"Uncertain and Eerie": Closure Cases Against Associations in Turkey
"Uncertain and Eerie": Closure Cases Against Associations in Turkey
Members of the We Will Stop Femicides Platform and many women and LGBTQIA+ rights defenders
gathered in front of the Çağlayan Courthouse in Istanbul to protest the closure case against the Platform
before the hearing on October 5, 2022. The banner reads, “We Will Stop Femicides Platform Association
cannot be shut down by unlawful cases.” (Photo by the We Will Stop Femicides Platform)
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FIDH and OMCT Europe would like to thank the Agence Française de
Développement (AFD) for the support provided to their activities in Turkey.
This report was prepared within the framework of the project “A Bottom-
up Approach to Protecting and Supporting Civil Human Rights Actors in
Post-Pandemic Turkey” conducted by the Human Rights Foundation of
Turkey (HRFT) in cooperation with the Human Rights Association (HRA),
the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT). This project is funded by the
European Union. HRFT, HRA, FIDH and OMCT are solely responsible for
the relevant content, and this report cannot be considered to reflect the
views of the European Union.
DIRECTORS OF PUBLICATION:
Alice Mogwe, Gerald Staberock
CONTRIBUTORS:
Clara Ferrerons Galeano, Justine Lavarde, Polat Yamaner, Gülseren Yoleri
COORDINATION:
Manon Cabaup, Elena Crespi, Ulviyya Hasanova, Tuğçe İnce, Hüseyin Küçükbalaban
EDITING:
David Hans
DESIGN:
FIDH
DÉPÔT LÉGAL:
Septembre 2023
II. Methodology 6
A. Conclusions 25
B. Recommendations 25
b. To International Actors 26
c. To International Donors 29
The involuntary dissolution of an association, i.e. its termination by a court decision, is a drastic measure that
must be applied only as a “last resort,” reserved for the most exceptional cases, such as when the very existence
of an association would pose “an imminent threat of violence or other grave violation of the law.”1 In Turkey,
however, the involuntary dissolution of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in various fields, through both
emergency decrees and court judgements, has in recent years become common practice. Indeed, both of these
means are frequently used to target human rights defenders (HRDs) and to stifle civic space, in breach of Turkey’s
obligations under international human rights law. Considering that the closure of LGBTQIA+ organisations in
particular was threatened by right-wing politicians during the May 2023 election campaign, and that a broader
alliance of right-wing parties led by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) won
the presidency and a parliamentary majority, it is to be expected that closure cases will be increasingly used as
a weapon against civil society in the coming years. This creates a chilling effect on all rights-based CSOs, which
already face a wide array of attacks and stigmatisation by the government, of which the threat of dissolution is
just another example.
This report (“Report”) follows a series of three on shrinking civic space2 published over the past three years by the
Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (“the Observatory,” a partnership of the International
Federation for Human Rights (“FIDH”) and the World Organisation Against Torture (“OMCT”)), and their member
in Turkey, the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği - İHD). Written on the basis of joint research
conducted by the Observatory in cooperation with IHD and FIDH’s other member organisation in Turkey, the
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı – TİHV), this Report focuses on the phenomenon
of closure cases against associations in Turkey as a particular form of administrative and judicial harassment
against CSOs.
Through in-depth documentation and analysis of closure cases filed as of 2021 against four associations – the
Religious Scholars Mutual Aid and Solidarity Association (Din Alimleri Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği –
DİAYDER), the Migration Monitoring Association (Göç İzleme Derneği – GÖÇİZDER), the We Will Stop Femicides
Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu – KCDP), and the Tarlabaşı Community Center (Tarlabaşı
Toplum Merkezi – TTM) – the Report exposes a pattern of systematic use of such cases as a tool to narrow
civic space both by targeting specific CSOs and by generating a chilling effect on civil society as a whole. The
Report provides legal analyses of each of these cases in light of international human rights standards. Further,
through interviews with representatives of the four associations conducted in June 2023, the Report traces the
political issues that appear to underlie the cases – i.e. the Kurdish issue and women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights – and
outlines the impact of these cases on the right to freedom of association. By sharing testimonies from people
these four associations have supported, it also shows how the closure cases have impacted the individuals
and communities that the four associations supported through their work. Finally, the Report makes specific
recommendations to decision-makers at both the national and the international levels, including international
organisations and international and regional human rights protection mechanisms, as well as to international
donors, regarding how to address the impact of closure cases against CSOs in Turkey.
1 Venice Commission & OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association, CDL-AD(2014)046 (December 17, 2014), Principle 10. Available
at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)046-e#:~:text=The%20Guidelines%20aim%20to%20
ensure,facilitating%20their%20aims%20and%20activities.
2 For the first report, focusing on the right to freedom of assembly, and on the challenges faced by CSOs and HRDs in exercising this right in Turkey, see The
Observatory & İHD, A Perpetual Emergency: Attacks on Freedom of Assembly in Turkey and Repercussions for Civil Society (July 2020). Available at:
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/turkey-attack-on-freedom-of-assembly-undermines-work-of-human-rights. For the second
report, focusing on the freedom of association, and providing a detailed overview of the legal and practical challenges faced by civil society and HRDs in
exercising this right in Turkey, see The Observatory & İHD, Turkey’s Civil Society on the Line: A Shrinking Space for Freedom of Association (May 2021).
Available at: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/turkey-ongoing-crackdown-poses-existential-threat-to-independent-26851.
For the third report, focusing on the use of administrative proceedings and sanctions to silence and stigmatise HRDs and CSOs, see The Observatory &
İHD, Drowned in Procedure, Sentenced to Fail: Administrative Harassment Against Civil Society in Turkey (June 2022). Available at: https://www.fidh.org/
en/region/europe-central-asia/turkey/administrative-harassment-weaponised-to-silence-civil-society.
Four in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted in person in Istanbul with representatives of the four
associations facing the closure cases mentioned above. Since the cases have been widely reported on by media,
and with their informed consent, the names of the associations have been shared, whereas the names of the
individual representatives have been anonymised for reasons of safety. To respect the privacy of the people
and communities that respondent CSOs work with, the researchers shared questions in writing with three of
the associations, to be conveyed to the persons they work with, and received anonymous replies. Quotes from
people that KCDP supported, including survivors of gender-based violence and families of women killed by
men, were already included in the hearing records of the closure case where they had testified as witnesses, and
the researchers chose to resort to these pre-existing records to avoid subjecting the witnesses to unnecessary
trauma by re-interviewing them.
TIHV submitted a formal request for information to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) Directorate General of
Civil Society Relations, via the Presidential Communication Center (Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Merkezi – CİMER),
on June 20, 2023, seeking statistics and information concerning closure cases. On July 31, 2023, the Directorate
General replied via CİMER that “Pursuant to Article 7 of the Law No. 4982 on the Right to Information, your
request cannot be answered as it is determined that the requested information can be produced as a result of a
separate and special study, research, examination or analysis.”3
Research was conducted under the auspices of the 42-month EU-funded programme, “A bottom-up approach
for protecting and supporting civil human rights actors in post-pandemic Turkey,” which is managed by TIHV in
cooperation with FIDH, IHD, and the OMCT. The project started in 2021 and aims to contribute to a transformative
human rights struggle through the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect
for all human rights and fundamental freedoms in Turkey through advocacy, solidarity, capacity and network
building, media activities, sub-granting, and support programs.
The researchers would like to thank the individuals and institutions who participated in this study and shared
their experiences, opinions, and demands.
3 E-mail from CİMER (July 31, 2023). Article 7/2 of the Law No. 4982 on the Right to Information states that public institutions “may respond negatively to
applications made for information or documents that can be produced as a result of a separate study, research, examination or analysis.”
Functions of CSOs include creating various platforms for public debate, and drawing attention to and
advocating for matters of public interest. For this reason, CSOs act as public watchdogs warranting multi-
layered protection under international human rights law.4 This protection, recognised and awarded by a
wide range of international law instruments, enables CSOs to carry out their activities, essential to the
proper functioning of a democratic society, without hindrance or fear of reprisals.
The right to freedom of association is enshrined under Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), among other international law treaties and
conventions. Together with other fundamental rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly, the right to freedom of association constitutes the foundation of a democratic society.
This right does not only recognise the right to form associations, but also encompasses the freedom to join,
participate, and carry out activities in associations, without unreasonable hindrances.5 While the right to
freedom of association is not absolute and may be subject to certain restrictions, such restrictions must
be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim,6 and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The
restrictions should always be narrowly interpreted and should never entirely extinguish the right or impair
its very essence. Interventions against an association affect both the association itself and its executives,
members, and the communities they work with. Furthermore, individual violations of the right to freedom of
association often represent a wider issue that aims not only to silence and punish the individual, but also to
stifle civil society as a whole.7
It is well-established under international human rights law that the dissolution of associations should be
a measure of last resort, used only when there is clear and imminent danger to society that cannot be
addressed through less severe means.8 Involuntary dissolution should not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or
based on political motivations.9 States must ensure that effective remedies are available for associations
facing involuntary dissolution in violation of the right to freedom of association. In addition to filing
challenges against dissolution before domestic courts, associations should be able to submit applications
to regional human rights mechanisms or engage with international human rights bodies, to raise awareness
and advocate for the restoration of their rights.
