו צריכים להישאר בכלא – להפסיק לשחרר טרוריסטים שיש להם דם על הידיים / אמונה ישראלית ששחרור טרוריסטים רק יוסיף דלק לאש הטרוריסטים/ שחרור לא אחראי של טרוריסטים יסכן את בטחון הישראליים.

**SLN9: הרשות הפלסטינית תפסיק לתגמל טרוריסטים עם משכורות כאשר הם בכלא.**

**SLN10: הימנעות מפנייה למוסדות בין-לאומיים:** לא לפנות למוסדות בין לאומיים ותאגידים משפיעים, כולל תאגידים חוקיים שנהנים מכשירות בין לאומית, במקרה שיראל מאשרת שחרור של אסירים פלסטינים.

**SLN11: נוכחות צבאית ישראלית בפלסטין:** נוכחות ישראלית במעברי הגבול הפלסטינים / קיום של תצפית ישראלית קבועה במדינת פלסטין / צה"ל צריך להישאר בשטחים הכבושים / גדה מערבית.

**SLN12: מדינת פלסטינית מפורזת:** להחרים כל נשק לא חוקי ופירוק נשק של קבוצות פלסטיניות לוחמניות / מאסר ומשפט לכל מי שמיוחסים לו התקפות טרור / פירוק מנשק של חמאס והג'יהאד האסלאמי / התנאי הישראלי של מדינה פלסטינית מפורקת מנשק ללא צבא.

**SLN13: פירוק מנשק של עזה:** דרישה ישראלית לפרק מנשק קבוצות פלסטיניות ברצועת עזה / הרס של כל טילים ורקטות וכו' / הרס של כל המנהרות מתחת לגבול עזה.

**SLN14: הפסקה של פעולות לוחמניות נגד ישראל:** הרשות הפלסטינית צריכה לנקוט בצעדים דרמטיים כדי להפסיק את ההתקפות הפלסטיניות נגד ישראל / דאגות מיידיות של ישראל היו האיום הביטחוני שמעמידים המשטרים האסלאמיים הקיצוניים.

**SLN15: תיווך של צד שלישי:** משקיף בין לאומי בגבולות בין מדינה פלסטינית חדשה שתקום ובין ישראל / כל תהליך כלפי ישימות/ בר קיימא צריך להיות מודרך על ידי החוק והחלטות בין לאומיות, להיות חסר פניות, להיות אחראי כלפי לשני הצדדים, להביא לסוף של פטירה מעונש. / הקהילה הבין לאומי חייבת לשים לחץ על הרשות הפלסטינית ועל הליגה הערבית להתחייב לתהליך שלום באזור. לפני שהמשא ומתן יכול להתחיל, כל ממשלה חייבת להראות את המסירות והמחויבות שלהן לתהליך השלום, או שיהיו רק הבטחות שבורות. / תהליך בר קיימא חייב להיות מחויב לכל הפרה של חוק זכויות אדם והחוק הבין לאומי, לבנות את האמון ההכרחי שמאפשר לשני הצדדים להיות מחויבים ולהסדר להתקיים.

**SLN16: מדינה פלסטינית חזקה יותר:** ישראל לא יכולה להיות בטוחה עד שמדינה פלסטינית מיוסדת באופן מספיק חזק כדי לשלוט בהתקפות פלסטיניות. / לפלסטין צריך שיהיה כוח שיטור חזק / משטרה פלסטינית וכוחות מיוחדים ימשיכו לפעול נגד כלפי כל מי שמסכן את הביטחון הלאומי הפלסטיני.

**SLN17: תיאום בטחוני בין צה"ל ובין כוחות הביטחון הפלסטיניים.**

**SLN18: חלוקה של ירושלים:** מערב ירושלים לפלסטינים ומזרח ירושלים לישראלים / חלוקה של העיר לפי שכונות ישראליות ופלסטיניות / העיר העתיקה תהיה מחולקת לשני חלקים: חלק יהודי תחת שליטה ישראלית וחלק מוסלמי ונוצרי תחת שליטה פלסטינית. / ישראל תהיה "שומרת" (אפוטרופוס) לכותל והמדינה הפלסטינית 'שומרת' (אפוטרופוס) לאתר האסלאמי הקדוש. הסטטוס קוו של האתרים הנוצריים הקדושים יישאר.

**SLN19: שליטה בין לאומית על ירושלים:** ירושלים תהיה עיר בין לאומית תחת סמכות של האומות המאוחדות. / ירושלים תהיה עיר בין לאומית תחת שליטה של אמנה בין דתית עירונית. / גוף ניטרלי (למשל האומות המאוחדות) יהיה "השומר" (אפוסטרופוס) על כל האתרים הקדושים.

**SLN20: הסכם על ניהול האתרים הקדושים:** העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת שליטה משותפת / גישה חופשית לכולם לאתרים הקדושים / אף צד לא יהיה בעל ריבונות על האתרים הקדושים.

**SLN21: ירושלים תחת שליטה ישראלית:** ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת ותחת ריבונות ישראלית / כל המקומות הקדושים, כולל האתרים הקדושים במזרח ירושלים יהיו תחת שליטה ישראלית / סיפוח של מזרח ירושלים לישראל.

**SLN22: להביא לסיום את הכיבוש הישראלי של אדמות שנלקחו בנכסה של 1967:** ישראל תיסוג לגבולות 1967. / להתנתק מהגבולות עם עזה, הגדה המערבית ומזרח ירושלים / הקו הירוק כגבול בין שתי המדינות / לקבוע את הגבולות של הישות הפלסטינית.

**SLN23: נסיגה ללא תנאים וחילופי אדמות:** ישראל תיסוג לגבול 1967 עם התאמה דרך הסכם של חילופי אדמות מקבילים. / ישראל תספח 3-4% מהגדה המערבית שכוללת גושי התנחלויות מרכזיים עם השוואה של חילופי אדמות שידונו במשא ומתן. / האדמה שנלקחה על ידי המתנחלים יכולה פשוט להימסר לפלסטינים מהאזורים האחרים של ישראל.

**SLN24:** גבולות מיוסדים על ידי חומת הביטחון.

**SLN25: בניית אווירה של אמון הדדי והבנה בין שני הצדדים:** איסור על כל צורות של הסתה לאלימות / לחנך לשלום / המדיה תשחק תפקיד חיובי בקידום שלום ואידיאולוגיות ותכניות בעד שלום.

**SLN26: ארה"ב והאיחוד האירופי יחמירו הצעדים נגד הקונפליקט:** הם חייבים לקחת תפקיד אקטיבי בתהליך השלום משום שיש להם את היכולת להשפיע רבות הן על הישראלים והן על הפלסטינים. / אם הישראלים והפלסטינים לא משתפים פעולה עם תהליך השלום, הם חייבים, למען השלום, להשתמש באופן יותר אגרסיבי של דיפלומטיה. / הם והקהילה הבין לאומית חייבים להמשיך לשים לחץ על ישראל ועל הפלסטינים להתחייב לתהליך השלום ולקחת צעדים דרושים כדי לקדם שלום מתמשך.

**SLN27: האומות המאוחדות כצד פעיל:** האו"ם צריך לשחק תפקיד יותר אקטיבי ומתקדם בשטח. / האו"ם צריך להתנתק מההשפעה של ארה"ב והדומיננטיות שלה.

**SLN28: להפסיק את פעולות צה"ל כנגד הפלסטינים:** על צה"ל להפסיק פעולות מזוינות כנגד הפלסטינים / צה"ל צריך להפסיק את מדיניות החיסולים / צה"ל צריך לנטוש את המדיניות של ענישה קולקטיבית, הריסת בתים והחרמה של אדמות פלסטינים.

**SLN29: הסרת המצור על עזה:** להיות יכולים לבקר קרובים מחוץ לעזה, יכולת לבנות מחדש בתים, חופש המסחר והסרת המגבלות על טווח הדייג של עזה.

**SLN30: חופש התנועה:** הקמת שדה תעופה / פתיחה מחדש של נמל התעופה בעזה / יצירת "מעבר בטוח" בין הגדה המערבית ורצועת עזה / נמל ימי, מעברים ומימון משכורות / פלסטינים שוקלים לקחת צעדים רציניים וריאליים על ידי ממשלת ישראל להסרת המצור וחגורת הביטחון תמתן את אלימות. / הפסקת הבניה של חומת ההפרדה.

**SLN31: שיתוף פעולה כלכלי:** העלאה של פרויקטים משותפים בכל המגזרים הכלכליים ושיתוף פעולה רציני בין כל הצדדים והקבוצות באזור ליצירת מציאות חדשה של שלום ושגשוג במספר תחומים כמו מים, בריאות, סביבה, תיירות ואחרים, אפילו לפני הגעה להסכם שלום סופי בין ישראל ושכנותיה הערביות. / לתת לפועלים

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הפלסטינים אפשרות לעבוד בתוך ישראל. / שיפור התנאים הכלכליים והמחייה יהיו בעלי השפעות חיוביות ניכרות על התמיכה של כל משא ומתן על שלום עתידי. / להתיר את חופש ההובלה של טובין לפלסטין.

**SLN32: שליטה משותפת על משאבים טבעיים:** שליטה על משאבים טבעיים: אדמה, מים, מינרלים, ים – לרווחה ולצמיחה הכלכלית והשגשוג של כל האוכלוסייה / להבטיח שליטה לגיטימית על משאבים טבעיים שכוללת אדמה, מים, מינרלים וזכויות ימיות / משאבים טבעיים חיוניים להתפתחות בת קיימא וצמיחה של כל חברה, וצריכה להיות מבוקרת לרווחת האוכלוסייה כולה, ללא אפליה.

**NA:** סה"כ מספר הכתבות: כאן המקודד יתייחס למספר הכולל של הכתבות בכל עיתון.

## D.1 Additions to the Israeli Codebook

Section	Additions
<b>CSS6</b> - Israeli measures against Palestinians	Palestinian prisoners in Israel/attempts to stop financial support for terror/preventing financial support following addressing to international institutions/preventing terror attacks/defence from terror attacks/confiscation of lands.
<b>CSS7</b> : Palestinians acts of vandalism	Tunnels.
<b>CSS8</b> : not recognizing Israel's right to exist	Not recognizing Israel's as a Jewish state.
<b>CSS11</b> : Israel measurements against Gaza	Also - steps to ease economic situation of the Palestinians, defence, attacking launchers, tense security situation.
<b>CSS12</b> : Settlers acts of vandalism	Right wing activists (not necessarily settlers).
<b>QSC2</b> : Violations of International law and human rights	Force feeding of Palestinian prisoners.
<b>QSC3</b> : Practical limitations on the Palestinians freedom of movement	Easing steps in the crossing borders, jobs permits, age limit to prayers.
<b>QSC4</b> : Palestinian refugees	Refugees camps in Palestine
<b>QSC5</b> : The influence of settlements on Palestine's natural resources and statehood	Discriminatory planning policy, Judaization of lands.
<b>QSC8</b> : Economic burden and boycotting Israeli products	Cultural boycotting/academic boycotting.
<b>QSC9</b> : Judaization of Jerusalem	Expansion of the settlements in Jerusalem area.
<b>QSC12</b> : Life hardship	Steps to ease economic situation of the Palestinians.
<b>QSC13</b> : Hamas threats	Threats of building tunnels.
<b>SLN5</b> : No change to be made to settlements	Including annexation of the Jordan Valley.
<b>SLN9</b> : PA to stop rewarding "terrorist"	Stop the incitement.

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Section	Additions
<b>SLN15:</b> Third-party mediation	Mention of the US involvement in the peace negotiations/UN as a discriminating organization/EU financial aid.
<b>SLN27:</b> The UN as an active side	UN as a discriminating organization
<b>QSC10:</b> Jews arrested for praying on temple mount/Palestinians' violations of Jewish sanctities in Jerusalem	Jews supposedly attacks on holy places in Jerusalem.
<b>SLN18:</b> Division of Jerusalem	Mention of the Palestinian citizens in East Jerusalem.
<b>SLN21:</b> Jerusalem under Israeli control	Mention of the Palestinian citizens in East Jerusalem.
<b>CSS13:</b> Israel's military superiority	Iron dome against Quasams.

# Chapter E

## SURVEY

### E.1 Master Copy



Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ from the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion; an independent market research company, and we are in the process of conducting a *face-to-face* survey for a dissertation project at the Technische Universität Dresden in Germany. The survey will investigate how Israelis and Palestinians think about the issue of conflict and peace in the area. The questions have been developed in Germany and from a non-partisan point of view. They are easy to answer. In most cases you just have to indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with a statement.

There is no right or wrong answer, it is just about your personal opinion. The whole interview should take no more than 25 minutes of your time.

Please be confident that the information you provide will remain confidential and that your answers will be used for statistical purposes only.

If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the supervisor of the dissertation or the director of the survey institute.

[IN CASE THE RESPONDENT ASKED FOR CONTACT INFORMATION]

**Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Donsbach**

Director of the Department of Communication at Technische Universität Dresden (TUD)  
Email; [wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de](mailto:wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de).

**Dr. Nabil Kukali**

President and director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion  
Email: [dr.kukali@pcpo.org](mailto:dr.kukali@pcpo.org).  
Tel.: 0599-726-878





Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ from Maagar Mochot Ltd.; an independent market research company, and we are in the process of conducting an *online survey* for a dissertation project at the Technische Universität Dresden in Germany. The survey will investigate how Israelis and Palestinians think about the issue of conflict and peace in the area. The questions have been developed in Germany and from a non-partisan point of view. They are easy to answer. In most cases you just have to indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with a statement.

There is no right or wrong answer, it is just about your personal opinion. The whole interview should take no more than 25 minutes of your time.

Please be confident that the information you provide will remain confidential and that your answers will be used for statistical purposes only.

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Founder and the CEO of Maagar Mochot Ltd.  
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Tel.: 0505-386-171

**SPLIT A or B****Respondent No:** \_\_\_\_\_.

The Questionnaire to be completed by adults 18 years and older.

Note to all interviewers: All questions should have clear and precise answers, otherwise a questionnaire will be considered void. Please comply with all notes. Thanks in advance.

	Date of Birth		Selected Respondent (First name or family name)
	Day	Month	
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			

**PART I: SAMPLE INFO** [TO BE COMPLETED BY THE INTERVIEWER]**S1) Split:**

1. A.
2. B.

**S2) Region:**

1. West Bank.
2. Gaza Strip.

**S2) Region:** \_\_\_\_\_.

**S3) In which governorate do you live?**

1. Jenin.
2. Nablus.
3. Ramallah.
4. Bethlehem.
5. Jerusalem.
6. Hebron.
7. Jericho.
8. Tulkarem.
9. Tubas.
10. Qalqilya.
11. Salfit.
12. Gaza City.
13. North of Gaza.
14. Deir Al Balah.
15. Khan Younis.
16. Rafah.

**S3) City:** \_\_\_\_\_

**S4) Type of residence:**

1. City.
2. Village.
3. Refugee camp.

**S4) Type of residence:**

1. City.
2. Village.
3. Settlement.

**S5) Date of interview:**     /     / 2015

**S6) Duration of interview (in minutes):** \_\_\_\_\_. [SHOULD BE COMPLETED AT  
THE END OF THE INTERVIEW]

**PART II: STUDY QUESTIONS**

**1) In general, do you believe that things in your country are heading in the right or wrong direction?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Right direction.
2. Wrong direction.
3. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**2) What are your sources of information regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?** [MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED] [READ THE LIST]

1. Radio.
2. TV.
3. Internet such as blogs and websites.
4. Social Media such as facebook, Twitter, etc.
5. Newspapers, printed or online.
6. Family and friends.
7. I do not follow the news. [DON'T READ]

[ASK QUESTIONS 3 IF HE OR SHE READS THE NEWSPAPER (ANSWERED 5) IN THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, OTHERWISE SKIP TO QUESTION 4]

**3) What is the local daily, weekly, or monthly newspaper do you usually read the most?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Al-Quds newspaper.
2. Al-Hayat newspaper.
3. Al-Ayyam newspaper.
4. Filistin newspaper.
5. Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_.

**4) What is the local daily, weekly, or monthly newspaper do you usually read the most?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Israel Hayom.
2. Yediot Ahronot.
3. Haaretz.
4. Maariv.
5. Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_.

**5) How often do you read the news in the internet?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Several times a day.
2. Once a day.
3. 4-6 days a week.
4. 2-3 days a week.
5. Once a week.
6. Less often than once a week.
7. I don't use the internet to read news. [DON'T READ]

**6) How interested, if at all, would you say you are in news related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?**

1. Extremely interested.
2. Very interested.
3. Somewhat interested.
4. Not very interested.
5. Not at all interested.

**7) Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree, please tell me what the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is about?**

The conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is about..	<b>Very low degree</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Very high degree</b>	<b>Don't know [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a. Religion (SPLIT A)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>b. Culture (SPLIT B)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>c. Nationalism (SPLIT A)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>d. Politics (SPLIT B)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>e. Economics (SPLIT A)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>f. History (SPLIT B)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>g. Existence (SPLIT A)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>h. Ethnicity (SPLIT B)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6

**8) How much you find the following historical events as a cause of nowadays conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree.**

<b>Historical event</b>	<b>Very low degree</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Very high degree</b>	<b>Don't know [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a.</b> Persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>b.</b> Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>c.</b> The British granting the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine - <i>Balfour Declaration</i> . (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>d.</b> The 1948 Arab-Israeli war. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>e.</b> Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 - <i>Six Days War</i> . (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>f.</b> Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their own agendas. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>g.</b> The Palestinian belief that they have lived on this land over centuries and are entitled to own it. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>h.</b> The Jewish belief that the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6

**9) Which statement do you feel closest to your opinion, if you were to get back to the beginning of the conflict in the beginning of last century, you:**

1. Would have kept the history as it is.
2. Would have sought out more peaceful changes to the history.
3. Would have persisted with even more extreme actions.
4. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**10) Do you feel that the following actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are almost always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?**

<b>Action</b>	<b>Almost always justified</b>	<b>Sometimes justified</b>	<b>Rarely justified</b>	<b>Never justified</b>	<b>Don't know [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a.</b> Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>b.</b> Military actions by Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>c.</b> Palestinian actions against Israelis. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>d.</b> Jewish settlers' actions against Palestinians. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>e.</b> Movement restrictions imposed by Israel. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>f.</b> The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prison. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>g.</b> Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>h.</b> Building the wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5



**11) Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process:**

<b>Items</b>	<b>Not serious at all</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Very serious</b>	<b>Don't know [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a.</b> Building settlements. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>b.</b> Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>c.</b> Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>d.</b> Hamas and Islamic Jihad's possession of weapons. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>e.</b> Israeli settlers' possession of weapons. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>f.</b> Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>g.</b> Detained Palestinians prisoners' by Israel. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>h.</b> The Israeli full control over natural resources. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>i.</b> Palestinian refugees' right of return. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>j.</b> The difficulty of having access to places of worship. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>k.</b> Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>l.</b> Not recognizing Israel's right to exist. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>m.</b> Hardliners constant refusal to any peace agreement. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>n.</b> The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>o.</b> Deterioration of the Palestinian economy. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>p.</b> Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>q.</b> The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>r.</b> Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. (SPLIT B)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>s.</b> Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>t.</b> Israel's absolute control over border	1	2	3	4	5	6

crossings. (SPLIT B)						
<b>u.</b> The freezing of the funds' transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel. (SPLIT A)	1	2	3	4	5	6

**11) With regard to the issue of Palestinian refugees, which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?**[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

**After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution?**  
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

<b>Suggested solutions</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> answer</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> answer</b>
1. The right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes within the 1948 borders.	1	2
2. Conditional return of Palestinian refugees.	1	2
3. Absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian state.	1	2
4. The refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries.	1	2
5. Abandoning the right of return and replacing it by financial compensation.	1	2
6. None of the above. [DON'T READ]	1	2
7. Don't know. [DON'T READ]	1	2

**12) Now, I need to read a list of possible solutions to the issue of Israeli settlements, which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?** [READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

**After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution?**  
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

<b>Suggested solutions</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> answer</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> answer</b>
1. All Israeli settlers evacuate settlements built on 1967 borders.	1	2
2. Dismantling all settlements built within the 1967 borders.	1	2
3. Compensation packages including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders.	1	2
4. Keeping all settlements intact.	1	2
5. Freezing settlement activities in the West Bank and Jerusalem.	1	2
6. Allowing all settlers to stay in the West Bank under the Palestinian sovereignty at their discretion.	1	2
7. Relinquishing parts of Israeli lands that would commensurate in area with that occupied by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank.	1	2
8. All settlements built on the Israeli side of the wall become	1	2

part of Israel.		
9. None of the above. [DON'T READ]	1	2
10. Don't know. [DON'T READ]	1	2

**13) There have been several different options proposed for Jerusalem, please tell me which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?**[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

**After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution?**  
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

Suggested solutions	1 <sup>st</sup> answer	2 <sup>nd</sup> answer
1. East Jerusalem for Palestinians and West Jerusalem for Israelis as it was the case before 1967.	1	2
2. Dividing Jerusalem into Palestinian and Jewish quarters.	1	2
3. International control over Jerusalem and its' holy places.	1	2
4. Jerusalem to remain united and under Israeli sovereignty with allowing access to Jerusalem's holy sites for both nations.	1	2
5. The old city should be placed under joint Palestinian-Israeli sovereignty.	1	2
6. None of the above. [DON'T READ]	1	2
7. Don't know. [DON'T READ]	1	2

**14) Several solutions have been proposed with regard to issue of Palestinian prisoners, which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?**[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

**After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution?**  
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

Suggested solutions	1 <sup>st</sup> answer	2 <sup>nd</sup> answer
1. Releasing Palestinian prisoners for humanitarian reasons only as in the case of illness, long-term prisoners, or women and children.	1	2
2. Keeping in prisons only those who killed or were accomplices in the killing of Israelis.	1	2
3. Keeping all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.	1	2
4. Releasing all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons.	1	2
5. None of the above. [DON'T READ]	1	2
6. Don't know. [DON'T READ]	1	2

**15) Now, with regard to the issue of natural resources, which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?**[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

**After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution?**  
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

Suggested solutions	1 <sup>st</sup> answer	2 <sup>nd</sup> answer
1. That natural resources be under Palestinian control in the newly established Palestinian state.	1	2
2. That natural resources be under joint control for the sake of economic prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis.	1	2
3. That natural resources remain under Israeli control, as it is the case today, but equal rights (price, consumption, and distribution) must be maintained for the Palestinians and Israelis.	1	2
4. None of the above. [DON'T READ]	1	2
5. Don't know. [DON'T READ]	1	2

**17) I want to propose to you plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to you, and 5 meaning very acceptable, to what extent do you accept the following:**

**a.** Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, etc. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**b.** Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**c.** Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two states. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**d.** Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and Israelis. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**e.** Building a Palestinian airport. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**f.** Building a Palestinian seaport. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**g.** Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**18) The following elements are all discussed as a part of establishing a Palestinian state. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, and 5 meaning you are in full support, please tell me how much you support or oppose each of the following elements:**

**a.** Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of land swap. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**b.** A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**c.** International presence on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state and Israel. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**d.** A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**e.** The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**f.** Building a “Safe Passage” between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**g.** Demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established Palestinian state. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**h.** Security coordination between Israel and Palestine. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5.