4 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Case of Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], Application No. 18030/11 (November 8, 2016), paras.
166-67. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-167828.
5 Human Rights Committee, Belyatsky et al. v. Belarus, CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, (August 7, 2007), par. 7.2. Available at: http://undocs.org/en/CCPR/
C/90/D/1296/2004.
6 Such as national security and public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
7 ECtHR, Case of Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 47145/14 (April 19, 2018), paras. 96-105. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-182178.
8 Venice Commission & OSCE/ODIHR, supra note 1, Principle 10.
9 ECtHR, Case of Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 9988/13 and 60 others (June 14, 2022), par. 139. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/fre?i=001-217751.
During the state of emergency rule in Turkey in 2016-2018, 1,598 associations, 129 foundations and 170
media institutions, including several human rights organisations, were shut down by emergency decrees (not
by courts) for alleged ties to terrorist organisations.15 Members of many human rights organisations that had
been closed by decree re-established new legal entities immediately after their closure (some with the same
name and others with new ones) to continue their work without interruption, while seeking legal remedy
against the closure of their organisations before the Inquiry Commission for State of Emergency Measures.
The Commission was set up in 2017 as an ad hoc administrative mechanism for individuals dismissed from
public service, and entities shut down by emergency decrees. It was criticized on several grounds for being
ineffective, for lacking impartiality and independence, and for violating due process. The Commission’s work
ended in January 2023 after rejecting 85.9% of the 127,292 applications it received.16 1,102 applications
concerned the closure of institutions, of which only 72 were accepted, with no breakdown available as to their
legal status, and no information regarding the grounds on which the applications were accepted or rejected.17
There are no statistics available concerning the number of associations that resorted to administrative courts
to appeal the Commission’s decisions.
10 “ Kaos GL ‘ahlaka aykırı’ değildir!”, Kaos GL (December 21, 2006). Available at: https://kaosgl.org/haber/lsquokaos-gl-ahlaka-aykirirsquo-degildirrsquo;
Pembe Hayat’ı kapatmaya ret, Pembe Hayat (November 2, 2006). Available at: https://www.pembehayat.org/haberler/pembe-hayat-i-kapatmaya-ret-456.
11 Eşcinsel örgütlenmesi karşıtı bir Vali daha, Kaos GL (May 23, 2006). Available at: https://kaosgl.org/haber/escinsel-orgutlenmesi-karsiti-bir-vali-daha.
12 L ambdaistanbul LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği’ne kapatma kararı, Kaos GL (May 29, 2008). Available at: https://kaosgl.org/haber/lambdaistanbul-lgbtt-
dayanisma-dernegirsquone-kapatma-karari.
13 However, foreshadowing what was to come in the next decade, the court noted that the association should not “encourage lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transvestite and transsexual behavior with the aim of spreading such sexual orientations.” Human Rights Watch, UPR Submission Turkey (November
2009). Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/lib-docs/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/TR/HRW_UPR_TUR_S08_2010_
HumanRightsWatch.pdf.
14 Siyah Pembe Üçgen İzmir Kapatılamadı, Kaos GL (April 30, 2010). Available at: https://kaosgl.org/haber/siyah-pembe-ucgen-izmir-kapatilamadi; Ekogenç
Derneği’ne açılan kapatma davasının gerekçeli kararı açıklandı: Cinsel yönelim ahlaksızlık değil, Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi (March 25, 2015).
Available at: https://www.stgm.org.tr/ekogenc-dernegine-acilan-kapatma-davasinin-gerekceli-karari-aciklandi-cinsel-yonelim-ahlaksizlik.
15 TIHV, Kuşatma Altındaki Yurttaşlık Alanı: Susturma, Baskılama ve Suçlulaştırma Pratikleri (November 2021). Available at: https://tihv.org.tr/wp-content/
uploads/2021/12/Kusatma_Altindaki_Yurttaslik_Alani.pdf; The Observatory & İHD, A Perpetual Emergency, supra, note 2.
16 A
nnouncement on the Decisions of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures (January 12, 2023). Available at: https://ohalkomisyonu.
tccb.gov.tr/.
17 T
he Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures Infographics (January 12, 2023). Available at: https://ohalkomisyonu.tccb.gov.
tr/#:~:text=%C4%B0nfografiklerine%20eri%C5%9Fmek%20i%C3%A7in-,t%C4%B1klay%C4%B1n%C4%B1z.,-7075%20SAYILI%20KANUNA.
18 As of August 22, 2023, the MoI website states that 211,207 associations have been dissolved and 101,302 associations are active, and that there are
no associations whose activities have been suspended. The website does not provide a date range for which these numbers are valid. Directorate General
of Civil Society Relations of the MoI, Number of Active and Dissolved Associations (n.d.). Available at: https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/faal-ve-fesih-dernek-
sayilari.
“Imams read Kurdish khutbah20 at the association. Because we are Kurdish, we understood everything
they were saying. We were part of the congregation of the association, we prayed there. At least 400-
500 people would come to Friday prayers, there were prayers held 4-5 times a day. We enjoyed those
prayers a lot. When we heard about the closure case, it’s like our world collapsed, we took it to heart.
What right do they have shutting down that mosque? After they closed the association, a lot changed
for us. We didn’t go to just any mosque; we pray in our homes. That’s because none of [the imams of the
other mosques] reacted to the closure [of DİAYDER].” – A participant in DİAYDER activities21
“We would always go to the association to pray, five times a day, on Fridays. The association was a very
positive place. After they shut it down, we almost stopped praying, we don’t go to other mosques. We
had become used to [DİAYDER]. They shut down the association, this is cruelty. It was only a place of
worship.” – A participant in DİAYDER activities22
23
19 In addition to DİAYDER, GÖÇİZDER, KCDP and TTM, a closure case was launched in 2022 against the Mutual Aid, Solidarity, Unity and Culture
Association with Families Who Lost Relatives in the Cradle of Civilizations (Medeniyetler Beşiğinde Yakınlarını Kaybeden Ailelerle Yardımlaşma Dayanışma
Birlik ve Kültür Derneği – MEBYA-DER), an association based in Diyarbakır that works in all areas related to people who have been unlawfully and
arbitrarily killed or forcibly disappeared in Turkey in violation of international human rights. The case is ongoing. Evrensel, MEBYA-DER’e kapatma
davasının reddi istendi (April 20, 2022). Available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/459798/mebya-dere-kapatma-davasinin-reddi-istendi.
20 A religious sermon delivered in mosques during Friday prayers and on other special occasions.
21 Excerpt of audio recording (July 13, 2023).
22 Ibid.
23 A masjid is a place of worship for Muslims.
2425
24 “If the purpose of the association becomes in breach of the law or morality, upon request by the public prosecutor or a relevant person, the court shall rule
for the dissolution of the association. The court shall take all necessary precautions during the trial including suspension of activities.”
25 “Associations;
a) May not carry out activities outside of the purpose indicated in their charter and the fields of work that are stated to realize this purpose.
b
) May not be founded to serve purposes expressly forbidden by the Constitution and laws or execute actions which constitute a crime.
May not carry out training or educational activities to prepare for military service, national defence and general law enforcement services, may not open
camps or educational spaces for such purposes. May not use special clothes or uniforms for their members.”
“The first institution that I visited and met with when I arrived in Istanbul was GÖÇİZDER. A few times
they helped connect me with people and organisations that can provide financial or in-kind support to
me. They helped me find short-term employment when I was looking for a job. When the association
executives were arrested, I didn’t have anyone left I could get in touch with. I heard they were evicted
from their office after the closure case. GÖÇİZDER was somewhere I could go when I needed anything.
The association shouldn’t be shut down; it should be supported.” – A person subjected to forced
displacement26
“GÖÇİZDER would visit people who were forced to migrate, try to help them. They would bring families
who migrated together and help them build solidarity. It is an association that does good work and
helps families who migrated.” – A person subjected to forced displacement27
“To the contrary, I want this [association] to be supported more. Because after all, they showed me that
I have rights [as a woman], my deceased daughter has rights, and that her murderer will be arrested.
They supported me. […] They walked with me, and I will walk with them till the end. […] Calling them
immoral, inappropriate, or unlawful means calling us that.” – Mother of 21-year-old Deniz Aktaş who
was murdered in 2015 by her boyfriend Lokman Barış Çelik29
“I said I wouldn’t cry anymore because the killer of my daughter was just put to prison thanks to [KCDP]
[…] but I cry whenever I remember that they are saying the association is against the family structure.