**19) In your opinion, what is the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian – Israeli conflict:** [READ ALL STATEMENTS] [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] [ROTATE ANSWERS]

1. Two states that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, the first is Israeli and the second is Palestinian.

2. One state in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations.

3. A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

4. The West Bank becomes part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt.

5. None. [DON'T READ]

**20) In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties? Please put them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and 10 represents the least important issue these days: [READ ALL THE FOLLOWING ITEMS]**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Settlements.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Prisoners.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Jerusalem.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The security of both Israel and the Palestinians.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Borders and crossing points.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The Refugees.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Control over natural resources like water.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Recognizing the Jewish state.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Having control over holy places.

**21) Now I will read to you several notions pertaining to the peace process. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree, and 5 meaning you strongly agree, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

**a.** The contribution of curricula in disseminating peace culture and the acceptance of the other. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**b.** Any agreement between the Palestinian and Israelis must be accepted and supported by the Arab League. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**c.** The international community should be ready to assist in the peace building process. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**d.** Palestinians and Israelis should stop all forms of incitements to hatred. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**e.** Peaceful negotiations are the only way to achieve peace between Palestinians and Israelis. (SPLIT A)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**f.** Both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, have the right to live in peace and security. (SPLIT B)

1.                      2.                      3.                      4.                      5

**22) Now I'm going to ask you about the performance of some political figures pertaining to the peace process. Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative? [READ ALL CHOICES]**

<b>Political figure</b>	<b>Highly positive</b>	<b>Somewhat positive</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Somewhat negative</b>	<b>Highly negative</b>	<b>Don't know [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a.</b> Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the PA.	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>b.</b> Khalid Misha'al, the head of Hamas Politburo.	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>c.</b> Rami Hamdallah, the PA's Prime Minister.	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>d.</b> Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister.	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>e.</b> Tzipi Livni, the head of the Hatnuah party in Israel.	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>f.</b> Isaac Herzog, the head of Labor party in Israel.	1	2	3	4	5	6

**23) Do you think it is most likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or absolute unlikely that the current leadership in your country can make peace with the other side? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]**

1. Most likely.
2. Somewhat likely.
3. Somewhat unlikely.
4. Absolute unlikely.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**24) If you had the ability to impose a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, would you:** [READ ALL CHOICES]

1. Impose the same solutions proposed by your government.
2. Impose solutions different from those proposed by your government.
3. Agree on the solutions proposed by the government of the other side.
4. Suggest different solutions than both governments.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**25) Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis under the current circumstances?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Strongly support.
2. Somewhat support.
3. Somewhat oppose.
4. Strongly oppose.
5. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**26) Do you believe, or not, that negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Strongly believe.
2. Believe to a certain degree.
3. I do not believe to a certain degree.
4. I do not believe at all.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**27) In your view, to which party resuming peace negotiations is more important, to the Palestinians or Israelis?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. More important to Palestinians.
2. More important to Israelis.
3. It is as equally important to both parties.
4. Not important to either party.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**28) Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required from them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or you believe they could have gone further to make them a success?**

**a. The Israelis?**

1. They have done all what has been required from them to do.
2. They could have gone further.
3. Not sure.



**b. The Palestinians?**

1. They have done all what has been required from them to do.
2. They could have gone further.
3. Not sure.

**29) In your view, historically seen, who is responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis?** [READ ALL CHOICES]

[MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED]

1. Palestinian people.
2. Israeli people.
3. Palestinian extremist movements.
4. Israeli extremist parties.
5. Palestinian government and leaders.
6. Israeli government and leaders.
7. Arab leaders.
8. United States.
9. Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_.

**30) In your opinion, does the United States play a balanced role towards both parties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a biased role to the Israeli stance, or biased role to the Palestinian stance?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. A balanced role to both parties.
2. A biased role to the Israeli stance.
3. A biased role to the Palestinian stance.
4. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**31) As you see it, which state or international organization could be the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. The Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia).
2. The United States.
3. The United Nations.
4. The European Union.
5. Russia.
6. France.
7. Turkey.
8. Jordan.
9. Egypt.
10. Qatar.
11. Iran.
12. None of the above. [DON'T READ]
13. Other (Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_).

**32) To what degree are you sick and tired from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?**

1. To a high degree.
2. To a moderate degree.
3. To a low degree.
4. They don't care.
5. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**33) To what degree are you willing to make peace with the other side?**

1. To a high degree.
2. To a moderate degree.
3. To a low degree.
4. They don't care.
5. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**34) I am now going to read you two statements, please tell which of the two best represents your own view?**

1. We should be willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace.
2. We should not have to give up any of our demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace.

**35) How confident are you that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians will be solved in the near future? Would you say very confident, somewhat confident, somewhat not confident or not confident at all?**

1. Very confident.
2. Somewhat confident
3. Somewhat not confident
4. Not confident at all.
5. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**36) To what degree do the following items apply to you, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree:**

<b>Item</b>	<b>To a low degree</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>To a high degree</b>	<b>Not applicable [DON'T READ]</b>	<b>Refused [DON'T READ]</b>
<b>a. Poverty</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>b. Low wages/pensions</b>						6	7
<b>c. Unemployment/lack of job opportunities/</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>d. Shortage of health care and education</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>e. Lack of security and safety/crime/violence.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>f. Restrictions imposed on freedom of movement/blockade.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>g. high cost of living/Inflation/high prices</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>h. Energy or fuel shortages</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>i. Electricity shortages</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>j. Water shortages</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>k. Housing problems</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**37) If you have the opportunity to emigrate, would you emigrate or remain in your country? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]**

1. Would remain.
2. Would emigrate.
3. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**38) Now I am going to read you a list of words and phrases that describe how would you express your feelings and attitudes towards the other side. For each word or phrase, please tell me whether you don't share this feeling, you share it to a low degree, you share it to a moderate degree, or you share it to a very high degree:**

<u>Feelings and attitudes towards the other side</u>	Don't share this feeling	To a low degree	To a moderate degree	To a high degree	Don't know [DON'T READ]
<b>a.</b> Tolerance towards the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>b.</b> Understanding the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>c.</b> Angry at the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>d.</b> Fear from the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>e.</b> Trust in the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>f.</b> Grudge against the other side.	1	2	3	4	5

**39) In this context, to what degree do you believe that the other side holds the same feelings towards you:**

<u>Feelings and attitudes of the other side towards you</u>	Don't share this feeling	To a low degree	To a moderate degree	To a high degree	Don't know [DON'T READ]
<b>a.</b> Tolerance.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>b.</b> Understands you.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>c.</b> Feels angry at you.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>d.</b> Fears you.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>e.</b> The other side trusts you.	1	2	3	4	5
<b>f.</b> Bears the grudge against you.	1	2	3	4	5

**40) Are you inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have nothing to do with politics or the current conflict i.e. music, folklore, general tendencies, literature, religion, social ideas or other? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]**

1. Yes, to a very high degree.
2. Yes, to a certain degree.
3. Yes, to a low degree.
4. No, never.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**41) Would you feel very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable if many of your neighbors were not from your religion?**

1. Very comfortable.
2. Somewhat comfortable.
3. Somewhat uncomfortable.
4. Very uncomfortable.
5. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**42) Has any of your relatives or friends been killed or injured during the past years as a result of the conflict?** [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]

1. Yes.
2. No.

### **PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS**

**D1) Gender:**

1. Male.
2. Female.

**D2) Age:** \_\_\_\_\_ years.

**D3) Social status:**

1. Married.
2. Single.
3. Divorced.
4. Widow/er.

**D4) Years of education:** \_\_\_\_\_ years.

**D5) Number of household members (of all ages who eat at the same table):**  
\_\_\_\_\_ persons.

**D6) The average monthly household income in Palestine is 2375 shekels. Is your monthly household income greater than 2375 shekels, less than 2375 shekels, or about the same?**

1. Greater than 2375 shekels.
2. Less than 2375 shekels.
3. About the same.
4. Don't know.
5. No answer. [DON'T READ]

**D6) The average monthly household income in Israel is 8900 shekels. Is your monthly household income greater than 8900 shekels, less than 8900 shekels, or about the same?**

1. Greater than 8900 shekels.
2. Less than 8900 shekels.
3. About the same.
4. Don't know.
5. No answer. [DON'T READ]

**D7) What is your religion?**

1. Muslim (Sunni).
2. Muslim (Shiite).
3. Christian (Greek Orthodox).
4. Christian (Roman Catholic).
5. Christian (Greek Catholic).
6. Christian (Lutheran).
7. Druze.
8. Jewish.
9. Atheist.

**D8) How do you introduce yourself from the religious point of view:**

1. Very religious (religious activist).
2. Somewhat religious.
3. Religious to a mediocre degree.
4. Somewhat irreligious.
5. Irreligious at all.
6. Don't know / Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

**D9) Are you a refugee or not?** [ASK TO ISRAELI ARABS ONLY]

1. Yes.
2. No.

**D10) Here is a list of parties likely to compete in the next election for the Legislative Council. If new elections, agreed to by all factions, were held today and this list were presented, for which would you vote? *If not sure: To which would you lean?*** [PRE-CODED OPEN ANSWERS] [GET ONE ANSWER ONLY] [DO NOT READ THE LIST]

1. Fatah.
2. Hamas.
3. Third Road.
4. Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
5. Palestine National Initiative.
6. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
7. Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement.
8. Independent Islamists.
9. Independent Nationalists.
10. Other (Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_) (on a voluntary basis).

11. No comment/Refused to answer. [DON'T READ]

12. Don't know. [DON'T READ]

**D11) Which political party did you vote for in the last Israeli election of March 2015? *If not sure: To which would you lean?*** [PRE-CODED OPEN ANSWERS] [GET ONE ANSWER ONLY] [DO NOT READ THE LIST]

1. Likud.

2. Zionist Union.

3. Jewish Home.

4. Yesh Atid.

5. United Arab List.

6. Kulanu.

7. United Tora Judaism.

8. Israel Beitenu.

9. Shas.

10. Meretz.

**Thanks for your cooperation**

**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that I have personally filled in this questionnaire form during the interview I have conducted with the respondent in accordance with the instructions given to me by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion-PCPO / Maagar Mochot and that all data and information contained herein are true and correct as given to me by the respondent himself. I further declare that I have revised this questionnaire form and made sure that it is free of any errors or deficiencies. I'm well aware of the fact that should the post- revision reveal any error or deficiency in the implementation, this questionnaire form will be annulled and its handling cost, the cost of its revision and the compensation for any delay or damage resulting from that will be deducted from any amounts due to me. The management of the PCPO / Maagar Mochot is hereby given the authority to estimate such deductions in accordance with the severity of such an error or deficiency.

Note: No questionnaire form will be accepted or paid unless duly signed by the surveyor.

Surveyor's name: \_\_\_\_\_.



## E.2 Arabic Translation

### E.2.1 Split A



حجاً، إسمي \_\_\_\_\_ وأنا من المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي، وهي مؤسسة مستقلة لأبحاث السوق. نجر  
 اء دراسة وجهاً لوجه لأطروحة دكتوراة ستقدم لجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا بألمانيا. ستبحث الدراسة في كيفية تفكير الإس  
 لسلطيين حول الصراع والسلام في المنطقة. لقد تم تصميم الأسئلة في ألمانيا ومن وجهة نظر لاحتزبية. وهي أسئلة سهل الإجابة  
 ك في معظم الأحيان أن تبين فقط مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك لمقولة أو لعبارة معينة.  
 هناك إجابات صحيحة وأخرى خاطئة، فكل ما نود معرفته هي وجهة نظرك الشخصية. والمقابلة كلها لن تأخذ أكثر من (25) د  
 ك.  
 بو أن تكون واثقاً / تكوني واثقة بأن البيانات والمعلومات التي ستزودنا بها ستبقى في منتهى السرية وأن إجاباتك لن تُستخدم إلا للأ  
 صائية فقط.

كان لديك أية أسئلة أو استفسارات، الرجاء الإتصال بدون تردد بالمشرف على هذه الدراسة أو بمدير مركز الأبحاث.  
 ا سأل المستجوب عن معلومات للإتصال):

فولفغانغ دونزباخ

ر قسم الإتصالات بجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا

يد الإلكتروني: [wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de](mailto:wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de)

نبيل كوكالي

س ومدير المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي

يد الإلكتروني: [dr.kukali@pcpo.org](mailto:dr.kukali@pcpo.org)

ف: 0599 – 726-878

## قسم (أ)

رقم المستجوب: \_\_\_\_\_  
تعباً الإستمارة من قبل الأفراد الذين أعمارهم 18 عاماً فما فوق.

ملاحظة لكل الباحثين: يجب أن تكون الإجابات على جميع الأسئلة واضحة ودقيقة. وفي حالة عدم الإلتزام بتعبئة الإستمارة كاملة وبدقة، فإنها ستُلغى وتُعتبر كأنها لم تكن. فالرجاء التقيد بكل الملاحظات. مع الشكر سلفاً.

المستجوب المختار (إسمه الأول أو الكنية)	الميلاد الشهر	تاريخ اليوم	
			1
			2
			3
			4
			5
			6
			7
			8
			9
			10
			11
			12
			13
			14
			15
			16
			17
			18
			19

**الجزء الأول: معلومات عن العينة (تعباً من قبل الباحث)****م (1) القسم:**

1. أ.
2. ب.

**م (2) المنطقة:**

1. الضفة الغربية.
2. قطاع غزة.

**م (3) في أية محافظة تعيش؟**

- |               |                |               |                  |
|---------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1. جنين.      | 2. نابلس.      | 3. رام الله.  | 4. بيت لحم.      |
| 5. القدس .    | 6. الخليل.     | 7. أريحا.     | 8. طولكرم.       |
| 9. طوباس.     | 10. قلقيلية.   | 11. سلفيت.    | 12. غزة المدينة. |
| 13. شمال غزة. | 14. دير البلح. | 15. خان يونس. | 16. رفح.         |

**م (4) نوع مكان الإقامة:**

1. مدينة / حضر.
2. قرية / ريف.
3. مخيم لاجئين.

**م (5) تاريخ إجراء المقابلة: / / 2015****م (6) مدة المقابلة (بالدقائق): \_\_\_\_\_ (يجب تعبئته عند نهاية المقابلة / الإنتهاء من تعبئة الإستمارة)****الجزء الثاني: أسئلة الدراسة**

1. تسير في الإتجاه الصحيح. 2. تسير في الإتجاه الخاطيء. 3. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

2. ما هي المصادر التي تحصل من خلالها على معلومات فيما يتعلّق بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟ (يُسمح بأكثر من إجابة) (اقرأ القائمة)

1. الإذاعة (الراديو).
2. التلفاز.
3. شبكة الإنترنت مثل البلوغات والمواقع.
4. وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي مثل الفيسبوك، تويتر .. وغيرها.
5. الصحف، مطبوعة أو على الإنترنت ("أون لاين").
6. العائلة والأصدقاء.
7. لا أتابع الأخبار (لا تقرأ).

[إسأل السؤال رقم 3 إذا كان المستجوب/ة يقرأ / تقرأ الجرائد (الإجابة 5 في السؤال رقم 2 أعلاه)، وإلاّ انتقل للسؤال رقم 4]

3. ما هي الصحيفة المحلية، اليومية أو الأسبوعية أو الشهرية، التي تفضّل عادةً قراءتها؟ (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. صحيفة القدس.
2. صحيفة الحياة.
3. صحيفة الأيام.
4. صحيفة فلسطين
5. غير ذلك، الرّجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

4. كم مرّة تطلّع على الأخبار عبر الإنترنت؟ (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط)

1. عدة مرات في اليوم.
2. مرّة في اليوم.
3. 4 – 6 أيّام في الأسبوع.
4. 2 – 3 أيّام في الأسبوع.
5. مرّة في الأسبوع.
6. غالباً أقلّ من مرّة في الأسبوع.
7. لا أستخدم الإنترنت لقراءة الأخبار. (لا تقرأ)

(5) ما هو مدى اهتمامك، إن وجد، في الأخبار المتعلقة بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟

1. مهتم للغاية.
2. مهتم جداً.
3. مهتم نوعاً ما.
4. لست مهتم كثيراً.
5. غير مهتم إطلاقاً.

(6) مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، بحيث أن رقم (1) يعني لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) يعني لدرجة كبيرة جداً، الرجاء أن تخبرني عن سبب الصراع ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.

سبب الصراع بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين هو حول...	لدرجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	لدرجة كبيرة جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a. الدين.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. القومية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. الاقتصاد.	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. الوجود.	1	2	3	4	5	6

(7) إلى أي مدى ترى بأن الأحداث التاريخية التالية كانت سبباً للصراع الحالي بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين، مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، بحيث أن رقم (1) يعني لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) يعني لدرجة كبيرة جداً.

الحدث التاريخي	لدرجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	لدرجة كبيرة جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a. اضطهاد اليهود في أوروبا وروسيا.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. منح الإنجليز اليهود الحق في إقامة وطن قومي لهم في فلسطين حسب وعد بلفور.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. احتلال إسرائيل للأراضي الفلسطينية في عام 1967 – حرب الأيام الستة.	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. اعتقال الفلسطينيين بأنهم عاشوا على هذه الأرض عبر قرون من الزمن وأن لهم الحق في امتلاكها.	1	2	3	4	5	6

(8) ما هي العبارة التي تشعر بأنها الأقرب إلى وجهة نظرك لو كان بمقدورك العودة لبداية الصراع في بداية القرن الماضي؟ هل كنت ....

1. ستبقى التاريخ كما كان عليه.
2. ستبحث عن تغييرات أكثر سلماً للتاريخ.
3. ستصر على إجراءات حتى أكثر تشدداً.
4. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)

(9) هل تشعر بأن الإجراءات التالية المتعلقة بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي مبررة دائماً تقريباً، مبررة أحياناً، مبررة نادراً، أو ليست مبررة أبداً؟

الإجراء	مبرر دائماً تقريباً	مبرر أحياناً	مبرر نادراً	ليس مبرر أبداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a. إطلاق الصواريخ على إسرائيل من قطاع غزة.	1	2	3	4	5
c. الأعمال الفلسطينية ضد الإسرائيليين.	1	2	3	4	5
e. قيود الحركة المفروضة من قبل إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5
g. جهود السلطة الفلسطينية لعزل إسرائيل دولياً.	1	2	3	4	5

10) مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5 حيث يعني (1) غير مهم على الإطلاق و (5) يعني مهم جداً، كيف تقيم دور البنود التالية في إعاقه عملية السلام الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟

البنود	غير مهم على الإطلاق	2	3	4	مهم جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a. بناء المستوطنات.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. عدم القبول بفكرة الدولة اليهودية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. وجود أسلحة بحوزة المستوطنين.	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. الأسرى الفلسطينيين المحتجزون لدى إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6
i. حق العودة للاجئين الفلسطينيين.	1	2	3	4	5	6
k. عدم وجود حدود واضحة المعالم لدولة فلسطين.	1	2	3	4	5	6
m. الرفض المستمر من طرف المتشدد في كلا الطرفين للوصول لأية اتفاقية سلام.	1	2	3	4	5	6
o. تدهور وضع الاقتصاد الفلسطيني نتيجة للصراع.	1	2	3	4	5	6
q. التهديد الأمني الذي تشكله الحركات المتطرفة على كلا الجانبين.	1	2	3	4	5	6
s. اعتماد الاقتصاد الفلسطيني على الاقتصاد الإسرائيلي.	1	2	3	4	5	6
u. تجميد تحويل الأموال للسلطة الفلسطينية من عائدات الضرائب والرسوم الجمركية الفلسطينية المحتجزة من قبل إسرائيل .	1	2	3	4	5	6

11) وفيما يتعلق بقضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحلول المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. حق اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام 1948.	1	1
2. عودة مشروطة للاجئين الفلسطينيين.	2	2
3. استيعاب اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً.	3	3
4. استيعاب اللاجئين ومنحهم حقوق المواطنة الكاملة في الدول العربية المضيفة لهم.	4	4
5. التخلي عن حق العودة واستبداله بالتعويض المالي.	5	5
6. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه.	6	6
7. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	7	7

12) والآن أريد أن أقرأ عليك قائمة بالحلول الممكنة لقضية المستوطنات الإسرائيلية. أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحلول المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. قيام جميع المستوطنين الإسرائيليين بإخلاء المستوطنات المقامة على حدود عام 1967.	1	1
2. تفكيك جميع المستوطنات المقامة ضمن حدود عام 1967.	2	2
3. دفع تعويضات للمستوطنين، بما في ذلك إعادة توطينهم ضمن الحدود الإسرائيلية.	3	3
4. إبقاء جميع المستوطنات سليمة.	4	4
5. تجميد نشاطات الإسطيان في الضفة الغربية والقدس.	5	5
6. السماح لجميع المستوطنين بالبقاء في الضفة الغربية تحت السيادة الفلسطينية إن هم اختاروا ذلك.	6	6
7. التخلي عن أجزاء من الأراضي الإسرائيلية مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات الإسرائيلية في الضفة الغربية.	7	7
8. أن تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب الإسرائيلي من الجدار الفاصل جزءاً من إسرائيل.	8	8
9. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	9	9
10. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	10	10

**13** لقد اقترحت في الماضي عدة خيارات متنوعة للقدس. الرجاء أن تخبرني أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. القدس الشرقية للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربية للإسرائيليين كما كان الوضع قبل عام 1967.	1	1
2. تقسيم القدس إلى أحياء فلسطينية وأخرى يهودية.	2	2
3. رقابة دولية على القدس وعلى أماكنها المقدسة.	3	3
4. تبقى القدس موحدة وتحت السيادة الإسرائيلية مع السماح بدخول مواطني الدولتين للأماكن المقدسة في القدس.	4	4
5. ينبغي أن توضع البلدة القديمة تحت سيادة فلسطينية – إسرائيلية مشتركة.	5	5
6. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	6	6
7. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	7	7

**14** لقد اقترحت في الماضي عدة حلول بخصوص قضية الأسرى الفلسطينيين. الرجاء أن تخبرني أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. إطلاق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين لدوافع إنسانية فقط، مثلاً في حالة المرض، سجناء فترة طويلة، أو نساء وأطفال.	1	1
2. الإبقاء في السجون فقط على من قتل أو كان شريكاً في قتل الإسرائيليين.	2	2
3. الإبقاء على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين في السجون الإسرائيلية.	3	3
4. إطلاق سراح جميع الأسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون الإسرائيلية.	4	4
5. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	5	5
6. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	6	6

**15** والآن فيما يتعلق بقضية الموارد الطبيعية، أي مما يلي تعتبره أفضل ترتيب عملي؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. أن تكون الموارد الطبيعية تحت السيطرة الفلسطينية في الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً.	1	1
2. أن تكون الموارد الطبيعية تحت سيطرة مشتركة لصالح الإزدهار الاقتصادي للشعبين، الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي.	2	2
3. أن تبقى الموارد الطبيعية تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية كما هو الحال عليه اليوم، ولكن يجب الإبقاء على حقوق متساوية لكلا الشعبين، الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي (مثلاً من حيث: الأسعار، الاستهلاك والتوزيع).	3	3
4. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	4	4
5. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	5	5

**16** أود أن أقترح عليك الآن خططاً للتعاون الاقتصادي بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين. وباستخدام سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) غير مقبول جداً بالنسبة لك، و (5) يعني مقبول جداً. فإلى أي مدى تقبل بما يلي:

a. القيام بمشاريع مشتركة في جميع القطاعات الاقتصادية مثل المياه، الصحة، البيئة، السياحة وغيرها (أ).

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

c. تعزيز التجارة وتبادل السلع والخدمات بين الدولتين.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

e. إنشاء مطار فلسطيني.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

g. توسيع نطاق الصيد البحري في قطاع غزة.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

17) لقد نوقشت جميع العناصر التالية كجزء من إقامة دولة فلسطينية. باستخدام سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) أنك معارض تماماً و (5) يعني أنك مؤيد تماماً، أرجو أن تخبرني عن مدى تأييدك أو معارضتك لكل من العناصر التالية:

a. انسحاب إسرائيلي إلى حدود عام 1967 مع بعض التعديلات من خلال اتفاقية على مبادلة أراضٍ بشكل متكافئ.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

c. تواجد دولي على الحدود ما بين الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً ودولة إسرائيل.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

e. وجود نقاط رقابة إسرائيلية دائمة على المعابر الحدودية الفلسطينية تعمل جنباً إلى جنب مع السلطة الفلسطينية.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

g. تدشين الموقع الحالي لحداد الفصل كحدود نهائية للدولة الفلسطينية المقامة.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

18) ما هو، حسب رأيك، أفضل حل مناسب للصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟ (اقرأ جميع الخيارات)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. دولتان تعترفان بشرعية بعضهما البعض – الأولى إسرائيلية والثانية فلسطينية.

2. دولة واحدة يكون فيها لكلا الشعبين، الإسرائيلي والفلسطيني، نفس الحقوق والواجبات.

3. كونفدرالية فلسطينية – أردنية.

4. الضفة الغربية تصبح جزءاً من الأردن، وقطاع غزة جزءاً من مصر.

5. لا أحد منها. (لا تقرأ)

19) حسب رأيك، ما هي القضايا التي يجب على الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين الشروع في مواجهتها كخطوة أولى نحو اتفاقية سلام حقيقي ونهائي ما بين الطرفين؟ رتب هذه القضايا حسب أولوياتها من (1) إلى (10)، حيث يمثل (1) القضية الأكثر أهمية ويمثل (10) القضية الأقل أهمية في الوقت الحاضر؟ (اقرأ جميع البنود التالية). (الرجاء التركيز في تعبئة هذا السؤال)

المستوطنات.

الأسرى.

القدس.

أمن إسرائيل والفلسطينيين.

الحدود والمعابر.

اللاجئون.

السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعية مثل المياه.

قيام دولة فلسطينية على حدود عام 1967.

الإعتراف بالدولة اليهودية.

السيطرة على الأماكن المقدسة.

**20** والآن سأقوم بطرح مجموعة من الأفكار المتعددة حول عملية السلام. باستخدام سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) أنك تعارض بشدة و (5) أنك تؤيد بشدة، الرجاء أن تخبرني عن مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك للمقولات التالية:

- a. يجب أن تساهم المناهج التعليمية في نشر ثقافة السلام وتقبل الطرف الآخر.  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
- c. أن يكون المجتمع الدولي على استعداد للمساعدة في عملية بناء السلام.  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
- e. المفاوضات السلمية هي الطريق الوحيدة لتحقيق السلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
- f. لكلا الشعبين، الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين، الحق في العيش بسلام وأمن. (ب)  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

**21** والآن أود أن أسألك عن أداء بعض الشخصيات السياسية في عملية السلام. هل تلعب أداء إيجابي جداً، إيجابي نوعاً ما، سلبي نوعاً ما أم سلبي جداً؟ (اقرأ جميع خيارات الإجابة لكل سؤال).

	الشخصية السياسية	إيجابي جداً	إيجابي نوعاً ما	حيادي	سلبي نوعاً ما	سلبي جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a.	محمود عباس، رئيس السلطة الفلسطينية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
b.	خالد مشعل، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c.	رامي الحمد الله، رئيس وزراء السلطة الفلسطينية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d.	بنيامين نتنياهو، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e.	تسيبي ليفني، رئيسة حزب "الحركة" في إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f.	إسحق هرتسوغ، رئيس حزب العمل في إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6

**22** هل تعتقد بأنه من المحتمل جداً، أو المحتمل نوعاً ما، أو من غير المحتمل نوعاً ما، أو من غير المحتمل إطلاقاً أن تستطيع القيادة الحالية في بلدك صنع سلام مع الطرف الآخر؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. محتمل جداً.  
2. محتمل نوعاً ما.  
3. غير محتمل نوعاً ما.  
4. غير محتمل إطلاقاً.  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

**23** لو كان عندك القدرة على فرض حل للصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي، هل كنت: (الرجاء قراءة جميع الخيارات)

1. ستفرض نفس الحلول المطروحة من قبل حكومة بلدك؟  
2. ستفرض حلولاً مختلفة عن تلك المطروحة من قبل حكومة بلدك؟  
3. ستوافق على الحلول المقترحة من قبل حكومة الطرف الآخر؟  
4. ستقترح حلولاً تختلف عما اقترحته كلا الحكومتين؟  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ)

**24** هل تؤيد أم تعارض استئناف مفاوضات السلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين في ظل الظروف الحالية؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. أؤيد بشدة.  
2. أؤيد إلى حد ما.  
3. أعارض إلى حد ما.  
4. أعارض بشدة.  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

**25** هل تعتقد بأن المفاوضات بين السلطة الفلسطينية وإسرائيل ستؤدي إلى سلام بين الطرفين في السنوات القادمة، أم لا؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. أعتقد بشدة.  
2. أعتقد إلى حد ما.  
3. لا أعتقد إلى حد ما.  
4. لا أعتقد أبداً.  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).



**(26) حسب رأيك، لأي طرف استئناف مفاوضات السلام أكثر أهمية، للفلسطينيين أم للإسرائيليين؟**  
(سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. إنه أكثر أهمية للفلسطينيين.
2. إنه أكثر أهمية للإسرائيليين.
3. إن أهميته متساوية لكلا الطرفين.
4. إنه ليس مهماً لأي من الطرفين.
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

**(27) بالرّجوع للماضي، هل تعتقد بأن الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين عملوا كلّ ما هو مطلوب منهم لإتجاح محادثات ومعاهدات السلام، أم هل تعتقد أنه كان بإمكانهم فعل المزيد لجعلها تنجح؟**

**a. بالنسبة للإسرائيليين؟**

1. عملوا كلّ ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه.
2. كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد.
3. غير متأكد.

**b. بالنسبة للفلسطينيين؟**

1. عملوا كلّ ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه.
2. كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد.
3. غير متأكد.

**(28) حسب رأيك، من هو المسؤول من الناحية التاريخية عن فشل محادثات ومعاهدات السلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين؟** (اقرأ جميع الخيارات) (يسمح بأكثر من إجابة).

1. الشعب الفلسطيني.
2. الشعب الإسرائيلي.
3. الحركات الفلسطينية المتطرفة.
4. الأحزاب الإسرائيلية المتطرفة.
5. الحكومة الفلسطينية والقادة الفلسطينيون.
6. الحكومة الإسرائيلية والقادة الإسرائيليون.
7. الزعماء العرب.
8. الولايات المتحدة.
9. غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

**(29) حسب رأيك، هل تلعب الولايات المتحدة دوراً متوازناً تجاه كلا الطرفين في الصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي، أم أنها تلعب دوراً منحازاً للموقف الإسرائيلي، أم دوراً منحازاً للموقف الفلسطيني؟** (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. دور متوازن تجاه الطرفين.
2. دور منحاز للموقف الإسرائيلي.
3. دور منحاز للموقف الفلسطيني.
4. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

**(30) ما هي الدولة أو المنظمة الدولية التي قد تكون – حسب رأيك – أفضل وسيط ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين؟**  
(سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. الرباعية الدولية (الولايات المتحدة، الأمم المتحدة، الاتحاد الأوروبي وروسيا).
2. الولايات المتحدة.
3. الأمم المتحدة.
4. الاتحاد الأوروبي.
5. روسيا.
6. فرنسا.
7. تركيا.
8. الأردن.
9. مصر.
10. قطر.
11. إيران.
12. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه (لا تقرأ).
13. غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

**(31) إلى أية درجة تشعر بالملل والتعب من الصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟**

1. لدرجة كبيرة.
2. لدرجة متوسطة.
3. لدرجة ضئيلة.
4. غير مهم.
5. لا أعرف (لا تقرأ).

**(32) إلى أية درجة أنت مستعد لصنع سلام مع الطرف الآخر؟**

1. لدرجة كبيرة.
2. لدرجة متوسطة.
3. لدرجة ضئيلة.
4. غير مهم.
5. لا أعرف (لا تقرأ).

33) سأقرأ عليك عبارتين وأرجو منك أن تخبرني أيهما الأقرب لوجهة نظرك؟

1. ينبغي علينا أن نكون مستعدين للمخاطرة وتقديم تنازلات لتحقيق سلام إسرائيلي – فلسطيني.
2. لا ينبغي علينا أن نتنازل عن أي من مطالبنا من أجل تحقيق سلام إسرائيلي – فلسطيني.

34) ما مدى ثقتك بأن يُحل الصراع ما بين الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في المستقبل القريب؟ هل من الممكن القول بأنك واثق جداً، واثق نوعاً ما، غير واثق نوعاً ما أم أنك غير واثق أبداً؟

1. واثق جداً.
2. واثق نوعاً ما.
3. غير واثق نوعاً ما.
4. غير واثق أبداً.
5. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

35) لأية درجة تنطبق البنود التالية عليك، مستخدماً سَلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني رقم (1) لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) لدرجة كبيرة جداً؟

البنود	لدرجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	لدرجة كبيرة جداً	لا ينطبق (لا تقرأ)	رفض (لا تقرأ)
a. الفقر.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. الأجور/ المعاشات المنخفضة.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. البطالة / نقص فرص العمل.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. نقص الرعاية الصحية والتعليم.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. عدم الأمن والأمان / الجريمة / العنف.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. القيود المفروضة على حرية الحركة / الحصار.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. ارتفاع تكاليف المعيشة / التضخم / ارتفاع الأسعار.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
h. نقص الطاقة أو الوقود.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
i. عدم توفر الكهرباء.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
j. عدم توفر المياه.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
k. مشكلة السكن.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

36) لو أتيحت لك الفرصة للهجرة، هل ستهاجر أم ستبقى في بلدك؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. سابقى.
2. سأهاجر.
3. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

37) والآن أود أن أقرأ عليك قائمة من الكلمات والإصطلاحات التي تصف كيف ستعبّر عن مشاعرك ومواقفك تجاه الطرف الآخر. أرجو أن تخبرني لكل من هذه الكلمات أو الإصطلاحات إن كانت لا تعبّر عن مشاعرك، أو إن كانت تعبّر عن مشاعرك بدرجة صغيرة، أو بدرجة متوسطة أو بدرجة عالية:

المشاعر والمواقف تجاه الطرف الآخر	لا تعبّر عن مشاعري	تعبّر بدرجة صغيرة	تعبّر بدرجة متوسطة	تعبّر بدرجة عالية	لا أدري (لا تقرأ)
a. التسامح تجاه الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
b. تفهم الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
c. الغضب من الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
d. الخوف من الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
e. الثقة بالطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
f. الحقد تجاه الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5

38) في هذا السياق، لأية درجة تشعر بأن الطرف الآخر يَكُنْ لك نفس المشاعر؟

مشاعر ومواقف الطرف الآخر تجاهك	لا يَكُنْ لي هذه المشاعر	درجة صغيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة عالية	لا أدري (لا تقرأ)
a. التسامح	1	2	3	4	5
b. أنه يتفهمك	1	2	3	4	5
c. الغضب منك	1	2	3	4	5
d. الخوف منك	1	2	3	4	5
e. يثق بك	1	2	3	4	5
f. يحقد عليك	1	2	3	4	5

39) هل تميل إلى معرفة المزيد عن الطرف الآخر في مجالات لا علاقة لها بالسياسة أو بالصراع القائم، مثل الموسيقى، التراث الشعبي (الفولكلور)، الاتجاهات العامة، الآداب، الدين، الأفكار الإجتماعية أو غيرها؟  
(سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. نعم، بدرجة كبيرة جداً.
2. نعم، إلى حد ما.
3. نعم، ولكن لدرجة صغيرة.
4. لا، أبداً قطعياً.
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

40) هل ستشعر بارتياح شديد، بارتياح نوعاً ما، بعدم ارتياح نوعاً ما، أو بعدم ارتياح شديد لو كان العديد من جيرانك من غير دينك؟  
1. بارتياح شديد.  
2. بارتياح نوعاً ما.  
3. بعدم ارتياح نوعاً ما.  
4. بعدم ارتياح شديد.  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

41) هل قُتل أو جُرح أحد من أفراد عائلتك أو أصدقائك خلال السنوات الماضية نتيجة للصراع؟  
1. نعم  
2. لا

#### الجزء الثالث: الأسئلة الديمغرافية

د (1) الجنس:

1. ذكر.
2. أنثى.

د (2) العمر: \_\_\_\_\_ سنة.

د (3) الحالة الإجتماعية:

1. متزوج / متزوجة.
2. أعزب / عزباء.
3. مطلق / مطلقة.
4. أرمل / أرملة.

د (4) عدد سنوات الدراسة: \_\_\_\_\_ سنة.

د (5) عدد أفراد الأسرة (من جميع الأعمار من يأكلون على طاولة واحدة): \_\_\_\_\_ شخص.

د (6) إن معدل الدخل الشهري للأسرة الواحدة في فلسطين هو 2375 شاقل. هل دخل أسرتك الشهري أعلى، أقل أو تقريباً يساوي 2375 شاقل؟  
1. أعلى من 2375 شاقل.  
2. أقل من 2375 شاقل.  
3. يعادل تقريباً 2375 شاقل.  
4. لا أدري. (لا تقرأ)  
5. رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

د (7) ما هي ديانتك؟

1. مسلم (سني).
2. مسلم (شيعي).
3. مسيحي (روم أرثوذكس).
4. مسيحي (لاتيني).
5. مسيحي (روم كاثوليك).
6. مسيحي (لوثري).
7. درزي.
8. يهودي.
9. مُلحد.

## د 8) كيف تصف نفسك من الناحية الدينية؟

1. متدين جداً (ناشط ديني).
2. متدين إلى حد ما.
3. متدين بدرجة متوسطة.
4. غير متدين إلى حد ما.
5. غير متدين إطلاقاً.
6. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ)

## د 9) في الأصل، هل أنت لاجيء أم لا؟

1. نعم.
2. لا.

د 10) فيما يلي قائمة بالأحزاب التي من المحتمل أن تتنافس في الانتخابات القادمة للمجلس التشريعي. فإذا وافقت جميع الأحزاب والفصائل على إجراء الانتخابات الجديدة اليوم وعرضت عليك القائمة التالية، فلن تصوت؟ (إذا كان المستجوب غير متأكد إسأل: لمن منها يميل؟). (أجوبة مفتوحة برمز مشفرة مسبقاً) (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط) (لا تقرأ القائمة).

1. فتح
2. حماس
3. الطريق الثالث
4. الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين (ج ش ت ف)
5. المبادرة الوطنية الفلسطينية
6. الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين (ج د ت ف)
7. حركة الجهاد الإسلامي الفلسطيني
8. الإسلاميون المستقلون
9. الوطنيون المستقلون
10. غير ذلك (الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_) (ينبغي أن يكون طوعاً).
11. لا تعليق / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).
12. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

شكراً على حسن تعاونكم

إقرار وتعهّد

إنني أؤكد بأنني قد نفذت هذه الإستمارة شخصياً خلال المقابلة التي أجريتها مع المستجوب وفق التعليمات الصادرة لي عن المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي (PCPO) وبأن كلّ البيانات والمعلومات الواردة فيها صحيحة ومضبوطة حسبما أفادني به المستجوب نفسه. وأصرّح أيضاً بأنني قد راجعت هذه الإستمارة وتأكدت بأنها خالية من أية أخطاء أو نواقص. كما وأنني على علم مسبق بأنه في حالة ما أظهر التدقيق أية أخطاء أو نواقص في التنفيذ، تلغى هذه الإستمارة وتخضع تكلفة معالجتها ومراجعتها وكذلك قيمة التعويض عن أي تأخير أو ضرر يترتب على ذلك من أية مبالغ مستحقة لي. ويترك تقدير قيمة الخصم لإدارة المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي (PCPO) حسب أهمية مثل هذا الخطأ أو النقص. علماً بأنه لن تُقبل أية استمارة أو تدفع قيمتها إلا إذا كانت موقعة حسب الأصول من قبل الباحث.