They buried my family in the ground and [the association] became my family. […] They are calling [the
association] immoral, that’s why I’m here today. They can’t call them immoral. I am here today because
I wish we hadn’t met like this but there are people in my position and unfortunately there will be others
too.” – Mother of 20-year-old Yağmur Önüt who was murdered in 2016 by her boyfriend Egemen
Vardar30
31
Year & place of First set up as a platform in 2010; association established in 2012 in Istanbul.
establishment:
Purpose and main Named after its goal to end femicides, KCDP gathers and publishes statistics on femicides and
activities: suspicious deaths of women, holds protests and gatherings, provides legal support to families
of murdered women as well as women and LGBTQIA+ survivors of sexual and gender-based
violence and survivors of child abuse, and advocates for policies that further gender equality
and accountability for sexual and gender-based violence.
Facts leading to the In October-November 2016, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Co-Mayor Gültan Kışanak,
dissolution case: Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP) co-Chair, and Van MP Figen
Yüksekdağ and Democratic Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi – DBP) co-Chair Sebahat
Tuncel were arrested as part of the post-coup attempt crackdown against Kurdish politicians
and municipalities. KCDP shared social media posts condemning the arrests.
Smear campaigns/ A man who is an AKP member was detained for two days in January 2016 for failing to pay
targeting: alimony to his ex-wife, and was released from detention after the AKP Kayseri Provincial
Directorate paid the alimony. Upon his release in front of the prison, he made statements
targeting women’s rights and women’s organisations. He later started a smear campaign against
KCDP online, likely targeting KCDP because of their visible activism in support of gender equality.
The AKP member filed multiple online complaints via the Prime Ministry Communication Center
(Başbakanlık İletişim Merkezi – BİMER31) in November 2016, claiming that “[KCDP] destroys
the family structure by disregarding the family concept under the guise of protecting women’s
rights, disregards women and children and gains interests over them, aims to create chaos in the
society and increase victimhood, insulted the President, aims to destroy the family and society,
broadcasts and defends women who join terror activities with people such as Sebahat Tuncel and
Gültan Kışanak.” He also requested that KCDP be shut down as part of the state of emergency.
Unknown persons also filed several other BİMER complaints against KCDP which are identical
in terms of content, and even spelling and grammar errors, leading to the conclusion that they
were orchestrated by the same man.
28 The Observatory, Turkey: Arbitrary detention of 22 members of the Migration Monitoring Association (June 14, 2022). Available at: https://www.fidh.org/
en/issues/human-rights-defenders/turkey-arbitrary-detention-of-22-members-of-the-migration-monitoring; The Observatory, Turkey: Violations of the right
to a fair trial and due process guarantees of Bilal Yıldız (December 22, 2022). Available at: https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/turkey-
violations-of-the-right-to-a-fair-trial-and-due-process.
29 Excerpt from transcript of the 5th hearing of the dissolution case against KCDP before the Istanbul 13th Civil Court of First Instance (April 5, 2023).
30 Excerpt from transcript of the 1st hearing of the dissolution case against KCDP before the Istanbul 13th Civil Court of First Instance (June 1, 2022).
31 BİMER became CİMER following the new presidential system that came into force in July 2018, which abolished the prime minister position.
“This closure case affected us so much. Our children were coming here to attend activities, now
they can’t. This was the second home for children. [TTM’s] closure will create huge chaos, because
[Tarlabaşı] is a swamp. They enlighten our children, through art, events. […] Our children come here
and say ‘we can achieve this.’ I wish there was a TTM in every neighbourhood.” – A 35-year-old woman
from Tarlabaşı32
“I was so sad [when I first heard about the closure case] because our children learn something here
instead of wandering the streets. […] No one comes to abandoned neighbourhoods like this and they
prevent those who do. For example, they say you can learn literacy at school, but they don’t provide
care for my child. [TTM] provides me with that option. I definitely don’t want TTM to close, I want this
case to be over as soon as possible.” – A 36-year-old mother living in Tarlabaşı33
3435
Year & place of First set up as a pilot project of the Istanbul Bilgi University Center for Migration Research in
establishment: 2006; association established in 2007 in Istanbul.
Purpose and main TTM aims to empower the residents of the Tarlabaşı neighbourhood in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, who
activities: are excluded from social life and struggle with various disadvantages caused by poverty and
migration, to support their access to their rights, and to reduce prejudice against the Tarlabaşı
neighbourhood. For this purpose, it provides social and psychological support programs to
children, youth, and women, and creates a model for a rights-based community centre that can
be replicated in similar neighbourhoods.
Facts leading to the In June 2021, which is Pride Month, TTM announced on social media that it would hold a closed
dissolution case: Zoom event for its volunteers on how to support LGBTQIA+ students and children, based on a
publication by an LGBTQIA+ organization.34
Smear campaigns/ The post was picked up by Milat, a pro-government newspaper on June 25, 2021, which
targeting: claimed that TTM was “engaged in LGBTI perversion and PKK propaganda to children” through
“funds from abroad,” and mentioned two individual TTM volunteers by name. The author of
the article also published several tweets targeting TTM and the volunteers, which brought a
wave of harassment online that went on for several months. Other pro-government newspapers
picked up on the article, and released others of a similar nature. On February 9, 2022, the same
author published another article targeting TTM, IBB, and CHP based on a 2021 report that TTM
submitted to a project led by IBB on the Beyoğlu district, stating that “IBB of CHP is trying to
save TTM by gushing over the pervert centre and cooperating with them.” On April 14, 2022, a
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) MP made a speech in parliament
that TTM “encourages homosexuality” and “aims to rip youth from social values to make them
individuals that are foreign and hostile to their nation” and “create a genderless society.”35
Related criminal In July 2021, the chair of TTM’s board of directors was questioned by the police in relation to
proceedings: a criminal complaint alleging the crime of obscenity based on social media posts and news
reports. In November 2021, the prosecutor decided not to pursue a criminal case.
Also in November 2021, a criminal investigation was launched against the chairs of the association
who served in the period 2018-2021 for alleged breaches of the Law on Associations based on
the same facts referred to in the dissolution case (below). The investigation is ongoing.
Related On the same day as the first Milat hit piece, social services visited TTM concerning the article,
administrative which was followed by a two-day audit by the IPDCSR and a five-week audit by the MoI. While
proceedings: the MoI audit was ongoing, a seven-person commission set up by the Beyoğlu District Governor’s
Office, and accompanied by the police, visited TTM without prior notice for another one-day
audit, which the MoI auditors were not informed about either. The commission and police forced
their way into the office.
36
The sermons in DİAYDER masjids are held in Kurdish, follow the Shafi’i school, and promote a democratic
understanding of Islam which touches upon notions of peace and justice, thus thwarting the centralisation and
standardisation of Sunni Islam by the government, and promoting religious freedoms and linguistic rights:
“We are targeted with this closure case because the State is trying to take over Kurds
economically and by using religion. […] The State collects taxes from everyone, but they don’t
serve Alevis, Jews, or Christians. They reject both ‘Kurdishness’ and Shafi’ism. They want us
to read their khutbahs.37 We are not attached to the Religious Affairs Presidency; we are not
attached to anyone. The people opened the masjid here, someone became the imam, and the
people pay for the expenses.”38
GÖÇİZDER’s documentation work on migration, particularly forced displacement following the 2015-2016
curfews in Kurdish-majority cities, “explains migration in terms of its causes and its consequences.”39 This
includes criticising State policies that discriminate against Kurds and documenting human rights violations faced
by internally displaced persons:
“There are many associations working in the field of migration and refugees. But this is an
attack against the way we work. If you are only considering the lives of [displaced persons and
refugees] here, there is no problem. But if you research how that person came to migrate there,
you are also exposing a crime. There is an attack against those [organisations] that are right
defenders, not against humanitarian organisations.”40
KCDP’s activism on gender equality includes criticising the government’s policies on broader issues related to
women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights, as well as demonstrating solidarity with women who are targeted for their activism.
KCDP’s street protests are especially visible at a time when anti-gender groups have become increasingly vocal
in their spreading of misogynistic and LGBTQIA+-phobic narratives that aim to promote traditional societal roles,
and to further undermine women’s and LGBTQIA+ equality and curtail their rights:41
“We were talking about the Istanbul Convention a lot [when the closure case was filed]. Alimony
and the civil code were on the agenda. The LASTESIS protest happened, and our executives
were detained by being handcuffed behind their backs.42 […] We always discuss femicides,
37 he State’s increasingly powerful Religious Affairs Presidency (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – DİB), which follows the Hanafi school, appoints all imams for
T
Sunni mosques across Turkey. DİB-appointed imams follow khutbahs in Turkish prepared by DİB, which have increasingly become politicized to gain
support for the AKP. Norwegian Helsinki Committee’s Freedom of Belief Initiative, An Appeal to Move Forward from Aspirations to Actions: Monitoring
Report on the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief in Turkey (April 2022). Available at: https://inancozgurlugugirisimi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/
iog-monitoring-report-on-forb-2022-en.pdf; Filiz Gazi, Propaganda-laced sermons distance Turks from the mosque, Duvar English (September 17,
2019). Available at: https://www.duvarenglish.com/society/2019/09/17/propaganda-laced-sermons-distances-turks-from-the-mosque.