إسم الباحث: \_\_\_\_\_ توقيع الباحث: \_\_\_\_\_  
توقيع المشرف: \_\_\_\_\_

## E.2.2 Split B



مُرحباً، إسمي \_\_\_\_\_ وأنا من المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي، وهي مؤسسة مستقلة لأبحاث البصدد إجراء دراسة وجهاً لوجه لأطروحة دكتوراة ستقدم لجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا بألمانيا. ستبحث الدراسة في؛ الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين حول الصراع والسلام في المنطقة. لقد تمّ تصميم الأسئلة في ألمانيا ومن وجهة نظر لاجزية. وهي الإجابة عليها. عليك في معظم الأحيان أن تبين فقط مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك لمقولة أو لعبارة معينة. ليس هناك إجابات صحي خاطئة، فكلّ ما نودّ معرفته هي وجهة نظرك الشخصية. والمقابلة كلّها لن تأخذ أكثر من (25) دقيقة من وقتك. نرجو أن تكوني واثقة بأن البيانات والمعلومات التي سنزودنا بها ستبقى في منتهى السرية وأنّ إجاباتك لن تُستخدم إلاّ للأغراض الإحصاء

فإذا كان لديك أية أسئلة أو استفسارات، الرّجاء الإتصال بدون تردّد بالمشرّف على هذه الدراسة أو بمدير مركز الأبحاث.

(إذا سأل المستجوب عن معلومات للإتصال):

أ.د. فولفغانغ دونزباخ

مدير قسم الإتصالات بجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا

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د. نبيل كوكالي

رئيس ومدير المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي

البريد الإلكتروني: [dr.kukali@pcpo.org](mailto:dr.kukali@pcpo.org)

هاتف: 0599 – 726-878

## قسم (ب)

رقم المستجوب: \_\_\_\_\_  
تعباً الإستمارة من قبل الأفراد الذين أعمارهم 18 عاماً فما فوق.

ملاحظة لكل الباحثين: يجب أن تكون الإجابات على جميع الأسئلة واضحة ودقيقة. وفي حالة عدم الإلتزام بتعبئة الإستمارة كاملة وبدقة، فإنها ستُلغى وتُعتبر كأنها لم تكن. فالرجاء التقيد بكل الملاحظات. مع الشكر سلفاً.

المستجوب المختار (إسمه الأول أو الكنية)	الميلاد الشهر	تاريخ اليوم	
			1
			2
			3
			4
			5
			6
			7
			8
			9
			10
			11
			12
			13
			14
			15
			16
			17
			18
			19

**الجزء الأول: معلومات عن العينة (تعباً من قبل الباحث)****م (1) القسم:**

1. أ.
2. ب.

**م (2) المنطقة:**

1. الضفة الغربية.
2. قطاع غزة

**م (3) في أية محافظة تعيش؟**

1. جنين.
2. نابلس.
3. رام الله.
4. بيت لحم.
5. القدس .
6. الخليل.
7. أريحا.
8. طولكرم.
9. طوباس.
10. قلقيلية.
11. سلفيت.
12. غزة المدينة.
13. شمال غزة.
14. دير البلح.
15. خان يونس.
16. رفح.

**م (4) نوع مكان الإقامة:**

1. مدينة / حضر.
2. قرية / ريف.
3. مخيم لاجئين.

**م (5) تاريخ إجراء المقابلة: / / 2015****م (6) مدة المقابلة (بالدقائق): \_\_\_\_\_ (يجب تعبئته عند نهاية المقابلة / الإنتهاء من تعبئة الإستمارة)****الجزء الثاني: أسئلة الدراسة**

**(1) بشكل عام، هل تعتقد بأن الأمور في بلدك تسير في الاتجاه الصحيح أم الاتجاه الخاطيء؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)**  
 1. تسير في الاتجاه الصحيح. 2. تسير في الاتجاه الخاطيء. 3. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

**(2) ما هي المصادر التي تحصل من خلالها على معلومات فيما يتعلّق بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟ (يُسمح بأكثر من إجابة) (اقرأ القائمة)**  
 1. الإذاعة (الراديو).  
 2. التلفاز.  
 3. شبكة الإنترنت مثل البلوغات والمواقع.  
 4. وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي مثل الفيسبوك، تويتر .. وغيرها.  
 5. الصحف، مطبوعة أو على الإنترنت ("أون لاين").  
 6. العائلة والأصدقاء.  
 7. لا أتابع الأخبار (لا تقرأ).

[إسأل السؤال رقم 3 إذا كان المستجوب/ة يقرأ / تقرأ الجرائد (الإجابة 5 في السؤال رقم 2 أعلاه)، وإلا انتقل للسؤال رقم 4]

**(3) ما هي الصحيفة المحلية، اليومية أو الأسبوعية أو الشهرية، التي تفضل عادة قراءتها؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).**

1. صحيفة القدس.
2. صحيفة الحياة.
3. صحيفة الأيام.
4. صحيفة فلسطين.
5. غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

**(4) كم مرّة تطلّع على الأخبار عبر الإنترنت؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)**

1. عدة مرات في اليوم.
2. مرّة في اليوم.
3. 4 – 6 أيام في الأسبوع.
4. 2 – 3 أيام في الأسبوع.
5. مرّة في الأسبوع.
6. غالباً أقلّ من مرّة في الأسبوع.
7. لا أستخدم الإنترنت لقراءة الأخبار. (لا تقرأ)

(5) ما هو مدى اهتمامك، إن وجد، في الأخبار المتعلقة بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟

1. مهتم للغاية.
2. مهتم جداً.
3. مهتم نوعاً ما.
4. لست مهتم كثيراً.
5. غير مهتم إطلاقاً.

(6) مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، بحيث أن رقم (1) يعني لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) يعني لدرجة كبيرة جداً، الرجاء أن تخبرني عن سبب الصراع ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.

سبب الصراع بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين هو حول...	درجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	درجة كبيرة جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
b. الثقافة / الحضارة.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. السياسة.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. التاريخ.	1	2	3	4	5	6
h. العرق.	1	2	3	4	5	6

(7) إلى أي مدى ترى بأن الأحداث التاريخية التالية كانت سبباً للصراع الحالي بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين، مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، بحيث أن رقم (1) يعني لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) يعني لدرجة كبيرة جداً.

الحدث التاريخي	درجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	درجة كبيرة جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
b. هجرة اليهود إلى فلسطين التاريخية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. الحرب العربية – الإسرائيلية عام 1948.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. استغلال العرب الصراع لخدمة أجنداتهم (مصالحهم) الخاصة.	1	2	3	4	5	6
h. اعتقاد اليهود بأن الأرض هي الوطن التاريخي للشعب اليهودي.	1	2	3	4	5	6

(8) ما هي العبارة التي تشعر بأنها الأقرب إلى وجهة نظرك لو كان بمقدورك العودة لبداية الصراع في بداية القرن الماضي؟ هل كنت ....

1. ستنقي التاريخ كما كان عليه.
2. ستبحث عن تغييرات أكثر سلماً للتاريخ.
3. ستصر على إجراءات حتى أكثر تشدداً.
4. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)

(9) هل تشعر بأن الإجراءات التالية المتعلقة بالصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي مبررة دائماً تقريباً، مبررة أحياناً، مبررة نادراً، أو ليست مبررة أبداً؟

الإجراء	مبرر دائماً تقريباً	مبرر أحياناً	مبرر نادراً	ليس مبرر أبداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
b. الأعمال العسكرية للحيش الإسرائيلي في الأراضي الفلسطينية.	1	2	3	4	5
d. أعمال المستوطنين اليهود ضد الفلسطينيين.	1	2	3	4	5
f. دعم السلطة الفلسطينية مالياً عائلات من هم في السجون الإسرائيلية.	1	2	3	4	5
h. بناء الجدار الفاصل ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.	1	2	3	4	5



**10** مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5 حيث يعني (1) غير مهم على الإطلاق و (5) يعني مهم جداً، كيف تقيم دور البنود التالية في إعاقه عملية السلام الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟

البنود	غير مهم على الإطلاق	2	3	4	مهم جداً (لا تعرف)
b. المحاولات الإسرائيلية لتعزيز الوجود اليهودي بداخل الحرم القدسي الشريف أو بجواره.	1	2	3	4	5
d. وجود أسلحة بحوزة حماس والجهاد الإسلامي.	1	2	3	4	5
f. وجود أنفاق تحت حدود قطاع غزة .	1	2	3	4	5
h. سيطرة إسرائيل الكاملة على الموارد الطبيعية.	1	2	3	4	5
j. صعوبة الوصول إلى أماكن العبادة .	1	2	3	4	5
l. عدم الاعتراف بحق إسرائيل في الوجود.	1	2	3	4	5
n. مقاطعة الفلسطينيين للمنتجات الإسرائيلية.	1	2	3	4	5
p. الإفتقار للتواصل بين المناطق في فلسطين.	1	2	3	4	5
r. الإفتقار للثقة ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.	1	2	3	4	5
t. سيطرة إسرائيل المطلقة على المعابر.	1	2	3	4	5

**11** وفيما يتعلق بقضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحلول المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. حقّ اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام 1948.	1	1
2. عودة مشروطة للاجئين الفلسطينيين.	2	2
3. استيعاب اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً.	3	3
4. استيعاب اللاجئين ومنحهم حقوق المواطنة الكاملة في الدول العربية المضيفة لهم.	4	4
5. التخلي عن حقّ العودة واستبداله بالتعويض المالي.	5	5
6. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه.	6	6
7. لا أعرف. (لا تعرف)	7	7

**12** والآن أريد أن أقرأ عليك قائمة بالحلول الممكنة لقضية المستوطنات الإسرائيلية. أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحلول المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. قيام جميع المستوطنين الإسرائيليين بإخلاء المستوطنات المقامة على حدود عام 1967.	1	1
2. تفكيك جميع المستوطنات المقامة ضمن حدود عام 1967.	2	2
3. دفع تعويضات للمستوطنين، بما في ذلك إعادة توطينهم ضمن الحدود الإسرائيلية.	3	3
4. إبقاء جميع المستوطنات سليمة.	4	4
5. تجميد نشاطات الإستييطان في الضفة الغربية والقدس.	5	5
6. السماح لجميع المستوطنين بالبقاء في الضفة الغربية تحت السيادة الفلسطينية إن هم اختاروا ذلك.	6	6
7. التخلي عن أجزاء من الأراضي الإسرائيلية مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات الإسرائيلية في الضفة الغربية.	7	7
8. أن تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب الإسرائيلي من الجدار الفاصل جزءاً من إسرائيل.	8	8
9. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تعرف)	9	9
10. لا أعرف. (لا تعرف)	10	10

**13** لقد اقترحت في الماضي عدة خيارات متنوعة للقدس. الرجاء أن تخبرني أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. القدس الشرقية للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربية للإسرائيليين كما كان الوضع قبل عام 1967.	1	1
2. تقسيم القدس إلى أحياء فلسطينية وأخرى يهودية.	2	2
3. رقابة دولية على القدس وعلى أماكنها المقدسة.	3	3
4. تبقى القدس موحدة وتحت السيادة الإسرائيلية مع السماح بدخول مواطني الدولتين للأماكن المقدسة في القدس.	4	4
5. ينبغي أن توضع البلدة القديمة تحت سيادة فلسطينية – إسرائيلية مشتركة.	5	5
6. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	6	6
7. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	7	7

**14** لقد اقترحت في الماضي عدة حلول بخصوص قضية الأسرى الفلسطينيين. الرجاء أن تخبرني أي من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. إطلاق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين لدوافع إنسانية فقط، مثلاً في حالة المرض، سجناء فترة طويلة، أو نساء وأطفال.	1	1
2. الإبقاء في السجون فقط على من قتل أو كان شريكاً في قتل الإسرائيليين.	2	2
3. الإبقاء على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين في السجون الإسرائيلية.	3	3
4. إطلاق سراح جميع الأسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون الإسرائيلية.	4	4
5. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	5	5
6. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	6	6

**15** والآن فيما يتعلق بقضية الموارد الطبيعية، أي مما يلي تعتبره أفضل ترتيب عملي؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط). ومن من هذه الحلول تعتبره ثاني أفضل حل عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ (اقرأ القائمة)، (تتأوب الأجوبة)، (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط)

الحل المقترحة	الحل الأفضل	ثاني أفضل حل
1. أن تكون الموارد الطبيعية تحت السيطرة الفلسطينية في الدولة الفلسطينية المقامة حديثاً.	1	1
2. أن تكون الموارد الطبيعية تحت سيطرة مشتركة لصالح الإزدهار الإقتصادي للشعبين، الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي.	2	2
3. أن تبقى الموارد الطبيعية تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية كما هو الحال عليه اليوم، ولكن يجب الإبقاء على حقوق متساوية لكلا الشعبين، الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي (مثلاً من حيث: الأسعار، الإستهلاك والتوزيع).	3	3
4. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه. (لا تقرأ)	4	4
5. لا أعرف. (لا تقرأ)	5	5

**16** أود أن أقترح عليك الآن خططاً للتعاون الإقتصادي بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين. وباستخدام سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) غير مقبول جداً بالنسبة لك، و (5) يعني مقبول جداً. فإلى أي مدى تقبل بما يلي:

- b. السماح للعمال الفلسطينيين بالعمل داخل إسرائيل.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
- d. وضع سياسة ضريبية متفق عليها بين الجانبين الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
- f. إنشاء ميناء بحري فلسطيني.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

17) لقد نوّقت جميع العناصر التالية كجزء من إقامة دولة فلسطينية. باستخدام سلّم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) أنك معارض تماماً و (5) يعني أنك مؤيد تماماً، أرجو أن تخبرني عن مدى تأييدك أو معارضتك لكلّ من العناصر التالية:

b. دولة فلسطينية منزوعة السلاح في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة، باستثناء توفّر بعض الأسلحة المرخصة لاستخدامها من قبل قوات الأمن الفلسطينية.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

d. دولة فلسطينية بسيطرة كاملة على معابر حدودها.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

f. إنشاء "ممر آمن" ما بين الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

h. التنسيق الأمني بين دولة إسرائيل وفلسطين.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

18) ما هو، حسب رأيك، أفضل حلّ مناسب للصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟ (اقرأ جميع الخيارات)، (تناوب الأجوبة)، (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. دولتان تعترفان بشريّة بعضهما البعض – الأولى إسرائيلية والثانية فلسطينية.
2. دولة واحدة يكون فيها لكلا الشعبين، الإسرائيلي والفلسطيني، نفس الحقوق والواجبات.
3. كنفدرالية فلسطينية – أردنية.
4. الضفة الغربية تصبح جزءاً من الأردن، وقطاع غزة جزءاً من مصر.
5. لا أحد منها. (لا تقرأ)

19) حسب رأيك، ما هي القضايا التي يجب على الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين الشروع في مواجهتها كخطوة أولى نحو اتفاقية سلام حقيقي ونهائي ما بين الطرفين؟ رتب هذه القضايا حسب أولوياتها من (1) إلى (10)، حيث يمثل (1) القضية الأكثر أهمية ويمثل (10) القضية الأقل أهمية في الوقت الحاضر؟ (اقرأ جميع البنود التالية). (الرجاء التركيز في تعبئة هذا السؤال)

المستوطنات.

الأسرى.

القدس.

أمن إسرائيل والفلسطينيين.

الحدود والمعابر.

اللاجئون.

السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعية مثل المياه.

قيام دولة فلسطينية على حدود عام 1967.

الإعتراف بالدولة اليهودية.

السيطرة على الأماكن المقدسة.

20) والآن سأقوم بطرح مجموعة من الأفكار المتعددة حول عملية السلام. باستخدام سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني (1) بأنك تعارض بشدة و (5) أنك تؤيد بشدة، الرجاء أن تخبرني عن مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك للمقولات التالية:

b. أية اتفاقية بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين يجب أن تكون مقبولة ومدعومة من قبل جامعة الدول العربية.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

d. يجب على الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين إيقاف جميع أشكال التحريض على الكراهية.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

f. لكلا الشعبين، الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين، الحق في العيش بسلام وأمن.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

21) والآن أود أن أسألك عن أداء بعض الشخصيات السياسية في عملية السلام. هل تلعب أداء إيجابي جداً، إيجابي نوعاً ما، سلبي نوعاً ما أم سلبي جداً؟ (اقرأ جميع خيارات الإجابة لكل سؤال).

	الشخصية السياسية	إيجابي جداً	إيجابي نوعاً ما	حيادي	سلبي نوعاً ما	سلبي جداً	لا أعرف (لا تقرأ)
a.	محمود عباس، رئيس السلطة الفلسطينية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
b.	خالد مشعل، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c.	رامي الحمد الله، رئيس وزراء السلطة الفلسطينية.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d.	بنيامين نتنياهو، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e.	تسيبي ليفني، رئيسة حزب "الحركة" في إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f.	إسحق هرتسوغ، رئيس حزب العمل في إسرائيل.	1	2	3	4	5	6

22) هل تعتقد بأنه من المحتمل جداً، أو المحتمل نوعاً ما، أو من غير المحتمل نوعاً ما، أو من غير المحتمل إطلاقاً أن تستطيع القيادة الحالية في بلدك صنع سلام مع الطرف الآخر؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. محتمل جداً. 2. محتمل نوعاً ما. 3. غير محتمل نوعاً ما. 4. غير محتمل إطلاقاً. 5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

23) لو كان عندك القدرة على فرض حل للصراع الفلسطيني - الإسرائيلي، هل كنت: (الرجاء قراءة جميع الخيارات)

1. ستفرض نفس الحلول المطروحة من قبل حكومة بلدك؟  
2. ستفرض حلولاً مختلفة عن تلك المطروحة من قبل حكومة بلدك؟  
3. ستوافق على الحلول المقترحة من قبل حكومة الطرف الآخر؟  
4. ستقترح حلولاً تختلف عما اقترحت كلا الحكومتين؟  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ)

24) هل تؤيد أم تعارض استئناف مفاوضات السلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين في ظل الظروف الحالية؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. أؤيد بشدة. 2. أؤيد إلى حد ما. 3. أعارض إلى حد ما. 4. أعارض بشدة. 5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

25) هل تعتقد بأن المفاوضات بين السلطة الفلسطينية وإسرائيل ستؤدي إلى سلام بين الطرفين في السنوات القادمة، أم لا؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. أعتقد بشدة. 2. أعتقد إلى حد ما. 3. لا أعتقد إلى حد ما. 4. لا أعتقد أبداً. 5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

26) حسب رأيك، لأي طرف استئناف مفاوضات السّلام أكثر أهمية، للفلسطينيين أم للإسرائيليين؟ (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. إنه أكثر أهمية للفلسطينيين.
2. إنه أكثر أهمية للإسرائيليين.
3. إن أهميته متساوية لكلا الطرفين.
4. إنه ليس مهماً لأي من الطرفين.
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

27) بالرجوع للماضي، هل تعتقد بأن الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين عملوا كل ما هو مطلوب منهم لإنجاح محادثات ومفاوضات السّلام، أم هل تعتقد أنه كان بإمكانهم فعل المزيد لجعلها تنجح؟

a. بالنسبة للإسرائيليين؟

1. عملوا كل ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه.
2. كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد.
3. غير متأكد.

b. بالنسبة للفلسطينيين؟

1. عملوا كل ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه.
2. كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد.
3. غير متأكد.

28) حسب رأيك، من هو المسؤول من الناحية التاريخية عن فشل محادثات ومفاوضات السّلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين؟ (اقرأ جميع الخيارات) (يسمح بأكثر من إجابة).

1. الشعب الفلسطيني.
2. الشعب الإسرائيلي.
3. الحركات الفلسطينية المتطرفة.
4. الأحزاب الإسرائيلية المتطرفة.
5. الحكومة الفلسطينية والقادة الفلسطينيون.
6. الحكومة الإسرائيلية والقادة الإسرائيليون.
7. الزعماء العرب.
8. الولايات المتحدة.
9. غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

29) حسب رأيك، هل تلعب الولايات المتحدة دوراً متوازناً تجاه كلا الطرفين في الصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي، أم أنها تلعب دوراً منحازاً للموقف الإسرائيلي، أم دوراً منحازاً للموقف الفلسطيني؟ (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. دور متوازن تجاه الطرفين.
2. دور منحاز للموقف الإسرائيلي.
3. دور منحاز للموقف الفلسطيني.
4. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

30) ما هي الدولة أو المنظمة الدولية التي قد تكون – حسب رأيك – أفضل وسيط ما بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين؟ (سجّل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. الرباعية الدولية (الولايات المتحدة، الأمم المتحدة، الاتحاد الأوروبي وروسيا).
2. الولايات المتحدة.
3. الأمم المتحدة.
4. الاتحاد الأوروبي.
5. روسيا.
6. فرنسا.
7. تركيا.
8. الأردن.
9. مصر.
10. قطر.
11. إيران.
12. لا أحد مما ذكر أعلاه (لا تقرأ).
13. غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد: \_\_\_\_\_.

31) إلى أية درجة تشعر بالملل والتعب من الصراع الفلسطيني – الإسرائيلي؟

1. لدرجة كبيرة.
2. لدرجة متوسطة.
3. لدرجة ضئيلة.
4. غير مهتم.
5. لا أعرف (لا تقرأ).

32) إلى أية درجة أنت مستعد لصنع سلام مع الطرف الآخر؟

1. لدرجة كبيرة.
2. لدرجة متوسطة.
3. لدرجة ضئيلة.
4. غير مهتم.
5. لا أعرف (لا تقرأ).

33) ساقراً عليك عبارتين وأرجو منك أن تخبرني أيهما الأقرب لوجهة نظرك؟

1. ينبغي علينا أن نكون مستعدين للمخاطرة وتقديم تنازلات لتحقيق سلام إسرائيلي – فلسطيني.
2. لا ينبغي علينا أن نتنازل عن أي من مطالبنا من أجل تحقيق سلام إسرائيلي – فلسطيني.