38 Interview no. 2 with DİAYDER representative, Istanbul, June 12, 2023.
39 Interview no. 1 with GÖÇİZDER representative, Istanbul, June 12, 2023.
40 Ibid.
41 Berfu Şeker & Ezel Buse Sönmezocak, Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention: War on Gender Equality in Turkey, Freedom House (June 2021). Available
at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/06292021_Freedom_House_Turkey_Policy_Brief-2-Withdrawal-from-the-Istanbul-Convention.
pdf.
42 Various women’s groups in Turkey organized dance protests in 2019 after the protest against sexual violence by the feminist group LASTESIS in Chile
went global. The protests were met with police violence and detentions, and six women – including KCDP executives and members – face criminal cases.
TTM, as an organisation working with women and children in one of the most marginalised neighbourhoods
in Istanbul, whose residents include internally displaced Kurds, Roma people and refugees, implements a
community model based on principles of peaceful coexistence. For TTM, this means creating safe platforms
for women and children from an LGBTQIA+-inclusive and gender equality perspective. Meanwhile, anti-gender
narratives in Turkey – similar to global narratives – claim that children are being brainwashed by “gender ideology,”
which is spreading “moral panic over the future of children”45:
“[The filing of the closure case] was at a time when there was a lot of propaganda against the
Istanbul Convention, about the family and children. They were even attacking advertisements
and the colours of t-shirts during Pride Month. It was a good coincidence for them to talk about
these using children, it served them well. Because children are a soft spot. They said that we
are victimising Syrian children. Refugees, children, LGBTI+ people… It became a good example
for them using vulnerabilities.”46
Kurds, women, and LGBTQIA+ people are also at the heart of politics, as demonstrated by the May 2023
election campaign, which instrumentalised them for different purposes. During this time, several political
figures – both from the ruling alliance and the opposition – resorted often to populist discourse and hate
speech against marginalised groups, especially refugees from Syria and Afghanistan and LGBTQIA+ people,
thus exacerbating the discrimination they face.47 The HDP political party is itself facing a closure case that also
requests a ban on political activity by 451 party members and executives,48 many of whom are already subject
to judicial harassment and in jail, in blatant disregard of outstanding judgements from the ECtHR qualifying
their detention as unlawful under the ECHR, and calling for their release.49 HDP supporters, Kurds for the most
part, are also stigmatised.50 Women’s rights are turned into bargaining chips, with right-wing parties demanding
the amendment of Turkey’s violence against women law as a condition to support the AKP-led alliance in the
elections, risking further curtailment of gender equality and fundamental rights.51 Against this backdrop, closure
cases against associations are also instrumentalised for political purposes, which may continue in the period
leading up to the March 2024 local elections.
In some cases, the cases brought against associations are used by the authorities to indirectly target their
political opponents. For instance, the closure case against DİAYDER also relates to the government’s targeting
of IBB, CHP, and Ekrem İmamoğlu. DİAYDER’s criminalisation ahead of the March 2024 local elections serves
the government narrative that CHP, which runs IBB, is “supporting terrorists” and should be voted out, while
alienating İmamoğlu from Kurdish voters by signalling that the municipality’s provision of equal services to Kurds
can easily become grounds for harassment and stigmatisation.52
Keep the Volume Up, Las Tesis Activists (last updated March 31, 2022). Available at: https://www.sessizkalma.org/en/defender/las-tesis-activists.
43 On the Boğaziçi protests, see TIHV, Preliminary Assessment Report on Violations of Rights During the Protests against the Appointment of Rector to
Boğaziçi University by the President (February 24, 2021). Available at: https://en.tihv.org.tr/alternative-shadow-reports/preliminary-assessment-report-
on-violations-of-rights-during-the-protests-against-the-appointment-of-rector-to-bogazici-university-by-the-president/.
44 Interview no. 4 with KCDP representative, Istanbul, June 13, 2023.
45 Nur Sinem Korou, Right-Wing Populism and Anti-Gender Movements: The Same Coin With Different Faces, Global Political Trends Center Istanbul Kültür
University (May 2020). Available at: https://www.iku.edu.tr/gpot/policy-brief-nur-sinem-kourou-right-wing-populism-and-anti-gender-movements-same-
coin-different.
46 Interview no. 3 with TTM representative, Istanbul, June 13, 2023.
47 Kays Abbas & Volkan Pekal, Mülteci karşıtı söylem saldırıları artırıyor, Evrensel (May 30, 2023). Available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/491080/
multeci-karsiti-soylem-saldirilari-artiriyor; Ezgi Akın, Erdogan slams Turkey’s LGBTQ community, weaponizes homophobia ahead of vote, Al-Monitor (May
4, 2023). Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/05/erdogan-slams-turkeys-lgbtq-community-weaponizes-homophobia-ahead-vote.
48 Ezgi Güngördü, Turkey’s Constitutional Court Back to Old Tricks: The Closure Case Against the Peoples’ Democratic Party, Völkerrechtsblog (April 26,
2023). Available at: https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/turkeys-constitutional-court-back-to-old-tricks/.
49 ECtHR, Case of Yüksekdağ Şenoğlu and Others v. Türkiye, Application No. 14332/17 (November 8, 2022). Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-220968; ECtHR, Case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (No. 2) [GC], Application No. 14305/17 (December 22, 2020). Available at: https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207173; Submission by ARTICLE 19, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, the International
Federation for Human Rights, and the Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project pursuant to Rule 9.2 of the Committee of Ministers’ Rules for the
Supervision of the Execution of Judgements providing initial observations on the implementation of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (No.2) (Application
no. 14305/17) Grand Chamber judgement, 22 December 2020 (February 7, 2021). Available at: https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/?i=DH-DD(2021)192revE.
50 Burcu Karakas & Umit Ozdal, Kurds fear Erdogan win amid sharper nationalist rhetoric, Reuters (May 25, 2023). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/
world/middle-east/kurds-fear-erdogan-win-amid-sharper-nationalist-rhetoric-2023-05-25/.
51 J essie Williams, What’s at Stake For Women in Turkey’s Election, Open Democracy (May 12, 2023). Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
en/5050/turkey-erdogan-election-2023-womens-rights-we-will-stop-femicides/.
52 It is also noteworthy that the smear campaign orchestrated by the pro-government Milat newspaper against TTM published a hit piece noting IBB’s
DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER, both of which work with the Kurdish community in Istanbul and adopt a critical stance
towards the State’s interference with religious freedom and its migration policies, by highlighting structural,
systemic discrimination against Kurds and other marginalised groups in Turkey, faced the same fate as critical
CSOs and HRDs in Kurdish-majority cities by being labelled as “terrorists.”54 TTM’s work on children’s rights,
which includes comprehensive sexuality education and acknowledges the discrimination faced by LGBTQIA+
children, caused them to face hate speech similar to that faced by LGBTQIA+ organisations.55 KCDP’s vocal
activism on gender equality issues and women’s rights, such as alimony and bodily autonomy, at a time when
anti-gender narratives have gained higher visibility in Turkey, caused them to face accusations of “destroying the
family.” As a result, both associations are labelled as “immoral.”
The labels of “terrorist” and “immoral” are significant because these are concepts mentioned, but only vaguely
defined, in the anti-terrorism framework and associations legislation that provide the legal basis for the State’s
harassment against these associations. The labels can co-exist: KCDP’s and its members’ vocal criticisms of the
government and solidarity with Kurdish women politicians subjected to judicial harassment, and TTM’s work
with Kurdish children in the neighbourhood, are also criminalised. GÖÇİZDER and TTM were also targeted by
pro-government media for receiving international funding, with accusations that they are “making terrorist/LGBT
propaganda” with foreign funds. This narrative stigmatising civil society for receiving foreign funding has been
increasingly pushed by both the government and government-controlled media over the years.56 Anti-gender
movements in particular accuse women and LGBTQIA+ groups of “importing Western values” through “foreign
funding,” echoing high-level government officials, including former MoI Soylu.57 There are no effective remedies
against these smear campaigns.58 As a case in point, TTM’s criminal complaint of August 2022 against Milat
newspaper and other instigators of the smear campaign against it ended, in November 2022, with a decision
not to prosecute.
The way in which the smear campaigns have been orchestrated reveals the political motivations underlying
the dissolution cases, as well as the ties between members of the ruling coalition, pro-government media, and
the cases themselves. The fact that details both of investigations against DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER members,
and of the dissolution case against TTM, were published by pro-government media before the associations or
the individuals themselves were informed and able to access the case files, strongly suggests the existence of
such a link. Besides being a procedural violation, it points to the judiciary’s lack of independence from political
power, and its collaboration with pro-government media in influencing public opinion regarding ongoing cases
against persons and institutions the government deems risky. Law enforcement also plays a critical part in this,
as demonstrated by pro-government media publishing photos of GÖÇİZDER members being detained. This
media coverage, which appears to benefit from connections between law enforcement and pro-government
media, points to the undue influence of mainstream political discourse over the security forces. It also appears
to be in breach of the procedural rights of suspects, and undermines the presumption of innocence.59 Moreover,
law enforcement reportedly intrudes into local communities these associations work with. TTM heard that police
stopped Tarlabaşı residents and asked if they were sending their children to TTM, claiming that “TTM takes
children to the mountain [to join the PKK] from the basement of their offices.”60 Police also reportedly visited
the masjids run by local communities that remained open even after DİAYDER was shut down, asking them why
support for TTM, whereas other pro-government outlets targeted the Şişli District Municipality run by CHP by linking them with TTM, even though
Tarlabaşı is located in the Beyoğlu district, whose municipality is run by AKP.
53 “ ‘NGOs faithful to our national sensitivities’ vs. ‘groups connected with foreign circles’: Stigmatisation of Independent NGOs and Foreign Funding” in The
Observatory & İHD, Drowned in Procedure, supra, note 2.
54 “ The Interconnectedness of Administrative and Judicial Harassment” in The Observatory & İHD, Drowned in Procedure, supra, note 2; “HRDs based in the
South-East” in The Observatory & İHD, Turkey’s Civil Society on the Line, supra, note 2.
55 Ali Erol, Kaos GL’yi hedef alan hükümet medyasının 2022 senesi nefret seyri, Kaos GL (January 11, 2023). Available at: https://kaosgl.org/haber/kaos-gl-
yi-hedef-alan-hukumet-medyasinin-2022-senesi-nefret-seyri.
56 “ ‘NGOs faithful to our national sensitivities’ vs. ‘groups connected with foreign circles’: Stigmatisation of Independent NGOs and Foreign Funding” in The
Observatory & İHD, Drowned in Procedure, supra, note 2.
57 Ibid.
58 “Stigmatisation and Discrediting of Civil Society Actors” in The Observatory & İHD, Turkey’s Civil Society on the Line, supra, note 2.
59 H
uman Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial,
CCPR/C/GC/32 (August 23, 2007), para. 30. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Download.
aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FGC%2F32&Lang=en.
60 Interview no. 3 with TTM representative, Istanbul, June 13, 2023.
The online BİMER and later CİMER systems allowing citizens to submit complaints to or requests for information
from the government also play a role in the stigmatisation and harassment of associations. These systems became
mediums for both ordinary citizens and long-time “professional” informants to “inform” the government of any
alleged suspicious activity by anyone, including neighbours, celebrities, and associations.62 Online complaints,
often anonymous, are frequently what instigate administrative and judicial proceedings, as in the case of KCDP,
where the chain of events leading to the dissolution case was triggered by multiple BİMER complaints. In 2022
and 2023, police officers visited the TTM office three times on the basis that there were CİMER complaints. In
one of these visits, the police said the complaint was that TTM is “talking about sexuality to children”63; in others,
they did not provide information about the complaint’s content.
In the cases of DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER, the closure cases are directly linked with the criminal cases filed
against the associations’ executives and members under “membership in an armed terrorist organisation.” The
ECtHR has repeatedly ruled that several provisions of Turkey’s broad anti-terrorism framework, which include
vaguely defined terms and offenses, lack foreseeability and violate the principle of legality, paving the way for
arbitrariness.64 The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Dunja Mijatović, said her office
“has consistently pointed to an overbroad interpretation by the Turkish judiciary of what constitutes terrorism
or membership of an armed criminal organisation despite all the changes over the years.”65 The weaponization
of the anti-terrorism framework reveals itself in the bills of indictment against DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER
members, where alleged grounds for membership include using Kurdish words, organising peaceful gatherings,
documenting human rights violations, and publishing on topics related to the Kurdish issue.
The prosecutors who requested dissolution referenced bills of indictment concerning individual association
executives and members, in the cases of GÖÇİZDER and DİAYDER. In fact, the request for dissolution of
GÖÇİZDER is half a page long and refers only to the allegations in the said bill of indictment. In the case of
KCDP, the prosecutor relied on records kept by police, without any legal basis, about the association’s executives.
Meanwhile, in the case of DİAYDER, the civil court referred to the allegations in the bills of indictment as grounds
for its conclusion that the association should be dissolved for becoming a source of criminal activity. These facts
demonstrate that both the prosecutors demanding the groups’ closure and the court in DİAYDER’s case attributed
unsubstantiated allegations concerning individual association executives and members to the association, even
when there is no established connection between the allegedly criminal actions and the association. And even
if any individuals were to be convicted, “the individual wrongdoing of founders or members of an association,
when not acting on behalf of the association, should lead only to their personal liability for such acts, and not to
the prohibition or dissolution of the whole association.”66
Prosecutors also launched these closure cases following conclusory reports sent to them by auditors from the
MoI or the provincial civil society directorate, who have been increasingly subjecting CSOs to burdensome
audits.67 The public officials who prepared these reports made broad determinations that lack any causality, legal
argumentation, or evidence that the associations are acting “unlawfully” and/or “immorally.” These are grounds
for dissolution under the Turkish Civil Code that are too vague to be sufficiently foreseeable and or to provide
Prosecutors do not appear to have scrutinised whether the dissolution request has a legitimate aim, or whether
there exist strong indications that dissolution corresponds to a pressing social need and is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. In three of the requests for dissolution, the prosecutors have copy-pasted sections of
the auditor’s reports without ostensibly having analysed the determinations reached by the auditors in light of
the provisions regarding closure cases. Instead, the prosecutors appear to have followed exactly the conclusions
of the auditors – who are themselves part of the MoI. The administration also carries significant weight in these
proceedings. In the determination of non-existence case against TTM, the MoI itself is the claimant, and the
Ministry of Family and Social Affairs intervened in the case. Both ministries also intervened in TTM’s dissolution
case.
The DİAYDER case demonstrates that closure cases can be accepted by judges without thorough legal
examination. The judge similarly engaged in no legal examination in the court’s ruling as to whether this restriction
of the right to freedom of association is justified or not. The courts fell short of proper examination in regard to
the existence of an imminent threat, too, when considering interim measures of suspension. DİAYDER’s activities
were suspended alongside the dissolution decision by the first instance court, even though the court did not
provide any reasoning as to the necessity of the suspension order. DİAYDER was thus effectively closed before
the dissolution decision became final. TTM’s activities were suspended immediately by the court following the
prosecutor’s request, without providing TTM an opportunity to respond. The court’s reasoning for the suspension
was taken verbatim from the auditor’s report; it was later removed, following TTM’s objections.
Finally, in addition to the closure cases, association executives faced criminal convictions under the Law on
Associations for minor procedural issues in bookkeeping, as well as administrative fines. These fines can also
be exorbitant, as in the case of DİAYDER executives who were fined for unauthorised aid collection, another
restrictive aspect of the legislation concerning associations.70 Association executives are thus impacted by both
the closure cases and the individual cases and sanctions that target them, which makes the consequences of
these parallel procedures on civil society even more difficult to endure.
DİAYDER experienced devastating consequences following the dissolution decision and the suspension of its
activities, as masjids that DİAYDER helped run have shut down:
“[The dissolution] had a very negative impact. We had institutionalisation through the
association. It had its advantages. For example, the people got to know the masjids through the
association’s representation. But now everyone backed away. People are dispersed, it’s hard to
bring them together.”71
68 In December 2020, the parliament enacted Law No. 7262 on the Prevention of Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (“Law No.
7262”), which contrary to what its name suggests, introduced several provisions restricting legitimate activities of civil society. Article 30/A of the Law on
Associations introduced with Law No. 7262 authorizes the Minister of Interior to suspend an association’s activities subject to court approval, request the
dissolution of an association, and appoint a trustee for the association. Interestingly, while the requests for dissolution of DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER by the
prosecutor reference Article 30/A of the Law on Associations in the “relevant legal provisions” section, there has been no other reference to Article 30/A
throughout the proceedings (or in DİAYDER’s dissolution decision) but rather to Article 30(a) of the same law, in addition to references to the Turkish Civil
Code. Since the same prosecutor submitted requests for dissolution of DİAYDER and GÖÇİZDER, this could mean that the reference to Article 30/A was
made in error and the prosecutor meant Article 30(a) instead. There were no other indications in the closure case files that provisions added through Law
No. 7262 were used, meaning that the existing framework for involuntary dissolution of associations is sufficient for arbitrary closure cases even without
the additional powers introduced through Law No. 7262. The Observatory & İHD, Drowned in Procedure, supra, note 2.