34) ما مدى ثقتك بأن يُحل الصراع ما بين الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في المستقبل القريب؟ هل من الممكن القول بأنك واثق جداً، واثق نوعاً ما، غير واثق نوعاً ما أم أنك غير واثق أبداً؟

1. واثق جداً.
2. واثق نوعاً ما.
3. غير واثق نوعاً ما.
4. غير واثق أبداً.
5. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

35) لأية درجة تنطبق البنود التالية عليك، مستخدماً سلم درجات من رقم 1 إلى 5، حيث يعني رقم (1) لدرجة صغيرة جداً و (5) لدرجة كبيرة جداً؟

البنود	لدرجة صغيرة جداً	2	3	4	لدرجة كبيرة جداً	لا ينطبق (لا تقرأ)	رفض (لا تقرأ)
a. الفقر.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. الأجور / المعاشات المنخفضة.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. البطالة / نقص فرص العمل.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. نقص الرعاية الصحية والتعليم.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. عدم الأمن والأمان / الجريمة / العنف.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. القيود المفروضة على حرية الحركة / الحصار.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. ارتفاع تكاليف المعيشة / التضخم / ارتفاع الأسعار.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
h. نقص الطاقة أو الوقود.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
i. عدم توفر الكهرباء.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
j. عدم توفر المياه.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
k. مشكلة السكن.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

36) لو أتاحت لك الفرصة للهجرة، هل ستهاجر أم ستبقى في بلدك؟ (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. سأبقى.
2. سأهاجر.
3. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

37) والآن أود أن أقرأ عليك قائمة من الكلمات والإصطلاحات التي تصف كيف ستعبر عن مشاعرك ومواقفك تجاه الطرف الآخر. أرجو أن تخبرني لكل من هذه الكلمات أو الإصطلاحات إن كانت لا تعبر عن مشاعرك، أو إن كانت تعبر عن مشاعرك بدرجة صغيرة، أو بدرجة متوسطة أو بدرجة عالية:

المشاعر والمواقف تجاه الطرف الآخر	لا تعبر عن مشاعري	تعبر بدرجة صغيرة	تعبر بدرجة متوسطة	تعبر بدرجة عالية	لا أدري (لا تقرأ)
a. التسامح تجاه الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
b. تفهم الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
c. الغضب من الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
d. الخوف من الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
e. الثقة بالطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5
f. الحقد تجاه الطرف الآخر	1	2	3	4	5

(38) في هذا السياق، لأية درجة تشعر بأن الطرف الآخر يَكُنْ لك نفس المشاعر؟

مشارع ومواقف الطرف الآخر تجاهك	لا يَكُنْ لي هذه المشاعر	درجة صغيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة عالية	لا أدري (لا تقرأ)
a. التسامح	1	2	3	4	5
b. أنه يتفهمك	1	2	3	4	5
c. الغضب منك	1	2	3	4	5
d. الخوف منك	1	2	3	4	5
e. يثق بك	1	2	3	4	5
f. يحقد عليك	1	2	3	4	5

(39) هل تميل إلى معرفة المزيد عن الطرف الآخر في مجالات لا علاقة لها بالسياسة أو بالصراع القائم، مثل الموسيقى، التراث الشعبي (الفولكلور)، الاتجاهات العامة، الآداب، الدين، الأفكار الاجتماعية أو غيرها؟  
(سجل إجابة واحدة فقط).

1. نعم، بدرجة كبيرة جداً.
2. نعم، إلى حد ما.
3. نعم، ولكن لدرجة صغيرة.
4. لا، أبداً قطعاً.
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

(40) هل ستشعر بارتياح شديد، بارتياح نوعاً ما، بعدم ارتياح نوعاً ما، أو بعدم ارتياح شديد لو كان العديد من جيرائك من غير دينك؟  
1. بارتياح شديد.  
2. بارتياح نوعاً ما.  
3. بعدم ارتياح نوعاً ما.  
4. بعدم ارتياح شديد.  
5. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).

(41) هل قُتل أو جرح أحد من أفراد عائلتك أو أصدقائك خلال السنوات الماضية نتيجة للصراع؟  
1. نعم  
2. لا

#### الجزء الثالث: الأسئلة الديمغرافية

د (1) الجنس:

1. ذكر.
2. أنثى.

د (2) العمر: \_\_\_\_\_ سنة.

د (3) الحالة الاجتماعية:

1. متزوج / متزوجة.
2. أعزب / عزباء.
3. مطلق / مطلقة.
4. أرمل / أرملة.

د (4) عدد سنوات الدراسة: \_\_\_\_\_ سنة.

د (5) عدد أفراد الأسرة (من جميع الأعمار من يأكلون على طاولة واحدة): \_\_\_\_\_ شخص.

د (6) إنَّ معذل الدخل الشهري للأسرة الواحدة في فلسطين هو 2375 شاقل. هل دخل أسرتك الشهري أعلى، أقل أو تقريباً يساوي 2375 شاقل؟  
1. أعلى من 2375 شاقل.  
2. أقل من 2375 شاقل.  
3. يعادل تقريباً 2375 شاقل.  
4. لا أدري. (لا تقرأ)  
5. رفض الإجابة. (لا تقرأ)

د (7) ما هي ديانتك؟

1. مسلم (سني).
2. مسلم (شيعي).
3. مسيحي (روم أرثوذكس).
4. مسيحي (لاتيني).
5. مسيحي (روم كاثوليك).
6. مسيحي (لوثري).
7. درزي.
8. يهودي.
9. ملحد.

## د 8) كيف تصف نفسك من الناحية الدينية؟

1. متدين جداً (ناشط ديني).
2. متدين إلى حد ما.
3. متدين بدرجة متوسطة.
4. غير متدين إلى حد ما.
5. غير متدين إطلاقاً.
6. لا أدري / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ)

## د 9) في الأصل، هل أنت لاجئ أم لا؟

1. نعم.
2. لا.

د 10) فيما يلي قائمة بالأحزاب التي من المحتمل أن تتنافس في الانتخابات القادمة للمجلس التشريعي. فإذا وافقت جميع الأحزاب والفصائل على إجراء الانتخابات الجديدة اليوم وعرضت عليك القائمة التالية، فلن تصوت؟ (إذا كان المستجوب غير متأكد إسأل: لمن منها يميل؟). (أجوبة مفتوحة برموز مشفرة مسبقاً) (سجل إجابة واحدة فقط) (لا تقرأ القائمة).

1. فتح
2. حماس
3. الطريق الثالث
4. الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين (ج ش ت ف)
5. المبادرة الوطنية الفلسطينية
6. الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين (ج د ت ف)
7. حركة الجهاد الإسلامي الفلسطينية
8. الإسلاميون المستقلون
9. الوطنيون المستقلون
10. غير ذلك (الرجاء حدد: \_\_\_\_\_) (ينبغي أن يكون طوعاً).
11. لا تعليق / رفض الإجابة (لا تقرأ).
12. لا أدري (لا تقرأ).

شكراً على حسن تعاونكم

## إقرار وتعهد

إنني أؤكد بأنني قد نفذت هذه الإستمارة شخصياً خلال المقابلة التي أجريتها مع المستجوب وفق التعليمات الصادرة لي عن المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي (PCPO) وبأن كل البيانات والمعلومات الواردة فيها صحيحة ومضبوطة حسبما أفادني به المستجوب نفسه. وأصرح أيضاً بأنني قد راجعت هذه الإستمارة وتأكدت بأنها خالية من أية أخطاء أو نواقص. كما وأنني على علم مسبق بأنه في حالة ما أظهر التدقيق أية أخطاء أو نواقص في التنفيذ، تلغى هذه الإستمارة وتخضع تكلفة معالجتها ومراجعتها وكذلك قيمة التعويض عن أي تأخير أو ضرر يترتب على ذلك من أية مبالغ مستحقة لي. ويترك تقدير قيمة الخصم لإدارة المركز الفلسطيني لاستطلاع الرأي (PCPO) حسب أهمية مثل هذا الخطأ أو النقص.

علماً بأنه لن تُقبل أية استمارة أو تدفع قيمتها إلا إذا كانت موقعة حسب الأصول من قبل الباحث.

إسم الباحث: \_\_\_\_\_

توقيع الباحث: \_\_\_\_\_

توقيع المشرف: \_\_\_\_\_



## E.3 Hebrew Translation

### E.3.1 Split A



#### שאלון A

לום, מדבר/ת \_\_\_\_\_ ממכון המחקר מאגר מוחות. אנו עורכים סקר בנושא הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני ותהליך השלום אזור. הסקר אנונימי ומיועד לצרכים סטטיסטיים בלבד, אודה לך אם תשיב/י על מספר שאלות קצרות.

#### רק 1

S. שאלון A

S. מדינה: ישראל

S. אזור חיוג:

S. סוג המגורים: 1. יישוב עירוני 2. יישוב כפרי 3. התנחלות

S. תאריך הראיון:

6. משך הראיון/המענה לסקר:

#### רק 2

Q (באופן כללי, האם אתה מאמין שהעניינים במדינת ישראל מתקדמים בכיוון הנכון או בכיוון הלא נכון

בכיוון הנכון 2. בכיוון הלא נכון 3. תשובות אחרות

Q) מהם מקורות המידע שלך אודות הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני? (ניתן לענות מס' תשובות)

Q2. רדיו Q22. טלוויזיה Q23. אינטרנט Q24. מדיה חברתית כמו פייסבוק, טוויטר וכדומה

Q2. עיתונות מודפסת ובאינטרנט Q26. משפחה וחברים Q27. תשובות אחרות

Q) (שאלה מס' 3 למי שענה תשובה מס' 5 "עיתונות" בשאלה 2) מהו העיתון היומי, השבועי או החודשי שאתה קורא בו  
ל הכי הרבה?

. ישראל היום 2. ידיעות אחרונות 3. הארץ 4. מעריב 5. אחר, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q) באיזו תדירות אתה קורא את החדשות באינטרנט?

. מספר פעמים ביום 2. פעם ביום 3. 4-6 פעמים בשבוע 4. 2-3 פעמים בשבוע 5. פעם בשבוע 6. פחות מפעם בשבוע 7  
שובות אחרות

Q) עד כמה אתה מתעניין אם בכלל בחדשות העוסקות בסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

. מתעניין באופן קיצוני 2. מתעניין מאוד 3. מתעניין במידה בינונית

. לא כל כך מתעניין 5. כלל לא מתעניין

6) בסולם של 1-5, כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד ו-5=במידה גבוהה מאוד, תאמר לי בבקשה באיזו מידה עוסק הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני בכל אחד מהנושאים הבאים? (בסולם 1-5, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q6A. דת

Q6C. לאומיות

Q6E. כלכלה

Q6G. קיום

7) עד כמה מהווה כל אחד מהאירועים ההיסטוריים הבאים גורם לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני? (בסולם של 1-5, כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד ו-5=במידה גבוהה מאוד, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q7A. הרדיפות אחר היהודים באירופה וברוסיה

Q7C. המנדט הבריטי שאישר ליהודים לכונן בית יהודי בפלסטינה – הצהרת בלפור

Q7E. הכיבוש הישראלי של השטחים הפלסטינאים ב-1967 – מלחמת ששת הימים

Q7G. האמונה הפלסטינית שהם חיים על אדמותיהם מזה דורות וזכותם להמשיך בכך

Q8) איזה משפט מהבאים הכי קרוב לעמדתך, כאשר אתה מביט לאחור לראשיתו של הסכסוך, בתחילת המאה שעברה:

1. הייתי משאיר את ההיסטוריה כמו שהיא 2. הייתי מחפש אחר יותר שינויים שיביאו לשלום

3. הייתי ממשיך באותו כיוון אבל עם צעדים יותר קיצוניים 4. תשובות אחרות

9) מהי עמדתך ביחס לצעדים הבאים הקשורים לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני: הם כמעט תמיד מוצדקים, מוצדקים במידה מסוימת או אף פעם לא מוצדקים? (בסולם 1-3, 4 תשובות אחרות)

Q9A. שיגור רקטות מעזה לישראל

Q9C. פעולות של פלסטינים נגד ישראל

Q9E. הגבלות על תנועה מצד ישראל על פלסטינים

Q9G. ניסיונות הרשות הפלסטינית לבדוד את ישראל בזירה הבינלאומית

10) בסולם של 1-5 כאשר 1=כלל לא מסכן ו-5=מסכן מאוד, באיזו מידה מסכן כל אחד מהגורמים הבאים את תהליך השלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? (בסולם 1-5, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q10A. בניית התנחלויות

Q10C. אי הכרה בקיומה של מדינת ישראל

Q10E. החזקת נשק על ידי מתנחלים ישראליים

Q10G. החזקת אסירים פלסטיניים במעצר על ידי ישראל

Q10I. זכות השיבה של הפליטים הפלסטינים

Q10K. העדר גבולות ברורים למדינה הפלסטינית

Q10M. קיצוניים משני הצדדים המתנגדים תמיד לכל הסכם שלום

Q10O. התדרדרות הכלכלה הפלסטינית בגלל הסכסוך

Q10Q. האיום הביטחוני מצד קיצוניים על שני הצדדים

Q10S. התלות של הכלכלה הפלסטינית בכלכלה הישראלית

Q10U. הקפאת העברת כספי מיסים לרשות הפלסטינית ומגבלות מכס מצד ישראל

Q11A. בהתייחס לסוגית הפליטים הפלסטינים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי הגבוה ביותר הניתן ליישום, מבין הפתרונות הבאים?

1. זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות 1948
2. חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים
3. קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום
4. שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום
5. נטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספיים
6. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
7. תשובות אחרות

Q11B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם?

1. זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות 1948
2. חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים
3. קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום
4. שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום
5. נטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספיים
6. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
7. תשובות אחרות

Q12A. מבין הפתרונות הבאים לבעיית ההתנחלויות הישראליות, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום?

1. כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות 1967
2. פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות 1967
3. חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל
4. לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים
5. הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים
6. לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני
7. ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות, בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית
8. כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל
9. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
10. תשובות אחרות

Q12B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם?

1. כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות 1967
2. פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות 1967
3. חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל
4. לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים
5. הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים
6. לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני

7. ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות, בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית
8. כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל
9. אף אחד מהפטרונות הללו
10. תשובות אחרות

Q13A. מהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה ביותר הניתנת ליישום ביחס לירושלים?

1. מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני 1967
2. חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים
3. פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים
4. ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים
5. העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית-פלסטינית
6. תשובות אחרות

Q13B. ומהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה השנייה הניתנת ליישום?

1. מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני 1967
2. חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים
3. פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים
4. ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים
5. העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית-פלסטינית
6. תשובות אחרות

Q14A. מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום ביחס לסוגיית האסירים הפלסטינים?

1. שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה, אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים
2. להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים
3. להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראליים
4. לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראליים
5. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
6. תשובות אחרות

Q14B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום?

1. שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה, אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים
2. להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים
3. להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראליים
4. לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראליים
5. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
6. תשובות אחרות

Q15A. ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום?

1. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם
2. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים
3. המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום, אבל יהיו זכויות שוות (ביחס למחירים, צריכה וחלוקה) לישראלים ולפלסטינים
4. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
5. תשובות אחרות

Q15B. ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום?

1. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם
2. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים
3. המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום, אבל יהיו זכויות שוות (ביחס למחירים, צריכה וחלוקה) לישראלים ולפלסטינים
4. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
5. תשובות אחרות

16) נציג בפניך תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי בין הפלסטינים לישראלים. עד כמה כל אחד מהמרכיבים מקובל עליך, בסולם של 1-5 כאשר 1=מאוד לא מקובל ו-5=מאוד מקובל?

- Q16A. יישום פרויקטים משולבים בכל תחומי הכלכלה, כמו מים, בריאות, סביבה, תיירות וכדומה
- Q16C. קידום מסחר והחלפת מוצרים ושירותים בין שתי המדינות
- Q16E. בניית שדה תעופה פלסטיני
- Q16G. הרחבת שטח הדייג המותר סביב רצועת עזה

17) עד כמה אתה תומך או ממתנגד לכל אחד המרכיבים הבאים שהם חלק מהקמת מדינה פלסטינית, בסולם 1-5 כאשר 1=מתנגד לחלוטין ו-5=תומך לחלוטין?

- Q17A. ישראל תיסוג לקוי 1967 עם חילופי שטחים מסוימים ומוסכמים
- Q17C. נוכחות בינלאומית בגבולות שבין המדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם לבין ישראל
- Q17E. קיום נקודות פיקוח ישראליות קבועות במעברי הגבול של הפלסטינים הפועלות בשיתוף פעולה עם הרשות הפלסטינית
- Q17G. לסמן את המיקום הנוכחי של החומה כגבול הקבע של המדינה הפלסטינית שתקום

Q18. לדעתך, מהו הפתרון המתאים ביותר לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. שתי מדינות המכירות כל אחת בלגיטימיות של השנייה, מדינת ישראל ומדינה פלסטינית
2. מדינה אחת שבה גם לישראלים וגם לפלסטינים יש זכויות וחובות שווים
3. קונפדרציה ירדנית-פלסטינית
4. הגדה המערבית תהיה חלק מירדן ורצועת עזה חלק ממצרים
5. תשובה אחרת

19) מהם הנושאים בהם צריכים הישראלים והפלסטינים לעסוק כאשר הם פועלים להשגת שלום אמיתי ומלא בין שני הצדדים.  
דרג את הגורמים בסולם 1-10 לפי חשיבות כאשר 1=הנושא החשוב ביותר ו-10=הנושא הכי פחות חשוב.

Q19-1 התנחלויות

Q19-2 אסירים

Q19-3 ירושלים

Q19-4 הביטחון של הישראלים והפלסטינים

Q19-5 גבולות ונקודות מעבר

Q19-6 הפליטים

Q19-7 פיקוח על משאבים כמו מים

Q19-8 הקמת מדינה פלסטינית בגבולות 1967

Q19-9 הכרה במדינה היהודית

Q19-10 פיקוח על המקומות הקדושים

20) להלן מספר משפטים לגבי תהליך השלום. עד כמה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים עם כל אחד מהם בסולם של 1-5 כאשר 1=מאוד לא מסכים ו-5=מאוד מסכים?

Q20A. סדר היום צריך לכלול יצירת תרבות ואווירה של שלום וקבלת האחר

Q20C. הקהילה הבינלאומית צריכה להיות מוכנה לסייע בתהליך בניית השלום

Q20E. רק במשא ומתן אפשר להשיג שלום בין ישראלים לפלסטינים

21) איזה תפקיד ממלא לדעתך כל אחד מהאישים הפוליטיים הבאים הקשורים לתהליך השלום: חיובי ביותר, חיובי במידה מסוימת, נייטרלי, שלילי במידה מסוימת או שלילי ביותר?

Q21A. מוחמד עבאס, יושב ראש הרשות הפלסטינית

Q21B. חאלד משעל, יושב ראש חמאס

Q21C. ראמי אל-חמדאללה, ראש הממשלה ברשות הפלסטינית

Q21D. בנימין נתניהו, ראש ממשלת ישראל

Q21E. ציפי לבני, ראש מפלגת התנועה

Q21F. יצחק הרצוג, ראש מפלגת המחנה הציוני

Q22) האם המנהיגות הישראלית הנוכחית יכולה להשיג שלום עם הצד השני?

1. כנראה שכן

2. ייתכן שכן

3. כנראה שלא

4. בהחלט לא

5. תשובות אחרות

(Q23) מה היית עושה אם הייתה לך היכולת לאכוף פתרון לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. אוכף את הפתרון המוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל
2. אוכף פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל
3. מסכים לפתרון המוצע על ידי הצד השני
4. מציע פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי שני הצדדים

(Q24) האם אתה תומך או מתנגד להמשך המשא ומתן לשלום בתנאים הנוכחיים?

1. תומך מאוד
2. תומך במידה מסוימת
3. מתנגד במידה מסוימת
4. מתנגד מאוד
5. תשובות אחרות

(Q25) האם אתה מאמין או לא מאמין שהמשא ומתן בין הרשות הפלסטינית וישראל יביא לשלום בין שני הצדדים בשנים

הקרובות?

1. מאמין מאוד
2. מאמין במידה מסוימת
3. לא מאמין במידה מסוימת
4. כלל לא מאמין
5. תשובות אחרות

(Q26) לאיזה צד יותר חשוב להמשיך בתהליך השלום?

1. יותר חשוב לפלסטינים
2. יותר חשוב לישראלים
3. חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה
4. לא חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה
5. תשובות אחרות

(27) בהתייחס לעבר, האם אתה מאמין שהישראלים והפלסטינים עשו ככל הניתן והנדרש מהם לנהל משא ומתן שיביא להשגת

שלום, או שהם היו יכולים לעשות יותר בכדי להצליח?