69 Kaos GL, Human Rights of LGBTI+ People in Turkey: 2019 Report (May 2020). Available at: https://kaosgldernegi.org/images/library/2020human-rights-
of-lgbti-people-2019-report-1.pdf.
70 F
or more on aid collection, see “Box #2 – Discrimination in aid collection and ‘public benefit’ status” in The Observatory & İHD, Drowned in Procedure,
supra, note 2.
71 Interview no. 2 with DİAYDER representative, Istanbul, June 12, 2023.
“We had to change the association’s office because the owner evicted us after the operation.
When you stay in a particular location for a long time, that also becomes part of your work. So
[the office change] also affected us.”72
Even if the cases against TTM are ongoing, the sudden suspension of its activities on February 21, 2022, and
which lasted until April 6, 2022, had negative effects equal to those linked to the association’s closure:
“We didn’t expect the suspension. We worked until the morning thinking they will seal off the
association because of the memory of Gündem Çocuk.73 All employees were let go so they
wouldn’t lose their rights. […] We re-opened after the first hearing of the dissolution case in May.
After we returned, we were thinking ‘What do we do now? How do we work in the neighbourhood
again?’ There is no money, we need to hire everyone back again, we need to tell the donors.”74
The closure cases require time and effort, which means fewer resources for activities.75 Meanwhile, the
uncertainty caused by the pending dissolution cases affects future planning and financial sustainability as well:
“We are reluctant to apply for project [funding] because we don’t know if [donors] will fund [an
association facing a closure case]. We had projects rejected when we thought they would be
accepted. We rented a small space; we couldn’t look for somewhere bigger and better because
we don’t know what will happen. We are struggling financially.”76
“We couldn’t ensure [financial] sustainability, we couldn’t make any applications for project
[funding]. Some donors told us they wouldn’t work with an association facing a [closure] case.
It was a challenging process. At the same time, we were able to receive minor support from
some institutions which we wouldn’t normally work with because we are at risk.”77
Even though none of the associations described any major negative impacts of the closure cases on their
relationships with the communities they served, these cases had a chilling effect on some of the associations
themselves:
“I can’t write what I want to write anymore. We think five times before saying anything public.”78
The chilling effect over association executives and members is also visible. The effect was stronger on DİAYDER
due to the closure and the severe judicial harassment they faced:
“Our members are people of a certain age. Now they think something will happen to us if we
go to this masjid.”79
“We had executives who held back, while others were more persistent to work. If we look at it
relatively, there were more friends who stood by us by risking everything and continued working.”80
TTM employees and volunteers were particularly affected by the baseless investigation against the chair, and
some dropped their TTM membership. Conversely, because of the closure case, TTM – though just an association
working in one neighbourhood in Istanbul – became known across the country and internationally:
“We didn’t think they would dare [dissolve the association] because we are an association of
imams. We thought it would hurt them in the end. […] Now civil society organisations think, if
even the devout are penalized, we will be penalized for sure.”82
Meanwhile, the receipt of international and particularly EU funding was raised a lot in both the criminal
proceedings and the smear campaign against GÖÇİZDER:
“This whole thing with funding started with us. After we were detained, they started bringing EU
funding to the agenda a lot. This is a threat to all civil society. They are saying, ‘if you don’t abide
by our limits, we’ll cut your funding and open an investigation.’”83
Associations also see the closure cases and the judicial harassment as the government’s attempt to isolate social
movements and organisations:
“It’s very telling that we were chosen. They think we are the hardest group to stand up for
because of our establishment, our work, the fact that most of our members are Kurdish. They
want to criminalise and isolate us via the PKK and also threaten other organisations.”84
KCDP’s closure case explicitly cites their solidarity with Kurdish women politicians:
“They arrest everyone in the Kurdish movement to alienate them. Similarly, they are tarring the
association with the brush of ‘terrorism,’ saying it is ‘in breach of morality and law’ in order to
alienate people from the women’s movement, to frighten them, and to put distance between us
and the families who are hurting and vulnerable. They criminalize you so no one would stand
up for you and you become isolated.”85
TTM raised the concern that their stigmatisation could spread onto others:
“We are re-thinking our relationships with other organisations because we think that they will
target them too.”86
In fact, the stigmatisation of these associations appears to have already strained their relationships with other
organisations, particularly for GÖÇİZDER and TTM, which work in two areas – migration and children’s rights –
that often require interacting with official bodies. GÖÇİZDER stated:
“We waited a lot for support from organisations from our own field. Rights defender organisations
already stood up for us. It would have meant more for organisations working in migration to
show support, but they didn’t much.”87
“Even though TTM is an organisation working on children’s rights, it was the LGBTI+ movement and
human rights movement that stood up for us more in this case. It was sometimes nerve-wracking that
children’s rights organisations and networks didn’t come together separately and show solidarity.”88
The fact that these closure cases are targeting individual associations one-by-one – as opposed to through mass
closure of associations via emergency decrees – adds to the isolation and undermines solidarity among CSOs:
Of the four associations, KCDP appears to be least impacted by the closure case, at least in their relationship
“When we called the families [to testify in the closure case], no one said they wouldn’t come.
Even those who were sick said they wanted to testify. […] What’s different about us is that the
families are talking about us [in court]. So there is a different voice in the file. The [witness] says
‘my daughter died,’ and the judge says ‘my condolences.’”90
KCDP is also the largest of the four associations, operating nation-wide, with a large number of members
who have a strong presence in street protests, and their response to this closure case includes both legal and
international advocacy and protests, which may explain their greater resilience in the face of closure cases and
other forms of harassment. These factors, together with the broader public legitimacy of the women’s movement,
may have at least partly shielded KCDP from the effects experienced by the other three associations.
E. In Limbo: What’s Next for Associations Facing the Risk of Involuntary
Dissolution?
The closure cases (and the appellate review of DİAYDER’s dissolution) were ongoing during the May 2023
parliamentary and presidential elections, which had brought a sliver of hope for the associations that a new
government could reverse course and alleviate the pressure on civil society. All respondents noted having considered
the possibility that an opposition win could end their harassment via closure cases. Since the AKP-led alliance won
a parliamentary majority and Erdoğan secured a third presidential mandate, associations are stuck in legal limbo
and concerned that the pressure will increase. Their concerns are justified: the day after the second round of the
presidential elections, the instigator of the smear campaign against TTM tweeted that all LGBTQIA+ organisations
and “associations funded from abroad” should be shut down. All four associations stated that even though legally
they are confident that the cases are baseless, they believe the judges may decide politically. GÖÇİZDER stated:
“If [the ruling alliance] also wins the local elections [of March 2024], things will get worse. We
think we might be shut down after the local elections.”91
In this environment, closure cases against associations may also become more widespread. In fact, shortly
after the elections, an AKP official stated that the recent constitutional amendment proposal, which re-defines
marriage as the union between a man and a woman, and will reportedly be presented to the General Assembly
of the Parliament in its next session, starting October 2023, will pave the way for the mass closure of LGBTQIA+
organisations.92
DİAYDER has already appealed against the dissolution decision, and GÖÇİZDER, KCDP, and TTM emphasized
that they intend to rigorously defend themselves in the judicial system regardless of the possibility of a politically
influenced outcome. This is because they see this as a struggle on behalf of all civil society:
“We planned for various scenarios in advance. If TTM gets shut down, we won’t quit the legal
process. We will go all the way to the Constitutional Court. Regardless of the outcome, it’s
important that these are recorded in writing, that all available processes are followed through.
We are thinking a lot about how this can benefit civic space and we think there must be both
domestic and international advocacy on closure cases.”93
“Not allowing them to shut down the association would be a win for us, in the name of democracy,
human rights and the Kurdish struggle.”94
“It is our right not to be shut down. In case of a [favourable outcome], it would be a positive
example for all associations facing closure.”95
The associations also emphasized that they were adamant about continuing their work even in the event that
they will be eventually dissolved:
Kurdish institutions and political parties are particularly resistant to closures as they have systematically faced this
form of harassment over the years, and established new institutions that succeeded those that were dissolved:
“Because of the tradition we come from, closure will not affect [our future work] that much. We
are determined to work in the field of migration. Maybe it won’t be me, it will be someone else,
but we will continue working.”97
During this period of uncertainty and ongoing harassment, all associations pointed to solidarity as the most
effective form of resistance against this attempt to target and isolate the organisations. Solidarity is also a source
of strength for the associations which face numerous challenges, and encourages individuals who work at the
associations to continue their work:
“Everyone should stand up for the associations [facing closure cases] and grow the solidarity.