Q27A. הישראלים:

1. עשו כל מה שניתן
2. יכלו לעשות יותר
3. לא בטוח

Q27B. הפלסטינים:

1. עשו כל מה שניתן 2. יכלו לעשות יותר 3. לא בטוח

28) מנקודת מבט היסטורית מי לדעתך אחראי לכישלון בהשגת הסכם במשא ומתן לשלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? (אפשר

מס' תשובות)

1-Q28. העם הפלסטיני

2-Q28. העם הישראלי

3-Q28. תנועות פלסטיניות קיצוניות

4-Q28. מפלגות ישראליות קיצוניות

5-Q28. הממשלה וההנהגה הפלסטינית

6-Q28. הממשלה וההנהגה הישראלית

7-Q28. מנהיגים ערביים

8-Q28. ארה"ב

9-Q28. אחרים, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q29) האם ארה"ב ממלאת לדעתך תפקיד מאוזן בין הצדדים בסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני, או שהיא מוטה לטובת ישראל או

לטובת הפלסטינים?

1. תפקיד מאוזן

2. מוטה לטובת ישראל

3. מוטה לטובת הפלסטינים

4. תשובות אחרות

Q30) איזו מדינה או ארגון בינלאומי יכול לדעתך להיות המתווך הטוב ביותר בין הישראלים לפלסטינים?

1. הקווארטט ( המרכב מארה"ב, האו"מ, האיחוד האירופאי ורוסיה)

2. ארה"ב 3. האו"מ 4. האיחוד האירופאי 5. רוסיה 6. צרפת 7. טורקיה 8. ירדן

9. מצרים 10. קטאר 11. איראן 12. אף אחת מהם 13. אחר, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q31) עד כמה אתה חש עייף או "חולה" ביחס לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. במידה רבה 2. במידה בינונית 3. במידה נמוכה 4. תשובות אחרות

Q32) באיזו מידה אתה מוכן לעשות שלום עם הצד השני?

1. במידה רבה 2. במידה בינונית 3. במידה נמוכה 4. לא משנה לי 5. תשובות אחרות

Q33) מבין שני המשפטים הבאים, איזה משפט מייצג יותר את השקפתך האישית?

1. עלינו להיות מוכנים לקחת סיכונים ולהקריב בכדי להשיג שלום ישראלי-פלסטיני

2. אסור לנו לוותר על שום דרישה למען השגת שלום ישראלי-פלסטיני



Q34) עד כמה אתה בטוח בכך שהסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני ייפתר בעתיד הקרוב?

1. בטוח מאוד
2. בטוח במידה מסוימת
3. לא בטוח במידה מסוימת
4. כלל לא בטוח
5. תשובות אחרות

35) באיזו מידה כל אחד מהנושאים הבאים נוגע לך, בסולם 1-5 כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד עד 5=במידה רבה מאוד? (סולם 1-5, 6=לא רלוונטי, 7=מסרב להשיב)

- Q35A. עוני
- Q35B. שכר נמוך ופנסיה נמוכה
- Q35C. אבטלה וחוסר תעסוקה
- Q35D. מחסור בשרותי בריאות ורווחה
- Q35E. חוסר ביטחון אישי, פשיעה ואלימות
- Q35F. הגבלות על חופש תנועה ומחסומים
- Q35G. יוקר המחיה
- Q35H. אנרגיה או מחסור בדלק
- Q35I. מחסור בחשמל
- Q35J. מחסור במים
- Q35K. בעיות בדיוור

Q36) אם הייתה לך ההזדמנות להגר, הייתה מנצל אותה ועובר למדינה אחרת או נשאר?

1. נשאר
2. מהגר
3. לא יודע

37) אקריא לך משפטים המתארים את יחסך ותחושתך כלפי הצד השני. עד כמה כל אחד מהם מבטא את תחושתך בסולם 1-4 כאשר 1=לא שותף לתחושה, 2=שותף במידה נמוכה, 3=שותף במידה בינונית, 4=שותף במידה רבה, ו-5=תשובה אחרת)

- Q37A. סובלנות כלפי הצד השני
- Q37B. הבנה כלפי הצד השני
- Q37C. כעס על הצד השני
- Q37D. פחד מהצד השני
- Q37E. ביטחון כלפי הצד השני
- Q37F. עוינות כלפי הצד השני

38) באותו הקשר, מהן לדעתך התחושות של הצד השני כלפיך? בסולם 1-4 כאשר 1=לא שותף לתחושה, 2=שותף במידה נמוכה, 3=שותף במידה בינונית, 4=שותף במידה רבה, ו-5=תשובה אחרת)

Q38A. סובלנות

Q38B. הבנה כלפך

Q38C. כועס עליך

Q38D. פוחד ממך

Q38E. בוטח בך

Q38F. עוין כלפך

Q39) האם אתה שואף לדעת יותר על הצד השני בתחומים שאינם קשורים כלל לפוליטיקה או לסכסוך, כמו מוזיקה, ספרות, דת, בעיות חברתיות וכדומה?

1. כן, במידה רבה מאוד

2. כן, במידה מסוימת

3. כן, במידה מעטה

4. לא, לעולם לא

5. תשובות אחרות

Q40) כיצד היית מרגיש אם רבים משכניך לא היו שותפים לדת שלך?

1. מאוד נוח

2. נוח במידה מסוימת

3. לא נוח במידה מסוימת

4. מאוד לא נוח

5. תשובות אחרות

Q41) האם מישהו מקרוביך או ממשפחתך נהרג או נפצע בעבר כתוצאה מן הסכסוך?

1. כן 2. לא

### פרק 3

D1. מין

1. גבר 2. אישה

D2. גיל: \_\_\_\_\_ שנים

D3. מצב משפחתי:

1. נשוי 2. רווק 3. גרוש 4. אלמן

D4. שנות לימוד: \_\_\_\_\_ שנים

D5. מס' הנפשות המתגוררות איתך בביתך: \_\_\_\_\_ אנשים

D6. ההכנסה המשפחתית הממוצעת לחודש למשפחה בישראל היא 8,900 ₪. מהי הכנסתך ביחס לממוצע?

1. יותר מהממוצע
2. פחות מהממוצע
3. בערך כמו הממוצע
4. לא יודע
5. תשובות אחרות

D7. מהי דתך?

1. מוסלמי – סוני
2. מוסלמי – שיעי
3. נוצרי – יווני אורתודוקסי
4. נוצרי – קתולי רומי
5. נוצרי – יווני קתולי
6. נוצרי – לותרני
7. דרוזי
8. יהודי
9. חסר דת

D8. כיצד אתה מגדיר עצמך מבחינת דתית?

1. מאוד דתי
2. דתי במידה מסוימת
3. דתי במידה מתונה
4. לא דתי במידה מסוימת
5. כלל לא דתי
6. תשובות אחרות

D9. במקור, האם אתה פליט?

1. כן
2. לא

D10. לאיזו מפלגה הצבעת בבחירות האחרונות לכנסת שהתקיימו במרץ 2015?

1. ליכוד
2. מחנה ציוני
3. בית יהודי
4. יש עתיד
5. רשימה ערבית מאוחדת
6. כולנו
7. יהדות התורה
8. ישראל ביתנו
9. ש"ס
10. מרצ

תודה רבה על השתתפותך !

## E.3.2 Split B

שאלון B

לום, מדבר/ת \_\_\_\_\_ ממכון המחקר מאגר מוחות. אנו עורכים סקר בנושא הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני ותהליך השלום אזור. הסקר אנונימי ומיועד לצרכים סטטיסטיים בלבד, אודה לך אם תשיב/י על מספר שאלות קצרות.

רק 1

S. שאלון B

S. מדינה: ישראל

S. אזור חיוג:

S. סוג המגורים: 1. יישוב עירוני 2. יישוב כפרי 3. התנחלות

S. תאריך הראיון:

6. משך הראיון/המענה לסקר:

רק 2

Q) באופן כללי, האם אתה מאמין שהעניינים במדינת ישראל מתקדמים בכיוון הנכון או בכיוון הלא נכון?  
בכיוון הנכון 2. בכיוון הלא נכון 3. תשובות אחרות

Q) מהם מקורות המידע שלך אודות הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני? (ניתן לענות מס' תשובות)  
Q2. רדיו Q22. טלוויזיה Q23. אינטרנט Q24. מדיה חברתית כמו פייסבוק, טוויטר וכדומה  
Q2. עיתונות מודפסת ובאינטרנט Q26. משפחה וחברים Q27. תשובות אחרות

Q) (שאלה מס' 3 למי שענה תשובה מס' 5 "עיתונות" בשאלה 2) מהו העיתון היומי, השבועי או החודשי שאתה קורא בו  
ל הכי הרבה?  
. ישראל היום 2. ידיעות אחרונות 3. הארץ 4. מעריב 5. אחר, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q) באיזו תדירות אתה קורא את החדשות באינטרנט?  
. מספר פעמים ביום 2. פעם ביום 3. 4-6 פעמים בשבוע 4. 2-3 פעמים בשבוע 5. פעם בשבוע 6. פחות מפעם בשבוע 7  
שובות אחרות

Q) עד כמה אתה מתעניין אם בכלל בחדשות העוסקות בסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?  
. מתעניין באופן קיצוני 2. מתעניין מאוד 3. מתעניין במידה בינונית  
. לא כל כך מתעניין 5. כלל לא מתעניין

6) בסולם של 1-5, כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד ו-5=במידה גבוהה מאוד, תאמר לי בבקשה באיזו מידה עוסק הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני בכל אחד מהגורמים הבאים? (בסולם 1-5, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q6B. תרבות

Q6D. פוליטיקה

Q6F. היסטוריה

Q6H. גזע

7) עד כמה מהווה כל אחד מהאירועים ההיסטוריים הבאים גורם לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני? (בסולם של 1-5, כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד ו-5=במידה גבוהה מאוד, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q7B. הגירת יהודית לפלסטין ההיסטורית

Q7D. מלחמת העצמאות 1948

Q7F. העצמת הסכסוך על ידי הערבים לטובת סדר היום שלהם

Q7H. האמונה היהודית ששטחי ארץ ישראל הם הבית לעם היהודי

Q8) איזה משפט מהבאים הכי קרוב לעמדתך, כאשר אתה מביט לאחור לראשיתו של הסכסוך, בתחילת המאה שעברה:

1. הייתי משאיר את ההיסטוריה כמו שהיא 2. הייתי מחפש אחר יותר שינויים שיביאו לשלום

3. הייתי ממשיך באותו כיוון אבל עם צעדים יותר קיצוניים 4. תשובות אחרות

9) מהי עמדתך ביחס לצעדים הבאים הקשורים לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני: הם כמעט תמיד מוצדקים, מוצדקים במידה מסוימת או אף פעם לא מוצדקים? (בסולם 1-3, 4 תשובות אחרות)

Q9B. פעולות הצבא הישראלי בשטחים הפלסטינים

Q9D. פעולות מתנחלים יהודים נגד פלסטינים

Q9F. תמיכה כספית של הרשות הפלסטינית במשפחות האסירים הפלסטינים

Q9H. בניית החומה בין הישראלים לפלסטינים

10) בסולם של 1-5 כאשר 1=כלל לא מסכן ו-5=מסכן מאוד, באיזו מידה מסכן כל אחד מהגורמים הבאים את תהליך השלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? (בסולם 1-5, 6 תשובות אחרות)

Q10B. ישראל פועלת לאפשר גישה של יהודים להר הבית

Q10D. החזקת נשק על ידי החמאס והג'יהד האיסלאמי

Q10F. מנהרות תחת הגבולות של רצועת עזה

Q10H. שליטה ישראלית מלאה במשאבים טבעיים

Q10J. קשיים בגישה למקומות הקדושים

Q10L. אי הכרה בזכותה של ישראל להתקיים

Q10N. חרם פלסטיני על מוצרים ישראלים

Q10P. העדר רצף טריטוריאלי בשטחי פלסטין

Q10R. חוסר אמון בין ישראלים לפלסטינים

Q10T. שליטה מוחלטת של ישראל במעברי הגבול

Q11A. בהתייחס לסוגית הפליטים הפלסטינים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי הגבוה ביותר הניתן ליישום, מבין הפתרונות הבאים?

1. זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות 1948
2. חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים
3. קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום
4. שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום
5. נטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספיים
6. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
7. תשובות אחרות

Q11B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם?

1. זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות 1948
2. חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים
3. קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום
4. שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום
5. נטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספיים
6. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
7. תשובות אחרות

Q12A. מבין הפתרונות הבאים לבעיית ההתנחלויות הישראליות, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום?

1. כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות 1967
2. פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות 1967
3. חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל
4. לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים
5. הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים
6. לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני
7. ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות, בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית
8. כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל
9. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
10. תשובות אחרות

Q12B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם?

1. כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות 1967
2. פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות 1967
3. חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל
4. לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים
5. הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים
6. לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני

7. ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות, בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית
8. כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל
9. אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו
10. תשובות אחרות

Q13A. מהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה ביותר הניתנת ליישום ביחס לירושלים?

1. מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני 1967
2. חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים
3. פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים
4. ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים
5. העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית-פלסטינית
6. תשובות אחרות

Q13B. ומהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה השנייה הניתנת ליישום?

1. מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני 1967
2. חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים
3. פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים
4. ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים
5. העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית-פלסטינית
6. תשובות אחרות

Q14A. מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום ביחס לסוגיית האסירים הפלסטינים?

1. שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה, אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים
2. להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים
3. להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראליים
4. לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראליים
5. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
6. תשובות אחרות

Q14B. ומהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום?

1. שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה, אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים
2. להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים
3. להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראליים
4. לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראליים
5. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
6. תשובות אחרות

Q15A. ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום?

1. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם
2. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים
3. המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום, אבל יהיו זכויות שוות (ביחס למחירים, צריכה וחלוקה)
- לישראלים ולפלסטינים
4. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
5. תשובות אחרות

Q15B. ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים, מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום?

1. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם
2. המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים
3. המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום, אבל יהיו זכויות שוות (ביחס למחירים, צריכה וחלוקה)
- לישראלים ולפלסטינים
4. אף אחת מהתשובות הנ"ל
5. תשובות אחרות

16) נציג בפניך תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי בין הפלסטינים לישראלים. עד כמה כל אחד מהמרכיבים מקובל עליך, בסולם של

1-5 כאשר 1=מאוד לא מקובל ו-5 מאוד מקובל?

- Q16B. לאפשר לעובדים פלסטינים לעבוד בתוך ישראל
- Q16D. מדיניות מיסוי שתהיה מוסכמת על ישראלים ופלסטינים
- Q16F. בניית נמל ימי פלסטיני

17) עד כמה אתה תומך או ממתנגד לכל אחד המרכיבים הבאים שהם חלק מהקמת מדינה פלסטינית, בסולם 1-5 כאשר

1=מתנגד לחלוטין ו-5=תומך לחלוטין?

Q17B. מדינה פלסטינית מפורזת מנשק בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה, לבד ממספר רישיונות לשאת נשק לשימוש כוחות הביטחון הפלסטיני

Q17D. מדינה פלסטינית עם פיקוח מלא במעברי הגבול שלה

Q17F. בניית "מעבר בטוח" בין רצועת עזה לגדה המערבית

Q17H. תאום בטחוני בין ישראל לפלסטין

Q18. לדעתך, מהו הפתרון המתאים ביותר לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. שתי מדינות המכירות כל אחת בלגיטימיות של השנייה, מדינת ישראל ומדינה פלסטינית
2. מדינה אחת שבה גם לישראלים וגם לפלסטינים יש זכויות וחובות שווים
3. קונפדרציה ירדנית-פלסטינית
4. הגדה המערבית תהיה חלק מירדן ורצועת עזה חלק ממצרים
5. תשובה אחרת



19) מהם הנושאים בהם צריכים הישראלים והפלסטינים לעסוק כאשר הם פועלים להשגת שלום אמיתי ומלא בין שני הצדדים.  
דרג את הגורמים בסולם 1-10 לפי חשיבות כאשר 1=הנושא החשוב ביותר ו-10=הנושא הכי פחות חשוב.

Q19-1 התנחלויות

Q19-2 אסירים

Q19-3 ירושלים

Q19-4 הביטחון של הישראלים והפלסטינים

Q19-5 גבולות ונקודות מעבר

Q19-6 הפליטים

Q19-7 פיקוח על משאבים כמו מים

Q19-8 הקמת מדינה פלסטינית בגבולות 1967

Q19-9 הכרה במדינה היהודית

Q19-10 פיקוח על המקומות הקדושים

20) להלן מספר משפטים לגבי תהליך השלום. עד כמה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים עם כל אחד מהם בסולם של 1-5 כאשר 1=מאוד לא מסכים ו-5=מאוד מסכים?

Q20B. כל הסכם בין ישראלים לפלסטינים חייב להיות מקובל ונתמך על ידי הליגה הערבית

Q20D. הישראלים והפלסטינים צריכים להפסיק כל דבר המגביר את השנאה

Q20F. לשני העמים, ישראלי ופלסטיני, יש זכות לחיות בשלום ובביטחון

21) איזה תפקיד ממלא לדעתך כל אחד מהאישים הפוליטיים הבאים הקשורים לתהליך השלום: חיובי ביותר, חיובי במידה מסוימת, נייטרלי, שלילי במידה מסוימת או שלילי ביותר?

Q21A. מוחמד עבאס, יושב ראש הרשות הפלסטינית

Q21B. חאלד משעל, יושב ראש חמאס

Q21C. ראמי אל-חמדאללה, ראש הממשלה ברשות הפלסטינית

Q21D. בנימין נתניהו, ראש ממשלת ישראל

Q21E. ציפי לבני, ראש מפלגת התנועה

Q21F. יצחק הרצוג, ראש מפלגת המחנה הציוני

Q22) האם המנהיגות הישראלית הנוכחית יכולה להשיג שלום עם הצד השני?

1. כנראה שכן

2. ייתכן שכן

3. כנראה שלא

4. בהחלט לא

5. תשובות אחרות

Q23) מה היית עושה אם הייתה לך היכולת לאכוף פתרון לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. אוכף את הפתרון המוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל
2. אוכף פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל
3. מסכים לפתרון המוצע על ידי הצד השני
4. מציע פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי שני הצדדים

Q24) האם אתה תומך או מתנגד להמשך המשא ומתן לשלום בתנאים הנוכחיים?

1. תומך מאוד
2. תומך במידה מסוימת
3. מתנגד במידה מסוימת
4. מתנגד מאוד
5. תשובות אחרות

Q25) האם אתה מאמין או לא מאמין שהמשא ומתן בין הרשות הפלסטינית וישראל יביא לשלום בין שני הצדדים בשנים

הקרובות?

1. מאמין מאוד
2. מאמין במידה מסוימת
3. לא מאמין במידה מסוימת
4. כלל לא מאמין
5. תשובות אחרות

Q26) לאיזה צד יותר חשוב להמשיך בתהליך השלום?

1. יותר חשוב לפלסטינים
2. יותר חשוב לישראלים
3. חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה
4. לא חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה
5. תשובות אחרות

27) בהתייחס לעבר, האם אתה מאמין שהישראלים והפלסטינים עשו ככל הניתן והנדרש מהם לנהל משא ומתן שיביא להשגת

שלום, או שהם היו יכולים לעשות יותר בכדי להצליח?

Q27A. הישראלים:

1. עשו כל מה שניתן
2. יכלו לעשות יותר
3. לא בטוח

Q27B. הפלסטינים:

1. עשו כל מה שניתן
2. יכלו לעשות יותר
3. לא בטוח

28) מנקודת מבט היסטורית מי לדעתך אחראי לכישלון בהשגת הסכם במשא ומתן לשלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? (אפשר

מס' תשובות)

1- Q28. העם הפלסטיני

2- Q28. העם הישראלי

3- Q28. תנועות פלסטיניות קיצוניות

4- Q28. מפלגות ישראליות קיצוניות

5- Q28. הממשלה וההנהגה הפלסטינית

6- Q28. הממשלה וההנהגה הישראלית

7- Q28. מנהיגים ערביים

8- Q28. ארה"ב

9- Q28. אחרים, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q29) האם ארה"ב ממלאת לדעתך תפקיד מאוזן בין הצדדים בסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני, או שהיא מוטה לטובת ישראל או

לטובת הפלסטינים?

1. תפקיד מאוזן

2. מוטה לטובת ישראל

3. מוטה לטובת הפלסטינים

4. תשובות אחרות

Q30) איזו מדינה או ארגון בינלאומי יכול לדעתך להיות המתווך הטוב ביותר בין הישראלים לפלסטינים?

1. הקווארטט ( המרכב מארה"ב, האו"מ, האיחוד האירופאי ורוסיה)

2. ארה"ב 3. האו"מ 4. האיחוד האירופאי 5. רוסיה 6. צרפת 7. טורקיה 8. ירדן

9. מצרים 10. קטאר 11. איראן 12. אף אחת מהם 13. אחר, פרט: \_\_\_\_\_

Q31) עד כמה אתה חש עייף או "חולה" ביחס לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני?

1. במידה רבה 2. במידה בינונית 3. במידה נמוכה 4. תשובות אחרות

Q32) באיזו מידה אתה מוכן לעשות שלום עם הצד השני?