This is effective. It affects the judge, and it affects the Ministry of Interior which we know
influences that judge. It affects State policy.”98
“Solidarity was both very impressive and empowering. We didn’t know if everyone would stand
with TTM. It was very beautiful to see us all [local organisations] together.”99
“Solidarity affects both the organisation and the individuals in that organisation. You work
wholeheartedly, you don’t even think about quitting. It’s also important in terms of morale to
realise you’re not alone.”100
Establishing these solidarity networks is also important in the event that other associations face similar cases.
For organisations which are smaller and less well connected, having these networks in place will ensure their
swift access to support.
The associations also raised international solidarity as a means to highlight the political nature of the closure
cases, and to support the associations facing them. DİAYDER stated:
“It is important to us that international organisations show moral support. This [closure case] is
a case of conscience.”101
In the case of KCDP and TTM, international support is also crucial to fight the anti-gender movements that push
for the same narratives across borders:
“There must be more solidarity and visibility. We are facing this here, but there are anti-gender
movements in Poland, Hungary, Romania. This is part of a global misogynist pandemic.
International solidarity is important also to highlight this globalisation.”102
One way of demonstrating that solidarity is to monitor the closure cases and observe the trials, which may have
a deterrent effect in regard to any procedural violations that may take place:
“International support and solidarity are very effective. There were organisations from Europe
who observed the court process. Even their presence in the courtroom has an effect over the
court; we see this in other trials too. The courts already act very arbitrarily. When international
observers are [in the courtroom] and they submit a letter to the court [that they are observing
the trial], [judges’] demeanour towards defendants and [defence] lawyers change. They act
kinder and follow procedural rules more.”103
B. Recommendations
a. To the Government of Turkey
• To ensure an enabling legal, institutional, and administrative environment for civil society actors, which
acknowledges the fundamental role they play in protecting democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental
rights, and that ensures their protection;
• To refrain in all circumstances from publicly stigmatising, delegitimising, or discrediting civil society
actors; and to address any attempt, whether by public officials or non-State actors, to stigmatise civil
society actors and HRDs, including those who are marginalised due to their gender, ethnicity, religion,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or other factors;
• To put an end to all acts of harassment against civil society actors for the exercise of their right to the
freedoms of assembly and association, of expression, and to defend human rights;
• To put an end to the use of closure cases and suspension of activities to harass associations; and to
ensure that CSOs have access to effective remedies under Turkish law to challenge their abuse and
receive reparations for the financial loss, reputational damage, and other consequences suffered due to
the harassment they were victims of;
• To repeal all provisions in domestic legislation, particularly in the anti-terrorism and civil society
legislation, that allow for the criminalisation or punishment of dissent and participation in civil society
activities, and that lead to the judicial or administrative harassment of civil society actors and HRDs.
To the UN Special Procedures, including the UN Special Rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association, on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
on the situation of human rights defenders, and on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism:
• To grant particular attention to the ongoing closure cases against associations and their impact on
the exercise, in particular, of the rights to freedom of association and expression, as well as on other
human rights, by monitoring the cases and reacting to the ongoing harassment against associations,
their executives and members, through official statements and/or communications to the Government
of Turkey regarding their cases and calling for the harassment to stop, the ongoing proceedings to be
discontinued, and the charges brought against individual members and executives to be dropped;
• To extend a request to the Government of Turkey for a country visit by the UN Special procedures,
independently by each mandate or jointly, to directly investigate and gather information on the cases and
on the increasing restrictions on civil society, meet the defendant associations and other stakeholders,
observe the proceedings against the associations themselves, their executives and members, and
formulate recommendations;
• To make concrete recommendations to the Government of Turkey regarding necessary legislative and
policy changes that should be implemented in order to create a safe and enabling environment for civil
society, and to comply with Turkey’s international human rights obligations.
• To monitor the abuse of closure cases to unduly restrict the rights to freedom of association, assembly
and expression, as well as the right to defend human rights in Turkey, and the impact of these cases and
dissolution decisions on civil society actors and HRDs.
• To maintain international scrutiny of the increased repression of civil society in Turkey, including by
publicly and privately urging the Government of Turkey to cease the use of closure cases to harass CSOs;
• To undertake a visit to Turkey at the earliest opportunity so as to engage directly with the Government
of Turkey as well as HRDs and CSO representatives, particularly those at risk, and to publicly share the
findings of the visit and ensure continued follow up by his Office on key human rights issues, including as
a priority the increasing restrictions on the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression;
• To raise the situation of CSOs in Turkey in the opening speech of the High Commissioner at the next
Human Rights Council session;
• To take necessary steps to put the situation of CSOs in Turkey, particularly the increased repression
against civil society that the closure cases are emblematic of, in light of the May 2023 elections, on the
agenda of future sessions of the Human Rights Council.
• To keep the shrinking civic space and the situation of CSOs and HRDs in Turkey on its agenda and
continue monitoring the developments, particularly following the May 2023 presidential and
parliamentary elections, with a view to assessing the impact of judicial, administrative, and other forms
of harassment, including closure cases against associations, on the work of civil society and HRDs in
Turkey. This includes adopting resolutions focusing on civic space, particularly on harassment against
civil society actors and HRDs through closure cases, and including specific recommendations in this
regard, as well as following up on previous ones on civic space and HRDs in Council of Europe Member
States, including Turkey.104
104 Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Situation of human rights defenders in Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur
• To keep the shrinking civic space and the situation of CSOs and HRDs in Turkey on its agenda and
continue monitoring the developments, with a view to assessing the impact of judicial, administrative,
and other forms of harassment, including closure cases, on the work of civil society and HRDs in Turkey,
and to issue resolutions on and recommendations to halt the harassment against civil society actors
and HRDs, including closure cases, in collaboration with other Council of Europe bodies and other
international organisations;
• To thoroughly monitor the execution of relevant ECtHR judgements relating to cases of HRDs and CSOs,
including those regarding violations of the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression,
and other fundamental rights, and to launch an infringement procedure under Article 46 ECHR if it finds
that Turkey has failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention to execute ECtHR judgements
by refusing to implement the judgement or solve the problem that led to the breach of Convention rights.
• To keep regularly monitoring the situation with regard to civil society and HRDs, including the rights
to freedom of assembly, association, and expression, the ongoing harassment of CSOs, including
through closure cases and in the context of countering terrorism, and to issue official statements and/or
communications to the Government of Turkey regarding such cases;
• To follow up on her last country visit to Turkey in 2019 to document the situation in which civil society
and HRDs operate and the challenges that they face in relation to their exercise of the rights to freedom of
association, assembly, and expression, including closure cases, and on the recommendations included
in the report issued following the visit. This includes extending a request to Turkey for a new country visit
to update the findings of the 2019 report, including with regard to the situation of CSOs and HRDS and
the ongoing harassment against them in the aftermath of the May 2023 presidential and parliamentary
elections in Turkey;
• To keep intervening in cases before the ECtHR regarding the continued harassment against HRDs and
civil society in Turkey, including infringement proceedings initiated by the Committee of Ministers for
failure by the State to implement previous judgements;
• To continue to firmly condemn the stigmatisation and harassment of women and LGBTQIA+ people
and organisations in Turkey, including in the context of closure cases, by following up on previous
recommendations issued to the Government of Turkey in this regard and by issuing new ones.
To the European Parliament, particularly to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on Human
Rights, and the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee:
• To keep the shrinking civic space and the situation of HRDs in Turkey on its agenda and to continue
monitoring the developments, with a view to assessing the impact of existing laws, policies, and
practices, including closure cases, on the work of civil society and HRDs, particularly following the May
2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, and to raise the issue in the context of their relations
with the authorities in Turkey and with other EU institutions;
• To adopt a resolution and issue public statements focusing specifically on the issue of continued
harassment against CSOs and HRDs, including closure cases against CSOs, citing individual cases and
including specific recommendations to the authorities in Turkey and to the other EU institutions in this
regard;
• To address the issue of civic space and the harassment against CSOs, particularly closure cases, in the
context of its annual report on the situation of human rights in Turkey;
• To hold a public debate in the European Parliament on the situation of CSOs and HRDs in Turkey,
focusing in particular on various forms of harassment, including closure cases as a way to crack down
on civil society and restrict its work, with the active participation of representatives of CSOs from Turkey
facing harassment and closure cases.