1. במידה רבה 2. במידה בינונית 3. במידה נמוכה 4. לא משנה לי 5. תשובות אחרות

Q33) מבין שני המשפטים הבאים, איזה משפט מייצג יותר את השקפתך האישית?

1. עלינו להיות מוכנים לקחת סיכונים ולהקריב בכדי להשיג שלום ישראלי-פלסטיני

2. אסור לנו לוותר על שום דרישה למען השגת שלום ישראלי-פלסטיני

Q34) עד כמה אתה בטוח בכך שהסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני ייפתר בעתיד הקרוב?

1. בטוח מאוד
2. בטוח במידה מסוימת
3. לא בטוח במידה מסוימת
4. כלל לא בטוח
5. תשובות אחרות

35) באיזו מידה כל אחד מהנושאים הבאים נוגע לך, בסולם 1-5 כאשר 1=במידה נמוכה מאוד עד 5=במידה רבה מאוד?  
(סולם 1-5, 6=לא רלוונטי, 7=מסרב להשיב)

- Q35A. עוני
- Q35B. שכר נמוך ופנסיה נמוכה
- Q35C. אבטלה וחוסר תעסוקה
- Q35D. מחסור בשרותי בריאות ורווחה
- Q35E. חוסר ביטחון אישי, פשיעה ואלימות
- Q35F. הגבלות על חופש תנועה ומחסומים
- Q35G. יוקר המחיה
- Q35H. אנרגיה או מחסור בדלק
- Q35I. מחסור בחשמל
- Q35J. מחסור במים
- Q35K. בעיות בדיוור

Q36) אם הייתה לך ההזדמנות להגר, הייתה מנצל אותה ועובר למדינה אחרת או נשאר?  
1. נשאר 2. מהגר 3. לא יודע

37) אקריא לך משפטים המתארים את יחסך ותחושתך כלפי הצד השני. עד כמה כל אחד מהם מבטא את תחושתך בסולם 1-4 כאשר 1=לא שותף לתחושה, 2=שותף במידה נמוכה, 3=שותף במידה בינונית, 4=שותף במידה רבה, ו-5=תשובה אחרת)

- Q37A. סובלנות כלפי הצד השני
- Q37B. הבנה כלפי הצד השני
- Q37C. כעס על הצד השני
- Q37D. פחד מהצד השני
- Q37E. ביטחון כלפי הצד השני
- Q37F. עוינות כלפי הצד השני

38) באותו הקשר, מהן לדעתך התחושות של הצד השני כלפיך? בסולם 1-4 כאשר 1=לא שותף לתחושה, 2=שותף במידה נמוכה, 3=שותף במידה בינונית, 4=שותף במידה רבה, ו-5=תשובה אחרת)

Q38A. סובלנות

Q38B. הבנה כלפך

Q38C. כועס עליך

Q38D. פוחד ממך

Q38E. בוטח בך

Q38F. עוין כלפך

Q39) האם אתה שואף לדעת יותר על הצד השני בתחומים שאינם קשורים כלל לפוליטיקה או לסכסוך, כמו מוזיקה, ספרות, דת, בעיות חברתיות וכדומה?

1. כן, במידה רבה מאוד

2. כן, במידה מסוימת

3. כן, במידה מעטה

4. לא, לעולם לא

5. תשובות אחרות

Q40) כיצד היית מרגיש אם רבים משכניך לא היו שותפים לדת שלך?

1. מאוד נוח

2. נוח במידה מסוימת

3. לא נוח במידה מסוימת

4. מאוד לא נוח

5. תשובות אחרות

Q41) האם מישהו מקרוביך או ממשפחתך נהרג או נפצע בעבר כתוצאה מן הסכסוך?

1. כן 2. לא

פרק 3

D1. מין

1. גבר 2. אישה

D2. גיל: \_\_\_\_\_ שנים

D3. מצב משפחתי:

1. נשוי 2. רווק 3. גרוש 4. אלמן

D4. שנות לימוד: \_\_\_\_\_ שנים

D5. מס' הנפשות המתגוררות איתך בביתך: \_\_\_\_\_ אנשים

D6. ההכנסה המשפחתית הממוצעת לחודש למשפחה בישראל היא 8,900 ₪. מהי הכנסתך ביחס לממוצע?

1. יותר מהממוצע
2. פחות מהממוצע
3. בערך כמו הממוצע
4. לא יודע
5. תשובות אחרות

D7. מהי דתך?

1. מוסלמי – סוני
2. מוסלמי – שיעי
3. נוצרי – יווני אורתודוקסי
4. נוצרי – קתולי רומי
5. נוצרי – יווני קתולי
6. נוצרי – לותרני
7. דרוזי
8. יהודי
9. חסר דת

D8. כיצד אתה מגדיר עצמך מבחינת דתית?

1. מאוד דתי
2. דתי במידה מסוימת
3. דתי במידה מתונה
4. לא דתי במידה מסוימת
5. כלל לא דתי
6. תשובות אחרות

D9. במקור, האם אתה פליט?

1. כן
2. לא

D10. לאיזו מפלגה הצבעת בבחירות האחרונות לכנסת שהתקיימו במרץ 2015?

1. ליכוד
2. מחנה ציוני
3. בית יהודי
4. יש עתיד
5. רשימה ערבית מאוחדת
6. כולנו
7. יהדות התורה
8. ישראל ביתנו
9. ש"ס
10. מרצ

תודה רבה על השתתפותך !

## Chapter F

### LIST OF TABLES

#### F.1 Tables of Content Analyses

**TABLE F.1** EPISODIC VS THEMATIC FRAMES OF PHOTOS IN NEWSPAPERS

<b>Country * Target of the Photo Crosstabulation</b>				
<b>Country</b>		<b>Target of the Photo</b>		<i>Total</i>
		<i>Episodic</i>	<i>Thematic</i>	
<b>Palestine</b>	Count	309	33	342
	Expected Count	269.9	72.1	342.0
	% within Country	90.4%	9.6%	100.0%
	% within Target of the Photo	63.4%	25.4%	55.4%
	% of Total	50.1%	5.3%	55.4%
<b>Israel</b>	Count	178	97	275
	Expected Count	217.1	57.9	275.0
	% within Country	64.7%	35.3%	100.0%
	% within Target of the Photo	36.6%	74.6%	44.6%
	% of Total	28.8%	15.7%	44.6%
<b>Total</b>	Count	487	130	617
	Expected Count	487.0	130.0	617.0
	% of Total	78.9%	21.1%	100.0%

**TABLE F.2** LEVEL OF HARMONY BETWEEN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI  
NEWSPAPERS

Dimensions	% of total dimesions		
	Palestine	Israel	Level of accordance
a. Settlement expansion	4.5%	4.6%	98.4%
b. Israeli Intransigence	5.6%	5.8%	96.8%
c. Lack of trust between Palestinians and Israelis	4.3%	5.9%	73.4%
d. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust	2.4%	4.1%	57.6%
e. 1967 Borders	1.6%	2.9%	57.4%
f. U.S. and E.U. strict measures against the conflict	2.3%	4.2%	55.4%
g. Israel procedures against Gaza	2.5%	1.3%	50.7%
h. Third-party mediation	3.3%	6.9%	47.2%
i. Release under certain conditions	1.6%	3.5%	46.9%
j. Restrictions on freedom of movement	3.8%	1.7%	44.8%
k. Palestinian Intransigence	1.9%	4.8%	39.2%
l. Settlers acts of vandalism	4.0%	1.5%	37.1%
m. Palestinians actions against Israelis	2.5%	6.6%	36.9%
n. Israel's right to exist	1.0%	2.7%	36.1%
o. United Nations as an active side	2.0%	0.6%	32.4%
p. Israeli military actions against Palestinians	14.8%	4.3%	29.1%
q. Israeli-American (alliance)	1.3%	4.6%	27.5%
r. Hamas threats	0.7%	2.8%	26.3%
s. Judaization of Jerusalem	4.1%	1.1%	26.0%
t. Economic burden	0.7%	3.3%	21.0%
u. Violations of international law and human rights	8.1%	1.0%	12.6%
v. Palestine will become a "terrorist" state	0.3%	2.7%	11.2%
w. Acts against Palestinian prisoners	6.8%	0.4%	5.7%
<i>% of news covered</i>	<i>80.1%</i>	<i>77.2%</i>	



## F.2 Tables of Survey Analyses

**TABLE F.3** INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - ACTIONS PERTAINING TO  
CONFLICT X COUNTRY

Independent samples test				
	F	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel	279	13.4	710	0.00
b. Military actions by Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories.	193	-18.2	733	0.00
c. Palestinian actions against Israelis	180	11.1	717	0.00
d. Jewish settlers actions against Palestinians.	44	-11.4	735	0.00
e. Movement restrictions imposed by Israel	54	-19.5	712	0.00
f. The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prison.	110	8.0	721	0.00
g. Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally	241	4.9	707	0.00
h. Building the wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis.	41	-17.6	722	0.00

**TABLE F.4** EVALUATION OF NETANYAHU - STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT  
VALUES

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Evaluation of Benjamin Netanyahu</i>	0.23***	Settlement	+
	0.15***	Jerusalem	+
	0.15**	Settlement	+
	0.11*	Prisoners	+
	0.09*	Jerusalem	+
	-0.14**	1967 Borders	-
	-0.14**	1967 Borders	-
	-0.16**	Natural resources	-
	-0.24***	Natural resources	-
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001			

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.5 PALESTINIANS' EVALUATIONS OF FACTS HINDERING  
THE PEACE PROCESS**

<b>Palestine - Descriptive Statistics</b>			
<b>Items</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners' by Israel.	508	4.21	1.09
t. Israel's absolute control over border crossings.	503	4.17	1.23
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.	496	4.12	1.15
i. Palestinian refugees' right of return.	503	4.07	1.20
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons.	508	4.07	1.09
a. Building settlements.	510	4.07	1.36
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources.	499	4.04	1.15
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict.	505	4.00	1.16
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship.	502	4.00	1.15
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount.	497	3.99	1.37
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement.	503	3.96	1.09
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine.	504	3.93	1.16
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides.	494	3.86	1.17
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy.	498	3.85	1.23
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state.	501	3.83	1.25
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.	490	3.80	1.23
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine.	497	3.80	1.22
l. Not recognizing Israel's right to exist.	497	3.53	1.36
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons.	489	3.40	1.41
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip.	492	3.40	1.38
n. The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products.	497	3.39	1.38
<i>Sample Mean</i>	<i>10493</i>	<i>3.88</i>	<i>1.23</i>

*Note:* Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

**TABLE F.6 ISRAELIS' EVALUATIONS OF FACTS HINDERING  
THE PEACE PROCESS**

<b>Israel - Descriptive Statistics</b>			
<b>Items</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip.	254	4.70	0.80
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons.	253	4.66	0.78
l. Not recognizing Israel's right to exist.	252	4.48	0.96
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state.	268	4.37	1.10
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.	253	4.19	1.09
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement.	265	4.18	1.13
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides.	261	4.16	1.06
i. Palestinian refugees' right of return.	266	3.91	1.26
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine.	261	3.69	1.26
a. Building settlements.	268	3.50	1.46
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict.	267	3.48	1.29
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship.	243	3.44	1.22
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy.	260	3.28	1.29
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount.	247	3.18	1.40
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.	266	3.18	1.30
n. The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products.	251	3.05	1.45
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine.	248	2.97	1.31
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons.	268	2.78	1.40
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners' by Israel.	268	2.62	1.35
t. Israel's absolute control over border crossings.	252	2.56	1.36
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources.	252	2.42	1.39
<i>Sample Mean</i>	<i>5423</i>	<i>3.56</i>	<i>1.22</i>

*Note:* Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

**TABLE F.7** INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - EVALUATIONS OF FACTS IN  
HINDERING THE PEACE PROCESS

<b>Independent samples test</b>				
<b>Facts</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
a. Building settlements.	6	5.4	776	0.000
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount.	1	7.5	742	0.000
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state.	16	-5.9	767	0.000
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons.	212	-13.2	740	0.000
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons.	42	14.1	774	0.000
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip.	170	-13.7	744	0.000
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners' by Israel.	33	17.7	774	0.000
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources.	33	16.9	749	0.000
i. Palestinian refugees' right of return.	3	1.8	767	0.077
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship.	5	6.1	743	0.000
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine.	4	2.7	763	0.007
l. Not recognizing Israel's right to exist.	75	-10.0	747	0.000
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement.	2	-2.6	766	0.009
n. The Palestinians' boycotting Israeli products.	0	3.2	746	0.001
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict.	9	5.7	770	0.000
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine.	0	8.5	743	0.000
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides.	6	-3.5	753	0.001
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.	11	-4.3	741	0.000
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy.	1	5.9	756	0.000
t. Israel's absolute control over border crossings.	14	16.4	753	0.000
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.	9	10.2	760	0.000

**TABLE F.8** DESCRIPTIVES FOR REJECTED HYPOTHESES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION

<b>Group Statistics</b>				
<b>Rejected hypothesis</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
a. Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors	Palestine	512	3.37	1.38
i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, etc.	Israel	269	3.33	1.44
c. Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange	Palestine	511	3.56	1.29
between the two states.	Israel	269	3.48	1.40
d. Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between	Palestine	508	3.35	1.34
Palestinians and Israelis.	Israel	255	3.38	1.32

*Note:* Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to you, and 5 meaning very acceptable, to what extent do you accept the following plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis.

**TABLE F.10** INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - PRIORITIZATION OF ISSUES

<b>Independent samples test</b>				
<b>Issues</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
a. Israeli settlements	7	7.0	1537	0.000
b. Palestinian prisoners	37	-29.9	1536	0.000
c. Jerusalem	7	-5.9	1537	0.000
d. Security of both Israel and the Palestinians	8	30.2	1536	0.000
e. Borders and crossing points	1	4.7	1537	0.000
f. Palestinian refugees	1	-21.0	1537	0.000
g. Control over natural resources	1	1.7	1536	0.091
h. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders	4	-15.6	1537	0.000
i. Recognizing the Jewish state	3	29.2	1534	0.000
j. Having control over holy places	3	-2.8	1537	0.005

*Note:* In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties? Please put them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and 10 represents the least important issue these days.

TABLE F.9 ELEMENTS OF ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE

Group Statistics				
Elements	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
a. Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of land swap	Palestine	510	3.49	1.28
	Israel	269	2.25	1.47
b. A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces.	Palestine	508	2.42	1.43
	Israel	255	3.19	1.55
c. International presence on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state and Israel.	Palestine	509	3.18	1.31
	Israel	269	2.92	1.54
d. A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings.	Palestine	508	3.73	1.39
	Israel	255	3.16	1.52
e. The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority.	Palestine	509	2.70	1.42
	Israel	269	3.43	1.40
f. Building a Safe Passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.	Palestine	509	3.87	1.32
	Israel	255	2.76	1.51
h. Security coordination between Israel and Palestine.	Palestine	506	3.15	1.46
	Israel	255	3.72	1.41

*Note:* Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, and 5 meaning you are in full support, please tell me how much you support or oppose each of the following elements as a part of establishing a Palestinian state.

**TABLE F.11** INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL FIGURES

<b>Independent samples test</b>				
<b>Political leaders</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig (2-tailed)</b>
a. Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the PA	19	-16.7	1536	0.000
b. Khalid Misha'al, the head of Hamas Politburo	137	-23.7	1535	0.000
c. Rami Hamdallah, the PA's Prime Minister	15	-14.5	1531	0.000
d. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister	149	30.7	1534	0.000
e. Tzipi Livni, the head of the Hatnuah party in Israel	105	27.8	1534	0.000
f. Isaac Herzog, the head of Labor party in Israel	57	31.3	1534	0.000

*Note:* I am going to ask you about the performance of some political figures pertaining to the peace process. Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative?

**TABLE F.12** FAITH IN LEADERSHIP TO MAKE PEACE

<b>Country</b>	<b>Items</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Palestinians</b>	Most likely	9.2
	Somewhat likely	39.4
	Somewhat unlikely	19.1
	Absolute unlikely	27.2
	Dont know	5.2
	<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>
<b>Israelis</b>	Most likely	4.8
	Somewhat likely	22.3
	Somewhat unlikely	44.8
	Absolute unlikely	24.0
	Dont know	4.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>

*Note:* Do you think it is most likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or absolute unlikely that the current leadership in your country can make peace with the other side?

**TABLE F.13** CHI-SQUARE TESTS - RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF PAST AGREEMENTS

Question 28	Pearson Chi-Square	df	Asmp. Sig. (2-sided)
a. Palestinian people	271 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
b. Israeli people	63 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
c. Palestinian extremist movements	512 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
d. Israeli extremist parties	0.03 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.855
e. Palestinian government and leaders	480 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
f. Israeli government and leaders	17 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
g. Arab leaders	47 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
h. United States	46 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000
i. Other	20 <sup>a</sup>	1	0.000

**TABLE F.14** UNCLEAR AFFILIATION TO THE PAST - STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT VALUES

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Unclear affiliation to the past</i>	0.19***	Jerusalem	+
	0.13**	Prisoners	+
	0.12**	1967 Borders	+
	0.12*	Natural resources	+
	0.10*	Natural resources	+
	-0.14**	Settlement	-
	-0.16***	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
	-0.16***	Settlement	-
	-0.17***	Security	-

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.



**TABLE F.15**  $R^2$  VALUES FOR ALL THE REGRESSION MODELS

<b>Palestine</b>		<b>Israel</b>	
<i>Issue / dependent variable</i>	<i>Value of <math>R^2</math></i>	<i>Issue / dependent variable</i>	<i>Value of <math>R^2</math></i>
Jerusalem	26.6%	Recognizing the Jewish state	38.6%
Recognizing the Jewish state	25.0%	A Palestine state on the 1967 Borders	36.2%
Prisoners	20.5%	A Palestine state on the 1967 Borders	36.0%
A Palestine state on the 1967 Borders	19.6%	Recognizing the Jewish state	34.7%
Settlement	19.1%	Prisoners	23.1%
Settlement	17.7%	Security	21.5%
Jerusalem	17.6%	Jerusalem	18.6%
A Palestine state on the 1967 Borders	15.6%	Refugees	15.4%
Security	15.2%	Natural resources	15.1%
Control over holy places	14.0%	Settlement	14.1%
Natural resources	13.9%	Natural resources	13.1%
Recognizing the Jewish state	13.5%	Jerusalem	12.8%
Security	12.4%	Natural resources	12.7%
Control over natural resources	12.2%	Borders and crossing points	12.1%
Refugees	11.4%	Prisoners	12.0%
Prisoners	11.0%	Borders	11.9%
Refugees	9.9%	Control over holy places	10.8%
Borders	9.6%	Security	10.3%
Borders	7.3%	Refugees	10.0%

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.16** SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING  
PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Evaluation of Khalid Misha'al</i>	0.147***	Control over holy places	+
	0.13**	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.117**	Natural resources	+
	0.106*	Natural resources	+
	-0.11*	Security	-
	-0.111*	Prisoners	-
<i>Things are heading in the right direction</i>	0.126**	1967 Borders	+
	0.111*	Jerusalem	+
	0.111*	Security	+
	-0.085*	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
	-0.102*	Settlement	-
	-0.102*	Borders	-
<i>Ready to compromise for peace</i>	0.191***	Settlement	+
	0.094*	Natural resources	+
	-0.093*	Control over holy places	-
	-0.097*	1967 Borders	-
	-0.106*	Refugees	-
	-0.118*	Borders	-
<i>Casualties as a result of the conflict</i>	0.131**	Security	+
	0.129**	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.096*	Security	+
	-0.11*	Refugees	-
	-0.114*	Borders	-
	-0.126**	1967 Borders	-
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001			

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

TABLE F.17 THIRD MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES FOR PALESTINIANS

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Positive feelings and attitudes towards the other</i>	0.171***	1967 Borders	+
	0.154***	Control over holy places	+
	0.128**	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.093*	1967 Borders	+
	-0.103*	Security	-
	-0.153***	Prisoners	-
	-0.258***	Jerusalem	-
<i>Willingness to emigrate</i>	0.163***	Jerusalem	+
	0.115*	Refugees	+
	0.106*	Prisoners	+
	0.102*	Settlement	+
	-0.101*	Natural resources	-
	-0.133**	Borders	-
	-0.15***	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
<i>Negative feelings and attitudes of the other towards you</i>	0.157***	Prisoners	+
	0.153***	Prisoners	+
	0.106*	Jerusalem	+
	-0.118*	1967 Borders	-
	-0.121*	1967 Borders	-
	-0.213***	Control over holy places	-
<i>Being a refugee</i>	0.167***	1967 Borders	+
	0.095*	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	-0.12**	Jerusalem	-
	-0.133**	Jerusalem	-
	-0.136**	Refugees	-
	-0.147***	Prisoners	-

\*p&lt;.05, \*\*p&lt;.01, \*\*\*p&lt;.001

Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.18** OTHER VARIABLES PREDICTING PALESTINIAN'S PERCEPTIONS

<b>Independent</b>	<b>Standardized coefficient</b>	<b>Dependent variable</b>	<b>Direction</b>
<i>Degree of</i>	-0.095*	Control over holy places	-
<i>religiosity</i>	-0.097*	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
<i>Quality of life</i>	0.124**	Security	+
	0.105*	Prisoners	+
<i>Gender</i>	.126**	Jerusalem	+
	.110*	Security	+
	-.095*	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
	-0.099*	Natural resources	-
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001			

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.19** MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI'S PERCEPTIONS

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Political affiliated to the United Arab List</i>	0.387***	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.307***	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.191**	Jerusalem	+
	0.157**	Security	+
	-0.128*	Settlement	-
	-0.14*	Refugees	-
	-0.139*	Refugees	-
	-0.139*	Prisoners	-
	-0.139**	1967 Borders	-
	-0.242***	Prisoners	-
	-0.357***	1967 Borders	-
<i>Degree of religiosity</i>	0.201**	Settlement	+
	0.212**	Control over holy places	+
	0.173**	Jerusalem	+
	0.197*	Jerusalem	+
	0.162*	Prisoners	+
	-0.162*	Security	-
	-0.124*	1967 Borders	-
	-0.193**	Security	-
	-0.245**	Borders	-
<i>Ready to compromise</i>	0.229***	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.261***	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	0.245**	Prisoners	+
	0.168*	Natural resources	+
	0.148*	Jerusalem	+
	-0.205**	Borders	-
	-0.264**	Prisoners	+
	-0.34***	Settlement	-
	-0.298***	1967 Borders	-

\*p&lt;.05, \*\*p&lt;.01, \*\*\*p&lt;.001

Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.20** SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Formal education</i>	0.243***	Borders	+
	0.188***	Prisoners	+
	0.143**	Control over holy places	+
	0.125*	Natural resources	+
	-.107*	1967 Borders	-
	-.181**	Refugees	-
<i>Evaluation of Khalid Misha'al</i>	.221***	Borders	+
	.160*	Settlement	+
	.158*	Settlement	+
	-.147**	Natural resources	-
	-.161**	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
	-.147**	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
<i>Politically affiliated to the United Torah Judaism</i>	.206***	Settlement	+
	.197***	Jerusalem	+
	.196**	Jerusalem	+
	-.181**	Borders	-
	-.174**	Security	-
	-.209***	Security	-
<i>Meretz</i>	.216***	Jerusalem	+
	.166**	Jerusalem	+
	.108*	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	-.148*	Settlement	-
	-.227***	1967 Borders	-

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.21** OTHER VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS

Independent	Standardized coefficient	Dependent variable	Direction
<i>Age</i>	.181**	Refugees	+
	.157*	Security	+
	-.119*	Natural resources	-
	-.180**	Natural resources	-
<i>Gender</i>	.223*	Natural resources	+
	.176**	Borders	+
	.115*	Recognizing the Jewish state	+
	-.191**	Settlement	-
<i>Casualties as a result of the conflict</i>	.216***	Jerusalem	+
	-.122*	Refugees	-
	-.126*	Natural resources	-
	-.116*	Recognizing the Jewish state	-
<i>Negative feelings and attitudes towards the other</i>	.213***	Settlement	+
	.186**	Refugees	+
	-.120*	Security	-
	-.133*	Jerusalem	-
<i>Affiliated to the Zionist Union</i>	.180*	Jerusalem	+
	.142*	Settlement	+
	-.165*	Control over holy places	-
	-.159**	1967 Borders	-
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001			

*Note:* The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.

**TABLE F.22** INFLUENTIAL DETERMINANTS IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Significant independent variables	Frequency*
Affiliation with a political party	51
Most appropriate solution to the conflict	19
Actions hindering the peace process	15
Readiness to compromise	15
Degree of religiosity	13
Evaluation of Khalid Misha'al	12
Economic cooperation	11
Skeptic about affiliation to the past	11
Casualties because of the conflict	10
Evaluation of Netanyahu	10
Negative feelings and attitudes towards the other	10
Willingness to immigrate	10
Positive feelings and attitudes towards the other	9
Confidence in the peace process	8
Gender	8
Formal education	7
Optimism	7
Positive feelings and attitudes of the other towards you	7
Quality of life	7
Age	6
A cultural difference	6
Being a refugee	6
Faith in negotiations	6
Evaluation of Mahmoud Abbas	5
Faith in leaders	5
Interest in the conflict	5
No affiliation with any political party	5
There is no best solution	5
Affiliation to the past	4
*Frequency in 40 regression models.	



## F.3 Tables of Document Analyses

**TABLE F.23** INVESTIGATED DIMENSIONS BY PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Dimension	N	%
a. Security	52	17.6%
b. Jerusalem	40	13.6%
c. Prisoners	35	11.9%
d. Hamas condemn the PA negotiations with Israel and calling to stop it	20	6.8%
e. Lack of Trust	16	5.4%
f. Third-party mediation	14	4.7%
g. Settlement	13	4.4%
h. Commemoration	11	3.7%
i. Palestinian Intransigence	11	3.7%
j. Resistance	11	3.7%
k. The Refugees	11	3.7%
l. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders	9	3.1%
m. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding	8	2.7%
n. Recognizing the Jewish state	7	2.4%
o. Violations of human rights	7	2.4%
p. Other	6	2.6%
q. Borders and crossing points	5	1.7%
r. Boycotting Israeli products	4	1.4%
s. Control over natural resources	4	1.4%
t. Israeli Intransigence	3	1.0%
u. Two-state solution	3	1.0%
v. Settlements	2	0.7%
w. Economic burden and boycotting Israeli products	1	0.3%
<i>Total</i>	295	100.0%

**TABLE F.24** INVESTIGATED DIMENSIONS BY ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
a. Security	51	21.4%
b. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding	17	7.1%
c. Israeli Intransigence	17	7.1%
d. Third-party mediation	17	7.1%
e. The Israeli-American (alliance)	16	6.7%
f. Recognizing the Jewish state	15	6.3%
g. Two-state solution	15	6.3%
h. Palestinian Intransigence	11	4.6%
i. Lack of Trust	10	4.2%
j. Other	10	4.2%
k. The Refugees	10	4.2%
l. U.S. and E.U. strict measures against the conflict	8	3.4%
m. Jerusalem	7	2.9%
n. Jewish connection and affiliation	7	2.9%
o. Economic burden and boycotting Israeli products	6	2.5%
p. Settlement	6	2.5%
q. The United Nations as an active side	4	1.7%
r. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders	3	1.3%
s. Settlements	3	1.3%
t. Borders and crossing points	2	0.8%
u. Commemoration	2	0.8%
v. Prisoners	1	0.4%
<i>Total</i>	238	100.0%

## Chapter G

## SPSS SYNTAX

### G.1 Content Analyses

#### **Episodic vs Thematic frames**

```
CROSSTABS  
/TABLES=Country BY IS12  
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES  
/STATISTICS=CHISQ CC PHI LAMBDA  
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED ROW COLUMN TOTAL SRESID  
/COUNT ROUND CELL  
/METHOD=EXACT TIMER(5).
```

#### **Average number of articles**

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
/MISSING=ANALYSIS  
/VARIABLES=Average  
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

#### **Percentage of news dedicated to each dimension**

```
CORRELATIONS  
/VARIABLES=Palestine Israel  
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG  
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
```

#### **Density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article**

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
/MISSING=LISTWISE  
/VARIABLES=Totalcauses  
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

#### **Density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article**

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
/MISSING=LISTWISE  
/VARIABLES=Totalconsequences  
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

#### **Density of coverage to solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article**

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
/MISSING=LISTWISE  
/VARIABLES=Totalsolutions  
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

**Density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article**

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
 /MISSING=LISTWISE  
 /VARIABLES=Total  
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

**Contingency level**

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)  
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS  
 /VARIABLES=Agreement  
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

**Intercoder reliability - Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate*****For Causes***

KALPHA judges = Causes\_1A Causes\_1S Causes\_1E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000.

KALPHA judges = Causes\_2A Causes\_2S Causes\_2E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000.

Result:

	Alpha	LL95%CI	UL95%CI	Units	Observrs	Pairs
Nominal	<b>.8587</b>	.8102	.9029	117.0000	3.0000	293.0000

Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin:

alphamin	q
.9000	.9649
.8000	<b>.0071</b>
.7000	.0000
.6700	.0000
.6000	.0000
.5000	.0000

Number of bootstrap samples:  
 10000

Judges used in these computations:  
 Causes\_1 Causes\_2 Causes\_3

***For Consequences***

KALPHA judges = Consequences\_1A Consequences\_1S Consequences\_1E/level = 1/detail  
 = 0/boot = 10000.

KALPHA judges = Consequences\_2A Consequences\_2S Consequences\_2E/level = 1/detail  
 = 0/boot = 10000.

Result:

	Alpha	LL95%CI	UL95%CI	Units	Observrs	Pairs
Nominal	<b>.9824</b>	.9644	.9960	150.0000	3.0000	360.0000

Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin:

alphamin	q
.9000	<b>.0000</b>

```
.8000      .0000
.7000      .0000
.6700      .0000
.6000      .0000
.5000      .0000
```

Number of bootstrap samples:  
10000

Judges used in these computations:  
Conseque Conseq\_1 Conseq\_2

### ***For Solutions***

KALPHA judges = Solutions\_1A Solutions\_1S Solutions\_1E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000.

KALPHA judges = Solutions\_2A Solutions\_2S Solutions\_2E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000.

Result:

	Alpha	LL95%CI	UL95%CI	Units	Observrs	Pairs
Nominal	<b>.8969</b>	.8583	.9356	89.0000	3.0000	251.0000

Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin:

alphamin	q
.9000	.5329
.8000	<b>.0000</b>
.7000	.0000
.6700	.0000
.6000	.0000
.5000	.0000

Number of bootstrap samples:  
10000

Judges used in these computations:  
Solution Soluti\_1 Soluti\_2

### **Intracoder reliability tests for SPSS files: Ahlam, Ehsan, Salwa, and Dana (T1, T2)**

#### **RELIABILITY**

/VARIABLES=Dimensions\_T1 Dimensions\_T2

/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL

/MODEL=ALPHA

/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE

/ICC=MODEL(ONEWAY) CIN=95 TESTVAL=0.

## G.2 Survey Analyses

### Evaluations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=LISTWISE
/VARIABLES=Q7Index
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

### Perceptions of most acceptable and next acceptable solutions of the core issues of the conflict

```
CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Country BY q11a q11b q12a
q12b q13a q13b q14a q14b q15a q15b
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL.
```

### Acceptance of plans of economic cooperation between both parties

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=Q16a Q16b Q16c Q16d
Q16e Q16f Q16g
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

### Support of elements as a part of establishing a Palestinian state

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q17a q17b q17c q17d q17e
q17f q17g q17h
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

### Prioritization of milestone issues

```
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4
q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

**Evaluations of political figures performance**

```

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q21a q21b q21c q21d q21e
q21f
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).

```

**Faith in leadership to make peace**

```

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q22
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).

```

**Resumption of peace negotiations**

```

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q24
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).

```

**Pearson correlation of support and faith in negotiations**

```

CORRELATIONS
/VARIABLES=q24 q25
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**Chi-Square Tests for responsibility for the failure of past agreements**

```

CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Country BY q28_1 q28_2
q28_3 q28_4 q28_5 q28_6 q28_7 q28_8
q28_9
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

```

**Chi-Square Test for role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict**

```

CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Country BY q29
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

```

**Chi-Square Test for best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis**

```

CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Country BY q30
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

```

**Chi-Square Tests for being fed up from the conflict and willingness to make peace**

```

CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Country BY q31 q32
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

```

**Difference in confidence in peace**

```

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q34
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).

```

**Difference in Quality of life**

```

T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=q35a q35b q35c q35d q35e
q35f q35g q35h q35i q35j q35k
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).

```

**Correlations between underlying and expected feelings and attitudes**

```

CORRELATIONS
/VARIABLES=q37a q37b q37c q37d q37e q37f q38a q38b q38c q38d q38e q38f
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**Indexes**

```

Compute Historical_events_A = SUM.3 (q7a,q7c,q7e,q7g)/4.
Compute Historical_events_B = SUM.3 (q7b,q7d,q7f,q7h)/4.
Compute Action_pertaining_A = SUM.3 (q9a,q9c,q9e,q9g)/4.
Compute Action_pertaining_B = SUM.3 (q9b,q9d,q9f,q9h)/4.
Compute Actions_hindering_A =
SUM.7(q10a,q10c,q10e,q10g,q10i,q10k,q10m,q10o,q10q,q10s,q10u)/11.

```



Compute Actions\_hindering\_B =  
 $\text{SUM.7}(q10b, q10d, q10f, q10h, q10j, q10l, q10n, q10p, q10r, q10t) / 10$ .  
 Compute Borders\_A =  $\text{SUM.3}(q17a, q17c, q17e, q17g) / 4$ .  
 Compute Borders\_B =  $\text{SUM.3}(q17b, q17d, q17f, q17h) / 4$ .  
 Compute Quality\_of\_life =  $\text{SUM.7}(q35a, q35b, q35c, q35d, q35e, q35f, q35g, q35h, q35i, q35j, q35k) / 11$ .  
 Compute Positive\_towards\_other =  $q37a + q37b + q37e$   
 Compute Negative\_towards\_other =  $q37c + q37d + q37f$   
 Compute Positive\_others\_towards\_self =  $q38a + q38b + q38e$   
 Compute Negative\_others\_towards\_self =  $q38c + q38d + q38f$

For Normality

Compute  $q19\_1n = \text{LN}(q19\_1)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_2n = \text{LN}(q19\_2)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_3n = \text{LN}(q19\_3)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_4n = \text{LN}(q19\_4)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_5n = \text{LN}(q19\_5)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_6n = \text{LN}(q19\_6)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_7n = \text{LN}(q19\_7)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_8n = \text{LN}(q19\_8)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_9n = \text{LN}(q19\_9)$ .  
 Compute  $q19\_10n = \text{LN}(q19\_10)$ .

## Modelling:

### SPLIT A – Palestine

#### REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE  
 /STATISTICS COEFF R  
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
 /NOORIGIN  
 /DEPENDENT q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10  
 /METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would\_kept Would\_have\_persisted Do\_not\_know q21a  
 q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive\_towards\_other Negative\_towards\_other  
 Positive\_others\_towards\_you Negative\_others\_towards\_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 d9  
 Quality\_of\_life q6a q6c q6e q6g Historical\_events\_A Action\_pertaining\_A  
 Actions\_hindering\_A Borders\_A q16a q16c d4palestine Hamas Third The\_popular  
 The\_Palestinian The\_democratic The\_Islamic Independent\_Muslim National\_Independence  
 Other None Refused onestate\_2 confed\_3 wbjor\_gzegy\_4 none\_5.

**SPLIT A – Israel**

## REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10

/METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would\_kept Would\_have\_persisted Do\_not\_know q21a q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive\_towards\_other Negative\_towards\_other Positive\_others\_towards\_you Negative\_others\_towards\_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 Quality\_of\_life q6a q6c q6e q6g Historical\_events\_A Action\_pertaining\_A Actions\_hindering\_A Borders\_A q16a q16c d4Israel Zionist\_Union Jewish\_home Yesh\_Atid United\_Arab\_List Kulanu United\_Tora\_Judaism Israel\_Beitenu Shas Meretz onestate\_2 confed\_3 wbjor\_gzegy\_4 none\_5.

**SPLIT B – Palestine**

## REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10

/METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would\_kept Would\_have\_persisted Do\_not\_know q21a q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive\_towards\_other Negative\_towards\_other Positive\_others\_towards\_you Negative\_others\_towards\_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 d9 Quality\_of\_life q6b q6d q6f q6h Historical\_events\_B Action\_pertaining\_B Actions\_hindering\_B Borders\_B q16d d4palestine Hamas Third The\_popluar The\_Palestinian The\_democratic The\_Islamic Independent\_Muslim National\_Independence Other None Refused onestate\_2 confed\_3 wbjor\_gzegy\_4 none\_5.

**SPLIT B – Israel**

## REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10

/METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would\_kept Would\_have\_persisted Do\_not\_know q21a q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive\_towards\_other Negative\_towards\_other Positive\_others\_towards\_you Negative\_others\_towards\_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 Quality\_of\_life q6b q6d q6f q6h Historical\_events\_B Action\_pertaining\_B Actions\_hindering\_B Borders\_B q16d d4Israel Zionist\_Union Jewish\_home Yesh\_Atid United\_Arab\_List Kulanu United\_Tora\_Judaism Israel\_Beitenu Shas Meretz onestate\_2 confed\_3 wbjor\_gzegy\_4 none\_5.

## List of variables

Description	Type	Question	Split
Right or wrong direction	Dummy In comparison with “wrong direction”	q1	
Interest in the conflict	Ordinal	q5	
What the conflict is about	Ordinal	q6a q6c q6e q6g	A
	Ordinal	q6b q6d q6f q6h	B
Influence of historical events	Ordinal	q7a q7c q7e q7g	A
	Ordinal	q7b q7d q7f q7h	B
Affiliation to the past	Dummy In comparison with “more peaceful solutions”	Would_kept Would_have_persisted Do_not_know	
Actions pertaining the conflict	Ordinal	q9a q9c q9e q9g	A
	Ordinal	q9b q9d q9f q9h	B
Actions hindering peace	Ordinal	q10a q10c q10e q10g q10i q10k q10m q10o q10q q10s q10u	A
	Ordinal	q10b q10d q10f q10h q10j q10l q10n q10p q10r q10t	B
Economic cooperation	Ordinal	q16a q16c	A
	Ordinal	q16d	B
Items for establishing Borders	Ordinal	q17a q17c q17e q17g	A
	Ordinal	q17b q17d q17f q17h	B
Best solution	Dummy In comparison with a “two-states solution”	onestate_2 confed_3 wbjor_gzegy_4 none_5	
Evaluation of Abbas	Ordinal	q21a	
Evaluation of Misha'al	Ordinal	q21b	
Evaluation of Netanyahu	Ordinal	q21d	
Faith in political leaders to make peace with the other	Ordinal	q22	
Resumption of negotiations	Ordinal	q24	
Faith in negotiations	Ordinal	q25	
Ready to compromise for peace	Dummy In comparison with “we should not have to give up any of our demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace”	q33	
Confidence that peace will take place in near future	Ordinal	q34	
Quality of life	Ordinal	q35a q35b q35c q35d q35e q35f q35g q35h q35i q35j q35k	
Positive feelings and attitudes towards the other	Ordinal	q37a q37b q37e	
Negative feelings and attitudes towards the other	Ordinal	q37c q37d q37f	
Positive feelings and attitudes of the other towards you	Ordinal	q38a q38b q38e	

Description	Type	Question	Split
Negative feelings and attitudes of the other towards you	Ordinal	q38c q38d q38f	
Willingness to emigrate	Recoded to ordinal	q36	
Inclination to integrate	Ordinal	q39	
Casualties as a result of the conflict	Dummy In comparison with “no casualties”	q41	
Gender	Dummy In comparison with “Female”	d1	
Age	Continues	d2	
Social status	Dummy In comparison with “Not-married”	d3	
Education	Continues	d4palestine	
Education	Continues	d4Israel	
Degree of religiosity	Ordinal	d8	
Refugee or not	Dummy In comparison with “Not a refugee”	d9	
Affiliation to Political Party in Palestine	Dummy In comparison with “Fatah”	Hamas Third The_popluar The_Palestinian The_democratic The_Islamic Independent_Muslim National_Independence Other None Refused	
Affiliation to Political Party in Israel	Dummy In comparison with “Likud”	Zionist_Union Jewish_home Yesh_Atid United_Arab_List Kulanu United_Tora_Judaism Israel_Beitenu Shas Meretz	

**Principle component analysis for the dependent variables of question 32 (Prioritization of issues) - Palestine and for Israel**

FACTOR

/VARIABLES q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10

/MISSING LISTWISE

/ANALYSIS q19\_1 q19\_2 q19\_3 q19\_4 q19\_5 q19\_6 q19\_7 q19\_8 q19\_9 q19\_10

/PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG DET KMO INV REPR AIC

EXTRACTION ROTATION

/FORMAT SORT BLANK(0.40)

/PLOT ROTATION

/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)

/EXTRACTION PC

/CRITERIA ITERATE(30)

/ROTATION VARIMAX

/SAVE AR(ALL)

/METHOD=CORRELATION.

## G.3 Document Analyses

**Political documents across causes, consequences, and solutions**

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=Country BY CCS

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES

/STATISTICS=CHISQ

/CELLS=ROW

/COUNT ROUND CELL.

## G.4 Regression Diagnostics

To avoid redundancy, below are templated for the syntax of each test

### Testing for normality of residuals

Regression

/dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources  
Borders\_1967 Jewish\_state Holy\_places

/method=backward

/save resid(residuals).

Examine (Independent variables for each Split separately)

variables=residuals

/plot boxplot stemleaf histogram npplot.

### Testing for collinearity

Regression

/ Missing listwise

/ Statistics Coeff outs r anova collin tol

/ Criteria=pin(.05) pout(.10)

/ Noorigin

/ dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources  
Borders\_1967 Jewish\_state Holy\_places

/ Method= backward (Independent variables for each Split separately)

### Testing for heteroscedasticity

**After using a specific macro for this test, I ran the bpktest test for each Split:**

BPKTEST dependent variables followed by the Independent variables for each Split separately.

### Testing for Model Specification

regression

/dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources  
Borders\_1967 Jewish\_state Holy\_places

/method=enter (Independent variables for each Split separately)

/save pred(residuals).

compute residuals2 = residuals\*\*2.

regression

/dependent hlthexp

/method=enter residuals residuals2.

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