• To regularly monitor respect for the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression,
as well as the situation of civil society and HRDs in Turkey, with a view to assessing the impact that
judicial, administrative, and other forms of harassment against CSOs, including closure cases against
associations, have on civil society and on the individuals and communities that benefit from its work,
as part of their monitoring of the progress made by Turkey towards meeting the criteria required of
candidate countries to accede to the EU, notably in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights,
and to address these issues in the upcoming country report due later in 2023, together with clear,
specific, and concrete recommendations to the Government of Turkey in this regard;
• To raise concerns regarding the shrinking civic space in Turkey, including the restrictions on freedom of
association, assembly, and expression, and the harassment of CSOs and HRDs, with a specific focus on
closure cases, both publicly through official communications and in their diplomatic relations with the
Government of Turkey, and both bilaterally and in multilateral fora, including in the context of High Level
Political Dialogues, and based on information provided by civil society actors;
• To continue to support civil society in Turkey and stand alongside targeted HRDs and CSOs, including
by ensuring that resources are available to CSOs and HRDs active on democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights, including those working on sensitive issues and facing harassment, including the threat
of dissolution; to tailor their support to CSOs and HRDs in Turkey based on an assessment of their
specific needs, including by providing support through flexible funding and institutional funding that
can be used to pay administrative fines, legal fees, and other costs related to closure cases, to support
civil society’s resilience in the face of increased harassment, and to provide unrestricted resources to
support other CSO work;
• To urgently implement all appropriate measures at all levels to develop and promote an enabling
framework for HRDs and CSO representatives to access visas for the EU to facilitate their work and
communication with EU institutions and other international actors;
• To address the stigmatisation of CSOs that seek, receive, and use international funding in their
cooperation with the authorities in Turkey; to ensure that funding received by CSOs does not further
expose them to harassment by the authorities; and to offer specific support and protection to HRDs
and CSOs who are harassed due to funding they receive from the EU, including through rapid response
mechanisms, emergency funding, and temporary relocation;
• To publicly reaffirm the importance of supporting civil society and HRDs, including in the context of
cooperation with the Government of Turkey in other areas, including security and counter-terrorism,
migration and trade, and to use its leverage to exact high standards of respect for human rights and civil
society when cooperating with Turkey; to publicly express concern regarding in particular the ongoing
global trend of abuse by States of counter-terrorism legislation and policies to target and harass civil
society and HRDs, and to urge the Government of Turkey to refrain from abusing counter-terrorism
laws to crack down on CSOs; to conduct human rights impact assessments of commercial and trade
agreements to assess their impact on human rights and the environment, including on civil society work,
prior to, during, and after their implementation; to refrain from using human rights as a bargaining chips
in exchange for cooperation in other areas, particularly on migration, and to withdraw the EU-Turkey
agreement, which the Government of Turkey has leveraged to push forward its anti-democratic and
anti-human rights agenda and to intensify the repression against civil society, political opponents, and
all dissenting voices in Turkey.
• To ensure full implementation of the EU local strategy to support and defend HRDs in Turkey, including
through close monitoring of and prompt reaction to the attacks against CSOs and HRDs, including
closure cases against associations, regular attendance at their trials, and regular communication on
their cases with the authorities, at all levels.
To EU Member States:
• To support CSOs and HRDs as per the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders;
• To publicly condemn the shrinking civic space and continued attacks against CSOs and HRDs in Turkey,
both collectively as members of regional and international organisations such as the United Nations, the
• To enhance scrutiny by international and regional organisations they are members of regarding the
issue of shrinking civic space and the situation of HRDs in Turkey, in particular on the impact that
judicial, administrative, and other forms of harassment, including closure cases, have on human rights,
particularly on the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression of civil society and HRDs,
by calling for the matter to be addressed as a matter of priority in the appropriate venues, including at
Council level, in the context of discussions on EU-Turkey relations.
• To keep the shrinking civic space and the situation of HRDs in Turkey on its agenda and to continue
monitoring the situation, with a view to assessing the impact of the restrictions on freedom of
association, assembly, and expression, and of judicial, administrative, and other forms of harassment,
including closure cases, on the work of civil society and HRDs in Turkey, and to issue statements and/
or resolutions focusing specifically on this issue, especially on closure cases against associations, and
including specific recommendations to the Government of Turkey in this regard.
To the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (“ODIHR”):
• To monitor the implementation of the OSCE ODIHR Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association105 by
Turkey, and to adopt a report on their respect by this State Party with specific recommendations to the
Government of Turkey in this regard to address any instances of non-compliance. This should include a
focus on involuntary dissolutions of associations and their impact on the exercise of the right to freedom
of association in Turkey;
• To request that the Expert Panel on Freedom of Assembly and Association monitor compliance by Turkey,
both in law and in practice, with the guidelines, and to issue recommendations to the Government of
Turkey in that regard;
• To publicly and promptly react to attacks against HRDs and CSOs and violations of their rights in Turkey,
including in the context of closure cases.
c. To International Donors
• To support civil society actors and HRDs in Turkey, including those who are targeted through closure
cases, and with a particular attention to those more marginalised because they are more isolated, less
connected to the international community, and receive less support, including by establishing more
efficient channels of communication and consultation with civil society actors in Turkey to directly and
regularly assess their needs and tailor their support to them;
• To engage in dialogue with the authorities in Turkey with a view to contributing to ending the stigmatisation
and other forms of harassment of CSOs for receiving foreign funding and other resources or support
from external partners;
• To explore alternative methods, with the participation of HRDs and CSOs working in Turkey, to fund
civil society in Turkey, that would circumvent the obstacles that derive from a restrictive environment,
including the risk of closure cases, and the stigmatisation of CSOs and HRDs receiving international
funding.
The sole objective of IHD is to carry out activities in defense of human rights and freedoms.
In 1992, the statute was changed to cover humanitarian aspects as laid out in the Geneva
1986 Conventions. Since then, IHD has also criticized human rights violations of armed groups.
IHD, together with its headquarters, 27 branches and 7 representations, is Turkey’s biggest
non-governmental human rights organisation and has been a member of FIDH since 1996,
EuroMed Rights since 1997, OMCT’s SOS-Torture Network since 2019 and the World
Coalition Against Death Penalty since 2023. IHD is also a founding member of Human Rights
Joint Platform (IHOP) which was established in 2005.
In addition to its treatment and rehabilitation efforts, HRFT also operates effective
documentation, investigation, and prevention of torture. HRFT played a pioneering role in the
preparation of the “UN Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, commonly known as the
“Istanbul Protocol”. HRFT regularly organizes the Istanbul Protocol training for health and
medical professionals within Turkey and abroad. In 2008, HRFT published the “Torture Atlas”,
along with the Association of Forensic Medicine Specialists and Turkish Medical Association.
The Torture Atlas is the only document of its kind focusing on the medical documentation
of torture. Since its establishment, HRFT has conducted lobbying and advocacy efforts to
contribute to the establishment of effective mechanisms for monitoring and prevention of
torture. Since 2000, HRFT has been organizing symposiums and panels on collective trauma,
within the scope of its “truth, justice, and reparation” approach.
HRFT conducts the Project of “A Bottom-up Approach for Protecting and Supporting Civil
Human Rights Actors in Post-Pandemic Turkey”, in cooperation with the Human Rights
Association (İHD), International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) and World Organization
against Torture (OMCT) and supported by the European Union. Within the scope of this
Project, HRFT established Regional Solidarity and Coordination Groups, to directly identify
repression and challenges faced by human rights defenders in Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır,
İstanbul, İzmir, Van and in nearby cities with an eye to enhance solidarity with defenders.
Within the framework of this Project, HRFT carries out multiple activities with the goal of
enhancing the capacity of the human rights movement to create transformative impact in
an extremely challenging context and contributing to the actualization of the right to defend
human rights. This Project started in March 2021, and will end in August 2024.
Experts sent to the field give their time to FIDH on a voluntary basis.
FIDH has conducted more than 1,500 missions in over 100 countries in the past 25 years. These activities
reinforce FIDH’s alert and advocacy campaigns.
TÉL. : + 33 1 43 55 25 18 / www.fidh.org
Created in 1985, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) works for, with and through an international
coalition of over 200 non-governmental organisations - the SOS -Torture Network - fighting torture,
summary executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and all other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment in the world and fighting for the protection of human rights defenders.
>> A personalised assistance as concrete as possible, including material support, with the
aim of ensuring the security of the defenders victims of serious violations;
>> The preparation, publication and world-wide dissemination of reports on violations
of the rights and freedoms of individuals or organisations working for
human rights around the world;
>> Sustained action with the United Nations and more particularly the Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, and when necessary with
geographic and thematic Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups;
>> Sustained lobbying with various regional and international intergovernmental
institutions, especially the Organisation of American States (OAS), the African
Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the International
Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), the Commonwealth, the League of
Arab States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
International Labour Organisation (ILO).
The Observatory’s activities are based on consultation and co-operation with national,
regional, and international non-governmental organisations.
With efficiency as its primary objective, the Observatory has adopted flexible criteria
to examine the admissibility of cases that are communicated to it, based on the
“operational definition” of human rights defenders adopted by FIDH and OMCT: “Each
person victim or at risk of being the victim of reprisals, harassment or violations, due to
his or her commitment, exercised individually or in association with others, in conformity
with international instruments of protection of human rights, to the promotion and
realisation of the rights recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
guaranteed by the different international instruments”.
To ensure its activities of alert and mobilisation, the Observatory has established a
system of communication devoted to defenders in danger.
FIDH TEL: + 33 1 43 55 25 18